CASES

1. US v. Go Chico, 1909
2. Padilla v. Dizon, 1988
3. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 2001 (concurring opinion of Justice Mendoza)
4. Go v. Sandiganbayan, 2007
5. Teves v. COMELEC, 2009
6. Sanchez v. People, 2009
7. People v. Simon, 1994 (separate Opinion of Justice Davide)
8. Ledonga v. People, 2005
9. People v. Bustinera, 2004

G.R. No. 4963 September 15, 1909

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GO CHICO, defendant-appellant.

Gibbs and Gale for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

The defendant is charged with the violation of section 1 of Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission, which reads as follows:

Any person who shall expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view on his own premises, or who shall expose, or
cause to be exposed, to public view, either on his own premises or elsewhere, any flag, banner, emblem, or device used
during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the United
States, or any flag, banner, emblem, or device used or adopted at any time by the public enemies of the United States in the
Philippine Island for the purpose of public disorder or of rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States
in the Philippine Islands, or any flag, banner, emblem, or device of the Katipunan Society, or which is commonly known as
such, shall be punished by a fine of not less that five hundred pesos for more than five thousand pesos, or by imprisonment
for not less than three months nor more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the
court.

The defendant was tried in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on the 8th day of September, 1908. After hearing the
evidence adduced the court adjudged the defendant guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him under that judgment to pay a fine
of P500, Philippine currency, and to pay the costs of the action, and to suffer subsidiary imprisonment during the time and in the
form and in the place prescribed by law until said fine should be paid. From that judgment and sentence the defendant appealed to
this court.

A careful examination of the record brought to this court discloses the following facts:

That on or about the 4th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila, the appellant Go Chico displayed in one of the windows and one of
the show cases of his store, No. 89 Calle Rosario, a number of medallions, in the form of a small button, upon the faces of which were
imprinted in miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the late insurrection in the
Philippine Islands to designate and identify those in armed insurrection against the United States. On the day previous to the one
above set forth the appellant had purchased the stock of goods in said store, of which the medallions formed a part, at a public sale
made under authority of the sheriff of the city of Manila. On the day in question, the 4th of August aforesaid, the appellant was
arranging his stock of goods for the purpose of displaying them to the public and in so doing placed in his showcase and in one of the
windows of his store the medallions described. The appellant was ignorant of the existence of a law against the display of the
medallions in question and had consequently no corrupt intention. The facts above stated are admitted.

The appellant rests his right to acquittal upon two propositions:

First. That before a conviction under the law cited can be had, a criminal intent upon the part of the accused must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Second. That the prohibition of the law is directed against the use of the identical banners, devices, or emblems actually used during
the Philippine insurrection by those in armed rebellion against the United States.
Page 1 of 77
In the opinion of this court it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with the criminal intent. In many crimes, made
such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it
were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would be substantially worthless. It would be impossible of execution. In many cases
the act complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect which the statute seeks to avoid. In those cases the pernicious
effect is produced with precisely the same force and result whether the intention of the person performing the act is good or bad. The
case at bar is a perfect illustration of this. The display of a flag or emblem used particularly within a recent period, by the enemies of
the Government tends to incite resistance to governmental functions and insurrection against governmental authority just as
effectively if made in the best of good faith as if made with the most corrupt intent. The display itself, without the intervention of any
other factor, is the evil. It is quite different from that large class of crimes, made such by the common law or by statute, in which the
injurious effect upon the public depends upon the corrupt intention of the person perpetrating the act. If A discharges a loaded gun
and kills B, the interest which society has in the act depends, not upon B's death, upon the intention with which A consummated the
act. If the gun were discharged intentionally, with the purpose of accomplishing the death of B, then society has been injured and its
security violated; but if the gun was discharged accidentally on the part of A, then society, strictly speaking, has no concern in the
matter, even though the death of B results. The reason for this is that A does not become a danger to society and institutions until he
becomes a person with a corrupt mind. The mere discharge of the gun and the death of B do not of themselves make him so. With
those two facts must go the corrupt intent to kill. In the case at bar, however, the evil to society and the Governmental does not
depend upon the state of mind of the one who displays the banner, but upon the effect which that display has upon the public mind.
In the one case the public is affected by the intention of the actor; in the other by the act itself.

It is stated in volume 12 of Cyc., page 148, that —

The legislature, however, may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission a crime without regard to the intent of the
doer, and if such an intention appears the courts must give it effect although the intention may have been innocent. Whether
or not in a given case the statute is to be so construed is to be determined by the court by considering the subject-matter of
the prohibition as well as the language of the statute, and thus ascertaining the intention of the legislature.

In the case of The People vs. Kibler (106 N. Y., 321) the defendant was charged with the sale of adulterated milk under a statute
reading as follows:

No person or persons shall sell or exchange or expose for sale or exchange any impure, unhealthy, adulterated, of
unwholesome milk.

It was proved in that case that one Vandeburg purchased at the defendant's store 1 pint of milk which was shown to contain a very
small percentage of water more than that permitted by the statute. There was no dispute about the facts, but the objection made by
the defendant was that he was not allowed, upon the trial, to show an absence of criminal intent, or to go the jury upon the question
whether it existed, but was condemned under a charge from the court which made his intent totally immaterial and his guilt consist
in having sold the adulterated article whether he knew it or not and however carefully he may have sought to keep on hand and sell
the genuine article.

The opinion of the court in that case says:

As the law stands, knowledge or intention forms no elements of the offense. The act alone, irrespective of its motive,
constitutes the crime.

xxx xxx xxx

It is notorious that the adulteration of food products has grown to proportions so enormous as to menace the health and
safety of the people. Ingenuity keeps pace with greed, and the careless and heedless consumers are exposed to increasing
perils. To redress such evils is a plain duty but a difficult task. Experience has taught the lesson that repressive measures
which depend for their efficiency upon proof of the dealer's knowledge or of his intent to deceive and defraud are of title use
and rarely accomplish their purpose. Such an emergency may justify legislation which throws upon the seller the entire
responsibility of the purity and soundness of what he sells and compels him to know and certain.

In the case of Gardner vs. The People (62 N. Y., 299) the question arose under a statute which provided that an inspector of elections
of the city of New York should not be removed from office except "after notice in writing to the officer sought to be removed, which
notice shall set forth clearly and distinctly the reasons for his removal," and further provided that any person who removed such an
officer without such notice should be guilty of a misdemeanor. An officer named Sheridan was removed by Gardener, the defendant,
without notice. Gardener was arrested and convicted of a misdemeanor under the statute. He appealed from the judgment of
conviction and the opinion from which the following quotation is made was written upon the decision of that appeal. Chief Justice
Church, writing the opinion of the court, says in relation to criminal intent:

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 In short, the defense was an honest misconstruction of the law under legal device. The court ruled out the evidence offered,
and held that intentionally doing the act prohibited constituted the offense. It is quite clear that the facts offered to be
shown, if true, would relieve the defendant from the imputation of a corrupt intent, and, indeed, from any intent to violate
the statute. The defendants made a mistake of law. Such mistakes do not excuse the commission of prohibited acts. "The rule
on the subject appears to be, that in acts mala in se, intent governs but in those mala prohibit a, the only inquiry is, has the
law been violated?

xxx xxx xxx

The authorities seem to establish that sustain and indictment for doing a prohibited act, it is sufficient to prove that the act
was knowingly and intentionally done.

xxx xxx xxx

In this case, if the defendants could have shown that they believed that in fact notice had been given to the inspector,
although it had not, they would not have been guilty of the offense, because the intention to do the act would have been
wanting. Their plea is: True, we intended to remove the inspector without notice, but we thought the law permitted it. This
was a mistake of law, and is not strictly a defense.

xxx xxx xxx

If the offense is merely technical, the punishment can be made correspondingly nominal; while a rule requiring proof of a
criminal intent to violate the statute, independent of an intent to do the act which the statute declares shall constitute the
offense, would, in many cases, prevent the restraining influence which the statute was designed to secure.

In the case of Fiedler vs. Darrin (50 N.Y., 437) the court says:

But when an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.

In the case of The Commonwealth vs. Murphy (165 Mass., 66) the court says:

In general, it may be said that there must be malus animus, or a criminal intent. But there is a large class of cases in which, on
grounds of public policy, certain acts are made punishable without proof that the defendant understands the facts that give
character to his act.

In such cases it is deemed best to require everybody at his peril to ascertain whether his act comes within the legislative
prohibition.

xxx xxx xxx

Considering the nature of the offense, the purpose to be accomplished, the practical methods available for the enforcement
of the law, and such other matters as throw light upon the meaning of the language, the question in interpreting a criminal
statute is whether the intention of the legislature was to make knowledge of the facts an essential element of the offense, or
to put upon everyone the burden of finding out whether his contemplated act is prohibited, and of refraining from it if it is.

In the case of Halsted vs. The State (41 N. J. L., 552; 32 Am. Rep., 247), the question of a criminal intent arose under a statute, under
which the defendant was convicted of a crime, providing that if any township committee or other body shall disburse or vote for the
disbursement of public moneys in excess of appropriations made for the purpose, the persons constituting such board shall be guilty
of a crime. The defendant was one who violated this law by voting to incur obligations in excess of the appropriation. He was
convicted and appealed and the opinion from which the quotation is taken was written upon a decision of that appeal. That court
says:

When the State had closed, the defense offered to show that the defendant, in aiding in the passage and effectuation of the
resolution which I have pronounced to be illegal, did so under the advice of counsel and in good faith, and from pure and
honest motives, and that he therein exercise due care and caution.

xxx xxx xxx

Page 3 of 77
 As there is an undoubted competency in the lawmaker to declare an act criminal, irrespective of the knowledge or motive of
the doer of such act, there can be of necessity, no judicial authority having the power to require, in the enforcement of the
law, such knowledge or motive to be shown. In such instances the entire function of the court is to find out the intention of
the legislature, and to enforce the law in absolute conformity to such intention. And in looking over the decided cases on the
subject it will be found that in the considered adjudications this inquiry has been the judicial guide.

In the case of Rex vs. Ogden (6 C. & P., 631; 25 E. C. L., 611), the prisoner was indicted for unlawfully transposing from one piece of
wrought plate to another the lion-poisson contrary to the statutes. It was conceded that the act was done without any fraudulent
intention. The court said:

There are no words in the act of Parliament referring to any fraudulent intention. The words of it are, 'Shall transpose or
remove, or cause of procure to be transposed or removed, from one piece of wrought plate to another.

In the case of The State vs. McBrayer (98 N. C., 623) the court stated:

It is a mistaken notion that positive, willful intent to violate the criminal law is an essential ingredient in every criminal
offense, and that where is an absence of such intent there is no offense; this is especially true as to statutory offenses. When
the statute plainly forbids an act to be done, and it is done by some person, the law implies conclusively the guilty intent,
although the offender was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the law he violates. When the language is plain and
positive, and the offense is not made to depend upon the positive, willful intent and purpose, nothing is left to interpretation.

In the case of the Commonwealth vs. Weiss (139 Pa. St., 247), the question arose on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment
requiring him to pay a penalty for a violation of the statute of the State which provided that any person would be liable to pay a
penalty "who shall manufacture, sell, or offer or expose for sale, or have in his possession with intent to sell," oleomargarine, etc. At
the trial the defendant requested the court to instruct the injury that if they believed, from the evidence, that the defendant did not
knowingly furnish or authorize to be furnished, or knew of there furnished, to any of his customers any oleomargarine, but, as far as
he knew, furnished genuine butter, then the verdict must be for the defendant. The court refused to make the charge as requested
and that is the only point upon which the defendant appealed.

The court says:

The prohibition is absolute and general; it could not be expressed in terms more explicit and comprehensive. The statutory
definition of the offense embraces no word implying that the forbidden act shall be done knowingly or willfully, and if it did,
the designed purpose of the act would be practically defeated. The intention of the legislature is plain, that persons engaged
in the traffic so engage in it at their peril and that they can not set up their ignorance of the nature and qualities of the
commodities they sell, as a defense.

The following authorities are to the same effect: State vs. Gould (40 Ia., 374); Commonwealth vs. Farren (9 Allen, 489);
Commonwealth vs. Nichols (10 Allen, 199); Commonwealth vs. Boyton (2 Allen, 160); Wharton's Criminal Law, section 2442;
Commonwealth vs. Sellers (130 Pa., 32); 3 Greenleaf on Evidence, section 21; Farrell vs. The State (32 Ohio State, 456);
Beekman vs. Anthony (56 Miss., 446); The People vs. Roby (52 Mich., 577).

It is clear from the authorities cited that in the act under consideration the legislature did not intend that a criminal intent should be
a necessary element of the crime. The statutory definition of the offense embraces no word implying that the prohibited act shall be
done knowingly or willfully. The wording is plain. The Act means what it says. Nothing is left to the interpretation.

Care must be exercised in distiguishing the differences between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act.
The accused did not consciously intend to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and the act is, by the very nature of
things, the crime itself — intent and all. The wording of the law is such that the intent and the act are inseparable. The act is the
crime. The accused intended to put the device in his window. Nothing more is required to commit the crime.

We do not believe that the second proposition of the accused, namely, that the law is applicable only to the identical banners, etc.,
actually used in the late insurrection, and not to duplicates of those banners, can be sustained.

It is impossible that the Commission should have intended to prohibit the display of the flag or flags actually used in the insurrection,
and, at the same time, permit exact duplicates thereof (saving, perhaps, size) to be displayed without hindrance. In the case before us,
to say that the display of a certain banner is a crime and that the display of its exact duplicate is not is to say nonsense. The rules
governing the interpretation of statutes are rules of construction not destruction. To give the interpretation contended for by the
appellant would, as to this particular provision, nullify the statute altogether.

Page 4 of 77
The words "used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identity those in armed rebellion against the
United States" mean not only the identical flags actually used in the insurrection, but any flag which is of that type. This description
refers not to a particular flag, but to a type of flag. That phrase was used because there was and is no other way of describing that
type of flag. While different words might be employed, according to the taste of the draftsman, the method of description would have
to be the same. There is no concrete word known by which that flag could be aptly or properly described. There was no opportunity,
within the scope of a legislative enactment, to describe the physical details. It had no characteristics whatever, apart from its use in
the insurrection, by which it could, in such enactment, be identified. The great and the only characteristic which it had upon the
which the Commission could seize as a means of description and identification was the fact that it was used in the insurrection. There
was, therefore, absolutely no way in which the Commission could, in the Act, describe the flag except by reciting where and how it
was used. It must not be forgotten that the Commission, by the words and phrases used, was not attempting to describe a particular
flag, but a type of flag. They were not describing a flag used upon a particular field or in a certain battle, but a type of flag used by an
army — a flag under which many persons rallied and which stirred their sentiments and feelings wherever seen or in whatever form
it appeared. It is a mere incident of description that the flag was used upon a particular field or in a particular battle. They were
describing the flag not a flag. It has a quality and significance and an entity apart from any place where or form in which it was used.

Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense, and the literal
interpretation of a statute may lead to an absurdity or evidently fail to give the real intent of the legislature. When this is the
case, resort is had to the principle that the spirit of a law controls the letter, so that a thing which is within the intention of a
statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter, and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not
within the statute unless it be within the intention of the makers, and the statute should be construed as to advance the
remedy and suppress the mischief contemplated by the framers. (U. S. vs. Kirby, 7 Wall., 487; State Bolden, 107 La., 116, 118;
U.S. vs.Buchanan, 9 Fed. Rep., 689; Green vs. Kemp, 13 Mass., 515; Lake Shore R. R. Co. vs. Roach, 80 N. Y., 339;
Delafield vs. Brady, 108 N. Y., 524 Doyle vs. Doyle, 50 Ohio State, 330.)

The intention of the legislature and the object aimed at, being the fundamental inquiry in judicial construction, are to control
the literal interpretation of particular language in a statute, and language capable of more than one meaning is to be taken in
that sense which will harmonize with such intention and object, and effect the purpose of the enactment. (26 Am. & Eng.
Ency. of Law., 602.)

Literally hundreds of cases might be cited to sustain this proposition.

The preamble is no part of the statute, but as setting out the object and intention of the legislature, it is considered in the
construction of an act. Therefore, whenever there is ambiguity, or wherever the words of the act have more than one
meaning, and there is no doubt as to the subject-matter to which they are to be applied, the preamble may be used." (U.
S. vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S., 72; Platt vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 99 U. S., 48; Myer vs. Western Car Co., 102 U. S., 1;
Holy Trinity Church vs. U. S., 143 U. S., 457; Coosaw Mining Co. vs. South Carolina, 144 U. S., 550; Cohn vs. Barrett, 5 Cal., 195;
Barnes vs. Jones, 51 Cal., 303; Field vs. Gooding, 106 Mass., 310; People vs. Molineaux, 40 N. Y., 113; Smith vs. The People, 47
N. Y., 330; The People vs. Davenport, 91 N.Y., 547; The People vs. O'Brien, 111 N.Y., 1)

The statute, then, being penal, must be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant
and at the same time preserve the obvious intention of the legislature. If the language be plain, it will be construed as it
reads, and the words of the statute given their full meaning; if ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of the
defendant than it would if the statute were remedial. In both cases it will endeavor to effect substantial justice."
(Bolles vs. Outing Co., 175 U. S., 262, 265; U. S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76, 95; U. S. vs. Reese, 92 U. S., 214)

It is said that notwithstanding this rule (the penal statutes must be construde strictly) the intention of the lawmakers must
govern in the construction of penal as well as other statutes. This is true, but this is not a new, independent rule which
subverts the old. It is a modification of the known maxim and amounts to this -- that though penal statutes are to be
construed strictly, they are not be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious purpose of the legislature. (U.
S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76; Taylor vs. Goodwin, L. R. 4, Q. B. Civ., 228.)

In the latter case it was held that under a statute which imposed a penalty for "furiously driving any sort of carriage" a person could
be convicted for immoderately driving a bicycle.

It is presumed that the legislature intends to impart to its enactments such a meaning as will render then operative and
effective, and to prevent persons from eluding or defeating them. Accordingly, in case of any doubt or obscurity, the
construction will be such as to carry out these objects. (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 106.)

In The People vs. Supervisors (43 N. Y., 130) the court said:

Page 5 of 77
 The occasion of the enactment of a law always be referred to in interpreting and giving effect to it. The court should place
itself in the situation of the legislature and ascertain the necessity and probable object of the statute, and then give such
construction to the language used as to carry the intention of the legislature into effect so far as it can be ascertained from
the terms of the statute itself. (U. S. vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S., 72, 79.)

We do not believe that in construing the statute in question there is necessity requiring that clauses should be taken from the
position given them and placed in other portions of the statute in order to give the whole Act a reasonable meaning. Leaving all of the
clauses located as they now are in the statute, a reasonable interpretation, based upon the plain and ordinary meaning of the words
used, requires that the Act should be held applicable to the case at bar.

The judgment of the court below and the sentence imposed thereunder are hereby affirmed. So ordered.

Adm. Case No. 3086 February 23, 1988

ALEXANDER PADILLA, complainant,

vs.
THE HON. BALTAZAR R. DIZON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City Branch 113, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative complaint, dated August 6, 1987, filed by the then Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, against
respondent Baltazar R. Dizon, RTC Judge, Branch 115, Pasay City, for rendering a manifestly erroneous decision due, at the very least,
to gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law, in Criminal Case No. 86- 10126-P, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Lo Chi
Fai", acquitting said accused of the offense charged, i.e., smuggling of foreign currency out of the country.

Required by the Court to answer the complaint, the respondent judge filed an Answer, dated October 6, 1987, reciting his
"commendable record as a fearless prosecutor" since his appointment as Assistant City Fiscal of Manila on December 4, 1962, until
his appointment eventually as RTC Judge on February 18, 1983; that at in the reorganization of the judiciary after the February 26,
1986 revolution, he was reappointed to his present position; that his length of service as prosecutor and judge is "tangible proof that
would negate the allegations of the petitioner" (should be complainant), whereas the latter did not last long in the service for reasons
only known to him; that the decision involved in the complaint was promulgated by respondent on September 29, 1986, but the
complaint against him was filed only on August 6, 1987, a clear indication of malice and ill-will of the complainant to subject
respondent to harassment, humiliation and vindictiveness; that his decision, of which he submits a copy (Annex A) as part of his
Answer, is based on "fundamental principles and the foundation of rights and justice" and that if there are mistakes or errors in the
questioned decision, they are committed in good faith. Accordingly, respondent prays for the dismissal of the petition (should be
complaint).

The issue before the Court is whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in
rendering the decision in question. A judge can not be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly or administratively, for an
erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith.

The case in which the respondent rendered a decision of acquittal involved a tourist, Lo Chi Fai, who was caught by a Customs guard
at the Manila International Airport while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the
country. Lo Chi Fai, was apprehended by a customs guard and two PAFSECOM officers on July 9, 1986, while on board Flight PR 300
of the Philippine Air Lines bound for Hongkong. At the time of his apprehension, he was found carrying with him foreign currency
and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces) amounting to US$ 355,349.57, in various currency denominations, to wit: Japanese
Yen, Swiss Franc, Australian Dollar, Singapore Dollar, HFL Guilder, French Franc, U.S. Dollar, English Pound, Malaysian Dollar,
Deutsche Mark, Canadian Dollar and Hongkong Dollar, without any authority as provided by law. At the time the accused was
apprehended, he was able to exhibit two currency declarations which he was supposed to have accomplished upon his arrival in
Manila in previous trips, namely, CB Currency Declaration No. 05048, dated May 4, 1986 for US$39,600.00 and Japanese Yen
4,000,000.00, and CB Currency Declaration No. 06346, dated June 29, 1986 for Japanese Yen 6,600,000.00.

