GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v.

CA and HEIRS OF
ABRAHAM CATE

GR No. 124208, Jan 01, 2008

Facts:

On 1974, Abraham Cate (Abraham) joined the military service as a Rifleman of the
Philippine Navy. he was transferred to the Philippine Constabulary and was later
promoted to Master Sergeant. On 1991, he was absorbed in the Philippine National Police
(PNP) with the rank of Senior Police Officer IV (SPO4).

In 1993, Abraham complained of a mass on his left cheek which gradually increased
in size. A biopsy was done and revealed that he was suffering from Osteoblastic
Osteosarcoma. operation removed the mass on his left cheek. However biopsy revealed
the recurrence of the ailment.

On 1994, Abraham was compulsorily retired from the PNP.

He filed a claim for income benefits with (GSIS) under P.D. No. 626

GSIS denied the claim on the ground that Osteosarcoma is not considered an
occupational disease under P.D. No. 626, and there is no showing that his duties as SPO4
in the Armed Forces of the Philippines had increased the risk of contracting said ailment.
Alleging that Osteosarcoma is not listed as an occupational disease in the
Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation. Hence, it is supposed to be upon the
claimant or private respondents to prove by substantial evidence that the risk
of contracting Osteosarcoma was increased by the working conditions of the late
Abraham.

On 1995, 1995, Abraham died at the age of 45. He was survived by his wife, Dorothy
Cate, and two children. The heirs of Abraham appealed the decision of GSIS to the
ECC.

ECC affirmed the decision of GSIS and dismissed the case for lack of merit. Concluding
that:

appellant's employment as member of the Philippine National Police had no

direct nor causal relationship with the contraction of appellant's ailment.

The heirs filed a petition for review of the decision of ECC with the CA.

The CA reversed and set aside the decision of ECC. Stating that
 Osteosarcoma is compensable on the ground that the Employees Compensation
Act is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to our working men,
and should, therefore, be liberally construed in favor of the applicant.

The GSIS and ECC separately filed a petition for review on certiorari. The two petitions
were consolidated

Issue:

whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the ailment of the late Abraham is compensable
under the present law on employees' compensation.

Held:

NO

Petitioners' failure to present positive evidence of a causal relation of the illness

and his working conditions is due to the pure and simple lack of available proof
to be offered in evidence. Verily, to deny compensation to osteosarcoma victims who
will definitely be unable to produce a single piece of proof to that effect, is unrealistic,
illogical and unfair. At the very least, on a very exceptional circumstance, the rule on
compensability should be relaxed and be allowed to apply to such
situations. To disallow the benefit will even more add up to the sufferings, this time, for
the ignorance of the inability of mankind to discover the real truth about cancer.

to allow the presumption of compensability to Osteosarcoma victims, will not adversely

prejudice such state policy. In fact, it will give more meaning to the very purpose
and essence of the State Insurance Fund. Upon the other hand, to deny the claim
will not only defeat the very reason for its creation but will likewise turn down benefits to
the intended rightful beneficiary thereof. As employee's compensation is based on social
security principles. We believe that in the meantime that osteosarcoma's cause and
origin are not yet unearthed, the benefit of the doubt should be resolved in
favor of the claim.

the present law on compensation allows certain diseases to be compensable if it is

sufficiently proven that the risk of contracting is increased by the working conditions.
It, therefore, now allows compensation subject to requirement of proving by sufficient
evidence that the risk of contracting the ailment is increased by the working conditions.

however, in the specific case of respondent, the requirement is impossible to

comply with, given the present state of scientific knowledge. The obligation
to present such as an impossible evidence must, therefore, be deemed
void. Respondent, therefore, is entitled to compensation, consistent with the social
legislation's intended beneficial purpose.
DOMINGA A. SALMONE, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION AND SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 142392, September 26, 2000

Facts:

1982, Petitioner was employed as sewer by the Paul Geneve Entertainment

Corporation, a corporation engaged in the business of sewing costumes, gowns and casual
and formal dresses. She was later promoted as the officer-in-charge and the over-all
custodian in the Sewing Department

Sometime on 1996, Petitioner started to feel chest pains. she filed a leave of absence
from work as the chest pains became unbearable. Per results of Petitioner's Medical
examination was found suffering from Atherosclerotic heart disease, Atrial
Fibrillation, Cardiac Arrhythmia. Upon recommendation of her doctor, Petitioner
resigned from her work hoping that with a much-needed complete rest, she will be
cured.

