EN BANC G.R. No.

L-17828 August 31, 1963 HELD: YES

LIGAYA MINA, JAIME MINA, SILVINA MINA, FAUSTA MINA,
PABLO MINA and MIGUEL MINA, the minors represented by PILAR LAZO as
guardian-ad-litem, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ANTONIA PACSON, CRISPINO MEDINA and CRESENCIA MINA, defendants-
appellees.
LABRADOR, J.:
FACTS:
-Plaintiffs, all surnamed Mina, are alleged to be the illegitimate children of
the deceased Joaquin Mina with plaintiff Pilar Lazo from 1933-1958, while
married to Antonia Pacson.
-Joaquin Mina died in August, 1958, leaving no descendants nor
ascendants except his widow, the defendant herein Antonia Pacson.
-On April 9, 1958, Joaquin Mina, then still living, executed a deed of
absolute sale of three parcels of land situated in the municipality of
Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, in favor of the defendants Crispino Medina and
Cresencia Mina for the sum of P12,000.
-On April 15, 1958 again he executed another deed of sale of parcels of
land covered by 12 transfer certificates of title to the same spouses
Crispino Medina and Cresencia Mina. Both deeds of sale bear the
conformity of his wife Antonia Pacson
-COURT ORDER: Plaintiffs are hereby directed to amend their complaint
within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof by including as party
defendant the surviving widow of the deceased Joaquin Mina and other
necessary parties.
-Plaintiffs failed to do so  Court dismissed
RATIO:
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE; FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ORDER TO IMPLEAD
INDISPENSABLE PARTY. — Appellants' contention that the dismissal of the
complaint in the previous action was "at the indirect instance of the
plaintiffs through inaction or omission," is not supported by the facts of the
case, because the order of the court dismissing the complaint in the first
case contained the warning that should the plaintiffs fail to comply with its
order to implead the surviving widow of the deceased and other necessary
parties, the case would be dismissed, and it was because of plaintiffs'
refusal to comply with this express mandate that the dismissal was
ordered. The dismissal was, therefore, justified under Rule 30, Section 3 of
the Rules of Court
RES JUDICATA; COMPLETE IDENTITY NECESSARY; PARTIES NOT INCLUDED
AND MATTERS NOT RAISED IN PREVIOUS CASE NOT BARRED. — The
previous order of dismissal bars the present complaint only as to matters
already presented in the previous care, like the action for annulment of the
deeds of sale as regards the defendants named therein, but matters not
raised and parties not included in the previous case are not barred, like the
action for the recognition of the filiation of the plaintiffs against the
defendant widow of the deceased alleged father.

ISSUE: WON the failure to comply with the order of the court warrants
dismissal
CASEÑAS vs. ROSALES G.R. No. L-18707 February 28, 1967
FACTS: Arañas and Caseñas filed with the CFI of Agusan, a complaint for
specific performance and enforcement of their alleged right under a certain
deed of sale, and damages against the spousesRosales. They alleged that
sometime in 1939, Agustin O. Caseñas acquired from Rodolfo Arañas under
a deed of assignment, the latter's rights and interest over a parcel of land ,
that Rodolfo Arañas in turn, acquired the said property from the spouses
Jose A. Rosales and Concepcion Sanchez under a deed of sale ,under the
terms of which, however, the actual transfer of the aforesaid land unto the
vendee would be made only on or before February 18, 1941; and that
despite the above documented transactions, and despite the arrival of the
stipulated period for the execution of the final deed of transfer, the vendors
spouses refused to fulfill their obligation to effect such transfer of the said lot
to the vendee, Rodolfo Arañas or his assignee, the herein appellant, Agustin
O. Caseñas.
After the defendants-spouses had filed their answer to the above complaint,
but before trial, the counsel for the plaintiffs gave notice to the trial court that
plaintiff Rodolfo Arañas and defendant Jose A. Rosales had both died.
In view of the said manifestation, the lower court, directed the surviving
plaintiff, Agustin O. Caseñas, to amend the complaint to effect the necessary
substitution of parties thereon. The said surviving plaintiff, however, failed
altogether to comply with the aforementioned order.
LC dismissed the case for failure on the part of the counsel for the plaintiffs
to comply with the order of this Court which shows abandonment and lack of
interest on the part of the plaintiffs.
Casenas, filed with the same CFI of Agusan, another complaint against the
widow and heirs of the late Jose A. Rosales "to quiet, and for reconveyance
of, title to real property, with damages. This suit referred itself to the very
same property litigated under Civil Case No. 261 and asserted exactly the
same .
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds, namely: res
judicata, prescription, lack of cause of action, failure to include indispensable
parties, and that the contract subject of the complaint was void ab initio. After
the plaintiff had filed his opposition to the above motion, the lcissued the
order under appeal dismissing the complaint.
Of the above grounds, though, the lower court relied alone on the
defendants' plea of res judicata, lack of cause of action and prescription.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the lower court was proper.
HELD: No, the SC remanded the case to the court of origin.
When certain of the parties to Civil Case No. 261 died and due notice thereof
was given to the trial court, it devolved on the said court to order, not the
amendment of the complaint, but the appearance of the legal representatives
of the deceased in accordance with the procedure and manner outlined in
Rule 3, Section 17 of the Rules of Court.
In the case of Barrameda vs. Barbara, 90 Phil. 718, the SC held that an order
to amend the complaint, before the proper substitution of parties as directed
by the aforequoted rule has been effected, is void and imposes upon the
plaintiff no duty to comply therewith to the end that an order dismissing the
said complaint, for such non-compliance, would similarly be void.
In a subsequent case, Ferriera et al. vs. Gonzalez, et al., G.R. No. L-11567,
July 17, 1958, this court affirmed a similar conclusion on the determination
that the continuance of a proceedings during the pendency of which a party
thereto dies, without such party having been validly substituted in
accordance with the rules, amounts to a "lack of jurisdiction."