An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai, with the RTC of Pasay City for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960, as
follows:

Page 6 of 77
 That on or about the 9th day of July, 1986, in the City of Pasay, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Mr. LO CHI FAI, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attempt to take out of the Philippines through the Manila International Airport the following foreign
currencies in cash and in checks:

Japanese Yen Y 32,800,000.00

Swiss Franc SW. FR 6,9000.00

Australian Dollar A$ 17,425.00

Singapore Dollar S$ 9,945.00

Deutsche Marck DM 18,595.00

Canadian Dollar CS 13,330.00

Hongkong Dollar HK$ 15,630.00

HFL Guilder HFL 430.00

French Franc F/6,860.00

US Dollar US$ 73,950.00

English Pound 5,318.00

Malaysian Dollar M$. 14,760.00

(in checks)

Australian Dollar A$ 7,750.00

British Pound 700.00

US Dollar US$ 17,630.00

Canadian Dollar C$ 990.00

without authority from the Central Bank.

Contrary to Law.

The case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 86-10126-P, was subsequently raffled to Branch 113, presided by herein
respondent Judge Baltazar A. Dizon.

Section 6 of Circular No. 960 of the Central Bank provides as follows:

Sec. 6. Export, import of foreign exchange; exceptions. — No person shall take out or transmit or attempt to take out
or transmit foreign exchange in any form, out of the Philippines directly, through other persons, through the mails
or through international carriers except when specifically authorized by the Central Bank or allowed under existing
international agreements or Central Bank regulations.

Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not
exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them. For purposes of establishing the amount of
foreign exchange brought in or out of the Philippines, tourists and non-resident temporary visitors bringing with
them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the
form prescribed by the Central Bank at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines.

The penal sanction is provided by Section 1, P.D. No. 1883, which reads as follows:

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 Section 1. Blackmarketing of Foreign Exchange .— That any person who shall engage in the trading or purchase and
sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and regulations of the Central Bank shall be guilty of
the crime of blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal, (minimum of 12
years and I day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less than fifty thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.

At the trial, the accused tried to establish that he was a businessman from Kowloon, Hongkong, engaged in the garment business, in
which he had invested 4 to 5 million Hongkong Dollars; that he had come to the Philippines 9 to 1 0 times, although the only dates he
could remember were April 2, 1986, May 4, 1986, June 28,1986, and July 8, 1986; that the reason for his coming to the Philippines
was to invest in business in the Philippines and also to play in the casino; that he had a group of business associates who decided to
invest in business with him, namely: Wakita Noboyuki, Kobayashi Nabuo, Lee Shiang Pin, Lee Chin and Cze Kai Kwan, who had their
own businesses in Japan and Hongkong; that when he came to the Philippines on April 2,1986, he brought US$50,000.00 and
8,500,000.00 Japanese Yen which he tried to declare but the Central Bank representative refused to accept his declaration, until he
could get a confirmation as to the source of the money, for which reason he contacted his bank in Hongkong and a telex was sent to
him on April 3,1986 (Exh. 4). He also brought in with him US$39,000.00 and 4,000,000.00 Japanese Yen when he arrived on May
4,1986 which he declared (Exh. 1). Again, he declared 8,600,000.00 Japanese Yen when he arrived on June 28, 1986 (Exh. 2). He also
testified that his business associates, as per their agreement to invest in some business with him in the Philippines, started putting
their money for this purpose in a common fund, hence, every time anyone of them came to the Philippines, they would declare the
money they were bringing in, and all declarations were handed to and kept by him; these currency declarations were presented at
the trial as exhibits for the defense. When asked by the court why he did not present all of these declarations when he was
apprehended at the airport, his answer was that he was not asked to present the declaration papers of his associates, and besides, he
does not understand English and he was not told to do so. He also testified on cross-examination that the reason he was going back to
Hongkong bringing with him all the money intended to be invested in the Philippines was because of the fear of his group that the
"revolution" taking place in Manila might become widespread. It was because of this fear that he was urged by his associates to come
to Manila on July 8, 1986 to bring the money out of the Philippines.

The respondent judge, in his decision acquitting the accused, stated:

The factual issue for this Court to determine is whether or not the accused wilfully violated Section 6 of Circular No.
960. The fact that the accused had in his possession the foreign currencies when he was about to depart from the
Philippines did not by that act alone make him liable for Violation of Section 6.

What is imperative is the purpose for which the act of bringing foreign currencies out of the country was done the
very intention. It is that which qualifies the act as criminal or not. There must be that clear intention to violate and
benefit from the act done. Intent is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by overt acts of a person.

The respondent proceeded to analyze the evidence which, according to him, tended to show that the accused had no wilfull intention
to violate the law. According to the respondent in his decision:

... this Court is persuaded to accept the explanation of the defense that the currencies confiscated and/or seized
from the accused belong to him and his business associates abovenamed. And from the unwavering and
unequivocal testimonies of Mr. Templo and all of currencies in question came from abroad and not from the local
source which is what is being prohibited by the government. Yes, simply reading the provisions of said circular will,
readily show that the currency declaration is required for the purpose of establishing the amount of currency being
brought by tourist or temporary non-resident visitors into the country. The currency declarations, therefore, is
already (sic) intended to serve as a guideline for the Customs authorities to determine the amounts actually
brought in by them to correspond to the amounts that could be allowed to be taken out. Indeed, this Court is
amazed and really has its misgivings in the manner currency declarations were made as testified to by the Central
Bank employees. Why the Bureau of Customs representative never took part in all these declarations testified to by
no less than five (5) Central Bank employees? Seemingly, these employees are the favorites of these travellers. It is
the hope of this Court that the authorities must do something to remedy the evident flaw in the system for effective
implementation of the questioned Central Bank Circular No. 960.

But even with a doubtful mind this Court would not be able to pin criminal responsibility on the accused. This is
due to its steadfast adherence and devotion to the rule of law-a factor in restoring the almost lost faith and erosion
of confidence of the people in the administration of justice. Courts of Justice are guided only by the rule of evidence.

The respondent-judge has shown gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in holding that to convict the accused for
violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law.
The respondent ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses punished by special
laws, which are mala prohibita. In requiring proof of malice, the respondent has by his gross ignorance allowed the accused to go scot
free. The accused at the time of his apprehension at the Manila International Airport had in his possession the amount of
Page 8 of 77
US$355,349.57 in assorted foreign currencies and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces), without any specific authority from
the Central Bank as required by law. At the time of his apprehension, he was able to exhibit only two foreign currency declarations in
his possession. These were old declarations made by him on the occasion of his previous trips to the Philippines.

Although lack of malice or wilfull intent is not a valid defense in a case for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the respondent
nonetheless chose to exonerate the accused based on his defense that the foreign currency he was bringing out of the country at the
time he was apprehended by the customs authorities were brought into the Philippines by him and his alleged business associates on
several previous occasions when they came to the Philippines, supposedly to be used for the purpose of investing in some
unspecified or undetermined business ventures; that this money was kept in the Philippines and he precisely came to the Philippines
to take the money out as he and his alleged business associates were afraid that the "attempted revolution" which occurred on July
6,1986 might spread. Such fantastic tale, although totally irrelevant to the matter of the criminal liability of the accused under the
information, was swallowed by the respondent-judge "hook, line and sinker." It did not matter to the respondent that the foreign
currency and foreign currency instruments found in the possession of the accused when he was apprehended at the airport-380
pieces in all-and the amounts of such foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by the
accused at the trial. It did not matter to the respondent that the accused by his own story admitted, in effect, that he was a carrier" of
foreign currency for other people. The respondent closed his eyes to the fact that the very substantial amounts of foreign exchange
found in the possession of the accused at the time of his apprehension consisted of personal checks of other people, as well as cash in
various currency denominations (12 kinds of currency in all), which clearly belied the claim of the accused that they were part of the
funds which he and his supposed associates had brought in and kept in the Philippines for the purpose of investing in some business
ventures. The respondent ignored the fact that most of the CB Currency declarations presented by the defense at the trial were
declarations belonging to other people which could not be utilized by the accused to justify his having the foreign exchange in his
possession. Although contrary to ordinary human experience and behavior, the respondent judge chose to give credence to the
fantastic tale of the accused that he and his alleged business associates had brought in from time to time and accumulated and kept in
the Philippines foreign exchange (of very substantial amounts in cash and checks in various foreign currency denominations) for the
purpose of investing in business even before they knew and had come to an agreement as to the specific business venture in which
they were going to invest. These and other circumstances which make the story concocted by the accused so palpably unbelievable as
to render the findings of the respondent judge obviously contrived to favor the acquittal of the accused, thereby clearly negating his
claim that he rendered the decision "in good faith." His actuations in this case amount to grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest
of sound and fair administration of justice.

He not only acquitted the accused Lo Chi Fai, but directed in his decision the release to the accused of at least the amount of
US$3,000.00, allowed, according to respondent, under Central Bank Circular No. 960. This, in spite of the fact that forfeiture
proceedings had already been instituted by the Bureau of Customs over the currency listed in the information, which according to the
respondent should be respected since the Bureau of Customs "has the exclusive jurisdiction in the matter of seizure and forfeiture of
the property involved in the alleged infringements of the aforesaid Central Bank Circular." In invoking the provisions of CB Circular
No. 960 to justify the release of US$ 3,000.00 to the accused, the respondent judge again displayed gross incompetence and gross
ignorance of the law. There is nothing in the said CB Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial court to release the said
amount of U.S. Currency to the accused. According to the above-cited CB Circular, tourists may take out or send out from the
Philippines foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them; for the purpose of
establishing such amount, tourists or non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in
other foreign currencies must declare their foreign exchange at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines. In other words, CB
Circular No. 960 merely provides that for the purpose of establishing the amount of foreign currency brought in or out of the
Philippines, a tourist upon arrival is required to declare any foreign exchange he is bringing in at the time of his arrival, if the same
exceeds the amount of US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies. There is nothing in said circular that would justify
returning to him the amount of at least US$3,000.00, if he is caught attempting to bring out foreign exchange in excess of said amount
without specific authority from the Central Bank.

Accordingly, the Court finds the respondent Regional Trial Court Judge, Baltazar R. Dizon, guilty of gross incompetence, gross
ignorance of the law and grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency, and consistent with the responsibility of
this Court for the just and proper administration of justice and for the attainment of the objective of maintaining the people's faith in
the judiciary (People vs. Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712), it is hereby ordered that the Respondent Judge be DISMISSED from the service.
All leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which he may be entitled are hereby forfeited with prejudice to his being
reinstated in any branch of government service, including government-owned and/or controlled agencies or corporations.

This resolution is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Page 9 of 77
 DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the
vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on
individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very
little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic
obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -

The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number,
is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others.

Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the
integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its
collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with
it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In
the process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and
colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State,
and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights
are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing
the Crime of Plunder),[1] as amended by RA 7659,[2] wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it
crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this
Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens
rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights
of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1,
par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any
person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office
concerned;

(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and
orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at
the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
Page 10 of 77
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare
any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from
the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied).

Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth,
it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).

On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a)
Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation
of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim.
Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use
Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation
with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation
of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents
necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges
and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness
and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause
for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein
did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the
Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense.On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the
Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant
petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for
proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as
defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that
a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution.[3] Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental
rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong
predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach
upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch
accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever
conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose
of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in
tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment
of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing
therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question
of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon[4] we held that as long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the
constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of
the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course,
where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the
positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He
must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the
constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly

Page 11 of 77
suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."[5] And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to
discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused
to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required
or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -

1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;

2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts:
(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving,
directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or
entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal
or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly
or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official
position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,

3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.

As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would
render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in
defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed
conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in
amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1,
par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various
elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:

"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with
Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and
penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY
AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE
ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR
MEANS, described as follows:

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF
GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-
accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less,
representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the

Page 12 of 77
province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN
DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS),
329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE
BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY
CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE
THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE
BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION
TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his
defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and
provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely
informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series"
in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec.
4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad
and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right
to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms
are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; [6] much less do we have to define every word we
use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an
enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a
statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be
gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain
and ordinary acceptation and signification,[7] unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to
those words.[8] The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly
accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"

Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship
as to obscure individual characters.

Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.

That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident
from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:

DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991

REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR
CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two or
more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of the same
act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.

Page 13 of 77
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same
act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is
only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe even two acts may already result in such
a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsorconsider deleting the words a series of overt or, to read, therefore: or conspiracy
COMMITTED by criminal acts such as. Remove the idea of necessitating a series. Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say acts of plunder there
should be, at least, two or more.
Page 14 of 77
 SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of
enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of
assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category
of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under
Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it
would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan[9] that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in
relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -

x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d).Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a
common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must
either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful
scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him
follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used
by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to
penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine
has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must
define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the
statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified
either by a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it
leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.[10] But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which
nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain
types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second
whenever directed against such activities.[11] With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear
and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. [12] It must be stressed, however, that
the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the
metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more
explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to
provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the
Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process
of law."[13] The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."[14]

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon
protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." [15] The possible harm to
society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others
may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

Page 15 of 77
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence,
and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the
validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." [16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[17] the Court ruled that
"claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken
words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws
that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the
most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the
Act would be valid."[18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all
its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the
law as applied to the conduct of others."[19]

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes
in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons
or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional."[20] As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." [21] Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim
that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties
not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.[22] It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy
requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract
contexts.[23] But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris[24]

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the
statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the
required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.

For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort,"[25]and is generally disfavored.[26] In determining the constitutionality of a statute,
therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the
defendant is charged.[27]

In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and
argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and
words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law
should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the
well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of
what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was
extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote
with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are
loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of
no reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague.Petitioners posited, among others, that
the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or
administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct
offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through
evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their
official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated because they
were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.

Page 16 of 77
 In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the
constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence"
merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of
all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.

The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third
International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice,
C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).

The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the
public officer in:

x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as
amended).

It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which is
unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.

In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par.
(e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that
case, petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable
obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires
only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal
act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient
to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other
crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the
State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.[29] The
use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the application
of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt
whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary
affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of
his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt"standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law
as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. [30] The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and
Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating -

DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990

MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does
that not work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than P100
million, but the totality of the crime committed is P100 million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public
document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to
be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of
the things taken by the robber in the information three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3
pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the
element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very
important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to
Page 17 of 77
 accumulate only P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the
totality of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so
how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove that
element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is P100
million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be P110
or P120 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those
transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is P100
million, then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the
crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to
constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of
the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to
form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need
to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged
in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public
treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids
beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.[31]
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative
of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated
otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1,
par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common
sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten
wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows
with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important
element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the
crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule
of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying Section
4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of the Plunder
Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts
charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive element
of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do
not have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of plunder and that cannot
be avoided by the prosecution.[32]
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its
definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4
is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x
Page 18 of 77
 It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely
procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance
of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law.Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder
may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the
fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4
is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without
necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides,
Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause -

Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance
is held invalid, the remaining provisions ofthis Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not
be affected thereby.

Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its
provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated
independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal
intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -

x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It
is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It
thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is
void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:

SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual
criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.[33]

However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:

SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the
Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?

SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .[34]

Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and
every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt
or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned,
however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.

Indeed, 2 provides that -

Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law
indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his
criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as
principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they
omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." [35]

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the
decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes
are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659.Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v.
Echegaray:[36]

Page 19 of 77
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was
callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or
her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting
in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and
drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape,
parricide,infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious
physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or
intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or
raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the
scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its
poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and
impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the
populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in
turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of
crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or
officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts
punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se[37] and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a
special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat
prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an
ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice
it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned
by People v. Echegaray[38] to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is
constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an
integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its
very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people
relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are
imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economicallycatastrophic looting of the national
treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left
unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder
Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the
avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the
amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and
trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven awedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long
time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in
the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL.Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment:

Before I explain my vote, I think it necessary to restate the basic facts.

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was President of the Philippines until January 20, 2001 when he was forced to vacate the
presidency by people power and then Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo succeeded him in office.[1] He was charged, in eight
cases filed with the Sandiganbayan, with various offenses committed while in office, among them plunder, for allegedly having
amassed ill-gotten wealth in the amount of P4.1 billion, more or less. He moved to quash the information for plunder on the ground
that R.A. No. 7080, otherwise called the Anti-Plunder Law, is unconstitutional and that the information charges more than one
offense.
Page 20 of 77
 In its resolution dated July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion, along with those filed by his co-accused,
Edward Serapio, and his son, Jose Jinggoy Estrada. Petitioner brought this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 to set
aside the Sandiganbayans resolution principally on the ground that the Anti-Plunder Law is void for being vague and overbroad. We
gave due course to the petition and required respondents to file comments and later heard the parties in oral arguments on
September 18, 2001 and on their memoranda filed on September 28, 2001 to consider the constitutional claims of petitioner.

I. THE ANTI-PLUNDER LAW

The Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. No. 7080) was enacted by Congress on July 12, 1991 pursuant to the constitutional mandate that
the State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption.[2] Section 2 of the statute provides:

Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives
by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of
at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder
shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall
declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks
derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. (As amended by Sec. 12, R.A. No. 7659).

The term ill-gotten wealth is defined in 1(d) as follows:

Ill-gotten wealth, means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section
Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates
by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury.

2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public
officer concerned;

3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and
orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 4 of the said law states:

Rule of Evidence. For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act
done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient
to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

II. ANTI-PLUNDER LAW NOT TO BE JUDGED

ON ITS FACE

The amended information against petitioner charges violations of 2, in relation to 1(d)(1)(2), of the statute. It reads:

AMENDED INFORMATION

Page 21 of 77
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former President of the
Republic of the Philippines, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a Asiong Salonga and a.k.a Jose Velarde, together with Jose Jinggoy Estrada,
Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy,
Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John Does & Jane Does, of the crime of plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as
amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then a public officer, being then the President of the Republic of the Philippines, by himself and/or in
connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused, who are members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates and/or other persons, by taking undue advantage of his official position, authority, relationship, connection,
or influence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire by himself, directly or indirectly,
ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of four billion ninety seven million eight hundred four thousand one hundred
seventy three pesos and seventeen centavos [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at
the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines, through any or a combination or a series of
overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means, described as follows:

(a) by receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the aggregate amount of five hundred forty-five
million pesos (P545,000,000.00), more or less, from illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of
pecuniary benefit, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie Atong Ang, Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Edward Serapio, and John Does and Jane Does, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling;

(b) by diverting, receiving, misappropriating, converting or misusing directly or indirectly, for his or their personal gain and benefit,
public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion of the
two hundred million pesos [P200,000,000.00] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171,
by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie Atong Ang, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos
Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and other John Does and Jane Does;

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, for his personal gain and benefit, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to
purchase 351,878,000 shares of stocks, more or less, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 shares of stocks, more or less,
of the Belle Corporation in the amount of more or less one billion one hundred two million nine hundred sixty five thousand six
hundred seven pesos and fifty centavos [P1,102,965,607.50] and more or less seven hundred forty four million six hundred twelve
thousand and four hundred fifty pesos [P744,612,450.00], respectively, or a total of more or less one billion eight hundred forty
seven million five hundred seventy eight thousand fifty seven pesos and fifty centavos [P1,847,578,057.50]; and by collecting or
receiving, directly or indirectly, by himself and/or in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, commissions or percentages by
reason of said purchases of shares of stock in the amount of one hundred eighty nine million seven hundred thousand pesos
[P189,700,000.00], more or less, from the Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the Equitable-PCI Bank under the
account name Jose Velarde;

(d) by unjustly enriching himself from commissions, gifts, shares, percentages, kickbacks, or any form of pecuniary benefits, in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does, in the amount of more or less three billion two hundred thirty three million one hundred
four thousand one hundred seventy three pesos and seventeen centavos [P3,233,104,173.17] and depositing the same under his
account name Jose Velarde at the Equitable-PCI Bank.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001

But, although this is a prosecution under 2, in relation to 1(d)(1)(2), what we are seeing here is a wholesale attack on the
validity of the entire statute. Petitioner makes little effort to show the alleged invalidity of the statute as applied to him. His focus is
instead on the statute as a whole as he attacks on their face not only 1(d)(1)(2) of the statute but also its other provisions which deal
with plunder committed by illegal or fraudulent disposition of government assets (1(d)(3)), acquisition of interest in business
(1(d)(4)), and establishment of monopolies and combinations or implementation of decrees intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests (1(d)(5)).
These other provisions of the statute are irrelevant to this case. What relevance do questions regarding the establishment of
monopolies and combinations, or the ownership of stocks in a business enterprise, or the illegal or fraudulent dispositions of
government property have to the criminal prosecution of petitioner when they are not even mentioned in the amended information
filed against him? Why should it be important to inquire whether the phrase overt act in 1(d) and 2 means the same thing as the
phrase criminal act as used in the same provisions when the acts imputed to petitioner in the amended information are criminal
acts? Had the provisions of the Revised Penal Code been subjected to this kind of line-by-line scrutiny whenever a portion thereof
was involved in a case, it is doubtful if we would have the jurisprudence on penal law that we have today. The prosecution of crimes
would certainly have been hampered, if not stultified. We should not even attempt to assume the power we are asked to exercise. The
Page 22 of 77
delicate power of pronouncing an Act of Congress unconstitutional is not to be exercised with reference to hypothetical cases . . . . In
determining the sufficiency of the notice a statute must of necessity be examined in the light of the conduct with which a defendant is
charged.[3]
Nonetheless, it is contended that because these provisions are void for being vague and overbroad, the entire statute, including
the part under which petitioner is being prosecuted, is also void. And if the entire statute is void, there is no law under which he can
be prosecuted for plunder. Nullum crimen sine lege, nullum poena sine lege.
Two justifications are advanced for this facial challenge to the validity of the entire statute. The first is that the statute comes
within the specific prohibitions of the Constitution and, for this reason, it must be given strict scrutiny and the normal presumption
of constitutionality should not be applied to it nor the usual judicial deference given to the judgment of Congress. [4] The second
justification given for the facial attack on the Anti-Plunder Law is that it is vague and overbroad.[5]
We find no basis for such claims either in the rulings of this Court or of those of the U.S. Supreme Court, from which petitioners
counsel purports to draw for his conclusions. We consider first the claim that the statute must be subjected to strict scrutiny.

