IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF THE MINOR CHARLES Manila Juvenila and Domestic Relations Court: In Sp. Proc.
nd Domestic Relations Court: In Sp. Proc. No. D-00011, adoption of Benigno
JOSEPH BLANCAFLOR WEEKS. UGGI LINDAMAND THERKELSEN and
ERLINDA G. BLANCAFLOR, petitioners-appellants, vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent-appellee.
November 27, 1964 | Reyes, JBL, J. | Domestic Adoption
Digester: Castro, Rachel Ann
SUMMARY: Uggi and Erlinda wanted to adopt Erlinda’s biological son, CJ. Their
application was denied by the lower court citing a case on the adoption of Benigno Lim:
an alien cannot adopt a Filipino unless the adoption would make the Filipino minor a
citizen of the alien's country. The Supreme Court reversed the decision and directed the
adoption to be allowed.
DOCTRINE: The citizenship of the adopter is a matter political, and not civil, in
nature, and the ways in which it should be conferred lay outside the ambit of the Civil
Code. It is not within the province of our civil law to determine how or when
citizenship in a foreign state is to be acquired. The disapproval of the adoption of an
alien child in order to forestall circumvention of our exclusion laws does not warrant,
denial of the adoption of a Filipino minor by qualified alien adopting parents, since it is
not shown that our public policy would be thereby subverted.
FACTS:
 This appeal was taken against a decision of the Manila Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, in its special Proceedings, No. D-00007, denying appellants'
application for adoption of the minor Charles Joseph Blancaflor Weeks.
Factual background of adoption:
 The petitioners are husband and wife who were married on June 2, 1962 (barely a
year before the decision appealed from).
 The minor sought to be adopted (we shall call him CJ), born on February 16, 1960,
is the natural child of petitioner-wife (Erlinda). His father was Charles Joseph
Week, who abandoned mother and child after the latter's birth. He is said to have
gone back to the United States.
 Petitioner-husband (Uggi) is a Danish subject, who has been granted permanent
residence in the Philippines. A former employee of Scandinavian Airlines System,
he is now Manager of M. Y. Travel International Hongkong Ltd., with a monthly
salary of P1,200.00. plus allowances.
 It does not appear that either of them has been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude.
 CJ has been living with them ever since their marriage.
 Uggi has treated CJ as his son, and the latter calls him "Daddy."
 Although the possibility exists that they may yet have their own children, the
adoption at this time, before any such children are begotten, may strengthen, rather
than disrupt, future domestic relations.
Lim, this Court has had occasion to rule that a Filipino cannot adopt an alien (Chinese) minor
about 19 years old. The adoption would not confer Philippine citizenship on the Chinese, but
could definitely legalize his stay in this country. It was also stated that conversely, an alien
cannot adopt a Filipino unless the adoption would make the Filipino minor a citizen of
the alien's country. As petitioner husband in this case is a Danish subject, it has to be
held that he cannot legally adopt the minor Charles Joseph Blancaflor Weeks, whose
citizenship is of this country, following that of his natural mother.
RULING: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is reversed,
and the court a quo is directed to allow the adoption sought. Without costs.
Whether the court a quo erred in denying adoption sought – YES
 If we understand the decision correctly, the adoption was denied solely because the
same would not result in the loss of the minor's Filipino citizenship and the
acquisition by him of the citizenship of his adopter. Unfortunately, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court did not expound the reasons for its opinion; but it is
clear that, if pursued to its logical consequences, the judgment appealed from
would operate to impose a further prerequisite on adoptions by aliens beyond those
required by law.
 As pointed out by the Solicitor General in his brief, the present Civil Code in force
(Article 335) only disqualifies from being adopters those aliens that are either
(a) non-residents or
(b) who are residents but the Republic of the Philippines has broken
diplomatic relations with their government.
Outside of these two cases, alienage by itself alone does not disqualify a foreigner
from adopting a person under our law.
 Petitioners admittedly do not fall in either class.
 The criterion adopted by the Court a quo would demand as a condition for the
approval of the adoption that the process should result in the acquisition, by the
person adopted, of the alien citizenship of the adopting parent.
 This finds no support in the law, for, as observed by this Court in Ching Leng vs.
Galang [G.R. No. L-11931, promulgated on 27 October 1958], the citizenship of
the adopter is a matter political, and not civil, in nature, and the ways in which it
should be conferred lay outside the ambit of the Civil Code. It is not within the
province of our civil law to determine how or when citizenship in a foreign state is
to be acquired. The disapproval of the adoption of an alien child in order to
forestall circumvention of our exclusion laws does not warrant, denial of the
adoption of a Filipino minor by qualified alien adopting parents, since it is not
shown that our public policy would be thereby subverted.
 REPUBLIC v. MILLER
April 21, 1999| Pardo, J. |
Digester: Chan, Ysabelle
SUMMARY: The respondents filed a petition to adopt Michael Madayag, a minor. The
SolGen assailed the granted petition, questioning whether the court may allow aliens to
adopt a Filipino despite the prohibition under the Family Code when the petition for
adoption was filed under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code.
DOCTRINE: This Court has ruled that an alien qualified to adopt under the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition,
acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a
new law disqualifying him. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent
does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder.
FACTS:
 The spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller, filed with the RTC, a verified
petition to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag.
 The RTC scheduled the petition for hearing. At the hearing, respondents adduced
evidence showing that:
o "Claude, 38, and Jumrus, 40, both American citizens, are husband and wife,
married on June 21, 1982. They were childless and "do not expect to have
sibling out of their union on account of a medical problem of the wife.
o Claude was a member of the US Air Force, as airman first class, assigned at
Clark Air Base since January 26, 1985. The family maintains their residence at
Don Bonifacio Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City, since 1985.
o The minor Michael Magno Madayag is the legitimate son of Marcelo S.
Madayag, Jr. and Zenaida Magno. Born on July 14, 1987, at San Fernando, La
Union, the minor has been in the custody of respondents since the first week
of August 1987. Poverty and deep concern for the future of their son
prompted the natural parents who have no visible means of livelihood to have
their child adopted by respondents. They executed affidavits giving their
irrevocable consent to the adoption by respondents.
 DSWD, through its Regional Office at San Fernando, Pampanga, recommended
approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation that respondents were
morally, emotionally and financially fit to be adoptive parents and that the adoption
would be to the minor's best interest and welfare.
 |RTC| granted the petition for adoption, finding that petitioners possess all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for adoption. This Court decrees the
minor Michael Magno Madayag freed from all obligation of obedience and support
with respect to natural parents and is hereby declared the child of the herein
petitioners by adoption. The minor's surname shall be changed from
"MADAYAG" to "MILLER", which is the surname of the herein petitioners
 RP, through the SolGen, appealed originally to the CA from a decision of the RTC
granting the petition of respondent spouses to adopt the minor Michael Magno
Madayag. CA certified the case to the SC because the petition raised only questions
of law. By resolution, SC accepted the appeal as one via certiorari from a decision
of the RTC under the SC Circular 2-90 on pure questions of law.
RULING: RTC affirmed.
Whether the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite the
prohibition under the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, when the petition
for adoption was filed on July 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code which allowed aliens to adopt. - YES
 This Court has ruled that an alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a
vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law
disqualifying him.
 Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code will not impair the right of
respondents to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the
time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in
force.
 A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon
events foreign to the will of the holder. The term expresses the concept of present
fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against
arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened
free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a
demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has
vested.
 As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in
accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires
jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or
civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or events,
although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in
the first instance.
 Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the
Family code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may
continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code.
 Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the
child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes,
parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give
them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter, as well as
childless couples or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and give them
legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural
parent instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
 LANDINGIN v. REPUBLIC
June 27, 2006 | Callejo, J. | Domestic Adoption Act
Digester: De Leon, Fenina
SUMMARY: Petitioner (who had children of her own) filed a petition for adoption of
3 minors, whose biological mother was Amelia Ramos. Pagbilao, DSWD Social Welfare
Officer II, submitted a Child Study Report recommending that the minors be adopted
by Petitioner. Pagbilao also narrated that Amelia, came to the Philippines and expressed
her consent to the adoption of her children by petitioner. TC granted petition. CA
reversed, holding that petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of
Amelia, that the affidavit of consent of the petitioner’s children could not also be
admitted in evidence as the same was executed in Guam, USA and was not
authenticated or acknowledged before a Philippine consular office, and that although
petitioner has a job, she was not stable enough to support the children. SC affirmed. 1)
Petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos. She also failed to
prove abandonment by Amelia the biological mother, which would have dispensed with
requirement of written consent. 2) Petitioner failed to offer in evidence and prove the
authentication of the Joint Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children
that was notarized in Guam. It did not comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103 which
governed the authentication in the PH of a document authenticated in a foreign
country. 3) Petitioner failed to prove she is financially capable of supporting the minors.
DOCTRINE: Marami? See bold + italicized + underlined paragraphs in each issue.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the USA, of Filipino parentage
and a resident of Guam, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon
Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos, who are the natural
children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother, and Amelia Ramos.
 Petitioner alleged in her petition that when Manuel died, the children were left to
their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia,
went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and
no longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos; the minors are being
financially supported by the petitioner and her children; as Maria passed away,
petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written consent
to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-
old widow, has children of her own who are already married, gainfully employed
and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA,
where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She came back to
the Philippines to spend time with the minors; her children gave their written
consent to the adoption of the minors. Petitioner’s brother, Mariano Ramos, who
earns substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the
minors while in petitioner’s custody.
 TC ordered the DSWD to conduct a case study and to submit a report
 OSG entered its appearance but deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac to appear
in its behalf.
 Petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex parte since her petition was
unopposed.
- She testified in her behalf.
- She also presented Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the
written consent executed by her and her siblings.
- She marked in evidence the Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her
children and notarized by a notary public in Guam, USA, as proof of consent.
 Pagbilao, DSWD Social Welfare Officer II, submitted a Child Study Report i
recommending that the minors be adopted by Petitioner.
 Pagbilao also narrated what transpired during her interview:
- The mother of minors came home together with her son John Mario, this May
2002 for 3 weeks vacation. This is to enable her appear for the personal
interview concerning the adoption of her children.
- The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and after
weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily
consented. She realized that her children need parental love, guidance and
support which she could not provide as she already has a second family &
residing in Italy. Knowing also that the petitioners & her children have been
supporting her children up to the present and truly care for them, she believes
her children will be in good hands.
 TC granted said petition for adoption
 CA reversed.
- Petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia
Ramos, the children’s natural mother.
- The affidavit of consent of the petitioner’s children could not also be admitted
in evidence as the same was executed in Guam, USA and was not
authenticated or acknowledged before a Philippine consular office,
- Although petitioner has a job, she was not stable enough to support the
children.
 Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari
RULING: Petition denied.
Whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written
consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos – NO.
 The Court adheres to the liberal concept, as stated in Malkinson v. Agrava, that
adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the
child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes,
parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give
them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to
allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give
them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their
natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should thus be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
 However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals, the Court also ruled that the liberality with
which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries out
the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the
adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount
consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, should
be understood in its proper context and perspective. The Court’s position
should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond
the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion to approve
adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child but
likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child.
(Failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos)
 Section 9 of R.A. No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly counseled and informed of
his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the
following to the adoption is hereby required:
a. The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
b. The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;
c. The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s)
and adoptee, if any;
d. The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter, if living with
said adopter and the latters spouse, if any;
e. The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
 The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is
intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the
best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption .
 Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the
validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his
child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights
and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents.
 Petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
 We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to interview Amelia
Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her son. If said Amelia Ramos was in
the Philippines and Pagbilao was able to interview her, it is incredible that the latter
would not require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent to the adoption of
her minor children. Neither did the petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as
witness in support of the petition.
 When petitioner filed her petition with the TC, R.A. No. 8552 was already in
effect. Section 9 provides that if the written consent of the biological parents
cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will
suffice. If the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she
should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.
(Abandonment by biological mother that would’ve dispensed with req’t of written consent is not proved)
 Petitioner: The written consent of the biological mother is no longer necessary
because Amelia left for Italy and never came back. The children were then left to
the guidance and care of their paternal grandmother. Hence, Amelia had effectively
abandoned the children. Also, when the petition for adoption was pending that
Amelia and her child by her 2nd marriage were on vacation in the Philippines.
Pagbilao was able to meet her, and Amelia intimated to the social worker that she
conformed to the adoption of her three children by the petitioner.
 Court: Contention rejected.
 Abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his
consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental
duties. The term means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal
obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds presence, love, care,
the opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and
maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child.
- Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care
of others is not such an abandonment. To dispense with the
requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have
existed at the time of adoption.
 Petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine Ramos to prove her
claim that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her children.
 However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker also stated:
- The petitioner, together with her children and other relatives abroad
have been supporting the minor children financially, even during the
time that they were still living with their natural parents. Their mother
also sends financial support but very minimal… In serious problems
she already consult (sic) her mother and petitioner-aunt… Amelia also
sends financial support ranging from P10,000-P15,000 a month
through her parents who share minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a
month to his (sic) children…
 Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children, or
to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to
leave the country by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not
surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the children to
her now deceased mother-in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted
her mother, Amelia, for serious personal problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to
send financial support to the children, though in minimal amounts as compared to
what her affluent in-laws provide.
 Nevertheless, the adoption of the minors herein will have the effect of severing all
legal ties between the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the
same shall then be vested on the adopter. It would thus be against the spirit of the
law if financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding
whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children. More
proof has to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children, and
that the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given to an
adopting parent.
 position to support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with
Whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner- the means of the family.
adopters children sufficiently complies with the law – NO.  According to the Adoption Home Study Report forwarded by the Government of
 Section 2 of Act No. 2103 Guam to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer supporting her legitimate children, as
Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign country shall be the latter are already adults. At the time of the filing of the petition, petitioner was
considered authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are made in accordance with the 57 years old, employed on a part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and
following requirements:
a. The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador, minister, secretary of tips of around $1,000 a month. Petitioner’s main intention in adopting the children
legation, charg d affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the is to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in
Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being amortized.
public or officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done.  It is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the
b. The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She only has a part-time job,
instrument or document is known to him, and that he is the same person who executed it, and she is rather of age. While petitioner claims that she has the financial support
and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be under his and backing of her children and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the
official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In
case the acknowledgment is made before a notary public or an officer mentioned in ability to support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a
subdivision (2) of the preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary public or the officer legal relation between the former and the latter. Moreover, the records do not
taking the acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an ambassador, minister, secretary of prove nor support petitioners allegation that her siblings and her children are
legation, charg de affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the financially able and that they are willing to support the minors herein.
Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he is accredited. The officer making
the authentication shall certify under his official seal that the person who took the
acknowledgment was at the time duly authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly
exercising the functions of the office by virtue of which he assumed to act, and that as such
he had authority under the law to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the
place where the acknowledgment was taken, and that his signature and seal, if any, are
genuine.
 Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos Report and of the Joint Affidavit of
Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she,
likewise, failed to prove. The joint written consent of petitioner’s children was
notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules
of Court in the same way as a document notarized in this country it needs to
comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103. As the alleged written consent of
petitioners legitimate children did not comply with the afore-cited law, the same
can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document whose authenticity must
be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or by
evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers.
 Since no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the written
consent of her legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.

Whether petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees – NO.

