LANSANG VS.

GARCIA

1. POLITICAL LAW; POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT; SUSPENSION OF PRIVILEGE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;
GROUNDS THEREFOR; PROCLAMATION 889-A SUPERSEDED FLAWS IN PROCLAMATION 889. — Regardless of
whether or not the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in case of "imminent danger" of invasion,
insurrection or rebellion — which is one of the grounds stated in said paragraph (2), Section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution,
but not mentioned in paragraph (14), Section 1 of its Bill of Rights — petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did
not declare the existence of actual "invasion; insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof," and that, consequently,
said Proclamation was invalid. This contention was predicated upon the fact that, although the first "whereas" in
Proclamation No. 889 stated that "lawless elements" had "entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded
their forces together for the avowed purpose of actually staging, undertaking and waging an armed insurrection and
rebellion, "the actuality so alleged refers to the existence, not of an uprising that constitutes the essence of a rebellion or
insurrection, but of the conspiracy and the intent to rise in arms. Whatever may be the merit of this claim, the same has
been rendered moot and academic by Proclamation No. 889-A, issued nine (9) days after the promulgation of the original
proclamation, or on August 30, 1971. Indeed, said Proclamation No. 889-A amended, inter alia, the first "whereas" of the
original proclamation by postulating that said lawless elements "have entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and
banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of staging, undertaking, waging and are actually engaged in an armed
insurrection and rebellion in order to forcibly seize political power in this country, overthrow the duly constituted government,
and supplant our existing political, social, economic and legal order with an entirely new one . . ." Moreover, the third,
"whereas" in the original proclamation was, likewise, amended by alleging therein that said lawless elements, "by their acts
of rebellion and insurrection," have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the security of
the State. In other words, apart from adverting to the existence of an actual conspiracy and of the intent to rise in arms to
overthrow the government, Proclamation No. 889-A asserts that the lawless elements "are actually engaged in an armed
insurrection and rebellion" to accomplish their purpose. In short, We hold that Proclamation No. 889-A has superseded the
original proclamation and that the flaws attributed thereto are purely formal in nature.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONS FOR VALID EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY. — Pursuant to provisions of the Constitution,
two (2) conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ, to wit (a) there must
be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or-pursuant to paragraph (2), Section 10, of Art. VII of the Constitution — "imminent
danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASES OF BARCELON v. BAKER AND MONTENEGRO v. CASTAÑEDA, DISCUSSED. — The
weight of Barcelon v. Baker, as a precedent, is diluted by two (2) factors, namely: (a) it relied heavily upon Martin v. Mott
involving the U.S. President's power to call out the militia, which — he being the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces
— may be exercised to suppress or prevent any lawless violence, even without invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or
imminent danger thereof, and is, accordingly, much broader than his authority to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, jeopardizing as the latter does individual liberty; and (b) the privilege had been suspended by the American
Governor-General, whose act, as representative of the Sovereign, affecting the freedom of its subjects, can hardly be
equated with that of the President of the Philippines dealing with the freedom of the Filipino people, in whom sovereignty
resides, and from whom all government authority emanates. The pertinent ruling in the Montenegro case was based mainly
upon the Barcelon case, and, hence, cannot have more weight than the same. Moreover, in the Barcelon case, the Court
held that it could go into the question: "Did the Governor-General" — acting under the authority vested in him by the
Congress of the United States, to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under certain conditions "act in
conformance with such authority?" In other words, it did determine whether or not the Chief Executive had acted in
accordance with law. Similarly, in the Montenegro case, the Court held that petitioner therein had "failed to overcome the
presumption of correctness which the judiciary accords to acts of the Executive . . ." In short, the Court considered the
question whether or not there really was a rebellion, as stated in the proclamation therein contested.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIAL REVIEW AUTHORITY OF COURT TO LOOK INTO EXISTENCE OF FACTUAL
BASES FOR SUSPENSION OF PRIVILEGE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. — In our resolution of October 5, 1971, We
stated that "a majority of the Court" had "tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the
existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A . . . and thus determine
the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III, Sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, Sec.
10, par. 2, of the Philippine Constitution . . ." Upon further deliberation, the members of the Court are now unanimous in the
conviction that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in order to determine the constitutional
sufficiency thereof.

