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Chaos: On Making a Convincing Case for Social Psychology

Abraham Tesser; Robert McMillen; Jon Collins

Online publication date: 16 December 2009

To cite this Article Tesser, Abraham , McMillen, Robert and Collins, Jon(1997) 'Chaos: On Making a Convincing Case for
Social Psychology', Psychological Inquiry, 8: 2, 137 — 143
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 COMMENTARIES
comes would be coded as losses than would be the case
for lower values of this payoff. What would be the net
effect of increasing this parameter? The answer to this
question was unclear until we developed a model that
allowed us to make quantitative predictions. Our intui-
tions were no longer reliable. In this case, as the simu-
lation data showed, cooperation decreased modestly as
the temptation increased, but the process by which this
occurred was completely different from that presumed
in the individualisticmodel. Understanding how coop-
eration levels change in this simulated environment is
a far more coinplex affair than simply understanding
the choice mechanisms of a single subject.
The emergence (or reemergence) of a dynamical
social psychology, as outlined by Vallacher and
Nowak, challenges social psychologists to revisit ques-
tions about the nature of social phenomena and the
relation between explanations in terms of groups and in
terms of individuals. Discovering the connections be-
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tween these levels of analysis may be one of the most
exciting and elusive problems to be addressed in the
future. Although there are new mathematical theories
that will provide useful tools in this pursuit, it would be
a pity to ignor~ethe wisdom of our predecessors of 50
years ago when they developed the original dynamical
social psychology.
Chaos: On Making a Convincing Case for Social Psychology
Abraham Tesser, Robert McMillen, and Jon Collins
Department of Psychology
University of Georgia
Vallacher and Nowak have done psychology in gen-
eral and social psychology in particular a great service
in writing the target article for this issue. Since the
1980s,the physical sciences, such as physics, chemistry
and meteorology, have benefited by analyzing in terms
of nonlinear dynamical systems phenomena that ap-
peared too complex for prediction. The understanding
of biological systems, particularly ecological systems,
has also benefited substantiallyfrom this kind of analy-
sis. Moreover, with the publication of Gleick's (1987)
Chaos, the general public became aware of this new
"science," and there has been speculation about its
application in almost every field. Much of that specu-
lation is based on only a vague understanding of the
technical work. There is a widespread intuitive under-
standing and attraction to concepts such as chaos, com-
plexity, dynamics, and emergent order. These are sexy
words, and they hold promise for an increment in our
Note
David M. Messick, Kellogg Graduate School of
Management, 356 Leverone Hall, Northwestern Uni-
versity, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL
60208-20 11.
References
Allison, G. T. (1971). Essence of decision. Boston: Little, Brown.
Allison, S. T., & Messick, D. M. (1985). The group attribution er-
ror. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 563-579.
Cartwright, D., & Zander, A. (Eds.). (1953). Group dynamics.
New York: Harper & Row.
Krech, D., & Crutchfield, R. S. (1948). Theory andproblems of so-
cial psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Lewin, K. (1935). A dynamic theory ofpersonality. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Messick, D. M., & Liebrand, W. B. G. (1995). Individual heuris-
tics and the dynamics of cooperation in large groups. Psycho-
logical Review, 102, 131-145.
Miller, N. E. (1944). Experimental studies of conflict. In J. McV.
Hunt (Ed.), Personality and the behavior disorders @p.
431-465). New York: Ronald Press.
Nowak, A., Lewenstein, M., & Szamrej, J. (1993, September). So-
cial transitions occur through bubbles. Scientzjtc American
[Polish version], 12, 16-25.
understanding of social psychological phenomena. But
they do so only to the extent that they have precise
meaning within some particular, developed formula-
tion. Vallacher and Nowak, in their book (Vallacher &
Nowak, 1994) and in the target article, have taken us a
long way toward a better understanding of these con-
cepts and toward the application of these concepts to
social psychological phenomena.
We too are taken with the potential of this approach.