 Petitioner claims that she is financially capable as she has worked in Guam for 14
years, has savings, a house, and currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of not less
than $1,000.00 a month. Her children and siblings have likewise committed
themselves to provide financial backing should the need arise.
 Court: The law, however, states that it is the adopter who should be in a position
to provide support in keeping with the means of the family.
 Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child,
it follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also be
carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a
 IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM
May 21, 2009|Carpio, J.| Adoption
Digester: de Vera, Clarissa M.
SUMMARY: Monina and his first husband Primo Lim were childless, thus, when
minor children were entrusted to them, they registered the children, Michelle and
Michael as their own. Primo died in 1998. In 2000, Monina got married to Olario, an
American citizen. She then filed for the adoption of Michelle and Michael under the
amnesty provided by RA 8552 for individuals who simulated the birth of children. At
the time of the filing of the petition for adoption, Michelle was already 25 years old and
Michael was 18 years old. The trial court denied the petition on the ground that the
petition should have been filed jointly by her and her husband Olario. This was affirmed
by the Supreme Court. The law is clear and it should be applied.
DOCTRINE: SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
xxxx
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the
other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the
spouses.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Monina Lim is an an optometrist by profession and married to Primo
Lim. They were childless.
 Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain
Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and
Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents
 The children were named Michelle and Michael Jude Lim.
 Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner.
She was born on 15 March 1977.
 Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His
date of birth is 1 August 1983
 The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent
the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname Lim in all their school
records and documents.
 Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Primo Lim died. On 27 December 2000,
petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
 Monina decided the children by availing of the amnesty given under (RA 8552) to
those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. She then filed separate
petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court
 At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and
already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old
o Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as
evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.
o Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his
Affidavit of Consent.
o Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent for the adoption of
Michelle and Michael
 In the separate Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), Michelle and Michael were considered as an abandoned
child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown.
 The trial court dismissed the petitions. It ruled that since petitioner had remarried,
petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III
of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
 Monina filed an MR but was denied by the trial court ruling that
 She did not fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of
RA 8552.
 Petitioners argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was
untenable because, under the law, there are additional requirements, such as
residency and certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was
not even made a party in this case, must comply.
 As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint
adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court
ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental
authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents
and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
RULING: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision
dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City,
Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.
Whether or not a person who has remarried can adopt singly – NO.
 Petitioner’s Arguments:
 The rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the court
and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be
adopted
 The legal maxim dura lex sed lex is not applicable to adoption cases.
 Joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the
petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore
necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of
majority.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
 The Court applied the maxim Dura lex sed lex and noted that at the time of the filing
of petition, she had already married Olario. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III
of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
 xxxx
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(iv) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other
(v) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the
other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto
(vi) if the spouses are legally separated from each other
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other,
joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
 The use of the word shall in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption
by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept
of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to
be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require
the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
 The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the
time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions
for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband,
Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this
ground.
 Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in
Section 7.
 First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or
of her husband Olario.
 Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner.
 And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
 The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent does not suffice. None of the requirements provided in Section 7 of RA
8552, that Olario must comply with, being an American citizen, were shown and
proved during the trial:
 he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the PH
 he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years
prior to the filing of the application for adoption;
 he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered;
 he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and
 the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the adopted child.
 These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to
adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees
are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner
or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
 Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the
children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority.
 Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise
parental authority over the persons of their common children.
 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority
over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of
the person or property of the children.
 It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when he
attains the age of majority or 18 years of age emancipation terminates parental
authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and
responsible for all acts of civil life.
 The Court noted that parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
adoption, which is enumerated in Article V of RA 8552 [See Notes]
 sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except
when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter
 deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter
 give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to:
 the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
 the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each
other.
 Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a
legitimate child of the adopter with all the right of a legitimate child such as:
 (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother;
 (2) to receive support from their parents; and
 (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights.
 Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy
all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and
successional rights.
 Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the
child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes,
parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give
them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or
persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the
person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts.
Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these
noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
 However, the Court is not in a position to affirm the petitioner’s contention, for
the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription
against judicial legislation.
 Lastly, Monina insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could
no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage
to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court. However, The filing of a case for
dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is
not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a
judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario,
the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and
the wife is required.

In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Garcia
March 31, 2005 | Sandoval-Gutierrez., J. |
Digester: Endaya, Ana Kristina R.
SUMMARY: Stephanie Nathy Astorga, a minor illegitimate child, has been using her
mother’s middle name and surname (Gemma Astorga Garcia). Her mother soon died.
Petitioner filed a petition to adopt Stephanie and that Stephanie’s middle name be
changed to her mother’s surname (Middle name: Astorga -> Garcia) and that the
surname be changed to petitioner’s surname (Surname: Garcia -> Catindig). RTC
granted this and held that the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Petitioner filed a motion for clarification praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the
surname of her mother as her middle name (Gusto niya Stephanie Garcia Catindig).
RTC denied this MR.
The SC held that an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, may use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name. The SC considered different factors.
First, what the law regulates is only the surname, the law is silent as to the middle name.
Also, one of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopter for all intents and purposes, hence, being a legitimate child by virtue
of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother. Also, It is a Filipino custom that the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Moreover Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname as her middle name will
maintain her maternal lineage.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
 Petitioner filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia.
◦ Allegations:
▪ Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994
▪ Mother: Gemma Astorga Garci
▪ Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname
▪ Petitioner is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent.
◦ Prayer: Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers
surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
 RTC: Granted adoption
◦ Petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification
provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to
maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted
◦ The grant of this petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the
minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.
◦ Petitioner’s care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present
constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of
Presidential Decree No. 603.
◦ Minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG. Upon
finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil
Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
◦ Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record
purposes.
 Petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother “GARCIA”
as her middle name.
 RTC: Denied petitioner’s M
◦ No law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name.
RULING: Petition is GRANTED. Stephanie should be allowed to use her
mother’s surname GARCIA as her middle name.
Whether an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name - YES
Petitioner’s arguments:
1. No law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there
is only one adopting parent;
2. Customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the
mother;
3. Middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person;
4. Adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her
right to bear a proper name should not be violated;
5. Permitting Stephanie to use the middle name Garcia (her mothers surname)
avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and;
6. Her continued use of Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by either the
Catindig or Garcia families.
Republic of the Philippines via OSG - Agrees with petitioner
1. Necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural
mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an
intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless
hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her
natural mother should be maintained.
2. No law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
3. Customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the
surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code
 and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that the initial or ◦ FC 189 enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the
surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father matter
so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother.  Members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family
Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother
Supreme Court as his middle name.
DISCUSSION - Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law
 Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the
Name
members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother
 For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is should immediately precede the surname of the father.
known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known.
 (Check notes for Justice Caguio and Puno’s comments - basically saying that use of
 Definition: Word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished father’s surname by child is mandatory while for the surname of the mother it is
from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the only permissive)
convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with
him. The Underlying Intent of Adoption Is In Favor of the Adopted Child
 Both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.  Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the
adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical
The name of an individual has two parts act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar
given or proper name surname or family name to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.
 The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a
That which is given to the individual That which identifies the family to relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child
at birth or at baptism, to distinguish which he belongs and is continued from with a legitimate status. This was confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a
him from other individuals. parent to child. State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United
Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral
May be freely selected by the parents responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child
Fixed by law
for the child The Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 secures these rights and privileges for the
adopted.
Rules regulating use of surname whatever one’s status in life(whether legitimate, illegitimate, adopted,  One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to FC 189 and Section
married, previously married, widow)
17 Article V of RA 8552.
A/N: Check notes for the provisions - basta binold lang ng SC ung “surname” kada
provision. Kasi surname lang naman nireregulate ng law.  Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie
is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of Middle Name discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her
father and her mother, as discussed above.
 No law regulating the use of a middle name.
 This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family
 Even FC176 as amended by R.A. 9255 (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To
Use The Surname Of Their Father), is silent as to what middle name a child may Law Committees as earlier discussed.
use.  It is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father.
 The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1), in
case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants,  Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname as her middle name will
in which case, the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added. maintain her maternal lineage.
 Law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.  FC 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552 provide that
the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
◦ CC 365 merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter.  Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural
mother in the future.
▪ What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the
 Records show that:
adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree
of adoption.
 ◦ Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner
for them at Bulacan.
◦ Petitioner provides for all their needs.
◦ Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them
Mama and Papa. Indeed, they are one normal happy family.
◦ Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name
will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but
will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of Adoption Statutes In Favor Of Adoption
 Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to
carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the
adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.[27
 NCC Art. 10: In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
◦ This provision necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and
justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the
determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be
authorized by some way of interpreting the law.
 Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father,
like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason
why she should not be allowed to do so.
NOTES
Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the
surname and that of the child because the fathers surname indicates the family to
which he belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the fathers
surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname
of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother,
how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his
point is that it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father
and permissive in the case of the surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by the present Article 364,
which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person
himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following
example: Alfonso Ponce Enriles correct surname is Ponce since the mothers surname is
Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez Davids family name
is Gutierrez and his mothers surname is David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the
effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but
he may use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name.
Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of
Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of
legitimate children so that the details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice
Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last because there are so many
traditions like the American tradition where they like to use their second given name
and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even include
the Clan name.
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the
Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any,
will be before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really
the Filipino way. The Committee approved the suggestion.
Civil Code Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code
Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the
surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs.
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name
and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she
may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname
employed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance with
Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such
additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word Junior can
be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.

ISABELITA LAHOM v. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO
July 14, 2003 | Vitug, J. | Adoption
Digester: Fausto, Jaime Manuel A.
SUMMARY: Petitioner Lahom raised respondent Jose Melvin as her own child. In
1972, the courts granted Lahom and her husband’s petition for adoption in favor of
Jose Melvin. Sadly, in 1999, Mrs. Lahom filed a petition to rescind the decree of
adoption due to Jose Melvin refusing to use the name Lahom, his indifference towards
petitioner, and due to his claim over Mrs. Lahom’s properties being the only motive to
stay as an adoptee. RTC denied the rescission because RA 8552 disallowed adopters to
rescind a decree of adoption. Also, Mrs. Lahom’s action has already prescribed pursuant
to Rule 100, Sec. 5, as she only filed this case years after discovery of the grounds for
rescission. The Court affirmed the RTC. It held the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Since
the action for rescission was filed during the effectivity of RA 8552, Mrs. Lahom no
longer has the right to rescind the adoption. She was also held to not have a vested right
as the right to rescind the adoption is merely statutory and the was already revoked by
law. Further, Rule 100 Sec. 5 provides a prescriptive period to file the rescission, which
she did not exercise even before the effectivity of RA 8552. The failure to comply with
the prescriptive period is a condition for one to exercise a vested right. The Court held
that the law must be applied even if the adoption is undersirable. Mrs. Lahom has other
remedies such as disinheritance under the Civil Code.
DOCTRINE: RA 8552 or the Domestic Adoption Act deleted from the law the right
of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. The jurisdiction of the court is determined
by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
FACTS:
 Respondent Jose Melvin Sibulo, who was then two years old, enjoyed the warmth,
love and support of Spouses Dr. Diosdado and Isabelita Lahom, the latter being
Jose Melvin’s aunt.
 In 1972, the spouses decided to file a petition for adoption in favor of Jose Melvin.
This was granted and the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed Jose Melvin’s
surname to “Lahom.”
 Sadly, in 1999, petitioner Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree
of adoption before the Naga RTC. She averred that:
 Jose Melvin refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the
frustration of the spouses even until Mr. Lahom died. Even before Mr.
Lahom’s death, he had made known his desire to revoke the adoption;
 Even Jose Melvin’s records in the PRC (he was a doctor) showed his name
was Sibulo;
 Mrs. Lahom, now a widow, yearned for the love and care of a son but Jose
Melvin would only visit her once a year. He also remained indifferent in the
past 3 years that Mrs. Lahom had an ailment.
 Mrs. Lahom suffered wounded feelings, knowing that Jose Melvin’s only
motive to his adoption was the expectancy of his alleged rights over her
properties, as shown by Sibulo’s filing for partition against her.
 Prior to the institution of the case, RA 8552 or the Domestic Adoption Act
went into effect. This new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters
to rescind a decree of adoption (See Sec. 19 - NOTES).
 Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that
the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case, and (b) that the petitioner had no
cause of action in view of the aforequoted provisions of RA 8552.
 Mrs. Lahom argued that RA 8552 should not retroactively applied, i.e. to cases
where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then
Article 348 of the Civil Code and Article 192 of the Family Code.
 RTC dismissed the petition, and held that:
 It had jurisdiction over the subject matter, as conferred by RA 8369, it being
designated as a Family Court; and
 RA 8552 deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption. She filed the
petition to rescind adoption five years after discovery of the grounds, which is
well beyond the prescription period allowed by the Rules (Rule 100, Sec. 5).
 Mrs. Lahom filed a petition for review under Rule 45.
RULING: Petition denied.
Background on RA 8552’s origins
 Romans used adoption to assure male heirs in the family. The rights were focused
on the adopter.
 Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and England, in an effort to preserve
inheritance within the family, neither allowed nor recognized adoption. It was only
later that the welfare of the child became a paramount concern.
 Spain later relented and this law found its way here. The Americans came and made
the interests of the child an overriding consideration.
 The Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child of 1924 and the UDHD of 1948
protected the rights of adopted children.
 The Civil Code, modified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code and then by the
Family code, gave immediate statutory acknowledgement to the rights of the
adopted.
 The Philippines, a State Party to the UN Convention of the Rights of a Child,
accepted the principle that adoption was impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted child.
 RA 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it
affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new family but
also in the society as well. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind
the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal
ties created by adoption.
Whether the subject adoption, decreed in 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and
an adopter after the effectivity of RA 8552 – NO. Assuming the first issue is in failure to comply with parental obligations.
the affirmative, whether the adopter’s action has prescribed – YES. “Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission
 Mrs. Lahom claims she has a vested right to annul the adoption decree granted by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes
under the Civil Code and Family Code. The concept of “vested right” is a provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.”
consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process
present fixed interest,
which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it
includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also
exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested.
 In Republic v CA, PD 603 allowed either spouse to adopt. Family Code came into
effect mandating joint adoption by husband and wife. The Court held that the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the action. The adoption by one spouse was held to be
valid as the petition was filed when PD 603 was still in effect.
 In Republic v Miller, PD 603 allowed aliens to adopt. The Family Code was then
enacted, disqualifying aliens from adopting. The Court allowed the adoption by an
alien in that case ruling that the controversy should be resolved in the light of
the law governing at the time the petition was filed.
 IN THIS CASE, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Mrs. Lahom
filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new
law had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil
Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption.
 Interestingly, EVEN BEFORE THE PASSAGE OF RA 8552, an action to set
aside the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of
Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after
the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a
condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to
protection.
 Further, a person has no vested right in statutory privileges. The right to adopt is
not a fundamental right, but merely one created by statute. a right of action given
by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.