5. POLITICAL LAW; POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT; SUSPENSION OF PRIVILEGE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;
GRANT OF SUCH POWER IS NEITHER ABSOLUTE NOR UNQUALIFIED. — Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the
privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and
under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional The precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as
well as an exception thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress its importance, by
providing that "(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended . . ." It is only by way of exception that it
permits the suspension of the privilege "in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" — or, under Art. VII of the
Constitution, "imminent danger thereof" — "when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be
suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist "

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; COURTS MAY LOOK INTO COMPLIANCE WITH CONDITIONS THEREFOR. — Far from being full and
plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the
prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but, also, as regards the time when and the place where it
may be exercised. These factors and the aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and define the extent, the
confines and the limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by
the Fundamental Law upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper
bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless.
Surely, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended to engage in such a wasteful exercise in futility.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; REBELLION OR INSURRECTION, WHEN FAIRLY ESTABLISHED, UPHELD BY COURTS. — Manifestly,
however, the liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law is one enjoyed and exercised, not in derogation thereof,
but consistently therewith, and, hence, within the framework of the social order established by the Constitution and the
context of the Rule of Law. Accordingly, when individual freedom is used to destroy that social order, by means of force and
violence, in defiance of the Rule of Law — such as by rising publicly and taking arms against the government to overthrow
the same, thereby committing the crime of rebellion — there emerges a circumstance that may warrant a limited withdrawal
of the aforementioned guarantee or protection, by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety
requires it. Although we must be forewarned against mistaking mere dissent — no matter how emphatic or intemperate it
may be — for dissidence amounting to rebellion or insurrection, the Court cannot hesitate, much less refuse — when the
existence of such rebellion or insurrection has been fairly established or cannot reasonably be denied — to uphold the
finding of the Executive thereon, without, in effect, encroaching upon a power vested in him by the Supreme Law of the land
and depriving him, to this extent, of such power, and, therefore, without violating the Constitution and jeopardizing the very
Rule of Law the Court is called upon to epitomize.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXISTENCE OF MEN ENGAGED IN REBELLION ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — At any rate,
two (2) facts are undeniable: (a) all Communists, whether they belong to the traditional group or to the Maoist faction, believe
that force and violence are indispensable to the attainment of their main and ultimate objective, and act in accordance with
such belief, although they may disagree on the means to be used at a given time and in a particular place; and (b) there is
a New People's Army, other, of course, than the armed forces of the Republic and antagonistic thereto. Such New People's
Army is per se proof of the existence of a rebellion, especially considering that its establishment was announced publicly
by the reorganized CPP. Such announcement is in the nature of a public challenge to the duly constituted authorities and
may be likened to a declaration of war, sufficient to establish a war status or a condition of belligerency, even before the
actual commencement of hostilities. We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who
have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the
Government of the Philippines.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REBELLION NEED NOT BE WIDESPREAD BUT MAY BE LIMITED TO ANY PART OF THE
PHILIPPINES. — The thrust of petitioners' argument is that the New People's Army proper is too small, compared with the
size of the armed forces of the Government, that the Communist rebellion or insurrection cannot so endanger public safety
as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This argument does not negate, however, the
existence of a rebellion, which, from the constitutional and statutory viewpoint, need not be widespread or attain the
magnitude of a civil war. This is apparent from the very provision of the Revised Penal Code defining the crime of rebellion,
which may be limited in its scope to "any part" of the Philippines, and, also, from paragraph (14) of Section 1, Article III of
the Constitution, authorizing the suspension of the privilege of the writ "wherever" — in case of rebellion — "the necessity
for such suspension shall exist." The magnitude of the rebellion has a bearing on the second condition essential to the
validity of the suspension of the privilege — namely, that the suspension be required by public safety. Before delving,
however, into the factual bases of the presidential findings thereon, let us consider the precise nature of the Court's function
in passing upon the validity of Proclamation No. 889, as amended.

PUBLIC SAFETY – sufficient data, good faith, petitioners’ ground AFP is to big compared to NPA – wrong; that is not the
only task of AFP.
10. ID.; SEPARATION OF POWERS; PRINCIPLE GOES HAND IN HAND WITH SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES.
— Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under
specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of government, the Executive
is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more,
it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the
suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority
to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn,
constitutionally supreme.

