Stanford Law Review

The Zones of Cyberspace

Author(s): Lawrence Lessig
Source: Stanford Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 5 (May, 1996), pp. 1403-1411
Published by: Stanford Law Review
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1229391
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 The Zones of Cyberspace
LawrenceLessig

Cyberspaceis a place. People live there. They experienceall the sorts of

things that they experiencein real space, there. For some, they experience
more. They experiencethis not as isolatedindividuals,playingsome high tech
computergame;they experienceit in groups,in communities,amongstrangers,
among people they come to know, and sometimeslike.1
While they are in thatplace, cyberspace,they are also here. They are at a
terminalscreen,eatingchips, ignoringthe phone. They are downstairson the
computer,late at night,while theirhusbandsareasleep. They areat work,or at
cyber cafes, or in a computerlab. They live this life there, while here. And
then at some point in the day, they jack out, and are only here. They step up
from the machine,in a bit of a daze; they turnaround. They have returned.
David Johnsonand David Post wantus to take this life in cyberspaceseri-
ously. They wantthe law to understandit as elsewhere. So far elsewhereis it
that it deserves,they argue,a specialrespectfromreal space law. Cyberspace
will "create"new law and legal institutionsof its own,2 and this new law
should free this space from at least some of the claims of real space law. A
separatenesswill emerge. Not quite a sovereignty,but somethingclose will
develop.
This is a small and quirkyfield, cyberlaw;these are two of its most impor-
tant thinkers,and this is a paperthat will be at the centerof much thoughtin
cyberlawto come. I have no doubtthatin largemeasure,JohnsonandPost will
be right: A new law will emerge here, and a certaincomity will follow it
around. But Johnsonand Post want to argue for a separationbetween real
space law andcyberspacelaw thatI don't believecan yet be sustained,nordo I
believe thatit should. The effects of thatplace will neverbe far removedfrom
this. And our understanding of whatthatplace will become is just beginning.
We, here, in this world,will keep a controlon the developmentthere. As well
we should.

The closeness that cyberspaceis

There is an interestinglink betweenDan Farber'spaperand this. Farber
offeredthreeperspectiveson legislativejurisdiction-a localist,a globalist,and

1. For descriptions,see HOWARD THEVIRTUAL

RHEINGOLD, COMMUNITY
38-65 (1995); SHERRY
TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN: IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET (1995).
2. David R. Johnson& David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,48 STAN.
L. REV.1367, 1387-91 (1996).

1403

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 1404 STANFORDLAWREVIEW [Vol. 48:1403

an evolutionary.3The link is to the firsttwo. A localist looks for stronglinks

with stuff thathappensin local spacebeforeshe claimsan authorityto regulate
beyond her borders. A globalist is far less picky. Everythingaffects every-
thing,the globalistinsists,andourregulationshouldreachanythingthataffects
us.
Johnsonand Post mix these two perspectives. They presenta pictureof
cyberspacethatis bothglobalandlocal. They firstestablishthe separatenessof
cyberspaceby arguingthat since it is everywhereif anywhere,and hence no
place in particular,it is thereforea space no wherehere-separate, removed.
Its globalnessestablishesits separateness; no locale can makeany specialclaim
upon it.
But in the very next breath,they are insistentlocalists: Cyberspace,sepa-
rate from real space, has little effect over real space;hence should real space
have little controlovercyberspace.Whenrealspacejurisdictionsassertcontrol
over cyberspacelife, this is an "illegitimateextra-territorial power grab"4-
unjustified,5and unwise. As they write: "[Governmentscannot] credibly
claim a rightto regulatethe net basedon supposedlocal harmscausedby activ-
ities that originateoutsidetheirbordersand that travelelectronicallyto many
differentnations."6
This argumentthey supportwith positive as well as normativearguments,
but I confess I don't findthe positivepointsverypersuasive.The firstis a kind
of is-ism- the realworldis madeof atoms,cyberspaceof bits;the rulesof the
atoms don't work very well when appliedto bits. Bits don't respectborders,
they can't be cabinedby borders.They go whereverthe net goes, and the net
goes everywherewithoutmuch limit. Hence rules that would containatoms
can't be appliedwell to bits.
This feels morelike sloganthanargument.I don't care reallywhetherit is
atoms,or bits;the legitimacyof regulationturnsuponeffects. If the net has an
effect on thathalf of the cybercitizenthatis in real space, if it has an effect on
thirdpartieswho are only in realspace,thenthe claim of a realspace sovereign
to regulateit will be as strongas any equivalentatominducedeffect. If a state
has the powerto regulatethe importationof obscenity,it can't makeany differ-