 Even if adoption turns out to be undesirable, the Court must still apply the law,
which disallows the rescission of adoption. Dura lex sed lex.
 Anyway, an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can
always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing
to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an
adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may
freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

NOTES:
 SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. - Upon petition of the adoptee, with the
assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is
incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the
following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal
maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt
 Sayson v. CA
January 23, 1992| Cruz, J. | Adoption
Digester: Lingat, Anna Mickaella N.
SUMMARY: A complaint for partition and accounting of the estate of Spouses
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson was filed by (petitioners) Teodoro’s siblings and mother-in-
law. Their children opposed the said complaint because they were excluded as heirs.
The children also filed a separate complaint for the accounting and partition of their
grandparents’ intestate estate. Delia and Edmundo claim that they were the adopted
children and that Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. Hence,
they were entitled to inherit Teodoro’s share in their grandparents’ estate by right of
representation. The petitioners claim that Delia and Edmundo are not lawful heirs
because they were not legally adopted. At the time the decree of adoption was issued,
Doribel was already born; hence the Spouses Sayson are disqualified from adopting.
They also claim that Doribel is not a legitimate daughter because she was born to one
Edita Abila. The Court ruled that Delia and Edmundo are validly adopted because the
decree already became final and executory. They should have appealed the decree or
notified the court when they learned of the birth of Doribel. Hence, Delia and
Edmundo may inherit from their parents. However, they may not inherit from their
grandparents because as adopted children, they do not have the right to represent their
parent. As to Doribel, the Court ruled that she is a legitimate daughter of the Spouses,
as evidenced by the birth certificate. Hence, she may inherit from her parents and
grandparents.
DOCTRINE: The challenge to the validity of adoption cannot be made collaterally, as
in their action for partition, but in a direct proceedings frontally addressing the issue.
Petitioners: Mauricio Sayson, Rosario Sayson-Malonda, Basilisa Sayson-Lirio,
Remedios Sayson-Reyes, and Juana Bautista
Private Respondents: Delia Sayson, assisted by her husband, Cirilo Cedo, Jr.,
Edmundo Sayson, and Doribel Sayson
FACTS:
 Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot 5 chidlren: Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios,
and Teodoro.
 Eleno and Rafaela died in 1952 and 1976 respectively.
 Teodoro died on 1972 and his wife, Isabel Bautista, died nine years later (1981).
Their properties were left in the possession of their children: Delia, Edmundo,
Doribel
 Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa and Remedios, together with Juana Bautista (Isabel’s
mother), filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
o The action was opposed to by the children (Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel),
who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as their parents’ lawful
descendants.
 The children filed their own complaint for accounting and partition of the
intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against their uncles and aunts.
o Delia and Edmundo claim that they were the adopted children and that
Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. Hence, they were
entitled to inherit Teodoro’s share in their grandparents’ estate by right of
representation.
RTC
 Both cases were decided in favor of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel.
 Delia and Edmundo were legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson
by virtue of decree of adoption in 1967
 Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate dated
1967.
 Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by
right of representation.
 RTC dismissed the complaint for the partition of estate of Teodoro and Isabel
because the children were excluded from sharing in their estate.
CA
 Affirmed with modification
 Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the
grandparents, Eleno and Rafaela Sayson
RULING: Petition is denied. CA is affirmed in toto.
Whether the children are validly adopted by the Spouses Sayson? - YES
Petitioners’ arguments:
 RTC and CA disregarded their evidence and misapplied pertinent law and
jurisprudence when it declared the respondents as exclusive heirs of Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson
 Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel had already been
born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9,
1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting.
 The pertinent provision is Article 335 of CC, naming those who cannot adopt
(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or
natural children by legal fiction.
 Curiously enough, they also argue that Doribel herself is not a legitimate daughter
but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for
guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother.
Court:
 The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. They seek to annul the
adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that the Teodoro and Isabel
already had a legitimate daughter at the time, but in the same breath, they try to
demolish this argument by denying that Doribel was born to the couple.
 There is a vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the decree
of adoption, years after it became final and executory (i.e. way back in 1967).
o They should have seasonable appealed the decree of adoption, pointing to the
birth of Doribel that disqualified the Spouses form adopting Delia and
Edmundo. They should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption
was issued.
o Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of the birth, but he did not
appeal the decree.
 When Doribel was born 10 days before the issuance of the Order of Adoption,
petitioners could have notified the court about the fact of her birth and perhaps
withdrew the petition or filed a petition for revocation or rescission of the adoption
(although the birth of a child is not one of those provided by law for the revocation
or rescission of an adoption).
 Trial judge cannot be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the finding
inter alia that the adopting parents were not disqualified (i.e. not having any
information on Doribel’s birth).
 The challenge to the validity of adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in
their action for partition, but in a direct proceedings frontally addressing the
issue.
o Freeman on Judgments: The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite
jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a
collateral proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases where the validity
of the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were
proven
o Santos v Aranzanso:
o An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the burden of
proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot be considered void merely because
the fact needed to show statutory compliance is obscure.
o While a judicial determination of some particular fact, such as the
abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be essential to the
exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this does not make it
essential to the jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact be determined
upon proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with the truth; a mere error
cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until reversed
on appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally attacked.
o If this were not the rule, the status of adopted children would always be
uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all investigations, and
might be regarded with different effect by different tribunals, and the adoption
might be held by one court to have been valid, while another court would hold
it to have been of no avail.
Whether Doribel is a legitimate daughter of the Spouses? - YES
Birth Certificate is a prima facie evidence
 Doribel’s birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence.
 It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Art 265 of the Civil Code
and Art 172 of the Family Code.
 While the birth certificate offers only a prima facie evidence of filiation, it is not
refuted by contrary evidence in this case.
 Mauricio’s testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila
was understandably suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit
of Abila denying her earlier statement in the petition for guardianship of Doribel is
hearsay evidence. It was never offered in evidence in the lower court.
 Even without the affidavit, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v
CA, where it was ruled that “evidentiary nature of public documents must be
sustained in the absence of strong, complete, and conclusive proof of its falsity or
nullity.
Legitimacy of a child cannot be collaterally attacked
 Doribel’s legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and
accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.
 Teotico v. Del Val: The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code does not have
this purely evidential character. It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in
wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the
child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the
proper parties, and within the period limited by law. The legitimacy of the child
cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for
a different purpose.
Conclusion of the Court:
(1) Doribel, Delia, Edmundo are exclusive heirs to estates of their parents
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson
 Doribel, as legitimate daughter, and Delia and Edmundo, as adopted children, are
the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased Spouses Sayson,
conformably to Art. 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different
marriages. An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same
manner as a legitimate child.
 The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his
children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads
among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in
acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love
for them and as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this
earth.
(2) Only Doribel can inherit from the grandparents’ estate
 With regard to the right of representation, Arts. 970, 971, and 981 are instructive:
o Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
o Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the
person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but
the one who the person represented would have succeeded.
 o Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are
dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.
 Doribel, as a legitimate daughter of Teodoro, and thus the granddaughter of Eleno
and Rafaela, she has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of
the intestate estate of her grandparents.
 Under Art 821, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited
had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of aunts and uncles.
 However, Delia and Edmundo may not inherit from the grandparents’
estate, to whom they are regarded as total strangers.
 While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and
have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the
adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives
of either party.
PABLO-GUALBERTO v. GUALBERTO
June 28, 2005 | Justice, J. | Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation To Custody of Minors
Digester: Magtanong, Patch
SUMMARY: Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn with an ancillary prayer for custody
pendente lite of their almost 4 year old son, Rafaello, whom her wife took away with her
from their conjugal home and his school when she left him. No evidence
that the son was exposed to the mother’s alleged sexual proclivities (lesbian) or that his
proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result. The Court granted the
custody of the child to Joycelyn. According to the tender years presumption, under
certain circumstances, the mother’s immoral conduct may constitute a compelling
reason to deprive her of custody. In this case however, the Court said that sexual
preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. The
husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the
welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper
parental care. Since Joycelyn was granted custody, the Writ of Habeas Corpus is not
proper.
DOCTRINE: A writ of habeas corpus may be issued only when the “rightful custody
of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto,” a situation that does not
apply here.
FACTS:
 On March 12, 2002, Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed RTC of Parañaque a
petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn D. Pablo Gualberto,
with an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4-year-old son,
minor Rafaello.
 On April 3, 2002, the Judge awarded custody pendente lite of the child to Crisanto:
o Renato Santos, President of United Security Logistic testified that he was
commissioned by Crisanto to conduct surveillance on Joycelyn and came up
with the conclusion that she is having lesbian relations with one Noreen Gay
Cuidadano in Cebu City.
o The findings of Renato Santos were corroborated by Cherry Batistel, a house
helper of the spouses who stated that [the mother] does not care for the child
as she very often goes out of the house and on one occasion, she saw
Joycelyn slapping the child.
 On April 16, 2002, the hearing of Joycelyn’s motion to lift the award of custody
pendente lite of the child to Crisanto was set but the former did not allegedly
present any evidence to support her motion. However, on May 17, 2002, the Judge
allegedly issued the assailed Order reversing her Order of April 3, 2002 and this
time awarding custody of the child to Joycelyn.
 The child subject of this Petition, Crisanto Rafaello P. Gualberto is barely four
years old. Under Article 213 of the Family Code, he shall not be separated from his
mother unless the Court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The Court
finds the reason stated by Crisanto not to be compelling reasons. The father should
however be entitled to spend time with the minor.