However, we believe that its adoption has some pro-
found implications for the paradigmatic epistemology
of social psychology. Although some of the implica-
tions of nonlinear dynamics can be dealt with by patch-
ing, changing the emphases, and increasing the sophis-
tication of how we currently collect data, other
implications require that we abandon some bedrock
assumptions and embrace new ways of testing the
"truth" of our theories. In this response we review
 COMMENTARIES
several implications of the nonlinear dynamics ap-
proach and describe what we believe are the necessary
methodological and epistemological accommodations
necessary to pursue those implications.
Paradigmatic Social Psychological
Bedrock
Contemporary social psychology is very much a
prototypical science. It develops theories about causes,
mediating processes, and effects. Depending on the
investigators' preferences, the theoretical causes and
effects are more or less abstract, but testing the theory
always involves translating the variables into opera-
tional definitions that involve the manipulation or
measurement of a real system, that is, person(s). The
theory is strengthened if the operational variables relate
to one another as predicted, it is weakened if they do
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not.
Usually the effect or dependent variable is measured
at one point in time. (This is particularly the case where
the random assignment of subjects to conditions is
possible.) For any level or any single combination of
levels of an independent variable(s) there is usually a
single predicted value of the dependent variable. The
latter two points describe normative practice, not bed-
rock assumptions. What is bedrock is that real-world
observations must take place in testing a theory, logical
(theoretical) coherence does not substitute for an em-
pirical test. Finally, somewhere between normative
practice and bedrock assumption is the generally un-
mentioned assumption that the cause and the effect are
not the same variable. Research with nonlinear dynam-
ics puts stress on all these assumptions: the normative,
the unmentioned, and the bedrock.
On Evaluating Some Nonlinear
Implications
Vallacher and Nowak present a number of implica-
tions of nonlinear systems for social psychology. We
review some of these implications and focus on what it
would take to evaluate their scientific utility. For exam-
ple, what kind of "tests" are necessary for us to increase
our confidence that some phenomena show extreme
sensitivity to initial conditions, that a change process is
discontinuous, and so forth. We ordered the implica-
tions on which we focus. We start with implications that
can be tested via conventional means, move on to
implications that push the envelope on our normative
methods, and conclude with implications that appear to
require basic epistemological revisions.
Hysteresis
Hysteresis is a "signature phenomenon of nonlinear
relations." Hysteresis is present if for some values of X
(the cause), Y (the effect) can take on two values. Which
of these two values is predicted depends on the history
of the variables. Evaluating a behavioral system for the
presence of hysteresis presents no special challenge to
experimental social psychologists. Indeed, we have
studied such systems for years. The primacy effect in
impression formation is an obvious example. The im-
pression of another will be more positive if the very
same descriptors on which it is based are presented in
a positive-negative order than if they are presented in
a negative-positive order (Asch, 1946). The hysteresis
hypothesis invites us to examine more levels of the
independent variable than we typically do (e.g., Tesser
& Achee, 1994), but very simple designs that take
account of the history of the system will suffice.
Discontinuous Change
One of the simplest forms of nonlinearity is discon-
tinuous changes. Large changes in X across most of its
range results in a small or no change in Y. There is,
however, a small region in X to which Y is sensitive,
and a relatively small change in X in this region results
in a very large change in Y. This kind of phenomenon
also has a history of study in psychology under the name
of threshold phenomena, step functions, and binary
responses. For example, nerve cell firing is a threshold
phenomenon, item response models in test theory are
sometimes based on step functions, and the personal
constructs by which we negotiate the interpersonal
world are binary, according to Kelly (1963).
In spite of this history, most empirical work in social
psychology appears insensitive to the possibility of
discontinuity. Although there has been a recent upturn
in the use of diary studies with multiple measures over
time, most of our studies involve few levels of the
independent variable, between-subjects designs, and
aggregation of data for evaluation. If we are to show
sensitivity to the possibility of discontinuous functions,
each of these practices will have to be reevaluated.