"Petitioner later filed a disability claim with the SSS from the Employees'
Compensation Fund, under Presidential Decree No. 626

SSS denied Petitioner's claim. Petitioner appealed from the said Decision to the
Public Respondent. denying her appeal

She filed a petition for review with a motion to litigate as pauper. CA dismissed the
petition because petitioner failed to adduce substantial evidence proving any of the
conditions of compensability.

Issue:

whether petitioner's illness is compensable, as work-related, and whether there was

sufficient evidence of compensability.

Held:

YES

"for a sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the said sickness
must be an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of said Rules,
otherwise, the claimant or employee concerned must prove that the risk of contracting
the disease is increased by the working condition."

The Court of Appeals ruled that "atherosclerotic heart disease, atrial fibrillation,
cardiac arrhythmia" from which petitioner suffered falls under the classification
"cardiovascular diseases" and under the Employees' Compensation
Commission, cardiovascular disease is listed as compensable occupational disease
provided that substantial evidence is adduced

Indisputably, cardiovascular diseases, are listed as compensable occupational

diseases in the Rules of the Employees' Compensation Commission, hence, no further
proof of casual relation between the disease and claimant's work is necessary.

Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was no substantial evidence supporting
the finding that petitioner's illness was an occupational disease compensable

The degree of proof required under P. D. No. 626, is merely substantial evidence,
which means

"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion."

What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal
relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is
probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially where there is
some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection. Probability, not certainty, is
the touchtone.

LEGAL HEIRS OF LATE EDWIN B. DEAUNA v. FIL-STAR MARITIME

CORPORATION

Facts:

Fil-Star Maritime Corporation (Fil-Star) is a local manning agency and Grandslam

Enterprise Corporation (Grandslam) is among Fil-Star's foreign principals. Grandslam
owns and manages the vessel M/V Sanko Stream (Sanko) which Edwin boarded on
for a nine-month engagement as Chief Engineer.

Prior to Edwin's deployment, he underwent the customary Pre-employment Medical

Examination (PEME) and was found as "fit to work" as was repeatedly the case in the past
30 years since his first deployment by Fil-Star in 1975.
2004, Edwin experienced abdominal pains while on-board Sanko. An ultrasound
examination revealed that he had kidney stones. Thereafter, he resumed his work
on-board Sanko.

8 months from deployment, Edwin was repatriated.

Dr. Mercado, a neurosurgeon at the Cardinal Santos Medical Center certified that: An
MRI of the brain showed a large right-sided brain tumor

The petitioners sent the respondents two letters requesting for the conduct of a medical
examination and treatment of Edwin's brain tumor. The respondents averred that they
provided Edwin with medical assistance for him to be able to promptly undergo a biopsy.

Dr. Mercado found out Edwin was suffering from "Glioblastoma WHO Grade 4"
(GBM), a malignant and aggressive form of brain cancer.

company-designated physician Dr. Cruz opined that the "etiology of GBM is

unknown". Further, Edwin's "illness is work-related if he has history of exposure to
radiation

Two demand letters seeking disability benefits were thereafter sent by the
petitioners to the respondents. Not long after, the petitioners again wrote the respondents
informing the latter that Edwin's condition was already critical. Hence, the
possibility that the claims for disability benefits would be converted to death benefits
arose. The respondents denied the petitioners' demand.

a complaint for disability benefits, medical and transportation reimbursements, moral

and exemplary damages and attorney's fees were filed before NLRC. Edwin died
during the pendency of the proceedings. He was substituted therein by the
petitioners who sought the payment of death benefits.

Voluntary Arbitrator VA Ofreneo awarded death benefits to the petitioners.

