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Rule 15 - Motions

HEARING ON MOTIONS:

1. China Banking Corp. v. Abel, G.R. No. 182547, 10 January 2011, 639 SCRA 134
FACTS:
In a foreclosure sale, China Bank acquired title over respondent Abel’s property at Quezon City, she
having failed to pay her loan. To enforce its ownership, China Bank filed with the RTC an ex parte petition for
the issuance of a writ of possession in its favor.
On October 2, 2003 the RTC rendered a decision, granting China Banks petition and directing the issuance
of a writ of possession over the property in its favor. Abel appealed from this decision but lost her appeal in the
Court of Appeals. She filed a petition for review but failed to. She filed a motion for reconsideration and a second
similar motion without success. The Courts judgment became final and executory and, eventually, the record of
her case was remanded to the RTC for execution.
China Bank filed a motion for execution with the RTC, setting it for hearing on June 8, 2007. On June 7,
2007 Abel filed a motion to cancel and reset the hearing on the ground that she needed more time to comment
on or oppose the banks motion. On June 8, 2007 the RTC granted her the 10-day period she asked but from
notice.

On June 19, 2007, noting Abel’s failure to file her opposition to or comment on the motion for execution,
the RTC issued an Order granting China Banks motion. After being served with the notice to vacate, Abel filed
on June 21, 2007 an omnibus urgent motion for reconsideration and to admit her opposition to the banks
motion for execution. She set her urgent motion for hearing on June 29, 2007. On June 22, 2007, however, the
day after receiving her motion, the RTC denied the same for lack of merit.

On June 25, 2007 the sheriff implemented the writ against Abel and placed China Bank in possession of
the subject property. On even date, Abel filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the RTCs June 19
and 22, 2007 Orders. On July 2, 2007, a Saturday, Abel took back possession of the premises on the strength of
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) that the CA issued on June 29, 2007.

On January 3, 2008 the CA rendered a decision setting aside the assailed orders of the RTC. China Bank
moved for its reconsideration but the CA denied this in an April 9, 2008 Resolution. The CA ruled that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the banks motion for execution, noting that the latter court
gave Abel 10 days from notice of its order, not 10 days from the issuance of such order, within which to file her
opposition. Parenthetically, the shorter period was what she asked for in her motion for postponement. But
there was no proof, said the CA, as to when Abel had notice of the RTCs June 8, 2007 Order as to determine
when the 10-day period actually began to run.

China Bank thus filed this petition for review on certiorari against the CA decision and resolution denying
its motion for reconsideration.
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ISSUE: WON the CA erred in setting aside the assailed RTCs Orders on the ground of failure to observe
due process respecting Abel’s right to be heard on the banks motion for execution.
HELD: The CA erred in attributing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC. Although the RTC caused the
issuance of the writ of execution before it could establish that Abel’s 10 days from notice within which to file
her opposition had lapsed, she filed with that court on June 21, 2007 an urgent motion for reconsideration with
her opposition to the motion for execution attached. The Court, acting on her motion, denied it on the following
day, June 22, 2007. Any perceived denial of her right to be heard on the banks motion for execution had been
cured by her motion for reconsideration and the RTCs action on the same.

True, Abel gave notice to China Bank that she would submit her motion for reconsideration for the RTCs
consideration on June 29, 2007 but that notice is for the benefit of the bank, not for her, that it may be heard
on the matter. She cannot complain that the court acted on her motion more promptly than she expected
especially since she actually offered no legitimate reason for opposing the issuance of a writ of possession in
the banks favor.

Orders for the issuance of a writ of possession are issued as a matter of course upon the filing of the
proper motion and approval of the corresponding bond since no discretion is left to the court to deny it. The
RTCs issuance of such writ conformably with the express provisions of law cannot be regarded as done without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Such issuance being ministerial, its execution by the sheriff is
likewise ministerial. In truth, the bank has failed to take possession of the property after more than seven years
on account of Abel’s legal maneuverings.

OMNIBUS MOTION RULE:

1. Cruz v. Manila International Airport Authority, G.R. No. 184732, 9 September 2013, 705 SCRA 275
FACTS:
Petitioner executed a Contract of Lease with MIAA over a property, in order to establish a commercial arcade
for sublease to other businesses.
She averred that MIAA failed to inform her that part of the leased premises is subject to an easement of public
use since the same was adjacent to Parañaque River.
As a result, she was not able to obtain a building permit as well as a certificate of electrical inspection, leading
her consequent failure to secure an electrical connection for the entire leased premises.
Due to lack of electricity, Cruz’s tenants did not pay rent; hence, she was unable to pay her own rental
obligations to MIAA.
Further, since some of Cruz’s stalls were located in the easement area, the MMDA demolished them, causing
her to suffer actual damages.
Thus, Cruz send MIAA her rental computation; however, instead of accepting Cruz’s payment, MIAA sent a letter
terminating the lease contract.
Petitioner then filed before the RTC Pasig a complaint for breach of contract, consignation, and damages against
MIAA.
MIAA filed a MD hinged on the following grounds:
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Violation of the certification requirement against forum shopping under Sec. 5, Rule 7 given that the lease
contract subject of the Pasig case is the same actionable document subject of the Manila Case which is a
complaint for partial annulment of contract also filed by petitioner before RTC Manila; and
Improper venue, since in the complaint for annulment of contract, as well as the verification/certification and
annexes attached thereto, it is indicated that petitioner is a resident of San Miguel, Manila.

RTC: issued an order dismissing petitioner’s complaint for breach of contract due to forum shopping since both
the Pasig and Manila cases are founded on the same actionable document between the same parties.
Petitioner’s MR was denied. Thus, petitioner filed a notice of appeal.
CA: Dismissed the Pasig case. While petitioner did not commit forum shopping, the Pasig case remained
dismissible on the ground of improper venue as petitioner was bound be her judicial admission that her
residence was actually Manila and not is San Juan.
Petitioner’s MR was denied. Hence, this petitioner.

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s appeal should be dismissed on the basis of improper venue.
Petitioner contends that the in ruling on the issue of improper venue, the CA practically allowed MIAA to pursue
a lost appeal, although the latter did not file a notice of appeal within the proper reglementay period nor pay
the prescribed docket fees.
MIAA maintained that despite raising the issue on improper venue before the CA, the RTC did not categorically
rule on the said issue. As such, it claimed that it could raise the foregoing ground as one of the issue before the
CA.

HELD:
Jurisprudence dictates that the appellee’s role in the appeal process is confined only to the task of refuting the
assigned errors interposed by the appellant. Since the appellee (defending party) is not the party who instituted
the appeal and accordingly has not complied with the procedure prescribed therefor, he merely assumes a
defensive stance and his interest solely relegated to the affirmance of the judgment appealed from. Keeping in
mind that the right to appeal is essentially statutory in character, it is highly erroneous for the appellee to either
assign any error or seek any affirmative relief or modification of the lower court’s judgment without interposing
its own appeal.
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the CA committed a reversible error in sustaining the dismissal of the
Pasig case on the ground of improper venue because the same was not an error raised by Cruz who was the
appellant before it. Pursuant to the abovementioned principles, the CA cannot take cognizance of MIAA’s
position that the venue was improperly laid since, being the appellee, MIAA’s participation was confined to the
refutation of the appellant’s assignment of errors. As MIAA’s interest was limited to sustaining the RTC-Pasig
City’s judgment, it cannot, without pursuing its own appeal, deviate from the pronouncements made therein.
In particular, records bear out that the RTC-Pasig City, while granting MIAA’s motion to dismiss, found the
latter’s argument on improper venue to be erroneous. Hence, given that the said conclusion was not properly
contested by MIAA on appeal, the RTC-Pasig City’s ruling on the matter should now be deemed as conclusive.
Corollary, the CA should not have taken this ground into consideration when it appreciated the case before it.
By acting otherwise, it therefore committed a reversible error, which thereby warrants the reversal of its
Decision.
Petitioner granted. CA decision set aside.

Rule 16 - Motion to Dismiss

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1. Equitable PCIB v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143556, 16 March 2004, 425 SCRA 544

FACTS: On September 19, 1995, Sta. Rosa Mining Co., Inc., (hereafter Sta. Rosa), respondent herein, filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 222, a complaint for sum of money and damages against
petitioners Philippine Commercial International Bank (now Equitable-PCIB), Rafael B. Buenaventura, the bank’s
former President, and Cynthia F. Lota (Lota, for brevity), the manager of the Cubao Branch. Sta. Rosa alleged
that it lost income opportunity from its joint venture with Sa Amin sa San Jose Panganiban, Inc. (hereafter Sa
Amin).
In its complaint, Sta. Rosa claimed that (1) On October 21, 1993, Sta. Rosa opened a savings account with
petitioner PCIB Cubao branch; (2) On October 22, 1993, it conveyed its interest to convert its savings account
into savings/current/time deposit accounts; (3) Sta. Rosa sought to obtain from petitioner PCIB checkbooks but
was refused allegedly due to a restraining order from SEC; (4) A verification with the SEC shows that a copy of
the restraining order was received by PCIB only on October 27, 1993, 1:45 p.m.; and (5) The refusal of petitioners
to issue checkbooks and to allow release of the funds prejudiced Sta. Rosa’s stockholders and the livelihood and
social development projects of their joint venture partner, Sa Amin.

On October 6, 1995, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Sta. Rosa was guilty of forum
shopping and that the complaint stated no cause of action. Petitioners averred that Sta. Rosa was guilty of forum
shopping because the amount involved in the case was also the issue in Civil Case No. 6014, entitled "Sa Amin
Sa Jose Panganiban, Inc. v. Sta. Rosa Mining Co., Inc." before Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte,
Branch 39. Hence, it should have secured whatever relief before the RTC of Daet. Also, according to petitioners,
Sta. Rosa had no cause of action because as judgment debtor in Civil Case No. 6014, Sta. Rosa has lost all rights
over the funds deposited under Savings Account No. 0453-52672-1 since the same had already been garnished
by RTC, Branch 39, in favor of the judgment creditor, Sa Amin.

