PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT, VOL.

15, 1-9 (1995)

Cultural relativism, ‘good’ governance and sustainable human

development
PETER BLUNT
Northern Territory University, Australia

SUMMARY
The vacuum left by the collapse of colonial empires has been filled by new forms of cultural and
ideological imperialism conceived largely in the West. The new imperialism is evident in such
notions as sustainable human development (SHD) and ‘good’ governance, which in many ways
are prescribed for poor countries by rich countries. It is suggested that there is no one best way to
‘good’ governance or SHD and that, while elements of a universal best practice may be found,
considerable room should be left for local variations.

INTRODUCTION

On the whole, it is probably true to say that rich countries are more reluctant than they
used to be to give aid of different kinds, but particularly grant aid, to developing
countries. Yet this trend has not been paralleled by a similar diminution in the
provision of development ‘advice’,or by a reduction in the extent of direct political and
economic interference by rich countries in the affairs of poorer nations. Powerful
governments, mainly in the West, and multilateral institutions such as the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund, appear to be as willing as ever to prescribe for
others universal values they have identified concerning such questions as economic
management, democracy, human rights, sound governance and the nature of de-
velopment itself.
Resistance to what is seen by many to be a new form of imperialism is becoming
stronger among poor countries however. In many developing countries there is a
mounting reluctance to conform to ideals ‘born in the USA’, and increasing resentment
of their association with economic incentives. After all, who is to say that freedom of
association is more important than having enough food to eat, or that freedom of
expression should come before the provision of access to safe drinking water? Does
having a vote, but no job, no prospects and no dignity or self-respect, constitute more
meaningful and desirable participation in the workings of society than having a job,
some prospects, some dignity, but no vote?

This article is based on an invited address to the Annual Executive Meeting of the International Union of
Local Government Associations, held in Darwin, Australia, on 19 September 1994. Professor Peter Blunt is
Dean of the Faculty of Business, and Director of the Centre for Development Management, Northern
Territory University, Darwin, NT Australia 0909.

CCC 0271-2075/95/010001-09
0 1995 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
2 P.Blunt

The position adopted in this article is that such questions cannot be answered in any
general or absolute sense, and should not in any case be the subject of what amounts to
international fiat. There is no simple, unitarian or one best way to development, to
human rights, to sound governance or to economic management. Rather, all of these
questions are to some extent liable to interpretation in the light of different cultural,
institutional and environmental circumstances, hence the term ‘cultural relativism’.
This is not to say that ‘anything goes’. It is simply a recognition that a better balance
needs to be struck between, on the one hand, yet to be defined universal imperatives
concerning such issues as human rights and sound governance and, on the other,
localized variations.
Accordingly, this article examines critically two notions which are crucial concerns
to development generally. The first is the United Nations Development Programme’s
(UNDP) idea of sustainable human development (SHD), which can be taken as an
attempt to define the ultimate mission of governments, at whatever level. The second
concerns the notion of sound governance itself, which more and more is being
recognized by donor agencies and others as a necessary condition for sustainable
development.

THE UNITARIAN VIEW OF SHD

The UNDP’s notion of sustainable human development consists of three major

elements: development ofthe people, meaning the enhancement of human capabilities
and health so that people can participate fully in life; development f o r the people,
meaning that all people should have the opportunity to receive or acquire a fair share
of the benefits which flow from economic growth; and development by the people,
meaning that all members of society should have the opportunity to participate in its
development.
According to the UNDP, development by the people, through increased partici-
pation, is not possible unless political, economic and social power is widely dispersed
throughout the community. The opportunity this provides for people to influence the
social, economic and political functioning of society is a cornerstone of SHD. This
view implies that people, by right, should have access to a variety of avenues for
exercising power. Its logic suggests that participation is both a means and an end, and
that the decentralization of government is desirable for its own sake.
In most societies, a number of groups have been chronically disadvantaged in their
opportunities to participate. Invariably, it is the poor, women and children, religious
and ethnic minorities, rural populations and the disabled who are among the least
empowered. The 1993 Human Development Report estimates that more than 90 per
cent of the world’s peoples are thus unable to exert a meaningful influence on the
economic, political and social functioning of the societies in which they live. Giving
voice to the mass of the people, by increasing their levels of participation, is therefore
seen by the UNDP to be a necessary condition of development (UNDP, 1993).
Following the Brundtland Commission’s landmark report Our Common Future,
which defined sustainable development as ‘meeting the needs of the present generation
without compromising the needs of future generations’, the UNDP’s latest thinking on
human development emphasizes the idea of sustainability so that the elements de-
scribed above-development of, by and for the people-are assured for future
 Cultural relativim 3

generations. Equality of access and opportunity are key ingredients of this vision of
the human condition. It is a vision which heralds the need for a global perspective
which eschews ethnic and national boundaries in the search for a new ethic of
universalism-one which regards all people as deserving of dignity and opportunity
and sees the planet as a global public good to be nurtured in the common interest rather
than exploited for the benefit of a few (UNDP, 1994a).
There is clearly much in the above that would find widespread acceptance. Equally,
there are some features, particularly those connected with development by the people,
which would be widely resisted.