3. Daniel A. Farber,Stretchingthe Margins: The Geographic Nexus in EnvironmentalLaw, 48

STAN.L. REV.1247, 1248 (1996).
4. Johnson & Post, supra note 2, at 1380.
5. So, of a net-based Ponzi scheme from the Cayman Islands over which Minnesota has tried to
assertjurisdiction,Johnsonand Post would argue that "clearly"Minnesotawould not have any jurisdic-
tion over the scheme. Id. at 1383.
6. Id. at 1390.

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 May 1996] ZONESOF CYBERSPACE 1405

ence whetherthatimportationis via atomsor bits,7at least fromthe perspective

of the justifiabilityof the regulation.8Its justificationrests here in effects.
If this localism,in Farber'sterms,is to be defended,somethingotherthan
physics must be appealedto. Johnson and Post have a second argument,
groundedin futility: The example here is the Germanthreatagainst Com-
puserve. In January,1996, Bavarianofficials threatenedCompuservewith
prosecution if it continued to carry sexually explicitly newsgroups from
USENET. In response,Compuserveremovedthese newsgroupsfrom its ser-
vice worldwide.
Schemes like this to regulatelocal access don't work, Johnsonand Post
argue,because"thedeterminedseekerof prohibitedcommunicationscan sim-
ply reconfigurehis connectionso as to appearto reside in a [different]loca-
tion."9 True enough-Germans determinedenough can (even now) use
Compuserveto gain access to the prohibitedmaterial.10But this forgets my
colleague Coase. A regulationneed not be absolutelyeffective to be suffi-
cientlyeffective. It need not raisethe cost of the prohibitedactivityto infinity
in orderto reducethe level of that activity quite substantially.If regulation
increasesthe cost of access to this kindof information,it will reduceaccess to
this information,even if it doesn't reduceit to zero. Thatis enoughto justify
the regulation.If governmentregulationhadto show thatit was perfectbefore
it wasjustified,then indeedtherewouldbe little regulationof cyberspace,or of
real space either. But regulation,whetherfor the good or the bad, has a lower
burdento meet.
There is somethingto the futility argument.This is David Post's piece,
Anarchy,Stateand the Internet.'' Post's argumentthere,echoedin the piece in
this review, is that the architectureof cyberspacecompels a differentkind of

7. Pointing to the recent AmateurAction case, United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir.
1996), Johnson and Post argue that the standardfor obscenity should not be the local physical commu-
nity where the material is consumed, but rather the online community within which the material is
delivered. But in that case, where the postmasterdownloadedsome materialonline, and received other
material through the mail, this rule would require that one community govern the online access, and
anothergovern the mail access. This is a differenceI don't understand.Whateverthe mode of transmis-
sion, whetherthe Interet or UPS, the test should be the same. And in both cases, the relevantquestion
would seem to be what effect this has on them in the jurisdictionwhere they live, when they step away
from the video machine or computer terminal. Maybe the effect is so insignificant that it ought in
neither case be regulated. But if it is regulatedin the one, the fact that the medium in the other is bits
shouldn't change the matter. Except according to a quite different argument,which I sketch below.
8. Or at least, if it did make a difference, the difference would turn on the greater, not lesser,
ability of bits to be regulated than atoms. If the only interest that obscenity laws advanced were a
zoning interest-assuring that only those who want to view the material viewed it-then one might
argue that because bytes are so much betterregulatedthan atoms, the justificationfor obscenity regula-
tion is reduced. Because, that is, the technology can better assure that only the intended recipient re-
ceives the regulatedmaterial,the regulationsof that materialin cyberspaceshould be less absolute than
in real space. But the Courthas never precisely defined for us the real interestsadvancedby obscenity
regulation. In Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), it soundedas if the interestwere purelya zoning
interest; but the Court rejected this notion in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
9. Johnson & Post, supra note 2, at 1374.
10. See Jon Auberbach,Fences in Cyberspace: GovernmentsMove to Limit Free Flow of the
Internet, BOSTON GLOBE,Feb. 1, 1996, at 1, 15.
11. David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and the Internet:An Essay on Law-Makingin Cyberspace,
1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 3, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/jol/post.html.

