530 Phil.

59

GARCIA, J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
Decision[1] dated October 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 17235, affirming in toto
an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 17, which found herein petitioners
guilty of the crime of libel.

The antecedent facts:

On March 24, 1992, in the RTC of Davao City, the city prosecutor of Davao, at the instance of one Aproniano
Rivera, filed an Information[2] for libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code
against the herein petitioners, Tony N. Figueroa and Rogelio J. Flaviano. Docketed in the same court as
Criminal Case No. 25,957-92 and raffled to Branch 17 thereof, the Information alleges as follows:
That on or about April 9, 1991, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-mentioned accused, Tony VN. Figueroa, writer under the column entitled "Footprints" of the
People's Daily Forum, conspiring, confederating and helping one another with his co-accused Rogelio J.
Flaviano, Publisher-Editor of the same magazine, with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, integrity,
character as well as the reputation and the social standing of one Aproniano Rivera and with intent to cast
dishonor, discredit and contempt upon said Aproniano Rivera, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously published
in the People's Daily Forum, a news publication as follows:
"Bangkerohan public market these days is no different from the US Times Square. Bullies, thugs, hooligans and
gyppers roam with impunity, some using organizational clout as a ploy to keep themselves from obvious
exposure. Some leeches, like a certain Aproniano "Rey" Rivera, our sources say, are lording it over like the
city's sprawling vegetable and meat complex has become an apportioned bailiwick.

"Rivera, apparently a non-Visayan pseudobully flaunting with his tag as president of a vendor's federation, has
intimated a good number of lowly hawkers. This is a confirmed fact, our sources believe. And our independent
eveasdroppers [sic] have come with a similar perception of a man who continues to lead a federation when, in
the first place, he has no business being in Davao or in Bankerohan.

"Often, Mr. "Re" (King?) Rivera strolls the stretches which criss-cross the Bankerohan confines with the
arrogance of a tribal chieftain; the only differences, however, are that: he uses no G-strings, speaks in some
strange Luzon lingo and twang, and has no solid leadership. Our reports have finely outlined the mechanics of
Rivera's tactics despite assertions the man is nothing but a paper tiger conveniently propped up by federation
members loyal to his sometime indecent role as a sachem.

"This man, the sources add, is backed by powerful city government hooligans who, it was reported, have direct
hand in the planned manipulation in the distribution of stalls to privileged applicants. Even if he has reportedly
sold his interest in the public market, which should be reason enough for him to resign from his position, Rivera
still carries the false aura of intimidating poor vendors and imposing his insensible remarks about what must be
done about the governance of Bangkerohan.

"Sometimes its hard to compel a man with Rivera's mind about the nuances of honorable resignation. May iba
d'yan na pakapalan na lang ng mukha!"

xxx xxx xxx

"Rivera, however, must be consoled in knowing he's not alone with his dirty antics. Romy Miclat, a president of
a meat vendors group in Bankerohan, and his board member, Erning Garcia, have tacitly followed the way of
the thugs, floating little fibs to gullible victims. Our moles have gathered the due are seeling [sic] the new
public market stalls for P9,000 with the assurances that the buyer gets a display area ordinarily occupied by two
applicants. A lot more have fallen prey to the scheme, and more the blindly swallowing all the books the two
are peddling.

"This dilemma has been there for so long, but the city hall, RCDP, and the city council have continuously
evaded the vicious cabal of men out to derail the raffling of the stalls to applicants. Some believe strongly this is
odd, but they can only whimper at their helplessness against power-brokers who have taken over the dominance
of Bangkerohan. One of the likely victims in this filthy machination are the sinapo vendors who have become
explosively furious over the snafu they are facing because of the manipulation of stalls inside Bangkerohan.
"Insiders continuo[u]sly tell of woeful tales about how they have been given runarounds by many so-called
public servants, but they have maintained their composures quite curiously. They are talking, however, of anger
which, our sources [s]ay, may end up with a bloody retaliation. This probability is looming more lucid every
day the officials handling the Bangkerohan stall mess are condoning their plight. Even politicos are oddly silent
about the whole controversy for some unknown reasons. It looks like the alleged schemes perpetrated by
Rivera, Miclat and Garcia will remain unperturbed, no thanks to power-brokers."
which newspaper was read by the people throughout Davao City, to the dishonor, discredit and contempt upon
said Aproniano Rivera.