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT MERELY CHECKS OR ASCERTAINS WHETHER THE EXECUTIVE HAS GONE BEYOND HIS
JURISDICTION. — In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check — not to supplant — the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the
power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. To be sure, the power of the Court to determine the validity of
the contested proclamation is far from being identical to, or even comparable with, its power over ordinary civil or criminal
cases elevated thereto by ordinary appeal from inferior courts, in which cases the appellate court has all of the powers of
the court of origin.

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW MUST HAVE EVIDENTIARY BASIS. — Under the principle of separation of powers
and the system of checks and balances, the judicial authority to review decisions of administrative bodies or agencies is
much more limited, as regards findings of fact made in said decisions. Under the English law, the reviewing court determines
only whether there is some evidentiary basis for the contested administrative finding; no quantitative examination of the
supporting evidence is undertaken. The administrative finding can be interfered with only if there is no evidence whatsoever
in support thereof, and said finding is, accordingly, arbitrary, capricious and obviously unauthorized. This view has been
adopted by some American courts. It has, likewise, been adhered to in a number of Philippine cases. Other cases, in both
jurisdictions, have applied the "substantial evidence" rule, which has been construed to mean "more than a mere scintilla"
or "relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," even if other minds equally
reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE NOT APPLIED TO TEST VALIDITY OF AN ACT OF
CONGRESS OR THE EXECUTIVE. — Manifestly, however, this approach refers to the review of administrative
determinations involving the exercise of quasi-judicial functions calling for or entailing the reception of evidence. It does not
and cannot be applied, in its aforesaid form, in testing the validity of an act of Congress or of the Executive, such as the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for, as a general rule, neither body takes evidence — in the sense
in which the term is used in judicial proceedings — before enacting a legislation or suspending the writ.

14. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPER STANDARD TO TEST VALIDITY OF ACTS OF CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE.
— Indeed, the co-equality of coordinate branches of the Government, under our constitutional system, seems to demand
that the test of the validity of acts of Congress and of those of the Executive be, mutatis mutandis, fundamentally the same.
Hence, counsel for petitioner Rogelio Arienda admits that the proper standard is not correctness, but arbitrariness.

15. ID.; POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT; PRESIDENT ACTED WITH DISCRETION IN SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE
OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. — Considering that the President was in possession of data — except those related to
events that happened after August 21, 1971 — when the Plaza Miranda bombing took place, the Court is not prepared to
hold that the Executive had acted arbitrarily or gravely abused his discretion when he then concluded that public safety and
national security required the suspension of the privilege of the writ, particularly if the NPA were to strike simultaneously
with violent demonstrations staged by the two hundred forty-five (245) KM chapters, all over the Philippines, with the
assistance and cooperation of the dozens of CPP front organizations, and the bombing of water mains and conduits, as
well as electric power plants and installations — a possibility which, no matter how remote, he was bound to forestall, and
a danger he was under obligation to anticipate and arrest. He had consulted his advisers and sought their views. He had
reason to feel that the situation was critical — as, indeed, it was — and demanded immediate action. This he took believing
in good faith that public safety required it. And, in the light of the circumstances adverted to above, he had substantial
grounds to entertain such belief.

16. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESIDENT ACTED IN GOOD FAITH IN ISSUING PROCLAMATION 889. — Neither should We overlook
the significance of another fact. The President could have declared a general suspension of the privilege. Instead,
Proclamation No. 889 limited the suspension to persons detained "for crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes
and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith."
Even this was further limited by Proclamation No. 889-A, which withdrew from the coverage of the suspension persons
detained for other crimes and offenses committed "on the occasion" of the insurrection or rebellion, or "incident thereto, or
in connection therewith." In fact, the petitioners in L-33964, L-33982 and L-34004 concede that the President had acted in
good faith.

17. ID.; ID.; SUSPENSION OF PRIVILEGE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; PRESIDENT HAS THREE COURSES OF
ACTION IN CASE OF INVASION, INSURRECTION OR REBELLION; SUSPENSION OF WRIT IS LEAST HARSH. — In
case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, the President has, under the Constitution, three (3)
courses of action open to him, namely: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces,
which measure, however, proved inadequate to attain the desired result. Of the two (2) other alternatives, the suspension
of the privilege is the least harsh. In view of the foregoing, it does not appear that the President has acted arbitrarily in
issuing Proclamation No. 889, as amended, nor that the same is unconstitutional.

18. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELEASE OF PETITIONERS TO BE ORDERED ONLY AFTER CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION. — The Members of the Court, with the exception of Mr. Justice Fernando, are of the opinion, and, so
hold, that, instead of this Court or its commissioner taking the evidence adverted to above, it is best to let said preliminary
examination and/or investigation be completed, so that petitioners' release could be ordered by the court of first instance,
should it find that there is no probable cause against them, or a warrant for their arrest could be issued, should a probable
cause be established against them. Such course of action is more favorable to the petitioners, inasmuch as a preliminary
examination or investigation requires a greater quantum of proof than that needed to establish that the Executive had not
acted arbitrarily in causing the petitioners to be apprehended and detained upon the ground that they had participated in
the commission of the crime of insurrection or rebellion. And, it is mainly for this reason that the Court has opted to allow
the Court of First Instance of Rizal to proceed with the determination of the existence of probable cause, although ordinarily
the Court would have merely determined the existence of substantial evidence of petitioners' connection with the crime of
rebellion. Besides, the latter alternative would require the reception of evidence by this Court and thus duplicate the
proceedings now taking place in the court of first instance. What is more, since the evidence involved in both proceedings
would be substantially the same and the presentation of such evidence cannot be made simultaneously, each proceeding
would tend to delay the other.

JACKSON VS. MACALINO

Raymond Michael Jackson, an American national, filed a petition for habeas corpus against the Commissioner of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID), John Doe and Jane Doe. The trial court, however, dismissed the said
petition on the ground that based on the return of the respondents, the petitioner was arrested and detained at the CID on
the basis of the summary deportation order issued by the Board of Commissioners (BOC) on December 11, 1997 and of
the hold departure order of the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 98-1155, and that the said petition
for habeas corpus was premature as there was a pending petition to lift the summary deportation order before the BOC filed
by petitioner. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari.

In dismissing the petition, the Court ruled that Section 13 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended; provides that if it
appears that the detained person is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be
considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint. In this case, based on the return of the writ by the respondents,
the petitioner was arrested and detained at the CID detention center at Bicutan, Paranaque City, under Mission Order No.
RBR-99-164 dated May 21, 1999 based on the Order of the BOC dated December 11, 1997 which had become final and
executory. Thus, the petitioner's arrest and detention are in accord with Section 45(d) in relation to Section 37 (a)(9) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.

Moreover, the petitioner, in his motion for reconsideration filed with the CID, offered to post a bail bond for his provisional
release to enable him to secure the necessary documents to establish the appropriate grounds for his permanent stay in
the Philippines. By offering to post a bail bond, the petitioner thereby admitted that he was under the custody of the CID
and voluntarily accepted the jurisdiction of the CID.

IN RE: PARONG V. ENRILE

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST; WHEN LAWFUL WITHOUT A JUDICIAL WARRANT; A CASE
OF; ARREST OF THE ACCUSED IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO; CASE AT BAR. — Where prior to the arrest of the nine (9)
of the fourteen (14) detainees, the latter were under surveillance as they were then identified as members of the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CCP) engaging in subversive activities and using the house of detainee Dra. Aurora Parong in
Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, as their headquarters and when caught in flagrante delicto, the nine (9) detainees mentioned
scampered towards different directions leaving on top of their conference table numerous subversive documents,
periodicals, pamphlets, books, correspondence, stationaries, and other papers, (code-named YORK), including one (1) .38
cal. revolver with eight (8) live bullets, nineteen (19) rounds of ammunition of M16 armalite, CPP/NPA funds, assorted
medicines packed and ready for distribution, there is no doubt that circumstances attendant in the arrest of the herein
detainees fall under a situation where arrest is lawful even without a judicial warrant as specifically provided for under
Section 6 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and allowed under existing jurisprudence.