Obviously, the greater the number of levels of the
independent variable, the more informative the research
can be with regard to shape. There is, however, a more
subtle point to be made that has to do with the range of
X and just what part of the range is articulated. Suppose
we measure a child's reading ability every week during
his or her 7th year. We might observe a curve showing
smooth, continuous improvements over the year. On the
other hand, suppose we measure reading ability once a
 COMMENTARIES
year from birth until age 50. We might find that the
function is discontinuous:little happening over the first
6 or 7 points, big increase over the points from 7 to 11,
and a leveling off after that. Rather than a smooth
function, the second study would suggest that reading
ability is closer to a discontinuousfunction. This exam-
ple also makes clear that the place in the range where
the scale is articulated will also determine the outcome.
Weekly measurement in Year 46 will show little rela-
tion between time and reading ability. Finally, these
examples also make clear that whether we regard the
relation to be smooth, discontinuous, or null depends
crucially on the scale of measurement, that is, its range
and articulation (van Geert, 1991).
If the true relation between X and Y is discontinuous
but there are individual differences in the threshold for
the "jump," aggregation will obscure a discontinuity
even if the scale of X is appropriate. Suppose we
observe Y at each of multiple levels of X. If the thresh-
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old is different for different subjects, each succeeding
level of X will have a larger proportion of subjects for
whom the threshold has been exceeded, and the means
(aggregate statistic) will appear to show a smooth in-
crease. This will occur regardless of whether the meas-
urement across X is made between subjects or within
subjects. However, if the measurement is made within
subjects,it is possible to look at the shape of the function
for each individual subject (Sidman, 1960) to decide
whether the function is continuous or discrete. Thus, if
there are individual differences in the impact or percep-
tion of X or in the location of the threshold, one must
take repeated measures within individuals in the appro-
priate range of the scale to determine if the function is
discontinuous.
However, th~ereis another side to this analytical coin.
Individual differences are not the only problem. If X is
only one of many uncorrelated contributors to Y, or if
Y is measured with substantial error, the discontinuity
will again be obscured. In this circumstance, however,
rather than disaggregation, one of the royal roads to
clearer understanding is aggregation. Aggregation over
subjects and conceptually equivalent occasions tends to
cancel out unc~orrelatedcauses and errors of measure-
ment, and what emerges is a much clearer picture of the
true relation (Tesser & Beach, 1995). A good example
of this strategy is the research on the so-called P300
response in psychophysiology (e.g., Donchin, Karis,
Bashore, Coles, & Gratton, 1986). Only the aggregated
data clearly reveal the shape of the curve relating brain
response over time to the input of "oddball" stimuli.
The nonlinear dynamics approach alerts us to the
very real possibility that some responses may be dis-
continuous. Testing for this possibility pushes the
norms of social psychological research methods but
demands nothing radical. It requires that we pay closer
attention to scales of measurement, their range, and
their articulation; it pushes us to take many measures
over time or any other variable of interest, and it alerts
us to the differential strategic consequences of "true"
individual differences and errors of measurement.
Fractal Dimensionality
One of the aspects of nonlinear dynamics that has
done as much as any other to fire the imagination is
fractal dimensionality, introduced by Mandelbrot
(1982). By now, all of us have seen beautiful pictures of
the Mandelbrot set. This is the lacy seashelllparamecium
figure whose detail can be blown up to reveal more lacy
seashells, whose details can be blown up to reveal even
more lacy seashells, and so on. No matter how deeply
we probe the detail of the set, it reveals self-similarity
on smaller and smaller scales of measurement. Nature is
full of fractal entities that reveal similar morphology
over several different scales of measurement. Any part
of a cloud formation reveals a formation similar to the
whole. The branch of a tree reveals a structure similar to
the tree itself, and so forth. A map of a coastline looks
roughly similar whether the scale is 100miles tothe inch,
50 miles to the inch, or 1 mile to the inch. Indeed,
picturing the map of a coastline is a good way to under-
stand the concept of fractional dimensionality and the
test for it. As pointed out by Vallacher and Nowak, the
curve depicting a coastline often has properties of both
a line (one dimension) and a surface (two dimensions).