The facts of this case fit four squares into the Barrameda case abovecited,
save for the minor variance that in the former two of the litigants died while
only one predeceased the case in Barrameda. Here, as in Barrameda, during
the pendency of civil case, notice was given to the trial court of the deaths of
one of the plaintiffs and one of the defendants in it. Instead of ordering the
substitution of the deceased's legal representatives in accordance with Rule
3, section 17 of the Rules of Court, the trial court directed the surviving
plaintiff to amend the complaint and when the latter failed to comply
therewith, the said court dismissed the complaint for such non-compliance.
We must hold, therefore, as We did in Barrameda that inasmuch as there
was no obligation on the part of the plaintiff-appellant herein to amend his
complaint in Civil Case No. 261, any such imposition being void, his failure to
comply with such an order did not justify the dismissal of his complaint.
Grounded as it was upon a void order, the dismissal was itself void.
Consequently, as the dismissal of Civil Case No. 261 was void, it clearly may
not be asserted to bar the subsequent prosecution of the same or identical
claim.
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal
right or rights of the other (Ma-ao Sugar Central vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666) and
both these elements were clearly alleged in the aforesaid complaint.
The resolution of the issue of prescription may be deferred until after the
case is tried on the merits where the defense pleaded against said issue is
the existence of a trust over the property in dispute.

AV.11 Republic Planters Bank v. Molina, GR. NO. 54287, September
28, 1988, 166 SCRA 39 (1988)
TITLE Republic Planters Bank v. Molina | GR. NO. 54287
MAIN For the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it
POINT must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. If it
did not acquire jurisdiction over the private respondents, it cannot
render any binding decision, favorable or adverse to them, or dismiss
the case with prejudice which, in effect, is an adjudication on the
merits.
FACTS Republic Planters Bank filed a complaint against private respondent,
for the collection of a sum of money based on a promissory note dated
January 26, 1970, in the amount of P100,000.00. On May 21, 1979,
Judge Alfredo C. Florendo dismissed Civil Case No. 116028 for failure
of the petitioner "to prosecute its case within a reasonable length of
time. A motion for reconsideration of that order was denied on January
15, 1979.
When Civil Case No. 129829 was filed by petitioner, a motion to
dismiss was submitted by private respondents on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by a prior judgment (res judicata) in Civil
Case No. 116028. Private respondents opined that said order was an
adjudication upon the merits. Petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss,
claiming that res judicata does not apply because the summons and
complaint in Civil Case No. 116028 were never served upon private
respondents and, as such, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction
over private respondents and, consequently, over the case. Petitioner
maintains that the order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 11 6028 never
became final as against private respondents.
RTC: Dismissed the complaint on the ground that the orders issued by Judge
Alfredo C. Florendo, dismissing Civil Case No. 116028, had become
final. The trial court ruled that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 116028
had the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, that the dismissal was
with prejudice since the order was unconditional, and that the lack of
jurisdiction over defendants (private respondents) in Civil Case No.
116028 was of no moment. 3
In a motion for reconsideration, petitioner reiterated its allegation that
in Civil Case No. 116028, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
private respondents and that at the time the court ordered its dismissal,
a motion for an alias writ of summons was pending resolution
inasmuch as the sheriff had not acted on the same. The motion for
reconsideration was denied by the trial court.
CA: Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals both questioned orders of
respondent court in Civil Case No. 129829. But then, petitioner sought
a more speedy remedy in questioning said orders by filing this petition
for certiorari before this Court.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion when it
ordered Civil Case No. 129829 dismissed on the ground of res judicata
it appearing that Civil Case No. 116028 was dismissed on May 21,
1979, for failure of petitioner to prosecute within a reasonable length
of time, although in the said case, the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of private respondents.
RULING: The questioned orders of the trial court in Civil Case No. 129829
supporting private respondent's motion to dismiss on the ground of res
judicata are without cogent basis. We sustain petitioner's claim that
respondent trial judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when
he issued said orders because he thereby traversed the constitutional
precept that "no person shall be deprived of property without due
process of law" and that jurisdiction is vitally essential for any order or
adjudication to be binding. Justice cannot be sacrificed for technicality.
Originally, the action for collection of the loan, evidenced by a
promissory note, was only for P100,000.00 but petitioner claims that as
of March 5, 1981, the obligation was already P429,219.74. It is a
cardinal rule that no one must be allowed to enrich himself at the
expense of another without just cause.
In the very order of dismissal of Civil Case No. 116028, the trial court
admitted that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of private
respondents and yet, it held that it was of no moment as to the
dismissal of the case. We disagree. For the court to have authority to
dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties. If it did not acquire jurisdiction over the
private respondents as parties to Civil Case No. 116028, it cannot
render any binding decision, favorable or adverse to them, or dismiss
the case with prejudice which, in effect, is an adjudication on the
merits. The controverted orders in Civil Case No. 116028 disregarded
the fundamental principles of remedial law and the meaning and the
effect of jurisdiction. A judgment, to be considered res judicata, must
be binding, and must be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Otherwise, the judgment is a nullity.
The order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 116028 does not have the
effect of an adjudication on the merits of the case because the court
that rendered the same did not have the requisite jurisdiction over the
persons of the defendants therein.
This being so, it cannot be the basis of res judicata and it cannot be a
bar to a lawful claim. If at all, such a dismissal may be considered as
one without prejudice. Trial courts have the duty to dispose of

controversies after trial on the merits whenever possible.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15814 February 28, 1962
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CANDELARIA BENGUAN, deceased.
SUSANA ABAY DE ARROYO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
FRANCISCO ABAY, CONRADO ABAY, JR., JOSE ABAY and NORMA
ABAY, opponents-appellees.