In an Order5 dated November 7, 1995, the RTC of Quezon City denied herein petitioners’ motion to dismiss. It
noted that whether there was malice or not in their alleged defiance of the Daet court’s garnishment order
which would entitle Sta. Rosa to damages could be established in the course of the trial. It also declared that
Sta. Rosa did not engage in forum shopping to obtain a favorable opinion from the other court because when
the Court of Appeals upheld the orders of garnishment of the Daet court directing petitioners to release the
money in favor of Sa Amin, Sta. Rosa as judgment debtor in Civil Case No. 6014, in effect was able to obtain a
favorable judgment which settled the case once and for all, enabling Sta. Rosa to resume its business. It likewise
disagreed with petitioners’ claim that they did not violate any rights of Sta. Rosa. It added that defiance of the
garnishment order had caused inconvenience not only to Sa Amin but also to Sta. Rosa, considering that the
garnishment order would indirectly benefit Sta. Rosa.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals, which
seasonably set aside the order of default of the lower court and directed the latter to admit petitioners’ Answer
and proceed to hear the case on the merits, thus:

WHEREFORE, the order of the public respondent dated March 4, 1998 is RESCINDED AND AVOIDED. Accordingly,
the respondent judge, or whoever is now acting in his place and stead, is directed to grant the petition for relief
filed by the petitioners, admit the petitioners’ answer, and thereafter proceed to hear the case on the merits.
Without costs.

SO ORDERED.13
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The CA reasoned that default judgments are frowned upon, so that courts should be liberal in setting aside
orders of default. It disagreed with the lower court’s ruling that petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was
dilatory, for having been set for hearing one month and a half after its filing, and also pro forma, for merely
reiterating the grounds already set forth in the motion to dismiss. The CA declared that a period of one and a
half months is not unreasonable considering the subject matter of the case and that the motion was filed within
the reglementary period, albeit on the last day for which the Answer should have been filed. It noted that while
the motion reiterated grounds previously relied upon, it also set forth further pertinent facts and plausible
arguments relative to Civil Case No. 6014, hence it cannot be deemed pro forma, much less intended to delay
the inexorable march of events in this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Civil Case No. Q-95-25073 should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

HELD: No. Petitioners contend that Sta. Rosa has no cause of action against them as there was no bad faith on
their part when they refused to release the funds to Sta. Rosa since they were enjoined by the SEC from releasing
the funds. Further, they were willing to release the funds in compliance with the Order of the Daet court after
the denial of their petition for certiorari by the Court of Appeals were it not for the motion for reconsideration
filed by SEC, among others, which prevented them from doing so.

Sta. Rosa argues that it has a cause of action for damages against petitioners as the bank’s Cubao Branch
Manager, Cynthia Lota, had maliciously misrepresented that she received the SEC TRO on October 25, 1993
when upon verification with the SEC, it turned out that a copy of the order was received by Lota only on October
27, 1993. Hence, for refusing to allow the withdrawal of funds deposited with petitioners, Sta. Rosa avers that
its joint venture agreement with Sa Amin was prejudiced and they failed to realize the expected profits.

When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should be based
only on the facts alleged in the complaint. The rule is that only the allegations in the complaint may properly be
considered in ascertaining the existence of a cause of action. Lack of cause of action must appear on the face of
the complaint, and its existence may be determined only by the allegations of the complaint. Consideration of
other facts is out of the question, and any attempt to prove extraneous circumstances is not allowed. Hence,
the test of sufficiency of the facts found in a complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not,
admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer
in the complaint.

Sta. Rosa’s claims might be entitled to relief because the allegations would suffice to constitute a cause of action
against petitioners. That petitioners have a valid defense is another matter. At any rate, matters such as the
propriety of refusal to release the funds by petitioners and the actual date of receipt of the restraining order,
among others, are matters for trial. They require evidentiary proof and support that can be better threshed out
not upon a motion to dismiss but in a full blown trial on the merits. These matters, indeed, would not yet go
into the question of the absence of a cause of action as a ground to dismiss.

2. Aldemita v. Heirs of Silva, G.R. No. 166403, 2 November 2006, 506 SCRA 607

Aldemita v Heirs of Silva (2006)

Petitioner: BENZON ALDEMITA
Respondents: HEIRS OF MELQUIADES SILVA, represented by RAMON VILLORDON, JR
Ponente: J. Austria-Martinez
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Facts:
1. A Complaint for Quieting of Title was filed with the RTC by the Heirs of Melquiades Silva, represented by
Ramon G. Villordon, Jr., against the Heirs of Dionisia Vda. De Zabate (represented by Emelia Deiparine and
Benzon O. Aldemita), involving Lot 11330 of Pcs-945.
2. During the pre-trial, the parties made the following stipulations of facts and/or admissions, to wit:
1) [Petitioner] Aldemita admitted that Lot 11330 has been registered in the name of Melquiades Silva as
shown by Transfer Certificate No. T-18993 of the Registry of Deeds and has been covered by Tax
Declaration No. 25845-R also in the name of Melquiades Silva;
2) [Petitioner] Aldemita also admitted that the [respondents] in this case have been the ones in actual
physical possession of the lot, except a 2,000-square-meter area which said he is claiming to be
possessed by him;
3) [Petitioner] Aldemita admitted, too, that the document "Kalig-onan sa Palit” (Exhibit 1), purportedly
executed on March 15, 1949 by Melquiades Silva in favor of Vda. De Zabate involving the land in
question, is actually a forged document. He contends, however that another document, the "Kalig-onan
sa Panagpalit nga Dayon" (Exhibit 2) was also executed by Melquiades Silva in favor of Vda. De Zabate
and that the latter was confirmed by Proferia Silva and Emeliana Zabate Paran in a Deed of Confirmation
of Previous Deed of Sale executed on February 20, 1979.
3. The RTC appointed the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office VII as commissioner of the court for the purpose
of determining whether the purported signature of Melquiades Silva in Exhibit 1 and that of Porferia Silva in
Exhibit 2.
4. The parties manifested through their respective counsel that they would submit the case for decision without
need of trial especially that the findings embodied in the commissioner’s report (that the signature of Silva was
indeed forged) have already been considered as the findings of facts in this case.
5.After Aldemita filed a Position Paper with the Court, his counsel Atty. Manuel Paradela filed a Motion To
Withdraw As Counsel. Immediately thereafter, the new counsel for petitioner Aldemita, Atty. Rodolfo Ugang,
Sr., entered his appearance and filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of cause of action.
 The Motion averred in main that the respondents should first be declared as heirs of Melquiades Silva in a
special proceeding before they can be considered as real parties-in-interest to institute the action in this
case.
6. The RTC denied the Motion for being belatedly filed. The Court also recognized the heirs of Melquiades Silva
as the real parties in interest who could institute an action for quieting of title. Meanwhile, believing the Silva’s
signature had been forged, the documents denominated as "Kalig-onan Sa Palit" and "Kalig-onan sa Panagpalit
nga Dayon," and the Deed of Confirmation of Previous Deed of Sale were all declared to be null and void.
7. The CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto.
8. Hence, the instant Petition.

Issue:
WON the evidence were required to prove the authenticity of the documents "Kalig-onan Sa Palit" and "Kalig-
onan sa Panagpalit nga Dayon," and the Deed of Confirmation of Previous Deed of Sale - No
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Ratio:
Aldemita: "Kalig-onan sa Panagpalit nga Dayon" which purports to be a deed of absolute sale qualifies as an
ancient document under Section 21 of Rule 132, and, hence, evidence of authenticity is not necessary. In view
of this, the property in question thus transferred to Emilia Deiparine as successor-in-interest of Vda. De Zabate.
Aldemita then predicates his title by virtue of The Deed of Sale executed by Emilia Deiparine in his favor.
1. Exhibit 2 cannot be considered an ancient document.
 An ancient document is one that is (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3)
unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. It must on its face appear to be genuine.
 During the pre-trial of the case, the parties agreed to submit the questioned documents to a commissioner
for the purpose of determining whether the purported signatures of Melquiades Silva in "Kalig-onan sa
Panagpalit nga Dayon" and Porferia Silva in Deed of Confirmation of Previous Deed of Sale are genuine.
After the appointed commissioner submitted his report finding the foregoing signatures as forgeries, the
parties manifested through their respective counsel to submit the case for decision without need of trial
since the findings embodied in the report have already been considered as findings of facts in the case.
Aldemita cannot now spin around and question the findings of the commissioner, because he agreed that
these findings shall be considered as the findings of fact of the case without necessity of a trial.
2. Moreover, the mere fact that the document designated as "Kalig-onan sa Panagpalit nga Dayon" (Exhibit 1)
would be considered as an ancient document accordingly being more than thirty (30) years already, it does not
follow that its due execution and authenticity need not be proven considering that in this case, said document
is not genuine and is a product of forgery. Hence, Aldemita should have presented evidence to prove the due
execution and authenticity of the said document which he failed to do so.
 Even the Deed of Confirmation of Previous Deed of Sale purportedly executed by Porferia Silva and Emiliana
Zabate Paran, having likewise reported by the commissioner document examiner Romeo Varona, that the
signature of Porferia Silva was forged, said document has no legal effect and has not confirmed anything.

Other Issue:
WON the heirs of Silva were real parties-in-interest who could institute the action in this case – YES
1. Following Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, Aldemita’s Motion to Dismiss should have been filed
within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. As it appears, the
motion was filed in the RTC after the case has been submitted for decision.
2. According to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, only the following defenses are not waived even if not
raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia;
(c) res judicata; and (d) prescription on the action. Failure to state a cause of action is not an exception in said
Rule. Thus, under Section 1, Rule 16, Aldemita is deemed to have waived this ground and cannot now raise it
after the case in the RTC had been submitted for decision or on appeal to the CA.
3. A reading of the Petition for Quieting of Title readily shows that such pleading states a cause of action. A
cause of action, which is an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another, has these elements:
1) the legal right of the plaintiff;
2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect that legal right; and
3) an act or omission of the defendant that violates such right.19
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Here, the respondents alleged that they are the heirs of the late Melquiades Silva and are thus the true owners
of a parcel of land registered in the name of the latter; that the private documents allegedly executed by the
late Melquiades Silva in favor of the predecessors-in-interest of the Aldemita are forged documents and that
the existence of these documents casts a cloud over the title of the respondents as owners of the property.
4. There are well-recognized exceptions to the rule that the allegations are hypothetically admitted as true and
inquiry is confined to the face of the complaint. Examples are whenever there is no hypothetical admission of
the veracity of allegations if their falsity is subject to judicial notice, or if such allegations are legally impossible,
or if these refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence, or if by the record or document included in the
pleading these allegations appear unfounded. Also, inquiry is not confined to the complaint if there is evidence
which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties, or in the course of hearings related to the
case. However, none of the exceptions are present in the instant case.
5. During the pre-trial, Aldemitadid not question the capacity of the Heirs of Melquiades Silva to sue; nor did he
question the representation of Ramon G. Villordon, Jr. as administrator of the estate of the deceased. In fact,
Aldemita, in his Pre-Trial Brief delimited the issues only to: (1) whether the ancient documents are valid; and (2)
whether the various transactions are valid. It is not disputed that the parties manifested to the RTC that they
were submitting the case without the need of trial. Aldemita did not complain in the RTC about the capability
of the Heirs of Melquiades Silva in his Position Paper. It is only after the case had already been submitted for
decision of the RTC that the issue on the capacity of the Heirs was raised through a new counsel.
6. At any rate, what is established in this case is that petitioner does not have any right to the subject property
and that the Heirs of Melquiades Silva are entitled thereto. As to whether the persons enumerated in the
complaint are actually the heirs may still be threshed out in the proper proceeding for declaration of heirs and
settlement of the Estate of said decedent.