A RELATIVIST VIEW OF SHD

The argument from cultural relativism would be that it is necessary now-perhaps

more so than ever before-to beware the dangers of projecting a philosophy which is
embedded too deeply in a particular intellectual tradition or ethnic or cultural frame-
work. This is because one of the greatest obstacles to global development and har-
mony, that of social disintegration, becomes insurmountable in the face of hardening
social divisions based on ideas of ethnic, religious or cultural supremacy. Such possi-
bilities are encouraged by views of the human condition which imply that their authors
have in some sense acquired-or assumed-exclusive occupation of the moral, in-
tellectual and political high ground.
However, the case for cultural relativism also has a firm empirical basis. For
example, the logic of resistance to universal notions of development by the people is
amply supported by research evidence which shows that perceptions of what consti-
tutes participation, as well as views concerning its desirability, vary between cultures.
Such variation has much to do with the well-established differences that exist between
cultures regarding attitudes to authority, uncertainty and group versus individual
loyalties. In societies which have high respect for authority, low tolerance of un-
certainty, and high group loyalty, notions of development by the people will be
significantly different to those found in societies which are more egalitarian and
individualistic and have high tolerance of uncertainty.
The evidence is equally damning of claims which suggest, say, that political democ-
racy is in some sense both a necessary and a sufficient condition for economic
development. The recent economic history of parts of East and South-East Asia clearly
demonstrates the falsity of any such claim. Economic development in East and
South-East Asia during the last 20 years, which has been more rapid and sustained than
anywhere else in the world, has been attained with widely varying levels of popular
participation (World Bank, 1993). China, South Korea and possibly Singapore pro-
vide clear illustrations of the benefits for economic growth and improvements in
general living standards of relatively interventionist forms of government. In recent
times (since 1980), the Chinese case is perhaps the most striking because, despite an
authoritarian political regime, the living standards of hundreds of millions of people
have been significantly improved in a very short time-although the social costs
incurred, even in this period, have been high.
On the other hand, until very recently, India, the oldest democracy in Asia, had
experienced little in the way of economic development. The comparison with China is
stark: according to the World Bank, India has twice as many poor people and four
4 P. Blunt

times as many extremely poor people as China. In terms of the provision of basic
needs-food, shelter, clothing-and in terms of health and education services (both
key ingredients of SHD), China has clearly outperformed India. Neither can it be said
with confidence that democracy in India has had the effect of empowering the poor or
of providing them with much in the way of dignity and self-respect. The case of India
shows that democracy and structural adjustment by themselves are not enough to
ensure equitable and sustainable development. What are required are economic,
political and governmental systems which are responsive to India’s cultural traditions
and present circumstances.
It is therefore necessary to reconceptualize the three elements of human develop-
ment in a way which does not proscribe or rule out, say, government intervention in the
market, or insist on democratic reforms at the expense of economic progress. This is a
pragmatic rather than an ideological approach which has implications not only for the
notion of SHD, but also for approaches to ‘good’ governance and public management
reform.

GOVERNANCE

But how do these arguments fare when it comes to questions of sound governance? It is
clear, once again, that the case for universalism is difficult to sustain theoretically or
empirically. Institutional arrangements in government, and the relationships between
governments and the private sector, vary between countries for cultural and historical
reasons, and evolve in response to, inter alia, internal pressures for change and forces
exerted by international markets. In particular, there is an emerging consensus regard-
ing the significance of culture-a society’s collective mental programming, made up of
its beliefs and values-in the shaping of institutions and as a partial explanation for
economic performance. A widely quoted explanation is the neo-Confucian hypothesis
(Hofstede and Bond, 1988), which proposes that much of the economic success of
Japan, the Asian ‘tigers’ or ‘dragons’ of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and
Taiwan, and the overseas Chinese, can be attributed to a common Confucian cultural
heritage, which values, inter aliu, thrift, discipline, harmony, a respect for authority
and high regard for education and the acquisition of knowledge and skill. These
cultural building blocks, it is suggested, have been the foundation of rapid and
sustained economic growth supported by institutional arrangements which differ from
one another in ways which have tended to make the most of national circumstances
(e.g. Redding and Hsiao, 1990; Whitley, 1990). Discussion of public management or
governance therefore needs to take account of culture, since what will be workable or
advisable in one set of cultural circumstances may not be in another (e.g. Blunt, 1990,
1994, 1995; Blunt and Jones, 1992; Hofstede, 1993; UNDP, 1994b).
That this tends not to be done probably hasmuch to do with institutional authorship
and the associated ‘high-ground’ mentality referred to earlier.
Most general accounts of governance-how it is defined, what governments should
do and symptoms of government failure--can accommodate local variations. The
World Bank’s (1992b) recent discussion of governance illustrates both the relative
ideological and cultural neutrality of the general account and the ethnocentrism of
certain features of the more detailed analysis of ‘good’ governance.
 Cultural relutivism 5