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 1406 STANFORDLAWREVIEW [Vol. 48:1403

regulation. The internet,he argues,is a networkof networks;each networkis

its own law, each carriesits own rule-set. Becausethese "rule-sets"arenot tied
to any particulargeographicalspace, they can exit wheneverthe geographical
space becomes hostile. It mattersnot at all, the argumentgoes, whetherthe
serversupportingone networkis locatedin Germany,or France,or Russia.12
So long as the networksare interconnected,if the laws of Germanybecome
hostile, the networkcan simply move to Russia. From the standpointof the
users, this move is invisible. And so any effort by Germanyto controlwhat
exists on Germanserverswill be defeatedby this structuralplasticity.
But what follows from this is not that no regulationis possible;what fol-
lows is that successful regulationwill be different. There is a competition
amongrule-sets;cyberspacecreatesa marketamongthese rule-sets. But there
are still ways to regulatea market,so long as the regulatorhas some market
power. Germany'seffort at silencing sex-speech on Compuservemay be
thoughtpathetic,since so easily evaded;nonetheless,it did have the effect of
pushingCompuserveto implementa technologythatwouldallow the company
to censormaterialbasedon the locationof the reader.A pathetic,but success-
ful, regulationby Germany.Orthe samecouldbe said aboutAmerica'sregula-
tion of cryptography.'3No doubt any effort directly to ban encryption
technologieswill, in the end, fail; but effortsto subsidizeparticulartechnolo-
gies will not so obviously fail. Regulationis possible, but throughdifferent
means.
The insightthatPost, andJohnsonandPost, have is thatbecausethe trans-
actionscosts of exit are so low, the powerof governmentto regulatethis space
is futile. But the conclusiondoesn't follow from the premise. Transactions
costs are low; but so long as they are not zero, thereis space for regulation.
The regulationwill be of a differentform;its techniqueswill have to become
quite different. But if well designed,they will not be futile.
There will be a law of cyberspace,but Johnsonand Post have not shown
enoughto showjust why it will be in any specialway immunefromreal space
regulations. It will be regulatedby real space regulationto the extent that it
affects real space life, andit will quitedramaticallyaffectreal space life. That
is the amazingthing aboutthis space-that this virtualplace has such power
over what we call the nonvirtual.This effect mustbe at the core of any argu-
ment aboutcyberspace'sdifference,not its absence.

12. Of course claims like this are always exaggeration. To an American user today, it matters
quite a bit whether the server she is accessing is located in Ohio or Oslo, for access to Oslo, or any
Europeanlocation, can be quite slow. While in theory it doesn't matterwhere the server is, if the U.S.
government succeeded in getting all materialof a certainkind (say, obscenity) moved to nonAmerican
servers, it would have a significantly reduce consumptionof that material.
13. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography,The Clipper
Chip, and the Constitution,143 U. PENN.L. REV.709 (1995) (examining the constitutionaland policy
questions that underlie governmentalregulationof consumer cryptography).

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May 1996] ZONESOF CYBERSPACE 1407