RULING: Petition granted.
Whether – YES.
 When love is lost between spouses and the marriage inevitably results in separation,
the bitterest tussle is often over the custody of their children. The Court is now
tasked to settle the opposing claims of the parents for custody pendente lite of their
child who is less than seven years old.
 On the one hand, the mother insists that, based on Article 213 of the Family Code,
her minor child cannot be separated from her. On the other hand, the father argues
that she is “unfit” to take care of their son; hence, for “compelling reasons,” he
must be awarded custody of the child.
 Article 213 of the Family Code provides:
“ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent designated by the court. The court shall take into account
all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of
age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
 No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.”
 This Court has held that when the parents are separated, legally or otherwise, the
foregoing provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing
from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads:
“Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of
children, the latter’s welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from
her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for
such measure.”
 The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be separated from
their mother finds its raison d’être in the basic need of minor children for their
mother’s loving care.
 In explaining the rationale for Article 363 of the Civil Code, the Code Commission
stressed thus:
“The general rule is recommended in order to avoid a tragedy where a mother
has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a
mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the
rule has to be for “compelling reasons” for the good of the child: those cases must
indeed be rare, if the mother’s heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in
cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree will
ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, her moral dereliction will
not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand the
situation.”
 Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling
reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been held that under certain
circumstances, the mother’s immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason
to deprive her of custody.
 But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or
incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful
to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child.
 To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral
lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the
offending spouse from exercising proper parental care.
 The word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Section 6 of Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court has been held to connote a mandatory character.
 The principle of “best interest of the child” pervades Philippine cases involving
adoption, guardianship, support, personal status, minors in conflict with the law,
and child custody. In these cases, it has long been recognized that in choosing the
parent to whom custody is given, the welfare of the minors should always be the
paramount consideration.
 The so-called “tender-age presumption” under Article 213 of the Family Code may
be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother
has been declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the
following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a
communicable disease.
[TOPIC}
Whether the writ of habeas corpus and the preliminary mandatory injunction
prayed for by Crisanto is proper– NO.
 As we have ruled that Joycelyn has the right to keep her minor son in her custody,
the writ of habeas corpus and the preliminary mandatory injunction prayed for by
Crisanto have no leg to stand on.
 A writ of habeas corpus may be issued only when the “rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto,” a situation that does not apply
here.
 On the other hand, the ancillary remedy of preliminary mandatory injunction
cannot be granted, because Crisanto’s right to custody has not been proven to be
“clear and unmistakable.”
 Unlike an ordinary preliminary injunction, the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction is more cautiously regarded, since the latter requires the performance of
a particular act that tends to go beyond the maintenance of the status quo. Besides,
such an injunction would serve no purpose, now that the case has been decided on
its merits.
 Gapusan-Chua v. CA
March 15, 1990 | Narvasa, J.| Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor
natural children
Digester: Melliza, F.S.L.
SUMMARY: Felisa died intestate and without legitimate issue. Ligaya, who claims to be
an acknowledged natural daughter of Felisa, instituted judicial proceedings for the
settlement of the latter's estate. She was later appointed to be designated as Special
Administratrix by the probate court. Sometime later, Prospero, Felisa’s surviving
spouse, filed a motion for reconsideration of the CFI’s Order. He denied that Ligaya
was an acknowledged natural child of his deceased wife, and applied for his own
appointment as administrator of his wife's estate. Hearings were held to on the issue of
Ligaya’s filiation. Ligaya presented the following documents: (1) Felisa's sworn
statement of assets and liabilities, in which she names and describes Ligaya as her
daughter; (2) her application for GSIS life insurance in which she again describes Ligaya
as her daughter; and (3) her application for membership in the Negros Occidental
Teachers' Federation, where she names Ligaya as her "adopted daughter". Probate
Court ruled for Ligaya, but the CA reversed and appointed Prosporo instead. The CA
held the evidence at best showed merely that Ligaya had been treated as a daughter by
Felisa, but that this did "not constitute acknowledgment" but "only a ground to compel
recognition;" It further ruled that Ligaya had failed to establish that she had been
acknowledged by Felisa in accordance with Article 278 of the Civil Code. Ligaya
appealed with the SC, arguing the statements in the documents were "authentic
writings" in contemplation of Article 278 of the Civil Code. The SC reversed the CA. It
held that the documents do constitute authentic writings required by Art. 278, and that
the lack of judicial recognition on Ligaya’s part was ratified by her when she reached the
age of majority.
DOCTRINE: Authentic writing need not be public documents for purposes of
voluntary recognition. It is enough that they are genuine or indubitable writings of the
father (or mother).
Lack of judicial approval may be cured by the express or implied ratification effected by
the minor upon reaching age of majority.
Implied ratification may be shown where the child keeps the acknowledgment papers
and the use of the parent’s surname.
Judicial approval is not needed if a recognition is voluntarily made —
1) of a person who is of age, only his consent being necessary; or
2) of a minor whose acknowledgment is effected in a record of birth or in a will.
On the other hand, judicial approval is needful if the recognition of the minor is
effected, not through a record of birth or in a will but through a statement in a court of
record or an authentic document. In any case the individual recognized can impugn the
recognition within four years following the attainment of his majority.
FACTS:
 Felisa Gapusan Parcon died intestate and without legitimate issue.
 Ligaya Gapusan-Chua, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of Felisa,
instituted judicial proceedings for the settlement of the latter's estate.
 Ligaya filed with the CFI of Negros Occidental a petition for the settlement of the
estate and for issuance of letters of administration in her favor. She also sought her
designation as Special Administratrix pending her appointment as regular
administratrix.
 CFI appointed Ligaya Special Administratrix of Felisa Parcon's estate.
 Sometime later, Prospero Parcon, Felisa Parcon's surviving husband, filed a motion
for reconsideration of the CFI’s Order. He denied that Ligaya was an
acknowledged natural child of his deceased wife, and applied for his own
appointment as administrator of his wife's estate.
 Hearings were had on the issue of Ligaya claimed filiation. Ligaya presented
following documents:
1. Felisa's sworn statement of assets and liabilities, in which she names
and describes Ligaya as her daughter;
2. her application for GSIS life insurance in which she again describes
Ligaya as her daughter; and
3. her application for membership in the Negros Occidental Teachers'
Federation, where she names Ligaya as her "adopted daughter".
 Prospero Parcon, on the other hand, sought to demonstrate that Ligaya's exhibits
did not constitute conclusive proof of her claimed status of acknowledged natural
child, for the reason that:
1. Another document, Felisa's application for membership in Negros Occidental
Teachers' Federation (NOTF), merely named Ligaya as her "adopted
daughter;"
2. in the distribution of death benefits pursuant to the decedent's GSIS insurance
policy, supra, Ligaya was allocated only P500.00 whereas Prospero received
P1,000.00; and
3. Mrs. Leticia Papasin (Felisa's sister) and Vice-Mayor Solomon Mendoza
travelled from afar to affirm before the Probate Court on the witness stand
that Ligaya was not the daughter of Felisa, Mrs. Papasin's testimony being that
in 1942 an unknown "drifter" had sold Ligaya, then an infant, to Felisa.
 Probate Court ruled that Ligaya is the acknowledged natural child of the late Felisa.
 CA reversed the Probate Court.
o In the CA’s view, the evidence at best showed merely that Ligaya had
been treated as a daughter by Felisa, but that this did "not constitute
acknowledgment" but "only a ground to compel recognition;"
o It further ruled that Ligaya had failed to establish that she had been
acknowledged by Felisa in accordance with Article 278 of the Civil Code
(Article 131 of the Civil Code of 1889).
 Ligaya wasn’t maligaya with the CA ruling, so she appealed to the SC.
 Ligaya argued the evidence submitted by her does indeed sufficiently establish her
status as the acknowledged natural child of Felisa Parcon, and that her appointment
as regular administratrix is justified by law and jurisprudence. These documents,
voluntarily made, were adequate foundation for a judicial declaration of her status
as heir. These statements, she alleges, were "authentic writings" in contemplation of
Article 278 of the Civil Code:
Art. 278. Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing.
 On the other hand, Prospero Parcon argued:
1. that, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, the statements designating Ligaya as
Felisa's daughter merely furnished ground for Ligaya to compel recognition by
action which, however, should have been brought during the lifetime of the
putative parent in accordance with Article 285 of the Civil Code, reading as
follows:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in
the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child,
in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of
four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document
should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either
or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from
the finding of the document.
2. Since, Parcon continues, no such action was instituted prior to the death of
Felisa, proof of the "authentic document" (sworn statement of assets and
liabilities) in the proceedings for the settlement of the latter's estate was
inefficacious as basis for a declaration of filiation or heirship.
RULING: CA ruling set aside; Probate Court ruling reinstated. Ligaya Gapusan-Chua is
the decedent's acknowledged natural child and appointing her regular administratrix.
(See Notes for discussion between compulsory and voluntary recognition)
Whether the documents presented constitute authentic writings for purposes of
voluntary recognition—Yes.
 An "authentic writing" within the contemplation of Article 278. "An 'authentic
writing' for purposes of voluntary recognition . . . (is) understood as a genuine or
indubitable writing of the father" (or mother), including "a public instrument" (one
acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official with the
formalities required by law), and, of course, a public or official document in
accordance with Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
 The sworn statement of assets and liabilities filed by Felisa Parcon is a public
document, having been executed and submitted pursuant to a requirement of the
law. So it has been held by this Court.
 The other two writings above mentioned are, to be sure, not public
documents, but this is of no moment; neither of them has to be a public
document in order to be categorized as an "authentic writing."
 It is enough that they are the genuine or indubitable writings of Felisa
Gapusan Parcon. That in one of the writings, Felisa's application for
membership in the Negros Occidental Teachers' Federation, Felisa
describes Ligaya as her "adopted" daughter is also inconsequential.
 It may be explained by her reluctance to confess publicly to her colleagues in the
teaching profession that she had borne a child out of wedlock. It is in any case a
categorical avowal by Felisa that Ligaya is indeed her daughter, an admission
entirely consistent with the two other authentic writings executed by her in which
she acknowledges Ligaya to be her daughter without qualification.
 Moreover, if these three (3) writings are considered in conjunction with the
undisputed fact that Ligaya had been continuously treated by Felisa as her daughter,
the proposition that Ligaya was indeed Felisa's daughter becomes well nigh
conclusive.
Whether the lack of judicial approval of the recognition may be ratified by the
minor upon reaching the age of majority.—Yes.
 The point need not be belabored, however. For whether Ligaya were still a minor
or already of age at the time of her recognition in the authentic writings mentioned,
that circumstance would be immaterial in the light of the attendant facts.
 In the first place, the consent required by Article 281 of a person of age who has
been voluntarily recognized may be given expressly or tacitly. Assuming then that
Ligaya was of age at the time of her voluntary recognition, the evidence shows that
she has in fact consented thereto.
 Her consent to her recognition is not only implicit from her failure to impugn it at
any time before her mother's death, but is made clearly manifest and conclusive by
her assertion of that recognition in the judicial proceeding for the settlement of her
mother's estate as basis for her rights thereto.
 Assuming on the other hand, that she was a minor at the time of her recognition,
and therefore judicial approval of the recognition was necessary, the absence
thereof was cured by her ratification of that recognition, after having reached the
age of majority, by her initiation of the proceedings for the settlement of her
deceased mother's estate on the claim precisely that she was the decedent's
acknowledged natural daughter.
 The requirement of judicial approval imposed by Article 281 is clearly
intended for the benefit of the minor. "The lack of judicial approval can not
impede the effectivity of the acknowledgment made. The judicial approval is
for the protection of the minor against any acknowledgment made to his
prejudice."
 "Therefore, the lack, or insufficiency of such approval is NOT a defect
available to the recognizing parent but one which the minor may raise or
waive. If after reaching majority the minor consents to the acknowledgment,
the lack of judicial approval should make no difference.
 Implied consent to the acknowledgment may be shown (e.g.,) by such acts
as keeping, even after reaching the age of majority, the acknowledgment
papers and the use of the parent's surname.
Notes:
The Court discussed between compulsory and voluntary recognition of the child:
Recognition of natural children may be voluntary or compulsory.
Voluntary recognition, it has been said, "is an admission of the fact of paternity or
maternity by the presumed parent, expressed in the form prescribed by the Civil Code.
Its essence lies in the avowal of the parent that the child is his; the formality is added to
make the admission incontestable, in view of its consequences." 9 The form is
prescribed by Article 278 of the Civil Code, earlier adverted to; it provides that a
voluntary recognition "shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing."
Compulsory recognition is sometimes also called judicial recognition, to distinguish it
from that which is a purely voluntary act of the parent. 11 It is recognition decreed by
final judgment of a competent court. It is governed by Articles 283 and 284, setting
forth the cases in which the father or mother, respectively, is obliged to recognize a
natural child, and Article 285 providing that generally, the action for recognition of
natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents.
The matter of whether or not judicial approval is needful for the efficacy of voluntary
recognition is dealt with in Article 281 of the Civil Code.
Art. 281. A child who is of age cannot be recognized without his consent.
When the recognition of a minor does not take place in a record of birth or in
a will, judicial approval shall be necessary.
A minor can in any case impugn the recognition within four years following
the attainment of his majority.
In other words, judicial approval is not needed if a recognition is voluntarily made —
1) of a person who is of age, only his consent being necessary; or
2) of a minor whose acknowledgment is effected in a record of birth or in a will.
On the other hand, judicial approval is needful if the recognition of the minor is
effected, not through a record of birth or in a will but through a statement in a court of
record or an authentic document. In any case the individual recognized can impugn the
recognition within four years following the attainment of his majority.
Modequillo v. Salinas
May 31, 1990| Gancayco, J| Family Home
Digester: Mercado, Carlo Robert M.
SUMMARY: Modequillo and Malubay were ruled against by the CA in a case for
damages due to a vehicular accident. This judgment became final and so execution of
the judgment proceeded. The sheriff levied two properties of Modequillo in Davao del
Sur. Modequillo filed a motion to quash the levy because one of the properties there
was his family home, constituted since 1969. SC ruled that the said property is subject to
execution. Articles of the Family Code on Family Home do not have retroactive effect.,
thus the property was constituted as a family home only upon the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 The debt or liability which was the basis of the
judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976
and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on
January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
Therefore, at the time the act giving rise to liability and the money judgment therefrom
were before the property was constituted as a family home. Thus, the property is subject
to execution.
DOCTRINE:
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same
judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in
the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of
the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein. It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 (Provisions on Family Home) of
said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to
have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution
Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity
of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state
that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
FACTS
 January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals ordering
Modequillo and Malubay to pay Salinas and Culan-Culan the ff. (not specified for
what acts but its due to a vehicular accident so quasi delict probably)
o the Salinas spouses:
 the amount of P30,000.00 by way of compensation for the death
of their son Audie Salinas;
 P10,000.00 for the loss of earnings by reason of the death of said
Audie Salinas;
 the sum of P5,000.00 as burial expenses of Audie Salinas; and
 the sum of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages.
o Culan-Culan:
  the sum of P5,000.00 for hospitalization expenses of Renato
Culan-Culan; and
 P5,000.00 for moral damages.
o Both Salinas and Culan-Culan,
 P7,000.00 for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses
 The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on
the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay
 July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcels of land in satisfaction of the judgment
o residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur
o agricultural land located at Dalagbong, Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur
 Both in the name of Modequilo
 A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by
defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land located
at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the
commencement of this case
o And that the judgment debt does not fall under exceptions where family
home may be levied against (still did not state the facts that gave rise to
the money judgment zzz)
o As to the agricultural land: although it is declared in the name of
defendant it is alleged to be still part of the public land and the transfer in
his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a
cultural minority was not approved by the proper government agency
 TC: denied motion
Petitioner’s contention, restated
 The residential house and lot was first occupied as his family residence in 1969 and
was duly constituted as a family home under the Family Code which took effect on
August 4, 1988.
 Thus, petitioner argues that the said residential house and lot is exempt from
payment of the obligation enumerated in Article 155 of the Family Code
 And that the decision in this case pertaining to damages arising from a vehicular
accident took place on March 16, 1976 and which became final in 1988 is not one
of those instances enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code when the
family home may be levied upon and sold on execution.
HELD Petition denied
W/N a family home was constituted on the residential property in issue –YES,
but NOT at the time that obligation was incurred, thus it could be levied upon
 Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot
from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the
same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually
resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law.
 The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the
constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein.
As applied
 The residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home
whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family
home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is
deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila
Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
 The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the
time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken.
 Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that “the provisions of this
Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.”
 It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that
all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the
time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from
execution
 Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of
the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
In short
 Property is subject to execution. The debt or liability which was the basis of the
judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16,
1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate
court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution
provided in the Family Code.
On the agricultural land
 As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court correctly ruled
that the levy to be made by the sheriff shall be on whatever rights the petitioner
may have on the land.
o So it is also subject to execution
Family Code provisions on family home
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried
head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it
is situated.
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied
as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by
law.
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment except:
1) For nonpayment of taxes;
2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who
have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
 SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO S. DE MESA v.
SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. and MA. RUFINA D. ACERO,
SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L. SAMONTE and REGISTRAR ALFREDO
SANTOS
January 16, 2012| Reyes, J. | Constitution of the Family Home
Digester: Roa, Annamhel Monique
SUMMARY: Petitioners purchased the subject property and occupied the same as their
family home before the effectivity of the Family Code. A month after the Code’s
effectivity, the wife obtained a loan from Acero, secured by a mortgage over the same
property. The check issued by the said wife bounced upon presentation, prompting Acero
to file a BP 22 case against the petitioners. Though they were acquitted, they were
nevertheless ordered to make payment with legal interest. A writ of execution was issued
upon the property and the Sheriff levied upon the same. It was sold on public auction,
with Acero being the highest bidder. Later, a Final Deed of Sale and a new TCT would
be issued in Acero’s name. Acero leased the property to petitioners and one Juanito Oliva.
Petitioners and Oliva paid to rentals, leading to Acero successfully filing a case for
ejectment against them. This decision was appealed all the way to the CA, which affirmed
the validity of the ejectment. The CA decision became final. Petitioners then filed at the
RTC a complaint to nullify Acero’s TCT and other documents, contending that it was a
family home. The RTC ruled that although the property is indeed a family home, it was
validly levied upon. The CA and the SC both affirmed this.
DOCTRINE: Family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted
as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter,
are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. The settled rule is that the
right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal
privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff,
but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not
sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family
home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff.
FACTS:
 Parcel of land = No. 3 Forbes Street, Mount Carmel Homes Subdivision, Iba,
Meycauayan, Bulacan, formerly covered by TCT No. T-76.725 (M) issued by the
Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan and registered under petitioner Araceli
(Araceli) Oliva-De Mesa’s name
 April 17, 1984 - Petitioners jointly purchased the subject property while they were
still merely cohabiting before marriage. A house was later constructed on the
property, which they occupied as their family home after they got married
sometime in January 1987.
 September 1988 - Araceli obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero, Jr. (Acero) in the
amount of P100,000.00, secured by a mortgage over the subject property. As
payment, Araceli issued a check drawn against China Banking Corporation payable
to Acero.
 The check bounced; the account from which it was drawn had already been closed.
Petitioners failed to heed Acero’s subsequent demand for payment.
 Information was filed with the RTC Malolos for BP 22.
 RTC – Acquitted the petitioners but ordered them to pay Acero the amount
loaned with legal interest from date of demand until fully paid.
 A writ of execution was issued and a Sheriff Samonte levied upon the subject
property. It was sold on public auction, with Acero being the highest bidder and
the corresponding certificate of sale issued to him.
 February 1995 - Acero leased the subject property to petitioners and a certain
Oliva (Oliva). Petitioners and Oliva, however, defaulted in the payment of the rent,
their accountability mounting.
 March 24, 1995 - A Final Deed of Sale over the subject property was issued to
Acero. A month later, petitioners’ TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in
his name.
 Unable to collect the rentals due, Acero and his wife (Sps. Acero) filed a complaint
for ejectment with the MTC Meycuayan against the petitioners and Juanito.
 In their defense, the petitioners claimed that Spouses Acero have no right over the
subject property.
o Petitioners deny that they are mere lessors; on the contrary, they are
the lawful owners of the subject property and, thus cannot be evicted.
 MTC – In favor of Sps. Acero; Ordered petitioners and Juanito to vacate the
subject property; Dismissed the petitioners' claim of ownership over the subject
property; Title belongs to Acero, as shown by TCT; From the time a Torrens title
over the subject property was issued in Acero’s name up to the time the complaint
for ejectment was filed, the petitioners never assailed the validity of the levy made
by Sheriff Samonte, the regularity of the public sale that was conducted thereafter
and the legitimacy of Acero’s Torrens title.
 RTC - Dismissed petitioners’ appeal due to the petitioners’ failure to submit their
Memorandum. MR denied.
 CA – Denied. Decision became final.
 In the interregnum, petitioners filed against the Sps. Acero a complaint to nullify
Acero’s TCT and other documents with damages with the RTC Malolos, asserting
that the subject property is a family home, which is exempt from execution under
the Family Code and, thus, could not have been validly levied upon for purposes of
satisfying the March 15, 1993 writ of execution.
 RTC - Dismissed the petitioners’ complaint. Citing Article 155(3) of the Family
Code, even assuming that the subject property is a family home, the exemption
from execution does not apply. A mortgage was constituted over the subject
property to secure the loan Araceli obtained from Acero and it was levied upon as
payment therefor. MR denied.
 CA – Affirmed; ratiocinating that the exemption of a family home from execution,
attachment or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is not automatic
and should accordingly be raised and proved to the Sheriff prior to the execution,
forced sale or attachment, which petitioners at no time was able to do. MR denied.
 Petitioners filed the instant petition for review.
o Comment of Sps. Acero: Petition ought to be denied on the ground
of forum-shopping as the issues raised had already been determined
by the MTC in its on the complaint for ejectment filed by petitioners,
which had already become final and executory following the
petitioner’s failure to appeal the CA Decision affirming it.
RULING: The petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan dismissed
the complaint for declaration of nullity and other documents, and the Resolution
denying reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
Whether petitioners are guilty of forum shopping - NO.
 Forum-shopping - When two or more actions involve the same transactions,
essential facts, and circumstances; and raise identical causes of action, subject
matter, and issues
 Elements: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same
interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two preceding
particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration
 There is no identity of issues and reliefs prayed for in the ejectment case and in the
action to cancel TCT No. T-221755 (M). Primordial issue in the ejectment case is
who among the contending parties has a better right of possession over the subject
property while ownership is the core issue in an action to cancel a Torrens title.
 The resolution of ownership issue in the ejectment case is only provisional as the
same is solely for the purpose of determining who among the parties therein has a
better right of possession over the subject property.
 Hence, a judgment rendered in an ejectment case is not a bar to action between the
same parties respecting title to the land or building.
Whether the CA erred in refusing to cancel the TCT in the name of Acero – NO.
 The rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from
execution, summarized:
o First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the
Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a
family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;
o Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be
family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was
constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein;
o Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially
constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by
operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
 Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987
(before Family Code effectivity). There was no showing, however, that the same was
judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988, the subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus
prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting
that the subject property was a family home.
 Nevertheless, Court agrees with the CA that the petitioners should have asserted
the subject property being a family home and its being exempted from execution at
the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter.
 Honrado v. CA - At no other time can the status of a residential house as a family
home be set up and proved and its exemption from execution claimed but before
the sale thereof at public auction.
 Sps. Versola v. CA - The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale
under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the
judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the
debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient
that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family
home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff.
Parting Note
 Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of
cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime. From the time of its constitution
and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, is generally exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment. The family home is a real right, which is
gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors
except in certain special cases. However, this right can be waived or be barred
by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the property as a family
home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter.
 The petitioners’ negligence or omission to assert their right within a reasonable
time gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned, waived or declined to
assert it. Since the exemption is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the
petitioners to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not
the sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family
home.
 Simple justice and fairness and equitable considerations demand that Claudio’s title
to the property be respected
 MONCUPA v. ENRILE, Ver, Kintanar, Gorospe, And Castro
January 30, 1986 | Gutierrez, Jr., J. | Writ of Habeas Corpus
Digester: Santos, Ihna
SUMMARY: Moncupa was arrested and detained. On the allegation that he was a
National Democratic Front staff member, a Presidential Commitment Order was issued
against him and 8 other persons. After 2 separate investigations, it was ascertained that
Moncupa was not a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators
recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms
and illegal possession of subversive documents under PD No. 33. Consequently, 2
separate information were filed against Moncupa, one, for illegal possession of firearms
and the other for violation of PD No. 33. During the pendency of this petition, it is
significant that his arraignment and further proceedings have not been pursued. And
yet, Moncupa’s motions for bail were denied by the lower court. Hence, Moncupa filed
the instant petition. The respondents, in their return of the writ, justified the validity of
Moncupa’s detention on the ground that the privilege of the writ had been suspended as
to Moncupa. However, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss stating that Moncupa
was temporarily released from detention on orders of the Minister of National Defense
with the approval of the President. The respondents argued that since Moncupa is free
and no longer under the custody of the respondents, the present petition for habeas
corpus may be deemed moot and academic as in similar cases. SC held that the
respondents’ contention that the petition has become moot and academic must
necessarily be denied. Moncupa may have been released from his detention cell but the
restraints attached to his temporary release preclude freedom of action which warrants
SC’s inquiry into the nature of his involuntary restraint and relieving him of such
restraints as may be illegal. In this case, the reservation of the military in the form of
restrictions attached to the temporary release of Moncupa constitute restraints on his
liberty. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of Moncupa. It is not physical
restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.
DOCTRINE: Temporary release of detainee from detention does not render the
petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic. A release that renders a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from
involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of
his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the
restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a
deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments,
become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail
themselves of the privilege of the writ.
FACTS:
 Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on April 22, 1982 at about 10:50pm,
at the corner of D. Tuazon Street and Quezon Avenue, QC. He was brought to
MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay where he was detained. The next day, on the allegation
that he was a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member, a Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against him and 8 other persons.
 After 2 separate investigations, conducted first, by Lieutenant Colonel Gerardo
Lantoria, Jr., Chief of Task Force Makabansa Investigation Group and second, by
Investigating Fiscal Amado Costales of QC, it was ascertained that Moncupa was
not a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators recommended the
prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal
possession of subversive documents under PD No. 33.
 Consequently, 2 separate information were filed against Moncupa, one, for illegal
possession of firearms before the CFI of Rizal and the other for violation of PD
No. 33 before the City Court of QC. Against the other accused, however, the cases
filed were for violation of PD No. 885, as amended. Significantly, Moncupa was
excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti-Subversion Law.
 During the pendency of this petition, it is significant that his arraignment and
further proceedings have not been pursued. And yet, Moncupa’s motions for bail
were denied by the lower court. Hence, Moncupa filed the instant petition.
 The respondents, in their return of the writ, justified the validity of Moncupa’s
detention on the ground that the privilege of the writ had been suspended as to
Moncupa.
 However, on August 30, 1983, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss stating
that on May 11, 1983, Moncupa was temporarily released from detention on orders
of the Minister of National Defense with the approval of the President. The
respondents argued that since Moncupa is free and no longer under the custody of
the respondents, the present petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and
academic as in similar cases.
Attached to Moncupa’s temporary release are these restrictions imposed on him:
 His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that he gets the
approval of respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila. 