2. Westmont Bank v. Funai Phils. Corp., G.R. Nos. 175733 & 180162, 8 July 2015,
762 SCRA 82
FACTS:
Respondents Funai Philippines Corporation (Funai) and Spouses Antonio and Sylvia Yutingco (Sps. Yutingco)
obtained loans from Westmont Bank (Westmont), now United Overseas Bank Phils.secured by several
promissory notes (PNs) with different maturity dates. The PNs commonly provide that in case the same are
referred to an attorney-at-law or a collection agency, or a suit is instituted in court for collection, Sps. Yutingco
will be liable to pay twenty percent (20%) of the total amount due as attorney's fees, exclusive of costs of suit
and other expenses.

However, Funai and Sps. Yutingco (original defendants) defaulted in the payment of the said loan obligations
when they fell due, and ignored Westmont's demands for payment. Hence, the Westmont filed a
complaint for sum of money, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment before the RTC.
After an ex-parte hearing, the RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment ordering the attachment of the
personal and real properties of the original defendants. Furthermore, the RTC issued another Order, directing
the attachment of properties appearing under the names of other persons, but which were under the control
of the original defendants. In view of the foregoing directives, Sheriff Gerry C. Duncan (Sheriff Duncan) and
Sheriff Cachero levied and seized the properties situated at: (a) No. 9 Northpark Avenue, Bellevue, Grace
Village, Quezon City; and (b) 2nd Level, Phase III, Sta. Lucia East Grand Mall, Cainta, Rizal (Sta. Lucia).
Pepito Ong Ngo (Ngo), as Acting President of Panamax Corporation (Panamax), filed an Affidavit of Third-Party
Claim over the properties seized in Sta. Lucia, claiming that Panamax is the true and lawful owner thereof.
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Westmont filed an Amended Complaint impeding additional defendants, Panamax, Ngo, Aimee R. Alba,
Richard N. Yu, Annabelle Baesa, and Nenita Resane (additional defendants), and praying that they be declared
as mere alter egos, conduits, dummies, or nominees of Sps. Yutingco to defraud their creditors, including
Westmont.

The RTC ruled that the additional defendants had no participation or any corresponding duty whatsoever
relative to the subject PNs, which were executed only by the original defendants in favor of Westmont; hence,
the latter cannot maintain an action against said additional defendants. The RTC further held that Westmont's
imputation that the additional defendants acted as dummies, conduits, and alter egos of the original
defendants are but mere inferences of fact, and not a narration of specific acts or set of facts or ultimate facts
required in a complaint to entitle the plaintiff to a remedy in law. Thus, it concluded that the complaint failed
to state a cause of action against the additional defendants.

Due to Westmont's continued refusal to release the seized items, the RTC issued a Break-Open Order to
enforce the writ. However the CA issued a TRO enjoining Sheriffs Duncan and Cachero from enforcing the writ
of execution. The CA process server, Alfredo Obrence, Jr. (Obrence), duly served a copy of the TRO to the RTC
Clerk of Court and informed Sheriff Cachero over the phone. Notwithstanding, the latter proceeded with the
implementation of the writ of execution.

Westmont's representative who was able to secure a facsimile copy of the TRO showed the same to Sheriff
Cachero who merely ignored it. Meanwhile, various audio, video, and electrical appliances were taken out
from the warehouse and loaded into a truck. Obrence arrived at the site and served on Sheriff Cachero a
duplicate original copy of the TRO. Nonetheless, the items on the truck were not unloaded and the truck was
allowed to leave the premises. Consequently, a case for indirect contempt was filed by Westmont against
Sheriffs Cachero and Duncan, and Ngo.

ISSUE:
WON Motion to dismiss should be granted on the ground of failure to state cause of action
HELD:
While the facts alleged in the complaint are hypothetically admitted by the defendant, who moves to dismiss
the complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, it must, nevertheless, be remembered that
the hypothetical admission extends only to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint, as
well as interferes fairly deductible therefrom. Verily, the filing of the motion to dismiss assailing the sufficiency
of the complaint does not admit the truth of mere epithets of fraud; nor allegations of legal conclusions; nor
an erroneous statement of law; nor mere interferences or conclusions from facts not stated; nor mere
conclusions of law; nor allegations of facts falsity of which is subject to judicial notice; nor matters of evidence;
nor surplusage and irrelevant matter; nor scandalous matter inserted merely to insult the opposing party; nor
to legally impossible facts; nor to facts which appear unfounded by a record incorporated In the pleading, or
by a document referred to; nor to general averments contradicted by more specific averments.

4. Aquino v. Quiazon, G.R. No. 201248, 11 March 2015, 753 SCRA 98

5. Heirs of Dolleton v. Fil-estate, G.R. No. 170750, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 409

DOCTRINE
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The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true
would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material
allegations.

FACTS
The Heirs of Tomas Dolleton, Heraclio Orcullo, Remedios San Pedro, et al., Heirs of Bernardo Millama, Heirs of
Agapito Villanueva, et al., Heirs of Hilarion Garcia, et al., Serafina SP Argana, et al., and Heirs of Mariano
Villanueva, et al. filed before the RTC separate Complaints for Quieting of Title and/or Recovery of Ownership
and Possession with Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order and Damages against Fil-Estate Management Inc.,
Spouses Arturo E. Dy and Susan Dy, Megatop Realty Development, Inc., and the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas.
The Complaints were later consolidated.
The eight Complaints were similarly worded and contained substantially identical allegations.
That they had been in continuous, open, and exclusive possession of the subject properties for more than 90
years until they were forcibly ousted by armed men.
They had cultivated the subject properties and religiously paid the real estate taxes for the same.
Spouses Dy cannot rely on Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) issued by the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas in
their names, because the subject properties were not covered by said certificates.
Respondents filed before the RTC a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Application for a Temporary Restraining
Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction. They moved for the dismissal of the eight Complaints on the grounds of
(1) prescription; (2) laches; (3) lack of cause of action; and (4) res judicata.
RTC: Granted respondents Motion to Dismiss for all the complaints. The trial court determined that the subject
properties were already registered in the names of respondents, and that petitioners were unable to prove by
clear and convincing evidence their title to the said properties.
CA: Denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC Resolutions stating that the titles to the subject properties were
indefeasible because they were registered under the Torrens system. Thus, it could not be said that any claim
on the subject properties casts a cloud on their title when they failed to demonstrate a legal or an equitable title
to the same.
In addition, actions had already prescribed. PD 1529 requires that an action assailing a certificate of title should
be filed within one year after its issuance and actions assailing fraudulent titles should be filed within 10 years
after the said titles were issued but in this case, it took 30 years before petitioners filed their case.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S
W/N the RTC properly granted respondents motion to dismiss

RULING & RATIO

NO

Rule 2
Section 1. Ordinary civil actions, basis of. — Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action.
Section 2. Cause of action, defined. — A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right
of another.

Respondents seek the dismissal of petitioners Complaints for failure to state a cause of action.
This contention is untenable.
 11

Respondents mistakenly construe the allegations in petitioners Complaints. What petitioners alleged in their
Complaints was that while the subject properties were not covered by respondents’ certificates of title,
nevertheless, respondents forcibly evicted petitioners therefrom.
It is not simply a question of whether petitioners’ possession can defeat respondents’ title to registered land.
Instead, an initial determination has to be made on whether the subject properties were in fact covered by
respondents’ certificates of title.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure defines a cause of action as the act or omission by which a party
violates the right of another.
Its essential elements are as follows: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever
law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff, for which the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true
would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations.
This Court is convinced that each of the Complaints filed by petitioners sufficiently stated a cause of action. The
Complaints alleged that petitioners are the owners of the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. As
owners thereof, they have the right to remain in peaceful possession of the said properties and, if deprived
thereof, they may recover the same.

Court’s ruling on other issues in case ASG asks

Complaints are not barred by prescription and laches

While petitioners improperly prayed for the cancellation of respondents TCTs in their Complaints, there is
nothing else in the said Complaints that would support the conclusion that they are either petitions for
reopening and review of the decree of registration under Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree or
actions for reconveyance based on implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code. Instead, petitioners
Complaints may be said to be in the nature of an accion reivindicatoria, an action for recovery of ownership and
possession of the subject properties, from which they were evicted sometime between 1991 and 1994 by
respondents. An accion reivindicatoria may be availed of within 10 years from dispossession. There is no
showing that prescription had already set in when petitioners filed their Complaints in 1997.

It appears from the records that the RTC did not conduct a hearing to receive evidence proving that petitioners
were guilty of laches. Well-settled is the rule that the elements of laches must be proven positively. Laches is
evidentiary in nature, a fact that cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and cannot be
resolved in a motion to dismiss. At this stage, therefore, the dismissal of petitioners Complaints on the ground
of laches is premature. Those issues must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits, wherein both parties
will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses.

Complaints are not barred by res judicata

There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the
second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. But
where there is identity of parties and subject matter in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of
action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and
determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. There is conclusiveness of judgment. Under the
 12

doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot
again be raised in any future case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different claim
or cause of action. The identity of causes of action is not required but merely identity of issues.

6. Intramuros Administration v. Contacto, G.R. No. 152576, 5 May 2003, 402

SCRA 581

FACTS: On 21 January 1993, the petitioner and respondent Yvette Contacto entered into a contract1 for the
lease of petitioner’s premises known as "Cantinas de Aduana" (Cantinas) to the latter to establish a fastfood
and restaurant business. The lease was for a period of five years, from 1 February 1993 to 31 January 1998, at a
monthly rental of P36,000. Yvette was to assume the payment of water and other utility expenses, and secure
appropriate licenses and permits.

In the next two years of the contract, Yvette additionally complained of inadequate facilities of the Cantinas,
which allegedly resulted in the suspension of her license and denial of her permit applications by the Manila
Health Department. She further claimed that in August 1995, she was constrained to rehabilitate the Cantinas
on her own, resulting in the significant increase in her food sales. During this time, however, Yvette did not pay
the stipulated rent. Thus, between 1994 and 1995, the petitioner and Yvette entered into three agreements
allowing the latter to restructure her outstanding obligations. Still, Yvette failed to pay the accrued rentals.