The respondents filed with the CA a petition for review. Before the CA could
resolve the case, the petitioners filed a motion for execution which was granted
by VA Ofreneo. Consequently, the respondents paid to the petitioners the sum of
P5,603,026.00

CA rendered decision reversing VA Ofreneo's award

CA denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration to the foregoing.

Hence, the instant petition.

The petitioners insist CBA merely focuses on the fact of death occurring during the
term of a seafarer's employment, regardless of its cause. They further claim that even if
death occurs beyond the term of a seafarer's employment, compensation should still be
awarded as long as a connection can be established between the causes of repatriation
and death.

respondents' denial of the petitioners' claims rests on the (1) circumstance that
Edwin died after the termination of his employment contract or more than a
year after he was already repatriated; and (2) argument that GBM was supposedly not
work-related in the absence of proofs of exposure of a seafarer to vinyl, radiation
or power lines while in the work place.

Issue:

(1)THE SURVIVING SPOUSE AND LEGAL HEIRS OF THE DECEASED SEAFARER

ARE ENTITLED TO DEATH COMPENSATION IN THE SUM OF US$121,000.00
UNDER THE AMOSUP/JSU-CBA

(2)PETITIONER[S] [ARE] ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES FOR (sic)

Php1,000,000.00, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES [OF] Php200,000.00 AND TEN PERCENT
(10%) OF THE AWARDS AS AND BY WAY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.

Held:

(1)YES

Under the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA provisions, Edwin's death a little more than a
year from his repatriation can still be considered as one occurring while he was still under
the respondents' employ.

Article 29.1 of the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA provides that the death of a seafarer,
for any cause, is compensable when it occurs while he is in the employment
of the company. Article 29.4, on the other hand, clarifies that the seafarer shall be
considered as in the employment of the company "for so long as the
provisions of Articles 25 and 26 apply and provided the death is directly
attributable to sickness or injury that caused the seafarer's employment to
be terminated in accordance with Article 22.1(b)".

we can thus conclude that at the time of Edwin's death on April 13, 2006 due to GBM,
he was still in the employment of the respondents. While it is true that Article
22.1 of the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA considers a seafarer as terminated when he signs
off from the vessel due to sickness, the foregoing is subject to the provisions of Article
29. Under Article 29, a seafarer remains under the respondents' employ as long
as the former is still entitled to medical assistance and sick pay, and provided
that the death which eventually occurs is directly attributable to the sickness which caused
the seafarer's employment to be terminated. As discussed above, the company-
designated physician, Dr. Cruz, in effect admitted that Edwin was repatriated due to
symptoms which a person suffering from GBM normally exhibits. Further, he
recommended to Capt. Millalos Edwin's entitlement to medical assistance and sick pay
for a period beyond 130 days from repatriation. Edwin subsequently died of GBM, the
symptoms of which were the cause of his earlier repatriation. Hence, since Edwin's
death is reasonably connected to the cause of his repatriation, within the
purview of the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA, he indubitably died while under the
respondents' employ, thus, entitling the petitioners to death benefits as
provided for in Appendix 3 of the said CBA.

(2) NO

The petitioners are, however, not entitled to moral and exemplary

damages and attorney's fees.

We find that the acts of the respondents hardly indicate an intent on their part to evade
the payment of their obligations so as to justify the award of moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees to the petitioners. The respondents extended medical
assistance and allowances to Edwin while he went through his treatment. Further, the
respondents offered an amount of US$60,000.00 as disability benefits even when the
petitioners' claims had not been conclusively established yet.

ROBERTO D. DEBAUDIN v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

Facts:

Petitioner is a seaman by profession. He joined the United Philippine Lines

(UPL) on 1975 and was separated from his employment on May 21, 1993 at the age of 62.

During his eighteen (18) years of service with UPL, he boarded various foreign ocean-
going vessels his responsibilities includes: cleaning chemical-spill-oil on deck, slat
dislodging, and spraying naphtha chemical and washing dirt and rusts inside the tank.