A line has finite length, but the length of our coastline
increases as our scale of measurement decreases, and it
reveals more structure, such as coves, bays, and inlets.
Its dimensionality is fractional, that is, more than one
dimension, but less than two. The discovery that order
variables (or dependent variables) have fractal dimen-
sionality is important because it indicates that the vari-
able is part of a chaotic system.
There are ways of determining the dimensionality of
an order variable. Vallacher and Nowak (Vallacher,
Nowak, & Kaufman, 1994) successfully used an algo-
rithm developed by Grassberger and Procaccia (1983)
to estimate the dimensionality in social judgments over
time. This method estimatesdimensionality by compar-
ing changes in information (Attneave, 1959) as one
systematically controls the previous trial, the previous
two trials, and so forth. In order to estimate dimension-
ality, however, one needs many datapoints. Not on the
order of 5 or 6 per subject, but more on the order of 500
or 600 per subject. (In order to save space, we follow
Vallacher et al., 1994, and assume that the subject is the
unit of choice.)
 COMMENTARIES
Getting this number of datapoints has a number of
nontrivial implications for how social psychologists do
their science. First, one must examine a system whose
temporal dynamics are revealed in a reasonable amount
of time. Vallacher et al. (1994) showed that some social
judgments can be usefully studied in a single laboratory
session. On the other hand, the full richness of close
relation dynamics may take years to play themselves
out. Again, scale of measurement is crucial. If we are
to stay in the lab and work with relatively fast phenom-
ena, we will have to develop methods for capturing lots
of observations in a short time. The mouse paradigm
developed by Vallacher and Nowak seems to be quite
promising for studying conscious shifts in judgments
and preferences. Many physiological measures yield
continuous data and are related to positive affect, nega-
tive affect, arousal, inhibition, internal versus external
information processing, and motivational states. Social
psychologists interested in temporal dynamics may do
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well to put more effort into learning these systems.
Finally, diary studies and beeper studies may be de-
signed to sample more frequently, to continue sampling
for longer periods of time, or both. One might even
envision subjects equipped with unobtrusive devices
that frequently sample gross motor activity, heart rate,
or blood/saliva chemistry during subjects' normal day-
to-day activities. All of this, however, is a lot of work.
Therefore, those who are optimistic about the approach
will have to provide particularly compelling theoretical
arguments or empirical examples of the utility of the
approach in order to enlist others.
Systems Thinking and Internal
Dynamics
The nonlinear dynamics approach puts a strong em-
phasis on systems thinking. One might characterize the
traditional approach in social psychology to be sympa-
thetic to this point of view but to have been relatively
indifferent to it in practice. The usual practice has been
to think of phenomena in unidirectional terms, that is,
X causes Y, and to pay relatively little attention to the
notion that Y may also be a cause of X or that Y may
have some internal dynamics of its own.
It is worth noting that the difference may not be as
great as it first appears. Bidirectional causality has
occupied a central role in the development of the disci-
pline. Many social psychologists study the impact of
attitudes on behavior (e.g., Fazio, 1990). Cognitive
dissonance theory, one of the most influential theories
in the history of the discipline, made us aware of the
reverse causal arrow, namely, that behavior can impact
attitudes (e.g., Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). Tesser's
(e.g., 1988) work on self-evaluation maintenance is
clearly a systems approach: There are three important
variables, self-relevance,performance relative to other,
and closeness of other. Each variable is both an inter-
active cause and an effect of the other two variables.
Self-regulation theories (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981)
also clearly are systems formulations. And, as Val-
lacher and Nowak point out, one of us (e.g., Tesser,
1978) has even conducted a research program on the
internal dynamics of evaluation simply as a result of
time and thought within the context of the "usual"
paradigm. Nevertheless, we argue that a real difference
between sympathy and practice exists.