Contrary to law.
On arraignment, petitioners as accused, assisted by counsel, entered a common plea of "Not Guilty." Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued.

On June 8, 1993, the RTC rendered its decision[3] finding both petitioners guilty as charged and accordingly
sentenced them, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to prove the guilt of both accused, Tony
Figueroa and Rogelio Flaviano, columnist and publisher-editor, respectively of the People's Daily Forum, of the
offense charged, beyond reasonable doubt; their evidence adduced is not sufficient to afford their exoneration,
pursuant to Art. 355 in relation to Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, without any mitigating ot [sic]
aggravating circumstances, proved in the commission of the offense charged, imposing the indeterminate
sentence law, both accused are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of five
months and one day of arresto mayor maximum as minimum penalty, to two years four months and 31 days of
prision correccional minimum as maximum penalty with accessory penalty as provided for by law.

Moreover, pursuant to Art. 100 in relation to Art. 104 of the Revised Penal Code, governing civil indemnity,
both accused are ordered to pay jointly and solidarily the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages to
complainant, Aproniano Rivera and the amount of P10,000.00 by way of attorney's fees with costs.

Without any aggravating circumstances proved by the prosecution, in the commission of the offense charged
exemplary damages against both accused, cannot be awarded. x x x

SO ORDERED.
From the trial court's judgment of conviction, petitioners went to the CA whereat their appellate recourse was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17235.

As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed Decision[4] dated October 11, 2002, affirmed
that of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED in all
respects.

SO ORDERED.
Undaunted, petitioners are now with this Court via this petition for review on their submissions that the CA
erred -

1. IN HOLDING THAT THE COLUMN ENTITLED "FOOTPRINTS" OF THE PEOPLE'S

DAILY FORUM IS LIBELOUS OR DEFAMATORY TO PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
APRONIANO RIVERA;
2.
3. IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER, HENCE
THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN THE PURVIEW
OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION;
4.
5. IN UPHOLDING THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.

The petition lacks merit.

In praying for their acquittal, petitioners attempt to pass off the subject published article as one that portrays the
condition of the Bankerohan Public Market in general. Citing Jimenez v. Reyes,[5] they challenge the finding of
the two courts below on the libelous or defamatory nature of the same article which, to them, must be read and
construed in its entirety. It is their posture that the article was not directed at the private character of
complainant Aproniano Rivera but on the sorry state of affairs at the Bankerohan Public Market.
Petitioners' posture cannot save the day for them.

Our own reading of the entire text of the published article convinces us of its libelous or defamatory character.
While it is true that a publication's libelous nature depends on its scope, spirit and motive taken in their entirety,
the article in question as a whole explicitly makes mention of private complainant Rivera all throughout. It
cannot be said that the article was a mere general commentary on the alleged existing state of affairs at the
aforementioned public market because Rivera was not only specifically pointed out several times therein but
was even tagged with derogatory names. Indubitably, this name-calling was, as correctly found by the two
courts below, directed at the very person of Rivera himself.

If, as argued, the published article was indeed merely intended to innocently present the current condition of the
Bankerohan Public Market, there would then be no place in the article for the needless name-calling which it is
wrought full of. It is beyond comprehension how calling Rivera a "leech," "a paper tiger," a "non-Visayan
pseudobully" with the "arrogance of a tribal chieftain" save for his speaking in "some strange Luzon lingo and
twang" and who "has no business being in Davao or Bankerohan" can ever be regarded or viewed as comments
free of malice. As it is, the tag and description thus given Rivera have no place in a general account of the
situation in the public market, and cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be construed to be anything other
than what they really are: defamatory and libelous in nature, and definitely directed at the private character of
complainant Rivera. For indeed, no logical connection can possibly be made between Rivera's Luzon origin and
the conditions of the Bankerohan Public Market. Doubtless, the words used in the article reek of venom towards
the very person of Rivera.

Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as follows:

Art. 353. Definition of libel. - A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means injuring a person's character, fame or reputation through
false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect,
goodwill or confidence in the complainant or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about him. It is the
publication of anything which is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into
disrepute.[6]

In the light of the numerable defamatory imputations made against complainant Rivera as a person, the article in
dispute, even taken, as urged, in its totality, undeniably caused serious damage to his character and person and
clearly injurious to his reputation.

At any rate, in libel cases, the question is not what the writer of the libelous material means, but what the words
used by him mean.[7] Here, the defamatory character of the words used by the petitioners is shown by the very
recitals thereof in the questioned article.

It is next contended by the petitioners that Rivera is a public officer. On this premise, they invoke in their favor
the application of one of the exceptions to the legal presumption of the malicious nature of every defamatory
imputation, as provided for under paragraph (2), Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be
true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers
in the exercise of their functions.

Again, as correctly found by both the trial court and the CA, Rivera is not a public officer or employee but a
private citizen. Hence, the published article cannot be considered as falling within the ambit of privileged
communication within the context of the above-quoted provision of the Penal Code.

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which an individual is invested
with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public. The individual so invested is a public officer. The most important characteristic which distinguishes an
office from an employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involve a delegation to the
individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, to
be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public
officer.[8]

Clearly, Rivera cannot be considered a public officer. Being a member of the market committee did not vest
upon him any sovereign function of the government, be it legislative, executive or judicial. As reasoned out by
the CA, the operation of a public market is not a governmental function but merely an activity undertaken by
the city in its private proprietary capacity. Furthermore, Rivera's membership in the market committee was in
representation of the association of market vendors, a non-governmental organization belonging to the private
sector.

Indeed, even if we were to pretend that Rivera was a public officer, which he clearly is not, the subject article
still would not pass muster as Article 354(2), supra, of the Revised Penal Code expressly requires that it be a
"fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks." Even a mere cursory glance at the
article reveals that it is far from being that.

Finally, petitioners assail the award by the two courts below of moral damages and attorney's fees in favor of
Rivera.

The assault must fail. Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code is express in stating that moral damages may be
recovered in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. From the very publication and circulation of
the subject defamatory and libelous material itself, there can be no doubt as to the resulting wounded feelings
and besmirched reputation sustained by complainant Rivera. The branding of defamatory names against him
most certainly exposed him to public contempt and ridicule. As found by the trial court in its judgment of
conviction:
Complainant, when he read the subject publication, was embarrass on what was written against him, made more
unpleasant on the occasion of the reunion of his son-in-law, who just arrived from the United States for the first
time, was confronted of the above-defamatory publication. He was worried and depressed, about the comments
against him, affecting his credibility and personality, as representative of many market organizations in Davao
City.
Having been exposed to embarrassment and ridicule occasioned by the publication of the subject article, Rivera
is entitled to moral damages and attorney's fees.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed CA Decision dated October 11, 2002 is
AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

[ GR No. 180762, Mar 04, 2009 ]

PEOPLE v. CARLITO DE LEON +
DECISION

599 Phil. 759

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26390
which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija, Branch 35[2] finding
herein appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of arson and sentencing them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the private complainant P2,000.00 as temperate damages and
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
On June 14, 1989, an Information[3] was filed charging Gaudencio Legaspi, Carlito de Leon, Bien de Leon,
Cornelio Cabildo and Filoteo de Leon with the crime of arson. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 5th day of April, 1986, in the Municipality of Peñaranda, Province of Nueva Ecija,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually aiding and helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously burn or set on fire the house of one RAFAEL MERCADO, an inhabited house or dwelling, to
the damage and prejudice of said Rafael Mercado in an amount that may be awarded to him under the Civil
Code of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Gaudencio Legaspi died on February 5, 1987 prior to his arraignment.[5]

Appellants Bien de Leon,[6] Carlito de Leon,[7] Filoteo de Leon[8] and Nelio Cabildo[9] were subsequently
arraigned and they all pleaded not guilty to the charge.