The questionof what cyberspacewill be

To argue that real space law should leave cyberspacealone one needs a
normativeargument-an argumentaboutwhy it is good or rightto leave cyber-
space alone. This dependsuponconsequences,andconsequencesdependupon
whatcyberspacewill become. JohnsonandPost pushthe firsthalf of this quite
well; but it is the secondhalf thatis the moreimportant.And moretroubling.
The argumentfocusing on consequencesis simple pragmatism.Cyberlaw
will evolve to the extent that it is easier to develop this separatelaw than to
workout the endless conflictsthatthe cross-borderexistenceshere will gener-
ate.'4 Some fields will be easierto regulatewith this cyber commonlaw, and
as this cyber common law of cyberspacedevelops, and earns the respect of
otherjurisdictions,it will be easierfor these otherjurisdictionssimply to defer
to this law.15 The alternativeis a revival of conflictsof law; but conflicts of
law is dead-killed by a realismintendedto save it. And withouta usable
body of law to deployagainstit, a law of cyberspacewill emergeas the simpler
way to resolvethe inevitable,andrepeated,conflictsthatcyberspacewill raise.
But this pragmatismmust say somethingabout what cyberspacewill be-
come, and it is here that I think Johnsonand Post are most ambitious,one
might say romantic,while I am firmlyskeptical. Theirpictureis of a democ-
racy in cyberspace-of a worldof cybercitizensdecidingon the laws thatwill
applyto them,anda claim thatthis moreperfectdemocracydeservesrespect.16
The separationthatthey arguefor comes thenfromthe respectthatwe owe this
autonomy.
This is a hope builton a pictureof cyberspaceas it is just now. As it is just
now, cyberspaceis such a place of relativefreedom. The technologiesof con-
trol are relativelycrude. Not thatthereis no control. Cyberspaceis not anar-
chy. But that control is exercised through the ordinarytools of human
regulation-through social norms, and social stigma;throughpeer pressure,
andreward. How this happensis an amazingquestion-how people who need
never meet can establishand enforce a rich set of social normsis a question
that will push theoriesof social normdevelopmentfar. But no one who has
lived any partof her life in this space as it is just now can doubtthatthis is a
space filled with community,and with the freedomthat the imperfectionsof
communityallows.
This is changing. Cyberspaceis changing. And to understandwhat this
change could be, we mustthinkagain aboutthe very natureof cyberspaceit-
self-more particularly,aboutthe natureof how cyberspaceregulatesitself.
Think of how a communityregulatesitself in real space. In real space,
when the state wantsto regulatesomething-say littering-the statethreatens,
or cajoles, throughprisons or fines or furry little animalson TV, to induce
people to internalizethis normagainstlittering. If the state succeeds,behavior
changes. But its success dependsuponindividualsinternalizingwhatthe state
14. Johnson & Post, supra note 2, at 1391-95.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., id. at 1389-91.

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 1408 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1403

requires.Betweenthe normandthe behaviorsoughtis a humanbeing, mediat-

ing whetherto conformor not. Lots of times, for lots of laws, the choice is not
to conform. Regardlessof what the law says, it is an individualwho decides
whetherto conform.
Regulationin cyberspaceis, or can be, different. If the regulatorwants to
induce a certain behavior, she need not threaten,or cajole, to inspire the
change. She need only changethe code-the softwarethat defines the terms
upon which the individualgains access to the system, or uses assets on the
system. If she wantsto limit trespasson a system,she need not rely simply on
a law againsttrespass;she can implementa systemof passwords.If she wants
to limitthe illegal use of copyrightedmaterial,she neednot rely on the threatof
copyrightlaw; she can encryptthe copyrightedmaterialso only those intended
to have access will have access. Always in principle,and increasinglyin prac-
tice, there is a code (as in software)to assurewhat the code (as in law) de-
mands, which means always in principleand increasinglyin practice,law is
inscribedin the code.
Code is an efficientmeansof regulation.But its perfectionmakesit some-
thing different. One obeys these laws as code not because one should; one
obeys these laws as code becauseone can do nothingelse. Thereis no choice
aboutwhetherto yield to the demandfor a password;one compliesif one wants
to enterthe system.17 In the well implementedsystem,thereis no civil disobe-
dience. Law as code is a startto the perfecttechnologyof justice.
It is not this just now. Just now the architectureof cyberspaceis quite
imperfect. Indeed,whatis centralaboutits presentarchitectureis the anarchy
that it preserves. Some see this anarchyas inherentin the space, as unavoida-
ble.'8 But this anarchyis just a consequenceof the presentdesign. In its pres-
ent design, cyberspace is open, and uncontrolled;regulation is achieved
throughsocial forces much like the social formsthatregulatereal space. It is
now unzoned: Bordersare not boundaries;they divide one system from an-
otherjust as Pennsylvaniais divided from Ohio. The essence of cyberspace
today is the searchengine-tools with which one crosses an infinitespace, to
locate, and go to, the stuff one wants. The space today is open, but only be-
cause it is madethat way. Or becausewe madeit that way. (For whateveris
true aboutsociety, at least cyberspaceis socially constructed.)
It could be made to be different,and my sense is that it is. The present
architectureof cyberspaceis changing. If there is one animatingidea behind
the kindsof reformspursuedbothin the social andeconomicspheresin cyber-
space, it is the idea to increasethe sophisticationof the architecturein cyber-

17. Hackers don't. But what hackers do doesn't define what the effect of law as code is on the
balance of the non-hackerpublic.
18. Hackersfor example-the civil disobedientsof cyberspace. Hackersdefine for themselves a
certainanarchy,by devoting themselves to findingthe holes in the existing code. Some believe that the
complexity of the code means these holes will always exist, and hence this anarchywill always exist.
But I don't think one need believe hacking impossible to believe it will become less and less significant.
People escaped from concentrationcamps, but that hardly underminesthe significance of the evil in
concentrationcamps.