PADILLA, J.:
On 5 January 1956 Susana Abay de Arroyo filed in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental a petition for the probate of the will of her deceased first-
degree cousin Candelaria Benguan (special proceedings No. 3883). On 28 May,
the Court ordered that the petition be published once a week for three
consecutive weeks in Civismo, a newspaper of general circulation in Negros
Occidental, setting the date of hearing thereof for the 23rd day of June 1956. On
the date and time set for the hearing of the petition attorney Rolando Medalla,
representing some of the heirs hereinafter referred to as opponents, moved for
the postponement of the hearing to give him time and opportunity to file a written
objection to the petition. Whereupon, the hearing was postponed to 30 June
1956. On 28 June, the opponents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that a
petition for the probate of the same last will and testament had been dismissed
by the same Court in a previous special proceedings No. 3628 and constitutes a
bar to the present proceedings (No. 3883). On 7 July, the petitioner answered the
motion to dismiss. By an order entered on 14 July, the Court dismissed the
petition. After considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner on
31 July 1956 and the answer thereto filed by the opponents on 3 August 1956,
the Court denied the motion for reconsideration. The petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals which certified the appeal to this Court for only questions of law
are raised. .
The previous proceedings invoked by the opponents to bar the present is special
proceedings No. 3623 filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental on
27 September 1955 by one Felix Abay, a brother of Susana Abay de Arroyo, the
herein petitioner and appellant. The last will and testament involved therein is the
same involved herein. However, upon failure of Felix Abay and his counsel Pio B.
Japitana to appear at the hearing on 5 November 1955, despite due notice, the
Court there dismissed the petition, without stating that it was a dismissal with
prejudice. Two motions for reconsideration were filed, the first on 15 November
1955 and the second on 28 November 1955, but both were denied, the last for
lack of merit. .
The issue now hinges on whether or not the petition for the probate of a will filed
in this special proceedings is barred by a previous special proceedings No. 3628,
the petition of which was dismissed for failure of the petitioner and his counsel to
appear on the date set for the hearing thereof. .
The appellant contends that the dismissal of the petition in the previous case
(spec. proc. No. 3628) does not bar the present (spec. proc. No. 3883), both for
the probate of the same last will and testament of the late Candelaria Benguan,
because the dismissal for failure of the petitioner and his counsel to appear at the
hearing set by the Court was not an adjudication on the merits of the case and is
not res judicata, because the parties in the previous and present proceedings are
not the same. .
The appellant's contention that the dismissal of the petition for probate in the
previous special proceedings due to failure of the then petitioner and his counsel
to appear on the date and time set for the hearing thereof is not an adjudication
on the merits must be upheld. In arriving at this conclusion the Court has not
overlooked the provisions of sections 3 and 4, Rule 30, and section 2, Rule 73, of
the Rules of Court. The probate of a will may be the concern of one person or
several persons as usually is the case. The fault of one such person may be
imputed to him alone who must suffer the consequences of his act. Such fault
cannot be imputed to other persons. Hence, the failure of Felix Abay and his
counsel to appear on the date and time set for the hearing of the petition for the
probate of a will claimed to have been executed by the late Candelaria Benguan
during her lifetime which brought about the dismissal of the petition filed in that
special proceedings (No. 3628) cannot prejudice the right of Susana Abay de
Arroyo, the petitioner, in a subsequent petition filed for the probate of the same
will and last testament. So the provisions of the Rules cited and invoked by the
opponents-appellees cannot be made to apply to proceedings for the probate of
wills, because as already stated other parties interested in the probate of a will
for transmission of property rights to them should not be prejudiced by the act or
fault of another and because it is the policy of the State to have such last wills
and testaments submitted to Court for their probate or legalization, as shown or
indicated or evidenced by or in the punishment provided for persons who are in
possession of last wills and testaments of deceased persons and fail or neglect
to deliver or present them to Court for probate or to deliver them to the executor
named in the will within twenty days after they know of the death of the testators
or within the same period of time after they know that they were named
executors of the will (sections 2 to 5, Rule 76). The underlying reason for the rule
that a dismissal of an action or complaint in a civil case may be a bar to a
subsequent action unless the dismissal is without prejudice is lack of interest or
inaction of the one who brought the action in court by his complaint and for such
lack of interest or inaction he should be made to suffer. .
The order of dismissal appealed from is set aside and the petition for probate of a
will filed in special proceedings No. 3883 remanded to the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental for further proceedings as provided for in the Rules of
Court, without special pronouncement as to costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7424 August 31, 1954
LOURDES CAMUS DE LOPEZ, on her behalf and as guardian ad litem of the
minors,
SALVADOR C. LOPEZ, JR., and LUIS CARLOS LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CIRILO G. MACEREN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao,
MARIA N. VDA. DE LOPEZ, ENRIQUE LOPEZ, SALVADOR LOPEZ, JR.,
LEOPOLDO LOPEZ, RODOLFO LOPEZ and the guardian ad litem for the
minor FLORDELIZ LOPEZ, respondents.
Petitioner Lourdes Camus de Lopez, on her behalf and as guardian ad litem of
her minor children, Salvador C. Lopez, Jr., and Luis Carlos Lopez, is the plaintiff
in Civil Case No. 1035 of the Court of First Instance of Davao.
Respondents Maria N. Vda. de Lopez, Enrique Lopez, Salvador Lopez, Jr.,
Leopoldo Lopez, Rodolfo Lopez and Flordeliz Lopez are the defendants in said
case No. 1035, the purpose of which is to secure delivery of some property of the
deceased Salvador Lopez, Sr., as alleged share of the petitioner, who claims to
be his widow.