The facts of the case are as follows:

At around 8:30 in the evening of April 5, 1986, Aquilina Mercado Rint (Aquilina) and her sister Leonisa
Mercado (Leonisa), together with their nephew Narciso Mercado Jr., (Junior) were inside a hut owned by their
father Rafael Mercado[10] (Rafael) located on a tumana in Polillo, San Josef, Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija. The loud
and insistent barking of their dog prompted Aquilina to peep through the window and saw five men
approaching the premises whom she recognized as Gaudencio Legaspi and herein appellants. Aquilina and
Leonisa hurriedly went out of the hut and hid behind a pile of wood nearby while Junior was dispatched to call
for help.

From their hiding place, they saw appellants surround the hut[11] and set to fire the cogon roofing.[12] While the
hut was burning, Leonisa grabbed a flashlight from her sister and focused the same at the group in order to see
them more clearly. Upon seeing a light focused on them, Gaudencio ordered the others to leave and the men
immediately fled the premises.[13] By the time Junior arrived with his uncles, the hut was already razed to the
ground.

On April 6, 1986, Police Officer Lucio Mercado (Lucio) conducted an investigation at the scene of the crime
and saw a big wood still on fire. A certain Julio took pictures of the remains of the hut.[14]

Aquilina and Leonisa valued the hut at P3,000.00 and claimed that a pair of earrings, some beddings, rice,
P1,500.00 in cash and plenty of wood were also lost in the fire.[15] They also testified that prior to the incident,
appellants had been to the premises, destroyed the plants, the fence and a hut which was first built therein.
Appellants likewise physically attacked their father and issued threats that if he would not give up his claim on
the land, something untoward would happen to him; and that their father Rafael filed several cases for
Malicious Mischief, Forcible Entry and Serious Physical Injuries against appellants.

Appellants denied the charge against them.

Carlito alleged that on the day of the alleged incident, he was working in Cavite where he had been staying for a
year with his family; that his uncle Gaudencio was originally in possession of the tumana contrary to Rafael's
claims; that his uncle used to plant vegetables and make charcoal therein until 1975 when he took over upon the
latter's request; and that when Gaudencio passed away in 1987, he applied for a patent over the tumana with the
Bureau of Lands.[16]

Carlito also alleged that there was actually no structure on the premises because Rafael's attempt to build a hut
was foiled by his helper, herein appellant Nelio.[17] On cross-examination however, he admitted that on March
12, 1986, he destroyed the first hut constructed by Rafael on the subject tumana when the prosecution
confronted him with evidence which showed that he was found guilty of Malicious Mischief in Criminal Case
No. 1985 filed against him by Rafael before the Municipal Trial Court of Peñaranda.[18]

Nelio testified that on the day of the incident, the appellants were in their respective homes and could not have
gone to the tumana to commit the crime as charged; that the burnt parts depicted in the pictures presented by the
prosecution were actually parts of tree trunks turned to charcoal; and that the cogon and bamboo shown in the
pictures were materials brought by Rafael into the landholding during the latter's unsuccessful attempt to build a
hut on the tumana.[19]

Bien also vehemently denied the charges against him and attributed the same to complainants' desire to grab the
tumana which rightfully belongs to his mother. He testified that since 1982, he has been living in Rizal, Nueva
Ecija which is about 35 kilometers away from Peñaranda.[20] For his part, Filoteo corroborated the claims made
by his co-appellants.[21]

On December 14, 2001, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:
In the light of the foregoing, the prosecution had established the guilt of all the accused Carlito de Leon, Bien de
Leon, Cornelio "aka" Nelio Cabildo and Filoteo de Leon beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of arson, and
they are hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to 14 years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Rafael Mercado the sum of P3,000.00 representing the value of the burned hut.

SO ORDERED.[22]
Appellants appealed before the Court of Appeals which rendered the herein assailed Decision affirming with
modification the decision of the court a quo, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants
Carlito de Leon, Bien de Leon, Cornelio Cabildo and Filoteo de Leon are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of private complainant Rafael Mercado the sum of Php2,000 as
temperate damages and Php20,000 as exemplary damages. Costs against accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.[23]
Hence, this appeal.

Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1613[24] amending the law on arson provides:
Sec. 3. Other Cases of Arson. - The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the
property burned is any of the following:

1. x x x
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;

xxxx

Section 4 of the same law provides that if the crime of arson was committed by a syndicate, i.e., if it is planned
or carried out by a group of three or more persons, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.

Under the following provision, the elements of arson are: (a) there is intentional burning; and, (b) what is
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. The appellate court correctly found that the prosecution
was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the presence of the two essential elements of the offense.

Although intent may be an ingredient of the crime of arson, it may be inferred from the acts of the
accused. There is a presumption that one intends the natural consequences of his act; and when it is shown that
one has deliberately set fire to a building, the prosecution is not bound to produce further evidence of his
wrongful intent.[25] If there is an eyewitness to the crime of arson, he can give in detail the acts of the
accused. When this is done the only substantial issue is the credibility of the witness.[26]

In the instant case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, found the testimonies of witnesses Aquilina
and Leonisa worthy of credence, thus:
The inconsistencies and contradictions presented in the case at bench do not detract from the fact that Rafael's
house was intentionally burned by accused-appellants who were positively identified by witnesses Aquilina and
Leonisa. In the face of these positive declarations, accused-appellants' puerile attempt to discredit them
crumples into dust.[27]
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any
clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would have affected the result of the case. Having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their behavior and manner of testifying, the trial judge was in a better position to determine their
credibility.[28]

The testimony of Aquilina that she witnessed the burning of her father's hut by appellants is positive and
categorical, thus:
ATTY. BAUTO:
 Where were you when according to you they burned the house of your father? that house where you
Q.
were residing?
A. I was in the tumana, sir.

Q. In the house or outside the house?

A. Outside of the house, sir.

Q. Why were you outside of the house?

When they were arriving or entering the premises of the house of my father or the tumana, our dog
A.
barked and we peeped thru the window, sir.

Q. What did you see?

A. We saw that men are coming, sir.

Q. How many men are coming?

A. Five men, sir.

Q. Were you able to recognize them when they were approaching the house?
A. Yes sir we recognize them.

Q. What did you do?

A. We went outside of the house, sir.

Q. Where did you go?

A. We hid ourselves behind the files (sic) of wood, sir.

Q. How far is that file (sic) of wood from the house of your father?
A. More or less seven meters, sir.

Q. Why did you, in the first place, go out of the house when you saw them coming?
A. Because we wanted to hide, sir.

Q. Why were you apprehensive?

A. Because they were our adversary, sir. (Kalaban po namin sila.)

xxxx

Q. Who were with you when you went out of the house?
Only my sister Leonisa because I already instructed my nephew to go to our house when we noticed
A.
them coming and I instructed him to fetch my brothers, sir.

Q. When you were already behind the files (sic) of wood what happened next?
They surrounded our house and they lighted it up with match, sir. (Pinaikutan po nila ang aming
A.
bahay at sinilaban.)

Q. Who first lighted a match for purposes of burning the house?

A. Gaudencio Legaspi, sir.

Q. And what did the others do after Gaudencio Legaspi lighted a match?
A. They also lighted their matches, sir.

COURT:

Q. You mean the five had their matches at the time?

A. Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q. What portion of the house was lighted first?

A. The cogon roofing of the hut, sir. That was the portion that could be easily burned.[29]
Positive identification, where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and
convincing proof, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. The appellants had not
shown that it was physically impossible for them to be present at the time and place of the crime.[30]

Thus, we find no reason to disturb the trial court's reliance on the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses. Findings and conclusions of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses enjoy, as a rule, a badge of
respect, for trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. Only the trial
judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness,
sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a
witness' honesty and sincerity.[31]

Proof of the corpus delicti is indispensable in the prosecution of arson, as in all kinds of criminal
offenses. Corpus delicti means the substance of the crime; it is the fact that a crime has actually been
committed. In arson, the corpus delicti is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire, e.g., the
charred remains of a house burned down and of its having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated
testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant
conviction.[32] The corpus delicti has been satisfactorily proven in the instant case.

The appellate court correctly imposed the penalty in its maximum period, i.e., reclusion perpetua considering
the presence of the special aggravating circumstance. The crime was committed by a syndicate since it was
carried out by a group of three or more persons.