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 May 1996] ZONESOF CYBERSPACE 1409

space, to facilitateboundariesratherthanborders. It is the movementto bring

to zoning to cyberspace. Fromthis perspective,the CommunicationsDecency
Act of 1996, and the NII White Paperon Copyrightare the very same thing:
Neitheraims at eliminatingmaterialin cyberspace;both aim insteadat induc-
ing a technologyfor zoning. The CommunicationsDecency Act does this by
grantingwide defensesto individualswho takestepsto block access by minors,
while threateninghuge penaltiesto those who don't.19 The White paperdoes
this by giving broadsupportto technologiesthatcontrolaccess to copyrighted
material,while narrowingthe scope for fairuse of materialotherwiseavailable
on the net. The aim of bothis to subsidizetechnologiesof control-to increase
the ability to select who gets access to what-and the mediumcyberspaceis
perfectlydesignedfor thatcontrol.
We arejust at the beginningof this change. Zoningwill replacethe present
wildernessof cyberspace,and this zoning will be achievedthroughcode-a
tool, as Johnsonand Post suggest, more perfect than any equivalenttool of
zoning in real space. The architectureof cyberspacewill in principleallow for
perfectzoning-a way perfectlyto excludethose who wouldcross boundaries.
It is the perfectionof the architecturethatJerryFrug'scontributionto this sym-
posiumspeaksof; andthe movementthatI am describingfrom open to closed
is just the movementthathe, andRichardFord,have described(andcriticized)
in real space law.20 Indeed,if thereis one clear returnfrom the mixing of the
perspectivesthatthis symposiumhas done, it is the lessons thatthe firstpanel
can offer the last: For in the rich descriptionsofferedthere-of movementsin
real space from open to closed, and in the structuresof incentivesthat might
yield this move, even thoughindividualsin the end mightregretit,21-we can
drawparallelsto the movementthatwe mightsee here. Movementsfromwhat,
speaking of free-speech terrains,Monroe Price calls an open terrainto a
closed;22but moregenerally,froma worldwhereboundariesare borders,to a
world whereboundariesare walls.
One mightwell say thatthis movementto moreperfectzoning is just what
"the people want." But want here is complex. They want controlover what
their kids get access to; they want controlover who "takes"their intellectual

19. The Act has two defenses. The first gives a substantivedefense to prosecutionif a user "has
taken, in good faith, reasonable,effective, and appropriateactions underthe circumstancesto restrictor
prevent access by minors." ? 501(2). The second directs that "no cause of action may be brought...
against any person [where thatperson] has taken in good faith to implementa defense authorizedunder
this section." ? 501(2). These defenses togethermarkout an extraordinarilylarge scope for protection.
Recently the Justice Departmenthas outlined what it considers to be adequate steps to satisfy these
defenses. These include simply registeringan "indecent"site with one of the services that helps users
screen "indecent"sites. The act is presently being challenged,and will most likely be held unconstitu-
tional because of the overbreadthof the "indecency"provisions. But that is independentof the structure
of its defenses. See American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
20. JerryFrug, The Geographyof Community,48 STAN.L. REV.1047 (1996); RichardThompsom
Ford, The Boundariesof Race: Political Geographyin Legal Analysis, 107 HARV.L. REV.1841, 1860-
78 (1994).
21. See Vicki Been, Commenton Professor JerryFrug's The Geographyof Community,48 STAN.
L. REV.1109 (1996).
22. Monroe E. Price, Free Expression and Digital Dreams: The Open and Closed Terrain of
Speech, 22 CRITICAL INQUIRY 64 (1995).