A. Test of Strict Scrutiny Not Applicable to Penal Statutes

Petitioner cites the dictum in Ople v. Torres[6] that when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this Court will give the
challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation stricter scrutiny and that It will not do for authorities to invoke the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. As will presently be shown, strict scrutiny, as used in that decision, is
not the same thing as the strict scrutiny urged by petitioner. Much less did this Court rule that because of the need to give stricter
scrutiny to laws abridging fundamental freedoms, it will not give such laws the presumption of validity.
Petitioner likewise cites the most celebrated footnote in [American] constitutional law, i.e., footnote 4 of the opinion in United
States v. Carolene Products Co.,[7] in which it was stated:

There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within
a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to
be embraced within the Fourteenth.

It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of
the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.

Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or
racial minorities: whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.

Again, it should be noted that what the U.S. Supreme Court said is that there may be narrower scope for the operation of the
presumption of constitutionality for legislation which comes within the first ten amendments to the American Federal Constitution
compared to legislation covered by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. The American Court did not say that such
legislation is not to be presumed constitutional, much less that it is presumptively invalid, but only that a narrower scope will be
given for the presumption of constitutionality in respect of such statutes. There is, therefore, no warrant for petitioners contention
that the presumption of constitutionality of a legislative act is applicable only where the Supreme Court deals with facts regarding
ordinary economic affairs, not where the interpretation of the text of the Constitution is involved.[8]
What footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case posits is a double standard of judicial review: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with
freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and deferential or rational basis standard of review for economic
legislation. As Justice (later Chief Justice) Fernando explained in Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Assn v. The City Mayor,[9] this
simply means that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts
is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects what are at the most rights of property, the permissible
scope of regulatory measures is wider.
Hence, strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race and facial
challenges are allowed for this purpose. But criminal statutes, like the Anti-Plunder Law, while subject to strict construction, are not
subject to strict scrutiny. The two (i.e., strict construction and strict scrutiny) are not the same. The rule of strict construction is a rule
of legal hermeneutics which deals with the parsing of statutes to determine the intent of the legislature. On the other hand, strict
scrutiny is a standard of judicial review for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the
regulation of fundamental freedoms. It is set opposite such terms as deferential review and intermediate review.
Thus, under deferential review, laws are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest, without courts
seriously inquiring into the substantiality of such interest and examining the alternative means by which the objectives could be
Page 23 of 77
achieved. Under intermediate review, the substantiality of the governmental interest is seriously looked into and the availability of
less restrictive alternatives are considered. Under strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.[10]
Considering these degrees of strictness in the review of statutes, how many criminal laws can survive the test of strict scrutiny
to which petitioner proposes to subject them? How many can pass muster if, as petitioner would have it, such statutes are not to be
presumed constitutional? Above all, what will happen to the States ability to deal with the problem of crimes, and, in particular, with
the problem of graft and corruption in government, if criminal laws are to be upheld only if it is shown that there is a compelling
governmental interest for making certain conduct criminal and if there is no other means less restrictive than that contained in the
law for achieving such governmental interest?

B. Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrines, as Grounds for Facial Challenge,

Not Applicable to Penal Laws

Nor do allegations that the Anti-Plunder Law is vague and overbroad justify a facial review of its validity. The void-for-
vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of
law.[11] The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. [12]
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon
protected speech. The theory is that [w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity. [13] The possible harm to
society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others
may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially
harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the
validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, we have not recognized an
overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment. [14] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[15] the Court ruled that claims
of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and,
again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought
to be applied to protected conduct. For this reason, it has been held that a facial challenge to a legislative Act is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid.[16] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as
applied to the conduct of others.[17]
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing on their faces
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when
what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons
or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.[18] As has been pointed out, vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated [only] as applied to a particular defendant. [19] Consequently, there is no basis for petitioners claim
that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

C. Anti-Plunder Law Should be Construed As Applied

Indeed, on its face invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to
parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. [20] It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile
abstract contexts.[21] But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris:[22]

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the
statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the
required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes,...ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
Page 24 of 77
This is the reason on its face invalidation of statutes has been described as manifestly strong medicine, to be employed sparingly and
only as a last resort,[23] and is generally disfavored.[24] In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which
are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged. [25]
This brings me to the question whether, as applied, 2, in relation to 1(d)(1)(2), of the Anti-Plunder Law is void on the ground of
vagueness and overbreadth.

III. ANTI-PLUNDER LAW NEITHER VAGUE NOR OVERBROAD

As earlier noted, the case against petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada in the Sandiganbayan is for violation of 2, in relation to
1(d)(1)(2), of the Anti-Plunder Law, which, so far as pertinent, provide:

SEC. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total
value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death....

SEC. 1. Definition of Terms. ...

(d) Ill-gotten wealth, means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of
Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business
associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury.

2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public
officer concerned;

The charge is that in violation of these provisions, during the period June 1998 to January 2001, petitioner, then the President of
the Philippines, willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amassed wealth in the total amount of P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, through
a combination or series of overt or criminal acts, to wit:(1) by receiving or collecting the total amount of P545,000,000.00, more or
less, from illegal gambling by himself and/or in connivance with his co-accused named therein, in exchange for protection of illegal
gambling; (2) by misappropriating, converting, or misusing, by himself or in connivance with his co-accused named therein, public
funds amounting to P130,000,000.00, more or less, representing a portion of the share of the Province of Ilocos Sur in the tobacco
excise tax; (3) by ordering the GSIS and the SSS to buy shares of stocks of the Belle Corp., worth P1,102,965,607.50 and
P744,612,450.00 respectively, or the total amount of P1,847,578,057.50, for which he received as commission the amount of
P189,700,000.00, more or less, from Belle Corp.; (4) by unjustly enriching himself from commissions, gifts, shares, percentages, and
kickbacks in the amount of P3,233,104,173.17, which he deposited in the Equitable-PCI Bank under the name of Jose Velarde.
Anyone reading the law in relation to this charge cannot possibly be mistaken as to what petitioner is accused of in Criminal
Case No. 26558 of the Sandiganbayan. But, repeatedly, petitioner complains that the law is vague and deprives him of due process. He
invokes the ruling in Connally v. General Constr. Co.[26] that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law. He does this by questioning not only 2, in relation to 1(d)(1)(2), as applied to him, but also other
provisions of the Anti-Plunder Law not involved in this case. In 55 out of 84 pages of discussion in his Memorandum, petitioner tries
to show why on their face these provisions are vague and overbroad by asking questions regarding the meaning of some words and
phrases in the statute, to wit:
1. Whether series means two, three, or four overt or criminal acts listed in 1(d) in view of the alleged divergence of
interpretation given to this word by the Ombudsman, the Solicitor General, and the Sandiganbayan, and whether the acts in a series
should be directly related to each other;
2. Whether combination includes two or more acts or at least two of the means or similar schemes mentioned in 1(d);
3. Whether pattern as used in 1(d) must be related to the word pattern in 4 which requires that it be indicative of an overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy;
4. Whether overt means the same thing as criminal;
5. Whether misuse of public funds is the same as illegal use of public property or technical malversation;
6. Whether raids on the public treasury refers to raids on the National Treasury or the treasury of a province or municipality;
Page 25 of 77
 7. Whether the receipt or acceptance of a gift, commission, kickback, or pecuniary benefits in connection with a government
contract or by reason of his office, as used in 1(d)(2), is the same as bribery in the Revised Penal Code or those which are considered
corrupt practices of public officers;
8. Whether illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government, as used in 1(d)(3),
refers to technical malversation or illegal use of public funds or property in the Revised Penal Code;
9. Whether mere ownership of stocks in a private corporation, such as a family firm engaged in fishing, is prohibited under
1(d)(4);
10. Whether the phrase monopolies or other combinations in restraint of trade in 1(d)(5) means the same thing as monopolies
and combinations in restraint of trade in the Revised Penal Code because the latter contemplates monopolies and combinations
established by any person, not necessarily a public officer; and
11. Whether under 1(d)(5) it is the public officer who intends to confer benefit on a particular person by implementing a decree
or it is the decree that is intended to benefit the particular person and the public officer simply implements it.
Many more questions of this tenor are asked in the memorandum of petitioner [27] as well as in the dissent of MR. JUSTICE
KAPUNAN. Not only are they irrelevant to this case, as already pointed out. It is also evident from their examination that what they
present are simply questions of statutory construction to be resolved on a case-to-case basis. Consider, for example, the following
words and phrases in 1(d) and 2:

A. Combination or series of overt or criminal acts

Petitioner contends that the phrase combination or series of overt, or criminal acts in 1(d) and 2 should state how many acts
are needed in order to have a combination or a series. It is not really required that this be specified. Petitioner, as well as MR. JUSTICE
KAPUNAN, cites the following remarks of Senators Gonzales and Taada during the discussion of S. No. 733 in the Senate:

SENATOR GONZALES. To commit the offense of plunder, as defined in this Act while constituting a single offense, it must consist of a
series of overt or criminal acts, such as bribery, extortion, malversation of public funds, swindling, falsification of public documents,
coercion, theft, fraud, and illegal exaction, and graft or corrupt practices act and like offenses. Now, Mr. President, I think, this
provision, by itself, will be vague. I am afraid that it might be faulted for being violative of the due process clause and the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation of an accused. Because, what is meant by series of overt or criminal acts? I mean,
would 2, 3, 4 or 5 constitute a series? During the period of amendments, can we establish a minimum of overt acts like, for example,
robbery in band? The law defines what is robbery in band by the number of participants therein.

In this particular case, probably, we can statutorily provide for the definition of series so that two, for example, would that be already
a series? Or, three, what would be the basis for such a determination?

SENATOR TAADA. I think, Mr. President, that would be called for, this being a penal legislation, we should be very clear as to what it
encompasses; otherwise, we may contravene the constitutional provision on the right of the accused to due process. [28]

But, as the later discussion in the Senate shows, the senators in the end reached a consensus as to the meaning of the phrase so
that an enumeration of the number of acts needed was no longer proposed. Thus, the record shows:
SENATOR MACEDA. In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe even two acts may already result in such a big
amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words a series of overt or. To read, therefore: or conspiracy
COMMITTED by criminal acts such. Remove the idea of necessitating a series. Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TAADA. That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT. Probably, two or more would be . . .
SENATOR MACEDA. Yes, because a series implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TAADA: Accepted, Mr. President.
....
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say acts of plunder
there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President. [29]
Indeed, the record shows that no amendment to S. No. 733 was proposed to this effect. To the contrary, Senators Gonzales and
Taada voted in favor of the bill on its third and final reading on July 25, 1989. The ordinary meaning of the term combination as the
union of two things or acts was adopted, although in the case of series, the senators agreed that a repetition of two or more times of
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the same thing or act would suffice, thus departing from the ordinary meaning of the word as a group of usually three or more things
or events standing or succeeding in order and having a like relationship to each other, or a spatial or temporal succession of persons
or things, or a group that has or admits an order of arrangement exhibiting progression.[30]
In the Bicameral Conference Committee on Justice meeting held on May 7, 1991, the same meanings were given to the words
combination and series. Representative Garcia explained that a combination is composed of two or more of the overt or criminal acts
enumerated in 1(d), while a series is a repetition of any of the same overt or criminal acts. Thus:
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say, THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR
CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if
there are two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are included,
how about a series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
....
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes, combination is not twice but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It can not be a repetition of the
same act.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): That be referred to series. Yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not [a] series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or
more, di ba?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes, this distinguishes it, really, from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good
suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts. So. . .
....
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAADA): Two different. . . .
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): For example, ha. . .
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition. . .[31]
Thus, resort to the deliberations in Congress will readily reveal that the word combination includes at least two different overt
or criminal acts listed in R.A. No. 7080, such as misappropriation (1(d)(1)) and taking undue advantage of official position
(1(d)(6)). On the other hand, series is used when the offender commits the same overt or criminal act more than once. There is no
plunder if only one act is proven, even if the ill-gotten wealth acquired thereby amounts to or exceeds the figure fixed by the law for
the offense (now P50,000,000.00). The overt or criminal acts need not be joined or separated in space or time, since the law does not
make such a qualification. It is enough that the prosecution proves that a public officer, by himself or in connivance with others,
amasses wealth amounting to at least P50 million by committing two or more overt or criminal acts.
Petitioner also contends that the phrase series of acts or transactions is the subject of conflicting decisions of various Circuit
Courts of Appeals in the United Sates. It turns out that the decisions concerned a phrase in Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides:

(b) Joinder of Defendants: Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged to have
participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such

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defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged on each
count. (Emphasis added)

The fact that there is a conflict in the rulings of the various courts does not mean that Rule 8(b) is void for being vague but only
that the U.S. Supreme Court should step in, for one of its essential functions is to assure the uniform interpretation of federal laws.
We have a similar provision in Rule 3, 6 of the 1997 Code of Civil Procedure. It reads:

SEC. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise
provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to
all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any
plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no
interest. (Emphasis added)

This provision has been in our Rules of Court since 1940 but it has never been thought of as vague. It will not do, therefore, to
cite the conflict of opinions in the United States as evidence of the vagueness of the phrase when we do not have any conflict in this
country.

B. Pattern of overt or criminal acts

Petitioner contends that it is not enough that there be at least two acts to constitute either a combination or series because 4
also mentions a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy, and pattern means an arrangement
or order of things or activity.
A pattern of overt or criminal acts is required in 4 to prove an unlawful scheme or conspiracy. In such a case, it is not necessary
to prove each and every criminal act done in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy so long as those proven show a pattern
indicating the scheme or conspiracy. In other words, when conspiracy is charged, there must be more than a combination or series of
two or more acts. There must be several acts showing a pattern which is indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy. As Senate
President Salonga explained, if there are 150 constitutive crimes charged, it is not necessary to prove beyond reasonable doubt all of
them.If a pattern can be shown by proving, for example, 10 criminal acts, then that would be sufficient to secure conviction.[32]
The State is thereby enabled by this device to deal with several acts constituting separate crimes as just one crime of plunder by
allowing their prosecution by means of a single information because there is a common purpose for committing them, namely, that of
amassing, accumulating or acquiring wealth through such overt or criminal acts. The pattern is the organizing principle that defines
what otherwise would be discreet criminal acts into the single crime of plunder.
As thus applied to petitioner, the Anti-Plunder Law presents only problems of statutory construction, not vagueness or
overbreadth. In Primicias v. Fugoso,[33]an ordinance of the City of Manila, prohibiting the holding of parades and assemblies in streets
and public places unless a permit was first secured from the city mayor and penalizing its violation, was construed to mean that it
gave the city mayor only the power to specify the streets and public places which can be used for the purpose but not the power to
ban absolutely the use of such places. A constitutional doubt was thus resolved through a limiting construction given to the
ordinance.
Nor is the alleged difference of opinion among the Ombudsman, the Solicitor General, and the Sandiganbayan as to the number
of acts or crimes needed to constitute plunder proof of the vagueness of the statute and, therefore, a ground for its invalidation. For
sometime it was thought that under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code convictions can be had for the complex crime of rebellion
with murder, arson, and other common crimes. The question was finally resolved in 1956 when this Court held that there is no such
complex crime because the common crimes were absorbed in rebellion. [34] The point is that Art. 134 gave rise to a difference of
opinion that nearly split the legal profession at the time, but no one thought Art. 134 to be vague and, therefore, void.
Where, therefore, the ambiguity is not latent and the legislative intention is discoverable with the aid of the canons of
construction, the void for vagueness doctrine has no application.
In Connally v. General Constr. Co.[35] the test of vagueness was formulated as follows:

[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.

Holmess test was that of the viewpoint of the bad man. In The Path of the Law, Holmes said:

If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which
such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it,
in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.[36]
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 Whether from the point of view of a man of common intelligence or from that of a bad man, there can be no mistaking the
meaning of the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to petitioner.

IV. PLUNDER A COMPLEX CRIME REQUIRING PROOF OF MENS REA

Petitioner argues that, in enacting the statute in question, Congress eliminated the element of mens rea, or the scienter, thus
reducing the burden of evidence required for proving the crimes which are mala in se.[37]
There are two points raised in this contention. First is the question whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se or a malum
prohibitum. For if it is a malum prohibitum, as the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General say it is, [38] then there is really a
constitutional problem because the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.

A. Plunder A Malum In Se Requiring Proof of Mens Rea

Plunder is a malum in se, requiring proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element
of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of
plunder was committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally. It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute
is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S. No. 733:

SENATOR TAADA. . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual
criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder. [39]

However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:

SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the
Gentlemans view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?

SENATOR TAADA. Yes, Mr. President . . .[40]

Seator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every
criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned,
however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, 2 provides that

Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder
Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by
his criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to any person who participates with the said public officers in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder. There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as
principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit,
but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean. [41]
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative
by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous
crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held
in People v. Echagaray:[42]

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was
callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or
her growth as a human being. . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting
in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and
drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide,
infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical
injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or

Page 29 of 77
intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or
raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the
scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its
poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and
impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the
populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in
turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of
crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or
officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts
punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se[43] and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a
special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat
prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an
ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

B. The Penalty for Plunder

The second question is whether under the statute the prosecution is relieved of the duty of proving beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of the defendant. It is contended that, in enacting the Anti-Plunder Law, Congress simply combined several existing crimes
into a single one but the penalty which it provided for the commission of the crime is grossly disproportionate to the crimes
combined while the quantum of proof required to prove each predicate crime is greatly reduced.
We have already explained why, contrary to petitioners contention, the quantum of proof required to prove the predicate
crimes in plunder is the same as that required were they separately prosecuted. We, therefore, limit this discussion to petitioners
claim that the penalty provided in the Anti-Plunder Law is grossly disproportionate to the penalties imposed for the predicate
crimes. Petitioner cites the following examples:

For example, please consider the following combination or series of overt or criminal acts (assuming the P50 M minimum has been
acquired) in light of the penalties laid down in the Penal Code:

a. One act of indirect bribery (penalized under Art. 211 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods),

combined with

one act of fraud against the public treasury (penalized under Art. 213 of the Revised Penal Code with prision
correccional in its medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period,

- equals -

plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death plus forfeiture of assets under R.A. 7080)
b. One act of prohibited transaction (penalized under Art. 215 of the revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from P200 to P1,000 or both),

combined with

one act of establishing a commercial monopoly (penalized under Art. 186 of Revised Penal Code with prision
correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from P200 to P6,000, or both),

-equals-

plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and forfeiture of assets under R.A. 7080.
c. One act of possession of prohibited interest by a public officer (penalized with prision correccional in
its minimum period or a fine of P200 to P1,000, or both under Art. 216 of the Revised Penal Code),
Page 30 of 77
 combined with

one act of combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade (penalized under Art. 186 of the Revised penal Code
with prision correccional in its minimum period, or a fine of P200 to P1,000, or both,

- equals -

plunder, punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and forfeiture of assets)[44]

But this is also the case whenever other special complex crimes are created out of two or more existing crimes. For example,
robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under Art. 294, par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code is punished with prision
correccional in its maximum period (4 years, 2 months, and 1 day) to prision mayor in its medium period (6 years and 1 day to 8
years). Homicide under Art. 249 of the same Code is punished with reclusion temporal (12 years and 1 day to 20 years). But when the
two crimes are committed on the same occasion, the law treats them as a special complex crime of robbery with homicide and
provides the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for its commission. Again, the penalty for simple rape under Art. 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua, while that for homicide under Art. 249 it is reclusion temporal (12 years and 1 day to 20
years). Yet, when committed on the same occasion, the two are treated as one special complex crime of rape with homicide and
punished with a heavier penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Obviously, the legislature views plunder as a crime as serious as
robbery with homicide or rape with homicide by punishing it with the same penalty. As the explanatory note accompanying S. No.
733 explains:

Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes the use of high office
for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time,
that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions
sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute
the plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in
Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard against the possible recurrence of the
depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting influences of
power.