On 16 January 1996, Yvette received a letter from the petitioner requiring her to pay her unsettled accounts
and to vacate the premises under threat of closure, within five days from receipt of the letter. With the advise
of then Secretary of the Department of Tourism Eduardo Pilapil, she attempted to hold a conference with the
petitioner in order to prevent the closure, but this attempt failed. On 22 January 1996, the scheduled date of
the closure, Yvette hurriedly filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a complaint for preliminary
injunction, with a prayer for specific performance and damages. She prayed that the petitioner be ordered to
(1) desist from enforcing the closure order; (2) offset all the expenses that she incurred or might incur as a result
of assuming petitioner’s obligation to make the leased premises fit for its intended use; (3) reduce the monthly
rental from P36,000 to P18,000, retroactive 1 February 1993 up to the expiration of the contract in 1998; and
(4) pay her actual and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and cost of suit. The complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. 96-767-44.

On 17 September 1998, pending the resolution of Civil Case No. 96-767-44 but after the expiration of the lease
contract, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a complaint7 against respondent spouses Yvette and
Gregorio Contacto. It alleged that the respondents occupied the leased premises for the entire five years
stipulated in the contract; however, they defaulted in the payment not only of their monthly rentals from May
1995 until 31 January 1998 when they vacated the leased premises but also the water bills and electric bills. It
then prayed that the respondents be ordered to pay (1) P3,069,225.13,8 representing unpaid rentals, penalty,
surcharges and interest, and electric and water bills after deducting their deposit of P72,000; (2) P500,000 as
exemplary damages; (3) attorneys fees equivalent to 20 percent of the total award; and (4) interest on the
monetary claims. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-90835 and assigned to Branch 9 of said court.

On 12 March 1999, the respondents filed in Civil Case No. 98-90835 a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of litis
pendentia,9 i.e., the pendency of Civil Case No. 96-767-44 in Branch 26 of the RTC of Manila. The RTC denied
the motion to dismiss. Hence, the respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63815. After due proceedings, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dated 28
 13

February 2002 granting the petition; declaring as null and void the 2 December 1999 and 8 September 2000
orders of Branch 9 of the RTC of Manila; and dismissing Civil Case No. 98-90835 on the ground of litis pendentia.

ISSUE: Wether the motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendencia in Civil Case No. 98-90835 should be
dismiss?

HELD: Yes. Nonetheless, respondents’ motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia cannot prosper.

In order to grant a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia, the following requisites must concur: (a)
there must be an identity of parties, or at least such parties as representing the same interests in both actions;
(b) there must be an identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

In the first case, Civil Case No. 96-767-44, respondent Yvette Contacto, as a lessee, asserts her right under the
lease contract to occupy the leased premises and to use the same for the purpose for which it was intended. On
the other hand, in the second case, Civil Case No. 98-90835, the petitioner asserts its right as a former lessor to
demand payment from the respondents, as former lessees, of the stipulated rentals, penalty, and surcharges,
as well as water and electric bills.

The reliefs prayed for in the first case are anchored on the then impending closure of the leased premises, as
well as the alleged failure or refusal of the petitioner to evict the sidewalk vendors in the area and improve the
facilities in the leased premises. The second case is based on the refusal of the respondents to pay the monthly
rentals from May 1995 up to 31 January 1998 when they vacated the leased premises, as well as the water and
electric bills.

From the foregoing, it is clear that there is as between the two actions no identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for, as well as of the facts from which the reliefs are founded. It is not therefore likely that petitioner’s
defense in the first case, which was filed by the respondents, would be in pursuit of its theory as plaintiff in the
second case.

The Court of Appeals, however, overlooked the fact that there is more to determining the identity of the causes
of action than an identity of contract. More fundamental is whether the cause of action in the second case
existed at the time of the filing of the complaint or answer with counterclaim, as the case may be.

7. Mid Pasig Land v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 153751, 8 October 2003, 413
SCRA 204
MID PASIG LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts:
 Mid-Pasig Land Development Corporation leased a portion of its seized property to ECRM Enterprises.
 ECRM intended to use the area as staging ground for its Home and Garden Exhibition.
 Under the contract of lease, ECRM agreed to pay the amount of P1,650,000.00 as rental for three months,
inclusive of 10% VAT, with option to renew, that upon expiration there is no delay of turnover of the property
 14

in the same or improved condition and would remove all temporary improvements at its own expense within
7 days after expiration of the lease.
 ECRM assigned to respondent Rockland Construction Co all its rights under a lease of agreement including the
extension of the lease period.
 After delivering the rental payment for 3 months, R verbally requested for the renewal of the lease term of 3
years.
 Before the request was acted upon, P retroactively increased the monthly rental to P770, 000.00 per month
effective April 15, 2000 thus R agreed to the increased rate and paid petitioner the rent differential
 R sub-leased the certain portions, however, a notice from petitioner was served stating too vacate the
property.
 R requesting for a formal 3 year lease contract be executed in its favor, nevertheless P stated therein that it
had not entered in any agreement with the R or among others
 P claimed that the assignment of the lease was not valid since it was done without its consent and the
provisions of lease agreement were violated.
 Respondent filed a complaint for specific performance with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order/writ of preliminary injunction.
 Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint was anticipatory in nature, failed to state
a cause of action and respondents claim is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds
 P filed a supplemental motion seeking its dismissal on the ground of litis pendentia.
 An order was issued denying P motion to dismiss on the ground that R substantially complied with all the
requirements for the filing of an initiatory pleading and that the complaint clearly stated a cause of action.
 P cannot likewise invoke the Statute of Frauds in seeking the dismissal of the complaint because the lease
contract was already partially executed by the acceptance of rental payments.
 A motion for reconsideration was thereafter filed by petitioner.
 P motion to dismiss was denied by the TC on the ground that there was no litis pendentia between Civil Cases
for unlawful detainer, because there was no identity of causes of action.
Issue: W/N the motion to dismiss on the of litis pendentia was proper.
Ruling:
 In order to sustain a dismissal of an action on the ground of litis pendentia, the following requisites must
concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) identity in the two
cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
 No question that parties are one and same.
 RTC reveals that the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for therein are no different from those pleaded in
the MeTC case.
 The only difference between the two cases herein is that R asserts, as a cause of action, its alleged
contractual right to possession of the property in the RTC case, while the same matter is set forth as its
counterclaim in the MeTC case where it is a defendant. However, the two cases are identical in all other
respects, with merely a reversal of the parties position in the two actions.
 The case is hereby dismissed for the grounds of litis pendentia.

Dismissal of Actions
 15

1. Dael v. Sps Beltran, G.R. No. 156470, 30 April 2008, 553 SCRA 182
DAEL V SPS. BELTRAN

FACTS:
 respondents sold a land to petitioner

 Petitioner alleged that respondents did not disclose that the land was previously mortgaged and that an
extrajudicial foreclosure over the property had already been instituted so he was constrained to bid in
the extrajudicial sale

 petitioner Frederick Dael filed before the RTC a Complaint for breach of contract and damages against
respondent-spouses Beltran

 respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that petitioner had no cause of action since the
contract to sell stated that the vendor was Benedicto Beltran and the vendee was Frederick George
Ghent Dael, not the petitioner.

 in a hearing on the motion, petitioner's counsel, disclosed that petitioner is the father of Frederick
George Ghent Dael whose name appears as the contracting party in the Contract to Sell. They moved to
reset the hearing to enable the petitioner to withdraw and have the complaint dismissed, amended, or
to enter into a compromise agreement with respondents

 RTC on the same day ordered petitioner to clarify whether or not he and Frederick George Ghent Dael
were one and the same person; whether or not they were Filipinos and residents of Dumaguete City;
and whether or not Frederick George Ghent Dael was of legal age, and married, as stated in the Contract
to Sell

 Petitioner did not comply. Instead, he filed a Notice of Dismissal on February 20, 2002

 RTC dismissed the complaint with prejudice

 Petitioner argued that the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice based on respondents'
Motion to Dismiss, and not without prejudice based on his Notice of Dismissal

 He asserts it is the prerogative of the plaintiff to indicate if the Notice of Dismissal filed is with or
without prejudice and the RTC cannot exercise its own discretion and dismiss the case with
prejudice

 respondents on the other hand counter that the RTC is correct in dismissing the case with prejudice
based on their Motion to Dismiss because they filed their motion ahead of petitioner who filed his Notice
of Dismissal only on February 20, 2002

 They further argue that although it is correct that under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure a
complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal before service of the
answer or of a motion for summary judgment, the petitioner filed the Notice of Dismissal only as
an afterthought after he realized that the Motion to Dismiss was meritorious

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC was correct in dismissing the action with prejudice

HELD: NO
 16

 Under Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure it is mandatory that the trial court issue an
order confirming such dismissal and, unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without
prejudice and could be accomplished by the plaintiff through mere notice of dismissal, and not through
motion subject to approval by the court. Dismissal is ipso facto upon notice, and without prejudice unless
otherwise stated in the notice

 The trial court has no choice but to consider the complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff may
opt for such dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of the ground

 Section 1 of Rule 17 does not encompass a Motion to Dismiss. The provision specifically provides that a
plaintiff may file a notice of dismissal before service of the service of the answer or a motion for summary
judgment. Thus, upon the filing of the Notice of Dismissal by the plaintiff, the Motion to Dismiss filed by
respondents became moot and academic and the trial court should have dismissed the case without
prejudice based on the Notice of Dismissal filed by the petitioner

 Moreover, to allow the case to be dismissed with prejudice would erroneously result inres
judicata [18] and imply that petitioner can no longer file a case against respondents without giving him a
chance to present evidence to prove otherwise

2. Ching v. Cheng, G.R. No. 175507, 8 October 2014, 737 SCRA 610

3. Shimizu Phils. Contractors v. Magsalin, G.R. No. 170026, 20 June 2012, 674
SCRA 65
Doctrine: Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is authorized under Section 3, Rule 17
of the Rules of Court; Procedurally, when a complaint is dismissed for failure to prosecute and the dismissal
is unqualified, the dismissal has the effect of an adjudication on the merits.

Grounds for Dismissal of a Case Motu Proprio for Failure to Prosecute (S3R17) -
(a) Failure of the plaintiff, without justifiable reasons, to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence
in chief;
(b) Failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; (c) Failure of the plaintiff
to comply with the Rules of Court; or
(d) Failure of the plaintiff to obey any order of the court.

Summary: Shimizu filed a complaint against both Magsalin and FGU Insurance. The complaint sought Php
2,329,124.60 as actual damages for the breach of contract. Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order of Dismissal for
the case without citing the basis nor the reasons therefor. The court held that when a complaint is dismissed
for failure to prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal has the effect of an adjudication on the
merits. A trial court should always specify the reasons for a complaints dismissal so that on appeal, the reviewing
court can readily determine the prima facie justification for the dismissal. The dismissal order clearly violates
this rule for its failure to disclose how and why Shimizu failed to prosecute its complaint. Where the reasons are
absent, a decision (such as the dismissal order) has absolutely nothing to support it and is thus a nullity.