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 1410 STANFORDLAWREVIEW [Vol. 48:1403

"property."They want to controlwhat their citizens read. All these "theys"

have lots to gain fromthe architecturethatcyberspaceis becoming,and we are
a lot of these "theys." Commerceis built on property,and propertydepends
uponboundaries.Whatpossiblereasoncould therebe to questionthe value of
clear borders?23
But we might nonethelessfind reasonto be skeptical,or at least reasonto
raise doubts. And it is upon two such doubtsthat I want to end this essay.
First, a doubt about the design: As importantas the natureof these newly
zoned spaces is, more importantis who is designingthem. They are the con-
struction,as Johnsonand Post describe,of "engineers."24Engineerswrite the
code; the code defines the architectures,and the architecturesdefine what is
possible within a certainsocial space. No process of democracydefines this
social space, save if the marketis a processof democracy.25
This mightnot be so bad, assumingthatthereare enoughplaces to choose
from,andgiven thatit is cyberspace,the placesto choose fromcould be many,
and the costs of exit are quite low.26 Even so, note the trend: the progression
away from democraticcontrol. We will stand in relationto these places of
cyberspaceas we standin relationto the commoditiesof the market:one more
place of unendingchoice;but one less place wherewe, collectively,have a role
in constructingthe choices that we have.
Whichbringsus backto the questionthatI beganwith above, and the sec-
ond doubtthat I want to raise in the end. This next generationof cyberspace
will provideindividualswith the perfecttechnologyof choice; it will empower
individualsto select into the world that they want to see, to select out of the
worldthatthey don't.27But the they who check out also live here;whennot in
cworld,they mustparticipatein the making,and regulating,of the life that is
here. And so the question: Justhow will this life in cworldaffect theirability
to connect to this life in the real world? Will this power of exit enhanceor
underminetheirabilityto engageas citizensin the worldfromwhichthey can't
easily disengage? Will the many communitiesof that world make it more or
less possible to function well in the communitiesof this world? These are
questions,the answersto which turnon the architecturethat cyberspacewill
become. But what the architectureof cyberspacewill become is a choice we
makehere. So again we are backto the questionhow this space may regulate
that space, if that space affects life here.
These questionspointto a choice, aboutwhatcyberspacewill become. One
alternativeis an open space;the otherclosed. I don't meanthese are the only

23. See William Ian Miller, Sanctuary,Red LightDistricts, and Washington,D.C.: Some Observa-
tions on Neuman's AnomalousZones, 48 STAN.L. REV.1235 (describing the costs of clear lines).
24. See Johnson & Post, supra note 2. at 1388.
25. See CASSSUNSTEIN,DEMOCRACY ANDTHEPROBLEM OFFREESPEECH (1994); Cass R. Sun-
stein, The First Amendmentin Cyberspace, 104 YALEL.J. 1757 (1995).
26. Not zero, mind you. Given the anonymityof this space, one must build a certainsocial capital
to function well. Exit, or banishment,is the forfeitingof that social capital. As in real life, this is a real
loss, and this loss is what makes communities somewhat sticky.
27. See the world Eugene Volokh describesin Cheap Speech and WhatIt Will Do, 104 YALEL.J.
1805 (1995).

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May 1996] ZONESOF CYBERSPACE 1411

choices. Architecturesdon't come in naturalkinds. My point instead is the

choice-that thereis a decision to be made aboutthe architecturethat cyber-
space will become, and the questionis how that decision will be made.
Or better,where will that decision be made. For this change has a very
predictableprogress. It is the same progressthatexplainsthe move to zoning
in cities. It is the resultof a collectionof choices made at an individuallevel,
but no collective choice madeat a collective level. It is the productof a mar-
ket. But individualchoice might aggregatein a way that individualscollec-
tively do not want. Individual choices are made within a particular
architecture;but they may yield an architecturedifferentfrom whatthe collec-
tive might want.
Might, not will. The point is not aboutpessimism,it is aboutpossibility.
But the possibilitysuggestsa questionabouthow quicklywe liberatethatspace
from regulationby the real space. For if there are choices to be made about
how this space will evolve, it is not quite clear where in cyberspacethese
choices can be made. If cyberspacewereto becomethis perfecttechnologyof
technologyand democracy,then therewould be little reasonto worry. But a
perfect technology of controldoes not entail a perfecttechnology of justice,
and it is this that commendsa continuedcheck.
It is not clearwherethatleaves the law of cyberspace,or whatstrategythis
recommends.But if the argumentfor deferencethatJohnsonandPost herebeg
is a normativeargument,we must say somethingmore about the normative
attractivenessof the worldthatcyberspacewill be. If it is a worldthat facili-
tates our isolation,if it is an even bettertechnologyfor constructingthis isola-
tion, if it is an even more efficient way to underminethe citizenshipof this
world,then one mightquestionit. At a minimum,one mightquestionwhether
we know whatwe mustdo to avoid these as outcomes. And we mightwantto
preservethe possibilityto avoid them.

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