She contends that, although his previous marriage with respondent Maria N. de
Lopez, which was unknown to petitioner, had not been dissolved and was still
subsisting, and acting in bad faith, and without advising petitioner of such first
marriage, Salvador Lopez, Sr., wedded the latter in 1938, and, thereafter, lived as
husband and wife with her; and that, as a consequence of said union, Salvador
C. Lopez, Jr., and Luis Carlos Lopez were born in Manila on December 6, 1939,
and November 25, 1940, respectively, and then christened as legitimate children
of Salvador Lopez, Sr. and the petitioner, as set forth in their respective birth and
baptismal certificates.
After the filing of the answer of said respondents, as defendants in said Civil
Case No. 1035, or on December 8, 1953, petitioner herein through her counsel
filed a "notice for the taking" of her deposition and that of one Pilar Cristobal, at
Room 202 of the Vasquez Building, 1865 Azcarraga Street, Manila, on January
16, 1954, at 2:00 p.m.
Acting, however, upon an urgent motion of the defendants in said Civil Case No.
1035, respondent Hon. Cirilo C. Maceren, as Judge of First Instance of Davao,
issued an order, dated January 11, 1954, prohibiting the taking of said deposition.
Accordingly, petitioner instituted the present case for the purpose of annulling
said order of January 11, 1954, and of having no restraint to the taking of the
aforementioned deposition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in
forbidding the taking of said deposition, she being entitled thereto as a matter of
right, without leave of court, after the filing of the answer of the defendants.
Ruling:
It is well-settled, however, that the discretion conferred by law is not unlimited;
that it must be exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively, but in a
reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that
its purpose may be attained. Referring to the objective of section 16 of Rule 18 of
the Rules of Court
It is not claimed that the order complained of sought to avert any of the evils
which said section 16 was meant to prevent or arrest. Moreover, petitioner was
permitted to institute and maintain Civil Case No. 1035 as a pauper. As such, she
can ill afford to meet the expenses to make, with her witnesses, the trip or trips
from Manila to Davao, and to stay in said province for the time necessary for the
hearing of the case, which might not take place on the first date set therefor.
Hence, the order in question tended, in effect, to deprive her, not only of her right,
under section 1 of Rule 18, to take the deposition in question, but also, of the
opportunity to prove her claim and, consequently, of the due process guaranteed
by the Constitution. Upon the other hand, the records indicate that the
defendants in Civil case No. 1035 — who are the widow of Salvador Lopez, Sr.
and their legitimate children — must be well-off financially, for the estate of the
deceased Salvador Lopez, Sr., which has already been partitioned among them,
appears to be worth approximately half a million pesos. The main reason given in
support of the contested order is that, if the deposition were taken, the court
could not observe the behaviour of the deponents. The insufficiency of this
circumstance to justify the interdiction of the taking of a deposition becomes
apparent when we consider that, otherwise, no deposition could ever be taken,
said objection or handicap being common to all depositions alike. In other words,
the order of respondent Judge cannot be sustained without nullifying the right to
take depositions, and, therefore, without, in effect repealing section 1 of Rule 18
of the Rules of Court, which, clearly, was not intended by the framers of section
16 of the same rule.
It is, consequently, clear that a grave abuse of discretion was committed by
respondent Judge in issuing the aforesaid order of January 11, 1954, for which
reason the same should be, as it is hereby annulled and set aside, with cost
against the respondents, except the Hon. Cirilo C. Maceren.
So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41154 January 29, 1988
SILVERIO VERAN, LUIS VERAN, CRISTINA VERAN, LEON VERAN,
GREGORIO SALAMERA, and GENEROSA SALAMERA, petitioners,
vs.
The HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PRIMITIVA VILLAREAL, respondents.
Plaintiffs brought this action to recover possession of a parcel of land located in
Atimonan, Quezon and registered in the name of a Aleja Glodoveza, mother and
grandmother of said plaintiffs, against the defendant Primitiva Villareal, who died
during the pendency of this action and was subsitituted accordingly.
It is alleged in the complaint that plaintiffs only allowed the afore-named
defendant, being a cousin, to erect her house on a portion of the and in dispute,
which they inherited from Aleja Glodoveza, who in turn received it as her share
from her mother's estate. Said defendant, however, refused to vacate the lot
when demanded to do so repeatedly, claiming co-ownership also by inheritance
from their common ancestor, the mother of Aleja Glodoveza.
Because of the pendency of the administrative case as mentioned in the answer,
the trial of the case was suspended indefinitely on petition of both parties.
However, when the plaintiffs changed their counsel, the latter moved for the
setting of the case for trial after almost four years from Dec. 5, 1955 when the
complaint was filed, the motion was granted, but for failure of the defendants to
appear on the date set for hearing, plaintiffs were allowed to present their
evidence ex-parte, after which decision was rendered on Dec. 15, 1959 in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant. Upon a motion for reconsideration, the
decision was set aside in order to allow the defendant to present her evidence,
after filing an amended answer, on the advice of the trial court itself, so as to
include a prayer for the reconveyance of the disputed portion of the lot, said lot,
described as Lot 1744, having been already registered in the name of Aleja
Glodoveza, the predecessor of plaintiffs.
Defendant offered as part of her evidence the deposition of Apolonia Glodoveza,
but it was denied admission by the trial court on the ground that no proof was
submitted to show that the witness was so old and infirm as not to be able to
come to court to testify, as contended by plaintiffs in their opposition to the
deposition-taking.
The Trial Court rendered judgement in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant, declaring the former owners pro indiviso of the Lot.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: W/N THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING
UNDUE APPRECIATION TO THE MATTERS RELATED IN THE IRREGULARLY-
ACCEPTED DEPOSITION OF WITNESS APOLONIA GLODOVEZA WHEN THE
SAME MATTERS — STANDING ALONE — ARE HARDLY ADEQUATE TO
BELIE THE CONTRARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY PETITIONERS.