Many other examples drawn from the Revised Penal Code and from special laws may be cited to show that, when special
complex crimes are created out of existing crimes, the penalty for the new crime is heavier.
______________________
To recapitulate, had R.A. No. 7080 been a law regulating speech, I would have no hesitation examining it on its face on the
chance that some of its provisionseven though not here before us are void. For then the risk that some state interest might be
jeopardized, i.e., the interest in the free flow of information or the prevention of chill on the freedom of expression, would trump any
marginal interest in security.
But the Anti-Plunder Law is not a regulation of speech. It is a criminal statute designed to combat graft and corruption,
especially those committed by highly-placed public officials. As conduct and not speech is its object, the Court cannot take chances by
examining other provisions not before it without risking vital interests of society. Accordingly, such statute must be examined only as
applied to the defendant and, if found valid as to him, the statute as a whole should not be declared unconstitutional for overbreadth
or vagueness of its other provisions. Doing so, I come to the following conclusions:
1. That the validity of R.A. No. 7080, otherwise known as the Anti-Plunder Law, cannot be determined by applying the test of
strict scrutiny in free speech cases without disastrous consequences to the States effort to prosecute crimes and that, contrary to
petitioners contention, the statute must be presumed to be constitutional;
2. That in determining the constitutionality of the Anti-Plunder Law, its provisions must be considered in light of the particular
acts alleged to have been committed by petitioner;
3. That, as applied to petitioner, the statute is neither vague nor overbroad;
4. That, contrary to the contention of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General, the crime of plunder is a malum in se and not
a malum prohibitum and the burden of proving each and every predicate crime is on the prosecution.
For these reasons, I respectfully submit that R.A. No. 7080 is valid and that, therefore, the petition should be dismissed.

G.R. No. 172602 April 13, 2007

HENRY T. GO, Petitioner,

vs.

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THE FIFTH DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is the petition for certiorari under Rules 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Henry T. Go seeking to nullify the
Resolution dated December 6, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28092, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Vicente C.
Rivera, Jr. and Henry T. Go, which denied his motion to quash. Likewise sought to be nullified is the Sandiganbayan Resolution of
March 24, 2006 denying petitioner Go’s motion for reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

On May 5, 2003, this Court rendered the Decision in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), 1 declaring
as null and void the 1997 Concession Agreement, the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA), and the Supplemental
Contracts entered into between the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), and PIATCO.

By the aforementioned contracts (collectively known as the PIATCO contracts), the Government awarded in favor of PIATCO the
project for the development of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operate-
and-transfer (BOT) scheme pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 6957 as amended by RA 7718 (BOT Law). 2

The Court ruled that Paircargo Consortium, PIATCO’s predecessor-in-interest, was not a qualified bidder as it failed to meet the
financial capability requirement under the BOT Law. Moreover, the PIATCO contracts were declared null and void for being contrary
to public policy. The penultimate paragraph of the Court’s Decision states thus:

CONCLUSION

In sum, this Court rules that in view of the absence of the requisite financial capacity of the Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of
respondent PIATCO, the award by the PBAC of the contract for the construction, operation and maintenance of the NAIA IPT III is null
and void. Further, considering that the 1997 Concession Agreement contains material and substantial amendments, which
amendments had the effect of converting the 1997 Concession Agreement into an entirely different agreement from the contract
bidded upon, the 1997 Concession Agreement is similarly null and void for being contrary to public policy. The provisions under
Section 4.04(b) and (c) in relation to Section 1.06 of the 1997 Concession Agreement and Section 4.04(c) in relation to Section 1.06 of
the ARCA, which constitute a direct government guarantee expressly prohibited by, among others, the BOT Law and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations are also null and void. The Supplements, being accessory contracts to the ARCA, are likewise null and void.3

Subsequently, an affidavit-complaint, later amended, was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman by Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco, Corporate
Secretary of Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corporation (AEDC), charging several persons in connection with the NAIA IPT III project. The
AEDC was the original proponent thereof which, however, lost to PIATCO when it failed to match the latter’s bid price.

After conducting a preliminary investigation thereon, the Office of the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan the Information
dated January 13, 2005 charging Vicente C. Rivera, as then DOTC Secretary, and petitioner Go, as Chairman and President of PIATCO,
with violation of Section 3(g)4 of RA 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 28092, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Vicente C. Rivera, Jr. and Henry T. Go. The Information reads:

INFORMATION

The undersigned Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, accuses VICENTE C.
RIVERA, JR. and HENRY T. GO with Violation of Sec. 3 (g), R.A. No. 3019 committed as follows:

On or about November 26, 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR., Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused HENRY T. GO,
Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously enter into an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA), after the project for the construction of the Ninoy
Aquino International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which ARCA substantially
amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957 as amended by
Republic Act 7718 (BOT Law) providing that the government shall assume the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter’s default
Page 32 of 77
specifically Article IV, Section 4.04 (c) in relation to Article I, Section 1.06 of the ARCA which term is more beneficial to PIATCO and in
violation of the BOT law, and manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

On February 11, 2005, petitioner Go posted a cash bond for his provisional liberty.

On February 15, 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued a Hold Departure Order against Rivera and petitioner Go.

On March 28, 2005, petitioner Go was arraigned and entered a plea of "not guilty."

On May 26, 2005, Rivera filed a Motion for Judicial Determination (or Re-Determination) of Probable Cause and Motion to Dismiss.
The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner Go a period of ten (10) days within which to file a comment thereon.

On June 20, 2005, petitioner Go filed his Comment with Motion to Quash. Adopting the view advanced by Rivera, petitioner Go
harped on the alleged "missing documents," including Pesayco’s amended affidavit-complaint and those others that were mentioned
in the resolution of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman finding probable cause against Rivera and petitioner Go, but which were not
allegedly in the records. Petitioner Go maintained that apart from the bare allegations contained in Pesayco’s affidavit-complaint,
there was no supporting evidence for the finding of the existence of probable cause against him and Rivera. Petitioner Go further
alleged that he could not be charged under Section 3(g) of RA 3019 because he is not a public officer and neither is he capacitated to
enter into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government. At least one of the important elements of the crime under Section
3(g) of RA 3019 is not allegedly present in his case.

On June 21, 2005, petitioner Go filed a Manifestation with Motion to Substitute the Comment with Motion to Quash, which the
prosecution, through the Office of the Ombudsman, opposed.

On December 6, 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution denying Rivera’s Motion for Judicial Determination (Re-
Determination) of Probable Cause and Motion to Dismiss and petitioner Go’s Motion to Quash.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that, contrary to the prosecution’s submission, it could still entertain petitioner Go’s Motion to Quash even
after his arraignment considering that it was based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. Nonetheless,
the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner Go’s Motion to Quash holding that, contrary to his claim, the allegations in the Information
actually make out the offense charged. More particularly, the allegations that accused Rivera, as DOTC Secretary, in conspiracy with
petitioner Go, entered into the ARCA with petitioner Go/PIATCO, which agreement was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the government, are constitutive of the elements of the offense charged as defined under Section 3(g) of RA 3019.

The Sandiganbayan explained that petitioner Go’s contentions that he is not a public officer, he did not conspire with Rivera in the
execution of the ARCA and, in any case, the said agreement cannot be said to be manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government, could not be properly considered for the purpose of quashing the Information on the ground relied upon by him.
According to the Sandiganbayan, these matters raised by petitioner Go have to be proved during trial.

The decretal portion of the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the "Motion for Determination (Re-Determination) of Probable Cause and Motion to Dismiss"
and the "Motion to Quash," filed by accused Vicente C. Rivera, Jr. and Henry T. Go, respectively, are hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.6

Petitioner Go filed a motion for reconsideration thereof but it was denied by the Sandiganbayan in the Resolution dated March 24,
2006.

Petitioner Go now seeks recourse to the Court and, in support of his petitioner, alleges that:

A.

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not ruling that
Section 3(g) does not embrace a private person within its proviso.

B.
Page 33 of 77
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not ruling that
there is no probable cause to hold petitioner for trial.7

Petitioner Go contends that Section 3(g) of RA 3019, by its text, cannot be extended or even enlarged by implication or intendment to
bring within its limited scope private persons. The said provision of law allegedly punishes only public officers as it penalizes the act
of "entering, on behalf of the government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same,
whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby." As a private person, he could not allegedly enter into a contract "on
behalf of the government," there being no showing of any agency relations or special authority for him to act for and on behalf of the
government.

Citing several cases,8 petitioner Go enumerates the following elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019:

(1) that the accused is a public officer;

(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and

(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

He also cites Marcos v. Sandiganbayan9 where the Court acquitted then First Lady Imelda R. Marcos of the charge of violation of
Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as it found that she did not sign the subject Lease Agreement, entered into between the Light Railway Transit
Authority (LRTA) and Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), as a public officer, but in her capacity as Chairman of the
PGHFI, a private entity. As such, the Court held that the first element of the offense charged, i.e., that the accused is a public officer,
was wanting.

Petitioner Go claims that, in the same manner, the first element of the offense charged against him is absent because he is not a public
officer who is authorized by law to bind the government through the act of "entering into a contract." He also points out that, similar
to his case, in Marcos, the Information also alleged that the former First Lady conspired with a public officer, then Minister Jose P.
Dans of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, in entering into a contract. Nonetheless, the Court therein dismissed the
allegation of conspiracy.

Petitioner Go maintains that by any of its definition,10 he cannot be considered a "public officer." Further, only a public officer can
enter into a

contract in representation of the government. He stresses that the first element of the offense, i.e., that the accused is a public officer,
is an essential ingredient of the crime under Section 3(g) of RA 3019. He likens it to the crime of parricide where the essential
element is the relationship of the offender to the victim and, citing a criminal law book author, a stranger who cooperates in the
execution of the offense is not allegedly guilty of this crime. The stranger is allegedly either liable for homicide or murder but never
by "conspiracy to commit parricide."11

By parity of reasoning, according to petitioner Go, the first essential element of the crime penalized under Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is
that the offender must be a public officer. Since he is not a public officer, one of the essential elements of the offense is lacking; hence,
there is no other recourse but to quash the Information.

Section 9 of RA 3019 was also cited which reads:

SEC. 9. Penalties for violation. –

(a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this
Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than six years and one month or fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from
public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly
out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income.

xxx

Petitioner Go posits that had it been the intention of the lawmakers to penalize private persons who supposedly "conspired" with
public officers in violation of Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of RA 3019, it could have easily used the conjunctive "and," not "or," between the
terms "public officer" and "private person" in Section 9 thereof.

Page 34 of 77
Petitioner Go takes exception to the Sandiganbayan’s pronouncement that even as a private individual he is not excluded from the
coverage of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 because he is not being accused singly but as someone who conspired with a public officer in
violating the said law. According to petitioner Go, this proposition applies only to Section 3(e)12 of RA 3019, the elements of which
include that "the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them."13 He stresses that, unlike Section
3(e) of RA 3019, Section 3(g) thereof penalizes only public officers as the operative phrase in the latter provision is "on behalf of the
government."

Petitioner Go vigorously asserts that there is no basis for the finding of probable cause against him for violation of Section 3(g) of RA
3019. In particular, he insists that the allegation of conspiracy between Rivera and himself is not supported by any evidence. He
makes an issue out of those documents that were mentioned in the resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman finding probable cause
against him but were not in the records of the Sandiganbayan. His mere signing of the ARCA does not allegedly establish culpability
for violation of RA 3019. Further, he faults the Sandiganbayan for invoking the doctrine of non-interference by the courts in the
determination by the Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause. It is petitioner Go’s view that the Sandiganbayan should have
ordered the quashal of the Information for palpable want of probable cause coupled with the absence of material documents.

The petition is bereft of merit.

For clarity, Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is quoted below anew:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same,
whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

As earlier mentioned, the elements of this offense are as follows:

(1) that the accused is a public officer;

(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and

(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. 14

Contrary to the contention of petitioner Go, however, the fact that he is not a public officer does not necessarily take him out of the
ambit of Section 3(g) of RA 3019. Petitioner Go’s simplistic syllogism, i.e., he is not a public officer ergo he cannot be charged with
violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, goes against the letter and spirit of the avowed policy of RA 3019 as embodied in Section 1
thereof:

SEC. 1. Statement of policy. - It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the principle that a public office is a public
trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead
thereto.

As early as in 1970, through the erudite Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Luciano v. Estrella,15 the Court had ascertained the scope of Section
3(g) of RA 3019 as applying to both public officers and private persons:

x x x [T]he act treated thereunder [referring to Section 3(g) of RA 3019] partakes the nature of malum prohibitum; it is the
commission of that act as defined by law, not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been
violated. And this construction would be in consonance with the announced purpose for which Republic Act 3019 was enacted, which
is the repression of certain acts of public officers and private persons constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead
thereto.16

Like in the present case, the Information in the said case charged both public officers and private persons with violation of Section
3(g) of RA 3019.

Section 9 of RA 3019 buttresses the conclusion that the anti-graft law’s application extends to both public officers and private
persons. The said provision, quoted earlier, provides in part that:

Page 35 of 77
SEC. 9. (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6
of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years, perpetual
disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and
unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income.

xxx

The fact that one of the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is "that the accused is a public officer" does not necessarily preclude its
application to private persons who, like petitioner Go, are being charged with conspiring with public officers in the commission of the
offense thereunder.

The case of Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan17 is instructive. In the said case, Gregorio Singian, Jr., a private person who was then
Executive Vice-President of Integrated Shoe, Inc. (ISI), together with some officers of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), was
charged with violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019 in connection with the loan accommodations that the said bank extended to
ISI which were characterized as behest loans.

A total of eighteen Informations were filed against Singian and his co-accused by the Office of the Ombudsman before the
Sandiganbayan corresponding to the nine loan accommodations granted to ISI. Each loan was subject of two Informations alleging
violations of both Section 3(e) and (g), respectively. In other words, nine Informations charged Singian and his co-accused with
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and the other nine charged them with violation of paragraph (g) of the same provision.

Singian filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for re-determination of existence of probable cause but the same was dismissed. He
then filed with the Court a petition for certiorari but it was likewise dismissed as the Court held that the Ombudsman and the
Sandiganbayan had not committed grave abuse of discretion when they respectively found probable cause against Singian for
violations of both paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of RA 3019.

Singian thus illustrates that private persons, like petitioner Go, when conspiring with public officers, may be indicted and, if found
guilty, held liable for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019. Another case, Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, 18may likewise be applied to this
case by analogy.

In the said case, Diosdado Garcia, proprietor of D.T. Garcia Construction Supply, together with Jaime Domingo, then municipal mayor
of San Manuel, Isabela, was charged with Section 3(h) of RA 3019 as it appeared that he was used by Domingo as a dummy to cover
up his business transaction with the municipality. Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law reads:

SEC.3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – x x x

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having an interest.

The elements of this offense are: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest
in any business, contract, or transaction; (3) he either: (a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such
interest, or (b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.19

Despite the first element mentioned above, the Court affirmed the conviction of Garcia, a private individual, as well as that of
Domingo, who was then a municipal mayor, for violation of Section 3(h) of RA 3019. In so holding, the Court established that
Domingo and Garcia acted in conspiracy with one another in the commission of the offense. Domingo thus also serves to debunk
petitioner Go’s theory that where an offense has as one of its elements that the accused is a public officer, it necessarily excludes
private persons from the scope of such offense.

The precept that could be drawn from Luciano, Singian and Domingo, and which is applicable to the present case, is that private
persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses
under Section 3 of RA 3019, including (g) and (h) thereof. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to
repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.

Reliance by petitioner Go on Marcos v. Sandiganbayan20 is not quite appropriate. To recall, upon her motion for reconsideration, the
Court therein acquitted former First Lady Imelda Marcos of the charge of violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 in its Resolution dated
October 6, 1998. Her acquittal was based on the finding that she signed the subject lease agreement as a private person, not as a
public officer. As such, the first element, i.e., that the accused is a public officer was wanting.

Page 36 of 77
Petitioner Go, however, failed to put the Court’s ruling in Marcos in its proper factual backdrop. The acquittal of the former First Lady
should be taken in the context of the Court’s Decision dated January 29, 1998, in Dans, Jr. v. People,21 which the former First Lady
sought to reconsider and, finding merit in her motion, gave rise to the Court’s Resolution in Marcos. In Dans, the Information filed
against the former First Lady and Jose P. Dans, Jr., then Minister of Transportation and Communications, for violation of Section 3(g)
of RA 3019, alleged that they were both public officers and, conspiring with each other, entered into the subject lease agreement
covering the LRTA property with the PGHFI, a private entity, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the government.

The Court in its original decision affirmed the former First Lady’s conviction for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 but acquitted her
co-accused, Dans, Jr., of the said offense. As stated earlier, upon the former First Lady’s motion for reconsideration, the Court
reversed her conviction in its Resolution in Marcos.

It can be gleaned from the entire context of Marcos and Dans that the reversal of the former First Lady’s conviction was based on the
fact that it was later held that she signed the subject lease agreement as a private person, not a public officer. However, this acquittal
should also be taken in conjunction with the fact that the public officer with whom she had supposedly conspired, her co-accused
Dans, had earlier been acquitted. In other words, the element that the accused is a public officer, was totally wanting in the former
First Lady’s case because Dans, the public officer with whom she had allegedly conspired in committing Section 3(g) of RA 3019, had
already been acquitted. Obviously, the former First Lady could not be convicted, on her own as a private person, of the said offense.

In contrast, petitioner Go cannot rightfully assert the total absence of the first element in his case because he is not being charged
alone but in conspiracy with Rivera, undoubtedly a public officer by virtue of his then being the DOTC Secretary. The case against
both of them is still pending before the Sandiganbayan. The facts attendant in petitioner Go’s case are, therefore, not exactly on all
fours as those of the former First Lady’s case as to warrant the application of the Marcos ruling in his case.

Anent the allegation of conspiracy, it is posited by the dissenting opinion that the Information is infirm as far as petitioner Go is
concerned because it failed to mention with specificity his participation in the planning and preparation of the alleged conspiracy. It
opines that "aside from the sweeping allegation of conspiracy, the Information failed to mention any act as to how petitioner had
taken part in the planning and preparation of the alleged conspiracy. Mere allegation of conspiracy in the Information does not
necessarily mean that the criminal acts recited therein also pertain to petitioner." While it concedes that the Sandiganbayan may
exercise jurisdiction over private individuals, it submits that it may do so only "upon Information alleging with specificity the precise
violations of the private individual." By way of conclusion, the dissenting opinion cites Sistoza v. Desierto 22 where the Court stated
that a signature appearing on a document is not enough to sustain a finding of conspiracy among officials and employees charged
with defrauding the government.

These asseverations, however, are unpersuasive. It is well established that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is
evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.23 In the same manner,
the absence (or presence) of any conspiracy among the accused is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense, the truth of which
can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.24

Following these truisms, the specific acts of petitioner Go in the alleged conspiracy with Rivera in violating Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as
well as the details on how petitioner Go had taken part in the planning and preparation of the alleged conspiracy need not be set
forth in the Information as these are evidentiary matters and, as such, are to be shown and proved during the trial on the merits.
Indeed, it bears stressing that "[t]o establish conspiracy, direct proof of an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and the
decision to commit it is not necessary. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after the commission of the
crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is
frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances. Once established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals
regardless of the degree of participation of each of them, for in contemplation of the law the act of one is the act of all." 25

In this connection, for purposes of the Information, it is sufficient that the requirements of Section 8, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
are complied with:

SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver
the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of
the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

An accused, like petitioner Go, may file a motion to quash the Information under Section 3(a) of Rule 117 on the grounds that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense. In such a case, the fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material
averments of an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the Information are not to be considered.26

Page 37 of 77
As correctly outlined by the Office of the Ombudsman, the facts alleged in the Information, if admitted hypothetically, establish all the
elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 vis-à-vis petitioner Go:

ELEMENTS ALLEGATIONS

1a\^/phi1.net
1. The offender is a public officer [T]he accused
VICENTE C. RIVERA,
JR., Secretary of
Department of
Transportation and
Communications
(DOTC), committing
the offense in
relation to his office
and taking
advantage of the
same, in conspiracy
with accused
HENRY T. GO,
Chairman and
President of
Philippine
International Air
Terminals, Co., xxx"

2. He entered into a contract or transaction in behalf of the government "[T]he accused

VICENTE C. RIVERA,
JR., xxx in
conspiracy with
accused HENRY T.
GO xxx did then and
there, willfully &
unlawfully and
feloniously entered
into an Amended
and Restated
Concession
Agreement (ARCA),
after the project for
the construction of
the Ninoy Aquino
International
Airport
International
Passenger Terminal
III (NAIA IPT III)
was awarded to
Paircargo
Consortium/PIATCO
xxx

3. The contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the "xxx which ARCA
government substantially
amended the draft
Concession
Agreement covering
the construction of
the NAIA IPT III
under Republic Act
6957, as amended
by Republic Act

Page 38 of 77
 7718 (BOT Law)
providing that the
government shall
assume the
liabilities of PIATCO
in the event of the
latter’s default
specifically Article
IV, Section 4.04 (c)
in relation to Article
I, Section 1.06 of the
ARCA which terms
are more beneficial
to PIATCO and in
violation of the BOT
Law and manifestly
grossly
disadvantageous to
the government of
the Republic of the
Philippines."27

Finally, in the assailed Resolution dated March 24, 2006, the Sandiganbayan ratiocinated thus:

The rule is that the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the public
prosecutor, the Office of the Ombudsman in this case. Such official is vested with authority to determine whether or not a criminal
case must be filed in court and the concomitant function of determining as well the persons to be prosecuted. Also, it must not be lost
sight of that the correctness of the exercise of such function is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to
pass upon, consistent with the policy of non-interference by the courts in the determination by the Ombudsman of the existence of
probable cause.