On 1993, he experienced episodes of bilateral blurring of vision. While in

Singapore then he was diagnosed to be suffering from advanced glaucoma.

petitioner filed before the SSS a claim for compensation benefits under P.D. No.
626. application, however, was denied on the ground that there is no causal
relationship between the illness and his job as a seaman. MR denied, he elevated the
case to ECC which affirmed decision stating that:

"For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of
these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be
shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions" (Rule III, Section 1[b] of the Implementing Rules of P.D.
626, as amended)
On appeal with CA, petition was denied due course and the CA accordingly
dismissed the case on the ground that petitioner failed to adduce substantial
evidence supporting the conclusion that the working conditions as a seaman increased
the risk of contracting his chronic open angle glaucoma.

Petitioner claims that as a utility staff he performed odd jobs without fail such as
cleaning chemical-spill-oil on deck, slat dislodging, and spraying naphtha chemical and
washing dirt and rusts inside the tank. According to him, these strenuous tasks required
climbing, bending over and running for so many times - acts which a medical book
considered as contributory factors that would increase intraocular pressure which causes
glaucoma. Aside from the physical demands of the job, petitioner contends that he was
also subjected to emotional strains of going through the perils of the sea and
homesickness for being away from his family during the entire duration of the contracts.
He, thus, alleges that his employment as a seaman contributed, even in a small degree, to
the development of his ailment.

Issue:

whether the work of petitioner as a seaman contributed even in a small degree in or had
increased the risk of contracting his chronic open angle glaucoma.

Held:

NO

petitioner's chronic open angle glaucoma is not listed as an occupational

disease; hence, he has the burden of proving by substantial evidence, or such
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion, that the nature of his employment or working conditions increased the risk
of contracting the ailment or that its progression or aggravation was brought about
thereby.

Records reveals petitioner's failure to adduce any proof of a reasonable

connection between his work as a seaman and the chronic open angle glaucoma he had
contracted. he merely claims that he performed odd jobs without fail - cleaning
chemical-spill-oil on deck etc. Adding thereto were the perils of the sea and the
homesickness he said he experienced which allegedly caused emotional strains on his
part.

petitioner presented no competent medical history, records or physician's

report to objectively substantiate the claim that there is a reasonable nexus
between his work and his ailment. Without saying more, his bare allegations do
not ipso facto make his illness compensable. Awards of compensation cannot rest
on speculations or presumptions. The claimant must present concrete evidence to
prove a positive proposition.
Moreover, petitioner cannot conveniently rely on the invocation that the
Employees Compensation Act, as a social legislation, must be liberally construed
in favor of the ordinary working person. While the sympathy of the law on social security
is toward the employees or their beneficiaries, it is imperative to remember that such
compassion must be balanced by the equally vital interest of denying undeserving claims
for compensation benefits.

PABLO A. AUSTRIA v. CA

Facts:

Petitioner was employed as bag piler at Central Azucarera de Tarlac from June 1, 1977
to July 20, 1997.

In 1994, petitioner began to feel severe back pain. The x-ray photographs taken
revealed osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine.

petitioner filed with the SSS a claim for compensation benefits under PD 626
as amended. The claim was granted and petitioner was awarded permanent
partial disability benefits for eight (8) months starting September 1, 1995, a second
release for seven (7) months starting May 10, 1996, and a third release for fifteen (15)
months starting April 1, 1997.

Petitioner requested the SSS for conversion of his permanent partial disability
benefit to permanent total disability benefit. The SSS denied the request. It
reasoned:

"Based on clinical records submitted, there is no progression of your illness which

was already granted under previous EC disability. Granting of extension on your
claim cannot be based solely on the findings on your lumbo-sacral X-ray hence
they are not related to each other or of different disease entity."

On appeal, the ECC affirmed the decision of the SSS. held that considering the degree
of his disability at the time he was separated from the service, petitioner has already
availed of the maximum benefits to which he is entitled on account of his
osteoarthritis.

CA dismissed the case. Hence this petition

Issue:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in denying the claim for additional
benefits in favor of the petitioner and not allowing the conversion of his (petitioner)
permanent partial disability to permanent total disability."