Why the gap between sympathy and practice? Psy-
chologists are sympathetic to systems-like notions of
behavior because such notions are intuitively appealing
in an informal way: Everything is related to everything
else, changes can have unforeseen consequences, small
causes can result in large changes, and so forth. Al-
though they are intuitively attractive, however, sys-
tems-like models are difficult to deal with formally. A
variable is a cause and, at the same time, an effect. To
understand the system, one has to keep in mind not only
bidirectional relations that might go in different direc-
tions, but combinations of relations, and so forth. But
we believe the most important reason for systems-like
research being underrepresented in our journals is that
we simply do not yet have the methods to adequately
analyze the data from a system. It is true that we have
become more sophisticated in analyzing data from time
series (e.g., Dorfman & Cacioppo, 1990). It is also true
that structural equation approaches (e.g., Joreskog &
Sorbom, 1985) can, given certain assumptions and un-
der certain conditions, be made to yield bidirectional
causal coefficients. It is also true that these approaches
encourage systems thinking. But, for the most part,
these systems tend to be used for additive combinations
of effects and linear relations among variables.
In sum, traditional social psychology is open to the
emphasis that Vallacher and Nowak put on systems-like
thinking. Indeed, their target article provides an impor-
tant step toward making systems-like thinking accessi-
ble. However, methods for evaluating empirical data in
comprehensive systems-like terms have not yet been
sufficiently developed.
Chaos and Sensitive Dependence on
Initial Conditions
We confess that our approach to the characteristics
of nonlinear dynamical systems is slightly disingenu-
ous. We have discussed each characteristic on its own
terms as if the finding of hysteresis or discontinuities,
 COMMENTARIES
for example, were an end in itself. They could very well
be ends in themselves. Indeed, phenomena with these
attributes have been productively studied in social psy-
chology. But this is not why Vallacher and Nowak
introduce them. Vallacher and Nowak introduce each
of the features we talked about because they are symp-
tomatic of systems that have properties that are down-
right exotic when it comes to normal social psychology.
The order variable of achaotic system as it unfolds over
time is simply not predictable. Although there may be
partial predictability, that is, ranges of values that the
system does not take on, it is not attracted to a single point
nor to regular periodic change in points. Indeed, its precise
location at any particular point in time is sensitively
dependent on initial conditions. This means that very, very
small differences, differences that are smaller than the
error that even precise empirical measures will yield,
cascade over time into very large differences.
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So, how does one put such a model, a model for
which specific predictions even in theory are not possi-
ble, to an emlpirical test? It is here that some of the
bedrock assumptions of normal science and the non-
linear dynamical approach appear to be at loggerheads.
Let us start at the descriptive level. It is certainly of
interest to know that there is variable, aperiodic behav-
ior associated with some system. But one of the corner-
stones of empirical science, even at the descriptive
level, is reliability, or replication.By definition,chaotic
systems yield different observations whenever they are
observed. Moreover, scientists want to move toward
prediction, control, and, ultimately, understanding.
Tests of understanding come from theories that tell the
scientist what to tweak and what the result of tweaking
the system will be. Again, even in principle, such tests
about specific values are not possible.
Is the Situation Hopeless?
The situation is not hopeless. Nonlinear dynamical
systems have advanced the physical and biological
sciences, and those disciplines are certainly no less
"scientific" than is social psychology. There are more
or less rigorous ways in which these models can be
scientifically productive. The first is not data driven at
all. Computer simulations (or simple demonstrations of
the complexity simple equations imply) can be quite
persuasive. In the usual case, the result of the simulation
is compared to our intuitive understanding of the phe-
nomenon. If it resonates with our intuition, the model
is given some credence. Although this kind of approach
is not used very often in mainstream social psychology,
it is a mainstay in the field of artificial intelligence. One
of the most persuasive demonstrations of the utility of
the nonlinear dynamics approach is a simulation re-
ported by Nowak, Szamrej, and Latant (1990) that
showed that with nonlinear attitude change rules and
aspects of Latant's earlier model of persuasion (e.g.,
Latant, 1981), random distributions of opinions in a
community become well organized.