Facts: The petitioner Shimizu claims that Leticia Magsalin, doing business as Karens Trading, had breached their
subcontract agreement for the supply, delivery, installation, and finishing of parquet tiles for certain floors in
the petitioners Makati City condominium project called The Regency at Salcedo. The breach triggered the
agreements termination. When Magsalin also refused to return the petitioners unliquidated advance payment
and to account for other monetary liabilities despite demand, the petitioner sent a notice to respondent FGU
 17

Insurance Corporation demanding damages pursuant to the surety and performance bonds the former had
issued for the subcontract.

Shimizu filed a complaint against both Magsalin and FGU Insurance at the RTC of Makati. The complaint sought
P2,329,124.60 as actual damages for the breach of contract. FGU Insurance was duly served with summons.
With respect to Magsalin, however, the corresponding officers return declared that both she and Karens Trading
could not be located at their given addresses, and that despite further efforts, their new addresses could not be
determined.

FGU Insurance filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The Shimizu filed its opposition to the motion. The
motion to dismiss was denied as well as the ensuing motion for reconsideration, and FGU Insurance was obliged
to file an answer. To assist the RTC in acquiring jurisdiction over Magsalin, Shimizu filed a motion for leave to
serve summons on respondent Magsalin by way of publication. Shimizu then filed its reply to FGU Insurances
answer

FGU Insurance filed a motion for leave of court to file a third-party

complaint. Attached to the motion was the subject complaint, with Reynaldo Baetiong, Godofredo Garcia and
Concordia Garcia named as third-party defendants. FGU Insurance claims that the three had executed counter-
guaranties over the surety and performance bonds it executed for the subcontract with Magsalin and, hence,
should be held jointly and severally liable in the event it is held liable in Civil Case No. 02-488.

RTC admitted the third-party complaint and denied the motion to serve summons by publication on the ground
that the action against respondent Magsalin was in personam.

The TC issued a notice setting the case for hearing on June 20, 2003. FGU Insurance filed a motion to cancel the
hearing on the ground that the third-party defendants had not yet filed their answer. The motion was granted.

Baetiong filed his answer to the third-party complaint. He denied any personal knowledge about the surety and
performance bonds for the subcontract with Magsalin. Of the (3) persons named as third-party defendants, only
Baetiong filed an answer to the third-party complaint; the officers returns on the summons to the Garcias state
that both could not be located at their given addresses. Incidentally, Shimizu claims, and Baetiong does not
dispute, that it was not served with a copy of Baetiongs answer.

Shimizu now argues before us that FGU Insurance, which is the plaintiff in the third-party complaint, had failed
to exert efforts to serve summons on the Garcias. It suggests that a motion to serve summons by publication
should have been filed for this purpose. The petitioner also asserts that the RTC should have scheduled a hearing
to determine the status of the summons to the third-party defendants

On Dec 16, 2003, the RTC issued a worded Order Of Dismissal, dismissing Civil Case No. 02-488: “For failure of
[petitioner] to prosecute, the case is hereby DISMISSED”

The RTC denied Shimizu’s motion for reconsideration prompting the latter to elevate its case to the CA via a
Rule 41 petition for review

FGU Insurance moved for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It argued that the
appeal raised a pure question of law as it did not dispute the proceedings before the issuance of the December
16, 2003 dismissal order.
 18

Shimizu, on the other hand, insisted that it had raised questions of fact in the appeal stating that “While, the
instant appeal does not involve the merits of the case, the same involves questions of fact based on the records
of the case. It must be emphasized that the lower courts dismissal of the case based on alleged failure to
prosecute on the part of plaintiff-appellant was too sudden and precipitate.”

The CA agreed with FGU Insurance and dismissed the appeal, and denied as well the
subsequent motion for reconsideration. The petitioner thus filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the Order of Dismissal was valid and proper – No.

Held: No, the dismissal order is void.

The nullity of the dismissal order is patent on its face. It simply states its conclusion that the case should be
dismissed for non prosequitur, a legal conclusion, but does not state the facts on which this conclusion is based.

Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is authorized under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules
of Court. A plain examination of the December 16, 2003 dismissal order shows that it is an unqualified order
and, as such, is deemed to be a dismissal with prejudice. “Dismissals of actions (under Section 3) which do not
expressly state whether they are with or without prejudice are held to be with prejudice.” As a prejudicial
dismissal, the dismissal order is also deemed to be a judgment on the merits so that the petitioner’s complaint
in Civil Case No. 02-488 can no longer be refiled on the principle of res judicata. Procedurally, when a complaint
is dismissed for failure to prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal has the effect of an
adjudication on the merits.

As an adjudication on the merits, it is imperative that the dismissal order conform with Section 1, Rule 36 of the
Rules of Court on the writing of valid judgments and final orders. A trial court should always specify the reasons
for a complaints dismissal so that on appeal, the reviewing court can readily determine the prima facie
justification for the dismissal. The dismissal order clearly violates this rule for its failure to disclose how and why
Shimizu failed to prosecute its complaint. Thus, neither Shimizu nor the reviewing court is able to know the
particular facts that had prompted the prejudicial dismissal.

We thus agree with Shimizu that the dismissal constituted a denial of due process. Elementary due process
demands that the parties to a litigation be given information on how the case was decided, as well as an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. Where the reasons are
absent, a decision (such as the dismissal order) has absolutely nothing to support it and is thus a nullity.

Moreover, the Dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 is not Supported by the Facts of the Case.

Based on available records and on the averments of the parties, the following events were chronologically
proximate to the dismissal of the Civil Case: (a) on March 24, 2003, the court admitted FGU Insurances third-
party complaint; (b) the trial court cancelled the June 20, 2003 hearing upon FGU Insurances motion; and (c) on
June 16, 2003, Baetiong filed his Answer to the third-party complaint but did not serve it upon the petitioner.
None of these events square with the grounds specified by Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court for the motu
proprio dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute. These grounds are as follows:
 19

(a) Failure of the plaintiff, without justifiable reasons, to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence
in chief;
(b) Failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; (c) Failure of the plaintiff
to comply with the Rules of Court; or
(d) Failure of the plaintiff to obey any order of the court.

The developments in the present case do not satisfy the stringent standards set
in law and jurisprudence for a non prosequitur. The fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the
circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable
promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute.

In this case, the parties own narrations of facts demonstrate Shimizu’s willingness to prosecute its complaint.
Indeed, neither FGU Insurance nor Baetiong was able to point to any specific act committed by Shimizu to justify
the dismissal of their case.

While it is discretionary on the trial court to dismiss cases, dismissals of actions should be made with care. The
repressive or restraining effect of the rule amounting to adjudication upon the merits may cut short a case even
before it is fully litigated; a ruling of dismissal may forever bar a litigant from pursuing judicial relief under the
same cause of action. This court is thus of the opinion that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 is not
warranted. Neither facts, law or jurisprudence supports the RTCs finding of failure to prosecute on the part of
the petitioner. Hence, the petition is granted. The order of dismissal is declared null and void.

4. Padilla v. Globe Asiatique, G.R. No. 207376, 6 August 2014, 732 SCRA 416
FACTS: From the years 2005 to 2008, Philippine National Bank (PNB) entered into several Contracts to Sell (CTS)
Facility Agreements2 with respondents Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corporation (Globe Asiatique) and
Filmal Realty Corporation (Filmal) represented by Delfin S. Lee and Dexter L. Lee, President and Vice-President,
respectively, of the two corporations. PNB thereby agreed to make available toGlobe Asiatique and Filmal CTS
Facility in the amount not exceeding 200,000,000.00 to finance the purchase of certain Accounts Receivables or
the in-house installment receivables of respondents arising from the sale of subdivision houses in their real
estate/housing projects as evidenced by contracts to sell. These availments werelater increased to a total
amount of 1,200,000,000.00.

Sometime in the first quarter of 2010, respondents defaulted in the payment of their outstanding balance and
delivery to PNB of transfer certificates of title corresponding to the assigned accounts receivables, for which
PNB declared them in default under the CTS Facility Agreements. Subsequently, respondents made partial
payments and made proposals for paying in full its obligation to PNB as shown in the exchange of
correspondence between respondents and PNB.

Thereafter, PNB instituted Civil Case No. R-PSY-10-04228-CV (Philippine National Bank v. Globe Asiatique Realty
Holdings Corporation, Filmal Realty Corporation, Delfin S. Lee and Dexter L. Lee) for recovery of sum of money
and damages with prayerfor writ of preliminary attachment before the RTC of Pasay City.

In their complaint, PNB alleged in detail the fraudulent acts and misrepresentations committed by respondents
in obtaining PNB’s conformity to the CTS Facility Agreements and the release of various sums to respondents in
the total amountof ₱974,377,159.10. PNB accused respondents of falsely representing that they have valid and
subsisting contracts to sell, which evidently showed they had no intention to pay their loan obligations. The
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the complaint was signed byPNB’s Senior Vice-
 20

president of the Remedial Management Group, Aida Padilla, who likewise executed an "Affidavit in Support of
the Application for the Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment."

ISSUE: Does the dismissal of the complaint due to lack of jurisdiction carry with it the dismissal of the
counterclaims?

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the complaint due to lack of jurisdiction does not carry with
it the dismissal of the counterclaims. The Supreme Court held thus:

"In this case, petitioner raises the lone issue of whether the Pasig City RTC was correct in refusing to hear her
counterclaims after the dismissal of respondents’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Said issue involves the
proper interpretation of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, specifically on whether the dismissal of
the complaint automatically results in the dismissal of counterclaims pleaded by the defendant. Since this is
clearly a question of law, petitioner appropriately filed in this Court a Rule 45 petition.

On the lone issue raised in the petition, we rule for the petitioner.

Xxx

Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is now explicitly provided that the dismissal of the complaint due to
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his case is “without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate action.” The effect of this amendment on previous rulings on whether
the dismissal of a complaint carries with it the dismissal of the counterclaims as well, was discussed in the case
of Pinga v. The Heirs of German Santiago, thus:

Similarly, Justice Feria notes that “the present rule reaffirms the right of the defendant to move for the dismissal
of the complaint and to prosecute his counterclaim, as stated in the separate opinion [of Justice Regalado in BA
Finance.] Retired Court of Appeals Justice Herrera pronounces that the amendment to Section 3, Rule 17 settles
that “nagging question” whether the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the counterclaim,
and opines that by reason of the amendments, the rulings in Metals Engineering, International Container, and
BA Finance “may be deemed abandoned.” On the effect of amendment to Section 3, Rule 17, the commentators
are in general agreement, although there is less unanimity of views insofar as Section 2, Rule 17 is concerned.