Held:

YES

PD 626 as amended provides three types of disability benefits to qualified employees: (1)
temporary total disability, (2) permanent total disability, and (3) permanent partial
disability. In the case at bar, petitioner was granted by the SSS, as affirmed by the ECC,
permanent partial disability benefit, but he seeks to avail of permanent total disability
benefit. Under Section 2 Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, a
disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness, the employee is
unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days;
and a disability is partial and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness, the
employee suffers a permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his body.

we find petitioner entitled to permanent total disability benefit under the law.
Petitioner has been employed as bag piler for twenty (20) years at the Central Azucarera
de Tarlac. His duties require him to carry heavy loads of refined sugar and to perform
other manual work. Since his work obviously taxes so much on his back, his illness
which affects his lumbar spine renders him incapable of doing his usual work
as bag piler. Hence, his disability to perform his regular duties may be
considered total and permanent.

Contrary to the assertion of the Court of Appeals, there is nothing in the lawthat
prohibits the conversion of permanent partial disability benefit to
permanent total disability benefit if it is shown that the employee's ailment
qualifies as such. Furthermore, the grant of permanent total disability benefit to an
employee who was initially compensated for permanent partial disability but is found to
be suffering from permanent total disability would not be prejudicial to the government
to give it reason to deny the claim.

ALEXANDER B. GATUS, PETITIONER, VS. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM,

RESPONDENT.

Facts:
Petitioner worked at the Central Azucarera beginning on 1972. He was a covered
member of the SSS. He optionally retired upon reaching 30 years of service on 2002,
at the age of 62 years. he held the position of Tender assigned at the Distillery Cooling
Tower.
On 1995, He suffered chest pains and was diagnosed to be suffering from Coronary
Artery Disease (CAD): Triple Vessel and Unstable Angina. His medical records
showed him to be hypertensive for 10 years and a smoker.
he was given by the SSS the following EC/SSS Permanent Partial Disability (PPD)
benefits: (a) 8 monthly pensions effective September 1, 1994 and (b) 4 monthly pensions
effective January 3, 1997. He became an SSS retirement pensioner on February 1, 2002.
Sometime in 2003, an SSS audit revealed the need to recover the EC benefits
already paid to him on the ground that his CAD, being attributed to his chronic
smoking, was not work-related. He was notified thereof through a letter
Convinced that he was entitled to the benefits, he assailed the decision but the SSS
maintained its position.
He elevated the matter to the ECC, which denied his appeal essentially ruling
that Appellant had been documented to be a chronic smoker and such factor
which is not in any way related to any form of employment increased his risk
of contracting heart disease.
Court of Appeals held that petitioner is not entitled to compensation benefits. The Court
of Appeals agreed with the ECC's findings that based on his medical records, petitioner
has been hypertensive for ten (10) years and smokes 20 packs of cigarettes a year.
Petitioner uses various references, including encyclopedia and medical books, to discuss
the general effects of pollution, mostly caused by the burning of fossil fuels, to people with
cardiovascular diseases; and the aggravation of coronary artery diseases brought about
by exposure to carbon monoxide. Petitioner claims that "air pollution (carbon
monoxide and lead from gasoline) contributed to the development of essential
hypertension and its complications: [c]oronary artery disease, hypertensive
cardiovascular disease and stroke."
Respondent SSS alleges that as viewed from the records of the case, the petitioner
failed to show proof by mere substantial evidence that the development of his disease was
work-related; that petitioner's heart ailment had no causal relation with his employment;
and that "[as] viewed from by his lifestyle, he was a chain smoker, a habit
[which had] contributed to the development of his heart ailment."
Issue:
Whether petitioner is entitled to compensation benefits
Held:
NO
Gatus was diagnosed to have suffered from CAD; Triple Vessel and Unstable Angina,
diseases or conditions falling under the category of Cardiovascular Diseases which are not
considered occupational diseases under the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation. His disease not being listed as an occupational disease, he was
expected to show that the illness or the fatal disease was caused by his
employment and the risk of contracting the disease was increased or
aggravated by the working conditions. His proof would constitute a reasonable
basis for arriving at a conclusion that the conditions of his employment had caused the
disease or that such working conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting the illness
or the fatal disease.
While he might have been exposed to various smoke emissions at work for 30 years, he
did not submit satisfactory evidence proving that the exposure had
contributed to the development of his disease or had increased the risk of
contracting the illness. Neither did he show that the disease had progressed
due to conditions in his job as a factory worker. In fact, he did not present any
physician's report in order to substantiate his allegation that the working conditions had
increased the risk of acquiring the cardiovascular disease.
Verily, his mere contention of exposure to various smoke emissions in the
working environment for a period of time does not ipso facto make the
resulting disability compensable. Awards of compensation cannot rest on
speculations or presumptions, for the claimant must prove a positive proposition.
In fine, Gatus was not qualified for the disability benefits under the employees
compensation law.