This simulation technique can be made more rigor-
ous by formally subjecting it to a kind of Turing test
(Turing, 1950). To perform the test, one records the
computer output and behavior from the human system.
If a judge cannot tell the computer output from the
human output, the simulation is an adequate one. The
systematic comparison with actual behavior makes this
test more rigorous than the usual simulation. Note that
regardless of how similar the simulation is to either our
intuition or to the actual behavior, the result can be no
more than a plausibility test (Bem 1972). It simply tells
us that the mechanism underlying the simulation could
produce the behavior. It does not tell us that it is the
mechanism that produced the behavior.
A third possibility is what we call behavioral boot-
strapping. This method is well illustrated by the work
of Vallacher et al. (1994; see also our earlier description
of testing for fractal dimensionality).A behavioral sys-
tem is observed with many measures over time under
one or more starting conditions. Then each individual
protocol is described. It can be described in terms of
periodicity, mean level, variance, or even dimensional-
ity. The observation of fractional dimensionality, or
quasiperiodicity, and so forth suggests a dynamical
system at work. But it tells us precious little about the
system. Although we may learn the dimensionality of
the system, we learn nothing about what those dimen-
sions may be or how they interact with one another. It
is a little like having only the eigenvalues from a factor
analysis. However, in the factor analysis case, at least
one knows that the factors combine additively. The
most realistic expectation from behavioral bootstrap-
ping is the vague demonstration that nonlinear dynam-
ics of some sort may be at work. Although this is an
acceptable starting point for empirical work, one hopes
that better specified models will follow.
From our perspective, some of the applications of
nonlinear dynamics to meteorology and biology repre-
sent the most rigorous approach possible. We have yet
to see such an application in social psychology. For
example, the logistic equation, described by Vallacher
and Nowak, had a history of empirical validation as a
model of population growth since before the discovery
by May (1973) of its more exotic chaotic properties.
Ecologists successfully used the model to make predic-
tions about equilibrium population size on the basis of
initial population size and the carrying capacity of the
environment. There were, of course, anomalous cases
 COMMENTARIES
in which populations, instead of settling down to the
predicted level, oscillated between two values or even
fluctuated wildly. The realization that the equation
could also account for this kind of behavior simply
increased the field's confidence in the formulation
Lorenz (1993) had a working simulation of the
weather before discovering the model's sensitive de-
pendence on initial conditions. The model was, of
course, better at predicting the actual weather in the
short term than in the long term. The model's success
at predicting specific empirical outcomes provides
some validity. The fact that it is also sensitively depend-
ent on initial conditions must increase our confidence
in the model because this sensitivity implies that the
model will do less well at predicting temporally re-
moved weather events.
Note that the last two examples includeelementsthat
map nicely onto the standard paradigm. First, the equa-
tions themselves come from a thorough understanding
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of the phenomena in question. There is a one-to-one,
theoretical correspondencebetween the variables in the
equation and the elements of the systems they are
intended to model. The investigators did not start with
an equation with exotic properties and look for a system
into which it could be made to fit. Rather, the equations
grew out of their knowledge of the system and happened
also to have exotic properties. From an epistemological
point of view, the sequence is irrelevant,but we suspect
that the sequence is crucial to the psychology of devel-
oping a successful, rigorously testable model. In both
cases, an interaction between theory and data are in-
volved. Although there are aspects of the logistic equa-
tion and the Lorenz equations that produce nonrepro-
ducible results, there are also aspects that make specific
predictions. The fact that the specific predictions are
successful lends greater credence to the aspects of pre-
dictions that cannot be made in specific terms. So,
nonlinear dynamical models can be tested rigorously.
Nonlinear dynamical models hold great intellectual
interest. They stretch our intuition concerning natural
phenomena. A plausible case can be made for their
applicability to social psychology. Thanks to Vallacher
and Nowak, the insights, methods, and procedures
needed to carry out this work are more accessible to the
field. Although changes in epistemology and methods
may be needed, we along with many of our colleagues
hope to see the discipline enriched by the social psy-
chological insights such models may provide.