On the matter of damages, the appellate court likewise correctly awarded temperate damages in the amount of
P2,000.00. In view of the presence of the special aggravating circumstance, exemplary damages in the amount
of P20,000.00 is likewise appropriate.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
26390, finding appellants Carlito de Leon, Bien de Leon, Cornelio Cabildo and Filoteo de Leon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of arson, sentencing them to suffer the penalty reclusion perpetua and ordering
them to pay the heirs of private complainant Rafael Mercado P2,000.00 as temperate damages and P20,000.00
as exemplary damages, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 127694. May 31, 2000]

QUIRICO MARI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The case before the Court is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the conviction of petitioner Quirico Mari for the offense of serious
slander by deed is hereby AFFIRMED, but with a modified penalty of one (1) month and
one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months of
prision correctional, as maximum.

"SO ORDERED."1[1]

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

Complainant Norma Capintoy and petitioner Quirico Mari were co-employees in the Department of
Agriculture, with office at Digos, Davao del Sur, although complainant occupied a higher position.

On December 6, 1991, petitioner borrowed from complainant the records of his 201 file. However,
when he returned the same three days later, complainant noticed that several papers were missing
which included official communications from the Civil Service Commission and Regional Office,
Department of Agriculture, and a copy of the complaint by the Rural Bank of Digos against petitioner.
Upon instruction of her superior officer, Honorio Lumain, complainant sent a memorandum to
petitioner asking him to explain why his 201 file was returned with missing documents.

Instead of acknowledging receipt of the memorandum, petitioner confronted complainant and angrily
shouted at her: "Putang ina, bullshit, bugo." He banged a chair in front of complainant and choked
her. With the intervention of the security guard, petitioner was prevailed upon to desist from further
injuring complainant.

Petitioner's version is that, he borrowed from complainant his service record and not his 201 file
which contained his personal records. The service record which he borrowed did not include the
missing documents. Acknowledging that complainant was higher in rank than him, he claimed that it
was complainant who provoked him into acting the way he did and he was just reacting to the
provocation.

On January 7, 1992, complainant filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Digos, Davao del Sur a criminal
complaint against petitioner for slander by deed.2[2]

On May 20, 1992, complainant filed an amended criminal complaint, adding that the crime was
aggravated by the fact that the offended party was a woman.3[3]

After trial, on September 22, 1994, the Municipal Trial Court, Digos, Davao del Sur rendered decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

"In the light of the foregoing, the court is of the opinion that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged and that private complainant has been slandered and embarrassed by
the accused.

"Finding, therefore, accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge filed against
him and crediting in favor of the prosecution one (1) ordinary aggravating circumstance,
the Court hereby sentences the accused to an Indeterminate Sentence of five (5)
months and eleven (11) days to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days
and to pay private complainant the amount of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS as
moral damages, FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS attorneys fees and to
reimburse her the cost of suit.

"Private complainant is, however, ordered to pay the docket fee corresponding to the
damages she is entitled to receive, by virtue of this decision.

"SO ORDERED.

"Digos, Davao del Sur, September 22, 1994."4[4]

In due time, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court.

After due proceedings, on December 1, 1995, the Regional Trial Court, Davao del Sur, Digos, Branch
19 rendered decision adopting the trial court's findings of fact, and affirming the appealed decision in
toto.5[5]

On June 18, 1996, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. 6[6]

On July 16, 1996, the Court of Appeals ordered respondents to file their comment on the petition,
which shall be considered as an answer in the event the petition is given due course.7[7]

On December 9, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming the judgment a quo
convicting petitioner of serious slander by deed, but modifying the penalty to an indeterminate
sentence of one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and four
(4) months of prision correccional, as maximum.8[8]

Hence, this appeal.9[9]

At issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the conviction of petitioner for serious
slander by deed assailing the trial court's finding that petitioner shouted invectives at complainant in
the presence of several persons and then choked her. Petitioner submits that the prosecution failed to
prove that he choked the complainant; that the choking was an after-thought as shown by
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

The issue raised is factual, which would bar us from reviewing the same in an appeal via
certiorari.10[10] The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court,11[11] unless the case falls
under any of the exceptions to the rule,12[12] such as diverse factual findings of the lower courts13[13] or
the findings are entirely grounded on speculations.14[14] Petitioner failed to prove that the case falls
within the exceptions.15[15]

However, we regret to note that the Municipal Trial Court, Digos, Davao del Sur, the Regional Trial
Court, Digos, Davao del Sur and even the Court of Appeals erred in the proper application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.