Accordingly, upon the foregoing premises, we believe and so hold that any and all questions relating to the finding of probable cause
by the Office of the Ombudsman should be addressed to the said office itself, then to the Court of Appeals and, ultimately, to the
Supreme Court.

On the matter of the judicial determination of probable cause, we stand by our finding that the same exists in this case, the said
finding we arrived at upon a personal determination thereof which we did for the purpose of and before the issuance of the warrant
of arrest.1awphi1.nét While it may indeed be true that the documents mentioned by accused-movant as being absent in the records
are missing, we nevertheless had for our perusal other documents assiduously listed down by accused Rivera in his motion, including
the information, which we found to constitute sufficient basis for our determination of the existence of probable cause. It must be
emphasized that such determination is separate and distinct from that made by the Office of the Ombudsman and which we did
independently therefrom.28

The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function of the government prosecutor, which in this
case is the Ombudsman. As a rule, courts do not interfere in the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion in determining probable cause,
unless there are compelling reasons.29 Mindful of this salutary rule, the Sandiganbayan nonetheless made its own determination on
the basis of the records that were before it. It concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the records for the finding of the
existence of probable cause against petitioner Go.

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must have
been so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.30 Clearly, in the light of the foregoing disquisition, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed on the
Sandiganbayan when it held that there exists probable cause against petitioner Go.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions dated December 6, 2005 and March 24, 2006 of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28092 are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Page 39 of 77
G.R. No. 180363 April 28, 2009

EDGAR Y. TEVES, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G. TEVES, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The issue for resolution is whether the crime of which petitioner Edgar Y. Teves was convicted in Teves v. Sandiganbayan 1 involved
moral turpitude.

The facts of the case are undisputed.

Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007
elections. On March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify2petitioner on the ground that in Teves v.
Sandiganbayan,3 he was convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code
(LGC) of 1991, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00. Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for
public office because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public office.4 The case was docketed as SPA No. 07-242 and assigned to the COMELEC’s First Division.

On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of member of House of
Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy.5

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc which was denied in its assailed October 9, 2007
Resolution for being moot, thus:

It appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14 May 2007 congressional elections for the position of member of the House of
Representatives of the Third district of Negros Oriental thereby rendering the instant Motion for Reconsideration moot and
academic.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration dated 28 May 2007 filed by respondent Edgar Y. Teves
challenging the Resolution of this Commission (First Division) promulgated on 11 May 2007 is hereby DENIED for having been
rendered moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.6

Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:

I.

THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN THE COMELEC EN BANC
DEMURRED IN RESOLVING THE MAIN ISSUE RAISED IN PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, WHETHER PETITIONER
IS DISQUALIFIED TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO.
154182.

II.

THE MAIN ISSUE IS NOT RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC AS THE RESOLUTION THEREOF WILL DETERMINE PETITIONER’S
QUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR OTHER PUBLIC POSITIONS IN FUTURE ELECTIONS.

III.

THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN THE COMELEC EN BANC IN
EFFECT AFFIRMED THE FINDINGS OF THE FIRST DIVISION WHICH RULED THAT PETITIONER’S CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION OF
SECTION 3(H) OF R.A. 3019 AND THE IMPOSITION OF FINE IS A CONVICTION FOR A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.

Page 40 of 77
 A.

THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE SHOULD BE RESOLVED
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE FINDINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 154182.

B.

THERE IS NOTHING IN THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT THAT SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE
COMELEC, THAT BASED ON THE "TOTALITY OF FACTS" DOCTRINE, PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL
TURPITUDE.7

The petition is impressed with merit.

The fact that petitioner lost in the congressional race in the May 14, 2007 elections did not effectively moot the issue of whether he
was disqualified from running for public office on the ground that the crime he was convicted of involved moral turpitude. It is still a
justiciable issue which the COMELEC should have resolved instead of merely declaring that the disqualification case has become
moot in view of petitioner’s defeat.

Further, there is no basis in the COMELEC’s findings that petitioner is eligible to run again in the 2010 elections because his
disqualification shall be deemed removed after the expiration of a period of five years from service of the sentence. Assuming that the
elections would be held on May 14, 2010, the records show that it was only on May 24, 2005 when petitioner paid the fine of
P10,000.00 he was sentenced to pay in Teves v. Sandignbayan.8 Such being the reckoning point, thus, the five-year disqualification
period will end only on May 25, 2010. Therefore he would still be ineligible to run for public office during the May 14, 2010 elections.

Hence, it behooves the Court to resolve the issue of whether or not petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral
turpitude.1avvphi1

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced
by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.lawphil.net

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that
said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless
within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)

Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness,
vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general. 9

Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any
interest.

The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect
financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity
in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law. 10

Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his

Page 41 of 77
official capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is
when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the Constitution or by law. 11

In Teves v. Sandiganbayan,12 petitioner was convicted under the second mode for having pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit
which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991. The Court held therein:

However, the evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental,
owned the cockpit in question. In his sworn application for registration of cockpit filed on 26 September 1983 with the Philippine
Gamefowl Commission, Cubao, Quezon City, as well as in his renewal application dated 6 January 1989 he stated that he is the owner
and manager of the said cockpit. Absent any evidence that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his ownership
thereof is rightly to be presumed because a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature. His
affidavit dated 27 September 1990 declaring that effective January 1990 he "turned over the management of the cockpit to Mrs.
Teresita Z. Teves for the reason that [he] could no longer devote a full time as manager of the said entity due to other work pressure"
is not sufficient proof that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit. Only the management of the cockpit was transferred
to Teresita Teves effective January 1990. Being the owner of the cockpit, his interest over it was direct.

Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he would have a direct interest
thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as
such their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. And Section 143 of the Civil Code declares all the property of the
conjugal partnership of gains to be owned in common by the husband and wife. Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct
and is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which reads:

Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee,
directly or indirectly, to:

xxxx

(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit…. [Emphasis supplied].

The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a
prohibited interest.13

However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same involved moral turpitude. A determination
of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such
acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.

Thus, in Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections,14 the Court clarified that:

Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for
the Supreme Court to determine." In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes
mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, the rationale of which was set forth in "Zari v. Flores," to wit:

"It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not be
merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes
the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies
in their being positively prohibited."

This guideline nonetheless proved short of providing a clear-cut solution, for in "International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, the
Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as
malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are
crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral
turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.
(Emphasis supplied)1awphi1

Applying the foregoing guidelines, we examined all the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s conviction and found that the same
does not involve moral turpitude.

Page 42 of 77
First, there is neither merit nor factual basis in COMELEC’s finding that petitioner used his official capacity in connection with his
interest in the cockpit and that he hid the same by transferring the management to his wife, in violation of the trust reposed on him
by the people.

The COMELEC, in justifying its conclusion that petitioner’s conviction involved moral turpitude, misunderstood or misapplied our
ruling in Teves v. Sandiganbayan. According to the COMELEC:

In the present case, while the crime for which [petitioner] was convicted may per se not involve moral turpitude, still the totality of
facts evinces [his] moral turpitude. The prohibition was intended to avoid any conflict of interest or any instance wherein the public
official would favor his own interest at the expense of the public interest. The [petitioner] knew of the prohibition but he attempted
to circumvent the same by holding out that the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is to be owned by a certain Daniel Teves.
Later on, he would aver that he already divested himself of any interest of the cockpit in favor of his wife. But the Supreme Court saw
through the ruse and declared that what he divested was only the management of the cockpit but not the ownership. And even if the
ownership is transferred to his wife, the respondent would nevertheless have an interest thereon because it would still belong to the
conjugal partnership of gains, of which the [petitioner] is the other half.

[Petitioner] therefore maintained ownership of the cockpit by deceit. He has the duty to divest himself but he did not and instead
employed means to hide his interests. He knew that it was prohibited he nevertheless concealed his interest thereon. The facts that
he hid his interest denotes his malicious intent to favor self-interest at the expense of the public. Only a man with a malevolent,
decadent, corrupt and selfish motive would cling on and conceal his interest, the acquisition of which is prohibited. This plainly
shows his moral depravity and proclivity to put primacy on his self interest over that of his fellowmen. Being a public official, his act
is also a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the people. Clearly, the totality of his acts is contrary to the accepted rules of right
and duty, honesty and good morals. The crime, as committed by the [petitioner], plainly involves moral turpitude. 15

On the contrary, the Court’s ruling states:

The Sandiganbayan found that the charge against Mayor Teves for causing the issuance of the business permit or license to operate
the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is "not well-founded." This it based, and rightly so, on the additional finding that only the
Sangguniang Bayan could have issued a permit to operate the Valencia Cockpit in the year 1992. Indeed, under Section 447(3) of the
LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992, it is the Sangguniang Bayan that has the authority to issue a license for the
establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits. Unlike in the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, wherein the municipal mayor
was the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, under the LGC of 1991, the mayor is not so anymore and is not even a member of
the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, Mayor Teves could not have intervened or taken part in his official capacity in the issuance of a
cockpit license during the material time, as alleged in the information, because he was not a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.16

Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to gain such pecuniary or financial interest
in the cockpit. Neither did he intentionally hide his interest in the subject cockpit by transferring the management thereof to his wife
considering that the said transfer occurred before the effectivity of the present LGC prohibiting possession of such interest.

As aptly observed in Teves v. Sandiganbayan:

As early as 1983, Edgar Teves was already the owner of the Valencia Cockpit. Since then until 31 December 1991, possession by a
local official of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not yet prohibited. It was before the effectivity of the LGC of 1991, or on January
1990, that he transferred the management of the cockpit to his wife Teresita. In accordance therewith it was Teresita who thereafter
applied for the renewal of the cockpit registration. Thus, in her sworn applications for renewal of the registration of the cockpit in
question dated 28 January 1990 and 18 February 1991, she stated that she is the Owner/Licensee and Operator/Manager of the said
cockpit. In her renewal application dated 6 January 1992, she referred to herself as the Owner/Licensee of the cockpit. Likewise in
the separate Lists of Duly Licensed Personnel for Calendar Years 1991 and 1992, which she submitted on 22 February 1991 and 17
February 1992, respectively, in compliance with the requirement of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission for the renewal of the
cockpit registration, she signed her name as Operator/Licensee.17 (Emphasis supplied)

Second, while possession of business and pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local government unit is expressly
prohibited by the present LGC, however, its illegality does not mean that violation thereof necessarily involves moral turpitude or
makes such possession of interest inherently immoral. Under the old LGC, mere possession by a public officer of pecuniary interest in
a cockpit was not among the prohibitions. Thus, in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that:

x x x under the old LGC, mere possession of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among the prohibitions enumerated in Section 41
thereof. Such possession became unlawful or prohibited only upon the advent of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January
1992. Petitioner Edgar Teves stands charged with an offense in connection with his prohibited interest committed on or about 4
February 1992, shortly after the maiden appearance of the prohibition. Presumably, he was not yet very much aware of the

Page 43 of 77
prohibition. Although ignorance thereof would not excuse him from criminal liability, such would justify the imposition of the lighter
penalty of a fine of P10,000 under Section 514 of the LGC of 1991.18 (Italics supplied)

The downgrading of the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine years and twenty-one days as minimum to twelve years as
maximum to a lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000.00 is a recognition that petitioner’s violation was not intentionally done contrary to
justice, modesty, or good morals but due to his lack of awareness or ignorance of the prohibition.

Lastly, it may be argued that having an interest in a cockpit is detrimental to public morality as it tends to bring forth idlers and
gamblers, hence, violation of Section 89(2) of the LGC involves moral turpitude.

Suffice it to state that cockfighting, or sabong in the local parlance, has a long and storied tradition in our culture and was prevalent
even during the Spanish occupation.19 While it is a form of gambling, the morality thereof or the wisdom in legalizing it is not a
justiciable issue. In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., it was held that:

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the
interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even
mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may
prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever
reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In
making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well
has it been said that courts do no sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments.
It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be
resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That
function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents
who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated May 11, 2007 and October 9,
2007 disqualifying petitioner Edgar Y. Teves from running for the position of Representative of the 3rd District of Negros Oriental,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring that the crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of
R.A. 3019) did not involve moral turpitude.

SO ORDERED.

LEONILO SANCHEZ alias NILO, G.R. No. 179090

Appellant,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,*
CORONA,**
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, Promulgated:

Appellees.
____________________

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

Page 44 of 77
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the

Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[2] dated February 20, 2007 which affirmed the Decision [3] dated July 30, 2003 of the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City, Bohol, convicting appellant Leonilo Sanchez alias Nilo (appellant) of the crime of Other Acts of Child

Abuse punishable under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610[4] in relation to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, [5] with a modification of the

penalty imposed.

The Facts

Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse in an Information [6] dated August 29, 2001 which reads:

The undersigned, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, hereby accuses Leonilo Sanchez alias Nilo of Lajog,
Clarin, Bohol of the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse, committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of September, 2000 in the municipality of Clarin, province of Bohol, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, acting as a Family Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
abuse, exploit and/or to inflict other conditions prejudicial to the child's development, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously abuse physically one [VVV],[7] a sixteen (16) year old minor, by hitting her thrice in the
upper part of her legs, and which acts are prejudicial to the child-victim's development which acts are not covered
by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, but the same are covered by Art. 59, par. 8 of P.D. No. 603 as amended; to
the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved during the trial.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 10(a) in relation to Sections 3(a) and 3(b) No. 1 of Rep. Act No.
7610 and Sec. 59(8) of PD 603, amended.

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions emerged.

Version of the Prosecution

Page 45 of 77
Private complainant VVV was born on March 24, 1984 in Mentalongon, Dalaguete, Cebu to FFF and MMM.[8]

On September 24, 1997, VVV's father, FFF, started leasing a portion of the fishpond owned by Escolastico Ronquillo (Escolastico),

located at Lajog, Clarin, Bohol. FFF and his family occupied the house beside the fishpond which was left by the former tenant. [9]

On September 2, 2000 at around 7:00 in the morning, while VVV was cutting grass in their yard, appellant arrived looking for FFF

who was then at another fishpond owned by Nilda Parilla located in Boacao, Clarin, Bohol. VVV knew appellant because he is the

husband of Bienvenida Ronquillo (Bienvenida), one of the heirs of Escolastico.[10] She noticed that appellant had a sanggot (sickle)

tucked in his waist.

Appellant then went to VVVs house and inquired from VVVs younger brother, BBB, the whereabouts of the latters father. BBB did not

answer but his mother, MMM, told appellant that FFF was not around. Right then and there, appellant told them to leave the place

and started destroying the house with the use of his sickle. As a result, appellant destroyed the roof, the wall and the windows of the

house.[11] MMM got angry and told appellant that he could not just drive them away since the contract for the use of the fishpond was

not yet terminated. VVV was then sent by MMM to fetch a barangay tanod. She did as ordered but barangay tanod Nicolas Patayon

refused to oblige because he did not want to interfere in the problem concerning the fishpond. On her way back to their house, VVV

saw appellant coming from his shop with a gallon of gasoline, headed to their house. Appellant warned VVV to better pack up her

familys things because he would burn their house.[12]

Page 46 of 77
Upon reaching their house, VVV saw her brother, BBB, get a piece of wood from the back of their house to defend themselves and

their house from appellant. However, appellant approached BBB, grabbed the piece of wood from the latter and started beating him

with it.[13] At the sight, VVV approached appellant and pushed him. Irked by what she did, appellant turned to her and struck her with

the piece of wood three (3) times, twice on the left thigh and once below her right buttocks. As a result, the wood broke into several

pieces. VVV picked up some of the broken pieces and threw them back at appellant. MMM restrained BBB, telling him not to fight

back. After which, appellant left, bringing with him the gallon of gasoline.[14]

FFF arrived at about 10:00 in the morning of that day. When he learned about what had happened, FFF brought his daughter to

the ClarinHealth Center for medical attention and treatment.[15] Dr. Vicente Manalo (Dr. Manalo) attended to VVV and issued her a

medical certificate[16] dated September 2, 2000, stating that VVV sustained the following:

CONTUSION WITH HEMATOMA PROXIMAL

LATERAL PORTION OF THIGH, RIGHT
TIME TO HEAL: 3-4 DAYS, BARRING COMPLICATIONS

From the health center, FFF and VVV went to the Clarin Police Station where they had the incident blottered. [17] Thereafter, FFF

requested Eliezer Inferido to take pictures of the injuries sustained by VVV.[18]

Version of the Defense

Appellant and his wife, Bienvenida, developed and operated the fishpond from 1982 to 1987. Sometime in 1997, FFF occupied the

fishpond and the nipa hut beside the same, by virtue of a Memorandum of Agreement[19] (MOA) entered into by FFF with the Heirs of

Page 47 of 77
Escolastico, as represented by Segundino Ronquillo. After the MOA expired in 1998, appellant and his wife, Bienvenida, decided to

discontinue the lease because they did not understand the management and accounting of FFF. They made several demands on him

to return possession of the fishpond but FFF refused, asking for a written termination of the contract from all the heirs of

Escolastico. To solve the problem, appellant and Bienvenida engaged the services of FFF as caretaker of the fishpond, providing him

with fingerlings, fertilizers and all necessary expenses.

This notwithstanding, FFF still failed to make an accounting. Thus, on September 2, 2000, at around 7:00 in the morning, after

pasturing his cattle, appellant dropped by the house of FFF to ask him to make a detailed accounting because he and his wife were

not satisfied with the harvest in August of 2000. MMM, however, retorted, saying that they would no longer make any accounting, as

Benny Ronquillo, brother of appellants wife, would finance the next cropping. Displeased with MMM's statement, appellant got angry

and demanded that they leave the fishpond. FFF's family resented this demand and a commotion ensued. BBB got a piece of wood

and struck appellant but the latter was able to parry the blow. Appellant got hold of the piece of wood which actually broke.

Intending not to hurt anybody, appellant threw the same behind him. Suddenly from behind, VVV appeared, got hold of the said piece

of wood and hit appellant once at the back of his shoulder. Appellant testified that the blow was not strong enough to injure him.[20]

Appellant claimed that he was surprised that a criminal case was filed by VVV against him for allegedly beating her. Appellant denied

that he beat VVV, saying that the instant case was fabricated and was being used as a means to extort money from him. [21] Moreover,

appellant asseverated that Ronald Lauren[22] (Ronald) witnessed the incident.

Page 48 of 77
Ronald testified that he saw BBB strike appellant with a piece of wood but appellant was able to parry the blow; that appellant threw

away the piece of wood; that when appellant threw the piece of wood, there was no one there at the time; and that appellant left the

place immediately.[23]

The RTC's Ruling

On July 30, 2003, the RTC found that at the arraignment, appellant, through former counsel Atty. Theodore Cabahug (Atty. Cabahug),

admitted that he hit VVV, although unintentionally. Thus, appellant had the burden of proving that, at the time VVV was hit, appellant

was performing a lawful act. The RTC ruled that the evidence did not favor appellant because his demand for FFF's family to vacate

the fishpond, coupled with threats and punctuated with actual use of force, exceeded the limits allowed by law. The RTC also held

that the injuries sustained by VVV were distinguishable, indicating that the blow was forceful, and that the force used was

strong. Thus, the RTC disposed in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds LEONILO SANCHEZ y Aranas guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating paragraph (a), Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7610, and applying in his favor the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, this Court imposes on him the indeterminate sentence of an imprisonment of Six (6) years
of prision [correccional] as minimum to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor as maximum, with
costs against him. The Court orders him to pay [VVV] the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for civil
indemnity and the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for damages; the awards for civil indemnity and
damages are without subsidiary penalties in case of insolvency.

IN ACCORDANCE with letter (f) of Section 31 of Republic Act No. 7610, the Court exercising its discretion also
imposes on Leonilo Sanchez yAranas the penalty of a fine of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) without subsidiary
penalty in case of insolvency.

SO ORDERED.[24]

Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration[25] contending that appellant never admitted that he hit VVV. The RTC, however, denied

the motion in its Order[26] dated August 8, 2003 for being pro forma. Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the CA.[27]

Page 49 of 77
 The CA's Ruling

On February 20, 2007, the CA held that the record of the proceedings taken during appellant's arraignment before the RTC belied

appellant's contention that his defense was one of absolute denial. The CA pointed to a manifestation of appellant's counsel, Atty.

Cabahug, in open court that appellant was putting up an affirmative defense because the act of hitting VVV was unintentional.

Furthermore, the defense of absolute denial interposed by appellant cannot prevail over the positive and categorical statements of

VVV and her witnesses, giving full credence to the factual findings of the RTC. The CA also ruled that the Information filed against

appellant was not defective inasmuch as the allegations therein were explicit. In sum, the CA held that the prosecution had fully

established the elements of the offense charged, i.e., Other Acts of Child Abuse under R.A. No. 7610 and P.D. No. 603. However, the CA

opined that the RTC erred in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law because R.A. No. 7610 is a special law. Lastly, the CA deleted

the award of civil indemnity and damages for utter lack of basis. The fallo of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed Judgment dated July 30, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court
of Bohol, Branch 1, TagbilaranCity in Criminal Case No. 11110 finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Other Acts of Child Abuse under Republic Act No. 7610 and Presidential Decree No. 603 is
hereby UPHELD with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day as minimum to eight (8) years as maximum of prision mayor.
The fine imposed is retained.