Notes
We acknowledge the support of National Institutes
of Mental Health Grant KO5 MH01233, National Sci-
ence Foundation Grant SBR 9121276, and National
Science Foundation Grant SBR-95 11385. We also are
grateful to John Achee, Jay Allen, Steven R. W. Beach,
and Dan Whitaker for their comments on a preliminary
draft.
Abraham Tesser, Department of Psychology, Uni-
versity of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602.
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Time and Theory in Social Psychology
Paul van Geert
Department of Psychology
University of Groningen
Downloaded By: [Umea University Library] At: 08:42 31 July 2010
It is hard to deny that Vallacher and Nowak are
talented architects. Their dynamic-systems-for-social-
psychology building is a well-designed and complete
structure. Their article provides an excellent and in-
sightful tutorial in the basics of dynamic systems think-
ing in psychology, and in social psychology in particu-
lar. As a commentator, I feel I am more or less in the
position of the interior decorator who is left with the
assignment of designing the form of the doorknobs or
such highly functional things as the toilet seats, a task
that, in spite of its indisputable intrinsic importance, is
not really very attractive. Instead, I have chosen to
readdress two of the fundamental issues raised by Val-
lacher and Nowak in order to shed some more light on
the following questions: What is the fundamental dis-
tinction between a dynamic and a nondynamic model
in (social) psychology? and What does dynamic sys-
tems thinking mean for social psychological theory
building?
What Is "Dynamic" in a Dynamic
Model?
The Longman Webster English College Dictionq
defines dynamics as "1. A branch of physics that deals
with forces and their relation to the motion of bodies.
2. The pattern of change or growth of an object or
phenomenon" (p. 456). Thus, if applied to social psy-
chology, dynamics means something like "the pattern
of change of social psychological properties or phe-
nomena'' or "a branch of social psychology that deals
with variables and their relation to the pattern of change
of social psychological properties or phenomena." With
this definition in mind, it is hard to find something in
Turing, A. M. (1950). Computing machinery and intelligence.
Mind, 59, 433-460.
Vallacher, R. R., & Nowak, A. Eds.). (1994). Dynamical system
in social psychology. San Diego, CA: Academic.
Vallacher, R., Nowak, A,, & Kaufman, J. (1994). Intrinsic dynarn-
ics of social judgement. Journal of Personaliiy and Social
Psychology, 67.20-34.
van Geert, P. (1991). A dynamic systems model of cognitive and
language growth. Psychological Review, 98, 3-53.
social psychology that does not meet the criterion
dynamic. Clearly, this cannot be the meaning of dy-
namics to which Vallacher and Nowak adhere. Let me
try to make this issue a little clearer by invoking an
example, namely, changing AIDS-risk behavior by
means of a television campaign. There exists an exten-
sive literature on this topic (Fisher & Fisher, 1992).My
only aim with this example, however, is to illustrate an
important distinction between time-based and vari-
able-based models, which leads directly to the heart of
dynamic modeling.
Let us assume we have a perfect and correct knowl-
edge of the strength of the attitude toward the impor-
tance of AIDS prevention in all the members of a
population. Let us also assume that the distribution of
these attitude strengths takes the form of a bell curve,
which can be sufficiently specified by its mean MI (this,
of course, is an assumption introduced for the sake of
simplicity). Next, we introduce an intervention in the
form of an AIDS prevention campaign that consists, for
instance, of the daily broadcast of a television commer-
cial that all persons watch with a fixed frequency. Then,
after some time, we apply our absolutely objective
measurement instrument again and find a new attitude
strength distribution with mean M2. The whole proce-
dure can be written down in the form of a model:
which one should read as: The mean attitude strength
M2 is the result of applying an intervention I to a
population with mean attitude strength MI. The whole
model can be written down in the form of a mathemati-
cal identity. Is this a dynamic model? According to the
dictionary definition,it is, because it describes a change