 His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of respondents is
also required in case he wants to change his place of residence. 

 His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should not
“participate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass
media representatives nor give any press release or information that is
inimical to the interest of national security.”
 He is required to report regularly to respondents or their representatives.


RULING: Petition granted. The conditions attached to the temporary release Moncupa
are declared null and void. The temporary release of Moncupa is declared absolute.
Whether the instant petition has become moot anc academic in view of
Moncupa’s temporary release – NO. The respondents have failed to show why
the writ may not issue and why the restraints on Moncupa’s freedom of
movement should not be lifted.
 Moncupa argues that although admittedly his temporary release is an improvement
upon his actual detention, the restrictions imposed by the respondents constitute an
involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom. He stresses that his temporary
 release did not render the instant petitioner moot and academic but that “it merely leaders to the premises of the Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services,
shifted the inquiry from the legality of his actual detention to the legality of the presumably in Manila, as well as the Ministry of Labor. As the voting was to take
conditions imposed by the respondents.” place in the business firm in Bataan, the limits set would nullify whatever efforts
 SC agreed with Moncupa. The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions they could have exerted. To that extent, and with the prohibition against their going
attached to the temporary release of Moncupa constitute restraints on his liberty. to Bataan, the restraint on liberty was undeniable. If so, the moot and academic
Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of Moncupa. It is not physical character of the petition was far from clear.
restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.  Toyota, et al. v. Hon. Fidel Ramos, et al.: Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus
 SC cited several jurisprudences to support its decision (see notes). becomes moot and academic when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioners is
 A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic lifted either temporarily or permanently. We have so held in a number of cases. But
must be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to the instant case presents a different situation. The question to be resolved is
be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is whether the State can reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a
present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but court of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An affirmative
appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, answer is the one suggested by the respondents because the release of the
in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned petitioners being merely “temporary” it follows that they can be re-arrested at any
or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ. time despite their acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. We hold that such
a reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not of men principle.
Under this principle the moment a person is acquitted on a criminal charge he can
NOTES: no longer be detained or re-arrested for the same offense. This concept is so basic
Jurisprudence supporting SC’s ruling: and elementary that it needs no elaboration.
 Villavicencio v. Lukban: The women who had been illegally seized and transported
against their will to Davao were no longer under any official restraint. Unlike
Moncupa, they were free to change their domicile without asking for official
permission. Indeed, some of them managed to return to Manila. Yet, the Court
condemned the involuntary restraints caused by the official action, fined the Mayor
of Manila and expressed the hope that its “decision may serve to bulwark the
fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty
from illegal encroachment.”
 Caunca v. Salazar: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance
to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom
of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the
house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal
freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to
choose one’s residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to
founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of the will. If the
actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of
another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the
individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.
 Tibo v. The Provincial Commander: Although the release in the custody of the
Deputy Minister did not signify that petitioners could once again enjoy their full
freedom, the application could have been dismissed, as it could be withdrawn by
the parties themselves. That is a purely voluntary act. When the hearing was held
on September 7, 1978, it turned out that counsel for petitioner Bonifacio V. Tupaz
could have acted in a hasty manner when he set forth the above allegations in his
manifestation of August 30, 1978, for Attorney Jose C. Espinas, who appeared for
petitioners, while conceding that there was such a release from confinement, also
alleged that it was conditioned on their restricting their activities as labor union
NBI Director Epimaco VELASCO et al v. CA and Felicitas Cuyag for Lawrence
Larkins
July 7, 1995 | Davide, Jr., J. | Writ of Habeas Corpus
Digester: Solis, Jose Miguel
SUMMARY: On September 1993, a warrant of arrest was issued by the Pasig RTC
against Larkins for an alleged violation of BP 22. Meanwhile, on November 1994,
Larkins was arrested for rape after one Desiree Alinea filed a complaint-affidavit with
the NBI stating the crime happened on November 19 in Valley Golf, Antipolo. Larkins
then posted for bail on the BP 22 charge and the Pasig RTC allowed it. However, the
NBI refused to release Larkins arguing that he was being detained for another cause
(rape) for which he would be held for inquest. The RTC of Antipolo having jurisdiction
over the rape case held that he was legally detained even after the judge who issued the
warrant for BP 22 has ordered his release because of the rape charges. The CA reversed
this ordering his release since he was illegally detained for 1 day since he has posted bail.
The Supreme Court held for herein petitioners stating that persons may be detained
upon submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court. Upon posting bail, it was
deemed that he submitted himself on court jurisdiction. It further explained that any
illegal detention is cured by this and the charge that followed.
DOCTRINE: The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such person is
charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.
FACTS:
 On September 1993, a warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Padolina (Pasig RTC)

against Lawrence A. Larkins for violation of BP 22. 
 complaint but by the issuance of a warrant of arrest or warrant of commitment. No
 While on 20 November 1994, one Desiree Alinea filed a complaint-affidavit in the
NBI accusing Larkins 
of rape committed against her on 19 November 1994 at
Valley Golf, Cainta, Rizal.
The following day, the NBI Special Investigators arrested Larkins in his office at
Makati sans 
warrant of arrest and was detained in the NBI Detention Cell at Taft,
Manila.
 The day following his arrest, Larkins posted a bail bond of P4,000 for the BP 22
Criminal Case. Thereafter, Judge Padolina cancelled the arrest warrant issued for
the BP 22 violation and ordered the release of Larkins unless otherwise detained
for some other cause. The NBI Special Investigators refused to release him because
he was detained for the crime of rape 
for which he would be held for inquest. 
 an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had
 On 23 November, a complaint for rape against Larkins was executed by Alinea.
 Then on 2 December 1994, the complaint for rape was filed with the RTC of
Antipolo and assigned 
to Judge Caballes.
 On the other hand, Atty. Ulep (Counsel of Larkins) filed an urgent motion for bail,
alleging that the evidence of guilt against Larkins for rape is not strong and that
Medico Legal report indicates that Alinea’s hymen is still intact (not lacerated nor
ruptured). Moreover, Atty. Ulep said that Larkins is entitled as a matter of right to
bail and that he also had no intention to leave the country. 

 6 December 1994, Larkin’s new lawyer Atty. Theodore Te filed an Urgent
Omnibus Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate Release,
principally based on the alleged illegality of the warrant of arrest.
 RTC: Refused to dismiss the complaint, to release the accused and to grant Larkins
bail. Issued a hold departure order against Larkins. 
Felicitas Cuyag, the common
law wife of Larkins, filed a petition for Habeas Corpus with Certiorari.
 CA: Ordered the NBI to appear and produce Larkins before the court and to show
cause why Larkins’ liberty is being restrained. Thereafter, the CA decided to release
Larkins because he was detained without a warrant of arrest which did not meet the
requirements of Rule 113 ROC. 

RULING: Petition granted.
Whether the NBI is justified in detaining Larkins despite the lack of an arrest
warrant for the crime he is being held for – YES.
Whether a writ of habeas corpus is proper in Larkin’s case – NO.
PETITIONERS:
 Larkins had already been charged with the crime of Rape and that he applied for
bail (thereby submitting himself to the Jurisdiction of the court). Ergo, the writ is
no longer available.
RESPONDENTS:
 Habeas Corpus is rendered unavailing not by the mere filing of information or
warrant of arrest nor warrant of commitment was issued so Habeas Corpus is still
available.
COURT:
 Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or
discharge from custody. In the case at bar, even if the arrest was illegal, the restraint
of liberty being questioned is already by virtue of the complaint or information and,
therefore, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available since the previous
illegality has already been cured.
 The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such person is charged
before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. 

 Moreover, by filing his motion for bail in the rape case, Larkins admitted that he
was under the custody of the court and voluntarily submitted his person to its
jurisdiction. It is settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is
tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
 When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue
of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to
the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court's jurisdiction
over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the
complaint, files any dilatory plea, or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court
jurisdiction over his person. The Urgent Omnibus Motion for Dismissal of the
Complaint and Immediate Release filed by the new counsel was made too late since
it was filed after the filing of the Urgent Motion for Bail.
 Nevertheless, the court chastised the NBI based on the following a) After the
warrantless arrest, Larkins was not delivered to the nearest police station, b) He was
not delivered to Judicial Authorities within 36 hours but to the custody of NBI, c)
It took some time before the complaint previously executed was actually filed in
court. Moreover, the Trial Court did not conduct a hearing on the Urgent Motion
for Bail. Well, this is also partly Larkins’ fault since he should have pressed on for a
hearing for bail. 
 liberty; and (4) a copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person. The
Whether the common law wife of Larkins has standing to file the petition for
habeas corpus – YES.
 The common law wife of Larkins had the standing to file a petition for Habeas
Corpus because she falls within the term “some person” provided in Section 3,
Rule 102 of ROC. However, she is not the proper person to file the petition for
certiorari aspect of this case since it can only be filed by Larkins.
 Although normally, the writ of Habeas Corpus will not be granted when there is an
adequate remedy available such as writ of error, appeal, or writ of certiorari, it may
nevertheless be available in exceptional circumstances.
For the writ should not be considered subservient to procedural limitations which
glorify form over substance. It must be kept in mind that although the question
most often considered in both habeas corpus and certiorari proceedings is whether an
inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, the former involves a collateral attack
on the judgment and “reaches the body but not the record” while the latter assails
directly the judgment and “reaches the record but not the body.”
 considering the quantity of the prohibited drug involved, is 6 months of arresto
NOTES:
 For those details which are not important but seems important.
CRUZ v. CA
January 19, 2000 | Puno, J. | Writ of habeas corpus
Digester: Sumagaysay, Rev
SUMMARY: 1992, Cruz was found guilty for violation of RA 6425 by the RTC for
selling 2.70 grams of marijuana and sentenced to life imprisonment. Meanwhile, RA
7659 was enacted amending the penalties applicable to the Dangerous Drugs Act of RA
6425. The applicable penalty was 6 mos 1 day to 6 years. This petition for habeas corpus
was filed since Cruz had already served 6 years and 3 months. The SC granted the
petition.
DOCTRINE: An application for the writ of habeas corpus is made upon verified
petition setting forth: (1) that the person in whose behalf the application is made is
imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; (2) the officer or name of the person by whom
he is imprisoned or restrained; (3) the place where he is imprisoned or restrained of his
writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty.
FACTS:
 1992, petitioner David Cruz was charged before the RTC Manila with a violation of
RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for selling 2.70 grams of marijuana.
He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appealed.
 RA 7659 and People v. Sunga was promulgated ruling that the applicable penalty for
selling less than 750 grams was reduced to prision correccional to reclusion
temporal.
 Cruz filed with an "Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal." Attached to the motion
was the Indorsement of Assistant Director Jesus P. Villanueva, Bureau of
Corrections, stating that the legal effects of the Motion were adequately explained
to Cruz. This was referred to the CA.
 1995, CA held in abeyance its resolution on the motion to withdraw appeal and
noted that the penalty imposable for the offense charged against David Cruz,
mayor, as the minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as the maximum, and that by 1996 Cruz shall have served the
maximum penalty imposable.
 1997, Meanwhile, Cruz’s counsel was required to file an appellant’s brief three
times but none was filed so the appeal was declared as abandoned.
 1998, petitioner’s mother, Maria Cruz sought the assistance of OLA, UP Law.
Hence this petitioner for certiorari and habeas corpus.
RULING: Petition granted.
Whether the CA erred in declaring the appeal of petitioner David Cruz as
abandoned and dismissed – NO.
 Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure :
 o Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to
prosecute.-The appellate, court may, upon motion of the
appellee or on its own motion and notice to the appellant,
dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within
the time prescribed by this Rule, except in case the appellant is
represented by a counsel de oficio.
 An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, upon motion of the appellee
or upon the court's own motion, if the appellant fails to file his brief within the
prescribed time. The only exception is when the appellant is represented by counsel
de officio.
 Petitioner David Cruz was represented not by counsel de officio, but by counsel of
his own choice. His lawyer, Atty. Carmelo Arcilla, was counsel de parte before the
trial court, before this Court on appeal, and before the Court of Appeals. There is
nothing in the records that would show that Atty. Arcilla withdrew his
representation of petitioner. On the contrary, the notice from the Court of Appeals
requiring the filing of the appellant's brief was received by Atty. Arcilla. And
despite this receipt, still no appellant's brief was filed. It was more than three (3)
months later that the appellate court issued the questioned Resolution. By
dismissing David Cruz's appeal, the Court of Appeals acted within its discretion.
Whether a new trial to determine penalty should be granted – NO.
 A new trial to determine his penalty cannot be granted petitioner. A motion for
new trial may be granted by the Court of Appeals only on the ground of newly
discovered evidence material to the accused's defense. This is clear from Section 14,
Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:
o Sec. 14. Motion for new trial.-At any time after the appeal from the
lower court has been perfected and before the judgment of the
appellate court convicting the accused becomes final, the latter may
move for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence
material to his defense, the motion to conform to the provisions of
Section 4, Rule 121.
 In the 1994 case of People v. Simon y Sunga, we held that for drugs with quantities
weighing 750 grams or more, and for drugs with quantities weighing below 750
grams, reclusion perpetua could not be imposed twice. The penalty of "prision
correccional" to reclusion perpetua" for drug offenses where the quantity involved
is less than those enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 17 of R.A. 7659 was
construed as "prision correccional to reclusion temporal." This was the range of the
imposable penalty for drugs weighing less than 750 grams and the proper penalty
depended on the quantity of the drug involved. If the drug weighs less than 250
grams, the penalty to be imposed is prision correctional; from 250 grams to 499
grams, prision mayor; and from 500 grams to 749 grams, reclusion temporal.
 In the instant case, the amount of marijuana for which David Cruz was convicted is
2.70 grams. The imposable penalty for this amount under the Simon ruling is
prision correctional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six
(6) years. Presently, David Cruz has already served six (6) years and three (3)
months of his sentence which is way beyond the last day of prision correccional.
The continued detention of Cruz at, the National Penitentiary has been admitted by
the Solicitor General as already illegal. David Cruz should therefore be released
from prison without further delay.
 An application for the writ of habeas corpus is made upon verified petition
setting forth: (1) that the person in whose behalf the application is made is
imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; (2) the officer or name of the person
by whom he is imprisoned or restrained; (3) the place where he is
imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; and (4) a copy of the commitment or
cause of detention of such person. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty.

Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be granted – YES.

 David, was tried and convicted by the trial court for violation of Article II, Section
4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He was convicted on September 27, 1993
and sentenced to life imprisonment and its accessory penalties. He was committed
to the National Penitentiary on October 13, 1993. On December 31, 1993, RA
7659 took effect. This law amended provisions of several penal laws, including the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
 The penalty for the illegal sale of marijuana under the old law was "life
imprisonment to death." Under R.A. 7659, the penalty depended on the quantity of
the drug. The sale of "750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana" became
punishable by reclusion perpetua, to death. The penalty for the sale of less than 750
grams of marijuana was reduced to a range "from prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua, depending upon the quantity" of the drug.
 DAVID SO, on behalf of daughter, MARIA ELENA SO GUISANDE v. HON.
ESTEBAN TACLA, JR., DR. BERNAROD VICENTE
HON. TACLA JR., PEOPLE v. SO
October 19, 2010 | Nachura, J. | Writ of Habeas Corpus
Digester: Tan, Raya Grace
SUMMARY: Guisande was accused of Qualified Theft in the criminal case pending
before Judge Tacla. So, in filing for the issuance of the writs of habeas corpus and
amparo alleged that Guisande was under a life-threatening situation while confined at
the NCMH to ascertain the actual psychological state of Guisande, who was being
charged with a non-bailable offense. The independent forensic assessment of Guisande
revealed that she has Bipolar I Disorder but nevertheless competent to stand trial.
During the pendency of the consolidated petitions, the criminal case against Guisande
was dismissed. OSG then filed MTD of the petitions. Granted. Moot and academic
because the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo was based on the
criminal case already dismissed.
DOCTRINE: The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act
or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of confinement and custody
for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to violate, a person’s life, liberty, and
security for amparo cases should be illegal or unlawful.
FACTS:
 Before us are consolidated petitions
o (1) Petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo filed by David
So, on behalf of his daughter Ma. Elena So Guisande, against Judge
Esteban A. Tacla, Jr and Dr. Bernardo A. Vicente.
o (2) Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the OSG
on behalf of Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente of the NCMH, assailing the
Resolution of the CA.
 Guisande was accused of Qualified Theft in the criminal case pending before Judge
Tacla. Prior to the criminal proceedings, Guisande was committed by so for
psychiatric treatment and care at the Makati Medical Center (MMC).
 The warrant for the arrest of Guisande, issued by Judge Tacla, was returned stating
that the former was confined at MMC for Bipolar Mood Disorder and that she was
“not ready for discharge,” as certified by her personal psychiatrist, Dr. Tan.
 Judge Tacla ordered Guisande’s referral to the NCMH for an independent forensic
assessment of Guisande’s mental health to determine if she would be able to stand
arraignment and undergo trial for Qualified Theft. NCMH Chief Dr. Vicente was
to have temporary custody of the accused.
 Accused Guisande was confined at the NCMH Payward, Pavilion 6-I-E, instead of
Pavilion 35, Forensic Psychiatric Section, where female court case patients are
usually confined at the NCMH.
 Claiming “life-threatening” circumstances surrounding her confinement at the
NCMH which supposedly worsened her mental condition and violated her
constitutional rights against solitary detention and assistance of counsel, Guisande
So simultaneously, albeit separately, filed a Motion for Relief from Solitary
Confinement before the RTC Mandaluyong City, and the present petition for the
issuance of the writs of habeas corpus and amparo.
 RTC granted the motion subject the condition that only the accused’s counsel and
the accused’s physician on her hypothyroid condition are allowed to visit the
accused in coordination with the respective psychiatrist/doctor of the NCMH
taking charge of the psychiatric examination upon accused. Joint writ of habeas
corpus and amparo was issued and referred to CA.
 December 3, 2009, NCMH submitted its evaluation report diagnosing Guisande
with Bipolar I Disorder. But no manifest signs and symptoms of psychosis at the
present time. Neither a manic episode nor a severe depressive episode was
manifested during her confinement at our center, despite voluntarily not taking her
medication is. Although she is complaining of mood symptoms, these are not
severe enough to impair her fitness to stand trial. She is therefore deemed
competent to stand the rigors of court trial.
 CA closed and terminated the petition for writ of habeas corpus and amparo.
Although the case involves a non-bailable offense where normally the Accused
should have been confined in jail, considering the peculiarities of this case, the
parties have all agreed to the set up as provided in this Order – the patient shall be
confined at the St. Clare’s Medical Center, her hospital of choice, under the
headship of Dr. Yat.
 During the pendency of these consolidated cases, the following events happened:
o February 4, 2010, Judge Tacla ordered the dismissal of the Criminal
Case. Therefore, the issuance of TRO has been rendered moot and
academic.
o In view of the dismissal of the criminal case, petition for writ of
habeas corpus and writ of amparo should be dismissed for having
been rendered moot and academic.
 OSG thus filed a motion to dismiss. So opposed because they filed criminal
complaints and an administrative case against Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente, as well
as NCMH and attending doctor thereat, for purported violations of accused
Guisande’s rights during her confinement at the NCMH. So further filed a petition
to cite Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente in contempt before the CA for their supposed
submission of an altered and falsified document.
 OSG filed another Manifestation and Motion reiterating its motion to dismiss and
informing the court of the following:
o June 7, 2010 resolution dismissing the charge of falsification.
o July 27, 2010 resolution where petitioner So’s verified petition for
contempt was dismissed for lack of merit, and where the CA ordered
the petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo closed and terminated
RULING: Petitions denied for being moot and academic.
WoN the consolidated cases should be dismissed – YES, the cases have been
rendered moot and academic by the dismissal of Criminal Case for Qualified Theft
pending before the RTC Mandaluyong City.
 As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the petition for the writs of habeas corpus
and amparo was based on the criminal case for Qualified Theft against Guisande.
With the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no
longer under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH.
Effectively, accused Guisande’s person, and treatment of any medical and mental
malady she may or may not have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful
processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. NOW MOOT AND ACADEMIC!
 The question before the CA was correctly limited to which hospital, the NCMH or
a medical facility of accused’s own choosing, accused Guisande should be referred
for treatment of a supposed mental condition. It was procedurally proper for the
RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate opinion on accused’s mental fitness to be
arraigned and stand trial.
 The Resolutions of the CA and Assistant City Prosecutor Escobar-Pilares,
unmistakably foreclose the justiciability of the petitions before this Court.
Re: Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus1 and Amparo2 [copy-pasted the entire court’s
discussion on it kasi maikli lang]
 The act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of confinement
and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to violate, a person’s life,
liberty, and security for amparo cases should be illegal or unlawful.
 The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee
the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that
vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted
in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced
disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted
judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and
undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes
less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the
basis of unsubstantiated allegations.
 The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the
individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of
movement or place under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s
liberty is restrainted via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.
Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the
restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action.
1 Rule 102, Sec. 1. To what habeas corpus extends. - Except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which
the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether
or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application
for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely
nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised
and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. x x x The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient.
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire
into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ
will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such
restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ
should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise,
again the writ will be refused.
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course
or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial
discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to
whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to
the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully
restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the
respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant of the person in
whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed.
NOTES:

2 Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is
a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
 ILUSORIO v. BILDNER
May 12, 2000 | Pardo, J. |
Digester: Valena, Maria Patricia S.
SUMMARY: Erlinda filed a petition for habeas corpus with the CA, alleging that
respondents (her two daughters) prevented her from seeing her husband Ilusorio. The
CA dismissed the petition upon finding that Ilusorio was completely sane and was not
being held against his will, but granted Erlinda visitation rights. The Supreme Court
upheld the dismissal of the petition but reversed the order granting visitation rights,
ruling that the CA exceeded its powers in issuing the same, which were not even prayed
for.
DOCTRINE: To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an
illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty
must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
FACTS:
 Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio, who is about 86
years of age and possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For
many years, he was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club.
 Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio were married on July 11, 1942. In 1972,
they separated for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta
Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio
Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand,
Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
 The spouses had six children: Ramon Ilusorio, Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner, Maximo,
Sylvia, Marietta, and Shereen.
 On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from the US, he stayed with
Erlinda for about five months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda
alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg
instead of 100 mg Zoloft, and as a consequence, his health deteriorated.
 On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Antipolo City a petition for
guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s
advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
 On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano
did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium,
Makati.
 Erlinda filed a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano,
alleging that respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and
prohibited him from returning to Antipolo City. The CA dismissed this petition but
ordered that Erlinda be granted visitation rights. Both parties appealed.
RULING: Petition denied.
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for the writ of habeas corpus –
NO.
 A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by
which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.
 Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to
produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and
cause of his capture and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the
court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf. It is a high
prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the great object of which is the
liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause. It is issued
when one is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising legal
custody over another person.

 It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of
his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the
restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation
of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom.
 The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if restraint is
illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal
and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty
must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
 There was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’ liberty
that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that he is about 86 years of age,
or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated.
Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity
of the individual to discern his actions.

 Potenciano did not request the administrator of the Cleveland Condominium not
to allow his wife and other children from seeing or visiting him. He made it clear
that he did not object to seeing them. As to his mental state, the Court of Appeals
observed that he was of sound and alert mind, having answered all the relevant
questions to the satisfaction of the court. Being of sound mind, he is thus
possessed with the capacity to make choices. He made it clear before the Court of
Appeals that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people.
 With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano may not
be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive
him of his right to privacy. The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it
awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even
prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of his sanity.
The CA also emphasized that the same shall be enforced under penalty of
contempt - Such assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary.
 In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do
so. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with
his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus
carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond
judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.

TUNG CHIN HUI v. RODRIGUEZ, Commissioner of Immigration
April 2, 2001 | Panganiban, J. | Writ of Habeas Corpus
Digester: Venturanza, Maria
SUMMARY: Petitioner, a Taiwanese national, was arrested and turned over to the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). The BID subsequently issued a
Summary Deportation order, finding him guilty of possessing a tampered passport
earlier cancelled by Taiwanese authorities. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus on the ground that his detention was illegal. The RTC granted his petition.
Respondents filed a notice of appeal 17 days after receipt of judgment, which was
granted due course. The CA subsequently overturned the decision of the RTC and the
Court affirmed this. On the procedural aspect, the Court held that the appeal from the
trial court was proper. It was filed within the reglementary period because the
reglementary period for filing an appeal in a habeas corpus case is now similar to that in
ordinary civil actions.
Regarding the substantive issues, the Court found that petitioner’s confinement was in
accord with the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, which provides that aliens who
violate the condition upon which he was admitted to the country, one of which is to
present an unexpired passport, shall be arrested upon the warrant of the BID and
deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner. Moreover, there was sufficient
evidence to show that he was an undocumented alien, including official letters of the
Taiwan Economic and Cultural Offices, which state that petitioner was using a passport
already cancelled in 1995.
DOCTRINE: The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or
detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued.
FACTS:
 The Petitioner, a Taiwanese national, arrived in this country on November 5, 1998,
as a temporary visitor. A few days later, he was arrested by several policemen, who
turned him over to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). Petitioner
was duly charged.
 The BID Board of Commissioners issued a Summary Deportation Order dated
November 25, 1998, finding him guilty of possessing a tampered passport earlier
cancelled by Taiwanese authorities.
 On December 11, 1998, petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a Petition for
Habeas Corpus on the ground that his detention was illegal.
 Trial Court: Granted petitioner’s petition and ordered his release. MR Denied.
o Respondents received the trial court’s Order on January 29, 1999. They then
filed a Notice of Appeal on February 16, 1999, which granted due course to
the Notice of Appeal on February 18, 1999.
 Court of Appeals: Appeal granted. Petition for habeas corpus dismissed.
 Meanwhile, during the pendency of the proceedings before the CA, petitioner filed
a Petition for Certiorari before the Court, contending that the RTC should have
rejected the appeal for allegedly being filed late - beyond the 48-hour period
provided under the pre-1997 Rules of Court. The Court denied the petition.
RULING: Petition denied.
Whether the appeal from the trial court was improper – NO.
 Argument of petitioner: Appeal not proper for (1) it was filed beyond the
reglementary period provided under the pre-1997 Rules of Court and (2) it assailed
not a judgment but a resolution denying a motion for reconsideration, contrary to
Section 1 of Rule 41.
 Argument rejected. The reglementary period for filing an appeal in a habeas corpus
case is now similar to that in ordinary civil actions and is governed by Section 3,
Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30)
days from notice of the judgment or final order.
 Moreover, in referring to the trial court’s ‘judgment’, respondents were clearly
appealing the January 7, 1999 Decision. Had they thought otherwise, they would
have referred to the ‘Order’. Indeed, ‘judgment’ is normally synonymous with
‘decision’.
Whether the writ of habeas corpus was proper – NO, confinement was not illegal
and there was no justification for a writ of habeas corpus.
 Habeas corpus is a writ directed to a person detaining another, commanding the
former to produce the body of the latter at a designated time and place. Section 1,
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that “the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto.”
o The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or
detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued.
 In the present case, petitioner’s confinement is in accord with Section 37 (a) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, which reads as follows:
Section 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration or of another officer designated by him for the purpose
and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a
determination by the Board of Commissioner of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien:
xxx
(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition
under which he was admitted as a non-immigrant;
 One such condition for the admission of aliens is found in Section 10 of the same
law, which requires them to “present for admission into the Philippines unexpired
passports or official documents in the nature of passports issued by the
governments of the countries to which they owe allegiance or other travel
documents showing their origins and identity as prescribed by regulations xxx.”
 Herein petitioner was properly charged before the BID for illegally entering the  Petitioner has not discharged this burden. He has not controverted either before
Philippines with the use of a passport issued to another person and cancelled by the the RTC, the CA or this Court the Board of Commissioners’ ruling that he was in
Taiwanese government in 1995. Subsequently, the BID Board of Commissioners fact Chen Kuan-Yuan, who was “sentenced to 8 years and 2 months’ imprisonment
issued the Summary Deportation Order. for drug trafficking and violation of controlling guns, ammunition and knives law”
and was holding a passport cancelled by the Republic of China in 1995.
Whether there was sufficient evidence to show that petitioner was an
undocumented alien – YES.  Argument of petitioner: At the time of his detention, there was no deportation
 Argument of petitioner: No evidence was presented to prove that he was an charge filed against him.
“undocumented alien”; that is, that he tampered with a passport that had already  Assuming arguendo that his arrest was illegal, supervening events bar his
been cancelled by the Taiwanese government. He further contends that he was in subsequent release.
fact allowed to enter the Philippines seventeen times from 1995 to 1998,  In this case, when the Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed, petitioner had already
notwithstanding the alleged cancellation of his passport in 1995. been charged and ordered deported by the Board of Commissioners.
 These contentions are not meritorious. The Return of the Writ submitted by
respondents before the trial court clearly shows that petitioner had lawfully been
charged and ordered deported for being an undocumented alien. Section 13, Rule
102 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that “the return [of the writ] shall be
considered prima facie evidence of the cause of the restraint xxx”
 Moreover, attached to the Return of the Writ were copies of official letters of the
Taiwan Economic and Cultural Offices. These documents show that petitioner,
whose real name is Chen Kuan-Yuan, was using a passport that had already been
cancelled by the Taiwanese government in 1995 and previously issued to a man
named Tung Chin Hui.
o The letters show that the Philippine government was informed about the
cancellation only in 1998, which is why he was allowed to enter the country in
1995.
o Furthermore, the foregoing letters of the official representative of the
Taiwanese government belie petitioner’s submission that there was no
evidence to prove the findings of the CA and the Board of Commissioners.
Verily, these documents constitute sufficient justification for his deportation.

Whether petitioner was accorded due process – YES.