2. ID; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARREST FOR CONTINUING OFFENSES. — The crimes of insurrection, or rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance on the occasion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of
continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive
conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the detainees without a judicial warrant was well within the
bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARREST OF PERSONS COMMITTING OVERT ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST GOVERNMENT
FORCES. — The absence of judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing over acts
of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The
arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its
government and duly constituted authorities.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ARREST OF PERSONS INVOLVED IN REBELLION; USUAL PROCEDURE IN PROSECUTION OF
OFFENSES; NOT REQUIRED. — The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armned elements,
or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an
armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense.
The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination
by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if
the offense is bailable.

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXECUTIVE POWER; ISSUANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMITMENT ORDER; MERELY

PREVENTIVE AND NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL INQUIRY. — The arrest and detention of persons ordered by the
President through the issuance of Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) is merely preventive. "When it comes to a decision
by the head of the State upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the
necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process." (Mover vs.
Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, citing Keely vs. Sanders, 99 U.S. 441, 446, 25 L. Ed. 327, 328) What should be underscored is that
if the greater violation against life itself such as killing, will not be the subject of judicial inquiry, as it cannot be raised as
transgressing against the due process clause that protects life, liberty and property, lesser violations against liberty such as
arrest and detention, may not be insisted upon as reviewable by the courts.

6. ID.; ID.; SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; LEGAL BASIS FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMITMENT ORDER TO VALIDATE ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT AND
CONTINUED DETENTION THEREUNDER. — The function of the PCO is to validate, on constitutional ground, the
detention of a person for any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045 which continues in force the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, if the arrest has been made initially without any warrant. Its legal effect is to render
the writ unavailing as a means of judicially inquiring into the legality of the detention in view of the suspension of the privilege
of the writ. The grant of the power to suspend the said privilege provides the basis for continuing with perfect legality the
detention as long as the invasion or rebellion has not been repelled or quelled, and the need therefor in the interest of public
safety continues.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; SIGNIFICANCE OF CONFERNMENT OF POWER UPON THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF;
NOT SUBJECT OF JUDICIAL INQUIRY AS TO LEGALITY UNDER THE BILL OF RIGHTS. — The significance of the
confernment of this power, constitutionality upon the President as Commander-in-Chief, is that the exercise thereof is not
subject of judicial inquiry, with a view to determining its legality in the light of the bill of rights guarantee to individual freedom.
This must be so because the suspension of the privilege is a military measure the necessity of which the President alone
may determine as an incident of his grave responsibility as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, of protecting not
only public safety but the very life of the State, the government and duly constituted authorities.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTINGENCIES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION THAT JUSTIFY NON-INTERFERENCE. — It should be
clear beyond doubt in the case of "invasion" along which "rebellion" or "insurrection" is mentioned by the Constitution, is a
contingency which does not present a legal question on whether there is a violation of the right to personal liberty when any
member of the invading force is captured and detained. The existence of warlike conditions as are created by invasion,
rebellion or insurrection, the direst of all emergencies that can possibly confront a nation, argues, beyond dispute, against
subjecting his actions in this regard to judicial inquiry or interference from whatever source.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION ON SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS; WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE AND SOUND JUDGMENT OF THE
PRESIDENT. — To be effective, the occasion for the application of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus on specific individuals should be left to the exclusive and sound judgment of the President, at least while the
exigencies of invasion, rebellion or insurrection persist, and the public safety requires it, a matter, likewise, which should be
left for the sole determination of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Nation's armed forces. The need for a unified
command in such contingencies is imperative-even axiomatic as a basic military concept in the art of warfare.

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; FUNCTION OF THE COURT AS INTERPRETED IN THE LANSANG CASE. — "The function of the Court
is merely to check--not to supplant--the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine wisdom of his act." (Lansang vs. Garcia, 42
SCRA 488).

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GRANT OF RIGHT TO BAIL; EFFECT. — If, the constitutional right to ball is granted, through the
procedure laid down under Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, what inevitably results is the supplanting of the decision of the
President to detain pursuant to Proclamation No. 2045, of persons who come under its coverage.

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; "PREVENTIVE DETENTION"; FACTORS THAT DETERMINE ITS LEGALITY. — The specific mention in
the Constitution of rebellion and insurrection along with invasion and imminent danger thereof, shows that the terms
"rebellion and insurrection" are used therein in the sense of a state or condition of the Nation, not in the concept of a statutory
offense. What, therefore, should determine the legality of imposing what is commonly referred to as "preventive detention"
resulting from the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, is the necessity of its adoption as a measure to suppress
or quell the rebellion, or beat off an invasion. The necessity of such measure as a means of defense for national survival
quite clearly transcends in importance and urgency the claim of those detained to the right to bail to obtain their freedom.
To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of the constitutional grant of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus on the occasions expressly mentioned in the charter.