The Order dated August 8, 2003 denying appellant's motion for reconsideration is hereby AFFIRMED.

The award of civil indemnity and damages in the assailed Decision is deleted.

With costs.

SO ORDERED.[28]

Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration[29] which the CA denied in its Resolution[30] dated July 11, 2007.

Page 50 of 77
Hence, this Petition claiming that the CA erred:

1. IN SUSTAINING THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE STATE TO PROVE
HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT[;]

2. IN SUSTAINING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT IT HAD JURISDICTION [OVER] THE CASE
DESPITE A DEFECTIVE INFORMATION WHICH ALLEGED THAT THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF IS (sic) NOT
COVERED BY THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED[; AND]

3. IN SUSTAINING THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED (VIOLATION OF SECTION
10(a) OF R.A. NO. 7610) NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE ACT COMPLAINED OF IS OBVIOUSLY COVERED
BY THE REVISED PENAL CODE (Act No. 3815) AS SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURY.[31]

Appellant posits that his conviction is not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt; that the RTC erred when it shifted the

burden of proof to appellant; that the RTC and CA erred in ruling that appellant interposed an affirmative defense when, all

throughout his testimony before the RTC, he denied having inflicted any injury on VVV; and that appellant and his counsel did not

sign any written stipulation for appellant to be bound thereby, hence, the burden of proof still rests in the prosecution. Moreover,

appellant claims that VVV and her family had ill motive to implicate him because of the pressure he exerted against them to give up

the fishpond. Appellant pointed out that VVV, in her testimony, made material inconsistencies as to who got the piece of wood at the

back of their house. Appellant also claims that he had no motive or intention of harming anyone, otherwise, he would have done so

earlier that day; that if BBB was also beaten, he should have submitted himself for medical treatment and examination; and that the

Information charging appellant was substantially and jurisdictionally defective as the acts complained of were covered by the

provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant submits that, if duly proven, the acts complained of are clearly constitutive of Slight

Physical Injuries punishable under Article 266[32] of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellant, likewise, posits that the instant case is not one for child abuse, since VVV was neither punished in a cruel and unusual

manner nor deliberately subjected to excessive indignities or humiliation. The act was not cruel since the injury was merely slight

Page 51 of 77
per medical findings; the location of the injury was on the thigh which is not unusual; and VVV was not beaten in front of many

people as to humiliate her. Lastly, no evidence was submitted by the prosecution, such as a testimony of a child psychologist, or even

of VVV's teacher who could have observed changes in the victim's behavior, as to prove that the injury was prejudicial to the victim's

development. Appellant alleges that the charge was obviously made as one for child abuse, instead of slight physical injuries, in order

to subject him to a much heavier penalty. Appellant prays for acquittal based on reasonable doubt and, in the alternative, if found

guilty, he should be convicted only of the crime of slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code. [33]

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asseverates that the instant Petition is fatally defective because it raises

purely factual issues contrary to the mandatory provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; that the Transcript of Stenographic Notes

(TSN) taken during appellant's arraignment on November 6, 2001 clearly shows that appellant, through Atty. Cabahug, raised an

affirmative defense, hence, appellant cannot now change his theory; that the prosecution established the fact that appellant

committed the acts complained of by virtue of the direct, positive and categorical testimonies of VVV, corroborated by MMM and duly

supported by the medical examination conducted by Dr. Manalo and the entry in the police blotter; that VVV's and MMM's statements

are consistent with their allegations in their respective complaint-affidavits; and that appellant failed to present any reason or

ground to set aside the decisions of the RTC and the CA. Furthermore, the OSG argues that there is no ambiguity in the Information as

the allegations are clear and explicit to constitute the essential elements of the offense of child abuse, to wit: (a) minority of the

victim; (b) acts complained of are prejudicial to the development of the child-victim; and (c) the said acts are covered by the

pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 7610 and P.D. No. 603. The OSG submits that appellant cannot now feign ignorance of the offense

under which he was specifically charged, and to which he voluntarily entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned.[34]

Page 52 of 77
However, the OSG opines that the CA erred in modifying the indeterminate sentence imposed by the RTC. The offense of Other Acts of

Child Abuse as defined and punished under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, a special law, carries the penalty of prision mayor in its

minimum period which is a penalty defined in the Revised Penal Code. The OSG states that the RTC correctly applied the first part of

Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentencing appellant to an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision

correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum, the minimum term thereof being

within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to the prescribed penalty, as there were no attendant mitigating and/or

aggravating circumstances. Thus, the OSG prays that the instant petition be denied and the assailed CA Decision be modified as

aforementioned but affirmed in all other respects.[35]

Our Ruling

The instant Petition is bereft of merit.

Under Subsection (b), Section 3 of R.A. No. 7610, child abuse refers to the maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or not, which

includes any of the following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth
and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.[36]

Page 53 of 77
In this case, the applicable laws are Article 59[37] of P.D. No. 603 and Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610

provides:

SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's
Development.

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

In this connection, our ruling in Araneta v. People[38] is instructive:

As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being
responsible for conditions prejudicial to the childs development. The Rules and Regulations of the questioned
statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three acts are
different from one another and from the act prejudicial to the childs development. Contrary to petitioners
assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No.
7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse,
child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the
development of the child is different from the former acts.

Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word or is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and
independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it
ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase be responsible
for other conditions prejudicial to the childs development supposes that there are four punishable acts
therein. First, the act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being
responsible for conditions prejudicial to the childs development. The fourth penalized act cannot be
interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three other acts, because an analysis of the
entire context of the questioned provision does not warrant such construal.[39]

Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be considered as child abuse but merely as slight physical injuries defined and

punishable under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant conveniently forgets that when the incident happened, VVV was a

child entitled to the protection extended by R.A. No. 7610, as mandated by the Constitution. [40] As defined in the law, child abuse

includes physical abuse of the child, whether the same is habitual or not. The act of appellant falls squarely within this definition. We,

therefore, cannot accept appellant's contention.

Page 54 of 77
In the same manner, we reject appellant's claim that the Information filed against him was defective. In Resty Jumaquio v. Hon. Joselito

C. Villarosa,[41] we held that what controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts

recited therein. Without doubt, the averments in the Information clearly make out the offense of child abuse under Section 10(a) of

R.A. No. 7610. The following were alleged: (1) the minority of VVV; (2) the acts constituting physical abuse, committed by appellant

against VVV; and (3) said acts are clearly punishable under R.A. No. 7610 in relation to P.D. No. 603. Indeed, as argued by the OSG, the

commission of the offense is clearly recited in the Information, and appellant cannot now feign ignorance of this.

Appellant could only proffer the defense of denial. Notably, the RTC found VVV and MMM to be credible witnesses, whose testimonies

deserve full credence. It bears stressing that full weight and respect are usually accorded by the appellate court to the findings of the

trial court on the credibility of witnesses, since the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the

witnesses.[42] Equally noteworthy is the fact that the CA did not disturb the RTC's appreciation of the witnesses credibility. Thus, we

apply the cardinal rule that factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its conclusions

anchored on such findings, are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect, especially when affirmed by the CA. The exception is when it

is established that the trial court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if

considered, will change the outcome of the case. We have reviewed the records of the RTC and the CA and we find no reason to

deviate from the findings of both courts and their uniform conclusion that appellant is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

offense of Other Acts of Child Abuse.[43]

However, the penalty imposed upon appellant by the CA deserves review. The imposable penalty under Section 10(a), Article VI of

Republic Act No. 7610 is prision mayor in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the RTC imposed upon

Page 55 of 77
appellant the penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as

maximum. The CA modified this by imposing upon appellant the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum,

to eight (8) years, as maximum, of prision mayor, postulating that since R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, the RTC should have imposed

on appellant an indeterminate sentence, "the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the

minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.[44] On the other hand, the OSG contends that the RTC

appropriately applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law, citing our ruling in People v. Simon.[45]

We agree with the OSG.

Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, provides:

SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code,
and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not
be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.

To repeat, the penalty for Other Acts of Child Abuse is prision mayor in its minimum period. This penalty is derived from, and defined

in, the Revised Penal Code. Although R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, the rules in the Revised Penal Code for graduating penalties by

degrees or determining the proper period should be applied. Thus, where the special law adopted penalties from the Revised Penal

Code, the Indeterminate Sentence Law will apply just as it would in felonies. [46] In People v. Simon,[47] the Court applied the first clause

of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law to cases of illegal drugs. In Cadua v. Court of Appeals,[48] the Court applied the same

principle to cases involving illegal possession of firearms. In those instances, the offenses were also penalized under special laws.

Page 56 of 77
Finally, in Dulla v. Court of Appeals,[49] a case involving sexual abuse of a child as penalized under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.

7610, the Court likewise applied the same first clause of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. This case should be no exception.

In the absence of any modifying circumstances, and because it is favorable to appellant, we find the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9)

months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision

mayor, as maximum, proper.

As a final word, we reiterate our view in Araneta,[50] to wit:

Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the implementation of a national comprehensive program for
the survival of the most vulnerable members of the population, the Filipino children, in keeping with the
Constitutional mandate under Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that The State shall defend the right of the
children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. This piece of legislation
supplies the inadequacies of existing laws treating crimes committed against children, namely, the Revised Penal
Code and Presidential Decree No. 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code. As a statute that provides for a
mechanism for strong deterrence against the commission of child abuse and exploitation, the law has stiffer
penalties for their commission, and a means by which child traffickers could easily be prosecuted and penalized.[51]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated February 20, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR No.

27817 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellant Leonilo Sanchez is hereby sentenced to four (4) years, nine (9) months and

eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994

Page 57 of 77
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA, respondent.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Ricardo M.Sampang for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:

Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on November 10, 1988 with a violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment alleging that on or about October
22, 1988, at Barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-
buyer in consideration of the sum of P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to laboratory examination, were found positive for
marijuana.1

Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on March 2, 1989, after his rearrest following his escape from Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga where he was temporarily detained,2 he pleaded not guilty. He voluntarily waived his right to a pre-trial
conference,3 after which trial on the merits ensued and was duly concluded.

The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant, later identified as a NARCOM operative, informed the police unit at
Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, of the illegal drug activities of a certain "Alyas Pusa" at Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga. Capt.
Francisco Bustamante, Commanding Officer of the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit in the camp, then formed a buy-bust team composed
of Sgt. Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz and
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members of the same unit. After securing marked money from Bustamante, the team, together with their
informant, proceeded to Sto. Cristo after they had coordinated with the police authorities and barangay officers thereof. When they
reached the place, the confidential informer pointed out appellant to Lopez who consequently approached appellant and asked him if
he had marijuana. Appellant answered in the affirmative and Lopez offered to buy two tea bags. Appellant then left and, upon
returning shortly thereafter, handed to Lopez two marijuana tea bags and Lopez gave him the marked money amounting to P40.00 as
payment. Lopez then scratched his head as a
pre-arranged signal to his companions who were stationed around ten to fifteen meters away, and the team closed in on them.
Thereupon, Villaruz, who was the head of the back-up team, arrested appellant. The latter was then brought by the team to the 3rd
Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Olivas on board a jeep and he was placed under custodial investigation, with Sgt. Pejoro as the
investigator.4

Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez' testimony, claiming that he saw the deal that transpired between Lopez and the appellant. He also
averred that he was the one who confiscated the marijuana and took the marked money from appellant. 5

Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that although he was part of the buy-bust team, he was stationed farthest from the rest of
the other members, that is, around two hundred meters away from his companions. He did not actually see the sale that transpired
between Lopez and appellant but he saw his teammates accosting appellant after the latter's arrest. He was likewise the one who
conducted the custodial investigation of appellant wherein the latter was apprised of his rights to remain silent, to information and to
counsel. Appellant, however, orally waived his right to counsel.6

Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit "G", the "Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated" which appellant signed, admitting
therein the confiscation of four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves in his possession. Pejoro likewise informed the court below that,
originally, what he placed on the receipt was that only one marijuana leaf was confiscated in exchange for P20.00. However, Lopez
and Villaruz corrected his entry by telling him to put "two", instead of "one" and "40", instead of "20". He agreed to the correction
since they were the ones who were personally and directly involved in the purchase of the marijuana and the arrest of appellant. 7

Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas, examined appellant at 5:30 p.m. of the day after the latter's apprehension, and
the results were practically normal except for his relatively high blood pressure. The doctor also did not find any trace of physical
injury on the person of appellant. The next day, he again examined appellant due to the latter's complaint of
gastro-intestinal pain. In the course of the examination, Dr. Calara discovered that appellant has a history of peptic ulcer, which

Page 58 of 77
causes him to experience abdominal pain and consequently vomit blood. In the afternoon, appellant came back with the same
complaint but, except for the gastro-intestinal pain, his physical condition remained normal.8

As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the attendant facts, claiming that on the day in question, at around 4:30 p.m.,
he was watching television with the members of his family in their house when three persons, whom he had never met before
suddenly arrived. Relying on the assurance that they would just inquire about something from him at their detachment, appellant
boarded a jeep with them. He was told that they were going to Camp Olivas, but he later noticed that they were taking a different
route. While on board, he was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When
they finally reached the camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine
times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied
knowledge of the P20.00 or the dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the twenty-peso bill came from the pocket of Pejoro.
Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was because of the blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro. He admitted having escaped
from the NARCOM office but claimed that he did so since he could no longer endure the maltreatment to which he was being
subjected. After escaping, he proceeded to the house of his uncle, Bienvenido Sunga, at San Matias, Guagua, reaching the place at
around 6:30 or 7:30 p.m. There, he consulted a quack doctor and, later, he was accompanied by his sister to the Romana Pangan
District Hospital at Floridablanca, Pampanga where he was confined for three days. 9

Appellant's brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the fact that appellant was hospitalized at Floridablanca, Pampanga after
undergoing abdominal pain and vomiting of blood. He likewise confirmed that appellant had been suffering from peptic ulcer even
before the latter's arrest.10 Also, Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared that she
treated appellant for three days due to abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that the cause for this ailment was appellant's
peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or serious external injury, abrasion or contusion on his body. 11

On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence presented, the trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant for a violation
of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a
fine of twenty thousand pesos and to pay the costs. The four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves were likewise ordered confiscated in
favor of the Government.12

Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned judgment of the lower court, contending in his assignment of errors
that the latter erred in (1) not upholding his defense of "frame-up", (2) not declaring Exhibit "G" (Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in evidence, and (3) convicting him of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 13

At the outset, it should be noted that while the People's real theory and evidence is to the effect the appellant actually sold only two
tea bags of marijuana dried leaves, while the other two tea bags were merely confiscated subsequently from his possession, 14 the
latter not being in any way connected with the sale, the information alleges that he sold and delivered four tea bags of marijuana
dried leaves.15 In view thereof, the issue presented for resolution in this appeal is merely the act of selling the two tea bags allegedly
committed by appellant, and does not include the disparate and distinct issue of illegal possession of the other two tea bags which
separate offense is not charged herein.16

To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably established.17 To sell means to give,
whether for money or any other material consideration.18 It must, therefore, be established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold
and delivered two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso
bills.

After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by both parties, we are morally certain that appellant was caught
in flagrante delicto engaging in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs. The prosecution was able to prove beyond a scintilla of doubt that
appellant, on October 22, 1988, did sell two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself creditably testified as
to how the sale took place and his testimony was amply corroborated by his teammates. As between the straightforward, positive
and corroborated testimony of Lopez and the bare denials and negative testimony of appellant, the former undeniably deserves
greater weight and is more entitled to credence.

We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible to mistake,
harassment, extortion and abuse.19 Nonetheless, such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not obtain in the case at bar.
Appellant's entrapment and arrest were not effected in a haphazard way, for a surveillance was conducted by the team before the
buy-bust operation was effected.20 No ill motive was or could be attributed to them, aside from the fact that they are presumed to
have regularly performed their official duty.21 Such lack of dubious motive coupled with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail over the self-
serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of having been framed,22 erected as it is upon the mere shifting sands of an alibi. To
top it all, appellant was caught
red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while there was a delimited chance for him to controvert the charge, he does not appear
to have plausibly done so.
Page 59 of 77
When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service of the then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police
(PC-INP) at Camp Olivas for examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic chemist therein, 23confirmed in her Technical Report No.
NB-448-88 that the contents of the four tea bags confiscated from appellant were positive for and had a total weight of 3.8 grams of
marijuana.24 Thus, the corpus delicti of the crime had been fully proved with certainty and conclusiveness.25

Appellant would want to make capital of the alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. Foremost, according to him, is the matter of who really confiscated the marijuana tea bags from him since, in open court,
Pejoro asserted that he had nothing to do with the confiscation of the marijuana, but in the aforementioned "Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated," he signed it as the one who seized the same.26

Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who confiscated the marijuana will not really matter since such is not an
element of the offense with which appellant is charged. What is unmistakably clear is that the marijuana was confiscated from the
possession of appellant. Even, assuming arguendo that the prosecution committed an error on who actually seized the marijuana
from appellant, such an error or discrepancy refers only to a minor matter and, as such, neither impairs the essential integrity of the
prosecution evidence as a whole nor reflects on the witnesses' honesty.27 Besides, there was clearly a mere imprecision of language
since Pejoro obviously meant that he did not take part in the physical taking of the drug from the person of appellant, but he
participated in the legalseizure or confiscation thereof as the investigator of their unit.

Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-peso bills allegedly confiscated from him were not powdered for finger-
printing purposes contrary to the normal procedure in buy-bust operations.28 This omission has been satisfactorily explained by Pfc.
Virgilio Villaruz in his testimony, as follows:

Q: Is it the standard operating procedure of your unit that in conducting such operation you do
not anymore provide a powder (sic) on the object so as to determine the thumbmark or identity
of the persons taking hold of the object?

A: We were not able to put powder on these denominations because we are lacking that kind of
material in our office since that item can be purchased only in Manila and only few are producing
that, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Is it not a fact that your office is within (the) P.C. Crime Laboratory, CIS, as well as the office of
NICA?

A: Our office is only adjacent to those offices but we cannot make a request for that powder
because they, themselves, are using that in their own work, sir.29

The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure to mark the money bills used for entrapment purposes can under no mode
of rationalization be fatal to the case of the prosecution because the Dangerous Drugs Act punishes "any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions."30 The dusting of said bills with phosphorescent powder is only an
evidentiary technique for identification purposes, which identification can be supplied by other species of evidence.

Again, appellant contends that there was neither a relative of his nor any barangay official or civilian to witness the seizure. He
decries the lack of pictures taken before, during and after his arrest. Moreover, he was not reported to or booked in the custody of
any barangay official or police authorities.31 These are absurd disputations. No law or jurisprudence requires that an arrest or
seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative, a barangay official or any other civilian, or be accompanied by the taking of pictures.
On the contrary, the police enforcers having caught appellant in flagrante delicto, they were not only authorized but were also under
the obligation to effect a warrantless arrest and seizure.

Likewise, contrary to appellant's contention, there was an arrest report prepared by the police in connection with his apprehension.
Said Booking Sheet and Arrest Report32 states, inter alia, that "suspect was arrested for selling two tea bags of suspected marijuana
dried leaves and the confiscation of another two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves." Below these remarks was affixed
appellant's signature. In the same manner, the receipt for the seized property, hereinbefore mentioned, was signed by appellant
wherein he acknowledged the confiscation of the marked bills from him.33

However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits inadmissible in evidence. Appellant's conformance to these
documents are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged. They were obtained in violation of his right as
a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the records to show that he was
Page 60 of 77
assisted by counsel.34 Although appellant manifested during the custodial investigation that he waived his right to counsel, the waiver
was not made in writing and in the presence of counsel,35 hence whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted
from him, either verbally or in writing, is not allowable in evidence.36 Besides, the arrest report is self-serving and hearsay and can
easily be concocted to implicate a suspect.

Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits, appellant cannot thereby be extricated from his predicament since his
criminal participation in the illegal sale of marijuana has been sufficiently proven. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of
prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction37 which happens the moment the buyer receives the
drug from the seller.38 In the present case, and in light of the preceding discussion, this sale has been ascertained beyond any
peradventure of doubt.

Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell marijuana to a total stranger. 39 We take this opportunity to once
again reiterate the doctrinal rule that drug-pushing, when done on a small scale as in this case, belongs to that class of crimes that
may be committed at any time and in any place.40 It is not contrary to human experience for a drug pusher to sell to a total
stranger,41 for what matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and seller but their agreement and the acts constituting
the sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves.42 While there may be instances where such sale could be improbable, taking into
consideration the diverse circumstances of person, time and place, as well as the incredibility of how the accused supposedly acted
on that occasion, we can safely say that those exceptional particulars are not present in this case.

Finally, appellant contends that he was subjected to physical and mental torture by the arresting officers which caused him to escape
from Camp Olivas the night he was placed under custody.43 This he asserts to support his explanation as to how his signatures on the
documents earlier discussed were supposedly obtained by force and coercion.