To be certain, when the Court promulgated the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, including the amended Rule 17,
those previous jural doctrines that were inconsistent with the new rules incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure were implicitly abandoned insofar as incidents arising after the effectivity of the new procedural rules
on 1 July 1997. BA Finance, or even the doctrine that a counterclaim may be necessarily dismissed along with
the complaint, clearly conflicts with the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The abandonment of BA Finance as
doctrine extends as far back as 1997, when the Court adopted the new Rules of Civil Procedure. ... we thus rule
that the dismissal of a complaint due to fault of the plaintiff is w ithout prejudice to the right of the defendant
to prosecute a ny pending counterclaims of whatever nature in the same or separate action. We confirm that
BA Finance and all previous rulings of the Court that are inconsistent with this present holding are now
abandoned . (Emphasis supplied.)

Subsequently, in Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporation this Court held that while the
declaration in Pinga refers to instances covered by Section 3, Rule 17 on dismissal of complaints due to the fault
of plaintiff, it does not preclude the application of the same rule when the dismissal was upon the instance of
 21

defendant who correctly argued lack of jurisdiction over its person. Further, in stark departure from Metals
Engineering, we declared that the court’s jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint is not to be confused with
jurisdiction over petitioner’s counterclaim, viz:

......Petitioner seeks to recover damages and attorney’s fees as a consequence of the unfounded suit filed by
respondent against it. Thus, petitioner’s compulsory counterclaim is only consistent with its position that the
respondent wrongfully filed a case against it and the RTC erroneously exercised jurisdiction over its person.

Distinction must be made in Civil Case No. MC99-605 as to the jurisdiction of the RTC over respondent’s
complaint and over petitioner’s counterclaim – while it may have no jurisdiction over the former, it may exercise
jurisdiction over the latter. The compulsory counterclaim attached to petitioner’s Answer ad cautelam can be
treated as a separate action, wherein petitioner is the plaintiff while respondent is the defendant. Petitioner
could have instituted a separate action for the very same claims but, for the sake of expediency and to avoid
multiplicity of suits, it chose to demand the same in Civil Case No. MC99-605. Jurisdiction of the RTC over the
subject matter and the parties in the counterclaim must thus be determined separately and independently from
the jurisdiction of the same court in the same case over the subject matter and the parties in respondent’s
complaint.

xxx

In the present case, the RTC of Pasig City should have allowed petitioner’s counterclaim to proceed
notwithstanding the dismissal of respondents’ complaint, the same being compulsory in nature and with its
cause not eliminated by such dismissal. It bears stressing that petitioner was hailed to a separate court (Pasig
City RTC) even while the dispute between PNB and respondents was still being litigated, and she already incurred
expenses defending herself, having been sued by respondents in her personal capacity. The accusations hurled
against her were serious (perjury and misrepresentation in executing the affidavit in support of the application
for writ of attachment before the Pasay City RTC) – with hints at possible criminal prosecution apart from that
criminal complaint already lodged in the Pasig City Prosecutor’s Office. The Pasig City RTC clearly erred in
refusing to hear the counterclaims upon the same ground for dismissal of the complaint, i.e., lack of jurisdiction
in strict observance of the policy against interference with the proceed ings of a co-equal court."

Rule 18 - Pre-Trial

RIANO, CIVIL PROCEDURE, Vol. 1, 2014 ed., pp. 496-510

1. AM No. 12-8-8-SC – Judicial Affidavit Rule

2. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
3. A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE
4. Whereas, case congestion and delays plague most courts in cities, given the huge volume of cases filed
each year and the slow and cumbersome adversarial syste1n that the judiciary has in place;
 22

5. Whereas, about 40% of criminal cases are dismissed annually owing to the fact that complainants simply
give up con1ing to court after repeated postponements;
6. Whereas, few foreign businessmen make long-term investments in the Philippines because its courts are
unable to provide ample and speedy protection to their investments, keeping its people poor;
7. Whereas, in order to reduce the time needed for completing the testimonies of witnesses in cases under
litigation, on February 21, 2012 the Supreme Court approved for piloting by trial courts in Quezon City
the compulsory use of judicial affidavits in place of the direct testimonies of witnesses;
8. Whereas, it is reported that such piloting has quickly resulted in reducing by about two-thirds the time
used for presenting the testimonies of witnesses, thus speeding up the hearing and adjudication of cases;
9. Whereas, the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, headed by Senior
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, and the Sub-Committee on the Revision of the Rules on Civil
Procedure, headed by Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, have recommended for adoption a Judicial
Affidavit Rule that will replicate nationwide the success of the Quezon City experience in the use of
judicial affidavits; and
10. Whereas, the Supreme Court En Banc finds merit in the recommendation;
11. NOW, THEREFORE, the Supreme Court En Banc hereby issues and promulgates the following:
12. Section 1. Scope. - (a) This Rule shall apply to all actions, proceedings, and incidents requiring the
reception of evidence before:
13. (1) The Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and the Shari' a Circuit Courts but shall not apply to small claims cases
under A.M. 08-8-7-SC;
14. (2) The Regional Trial Courts and the Shari'a District Courts;
15. (3) The Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Court of Appeals, and the Shari'a Appellate Courts;
16. (4) The investigating officers and bodies authorized by the Supreme Court to receive evidence, including
the Integrated Bar of the Philippine (IBP); and
17. (5) The special courts and quasi-judicial bodies, whose rules of procedure are subject to disapproval of
the Supreme Court, insofar as their existing rules of procedure contravene the provisions of this Rule.1
18. (b) For the purpose of brevity, the above courts, quasi-judicial bodies, or investigating officers shall be
uniformly referred to here as the "court."
19. Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in lieu of direct testimonies. - (a) The parties shall
file with the court and serve on the adverse party, personally or by licensed courier service, not later
than five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing with respect to
motions and incidents, the following:
20. (1) The judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall take the place of such witnesses' direct
testimonies; and
21. (2) The parties' docun1entary or object evidence, if any, which shall be attached to the judicial affidavits
and marked as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on in the case of the complainant or the plaintiff, and as Exhibits
1, 2, 3, and so on in the case of the respondent or the defendant.
22. (b) Should a party or a witness desire to keep the original document or object evidence in his possession,
he may, after the same has been identified, marked as exhibit, and authenticated, warrant in his judicial
affidavit that the copy or reproduction attached to such affidavit is a faithful copy or reproduction of
that original. In addition, the party or witness shall bring the original document or object evidence for
comparison during the preliminary conference with the attached copy, reproduction, or pictures, failing
which the latter shall not be admitted.
23. This is without prejudice to the introduction of secondary evidence in place of the original when allowed
by existing rules.
 23

24. Section 3. Contents of judicial Affidavit. - A judicial affidavit shall be prepared in the language known to
the witness and, if not in English or Filipino, accompanied by a translation in English or Filipino, and shall
contain the following:
25. (a) The name, age, residence or business address, and occupation of the witness;
26. (b) The name and address of the lawyer who conducts or supervises the examination of the witness and
the place where the examination is being held;
27. (c) A statement that the witness is answering the questions asked of him, fully conscious that he does so
under oath, and that he may face criminal liability for false testimony or perjury;
28. (d) Questions asked of the witness and his corresponding answers, consecutively numbered, that:
29. (1) Show the circumstances under which the witness acquired the facts upon which he testifies;
30. (2) Elicit from him those facts which are relevant to the issues that the case presents; and
31. (3) Identify the attached documentary and object evidence and establish their authenticity in accordance
with the Rules of Court;
32. (e) The signature of the witness over his printed name; and
33. (f) A jurat with the signature of the notary public who administers the oath or an officer who is authorized
by law to administer the same.
34. Section 4. Sworn attestation of the lawyer. - (a) The judicial affidavit shall contain a sworn attestation at
the end, executed by the lawyer who conducted or supervised the examination of the witness, to the
effect that:
35. (1) He faithfully recorded or caused to be recorded the questions he asked and the corresponding
answers that the witness gave; and
36. (2) Neither he nor any other person then present or assisting him coached the witness regarding the
latter's answers.
37. (b) A false attestation shall subject the lawyer mentioned to disciplinary action, including disbarment.
38. Section 5. Subpoena. - If the government employee or official, or the requested witness, who is neither
the witness of the adverse party nor a hostile witness, unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit
or refuses without just cause to make the relevant books, documents, or other things under his control
available for copying, authentication, and eventual production in court, the requesting party may avail
himself of the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum or duces tecum under Rule 21 of the Rules of
Court. The rules governing the issuance of a subpoena to the witness in this case shall be the same as
when taking his deposition except that the taking of a judicial affidavit shal1 be understood to be ex
parte.
39. Section 6. Offer of and objections to testimony in judicial affidavit. - The party presenting the judicial
affidavit of his witness in place of direct testimony shall state the purpose of such testimony at the start
of the presentation of the witness. The adverse party may move to disqualify the witness or to strike out
his affidavit or any of the answers found in it on ground of inadmissibility. The court shall promptly rule
on the motion and, if granted, shall cause the marking of any excluded answer by placing it in brackets
under the initials of an authorized court personnel, without prejudice to a tender of excluded evidence
under Section 40 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
40. Section 7. Examination of the witness on his judicial affidavit. - The adverse party shall have the right to
cross-examine the witness on his judicial affidavit and on the exhibits attached to the same. The party
who presents the witness may also examine him as on re-direct. In every case, the court shall take active
part in examining the witness to determine his credibility as well as the truth of his testimony and to
elicit the answers that it needs for resolving the issues.
41. Section 8. Oral offer of and objections to exhibits. - (a) Upon the termination of the testimony of his last
witness, a party shall immediately make an oral offer of evidence of his documentary or object exhibits,
 24