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; COVERAGE UNDER PROCLAMATION NO. 2045; JUSTIFICATION. — Proclamation No. 2045 mentions
not only rebellion or insurrection as coming within the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, but also other
offenses, including subversion which is not mentioned in the Constitution, committed by reason or on the occasion of the
rebellion, or in connection therewith, or in the furtherance thereof. The constitutional guarantee of individual freedom is
intact in all its plenitude and sanctity, save only a few, in relation to the entire population, as the Constitution itself permits
in case of overwhelming and imperious necessity.

14. ID.; ID.; ID.; DELIBERATELY VESTED ON THE PRESIDENT. — Worthy of profound notice and keen appreciation is
the fact that the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been deliberately vested on the President
as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, together with the related power to call out the armed forces to suppress
lawless violence and impose martial law. (Section 9, Article VII, Constitution). The choice could not have been more wise
and sound, for no other official may, with equal capability and fitness, be entrusted with the grave responsibility that goes
with the grant of the authority.

15. ID.; ID.; ID.; CARRIES WITH IT THE SUSPENSION OF THE RIGHT TO BAIL. — The suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government's campaign to
suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance
of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, without the
least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeoparding the success of government efforts to bring to an end the
invasion, rebellion or insurrection. The recent case of Buscayno vs. Military Commission (109 SCRA 273), decided after
Proclamation No. 2045 was issued, which in terms clear and categorical, held that the constitutional right to bail is unavailing
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended with respect to certain crimes as enumerated or described in
above-mentioned Proclamation.

16. ID.; ID.; ID.; AVAILABILITY OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN INDIVIDUAL CASES AFTER SUSPENSION,
NOT INTENDED IN THE LANSANG CASE. — In Lansang vs. Garcia (42 SCRA 488), the Court went no further than to
pronounce the suspension of the writ of the privilege of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, valid and constitutional, on a
finding that there was no arbitrariness attendant to the suspension. It never intended to suggest that for every individual
case of arrest and detention, the writ of habeas corpus is available, even after the suspension of this privilege, to question
the legality of the arrest and detention on ground of arbitrariness.

17. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE NOT IMMEDIATELY REVIEWABLE BY THE SUPREME COURT ON
CLAIM OF ARBITRARINESS. — When a person is charged in court for an ordinary offense, the law does not authorize the
filing of a petition for habeas corpus based on the ground that there is absolutely no evidence to hold him for trial, which, in
effect constitutes an allegation of arbitrariness in the filing of the case against him. The law had afforded him adequate
safeguards against arbitrariness, such as the requirement of determining the existence of a probable cause by the judge
before the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The finding of such probable cause may not be immediately brought for review
by this Court in a habeas corpus proceeding, on the claim of arbitrariness. The matter is to be decided on the basis of
evidence, and this Court is not the proper forum for the review sought, not being a trial of facts. Moreover, arbitrariness,
while so easy to allege, is hard to prove, in the face of the formidable obstacle built up by the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty.

18. ID.; ID.; ID.; ISSUANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMITMENT ORDER; LETTER OF INSTRUCTION NO. 1211; MERE
GUIDELINES FOR THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF PERSONS COVERED BY PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION
NO. 2045. — LOI 1211, by its very nature, and clearly by its language, is a mere directive of the President as Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to his subordinates or implementing officers for the ultimate objective of
providing guidelines in the arrest and detention of the persons covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 2045.

19. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. — The purpose is "to insure protection to individual liberties without sacrifying the
requirements of public order and safety and the effectiveness of the campaign against those seeking the forcible overthrow
of the government and duly constituted authorities."

20. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT LIMIT OR CURTAIL THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT IN FAVOR OF THE
JUDICIARY. — LOI 1211 does not, in any mane, limit the authority of the President to cause the arrest and detention of
persons engaged in, or charged with the crimes or offenses mentioned in said Proclamation in that he (President) would
subject himself to the superior authority of the judge, who under normal judicial processes in the prosecution of the common
offenses, is the one authorized to issue a judicial warrant after a preliminary investigation is conducted with a finding of
probable cause. In the event that the judge believes no warrant shall issue, the President, under Presidential Proclamation
No. 2045 and Letter of Instruction No. 1211, is not bound by such finding, as explicitly provided in paragraph 2 of LOI 1211.
VOL. 206 p. 398.

21. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT FORM PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND. — To form part of the law of the land, the
decree, order or LOI must be issued by the President in the exercise of his extraordinary power of legislation as
contemplated in Section 6 of the 1976 amendments to the Constitution, whenever in his judgment. there exists a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasan Pambansa or the regular National Assembly
fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action. There can
be no pretense, much less a showing, that these conditions prompted the President to issue LOI 1211.

22. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTES A FINDING THAT THE CONDITIONS PRESCRIBED IN LETTER, OF INSTRUCTION
NO. 1211 HAVE BEEN MET. — The issuance of the PCO by the President necessarily constitutes a finding that the
conditions he has prescribed in LOI 1211 for the issuance of the PCO have been met, and intends that the detention would
be pursuant to the executive process incident to the government campaign against the rebels, subversives and dissidents
waging a rebellion or insurrection.

23. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULING IN LANSANG CASE COMPARED WITH RULING OF BARCELON VS, BAKER AND
MONTENEGRO VS. CASTAÑEDA. — in Barcelon vs. Baker (5 Phil. 87, a 1905 decision, and Montenegro vs. Castañeda
(91 Phil. 882, 1952), the President's decision to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is "final and conclusive
upon the courts, and all other persons." This well-settled ruling was diluted in the Lansang case which declared that the
"function of the Court is merely to check-not to supplant — the Executive, or ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond
the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction not to exercise the power vested in him to determine the wisdom of his act." Judicial
interference was thus held as permissible, and the test as laid down therein is not whether the President acted correctly but
whether he acted arbitrarily.

24. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NEED FOR REVERSION TO THE RULINGS OF BARCELON VS. BAKER AND MONTENEGRO vs.
CASTAÑEDA, SHOWN. — The ruling in the Lansang case would seem to be pure semanticism if the Supreme Court would
consider that with particular reference to the nature of the actions the President would take on the occasion of the grave
emergency he has to deal with, which, as clearly indicated in Section 9, Art, VII of the Constitution partakes of military
measures, the judicial can, with becoming modesty, ill afford to assume the authority to check or reverse or supplant the
presidential actions. On these occasions, the President takes absolute command, for the very life of the Nation and its
government, which, incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave peril, In his separate opinion in the Lansang case, then
Justice Fernando, now our owned Chief Justice, went along with the proposition that the decision of the Executive in the
exercise of his power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not alone, and in his own language, is "ordinarily
beyond the ken of the Courts." Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, affords further reason for the re-examination of
the Lansang doctrine and reversion to that of Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs, Castañeda.
25. ID.; ID.; ID.; "POLITICAL QUESTION"; CONCEPT. — The Founding Fathers must have felt that in the particular
situations at hand, the Executive and the Judiciary should maintain a mutually deferential attitude. This is the very essence
of the doctrine of "political question," as determining the justiciability of a case. The wisdom of this concept remains well-
recognized in advanced constitutional systems. To erase it from our own system as seems to be what was done in the
Lansang case, may neither be proper nor prudent. A good example could be given in the exercise of the presidential power
of pardon which is beyond judicial review specially under the new Constitution where the condition that it may be granted
only after final conviction has been done away with.

26. ID.; ID.; ID.; "MILITARY POWER" OF THE PRESIDENT IS INTENDED AS A LIMITATION TO THE RIGHT TO
LIBERTY. — The Constitution is the law "equally in war and in peace," as Chief Justice Fernando cited in his brilliant
separate opinion in the same Lansang case. Precisely, it is the Constitution that gives the President specific "military power"
in times of warlike conditions as exist on the occasion of invasion, insurrection or rebellion. Boot power and right are
constitutionally granted, with the difference that the guarantee of the right to liberty is for personal benefit, while the grant of
the presidential power is for public safety. Which of the two enjoys primacy over the other is all too obvious. For the power
is intended as a limitation of the right, in much the same way as individual freedom yields to the exercise of the police power
of the State in the interest of general welfare. The difference again is that the power comes into being during extreme
emergencies the exercise of which, for complete effectiveness for the purpose it was granted should not permit interference,
while individual freedom is obviously for full enjoyment in time of peace, but in time of war or grave peril to the nation, should
be limited or restricted. In a true sense then, our Constitution is for both peacetime and in time of war; it is not that in time
of war the Constitution is silenced.