The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence that for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances.44 The evidence on record is bereft of any support for appellant's allegation of maltreatment. Two
doctors, one for the prosecution45 and the other for the defense,46 testified on the absence of any tell-tale sign or indication of bodily
injury, abrasions or contusions on the person of appellant. What is evident is that the cause of his abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer
from which he had been suffering even before his arrest.47 His own brother even corroborated that fact, saying that appellant has had
a history of bleeding peptic ulcer.48

Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated at Camp Olivas, he had no reason whatsoever for not divulging the same to his
brother who went to see him at the camp after his arrest and during his detention there. 49Significantly, he also did not even report
the matter to the authorities nor file appropriate charges against the alleged malefactors despite the opportunity to do so 50 and with
the legal services of counsel being available to him. Such omissions funnel down to the conclusion that appellant's story is a pure
fabrication.

These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute his allegations that his arrest was baseless and premeditated for the NARCOM
agents were determined to arrest him at all costs.51 Premeditated or not, appellant's arrest was only the culmination, the final act
needed for his isolation from society and it was providential that it came about after he was caught in the very act of illicit trade of
prohibited drugs. Accordingly, this opinion could have concluded on a note of affirmance of the judgment of the trial court. However,
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, was further amended by Republic Act No. 7659 effective December 31, 1993, 52 which
supervenience necessarily affects the original disposition of this case and entails additional questions of law which we shall now
resolve.

II

The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to the adjudication of the case at bar, are to this effect:

Sec. 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, are hereby amended to read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. — The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

Page 61 of 77
 xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is
hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instrument of the
Crime. — The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14,
14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any
of the following quantities:

xxx xxx xxx

5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana

xxx xxx xxx

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range
from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.

1. Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the sale of four tea bags of marijuana with a total weight of only 3.8
grams and, in fact, stands to be convicted for the sale of only two of those tea bags, the initial inquiry would be whether the patently
favorable provisions of Republic Act
No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the lesser penalty provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit originally amendatory and in substitution of the previous Articles
190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code,53 it has long been settled that by force of Article 10 of said Code the beneficient provisions of
Article 22 thereof applies to and shall be given retrospective effect to crimes punished by special laws.54 The execution in said article
would not apply to those convicted of drug offenses since habitual delinquency refers to convictions for the third time or more of the
crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification.55

Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 could neither have then been involved nor invoked in the present
case, a corollary question would be whether this court, at the present stage, can
sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be imposed on appellant. That issue has likewise been
resolved in the cited case of People vs. Moran, et al., ante., thus:

. . . . The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in so far as
they are favorable to persons accused of a felony, would be useless and nugatory if the courts of justice were not
under obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether or not the accused has applied for it, just as would also
all provisions relating to the prescription of the crime and the penalty.

If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced penalties provided in Republic Act No. 7659 has already
become final and executory or the accused is serving sentence thereunder, then practice, procedure and pragmatic considerations
would warrant and necessitate the matter being brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a writ of habeas corpus.56

2. Probably through oversight, an error on the matter of imposable penalties appears to have been committed in the drafting of the
aforesaid law; thereby calling for and necessitating judicial reconciliation and craftsmanship.

As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as now further amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall unlawfully sell, administer,
deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. That penalty, according to the amendment to
Section 20 of the law, shall be applied if what is involved is 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana; otherwise, if the
quantity involved is less, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.

In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of its dual
imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of the
penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. The same error has been committed with respect to the other
prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the
whole law,57 we hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the quantities stated

Page 62 of 77
in the first paragraph shall range from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant
with the fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should be construed in a manner favorable to the accused.

3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is only 3.8 grams, hence covered by the imposable range of penalties
under the second paragraph of Section 20, as now modified, the law provides that the penalty shall be taken from said range
"depending upon the quantity" of the drug involved in the case. The penalty in said second paragraph constitutes a complex one
composed of three distinct penalties, that is, prision correccional,prision mayor, and reclusion temporal. In such a situation, the Code
provides that each one shall form a period, with the lightest of them being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe
as the maximum period.58

Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating and aggravating circumstances determine which period of such
complex penalty
shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the second paragraph of Section 20, however, is its specific mandate, above
quoted, that the penalty shall instead depend upon the quantity of the drug subject of the criminal transaction.59 Accordingly, by way
of exception to Article 77 of the Code and to subserve the purpose of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, each of the aforesaid
component penalties shall be considered as a principal imposable penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereby,
the modifying circumstances will not altogether be disregarded. Since each component penalty of the total complex penalty will have
to be imposed separately as determined by the quantity of the drug involved, then the modifying circumstances can be used to fix the
proper period of that component penalty, as shall hereafter be explained.

It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20 in the context of our aforesaid disposition thereon that, unless there
are compelling reasons for a deviation, the quantities of the drugs enumerated in its second paragraph be divided into three, with the
resulting quotient, and double or treble the same, to be respectively the bases for allocating the penalty proportionately among the
three aforesaid periods according to the severity thereof. Thus, if the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be
imposed shall be prision correccional; from 250 to 499 grams, prision mayor; and 500 to
749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death.60

Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the case at bar, the penalty of prision correccional is consequently
indicated but, again, another preliminary and cognate issue has first to be resolved.

4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years and, as a divisible penalty, it consists of three periods as
provided in the text of and illustrated in the table provided by Article 76 of the Code. The question is whether or not in determining
the penalty to be imposed, which is here to be taken from the penalty of prision correccional, the presence or absence of mitigating,
aggravating or other circumstances modifying criminal liability should be taken into account.

We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on
mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines
as applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own specific
penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised
Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum
periods, it would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is to
determine the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.

This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees
could not be given supplementary application to special laws, since the penalties in the latter were not components of or
contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special
laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in
the special law against, such supplementary application.

The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty
therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation
and legal effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision
correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise. More on this
later.

For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, is prision correccional, to be taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, there
being no attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance.

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5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the developmental changes in the penalties imposed for offenses under special laws
would be necessary.

Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional practice in the United States but differently from the penalties provided in
our Revised Penal Code and its Spanish origins, provided for one specific penalty or a range of penalties with definitive durations,
such as imprisonment for one year or for one to five years but without division into periods or any technical statutory cognomen.
This is the special law contemplated in and referred to at the time laws like the Indeterminate Sentence Law 61 were passed during
the American regime.

Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special law would direct that an offense thereunder shall be punished under
the Revised Penal Code and in the same manner provided therein. Inceptively, for instance, Commonwealth Act No. 303 62 penalizing
non-payment of salaries and wages with the periodicity prescribed therein, provided:

Sec. 4. Failure of the employer to pay his employee or laborer as required by section one of this Act, shall prima
facie be considered a fraud committed by such employer against his employee or laborer by means of false
pretenses similar to those mentioned in article three hundred and fifteen, paragraph four, sub-paragraph two (a) of
the Revised Penal Code and shall be punished in the same manner as therein provided.63

Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses defined therein were specifically punished by the penalties as technically
named and understood in the Revised Penal Code. These are exemplified by Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act) where the
penalties ranged from arresto mayor to
death;64 Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Decree) where the penalties run from arresto mayor to prision mayor; and
Presidential Decree
No. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts involving firearms), the penalties wherefor may involve prision mayor,
reclusion temporal, reclusion perpetua or death.

Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539

(Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months and not more than 17
years and 4 months, when committed without violence or intimidation of persons or force upon things; not less than 17 years and 4
months and not more than 30 years, when committed with violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and
life imprisonment to death, when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed.

With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the special law are different from and are without reference or relation
to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties under said Code
or by other relevant statutory provisions based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the Code. In this type of special
law, the legislative intendment is clear.

The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example, Republic Act No. 6539. While it is true that the penalty of 14 years
and
8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium period of reclusion temporal,such technical
term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended
by the qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code,
therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the same formulation.

On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and the correlative effects thereof under the Revised Penal Code, as well
as other statutory enactments founded upon and applicable to such provisions of the Code, have suppletory effect to the penalties
under the former Republic Act
No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1866. While these are special laws, the fact that the
penalties for offenses thereunder are those provided for in the Revised Penal code lucidly reveals the statutory intent to give the
related provisions on penalties for felonies under the Code the corresponding application to said special laws, in the absence of any
express or implicit proscription in these special laws. To hold otherwise would be to sanction an indefensible judicial truncation of an
integrated system of penalties under the Code and its allied legislation, which could never have been the intendment of Congress.

In People vs. Macatanda,65 a prosecution under a special law (Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law of 1974), it was contended by the prosecution that Article 64, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code should not apply
to said special law. We said therein that —

We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a special law entirely distinct from and unrelated to the
Revised Penal Code. From the nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of the classification and duration of
penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is not for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws,
the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to
Page 64 of 77
 the offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 310) or otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions thereof such as Article
104 of the Revised Penal Code . . . . Article 64 of the same Code should, likewise, be applicable, . . . . (Emphasis
supplied.)

More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code to Republic Act No. 6425, in
this case involving Article 63(2) of the Code, we have this more recent pronouncement:

. . . Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall be "supplementary" to
special laws, this Court held that where the special law expressly grants to the court discretion in applying the
penalty prescribed for the offense, there is no room for the application of the provisions of the Code . . . .

The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No. 1623, contains no explicit grant of discretion to the Court
in the application of the penalty prescribed by the law. In such case, the court must be guided by the rules prescribed
by the Revised Penal Code concerning the application of penalties which distill the "deep legal thought and centuries
of experience in the administration of criminal laws." (Emphasis ours.)66

Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the Dangerous Drugs Act as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659 by the
incorporation and prescription therein of the technical penalties defined in and constituting integral parts of the three scales of
penalties in the Code, 67 with much more reason should the provisions of said Code on the appreciation and effects of all attendant
modifying circumstances apply in fixing the penalty. Likewise, the different kinds or classifications of penalties and the rules for
graduating
such penalties by degrees should have supplementary effect on Republic Act No. 6425, except if they would result in absurdities as
will now be explained.

While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this aspect is involved in the discussion on the role of modifying circumstances,
we have perforce to lay down the caveat that mitigating circumstances should be considered and applied only if they affect
the periods and the degrees of the penalties within rational limits.

Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine the degree of the penalty, in accordance with
the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime and the
nature of the participation of the accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged
mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These
provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated
second paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by the
legislature.

Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some manner not specially provided for in the
four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the crime
consists of one or two penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many
penalties which follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in this
case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is,
prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto menor, destierro and arresto
mayor. There could, however, be no further reduction by still one or two degrees, which must each likewise consist of three penalties,
since only the penalties of fine and public censure remain in the scale.

The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding
penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond
or lower than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall
each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in
order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation
is to be adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an
imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress.

6. The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the case now before us. Apparently it does, since
drug offenses are not included in nor has appellant committed any act which would put him within the exceptions to said law and the
penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua or death, provided, of course, that the penalty as ultimately resolved will
exceed one year of imprisonment.68 The more important aspect, however, is how the indeterminate sentence shall be ascertained.

It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate sentence for an offense under the Revised Penal Code, states
that "if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum
Page 65 of 77
term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed
by the same." We hold that this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an offense under a special law wherein the penalty
imposed was not taken from and is without reference to the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that
it may be said that the "offense is punished" under that law.

There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on indeterminate sentence for offenses under special laws was necessary
because of the nature of the former type of penalties under said laws which were not included or contemplated in the scale of
penalties in Article 71 of the Code, hence there could be no minimum "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed
by the Code for the offense," as is the rule for felonies therein. In the illustrative examples of penalties in special laws hereinbefore
provided, this rule applied, and would still apply, only to the first and last examples. Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act No.
4103 as earlier noted, this holding is but an application and is justified under the rule of contemporanea expositio.69

We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the
Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence with their technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining
the maximum of said sentence, we
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to
impose the same in the medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in effect punished by and under
the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, we must apply the first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs
that "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence
the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposedunder the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the Code for the offense." (Emphasis ours.)

A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of context but also an admission of the hornbook maxim that qui haeret
in litera haeret in cortice. Fortunately, this Court has never gone only skin-deep in its construction of Act. No. 4103 by a mere literal
appreciation of its provisions. Thus, with regard to the phrase in Section 2 thereof excepting from its coverage "persons convicted of
offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment," we have held that what is considered is the penalty actually imposed and
not the penalty imposable under the law,70and that reclusion perpetua is likewise embraced therein although what the law states is
"life imprisonment".

What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition, therefore, is that under the concurrence of the principles of literal
interpretation, which have been rationalized by comparative decisions of this Court; of historical interpretation, as explicated by the
antecedents of the law and related contemporaneous legislation; and of structural interpretation, considering the interrelation of the
penalties in the Code as supplemented by Act No. 4103 in an integrated scheme of penalties, it follows that the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence in this case shall be the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall have
interpreted the seeming ambiguity in Section 1 of Act No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws, which is the best mode
of interpretation.71

The indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of compassion, and should be liberally interpreted in favor of the
accused.72 The "minimum" sentence is merely a period at which, and not before, as a matter of grace and not of right, the prisoner
may merely be allowed to serve the balance of his sentence outside of his confinement. 73 It does not constitute the totality of the
penalty since thereafter he still has to continue serving the rest of his sentence under set conditions. That minimum is only the period
when the convict's eligibility for parole may be considered. In fact, his release on parole may readily be denied if he is found
unworthy thereof, or his reincarceration may be ordered on legal grounds, even if he has served the minimum sentence.

It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence within
the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the maximum range we have fixed through the
application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum sentence at 6
months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional. The difference, which could thereby even involve only
one day, is hardly worth the creation of an overrated tempest in the judicial teapot.

ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the judgment of conviction rendered by the court a quo against accused-appellant
Martin Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that he should be, as he hereby is, sentenced to serve an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as the maximum
thereof.

SO ORDERED.

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

Page 66 of 77
I am still unable to agree with the view that (a) in appropriate cases where the penalty to be imposed would beprision
correccional pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the
sentence to be meted out, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended), should be that whose minimum is
within the range of the penalty next lower, i.e., arresto mayor; and (b) the presence of two or more mitigating circumstances not
offset by any mitigating circumstances or of a privileged mitigating circumstance shall not reduce the penalty by one or two degrees
if the penalty to be imposed, taking into account the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved, would be prision correccional.

The first view is based on the proposition that since R.A. No. 7659 had unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal
Code in their technical terms, hence also their technical signification and effects, then what should govern is the first part of Section 1
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law which directs that:

in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of
the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.

Elsewise stated, by the adoption of the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code for the offenses penalized under the
Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, the latter offenses would now be considered as punished under the Revised Penal
Code for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act. No. 4103, as amended by Act. No. 4225 and R.A. No. 4203) also provides that:

if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum prescribed by the same (Emphasis supplied).

There are, therefore, two categories of offenses which should be taken into account in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law: (1) offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code, and (2) offenses punished by other laws (or special laws).

The offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code are those defined and penalized in Book II thereof, which is thus appropriately titled
CRIMES AND PENALTIES. To simplify further, a crime is deemed punished under the Revised Penal Code if it is defined by it, and none
other, as a crime and is punished by a penalty which is included in the classification of Penalties in Chapter II, Title III of Book I
thereof.

On the other hand, an offense is considered punished under any other law (or special law) if it is not defined and penalized by the
Revised Penal Code but by such other law.

It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code if both its definition and the penalty therefor are found in the said
Code, and it is deemed punished by a special law if its definition and the penalty therefor are found in the special law. That the latter
imports or borrows from the Revised Penal Code its nomenclature of penalties does not make an offense in the special law punished
by or punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The reason is quite simple. It is still the special law that defines the offense and
imposes a penalty therefor, although it adopts the Code's nomenclature of penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of a
penalty found in the Revised Penal Code can by no means make an offense thereunder an offense "punished or punishable" by the
Revised Penal Code.

Thus, I cannot subscribe to the view that since R.A. No. 7659 had adopted the penalties prescribed by the Revised Penal Code in drug
cases, offenses related to drugs should now be considered as punished under the Revised Penal Code. If that were so, then we are also
bound, ineluctably, to declare that such offenses are mala in se and to apply the Articles of the Revised Penal Code regarding the
stages of a felony (Article 6), the nature of participation (Article 16), accessory penalties (Articles 40-45), application of penalties to
principals, accomplices, and accessories (Article 46 et seq.), complex crimes (Article 48), and graduation of penalties (Article 61),
among others. We cannot do otherwise without being drawn to an inconsistent posture which is extremely hard to justify.

I respectfully submit then that the adoption by the Dangerous Drugs Act of the penalties in the Revised Penal Code does not make an
offense under the Dangerous Drugs Act an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, where the proper penalty to be
imposed under Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act is prisioncorreccional, then, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
indeterminate sentence to be meted on the accused should be that whose minimum should not be less than the minimum prescribed
by the special law (the Dangerous Drugs Act), i.e., not lower than six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional.

Page 67 of 77
 II

The majority opinion holds the view that while the penalty provided for in Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act is a complex one
composed of three distinct penalties, viz., prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal,and that pursuant to Article 77 of
the Revised Penal Code, each should form a period, with the lightest of them being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the
most severe as the maximum, yet, considering that under the said second paragraph of Section 20 the penalty depends on the
quantity of the drug subject of the criminal transaction, then by way of exception to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code and to
subserve the purpose of Section 20, as amended, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a principal penalty
depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereafter, applying the modifying circumstances pursuant to Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code, the proper period of the component penalty shall then be fixed.

To illustrate, if the quantity of the drugs involved (e.g., marijuana below 250 grams) the proper principal penalty should
be prision correccional, but there is one mitigating and no aggravating circumstance, then the penalty to be imposed should
be prision correccional in its minimum period. Yet, the majority opinion puts a limit to such a rule. It declares:

The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods of the
corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties
reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than
prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20
shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event
be prision correccional in order to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses.

Simply put, this rule would allow the reduction from reclusion
temporal — if it is the penalty to be imposed on the basis of the quantity of the drugs involved — by two degrees, or to prision
correccional, if there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance is present (paragraph 5, Article 64,
Revised Penal Code) or if there is a privileged mitigating circumstances of, say, minority (Article 68, Revised Penal Code), or under
circumstances covered by Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. Yet, if the proper penalty to be imposed is prision mayor, regardless of
the fact that a reduction by two degrees is proper, it should only be reduced by one degree because the rule does not allow a
reduction beyond prision correccional. Finally, if the proper penalty to be imposed is prision correccional, no reduction at all would be
allowed.

I find the justification for the rule to be arbitrary and unfair. It is arbitrary because within the same second paragraph involving the
same range of penalty, we both allow and disallow the application of Article 64(5), Article 68, and Article 69 of the Revised Penal
Code. The reason for the disallowance, viz., in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses, is unconvincing because
Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, has in fact "depreciated" the seriousness of drug offenses by providing quantity as basis for the determination of the
proper penalty and limiting fine only to cases punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It is unfair because an accused who is found
guilty of possessing MORE dangerous
drugs — say 500 to 749 grams of marijuana, in which case the penalty to be imposed would be reclusion temporal— may only be
sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum because of privileged mitigating circumstances. Yet, an
accused who is found guilty of possession of only one (1) gram of marijuana — in which case the penalty to be imposed is prision
correccional — would not be entitled to a reduction thereof even if he has the same number of privileged mitigating circumstances as
the former has.

Also, if the privileged mitigating circumstance happens to be the minority of the accused, then he is entitled to the reduction of the
penalty as a matter of right pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:

Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. — When the offender is a minor under
eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of Article 80 of this
Code, the following rules shall be observed:

1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from liability by
reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall
be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime
which he committed.

2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lover than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.

I do not think that as to the second paragraph of Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659,
we can be at liberty to apply the Revised Penal Code in one aspect and not to apply it in another.
Page 68 of 77
 Feliciano and Quiason, JJ., concur.

EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision,[1] dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
20443, affirming the Decision dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos.
7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed with the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 7068
- 7070. The Information in Criminal Case No. 7068 alleges as follows:

That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping with one another, knowing fully well that they did not have
sufficient funds deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Tagbilaran Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously, draw and issue UCPB Check No. 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of NINE THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE
PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (P9,075.55), payable to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter that they did
not have sufficient funds deposited with the bank to cover up the amount of the check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously pass on, indorse, give and deliver the said check to Alfredo Oculam by way of rediscounting of the aforementioned checks;
however, upon presentation of the check to the drawee bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the
account of the accused with the United Coconut Planters Bank, Tagbilaran Branch, had already been closed, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Alfredo Oculam in the aforestated amount.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.[2]

The accusatory portions of the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7069 and 7070 are similarly worded, except for the
allegations concerning the number, date and amount of each check, that is:
(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 - UCPB Check No. 284744 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of P12,730.00;[3]
(b) Criminal Case No. 7070 UCPB Check No. 106136 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of P8,496.55.[4]
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When arraigned on June 26, 1991, the two accused pleaded not guilty to the
crimes charged.[5]
The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant Alfredo Oculam. He testified that: in 1989, spouses Adronico [6] and
Evangeline Ladonga became his regular customers in his pawnshop business in Tagbilaran City, Bohol; [7] sometime in May 1990, the
Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post
dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico;[8] sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the
Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26,
1990 issued by Adronico;[9] between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55,
guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; [10] the three checks bounced upon
presentment for the reason CLOSED ACCOUNT;[11] when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands,
he filed a criminal complaint against them.[12]
While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed,
the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should
not encash the checks when they mature; [13] and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the
issuance thereof.[14]
On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
B.P. Blg. 22, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment finding accused Adronico Ladonga, alias Ronie, and Evangeline Ladonga
guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the aforesaid three (3) criminal cases, for which they stand charged before this Court, and
accordingly, sentences them to imprisonment and fine, as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an imprisonment of one (1) year for each of them, and a fine in the amount of P9,075.55,
equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 284743;

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2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an imprisonment for each of them to one (1) year and a fine of P12, 730.00, equivalent to the
amount of UCPB Check No. 284744; and,

3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an imprisonment of one year for each of them and a fine of P8,496.55 equivalent to the
amount of UCPB Check No. 106136;

4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly and solidarily pay and reimburse the complainant, Mr. Alfredo Oculam, the sum
of P15,000.00 representing actual expenses incurred in prosecuting the instant cases; P10,000.00 as attorneys fee; and the amount
of P30,302.10 which is the total value of the three (3) subject checks which bounced; but without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

With Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.[15]

Adronico applied for probation which was granted.[16] On the other hand, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals,
arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is
inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the
issuance thereof.[17]
On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner. [18] It held that the provisions of the penal code were
made applicable to special penal laws in the decisions of this Court in People vs. Parel, [19] U.S. vs. Ponte, [20] and U.S. vs. Bruhez.[21] It
noted that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code itself provides that its provisions shall be supplementary to special laws unless the
latter provide the contrary. The Court of Appeals stressed that since B.P. Blg. 22 does not prohibit the applicability in a suppletory
character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the principle of conspiracy may be applied to cases involving violations
of B.P. Blg. 22. Lastly, it ruled that the fact that petitioner did not make and issue or sign the checks did not exculpate her from
criminal liability as it is not indispensable that a co-conspirator takes a direct part in every act and knows the part which everyone
performed. The Court of Appeals underscored that in conspiracy the act of one conspirator could be held to be the act of the other.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals denied the same in a Resolution dated November 16,
1999.[22]
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner presents to the Court the following issues for resolution:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO WAS NOT THE DRAWER OR ISSUER OF THE THREE CHECKS THAT BOUNCED BUT
HER CO-ACCUSED HUSBAND UNDER THE LATTERS ACCOUNT COULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA
BILANG 22 AS CONSPIRATOR.

2. ANCILLARY TO THE MAIN ISSUE ARE THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

A. WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 BY INVOKING THE LAST
SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH STATES:

Art. 10. Offenses not subject of the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be punished under special laws
are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially
provide the contrary.

B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE CONVICTION OF
PETITIONER AS CONSPIRATOR APPLYING THE SUPPLETORY CHARACTER OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE TO SPECIAL LAWS
LIKE B.P. BLG. 22 IS APPLICABLE.[23]

Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held criminally liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 because she had no participation
in the drawing and issuance of the three checks subject of the three criminal cases, a fact proven by the checks themselves. She
contends that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in applying the principle of conspiracy, as defined under the RPC, to violations
of B.P. Blg. 22. She posits that the application of the principle of conspiracy would enlarge the scope of the statute and include
situations not provided for or intended by the lawmakers, such as penalizing a person, like petitioner, who had no participation in the
drawing or issuance of checks.
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and echoes the declaration of the Court of Appeals that some
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the addition of the second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special laws.
Page 70 of 77
It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws
are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially
provide the contrary.

The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future are made punishable under special
laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws. While it seems that
the two clauses are contradictory, a sensible interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled.
The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are controlling with regard to offenses therein
specifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule of statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail over
general ones.[24] Lex specialis derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be considered as a superfluity, and could have been eliminated
altogether. The second clause contains the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision
that the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary.
The appellate courts reliance on the cases of People vs. Parel,[25] U.S. vs. Ponte,[26] and U.S. vs. Bruhez[27] rests on a firm basis.
These cases involved the suppletory application of principles under the then Penal Code to special laws. People vs. Parel is concerned
with the application of Article 22[28] of the Code to violations of Act No. 3030, the Election Law, with reference to the retroactive effect
of penal laws if they favor the accused. U.S. vs. Ponte involved the application of Article 17[29] of the same Penal Code, with reference
to the participation of principals in the commission of the crime of misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized by Act
No. 1740. U.S. vs. Bruhez covered Article 45[30] of the same Code, with reference to the confiscation of the instruments used in
violation of Act No. 1461, the Opium Law.
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of
contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied
suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs. People,[31] the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment
under Article 39[32] of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the application of the provision on
principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of
one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all
the conspirators are principals.[33]
All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner must be set aside.
Article 8 of the RPC provides that a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. [34] The overt act or acts of the accused may
consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by
moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.[35]
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged
conspiracy. As testified to by the lone prosecution witness, complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely present when her
husband, Adronico, signed the check subject of Criminal Case No. 7068. [36] With respect to Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070, Oculam
also did not describe the details of petitioners participation. He did not specify the nature of petitioners involvement in the
commission of the crime, either by a direct act of participation, a direct inducement of her co-conspirator, or cooperating in the
commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Apparently, the only semblance of
overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot
be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design.
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. [37] Conspiracy transcends mere
companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. [38] Even knowledge,
acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation
in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. [39]
As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of recent vintage, People vs. Mandao:[40]

To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every turn. It is a legal concept that imputes
culpability under specific circumstances; as such, it must be established as clearly as any element of the crime. Evidence to prove it
must be positive and convincing, considering that it is a convenient and simplistic device by which the accused may be ensnared and
kept within the penal fold.

Page 71 of 77
Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy, and a judgment of conviction must always be founded on the
strength of the prosecutions evidence. The Court ruled thus in People v. Legaspi, from which we quote:

At most, the prosecution, realizing the weakness of its evidence against accused-appellant Franco, merely relied and pegged the
latters criminal liability on its sweeping theory of conspiracy, which to us, was not attendant in the commission of the crime.

The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction must be predicated on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution
and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defense could be laid the
responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is
moral certainty.

Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt in order to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.

In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. In
criminal cases, moral certainty -- not mere possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even when the evidence
for the defense is weak, the accused must be acquitted when the prosecution has not proven guilt with the requisite quantum of
proof required in all criminal cases. (Citations omitted)[41]

All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner with moral certainty. Its evidence falls short of the
quantum of proof required for conviction. Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of the petitioners innocence must be upheld
and she must be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 20443 affirming the Decision, dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 3), Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068,
7069 and 7070 convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline
Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LUISITO D. BUSTINERA, appellant.

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

From the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of qualified theft[2] for the unlawful taking of a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, he comes to this Court on appeal.
In an information[3] dated June 17, 1997, appellant was indicted as follows:

The undersigned accuses LUISITO D. BUSTINERA of the crime of Qualified Theft, committed as follows:

That on or about the 25th day of December up to the 9th day of January, 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused being then
employed as one [of] the taxi Drivers of Elias S. Cipriano, an Operator of several taxi cabs with business address at corner 44
Commonwealth Avenue, iliman (sic), this City, and as such has free access to the taxi he being driven, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain, with grave abuse of confidence reposed upon him by his employer and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi with Plate No. PWH-266
worth P303,000.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to Elias S. Cipriano, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the
amount of P303,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment[4] on March 27, 2000, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on
the merits ensued.
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is established.
Sometime in 1996, Edwin Cipriano (Cipriano), who manages ESC Transport, the taxicab business of his father, hired appellant
as a taxi driver and assigned him to drive a Daewoo Racer with plate number PWH-266. It was agreed that appellant would drive the
Page 72 of 77
taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m, after which he would return it to ESC Transports garage and remit the boundary fee in the amount
of P780.00 per day.[5]
On December 25, 1996, appellant admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi, but he did not return it on the same day as
he was supposed to.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, on December 25, 1996, did you report for work?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, since you reported for work, what are your duties and responsibilities as taxi driver of the taxi company?
A: That we have to bring back the taxi at night with the boundary.
Q: How much is your boundary?
A: P780.00, sir.
Q: On December 25, 1996, did you bring out any taxi?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, when ever (sic) you bring out a taxi, what procedure [do] you follow with that company?
A: That we have to bring back the taxi to the company and before we leave we also sign something, sir.
Q: What is that something you mentioned?
A: On the record book and on the daily trip ticket, sir.
Q: You said that you have to return your taxi at the end of the day, what is then the procedure reflect (sic) by your
company when you return a taxi?
A: To remit the boundary and to sign the record book and daily trip ticket.
Q: So, when you return the taxi, you sign the record book?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You mentioned that on December 25, 1996, you brought out a taxi?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of taxi?
A: Daewoo taxi, sir.
Q: Now did you return the taxi on December 25, 1996?
A: I was not able to bring back the taxi because I was short of my boundary, sir.[6]
The following day, December 26, 1996, Cipriano went to appellants house to ascertain why the taxi was not returned. [7] Arriving
at appellants house, he did not find the taxi there, appellants wife telling him that her husband had not yet arrived. [8] Leaving nothing
to chance, Cipriano went to the Commonwealth Avenue police station and reported that his taxi was missing. [9]
On January 9, 1997, appellants wife went to the garage of ESC Transport and revealed that the taxi had been abandoned in
Regalado Street, Lagro, Quezon City.[10] Cipriano lost no time in repairing to Regalado Street where he recovered the taxi.[11]
Upon the other hand, while appellant does not deny that he did not return the taxi on December 25, 1996 as he was short of the
boundary fee, he claims that he did not abandon the taxi but actually returned it on January 5, 1997; [12] and that on December 27,
1996, he gave the amount of P2,000.00[13] to his wife whom he instructed to remit the same to Cipriano as payment of the boundary
fee[14] and to tell the latter that he could not return the taxi as he still had a balance thereof. [15]
Appellant, however, admits that his wife informed him that when she went to the garage to remit the boundary fee on the very
same day (December 27, 1996),[16] Cipriano was already demanding the return of the taxi.[17]
Appellant maintains though that he returned the taxi on January 5, 1997 and signed the record book, [18] which was company
procedure, to show that he indeed returned it and gave his employer P2,500.00[19] as partial payment for the boundary fee covering
the period from December 25, 1996 to January 5, 1997.
Continuing, appellant claims that as he still had a balance in the boundary fee, he left his drivers license with Cipriano;[20] that as
he could not drive, which was the only work he had ever known, without his drivers license, and with the obligation to pay the
balance of the boundary fee still lingering, his wife started working on February 18, 1997 as a stay-in maid for Cipriano, with a

Page 73 of 77
monthly salary of P1,300.00,[21] until March 26, 1997 when Cipriano told her that she had worked off the balance of his
obligation;[22] and that with his obligation extinguished, his drivers license was returned to him.[23]
Brushing aside appellants claim that he returned the taxi on January 5, 1997 and that he had in fact paid the total amount
of P4,500.00, the trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft by Decision of May 17, 2001, the dispositive
portion of which is quoted verbatim:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged, and he is accordingly
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs.

In the service of his sentence, accused is ordered credited with four-fifths (4/5) of the preventive imprisonment undergone by him
there being no showing that he agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.

SO ORDERED.[24] (Emphasis and italics in the original)

Hence, the present appeal anchored on the following assigned errors:

I.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING WITHOUT CONCRETE BASIS THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS INTENT
TO GAIN WHEN HE FAILED TO RETURN THE TAXI TO ITS GARAGE.

II.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
QUALIFIED THEFT.[25]

It is settled that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review, and it becomes the duty of the
appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment even if they have not been specifically assigned. [26]
Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended for the unlawful taking of a
motor vehicle.However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles,[27] by Republic Act No. 6539, as
amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING.
When statutes are in pari materia[28] or when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things,
or cover the same specific or particular subject matter, [29] or have the same purpose or object,[30] the rule dictates that they should be
construed together interpretare et concordare leges legibus, est optimus interpretandi modus.[31] Every statute must be so construed
and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence,[32] as this Court explained in City of Naga v.
Agna,[33] viz:

. . . When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory construction dictates that they should be construed together. This is
because enactments of the same legislature on the same subject matter are supposed to form part of one uniform system; that later
statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to
have in mind the existing legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its new act with reference thereto. Having thus in mind
the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed to have enacted the
new provision in accordance with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old
and they all should be construed together. In construing them the old statutes relating to the same subject matter should be
compared with the new provisions and if possible by reasonable construction, both should be so construed that effect may
be given to every provision of each. However, when the new provision and the old relating to the same subject cannot be
reconciled the former shall prevail as it is the latter expression of the legislative will . . . [34] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied; citations omitted)

The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of
personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be
done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things.[35]
Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2) the
theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4)
the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond
or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity,
vehicular accident or civil disturbance.[36]

Page 74 of 77
 On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain, of a
motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things. The elements of carnapping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the
taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things;
and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain.[37]
Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle,[38] the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and
carnapping being the same.[39]
In the 2000 case of People v. Tan[40] where the accused took a Mitsubishi Gallant and in the later case of People v.
Lobitania[41] which involved the taking of a Yamaha motorized tricycle, this Court held that the unlawful taking of motor vehicles is
now covered by the anti-carnapping law and not by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery.

There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law is a special law, different from the crime of robbery and theft included in
the Revised Penal Code. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. But a careful comparison of
this special law with the crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful
taking, intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken without the latter's consent. However, the anti-
carnapping law particularly deals with the theft and robbery of motor vehicles. Hence a motor vehicle is said to have been
carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to gain, without the owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or without the
use of force upon things. Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall within the
purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the case before the enactment of said statute.[42] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted.)

It is to be noted, however, that while the anti-carnapping law penalizes the unlawful taking of motor vehicles, it excepts from its
coverage certain vehicles such as roadrollers, trolleys, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks and cranes if not
used on public highways, vehicles which run only on rails and tracks, and tractors, trailers and tractor engines of all kinds and used
exclusively for agricultural purposes. By implication, the theft or robbery of the foregoing vehicles would be covered by Article 310 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended and the provisions on robbery, respectively. [43]
From the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-carnapping law and
not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply as the said motor vehicle does not fall within the exceptions mentioned in the
anti-carnapping law.
The designation in the information of the offense committed by appellant as one for qualified theft notwithstanding, appellant
may still be convicted of the crime of carnapping. For while it is necessary that the statutory designation be stated in the
information, a mistake in the caption of an indictment in designating the correct name of the offense is not a fatal defect as it is not
the designation that is controlling but the facts alleged in the information which determines the real nature of the crime.[44]
In the case at bar, the information alleges that appellant, with intent to gain, took the taxi owned by Cipriano without the latters
consent.[45] Thus, the indictment alleges every element of the crime of carnapping,[46] and the prosecution proved the same.
Appellants appeal is thus bereft of merit.
That appellant brought out the taxi on December 25, 1996 and did not return it on the same day as he was supposed to is
admitted.[47]
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains
possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.[48]
While the nature of appellants possession of the taxi was initially lawful as he was hired as a taxi driver and was entrusted
possession thereof, his act of not returning it to its owner, which is contrary to company practice and against the owners consent
transformed the character of the possession into an unlawful one. [49] Appellant himself admits that he was aware that his possession
of the taxi was no longer with Ciprianos consent as the latter was already demanding its return.
Q: Also you said that during your direct testimony that when you gave your wife the P2,500.00, you also told her to go to
the company to ask the company for permission for you to use the taxi since you were then still short of the
boundary. Alright, after telling that to your wife and after seeing your wife between December 27, 1996 and January
5, 1997, did you ask your wife what was the answer of the company to that request of yours?
A: He did not allow me, sir, and he even [got] angry with me.
Q: So, when did you learn that the company was not agreeable to your making use of the taxicab without first returning it
to the company?
A: Before the new year, sir.

Page 75 of 77
 Q: When you said new year, you were referring to January 1, 1997?
A: Either December 29 or December 30, 1996, sir.
Q: So, are you telling us that even if you knew already that the company was not agreeable to your making use of
the taxicab continually (sic) without returning the same to the company, you still went ahead and make (sic)
use of it and returned it only on January 5, 1997.
A: Yes, sir.[50] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Appellant assails the trial courts conclusion that there was intent to gain with the mere taking of the taxi without the owners
consent. He maintains that his reason for failing to return the taxi was his inability to remit the boundary fee, his earnings that day
not having permitted it; and that there was no intent to gain since the taking of the taxi was not permanent in character, he having
returned it.
Appellants position does not persuade.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle.[51] Actual gain is
irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain.[52] The term gain is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also
includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed.[53] Thus, the mere use of
the thing which was taken without the owners consent constitutes gain.[54]
In Villacorta v. Insurance Commission[55] which was reiterated in Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmens
Insurance Co, Inc.,[56] Justice Claudio Teehankee (later Chief Justice), interpreting the theft clause of an insurance policy, explained
that, when one takes the motor vehicle of another without the latters consent even if the motor vehicle is later returned, there is
theft, there being intent to gain as the use of the thing unlawfully taken constitutes gain:

Assuming, despite the totally inadequate evidence, that the taking was temporary and for a joy ride, the Court sustains as the
better view[57] that which holds that when a person, either with the object of going to a certain place, or learning how to drive, or
enjoying a free ride, takes possession of a vehicle belonging to another, without the consent of its owner, he is guilty of theft because
by taking possession of the personal property belonging to another and using it, his intent to gain is evident since he derives
therefrom utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure. Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites in his work Groizard who holds that
the use of a thing constitutes gain and Cuello Calon who calls it hurt de uso.[58] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation
omitted)

Besides, the trial court did not believe appellants claim that he in fact returned the taxi on January 5, 1997.

The Court can not (sic) believe accuseds assertion that he returned the subject vehicle on January 5, 1997 to the garage and that he
had in fact paid the amount of P4,500.00 in partial payment of his unremitted boundary for ten (10) days. He could not even be
certain of the exact amount he allegedly paid the taxicab owner. On direct-examination, he claimed that he paid Edwin Cipriano on
December 27, 1996 the amount of P2,000.00 and it was his wife who handed said amount to Cipriano, yet on cross-examination, he
claimed that he gave P2,500.00 to his wife on that date for payment to the taxicab owner.[59]

The rule is well-entrenched that findings of fact of the trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and significance which, if considered, would alter the result of the case. [60] The reason for the rule being that
trial courts have the distinct advantage of having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying or their conduct and behavior during the trial.[61]
Other than his bare and self-serving allegations, appellant has not shown any scintilla of evidence that he indeed returned the
taxi on January 5, 1997.
Q: You said that you returned the taxi on January 5, 1997, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, did you sign any record when you returned the taxi?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you have any copy of that record?
A: They were the one (sic) in-charge of the record book and I even voluntarily left my drivers license with them,
sir.
Q: You said that you did not return the taxi because you were short of (sic) boundary, did you turn over any money to your
employer when you returned the taxi?

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 A: I gave them [an] additional P2,500.00, sir.
Q: At the time when you returned the taxi, how much was your short indebtedness (sic) or short boundary (sic)?
A: I was short for ten (10) days, and I was able to pay P4,500.00.
Q: Do you have any receipt to show receipt of payment for this P4,500.00?
A: They were the ones having the record of my payment, and our agreement was that I have to pay the balance in
installment.[62] (Emphasis supplied)
While appellant maintains that he signed on January 5, 1997 the record book indicating that he returned the taxi on the said
date and paid Cipriano the amount of P4,500.00 as partial payment for the boundary fee, appellant did not produce the documentary
evidence alluded to, to substantiate his claim. That such alleged record book is in the possession of Cipriano did not prevent him from
producing it as appellant has the right to have compulsory process issued to secure the production of evidence on his behalf. [63]
The trial court having convicted appellant of qualified theft instead of carnapping, it erred in the imposition of the penalty.
While the information alleges that the crime was attended with grave abuse of confidence, the same cannot be appreciated as the
suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of said Code, cannot be invoked when there is a
legal impossibility of application, either by express provision or by necessary implication. [64]
Moreover, when the penalties under the special law are different from and are without reference or relation to those under the
Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules, for the application of penalties under the said Code or by other
relevant statutory provisions are based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the Code. [65]
Thus, in People v. Panida[66] which involved the crime of carnapping and the penalty imposed was the indeterminate sentence of
14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months, as maximum, this Court did not apply the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code suppletorily as the anti-carnapping law provides for its own penalties which are distinct and without reference to the said
Code.

The charge being simple carnapping, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months and not more
than 17 years and 4 months. There can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties under the Revised
Penal Code or by other relevant statutory provisions based on, or applicable only to, the rules for felonies under the Code.
While it is true that the penalty of 14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of
the medium period of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for
carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not
correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539
and special laws of the same formulation. For this reason, we hold that the proper penalty to be imposed on each of accused-
appellants is an indeterminate sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months, as
maximum.[67] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Appellant being then culpable for carnapping under the first clause of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, the
imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months, not more than 17 years and 4 months,[68] for, as
discussed above, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code cannot be applied suppletorily and, therefore, the alleged aggravating
circumstance of grave abuse of confidence cannot be appreciated.
Applying Section 1 of Act No. 4103,[69] as amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is
punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same the penalty
imposed being a range.[70]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, in Crim Case No. Q-97-71956, finding
appellant Luisito D.Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another judgment
entered in its place, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping under Republic Act No. 6539, as amended
and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of Fourteen (14) Years and Eight (8) Months, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years
and Four (4) Months, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

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