Ruling:
The deposition of Apolonia Glodoveza was taken on January 21, 1961. At that
time the applicable rules of procedure were provided in the (old) Rules of Court,
Section I of Rule 18 of which states:
Section 1. Deposition pending action, when may be taken.-By leave of court after
jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the
subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the
testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of
any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. ...
Considering that the deposition was taken long after the answer had been filed
and served, there was therefore no need to seek the approval of the trial court for
the taking of the deposition, notice of such taking being sufficient. In the instant
case, it is not disputed that notice of the deposition-taking was received by
petitioners well before the intended date and that although petitioners filed an
opposition, this was not acted upon by the trial court before the taking of the
deposition.
Leave of court for taking depositions should, however, be distinguished from the
approval of the court for the use of the deposition Under Section 4 of Rule 24 of
the Revised Rules of Court, which was already in force and effect when the
deposition was offered in evidence:
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any
party for any purpose if the court finds:
(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness,
infirmity, or imprisonment;
Thus, with regard to the use of a deposition, there is occasion for the court to
exercise its discretion, the proper time being when the deposition is formally
offered in evidence.
In the instant case, the trial court did not admit the deposition when it was
formally offered, on the ground that petitioners were denied their right to cross-
examine the deponent. However, the Court of Appeals, in deciding to admit the
deposition, observed:
The rejection of said deposition is assigned as one of the errors of the trial court.
From the facts sufficiently disclosed by the records, We find no irregularity in its
execution. The reason for the taking was disclosed not only in the notice, but also
in the deposition itself. To reject such a deposition on the ground considered by
the trial court smacks of a technicality which does not serve the ends of
substantial justice. The counsel of the plaintiffs was notified sufficiently in
advance of the deposition-taking, and his opposition was not acted upon
favorably before the day set for the taking of the deposition. If he failed to appear
on that day, as he could have done if he exerted diligent efforts, he did so at his
own risk. (p. 7, Decision).
The findings of fact supporting this conclusion of the Court of Appeals not being
disputed, We agree that, under the circumstance, petitioners' contention that they
were denied their right to cross-examine the deponent is unfounded.
In view of the foregoing, it cannot be argued that the Court of Appeals committed
a reversible error when it decided to admit the deposition of Apolonia Glodoveza.
FORTUNE CORPORATION vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108119; January 19, 1994
Facts:
An action for breach of contract was filed by petitioner Fortune Corporation
against respondent Inter-Merchants Corporation, docketed as Civil Case No.
SP-3469.
After respondent corporation had filed its Answer, petitioner served the
former with written interrogatories pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Court.
The interrogatories were answered by respondent corporation through its
board chairman, Juanito A. Teope. Petitioner served upon private respondent
a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination in accordance with
Section 15, Rule 24.
Private respondent filed an Urgent Motion Not To Take Deposition/Vehement
Opposition to Plaintiff's Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination,
dated March 27, 1992, alleging inter alia that :
(a) herein petitioner has previously availed of one mode of discovery, that is,
the written interrogatories which practically covered all the claims,
counterclaims and defenses in the case;
(b) there is absolutely no sound reason or justification advanced for the
taking of the oral deposition;
(c) such taking would cause annoyance, embarrassment and oppression
upon the prospective deponent, Juanito A. Teope;
(d) Mr. Teope has no intention of leaving the country; and
(e) the intended deponent is available to testify in open court if required
during the trial on the merits.
The trial court ordered that the requested deposition shall not be taken. Its
motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed an original
action for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
However, in a resolution dated May 20, 1992, this Court referred the case to
the Court of Appeals for consideration and adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the petition:
Hence this petition.
Issues:
I. Whether or not availing one mode of discovery will bar the party in availing
the other modes?
Ruling:
No. As a general rule, the scope of discovery is to be liberally construed so
as to provide the litigants with information essential to the expenditious and
proper litigation of each of the facts in dispute.
Moreover, it cannot be disputed that the various methods of discovery as
provided for in the Rules are clearly intended to be cumulative, as opposed
to alternative or mutually exclusive.
Supreme Court held that under the present Rules the fact that a party has
resorted to a particular method of discovery will not bar subsequent use of
other discovery devices, as long as the party is not attempting to circumvent
a ruling of the court, or to harass or oppress the other party. As a matter of
practice, it will often be desirable to resort to both interrogatories and
depositions in one or the other sequence.
Additional lines of inquiry may come to light after the deposition has been
taken, as to which written interrogatories probably would be adequate, and
there is no reason why the examining party should not be entitled to obtain
all the relevant information he desires if no substantial prejudice is done to
the party from whom discovery is sought.
Petition Granted.

HYATT INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING CORP. vs.LEY CONSTRUCTION
AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.(G.R. No. 147143; March 10, 2006)
Facts:
Ley Construction and Development Corporation (LCDC) filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages with the RTC of Makati against Hyatt
Industrial Manufacturing Corporation (Hyatt) claiming that Hyatt reneged in
its obligation to transfer 40% of the pro indiviso share of a real property in
Makati in favor of LCDC despite LCDC’s full payment of the purchase price
of P2,634,000.00; and that Hyatt failed to develop the said property in a joint
venture, despite LCDC’s payment of 40% of the pre-construction cost. LCDC
filed amended complaints impleading Princeton Development Corporation
(Princeton) and Yu He Ching (Yu) President of Hyatt as additional defendants
claiming that Hyatt sold the subject property to Princeton in fraud of LCDC
and alleging that LCDC paid the purchase price of P2, 634,000.00 to Hyatt
through Yu.
LCDC filed notices to take the depositions of Yu; Pacita Tan Go, Account
Officer of Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC); and Elena Sy,
Finance Officer of Hyatt. Hyatt also filed notice to take deposition of Manuel
Ley, President of LCDC, while Princeton filed notice to take the depositions
of Manuel and Janet Ley. The RTC ordered the deposition-taking to proceed.