27. ID.; ID.; IN TIME OF WAR OR SIMILAR EMERGENCIES; PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT JUSTIFIES
LIMITATION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS. — The Founding Fathers, with admirable foresight and vision, inserted provisions
therein that comes into play and application in time of war or similar emergencies. So it is that, as proclaimed by the
Constitution, the defense of the State is a prime duty of government. Compulsory military service may be imposed, certainly
a mandate that derogates on the right to personal liberty. It, therefore. becomes self-evident that the duty of the judiciary to
protect individual rights must yield to the power of the Executive to protect the State, for if the State perishes, the Constitution
with the Bill of Rights that guarantees the right to personal liberty perishes with it.

28. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION OF EXISTENCE OF EMERGENCIES AND EXERCISE OF THE
POWER TO SUSPEND THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; BEYOND JUDICIAL REVIEW. — In times of war or national
emergency, the legislature may surrender a part of its power of legislation to the President, (Section 15, Article VIII, 1973
Constitution). Would it not be as proper and wholly acceptable to lay down the principle that during such crises, the judiciary
should be less jealous of its power and more trusting of the Executive in the exercise of its emergency powers in recognition
of the same necessity? Verily, the existence of the emergencies should be left to President's sole and unfettered
determination. His exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the occasion thereof,
should also be beyond judicial review. Arbitrariness, as a ground for judicial inquiry of presidential acts and decisions,
sounds good in theory but impractical and unrealistic, considering how well-nigh impossible it is for the courts to contradict
the finding of the President on the existence of the emergency that gives occasion for the exercise of the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ. For the Court to insist on reviewing Presidential action on the ground of arbitrariness may only result
in a violent collision of two jealous powers with tragic consequences, by all means to be avoided, in favor of adhering to the
more desirable and long-tested doctrine of "political question" in reference to the power of judicial review. (Tañada, et al.
vs. Cuenco, et al., 103 Phil. 1051).

29. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS INCLUDES POWER TO DEFER
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES UNDER PROCLAMATION NO. 2045 AND TO WITHHOLD THE RIGHT TO BAIL. — In
times of war and similar emergency as expressly provided in the Constitution, the President may suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, which has the effect of allowing the Executive to defer the prosecution of any of the offenses
covered by Proclamation No. 2045, including, as a necessary consequence, the withholding for the duration of the
suspension of the privilege, of the right to bail.

30. ID.; ID.; ID.; ISSUANCE OF A PRESIDENTIAL COMMITMENT ORDER; AN EXCLUSIVE PREROGATIVE OF THE
PRESIDENT; NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF "POLITICAL QUESTION"; CASE AT
BAR. — Under LOI 1211, a Presidential Commitment Order, the issuance of which is the exclusive prerogative of the
President under the Constitution, may not be declared void by the courts, under the doctrine of "political question" as has
been applied in the Baker and Castañeda cases, on any ground, let alone its supposed violation of the provision of LOI
1211, thus diluting, if not abandoning, the doctrine of the Lansang case. The supreme mandate received by the President
from the people and his oath to do justice to every man should be sufficient guarantee, without need of judicial overseeing,
against commission by him of an act of arbitrariness in the discharge particularly of those duties imposed upon him for the
protection of public safety which in itself includes the protection of life, liberty and property. This Court is not possessed with
the attribute of infallibility that when it reviews the acts of the President in the exercise of his exclusive power, for possible
fault of arbitrariness, it would not itself go so far as to commit the self-same fault. Hence, in the case at bar, the issuance of
the Presidential Commitment Order against herein petitioners, their continued detention is rendered valid and legal, and
their right to be released even after the filing of charges against them in court, to depend on the President, who may order
the release of a detainee or his being placed under house arrest, as he has done in meritorious cases.