piece by piece, in their chronological order, stating the purpose or purposes for which he offers the
particular exhibit.
42. (b) After each piece of exhibit is offered, the adverse party shall state the legal ground for his objection,
if any, to its admission, and the court shall immediately make its ruling respecting that exhibit.
43. (c) Since the documentary or object exhibits form part of the judicial affidavits that describe and
authenticate them, it is sufficient that such exhibits are simply cited by their markings during the offers,
the objections, and the rulings, dispensing with the description of each exhibit.
44. Section 9. Application of rule to criminal actions. - (a) This rule shall apply to all criminal actions:
45. (1) Where the maximum of the imposable penalty does not exceed six years;
46. (2) Where the accused agrees to the use of judicial affidavits, irrespective of the penalty involved; or
47. (3) With respect to the civil aspect of the actions, whatever the penalties involved are.
48. (b) The prosecution shall submit the judicial affidavits of its witnesses not later than five days before the
pre-trial, serving copies if the same upon the accused. The complainant or public prosecutor shall attach
to the affidavits such documentary or object evidence as he may have, marking them as Exhibits A, B, C,
and so on. No further judicial affidavit, documentary, or object evidence shall be admitted at the trial.
49. (c) If the accused desires to be heard on his defense after receipt of the judicial affidavits of the
prosecution, he shall have the option to submit his judicial affidavit as well as those of his witnesses to
the court within ten days from receipt of such affidavits and serve a copy of each on the public and
private prosecutor, including his documentary and object evidence previously marked as Exhibits 1, 2, 3,
and so on. These affidavits shall serve as direct testimonies of the accused and his witnesses when they
appear before the court to testify.
50. Section 10. Effect of non-compliance with the judicial Affidavit Rule. - (a) A party who fails to submit the
required judicial affidavits and exhibits on time shall be deemed to have waived their submission. The
court may, however, allow only once the late submission of the same provided, the delay is for a valid
reason, would not unduly prejudice the opposing party, and the defaulting party pays a fine of not less
than P 1,000.00 nor more than P 5,000.00 at the discretion of the court.
51. (b) The court shall not consider the affidavit of any witness who fails to appear at the scheduled hearing
of the case as required. Counsel who fails to appear without valid cause despite notice shall be deemed
to have waived his client's right to confront by cross-examination the witnesses there present.
52. (c) The court shall not admit as evidence judicial affidavits that do not conform to the content
requirements of Section 3 and the attestation requirement of Section 4 above. The court may, however,
allow only once the subsequent submission of the compliant replacement affidavits before the hearing
or trial provided the delay is for a valid reason and would not unduly prejudice the opposing party and
provided further, that public or private counsel responsible for their preparation and submission pays a
fine of not less than P 1,000.00 nor more than P 5,000.00, at the discretion of the court.
53. Section 11. Repeal or modification of inconsistent rules. - The provisions of the Rules of Court and the
rules of procedure governing investigating officers and bodies authorized by the Supreme Court to
receive evidence are repealed or modified insofar as these are inconsistent with the provisions of this
Rule.1âwphi1
54. The rules of procedure governing quasi-judicial bodies inconsistent herewith are hereby disapproved.
55. Section 12. Effectivity. - This rule shall take effect on January 1, 2013 following its publication in two
newspapers of general circulation not later than September 15, 2012. It shall also apply to existing cases.
56. Manila, September 4, 2012.
57. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
 25

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DISODADO M. PERLATA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE P. PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

58. ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice
59.

60. Footnotes
61. 1 By virtue of the Supreme Court's authority under Section 5 (5), Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution to
disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies.

2. Paredes v. Verano, G.R. No. 164375, 12 October 2006, 504 SCRA 264
Facts:
1. The legal battle between the parties began with a complaint for the establishment of a right of way filed
by the petitioners against respondents. The complaint culminated in a judgment by compromise.
2. In the Compromise Agreement, respondent Cosme Hinunangan granted a 2 meter-wide right of way in
favor of petitioners in consideration of the amount of Php 6,000.00 which petitioners agreed to pay.
3. Alleging that petitioners had blocked the passage way in violation of the Compromise Agreement,
respondents filed a complaint for specific performance with damages against petitioners.
4. In their answer, petitioners denied having violated the Compromise Agreement, and alleged that like
them, respondents were not actual residents of Barangay Tagnipa where the “road right of way” was
established and that respondent Cosme had already sold his only remaining lot in the vicinity to
petitioner Paredes.
5. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of action. TC-DENIED.
6. Pre-trial was initially set for 24 April 2003, but this was reset to 3 June 2003. But the pre-trial set on 3
June 2003 did not push through either because none of the parties appeared. So, pre-trial was reset to
11 November 2003. However, petitioner Baybay was present in court along with other defendants was
 26

called. RTC was informed then of a proposed settlement between the parties, although Baybay qualified
his reaction by telling the court that he would first have to inform his lawyer of the said propodal.
7. RTC reset the pre-trial for 23 January 2004.
8. Before the new pre-trial date, counsel for petitioners filed a Manifestation of Willingness to Settle With
Request for Cancellation dated 5 January 2004.
9. The hearing did push through on 23 January 2004. The private respondents and their counsel were
present. So were petitioners Baybay and Paredes, and co-defendant Alago, but not their counsel.
10. RTC allowed respondents to present their evidence ex parte, “for failure of the defendants’ counsel to
appear before the RTC.
11. Motion for recon – DENIED.
12. Petition for certiorari – CA – dismissed for failure to attach duplicate orig copies of annexes to petition
as well as other pleadings relevant and pertinent to the petition.
13. Motion for recon with motion to admit additional exhibits – DENIED. CA ruled that even with the
submission by petitioners of the required pleadings and documents, the instant petition must
nevertheless failed. It conceded that under Sec 5 Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the
failure of the defendant, and not defendant’s counsel, to appear at the pre-trial that would serve cause
to allow plaintiff to present evidence ex parte.

Issue: Whether the absence of the counsel for defendants at the pre-trial, with all defendants themselves
present, is a ground to declare defendants in default and to authorize plaintiffs to present evidence ex parte.
Held: No.

Section 4. Appearance of parties. — It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-
trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative
shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative
modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.

Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. — The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the
next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless
other-wise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff
to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.

Section 4 imposes the duty on litigating parties and their respective counsel during pre-trial. The
provision also provides for the instances where the non-appearance of a party may be excused. Nothing,
however, in Sec 4 provides for a sanction should the parties or their respective counsel be absent during pre-
trial. The penalty is provided for in Sec 5 which penalizes the failure to appear of either the plaintiff or the
defendant, and not their respective counsel.

The absence of counsel for defendants at pretrial does not ipso facto authorize the judge to declare the
defendant as in default and order the presentation of evidence ex parte. Nothing in the rules of court sanctions
the presentation of evidence ex parte upon instances when counsel for defendant is absent during pre-trial. The
Rules do not countenance stringent construction at the expense of justice and equity.
 27

3. Saguid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150611, 10 June 2003, 403 SCRA 678

Facts:
Gina and Saguid decided to cohabit as husband and wife without the benefit of marriag. They acquired
properties during their cohabitation but ended after nine years. Gina filed a complaint for partition and recovery
of personal property with receivership against petitioner. The court ordered petitioner to file the pre-trial brief
but he failed to do so. The trial court declared him in default. He filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied.
Gina was allowed to present evidence ex parte. A decision was rendered in favor of Gina. The CA affirmed the
decision and ruled that the propriety of order which declared the petitioner in default became moot and
academic in view of the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It explained that the new rule now
requires the filing of pre-trial brief and the defendant’s non-compliance entitles the plaintiff to present evidence
ex parte.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in allowing Gina to present evidence ex parte.
Held:
Under Seciton 6 of Rule 18 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief
shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial, the plaintiff may present evidence ex parte and
court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. The remedy of the defendant is to file a motion for
reconsideration showing his failure has a valid and meritorious defense.
In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to file pre-trial is justified because he was not represented
by counsel. The justification is not sufficient to set aside the order directing private respondent to present
evidence ex parte, in as much as the petitioner chose at his own risk not to be represented by counsel. Even
without the assistance of a lawyer, petitioner was able to file a motion for extension to file answer, the required
answer stating therein the special and affirmative defenses, and several other motions.
If it were true that petitioners did not understand the importance of order directing him to file a pre-trial brief,
he could have inquired from the court and file a motion for extension of time to file the brief. Pre-trial rules are
not to be belittled or dismissed because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a party’s substantive
rights. Like all rules, they should be followed except only for the most persuasive reason to relax the application
of the rules. In civil cases, while assistance of a lawyer is desirable, it is not indispensable.
However, the CA erred in its ruling. While the rules may indeed be applied retroactively, the same is not called
for in the case at bar. Even before the 1997 Rules took effect, the filing of the brief was required under an SC-
Circular.

Rule 19 - Intervention

RIANO, CIVIL PROCEDURE, Vol. 1, 2014 ed., pp. 394-400.

1. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Heirs of Minoza, G.R. No. 186045, 2 February
2011, 641 SCRA 520
FACTS:
On July 6, 1998, a Complaint[3] for Reconveyance, Cancellation of Defendants Title, Issuance of New Title to
Plaintiffs and Damages was filed by Leila M. Hermosisima (Leila) for herself and on behalf of the other heirs of
the late Estanislao Mioza. The complaint alleged that Leilas late great grandfather, Estanislao Mioza, was the
registered owner of Cadastral Lot Nos. 986 and 991-A, located at Banilad Estate, Cebu City, per TCT Nos. RT-
 28

6101 (T-10534) and RT-6102 (T10026). It was, likewise, alleged that the late Estanislao Mioza had three children,
namely, Adriana, Patricio, and Santiago, all surnamed Mioza. In the late 1940s, the National Airports Corporation
(NAC) embarked in an expansion project of the Lahug Airport. For said purpose, the NAC acquired several
properties which surrounded the airport either through negotiated sale or through expropriation. Among the
properties that were acquired by the NAC through a negotiated sale were Lot Nos. 986 and 991-A.[4]

Leila claimed that their predecessors-in-interest, specifically, Adriana, Patricio, and Santiago executed a Deed of
Sale on February 15, 1950 conveying the subject lots to the NAC on the assurance made by the latter that they
(Leilas predecessors-in-interest) can buy the properties back if the lots are no longer needed. Consequently,
they sold Lot No. 986 to the NAC for only P157.20 and Lot No. 991-A for P105.40. However, the expansion
project did not push through. More than forty years after the sale, plaintiffs informed the NACs successor-in-
interest, the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA), that they were exercising the buy-back
option of the agreement, but the MCIAA refused to allow the repurchase on the ground that the sale was in fact
unconditional.
The MCIAA, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an Answer with Counterclaim.
After the parties filed their respective pleadings, trial ensued.
On November 16, 1999, before the MCIAA could present evidence in support of its case, a Motion for
Intervention,[5] with an attached Complainant-in-Intervention, was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cebu City, Branch 22, by the heirs of Filomeno T. Mioza, represented by Laureano M. Mioza; the heirs of
Pedro T, Mioza, represented by Leoncio J. Mioza; and the Heirs of Florencia T. Mioza, represented by Antonio
M. Urbiztondo (Intervenors), who claimed to be the true, legal, and legitimate heirs of the late Estanislao Mioza.
The intervenors alleged in their complaint (1) that the plaintiffs in the main case are not related to the late
spouses Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia Togono whose true and legitimate children were: Filomeno, Pedro, and
Florencia, all surnamed Mioza; (2) that, on January 21, 1958, Adriana, Patricio, and Santiago, executed, in fraud
of the intervenors, an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the late spouses Estanislao Mioza and Inocencia
Togono and adjudicated unto themselves the estate of the deceased spouses; and (3) that, on February 15,
1958, the same Adriana, Patricio, and Santiago, fraudulently, deceitfully, and in bad faith, sold Lot Nos. 986 and
991-A to the NAC.