Governance defined
Governance can be understood in terms of three major components: first is the form of
political authority that exists in a country (parliamentary or presidential, civilian or
military and autocratic or democratic); second is the means through which authority is
exercised in the management of economic and social resources; and third is the ability
of governments to discharge government functions effectively, efficiently and equi-
tably through the design, formulation and implementation of sound policies (World
Bank, 1992b).

What should governments do?

Whatever the nature of society, market oriented or otherwise, governments should set
the rules by which the system works, and take corrective actions when it fails.
Governments must therefore create institutions and frameworks for the maintenance
of law and order and for the protection of property rights in order to encourage
investment and production (Eggerston, 1990). The state should also play a major part
in the establishment of basic infrastructure and the provision of services such as health
and education, particularly for the poor.

Symptoms and causes of public management failure

These include poor-quality services; an inability to make and implement policy or even
to take routine decisions; weak financial management, including unrealistic budgeting
and poor control; the practice of employing public resources in the pursuit of private
interests, which can be a function of the failure to separate clearly what is public from
what is private; the arbitrary application of laws and rules; an excess of rules and
regulations which stifle entrepreneurial activity and encourage certain forms of cor-
ruption; closed, or non-transparent, decision-making systems; and resources allocated
in a manner which is not consistent with development.
When these symptoms are prevalent likely results include a downward spiral of
reduced government control, less compliance with rules and regulations, followed by
government crack-downs or coercion. If combined with poor economic performance,
this in turn depresses public confidence and makes recovery difficult. Most at risk in
such circumstances are programmes for poverty alleviation and protection of the
environment. Powerful private interest groups, or misplaced priorities, may dissuade
governments from implementing environmental protection programmes which are
designed for the general good. A climate develops in which government is perceived to
collude in not monitoring industrial pollution, natural resource depletion and environ-
mental degradation, and to be unconcerned about enforcing legislation. Confidence
and trust in government is further undermined, and so on.
These general features of governance may be culturally and ideologically impreg-
nated, but they are much less so than the World Bank’s discussion of ‘good’
governance.

‘Good’ governance
According to the World Bank (1992a), six aspects of ‘good’ governance are of
particular importance: political accountability, freedom of association and partici-
6 P. Blunt

pation, a fair and reliable judicial system, bureaucratic accountability, freedom of

information and expression, and effective and efficient public sector management.

1. To a large extent the effectiveness of government can be said to depend on

perceptions of its legitimacy or political accountability. The favoured method (in
the West) for ensuring some degree of political accountability is to subject
political leadership, and possibly other public officials, to periodic tests of their
acceptability to the people by holding elections and limiting periods of office.
2. A second prerequisite of good governance in the western paradigm isfreedom of
association and participation, which involve the freedom to establish religious
groups, professional associations and other voluntary organizations with social,
political or economic purposes. The role of the media, and their freedom, is seen
to be critical here.
3. Clear, established legal frameworks are necessary to create a predictable and
secure living and working environment for ordinary citizens, and a conducive
environment for entrepreneurs, farmers and other economic actors. A particu-
larly important aspect is the uniform application of the law, meaning that all
should be subject to it so that violations by the rich or powerful are dealt within
the same way as those of other citizens. The law should also afford to the
vulnerable protection against exploitation and abuse. In many important
respects law serves to define and control the environment within which social and
business transactions are conducted and economic opportunities and risks are
assessed. It provides protection against unreasonable interference or expropri-
ation and exploitation of the environment.
A fair and effective legal framework requires, first, that there exists a set of
rules which are known in advance; second, that the rules are in force: third, that
means exist to ensure the application of the rules; fourth, that conflict resolution
is a function of binding decisions made by an independent and credible judiciary;
and, fifth, that procedures are in place for changing the rules when they cease to
serve the purposes for which they were intended.
4. Bureaucratic accountability requires a system to monitor and control the per-
formance of government officers and organizations, particularly in relation to
quality, inefficiencies and the abuse of resources. Open systems of financial
management and procurement, accounting and auditing, and of revenue collec-
tion (e.g. customs duty)-together with enforced penalties for malfeasance-are
also necessary.
Transparency is a key element of bureaucratic accountability which entails,
among other things, making available for public scrutiny all public accounts and
audit reports. Transparency is a protection against government error, the misal-
location of resources and corruption. Environmental protection and all forms of
procurement are areas in which transparency is critical to effectiveness and the
containment of corruption. Procurement in particular offers considerable op-
portunity for malfeasance.
5. Efficient markets and bureaucratic transparency are heavily dependent on the
availability and validity of information. Likewise, the debate of public policy
issues can be widened if governments make available data pertaining to national
accounts, balance of payments, employment, cost of living, and so on. The
independent analysis of information is also of importance and civil society
 Cultural relativism 7