 Argument of petitioner: Petitioner relies on the ruling of the trial court, which
said “[w]hile it may be true that there is a Summary Deportation Order against the
petitioner allegedly for being [an] undocumented alien, having used a passport
which had already been cancelled, there is no showing that he was informed about
it.”
 Other than petitioner’s bare allegations, however, we find no sufficient basis to
overturn the presumption that the BID conducted its proceedings in accordance
with law.
 In any event, when petitioner filed the Petition for Habeas Corpus before the RTC,
he was afforded ample opportunity to air his side and to assail the legal and factual
bases of the Board of Commissioners’ Summary Deportation Order. Moreover, he
could have raised the same points in the proceedings before the CA and even
before this Court. Indeed, an alien has the burden of proof to show that he entered
the Philippines lawfully.
 Tijing v. Court of Appeals
March 8, 2001 | Quisumbing, J. |
Digester: Villafuerte, Beatriz C.
SUMMARY: Bienvenida was a laundrywoman of Angelita Diamante. One day,
Angelita went to Bienvenida’s house for an urgent laundry job. Since, Bienvenida was
on her way to the market, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She left her four
month old son Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita. When Bienvenida returned,
Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida later learned that Angelita moved to
another place. Years later, Bienvenida read in the tabloid about the death of Angelita’s
common-law husband whose remains were lying in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida and
her husband immediately went to Hagonoy and allegedly found her son, Edgardo, Jr.,
for the first time in four years. She demanded Angelita to return the child to her but the
former refused. Bienvenida and her husband then filed the present petition for habeas
corpus. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Bienvenida and ordered that the person of
the child be turned over to her and her husband. It ruled that petition for habeas corpus
was the proper remedy and that it was established that the child found was actually
Bienvenido’s son. (see ratio for pieces of evidence considered by the Court in
establishing the child’s identity)
DOCTRINE:
Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought of to
be distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one and the same. Petitioners must
convincingly establish that the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is
made is the person upon whom they have rightful custody. If there is doubt on the
identity of the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made, petitioners
cannot invoke with certainty their right of custody over the said minor.
FACTS:
 Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered
nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the
laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of
Tondo, Manila.
 According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her
for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing,
she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-month old son,
Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the
child while Bienvenida was doing laundry.
 When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were
gone.
 Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelitas house in Tondo, Manila, but did not
find them there. Angelitas maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a
stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelitas house
after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to another
place. Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police
who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance.
 Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not imagine how her
spouse would react to the disappearance of their youngest child and this made her
problem even more serious. As fate would have it, Bienvenida and her husband
reconciled and together, this time, they looked for their missing son in other places.
Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.
 Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of
Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains
were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida lost no time in going to
Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time
after four years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin
Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez.
She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to do
so.
 Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in
order to recover their son.
o Petitioners presented two witnesses, namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin
Lopez.
o Lourdes Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo
Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She supported
her testimony with her clinical records.
o Benjamin Lopez, declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not
have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile. He
recalled that Tomas met an accident and bumped his private part against the
edge of a banca causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-
bearing capacity. Benjamin further declared that Tomas admitted to him that
John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son and that he and Angelita were
not blessed with children.
 Angelita’s claim:
o She is the natural mother of the child.
o She asserts that at age 42, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27,
1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila.
o She added, though, that she has two other children with her real husband,
Angel Sanchez.
o She said the birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-law
husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on August 4,
1989.
 [RTC] Granted petition for Habeas Corpus, as such, respondent Angelita
Diamante was ordered to immediately release from her personal custody minor
John Thomas Lopez and turn his person to petitioners, Spouses Edgardo Tijing
and Bienvenida Tijing.
o Since Angelita and her common-law husband could not have children, the
alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility.
o The minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity.
o Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are
 one and the same person who is the natural child of petitioners.
o Branch Sheriff of this Court, Carlos Bajar, was also commanded to
implement the decision of this Court by assisting herein petitioners in the
recovery of the person of their minor son, Edgardo Tijing Jr., the same
person as John Thomas D. Lopez
 Angelita seasonably filed her notice of appeal.
 Nonetheless, on August 3, 1994, the sheriff implemented the order of the trial
court by taking custody of the minor. In his report, the sheriff stated that Angelita
peacefully surrendered the minor and he turned over the custody of said child to
petitioner Edgardo Tijing.
 [Court of Appeals] Reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial
court. It directed the custody of the minor to be returned to respondent Angelita
Diamant
o The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus.
o In its view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to
establish that she was the mother of the minor.
o It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and
John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person.
 Hence instant petition
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed DECISION
of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and decision of the Regional Trial Court is
REINSTATED.
Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy—YES.
Writ of habeas corpus
 The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
 Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a
minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free
will.
 It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal
and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the
availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of
determining the right of custody over a child.
 It must be stressed too that in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is
relevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions including those as to
identity of the person.
As applied
 In this case, the minors identity is crucial in determining the propriety of the writ
sought. Thus, it must be resolved first whether the Edgardo Tijing, Jr., claimed by
Bienvenida to be her son, is the same minor named John Thomas Lopez, whom
Angelita insists to be her offspring.
Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the
same person and is the son of petitioners—YES.
 We must first determine who between Bienvenida and Angelita is the minors
biological mother.
 Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought
of to be distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one and the same.
Petitioners must convincingly establish that the minor in whose behalf the
application for the writ is made is the person upon whom they have rightful
custody. If there is doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf the
application for the writ is made, petitioners cannot invoke with certainty their right
of custody over the said minor.
 A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence
presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez
is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
1. There is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children.
 she admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent
ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas
Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974.
 Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she
offered no evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or
for a period of ten years.
 The midwife who allegedly delivered the child was not presented in
court.
 No clinical records, log book or discharge order from the clinic were
ever submitted.
2. There is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer
capable of siring a son.
 Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile
because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John
Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son.
 Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children
after almost fifteen years together.
 Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent for fourteen
years, they also bore no offspring.
3. It is unusual that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas
Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the
alleged birth of the child.
 Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at
birth should cause the registration of such birth.
 Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the
birth of his child.
 The certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty
days after the birth.
  Significantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and
private respondent were legally married on October 31, 1974, in
Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even private respondent had
admitted she is a common-law wife. This false entry puts to doubt the
other data in said birth certificate.
4. The trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were
both in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and
head shapes.
 Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and
material evidence to establish parentage.
 The trial courts conclusion should be given high respect, it having had
the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor and
petitioner concerned.
5. Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenidas giving birth to
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic.
 Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of
a log book, discharge order and the signatures of petitioners.
Final Note
 Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available.
 Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for
identification and parentage testing.
o The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-
NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis.
o The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two
(2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The
DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to
establish parentage.
 Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is
still open to challenge.
 Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results
of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject
said result is to deny progress. Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to
DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt
resolution of parentage and identity issues.
SALIENTES v. ABANILLA
August 29, 2006| Quisimbing, J. |Writ of Habeas Corpus
Digester: Agustin, Chrissete
SUMMARY: Abanilla and Salientes are the parents of Lorenzo Abanilla. Due to in-
laws problems, Abanilla suggested to Salientes that they move to their own house (they
were still living with Salientes’ parents), but Salientes refused. When Abanilla left the
house, he was prevented from seeing his son. Abanilla then filed a petition for habeas
corpus and custody before the RTC. The RTC ordered the Salienteses to produce and
bring before the court the body of Lorenzo. The CA and the SC affirmed the RTC
Order. Contrary to the contention of the Salienteses that the Order violates Art. 213,
the Court held that the RTC did not rule on the custody of Lorenzo, but it merely
directed the Salienteses to produce the minor in court. It was merely a precedent to the
RTC’s full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending.
DOCTRINE: Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is
withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 (FC), Loran and Marie
Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody.
Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be
adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one
parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present
case, private respondent’s cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his
child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available
to him.
FACTS:
 Loran S.D. Abanilla and Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents of the
minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie Antonette’s parents.
 Due to in-laws problems, Loran Abanilla suggested to his wife that they transfer to
their own house, but she refused. So, he alone left the house of the Salientes.
Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son.
 Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative of his
son, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody before the RTC of Muntinlupa.
 RTC: On January 23, 2003, the RTC ordered the respondents (petitioners in this
case) to produce and bring before the RTC the body of Lorenzo Emmanuel
Salientes Abanilla on January 31, 2003 at 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon and to show
cause why the said child should not be discharged from restraint.
 Petitioners filed MR – Denied. Petitioners filed certiorari with the CA,
 CA: Affirmed RTC Order. The January 23, 2003 Order did not award the custody
of the 2- year-old child to any one but was simply the standard order issued for the
production of restrained persons. CA held that the RTC was still about to conduct
a full inquiry, in a summary proceeding, on the cause of the minor’s detention and
the matter of his custody.
 Petitioners filed MR – Denied. Petitioners appealed to the SC via certiorari.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November
10, 2003 and the Resolution dated March 19, 2004 of the CA are AFFIRMED.
Whether the CA erred when it dismissed the petition for certiorari against the present case, private respondent’s cause of action is the deprivation of his
trial court’s orders dated January 23, 2003 (granting of habeas corpus) and right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas
February 24, 2003 (denial of MR) – NO corpus is available to him.
PETITIONERS:  In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the supreme consideration. The
 Order is contrary to Article 213 (FC) which provides that no child under seven Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions
years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the
reasons to order otherwise. Loran had the burden of showing any compelling paramount consideration
reason but failed to present even a prima facie proof thereof.  Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to any of
 Even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper remedy for private the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and
respondent was simply an action for custody, but not habeas corpus. Petitioners assert explain why private respondent is prevented from seeing his child. This is in line
that habeas corpus is unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the right with the directive in Section 9 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC (Rules on Custody of
of custody of the minor. There was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors) that
by his own mother. There was no need for the mother to show cause and explain within 15 days after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to
the custody of her very own child. file answer, the court shall issue an order requiring the respondent (herein
RESPONDENT: petitioners) to present the minor before the court. This was exactly what the
 Article 213, FC applies only to the second part of his petition regarding the custody court did.
of his son. It does not address the first part, which pertains to his right as the father  Moreover, Article 213 (FC) deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and
to see his son. serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can
 The writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who restrains the minor’s raise it as a counter argument for private respondent’s petition for custody. But it is
right to see his father and vice versa. not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said
 The instant petition is merely filed for delay, for had petitioners really intended to provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of
bring the child before the court in accordance with the new rules on custody of age.
minors, they would have done so on the dates specified in the January 23, 2003 and
the February 24, 2003 orders of the trial court.
 Under the law, he and petitioner Marie Antonette have shared custody and parental
authority over their son. He alleges that at times when petitioner Marie Antonette is
out of the country as required of her job as an international flight stewardess, he,
the father, should have custody of their son and not the maternal grandparents.
COURT:
 The assailed January 23, 2003 Order of the trial court did not grant custody of the
minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in
court and explain why they are restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an
interlocutory order precedent to the trial court’s full inquiry into the issue of
custody, which was still pending before it.
 Under Rule 41, Section 1 of the ROC, an interlocutory order is not appealable but
the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action under Rule 65. The
aggrieved party must show that the court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon petitioners to show
that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order.

 Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a
person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 (FC), Loran and Marie Antonette have
joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further,
although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be
adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one
parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the
 BARREDO v VINARAO
August 2, 2007 | Corona, J. | Topic
Digester: Angat, Christine Joy F.
SUMMARY: Barredo was found guilty of carnapping and illegal possession of firearms
and was sentenced to an imprisonment of 30 years and 18 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal, respectively. He was then confined at the maximum security compound of the
New Bilibid Prison. Barredo eventually filed a petition for habeas corpus, arguing that
by virtue of the Board of Pardon’s recommendation for the commutation of his
sentence and the revised computation table for crediting of a prisoner’s good conduct,
his sentence was already reduced and he was able to serve the same. The Court held that
Barredo is not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus. Writ of habeas corpus is availed of
in instances of illegal confinement, while Barredo’s confinement was due to a valid
judgment by the court. Likewise, since he has not yet served his sentence, he continues
to be validly confined, therefore he is not entitled to the writ.
DOCTRINE: Writ of habeas corpus is a remedy to obtain immediate relief for those
who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus to
deliver them from unlawful custody. It is a writ of inquiry intended to test the
circumstance under which a person is detained.
GENERAL RULE: The writ of habeas corpus may not be availed of when the person
in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment.
EXCEPTION: It may be availed of post-conviction when:
(1) there was a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person;
(2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence or
(3) the imposed penalty was excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.
FACTS:
 Samuel Barredo was charged and found guilty of carnapping and illegal possession
of firearms.
o For the charge of carnapping, he was sentenced to undergo an imprisonment
term of 30 years.
o For the charge of illegal possession of firearms, he was sentenced to an
imprisonment term of 18 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal.
 During the trial, Barredo was committed to the custody of the Quezon City Jail as a
detention prisoner (starting March 15, 1993). When the conviction came out and
became final and executory, he was transferred to and confined at the maximum
security compound of the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City on July 23, 1994.
 On August 2, 2004, Barredo filed a petition for habeas corpus, arguing that as of
said date, he already served a total of 18 years and should therefore be released.
o The Board of Pardons and Parole passed a resolution recommending the
commutation of his sentence to a period of from 15 years to 20 years.
o Based on the Bureau of Corrections revised computation table for determining
the time to be credited prisoners for good conduct while serving sentence, he
should only serve 14 years, 9 months, and 18 days.
RULING: Petition denied
Whether Barredo is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus– NO
 Writ of habeas corpus will not issue if detention is by virtue of valid
judgment.
o Writ of habeas corpus is a remedy to obtain immediate relief for those who
may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and
thus to deliver them from unlawful custody. It is a writ of inquiry intended to
test the circumstance under which a person is detained.
o Thus, the writ applies to all cases of illegal confinement, detention or
deprivation of liberty. If a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record the writ of habeas corpus will not be
allowed (Rule 102, Sec. 4)
 GENERAL RULE: The writ of habeas corpus may not be availed of
when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a
valid judgment.
 EXCEPTION: It may be availed of post-conviction when:
(1) there was a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the
restraint of a person;
(2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence or
(3) the imposed penalty was excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to
such excess.
o IN THIS CASE: Barredo was detained pursuant to a final judgment convicting
him for the crimes of carnapping and illegal possession of firearms. The same
being a valid conviction, he cannot be entitled to the writ of habeas corpus.
Whether Barredo has already served his sentence so his continued imprisonment
is considered illegal confinement as to warrant his release - NO
 The trial court’s sentence imposing the penalty of imprisonment for 30 years
is voided.
o Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the crime charged is punishable by a
special law, the court should impose an indeterminate sentence with a
maximum term not exceeding the maximum fixed by the special penal law and
a minimum term not less than the minimum term prescribed by the same law.
o IN THIS CASE: Barredo was charged with carnapping and was sentenced to a
straight penalty of imprisonment for 30 years. Barredo was therefore deprived
the benefits of the ISLAW.
 The proper penalty should have been imprisonment not for 30 years but
for an indeterminate sentence of 17 years and 4 months as minimum to
30 years as maximum.
 Thus, for failure to impose the ISLAW, the sentence of 30 years is
considered void and is modified and the correct penalty is imposed.
 Barredo is entitled to a reduction of the penalty imposed upon him in the
illegal possession of firearms.
o In criminal law, laws that are for the benefit of the accused should be applied
retroactively.
 o IN THIS CASE: RA 8294, which amended the existing law on illegal
possession of firearms, reduced the penalty for simple illegal possession to
prision correccional (1 year 1 day to 6 years) in its maximum period and a fine
not less than P15,000.
o Barredo was sentenced to an imprisonment term of 18 years and 1 day of
reclusion temporal. However, applying the benefit of RA 8294’s retroactive
application, as well as the ISLAW, the proper imposable penalty is
imprisonment for 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as
maximum
 Notwithstanding all these considerations, Barredo has not yet served the
penalties imposed on him.
o In criminal law, the person convicted has to serve the penalties imposed on
him successively, in the order of their severity.
o IN THIS CASE: Barredo has first to serve the more severe penalty, i.e. the
penalty in the carnapping case imposing imprisonment for 17 years and 4
months as minimum to 30 years as maximum. Only after he has served this
will he commence serving the less severe penalty imposed in the illegal
possession of firearms case: imprisonment for 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as
minimum to 6 years as maximum.
o However, as stated in the certifications issued by the Bureau of Corrections, as
of April 3, 2007, Barredo has only served a total of 18 years, 4 months and 26
days, inclusive of his good conduct time allowance and preventive
imprisonment.
 While Barredo has already served the minimum penalty in the carnapping
case, he has not yet served the minimum penalty in the illegal possession
of firearms case. He is therefore not illegally confined as to entitle him to
the issuance of writ of habeas corpus.
o Neither can it be said that he is eligible for parole. Only prisoners who have
served the minimum penalty imposed on them may be released on parole on
such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the Board of Pardons and
Parole.
o Moreover, even if Barredo’s claim that the Board of Pardons and Parole issued
a resolution recommending the commutation of his sentence, the same does
not justify the issuance of writ of habeas corpus. Commutation of sentence is a
prerogative of the Chief Executive and the recommendation of the Board of
Pardons and Parole was just a mere recommendation. Unless the President has
approved of the same, there is no commutation to speak of.
NOTES:
 For those details which are not important but seems important.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
EUFEMIA RODRIGUEZ v. LUISA VILLANUEVA and TERESITA
PABELLO
June 29, 2008 | Corona, J. | Writ of Habeas Corpus
Digester: Aspi, Maria Margarita
SUMMARY: Petitioner Veluz alleged that respondents, the legally adopted children of
Eufemia, took the latter from his house. Despite repeated demands for the return of
Eufemia, respondents still failed to do so. Claiming that respondents were restraining
Eufemia of her liberty, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus. This was denied by the
CA. SC affirmed. In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first
inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ
will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such
restraint exists. If the alleged cause is found to be unlawful, then the writ should be
granted and the petitioner discharged. If otherwise, the writ will be refused. In this case,
the CA made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being restrained of her liberty. It
found that she was not. SC found no cogent reason or compelling reason to disturb this
finding.
DOCTRINE: The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody
of a person is being withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is issued when one is
either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising legal custody
over another person. The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or
not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ
of habeas corpus is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal
restraint of liberty.
FACTS:
 Eufemia Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a poor state
of mental health and deteriorating cognitive abilities. She was living with petitioner
Edgardo Veluz, her nephew, since 2000. He acted as her guardian.
 Morning of January 11, 2005: respondents Luisa Villanueva and Teresita Pabello
(the legally adopted children of Eufemia) took Eufemia from petitioner’s house. He
made repeated demands for the return of Eufemia but these proved futile.
 Claiming that respondents were restraining Eufemia of her liberty, petitioner filed a
petition for habeas corpus in the CA on January 13, 2005.
 CA: petition denied; petitioner failed to present any convincing proof that
respondents were unlawfully restraining their mother of her liberty. He also failed
to establish his legal right to the custody of Eufemia as he was not her legal
guardian.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration; denied.
RULING: Petition DENIED
Whether Eufemia is being restrained of her liberty– NO.
Petitioner
 In determining whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should issue, a court should
limit itself to determining whether or not a person is unlawfully being deprived of
liberty. There is no need to consider legal custody or custodial rights. Respondents
themselves have no right to Eufemia’s custody. The issue of legal custody is
irrelevant. What is important is Eufemia’s personal freedom.
 The writ of habeas corpus is available not only if the rightful custody of a person is
being withheld from the person entitled thereto but also if the person who
disappears or is illegally being detained is of legal age and is not under guardianship.
 A writ of habeas corpus can cover persons who are not under the legal custody of
another. As long as it is alleged that a person is being illegally deprived of liberty,
the writ of habeas corpus may issue so that his physical body may be brought before
the court that will determine whether or not there is in fact an unlawful deprivation
of liberty.
Respondents
 State that they are the legally adopted daughters of Eufemia and her deceased
spouse, Maximo Rodriguez. Prior to their adoption, respondent Luisa was
Eufemia’s half-sister while respondent Teresita was Eufemia’s niece and
petitioner’s sister.
 It was petitioner and his family who were staying with Eufemia, not the other way
around as petitioner claimed. Eufemia paid for the rent of the house, the utilities
and other household needs.
 Sometime in the 1980s, petitioner was appointed as the “encargado” or administrator
of the properties of Eufemia as well as those left by the deceased Maximo. As such,
he took charge of collecting payments from tenants and transacted business with
third persons for and in behalf of Eufemia and the respondents who were the only
compulsory heirs of the late Maximo.
 In the latter part of 2002, Eufemia and the respondents demanded an inventory
and return of the properties entrusted to petitioner. These demands were
unheeded. Hence, Eufemia and the respondents were compelled to file a complaint
for estafa against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
 Consequently, and by reason of their mother’s deteriorating health, respondents
decided to take custody of Eufemia on January 11, 2005. The latter willingly went
with them.
 Petitioner failed to prove either his right to the custody of Eufemia or the illegality
of respondents’ action.
Court
 The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a
person is being withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is issued when one is
either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising legal
custody over another person.
 It contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a person’s liberty either through
illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of the custody of any
person from someone entitled to such custody.
 The issue is not whether the custody of Eufemia is being rightfully withheld from
petitioner but whether Eufemia is being restrained of her liberty.
 In order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must
be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.
 In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether
or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application
for a writ of habeas corpus is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or
moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.
 A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of
liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into
all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient.
 In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into
whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be
refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint
exists. If the alleged cause is found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted
and the petitioner discharged. If otherwise, the writ will be refused.
 While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a
mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition.
Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to
whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ.
 It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his
liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining
or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be
dismissed.
 In this case, the Court of Appeals made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being
restrained of her liberty. It found that she was not:
“There is no proof that Eufemia is being detained and restrained of her
liberty by respondents. Nothing on record reveals that she was forcibly taken
by respondents. On the contrary, respondents, being Eufemia’s adopted children,
are taking care of her.”