On February 18, 2000, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, issued an Order denying the Motion for Intervention.

In denying the motion, the trial court opined that the ownership of the subject lots was merely a collateral issue
in the action. The principal issue to be resolved was whether or not the heirs of the late Estanislao Mioza
whoever they may be have a right to repurchase the said lots from the MCIAA. Consequently, the rights being
claimed by the intervenors should be asserted in and would be fully protected by a separate
proceeding. Moreover, if the motion was granted, it would unduly delay the proceedings in the instant
case. Finally, the complaint-in-intervention was flawed, considering that it was not verified and does not contain
the requisite certification of non-forum shopping.

The intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration, to which was attached a Complaint-in-Intervention with the
required Verification and Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. However, the RTC denied the motion in its Order
dated July 25, 2000.

Aggrieved, the intervenors sought recourse before the CA.

In ruling for the intervenors, the CA ratiocinated that contrary to the findings of the trial court, the determination
of the true heirs of the late Estanislao Mioza is not only a collateral, but the focal issue of the case, for if the
 29

intervenors can prove that they are indeed the true heirs of Estanislao Mioza, there would be no more need to
determine whether the right to buy back the subject lots exists or not as the MCIAA would not have acquired
rights to the subject lots in the first place. In addition, to grant the motion for intervention would avoid
multiplicity of suits. As to the lack of verification and certification on non-forum shopping, the CA opined that
the filing of the motion for reconsideration with an appended complaint-in-intervention containing the required
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping amounted to substantial compliance of the Rules.

ISSUE: The court of appeals (cebu city) gravely erred in allowing respondents to intervene?

HELD: YES

At the outset, on the procedural aspect, contrary to petitioners contention, the initial lack of the complaint-in-
intervention of the requisite verification and certification on non-forum shopping was cured when the
intervenors, in their motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to intervene, appended a
complaint-in-intervention containing the required verification and certificate of non-forum shopping.

Moreover, as to the certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike
in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need
to relax the Rules on the ground of substantial compliance or presence of special circumstances or compelling
reasons. Also, the certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a
case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common
cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complies with the Rule.

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant
therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such
proceedings. It is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make
himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in
resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by
which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a
person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a party thereto for
the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings.

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court:

Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest in the matter in litigation;
(2) or in the success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against the parties; (4) or when he is so situated as
to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer
thereof.[18]Moreover, the court must take into consideration whether or not the intervention will unduly delay
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors right or
interest can be adequately pursued and protected in a separate proceeding.

In the case at bar, the intervenors are claiming that they are the legitimate heirs of Estanislao Mioza and
Inocencia Togono and not the original plaintiffs represented by Leila Hermosisima. True, if their allegations were
later proven to be valid claims, the intervenors would surely have a legal interest in the matter in
litigation. Nonetheless, this Court has ruled that the interest contemplated by law must be actual, substantial,
material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant. It must be of such direct and immediate
 30

character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the
judgment.[19] Otherwise, if persons not parties to the action were allowed to intervene, proceedings would
become unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable

2. Ombudsman v. Sison, G.R No. 185954, 16 February 2010, 612 SCRA 702
FACTS: On October 11, 2004, the Isog Han Samar Movement, represented by Fr. Noel Labendia of the Diocese
of Calbayog, Catbalogan, Samar, filed a letter-complaint addressed to then Ombudsman, Hon. Simeon Marcelo,
accusing Governor Milagrosa T. Tan and other local public officials of the Province of Samar, including
respondent Maximo D. Sison, of highly anomalous transactions entered into by them amounting to several
millions of pesos. Sison was the Provincial Budget Officer.

The letter-complaint stemmed from the audit investigation dated August 13, 2004 conducted by the Legal and
Adjudication Office (LAO), Commission on Audit (COA), which found, among others, that various purchases
totaling PhP 29.34 million went without proper bidding procedures and documentations; that calamity funds
were expended without a State of Calamity having been declared by the President; and that purchases for rice,
medicines, electric fans, and cement were substantially overpriced.

On January 24, 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman, through Director Jose T. De Jesus, Jr., found basis to proceed
with the administrative case against the impleaded provincial officials of Samar, docketed as OMB-C-A-05-0051-
B. The latter were then required to file their counter-affidavits and countervailing evidence against the
complaint.

On May 6, 2005, Sison submitted his Position Paper to the Office of the Ombudsman and reiterated that he had
not participated in the alleged anomalous purchases and use of public funds by the Province of Samar.

On August 22, 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman rendered a Decision, finding Sison and several other local
officials of the Province of Samar guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and dismissing him from service.

Aggrieved, Sison appealed to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 96611.
On June 26, 2008, the CA rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman against Sison.

In ruling thus, the CA held that the Office of the Ombudsman failed to adduce substantial evidence in order to
convict Sison. On July 22, 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion for Intervention and to
Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the CA in its assailed resolution
of December 18, 2008.

ISSUE: Whether the [CA] gravely erred in denying petitioner's right to intervene in the proceedings, considering
that (a) the Office of the Ombudsman has sufficient legal interest warranting its intervention in the proceedings
before the [CA] since it rendered the subject decision pursuant to its administrative authority over public
officials and employees; and (b) contrary to the appellate court a quo's ruling, petitioner Office of the
Ombudsman filed its Omnibus Motion to Intervene and to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration on a
patently erroneous decision of the [CA] which has not yet attained finality.
 31

HELD: To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the movant
has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly
decided in a separate proceeding. The interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in
litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct
legal operation and effect of the judgment.

The Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to intervene in the instant case. It must remain partial
and detached. More importantly, it must be mindful of its role as an adjudicator, not an advocate.

It is an established doctrine that judges should detach themselves from cases where their decisions are appealed
to a higher court for review. The raison d'etre for such a doctrine is the fact that judges are not active combatants
in such proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate
court to decide the issues without the judges' active participation. When judges actively participate in the appeal
of their judgment, they, in a way, cease to be judicial and have become adversarial instead.

It should be noted that the Office of the Ombudsman was aware of the appeal filed by Sison. The Rules of Court
provides that the appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review with the CA, with proof of service
of a copy on the court or agency a quo. Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman had sufficient time within which
to file a motion to intervene. As such, its failure to do so should not now be countenanced. The Office of the
Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," not merely a passive onlooker.

In this case, it cannot be denied that the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was belatedly filed. As we held in
Rockland Construction Co., Inc. v. Singzon, Jr., no intervention is permitted after a decision has already been
rendered.

In light of the foregoing considerations, all other issues raised in the petition are rendered moot and academic
and no further discussion is necessary.

3. Pacana –Contreras v. Rovila Water Supply, Inc., G.R. No. 168979, 2 December
2013, 711 SCRA 219

Facts:
 Petitioners Rebecca Pacaña-Contreras and Rosalie Pacaña, children of Lourdes Teves Pacaña and Luciano
Pacaña, filed the present case against Rovila Inc., Earl, Lilia, Dalla and Marisa for accounting and damages.
 P claimed that they have been engaged in the water supply business and they have operated the “Rovila
Water Supply”.
 They alleged that Lilia was a former trusted employee in their family business who hid business records
and burned the family files.
 After which, she claimed ownership over their business.
 Upon inquiry to the SEC, P claimed that Rovila Inc was surreptitiously formed with the respondents as
the majority stockholders.
 The R takeover and illegally usurp the family business by allegedly using the name of Lourdes through a
sworn declaration and special power of attorney (SPA).
 The R filed a first motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over an intra-
corporate controversy
 32

 When Lourdes died, P amended their complaint with leave of court.

 Thereafter, Luciano died, and then R filed their answer.
 P’s sisters filed a motion for leave to intervene that was also granted by the court
 R seeks dismissal of the complaint for the reason that P are not the real party interest.
 RTC directed the respondents to put into writing their earlier manifestation
 RTC issued a pre-trial order where one of the issues submitted was whether the complaint should be
dismissed for failure to comply with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which requires that every action must
be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest
 The respondents again filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds, among others, that the petitioners are
not the real parties in interest to institute and prosecute the case and that they have no valid cause of action
against the respondents.
 RTC - denied the respondents’ motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration. The motion was filed
out of time as it was filed only after the conclusion of the pre-trial conference
 R filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA, invoking grave abuse of
discretion in the denial of their motion to dismiss
 CA - granted the petition and ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion as the petitioners
filed the complaint and the amended complaint as attorneys-in-fact of their parents. As such, they are not the
real parties in interest and cannot bring an action in their own names
 The CA agreed with the respondents that they alleged the following issues as affirmative defenses in
their answer: 1) the petitioners are not the real parties in interest; and 2) that they had no legal right to institute
the action in behalf of their parents.

Issue: W/N the complaint should be dismissed for failure to comply with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
which requires that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest

Ruling:
 The Court held that while an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and non-appealable,
certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to address an order of denial made without or in excess of
jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari is granted to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to
prevent it from committing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
 Pursuant to jurisprudence, this is also the ground invoked when the respondents alleged that the
petitioners are not the real parties in interest because: 1) the petitioners should not have filed the case in their
own names, being merely attorneys-in-fact of their mother; and 2) the petitioners should first be declared as
heirs.
 Applying Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which provides for the grounds for the dismissal of a civil case,
the respondents’ grounds for dismissal fall under Section 1(g) and (j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, particularly,
failure to state a cause of action and failure to comply with a condition precedent (substitution of parties),
respectively. The first para of Section 1
 Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides for the period within which to file a motion to dismiss under the
grounds enumerated. Specifically, the motion should be filed within the time for, but before the filing of, the
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.
 The issues submitted during the pre-trial are thus the issues that would govern the trial proper. The
dismissal of the case based on the grounds invoked by the respondents are specifically covered by Rule 16 and
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which set a period when they should be raised; otherwise, they are deemed waived.
 Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal
under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
 33

 The heirs of the spouses Luciano and Lourdes Pacaña, except herein petitioner and Lagrimas Pacaña-
Gonzalez, are ORDERED IMPLEADED as parties plaintiffs and the RTC is directed tp proceed with the trial of the
case with DISPATCH.

Rule 20 - Calendar of Cases

Rule 21 - Subpoena
Rule 22 - Computation of Time