However, at the scheduled deposition of Elena Sy, Hyatt and Yu prayed that
all settings for depositions be disregarded and pre-trial be set instead,
contending that the taking of depositions only delay the resolution of the
case. The RTC agreed and on the same day ordered all depositions
cancelled and pre-trial to take place.
LCDC moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied due to the following
reasons 1) said depositions will only delay the early termination of the case;
2) had the Court set the case for pre-trial conference and trial thereafter, the
case would have been terminated earlier; 3) what the parties would like to
elicit from their deponents would probably be elicited at the pre-trial
conference; 4) no substantial rights of the parties would be prejudiced, if pre-
trial conference is held, instead of deposition.
On the scheduled date of the pre-trial, LCDC filed an Urgent Motion to
Suspend Proceedings Due to Pendency of Petition for Certiorari in the Court
of Appeals (12th Division), which sought to annul the order regarding the
cancellation of the deposition-taking. RTC denied plaintiff’s motion to
suspend proceedings and gave LCDC two (2) options: enter into a pre-trial
conference, advising plaintiff that what it would like to obtain at the deposition
may be obtained at the pre-trial conference; and, terminate the pre-trial
conference and apply for deposition later on.
The pre-trial proceeded as scheduled and with the refusal of LCDC to enter
into pre-trial, Hyatt, Yu and Princeton moved to declare LCDC non-suited
which the RTC granted.
For LCDC’s failure to enter into pre-trial conference without any valid reason
the complaint and the counterclaims were dismissed by the RTC.
LCDC filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied compelling it
file an appeal with CA (7th Division).
CA’s 12th Division denied LCDC’s petition for certiorari declaring that the
granting of the petition and setting aside of the RTC Orders are manifestly
pointless considering that the complaint itself had already been dismissed.
Meanwhile CA’s 7th Division finds the appeal meritorious and remanded the
case to the RTC for further hearing and to proceed with the deposition taking.
Hyatt and Princeton filed their respective motions for reconsideration which
the CA denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issues:
Whether or not the CA erred in remanding the case to the trial court and
order the deposition-taking to proceed.
Ruling:
No. A deposition should be allowed; absent any showing that taking it would
prejudice any party. It is accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the
liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters
inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is
made in good faith and within the bounds of law. It is allowed as a departure
from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in
open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge,
consistent with the principle of promoting just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding; and provided it is taken in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e., with leave of court
if summons have been served, and without such leave if an answer has been
submitted; and provided further that a circumstance for its admissibility exists
(Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court). The rules on discovery should not be
unduly restricted; otherwise, the advantage of a liberal discovery procedure
in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation would be
defeated.
Sec. 1, Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Court which provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken.---
By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any
defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or
without such leave after an answer has been served, the
 testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken,
at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral examination
or written interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be
compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21.
Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these Rules.
The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only
by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.
(Emphasis supplied).
LCDC complied with the above quoted provision as it made its notice to take
depositions after the answers of the defendants have been served, thus,
erred in canceling the previously scheduled depositions.
While it is true that depositions may be disallowed by trial courts if the
examination is conducted in bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy,
embarrass, or oppress the person who is the subject of the inquiry, or when
the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized
domains of privilege, such circumstances, however are absent in the case at
bar.
The taking of depositions would not cause unnecessary duplicity even
though the intended deponents shall also be called as witnesses during trial,
as explained in Fortune Corp. v. Court of Appeals:
The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not
constitute “good cause” to justify the court’s order that his deposition
shall not be taken. That the witness is unable to attend or testify is
one of the grounds when the deposition of a witness may be used in
court during the trial. But the same reason cannot be successfully
invoked to prohibit the taking of his deposition.
x x x Under the concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves the
double function of a method of discovery - with use on trial not necessarily
contemplated - and a method of presenting testimony. Accordingly, no
limitations other than relevancy and privilege have been placed on the taking
of depositions, while the use at the trial is subject to circumscriptions looking
toward the use of oral testimony wherever practicable.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan the Court held:
What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of
information which may be useful in the preparation for trial, such as
the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant
facts; those relevant facts themselves; and the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things. Hence, “the deposition-
discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No
longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to
preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his
opponent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts
gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end,
either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has
in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply
advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from
the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the
possibility, of surprise.
The trial court erred in forcing LCDC to choose only from the options given
by the trial court and in dismissing the complaint upon LCDC’s refusal to
choose either of the two.
The information LCDC seeks to obtain through the depositions, may not be
obtained at the pre-trial conference, as the said deponents are not parties to
the pre-trial conference.
As also pointed out by the CA:
x x x To unduly restrict the modes of discovery during trial, would defeat the
very purpose for which it is intended, as a pre-trial device. By then, the
issues would have been confined only on matters defined during pre-trial.
The importance of the modes of discovery cannot be gainsaid in this case in
view of the nature of the controversy involved and the conflicting interest
claimed by the parties.
Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to
supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real matters of
dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during
the preparation for trial.
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a
device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify
the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the
facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable
the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest
possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent
that said trials are carried on in the dark.
In this case, the information sought to be obtained through the depositions of
Elena and Pacita are necessary to fully equip LCDC in determining what
issues will be defined at the pre-trial. Without such information before pre-
trial, LCDC will be forced to prosecute its case in the dark --- the very
situation which the rules of discovery seek to prevent. Indeed, the rules on
discovery seek to make trial less a game of blind man’s bluff and more a fair
contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable
extent.
Petition is denied for lack of merit.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 145542, June 04, 2004
ELENA S. ONG, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO V. MAZO AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, GUIUAN, EASTERN SAMAR, BRANCH 3, ELVIRA C.