In the first place, the municipal trial court found the attendance of an "ordinary aggravating
circumstance." The court did not state what this aggravating circumstance was, as required.16[16]
True, the amended criminal complaint alleged that the crime had been aggravated by the fact that the
offended party is a woman. However, the mere fact that the victim is a woman is not per se an
aggravating circumstance.17[17] There was no finding that the evidence proved that the accused in fact
deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim, or showed manifest disrespect to the
offended woman or displayed some specific insult or disrespect to her womanhood. There was no
proof of specific fact or circumstance, other than the victim is a woman, showing insult or disregard of
sex in order that it may be considered as aggravating circumstance.18[18] Hence, such aggravating
circumstance was not proved, and indeed, in the circumstances of this case may not be considered
as aggravating.19[19] Consequently, the trial court erred in "crediting in favor of the prosecution one (1)
ordinary aggravating circumstance." On review, the Regional Trial Court Judge did not notice the
error because it did not make its own findings of fact, and followed the line of least resistance by
simply adopting the trial courts "finding of fact as well as its reasons for making so." Neither did the
Court of Appeals notice the error, even if the Solicitor General in his comment noted that the
sentence imposed on the accused was excessive, meaning that there was no aggravating
circumstance proved.20[20]

In the second place, in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court shall fix minimum and
maximum penalties.21[21] If the offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code, as in this case, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the
Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.22[22] The court shall fix the minimum penalty
within the number of months or years covered by the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed
by the Code for the offense without regard to any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime.23[23] The court has the unqualified discretion to fix the term of the minimum
penalty.24[24] The only limitation is that it must be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense committed, without regard to its three (3) periods 25[25] or
reference to the degrees into which it may be subdivided.26[26] Then, the court shall fix the maximum
period. In doing so, the court shall now consider the attending circumstances, finding whether any
modifying circumstance attended the commission of the crime. In this case, there was no modifying
circumstance, hence, the maximum penalty imposable must be within the range of the medium period
of the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense.27[27] The penalty prescribed by law for serious
slander by deed under Article 359 of the Revised Penal Code is arresto mayor maximum to prision
correccional minimum or four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months or a
fine ranging from P200.00 to P1,000.00. The penalty next lower in degree is arresto mayor minimum
and medium periods, or one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months. Consequently, the
minimum shall be taken from any of its periods, but must be definite, say, one (1) month and one (1)
day, as minimum. The maximum shall be taken from the medium period of the prescribed penalty,
that is, within the range of one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional but also a specific, definite, fixed period, say, one (1) year and one (1) day, as maximum.
Notice that the trial court imposed five months of arresto mayor as minimum, exceeding the range
provided by law. However, the minimum fixed by the Court of Appeals was correct, that is, one (1)
month and one (1) day of arresto mayor. The maximum fixed by the trial court of two (2) years, eleven
(11) months and eleven (11) days was wrong as it exceeded the prescribed range because that
period is within the maximum of the penalty prescribed by the Code, which could not be imposed in
the absence of any aggravating circumstance. The maximum penalty fixed by the Court of Appeals
(two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional) was also wrong because it exceeded the
range of the medium period of the prescribed penalty.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it would serve the ends of justice better if the petitioner were
sentenced to pay a fine instead of imprisonment. The offense while considered serious slander by
deed was done in the heat of anger28[28] and was in reaction to a perceived provocation. The penalty
for serious slander by deed may be either imprisonment or a fine.29[29] We opt to impose a fine.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals and in lieu
thereof renders judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of serious slander by deed
defined and penalized under Article 359 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to pay a fine
of P1,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
With costs.

SO ORDERED.