organizations such as autonomous research institutions and universities can have

key roles to play in this.
Quality of decision-making, and therefore risk and cost, are all a function of
the quality of information supply. Government is clearly a major source of
information as well as a major user. Government policies are vulnerable to
poor-quality information in the same way that information about the economy
and market conditions is essential to valid private sector calculations.
6. The sixth ingredient of sound public management or governance is effective and
efficient public sector management.
A seventh requirement not emphasized by the World Bank but favoured by other
multilateral institutions such as the UNDP, and by a number of bilateral donor
agencies, is cooperation between governments and civil society organizations. In this
view, sound governance is not simply something that governments ‘do’ by themselves.
The achievements of governments depend on the cooperation and involvement of
other economic and social actors-such as ‘community organizations’ (UNDP, 1993).
Two broad types are identified: ‘people’s organizations’ and NGOs. Examples of the
former include self-help farming groups, urban housing and welfare associations,
women’s groups and trade unions. People’s organizations represent their members’
interests, are accountable to their members and tend to have participative organiz-
ational structures.
The genesis of such organizations can lie in the failure of governments to provide
basic services and infrastructure; in the failure of markets to supply the right kinds of
goods and services; or in the vision and energy of a charismatic popular leader who can
see ways of making things better for ordinary people and can inspire others to
cooperate in the interests of the greater good. In a few cases, it may be the things that
governments do, rather than omit to do, which promote the formation of people’s
organizations-for example where infringements of human rights or police brutality
are commonplace.
As in the case of SHD, there are elements of the above account of ‘good’ governance
which would probably be universally accepted as imperative (e.g. the need for suitable
legal frameworks), yet there are others which clearly would not. Freedoms of ex-
pression and participation, the availability of information, means for ensuring ac-
countability and the extent of government interaction with civil society and
community organizations are all much less likely to have universal appeal or, for
reasons given earlier, validity.

CONCLUSION

Encouraging informed debate about what it is that governments ought to be doing, and
how, is clearly desirable. The debate must be genuinely multilateral, however, and it
should brook differences of opinion. The argument in this article has been that the
debate has tended to be too one-sided and has frequently been culturally and ideologi-
cally biased. We have seen, for example, how the UNDP’s notion of sustainable human
development confounds ends and means in a way which gives prominence to an
ideological percept-popular participation in political and organizational decision-
making-that is central to the western democratic tradition. Similar preoccupations
are evident in the World Bank’s prescriptions concerning ‘good’ governance.
8 P. Blunt

The major challenges of sustainable human development (however it is defined)

include poverty elimination, employment creation, environnhental protection, social
integration, economic management, agricultural reform, and population control.
These challenges can only be overcome with sound governance and public sector
management. It is possible that elements of a universal best practice can be found, but
the search has only just begun.
The position adopted in this article has been that there is no one best way to define
sustainable human development or to govern. Countries and cultures will naturally
vary in these respects. At certain stages in their development, some will give priority to
aims rather than means. Others will define aims and means somewhat differently, but
intrinsically no better or worse than they might be defined in the West. This should lead
one to expect, rather than to resist on principle, the expression of cultural and
institutional differences which give rise to foi-ms of governance and public sector
management which do not conform neatly to models now popular in the West. It
follows from this that cultural differences may be critical also to the development of
types of political participation which do not reflect democratic ideals, but can, and
sometimes do, result in significant economic and social benefits for the mass of the
people.
The climate of acceptance for such differences is clearly improving as the economic
high-ground is taken over by new regions (such as East and South-East Asia) whose lot
in the past has usually been to accept advice from others (usually in the West) rather
than to make up their own minds. These shifts in the balance of economic power are
likely to be accompanied by changes in the balance of ideological power which will
alter perceptions of what is acceptable, and of who decides, whether it be in relation to
human rights (e.g. Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, 1993), SHD, democ-
racy, economic management or sound governance. It is to be hoped that changing
perceptions in the West will come about more as a result of genuine enlightenment than
a reluctant resignation to the demands of what are seen to be inevitable economic
imperatives.
Hopefully, notions such as the ones discussed in this article eventually will be defined
partly in universal and partly in localized terms. Finding a valid balance will be
difficult, but evidence supporting the need to do so is compelling.

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 Cultural relutivism 9

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