LANUEVO AND CHARITO A. TOMILLOSO, Respondents.
PONENTE: CARPIO MORALES, J.
Facts:
Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioner in RTC
Eastern Samar which arose from a vehicular accident whereby a bus owned by
petitioner allegedly bumped a jeep owned and driven by respondent Lanuevo,
with Tomilloso as her passener at the time. After petitioner filed her Answer with
Counterclaim, and later a motion to dismiss the complaint, respondents filed a
motion for leave of court to file an amended complaint which was granted.
On 14 November 1996, petitioner served written interrogatories upon
respondents and on 21 November 1996, she filed a “Manifestation and Omnibus
Motion” seeking an order from the trial court directing respondents to answer the
interrogatories. Respondents objected to the motion.
On 6 May 1999, the RTC denied the motion on the ground that it constituted a
“fishing expedition” which would be more properly ventilated in a pre-trial
conference. Petitioner moved to reconsider but was denied on 4 July 2000.
On 4 August 2000, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with CA assailing RTC
orders as having been issued with graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
On 17 August 2000, the CA dismissed the petition due to late filing. Petitioner
moved to reconsider arguing that what was filed was a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65, not an appeal.
On 10 October 2000, the CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC’s denial of petitioner’s “Manifestation and Omnibus
Motion” to seek an order from RTC to compel respondents to answer the
interrogatories is proper.
Ruling:
NO. Petition is Impressed with Merit.
Parties’ Arguments
To the present petition, respondents filed their Comment, explaining that the
appellate court considered petitioner’s petition thereat as an appeal because it
found the assailed orders of the trial court as not warranting the remedy of the
special civil action of certiorari.
On the denial by the trial court of petitioner’s motion to direct respondents to
answer the written interrogatories, respondents justified the same, it contending
that the trial court had jurisdiction to pass upon the propriety of such mode
of discovery under Section 3, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court and that the remedy
of certiorari is unavailing since what is traversed is an error of law or fact that is
properly the subject of an appeal.
Insisting that the trial court erred in refusing to compel respondents to answer her
written interrogatories, petitioner, in her Reply to respondents’ Comment, invokes
this Court’s plenary power to resolve not only the issue of the appellate court’s
dismissal of her petition but also the question of whether the trial court gravely
abused its discretion in disallowing the written interrogatories.
In their respective memoranda, both parties raise the issue of the propriety of
availment of written interrogatories.
Meanwhile, on February 28, 2001, the trial court suspended indefinitely the
proceedings in the initiatory civil case between the parties in light of petitioner’s
appeal before this Court. The appeal is impressed with merit.
On August 4, 2000, when petitioner filed her petition for certiorari before the
appellate court, Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended by Circular No. 39-98 read:
SEC. 4. Where petition filed. — The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the
Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person inthe Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also
be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it
involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise
provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only
by the Court of Appeals.
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after
notice of said judgment, order or resolution, the period herein fixed shall be
interrupted.
If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the
remaining period, but which shall not beless than five (5) days in any event,
reckoned from such notice of denial. No extension of time to file the petition shall
be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed
fifteen (15) days. (Underscoring supplied)
Under the foregoing rule, when petitioner’s counsel received on July 18, 2000 the
trial court’s order of July 4, 2000 denying her motion for reconsideration of the
Order of May 6, 1999, she still had 15 days left of the 60-day period to file the
petition for certiorari.
Section 4 of Rule 65 was subsequently further amended, however, by A.M. No.
00-2-03-SC which took effect onSeptember 1, 2000 as follows:
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion
for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or
not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion. (Emphasis supplied)
Contrary then to petitioner’s protestation that the appellate court erred in treating
her petition for certiorari as an appeal which was filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period, as reflected above, the 15-day period left for petitioner to
file the petition referred to the remaining number of days left after computation of
the 60-day period in Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as then
amended by Circular No. 39-98 With the setting aside of the appellate court’s
questioned orders, the resolution of the present petition should have been
accomplished. Nonetheless, considering that the relatively simple case for
damages, which was instituted by respondents against petitioner way back in
1996 or eight long years ago, had virtually come to a halt due to the lingering
legal issue respecting the trial court’s order stopping petitioner from availing of
her written interrogatories as a mode of discovery, instead of remanding this case
to the appellate court as anyway both parties have advanced and argued the
sole issue which is purely one of law, in the overriding interest of justice,
this Court shall now resolve the issue as if it had been raised via a special civil
action for certiorari with this Court.
No doubt, the twin orders denying the written interrogatories were interlocutory in
nature for they leave something more to be done on the merits of the case. And
the extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an
interlocutory order of a trial court, the proper remedy in such cases being an
ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment where incorporated in said appeal are
the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. Nonetheless, this by no means
is an absolute rule. If the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and
the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, certiorari
may be allowed as a mode of redress.
This Court finds that the orders disallowing petitioner’s written interrogatories are
patently erroneous, hence, the resort to certiorari is warranted. In denying
petitioner’s availment of interrogatories, the trial court was of the view that —
. . . in as much that the written interrogatories is (sic) a sort of fishing expedition,
said questions and answer would be properly ventilated in a pre-trial conference
for which this court direct the defendant Elena Ong to file her answer to the
amended complaint anent thereto, both parties are required to file their
respective pre-trial briefs after which this case will be calendared for pre-trial
conference.
This Court has long espoused the policy of encouraging the availment of the
various modes or instruments of discovery as embodied in Rules 24 to 29 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
The thrust of the Rules is to even make the availment of the modes of discovery
– depositions, interrogatories and requests for admissions – without much court
intervention since leave of court is not necessary to put into motion such
modes after an answer to the complaint has been served.
The rationale behind the recognition accorded the modes of discovery is that
they enable a party to discover the evidence of the adverse party and thus
facilitate an amicable settlement or expedite the trial of the case.