 The Court finds no cogent reason or compelling reason to disturb this finding.
 MARTIN GIBBS FLETCHER vs. THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU
OF CORRECTIONS
July 17, 2009 | Corona, J. | Writ of Habeas Corpus
SUMMARY: Fletcher filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus
seeking his release from prison. He claimed that his prison sentence of 12 to 17 years
for having been convicted of estafa was commuted by then President Fidel V. Ramos to
nine to 12 years. Since he had already served 14 years, three months and 12 days,
including his good conduct allowance, his continued imprisonment is illegal. The SC
ruled against him. The Court held that the writ extends only to cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, not in a case,
such as Fletcher's, where the detention is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid
judgment.
DOCTRINE: The writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally
confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be
issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid
judgment.
FACTS:
 Martin Gibbs Fletcher was convicted of estafa in 1996 and was sentenced to
imprisonment of 12 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and four
months of reclusion temporal as maximum, with payment of actual damages of
P102,235.56. He began serving his sentence on July 24, 1997.
 Another case for estafa was filed against him in 1996 where he pleaded not guilty
during the arraignment in 2008.
 Fletcher filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus seeking his
release from prison. He claimed that his prison sentence of 12 to 17 years was
commuted by then President Fidel V. Ramos to nine to 12 years. Since he had
already served 14 years, three months and 12 days, including his good conduct
allowance, his continued imprisonment is illegal.
 In its return to the writ, the OSG opposed the issuance of the writ on the following
grounds:
o The petition failed to comply with Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
In particular, the petition was neither signed nor verified by Fletcher or a
person on his behalf or by his purported counsel. Moreover, it was not
accompanied by a copy of the cause of petitioners detention or commitment
order.
o Fletcher's prison sentence was never commuted by then President Ramos, and
that he had not been granted the status of a colonist.
o There were other pending cases against him warranting his continued
detention.
o He was put under custody by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
RULING: Petition dismissed.
Whether Fletcher is entitled to the issuance of the writ. – NO.
 The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his liberty.
 Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that the writ obtains immediate
relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient
cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the person is
by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
 In the instant case, Fletcher's detention is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid
judgment when he was convicted of estafa. Therefore, the issuance of the writ in
his case is not applicable.
 His contention that he should be released on parole after serving the minimum
period of his sentence cannot likewise be countenanced. The pendency of another
criminal case is a ground for the disqualification of such convict from being
released on parole. In Fletcher's case, another criminal case for estafa against him is
pending before the trial court.
 Finally, Fletcher's claim that his sentence was commuted by then President Ramos
cannot be given any legal weight, in light of his failure to adduce any proof of such
commutation. Other than indorsements by the Chief Justice, Public Attorneys
Office and Undersecretary of the Department of Justice, no document purporting
to be the commutation of his sentence by then President Ramos was attached in his
petition and in his subsequent letters to this Court.
 Fletcher’s barren claim of commutation therefore deserves scant consideration, lest
the Court be accused of usurping the President's sole prerogative to commute his
sentence.
[PROCEDURAL]
Whether a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus be dismissed on
technical grounds. – NO.
 OSG's contention that the petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with
Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court deserves scant merit. Strict compliance
with the technical requirements for a habeas corpus petition as provided in the
Rules of Court may be dispensed with where the allegations in the application are
sufficient to make out a case for habeas corpus.
 The formalities required for petitions for habeas corpus shall be construed liberally.
The petition for the writ is required to be verified but the defect in form is not
fatal. It is the duty of a court to issue the writ if there is evidence that a person is
unjustly restrained of his liberty within its jurisdiction even if there is no application
therefor.
 Therefore, a petition which is deficient in form, such as Fletcher's petition-letter in
this case, may be entertained so long as its allegations sufficiently make out a case
for habeas corpus.
On the purpose of the writ:
 The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from
unlawful restraint. The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint and as an effective defense of personal freedom.
 Where the restraint of liberty is allegedly authored by the State, the very entity
tasked to ensure the liberty of all persons (citizens and aliens alike) within its
jurisdiction, courts must be vigilant in extending the habeas corpus remedy to one
who invokes it. To strictly restrict the great writ of liberty to technicalities not only
defeats the spirit that animates the writ but also waters down the precious right that
the writ seeks to protect, the right to liberty. To dilute the remedy that guarantees
protection to the right is to negate the right itself. Thus, the Court will not unduly
confine the writ of habeas corpus in the prison walls of technicality. Otherwise, it
will betray its constitutional mandate to promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights.
NOTES:
Caballes v CA
February 23, 2005 | Callejo, Sr., J. | Petition
for Certiorari | Habeas Corpus
PETITIONERS: Glenn Caballes y Chua
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals, Hon. Emmanuel D. Laurea, Hon. Benjamin T.
Antonio, and People of the Philippines
SUMMARY
Caballes was charged with rape in RTC Malabon. He filed a “Petition for Habeas
Corpus and/or Certiorari and Prohibition” with CA, alleging that he was deprived of his
right to a speedy trial and his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case;
that RTC Judge Laurea erred in inhibiting himself from the case; and that the trial court
committed grave abuse of its discretion in denying his petition for bail. CA denied his
petition for being an improper remedy. He then filed a petition for certiorari with SC. SC
ruled that the CA decision already became final and executory for failure to file an
appeal within the reglementary period, which is 48 hours from notice of judgment
resolving a habeas corpus case. SC also held that the proper remedy from a court’s
denial of a writ of habeas corpus is an appeal, not a petition for certiorari. Finally, SC
ruled that the allegations of Caballes cannot be resolved by filing a petition for habeas
corpus.
DOCTRINES
1. See rules in ratios 1 and 2.
2. Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for
the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error.
The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon
the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the
only parties before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the
petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether the custodian has
authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty.
FACTS
1. November 19, 2001: Peititoner Glenn Chua Caballes was charged with rape of a
minor in RTC Malabon.
2. Caballes filed a petition for bail, which was later denied on the court’s finding that
the evidence of guilt is strong.
3. July 11, 2003: Caballes filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that his right to
speedy trial has been violated.[1]
4. Judge Laurea issued an Order inhibiting himself from hearing the case "to avoid
being misunderstood, to preserve his reputation for probity and objectivity and to live
up to the ideal impartial administration of justice." The case was re-raffled to Branch
170, presided by Judge Benjamin T. Antonio.
5. Judge Antonio denied Caballes’ MTD. He reasoned that there was no violation of
the Caballes right to speedy trial, considering that the apparent delays could not be
attributed to the fault of the prosecution alone. The trial court noted that the Caballes
also sought Postponements of the trials.
6. Caballes then filed with CA a "Petition for Habeas Corpus and/or Certiorari and
Prohibition." Caballes averred in his petition for Habeas Corpus that
a. He was deprived of his right to a speedy trial and his constitutional right
to a speedy disposition of the case;
b. Judge Laurea erred in inhibiting himself from the case; and
c. The trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion in denying his
petition for bail.
7. CA denied the petition, arguing that the petition for habeas corpus is not the proper
relief. MR denied.
ISSUES/HELD/RATIO
Issue 1: [Topic] Whether or not the decision of the CA is already final and
executory - YES
1. Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that the period for appeal from
the judgment of any court in habeas corpus cases shall be forty-eight (48) hours from
notice of the judgment appealed from.
2. While the said provision was not incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
this Court approved Administrative Matter No. 01-1-03-SC amending Section 3, Rule
41of the said Rules, which took effect on July 15, 2001, thus:
“However, an appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.”
3. (Note: Court did not mention when Caballes received the CA Resolution and when
he filed his petition for certiorari with SC. But we can infer he filed said petition more
than 48 hours from when he received CA reso. Otherwise, why would SC say that CA
decision became final and executory?)
Issue 2 [Topic]: WON the proper remedy from the appellate court’s denial of a
petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court – NO. Appeal should be filed
4. Following the rules mentioned above, the petitioner should have appealed
to this Court from the CA decision denying his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, as well as the denial of his motion for reconsideration thereof; instead,
the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended.
5. The well-settled rule is that certiorari is not available where the aggrieved party’s
remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the reason
being that certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy.
6. A habeas corpus action stands in no different position than with any other
proceeding and if the appealed decision is to be reviewed by an appellate court, the
remedy is by writ of error because the error committed by the court is an error of
judgment and not an error of jurisdiction.
Issue 3: [TOPIC] WON Caballes is entitled to the issuance of the writ - NO
7. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which the complaint is
made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose
to be served is relief from illegal restraint.
8. Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as
substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal,
certiorari or writ of error. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to
the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason,
null and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other
remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances.
9. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly
course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to
the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that
habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of
law and irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the
course of the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life and
liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also been held that where restraint
is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do not render the
proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases,
the restraint is not illegal.
10. Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when
instituted for the sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the
judge in order that the cause of his detention may be inquired into and his statements
final. The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief,
but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful
authority. Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner (prisoner)
and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be
resolved is whether the custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his
liberty.
11. Our review of the petitioner’s material averments in his petition before the CA
reveals that it was a "petition for habeas corpus or, in the alternative, a petition for a
writ of certiorari" The petitioner assailed therein the orders of the trial court denying his
petition for bail and his motion to dismiss on the ground that he was deprived of his
right to a speedy disposition of the case against him, and questioned Judge Laurea’s
order of inhibition. We agree with the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
cannot be joined with the special civil action for certiorari because the two
remedies are governed by a different set of rules. Rule 2, Section 5(b) of the Rules
of Court mandates that the joinder of causes of action shall not include special
actions or actions governed by special rules, thus proscribing the joinder of a
special proceeding with a special civil action.
12. We also agree with the ruling of the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
is a remedy different from the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, as amended. The writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on the
processes, orders, or judgment of the trial court, while certiorari is a direct attack of
said processes, orders, or judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches only
jurisdictional errors. It has no other use, except to bring before the court a record
material to be considered in exercising jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches the
record. On the other hand, a writ of habeas corpus reaches the body but not the
record; it also reaches jurisdictional matters but does not reach the record.
However, when jurisdiction is obtained by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, to
bring the body of the person whose liberty is involved into court, and if it is necessary,
to provide the record upon which the detention is based, that may be accomplished by
using a writ of certiorari as an ancillary proceeding, i.e., it is subordinate to or in aid of
the primary action for the purpose of impeaching the record. When a writ of certiorari is
issued as the foundation of jurisdiction to bring it and direct upon the validity of a judicial
determination by any body or officer, jurisdictional questions only are reached, and such
questions pertaining to the detention made by the officer or body particularly
complained of.
13. The petitioner manifested to the appellate court that his petition should be treated
as a petition for habeas corpus. Even then, the CA rightly dismissed the petition
because the petitioner failed to establish his right to the writ. The records show that the
petitioner was charged with rape punishable by reclusion perpetua and was detained
based on the said charge; hence, if the evidence of his guilt is strong, he shall not be
admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. There is no question
that the trial court had jurisdiction over the offense charged and over the person of the
petitioner. The jail warden has the authority and, in fact, is mandated to detain the
petitioner until granted bail by the court, or the case against him dismissed, or until he
is acquitted after trial. The petitioner failed to establish that his incarceration pendente
lite was illegal, and likewise failed to establish exceptional circumstances warranting
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by the appellate court.
DISPOSITIVE
Petition denied for lack of merit