Thus, to deny a party the liberty to have his written interrogatories answered by
his opponent, as what the trial court did, on the premise that the interrogatories
were a “fishing expedition,” is to disregard the categorical pronouncement in
aforementioned case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan that the time-honored cry of
‘fishing expedition’ can no longer provide a reason to prevent a party
from inquiring into the facts underlying the opposing party’s case through the
discovery procedures.
The trial court’s orders, not being in accordance with law and jurisprudential
dictum, are therefore correctible by writ of certiorari.

SALVADOR D. BRIBONERIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, GERTRUDES B. MAG-ISA,
married to and assisted by PEDRO MAG-ISA, respondents.
On 23 May 1988, petitioner Salvador D. Briboneria, as plaintiff, filed a complaint 2
for Annulment of Document and Damages, with prayer for preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order against private respondent Gertrudes B. Mag-isa,
with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.
Plaintiff, together with his wife Nonita A. Briboneria, are the registered owners (of) a
parcel of land located at 59 Amsterdam Street Provident Village, J. de la Peña,
Marikina, Metro-Manila,
Among the improvements on this parcel of land is plaintiff's residential house where
his wife and children used to stay until they migrated to the United States.
The abovementioned parcel of land was acquired and the residential house was
constructed through plaintiff's hard-earned salaries and benefits from his
employment abroad.
Plaintiff, as the duly registered owner, has declared the above-described parcel of
land and residential house for tax purposes under P.D. No. 464.
Of late, plaintiff was surprised to learn that his wife Nonita A. Briboneria sold to
defendant Gertrudis B. Mag-isa by means of a Deed of Absolute Sale,
Plaintiff, as the duly registered owner, never authorized or empowered Nonita A.
Briboneria or anybody for or on his behalf, stead or representation to enter into any
transaction regarding the sale, transfer or conveyance of the abovedescribed house
and lot.
Plaintiff had all along been expecting that the house and lot shall be for his family,
particularly his children.
As a result of the unauthorized sale, plaintiff was denied the use and enjoyment of
his properties since defendant Gertrudis B. Mag-isa had even leased the premises to
another who in turn had prohibited plaintiff from entering the premises.
By reason of the unlawful deprivation from him of his properties, plaintiff suffered
serious anxiety, fright, mental anguish and wounded feelings and further subjected
him to social humiliation and embarassment, particularly considering that the
abovementioned properties came from his hard-earned salaries and emoluments from
his employment abroad.
ISSUE: whether or not a request for admission must be served directly on a party,
and not his counsel, in order that said request can be considered as validly served
Ruling:
In our decision which is sought to be reconsidered, we held that a request for
admission may be validly served upon party's counsel. After a further review of the
facts of the case and the circumstances surrounding the same, we are now fully
convinced that it should not be so.
The general rule as provided for under Section 2 of Rule 27 (now Section 2, Rule 13)
of the Rules of Court is that all notices must be served upon counsel and not upon
party. This is so because the attorney of a party is the agent of the party and is the
one responsible for the conduct of the case in all its procedural aspects; hence, notice
to counsel is notice to party. The purpose of the rule is obviously to maintain a
uniform procedure calculated to place in competent hands the orderly prosecution of
a party's case (Chainani v. Judge Tancinco, G.R. No. L-4782, Feb. 29, 1952; Capili v.
Badelles, G.R. No. L-17786, Sept. 29, 1962). However, the general rule cannot apply
where the law expressly provides that notice must be served upon a definite person.
In such cases, service must be made directly upon the person mentioned in the law
and upon no other in order that the notice be valid.
Whenever notice is necessary, it must appear that it was served on the proper person,
and there must be strict compliance with a statute requiring service on a particular
person, so that service on another person is not sufficient.
In general, service of notice of a modal or formal step in a proceeding on the attorney ISSUE: Whether or not the earlier decision of dismissing the case was
of record is sufficient, if not otherwise specifically provided by statute or rule of null and void.
court. (66 C.J.S. 658)

HELD: The decision of the appellate court is affirmed.

1. The omissions of the counsel are not fatal to its cause in view of the
defective procedure which resulted in its dismissal.
2. The rules on discovery are intended to enable a party to obtain
knowledge of material facts within the knowledge of the adverse
party or third parties through depositions; to obtain knowledge of
material facts or admissions from the adverse party through written
interrogatories; to obtain admissions from the adverse party
regarding the genuineness of relevant documents or relevant
matters of fact through requests for admission; to inspect relevant
documents or objects and lands or other property in the possession
or control of the adverse party; and to determine the physical or
Koh vs. IAC mental condition of a party when such is controversy.
1. Koh’s father sent her $500 through the Metropolitan Bank & trust 3. Trial judges should therefore, encourage the proper utilization of
Company which is the remitting bank of respondent First Interstate rules in discovery. However, recourse to discovery of procedures is
Bank of California. But due to a computer mistake, respondent not mandatory. If the parties do not choose to resort to such
Bank’s Los Angeles office erroneously overstated the amount of procedures, the pre-trial conference should be set.
$8500 instead of $500.
2. It was deposited to her account and she subsequently withdrew it.
3. Koh admitted that what happened was true and that she’s offering
the bank to pay it in installments of $100 but the offer was rejected.
4. The Officer in Charge of RTC Makati sent the following “NOTICE OF
CASE STATUS” to the parties through their respective lawyers. Stated
on it, “If a party believes that those modes of discovery are not
applicable, necessary or feasible with respect to him, he shall file a
manifestation to that effect.”
5. No manifestation was filed by the parties’ lawyers. And for the non-
compliance with Order the case was dismissed.
6. The respondent Bank refilled its case but Koh invoked res adjudicate
and filed for a motion to dimiss. It was denied by the judge.
7. Elevated to the IAC, it was also denied.