REPUBLIC v. PEDRO MARIANO

Facts:

For an eleven-year period starting 1983, respondent Pedro Mariano was an

employee of LGP Printing Press. During his employment, Mariano worked in various
capacities, including that of a machine operator, paper cutter, monotype composer, film
developer, and supervisor of the printing press

Sometime in 1994, Mariano's service abruptly ended when he could no longer perform
any work due to a heart ailment. An electrocardiograph test revealed that he was
suffering from "Incomplete Right Bundle Branch Block."

Mariano filed a claim for employee's compensation benefit with the SSS. SSS denied
his claim on the ground that there was no causal connection between his ailment
and his job as film developer.

SSS forwarded the record of respondent's case to the ECC. ECC remanded
respondent's case to the SSS for reception of additional documentary evidence.

the SSS directed respondent to submit the following: (1) complete clinical abstract if he
was confined; and (2) records of consultation due to hypertension.
Meanwhile, respondent had consulted Dr. Rogelio Mariano, whose diagnosis showed he
was suffering from Parkinson's disease and hypertension

The SSS once again submitted respondent's case records to the ECC for review. the
ECC, dismissed respondent's claim on the ground that petitioner failed to
establish a causal connection between Parkinson's Disease and the working conditions
at the printing press.

Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which rendered a
judgment reversing the decision of the ECC. Court of Appeals found that the
nature of petitioner's work at LGP resulted in his exposure to various toxic chemicals,
which is a possible cause of Parkinson's Disease.

For the petitioner, the OSG contends that P.D. No. 626 does not list Parkinson's Disease
as an occupational ailment, hence, it is not compensable. The OSG takes the view that
the evidence on record does not establish that the risk of contracting said ailment was
increased by the nature of respondent's work.

Respondent counters that the nature of his functions at LGP clearly brought about the
onset of Parkinson's Disease.

Issue:

Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the ECC decision and in ordering
petitioner to pay respondent his claim for compensation benefits?

Held:

NO

First, as to Parkinson's disease, while it is true that this disease is not included in the
list of compensable diseases under the law then prevailing, it was found by the Court
of Appeals that the conditions prevailing at LGP largely led to the
progression of the ailment. The respondent's functions entailed constant exposure
to hazardous or toxic chemicals such as carbon disulfate, carbon monoxide, or
manganese. Where it was established that the claimant's ailment occurred
during and in the course of his employment, it must be presumed that the
nature of the claimant's employment is the cause of the disease.

Second, even if we were to assume that Parkinson's Disease is not compensable, there
can be no question that Essential Hypertension is a compensable illness, following our
ruling in Government Service Insurance System v. Gabriel, that hypertension and
heart ailments are compensable illnesses.
On this score, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in liberally construing
the rules implementing P.D. No. 626. In matters of labor and social legislation, it is well
established that doubts in the interpretation and application of the law are resolved
liberally in favor of the worker and strictly against the employer.
While the SSS and ECC may be commended for their vigilance against sustaining
unjustified claims that would only drain funds meant for deserving disabled employees,
respondent Mariano's case does not fall in that class. Said agencies ought to realize, in our
view, that strict interpretation of the rules should not result in the denial of assistance to
those in need and qualified therefor.

MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION AND/OR WASTFEL-LARSEN

MANAGEMENT A/S*, PETITIONERS, VS. OBERTO S. LOBUSTA,
RESPONDENT.

Facts:
Petitioner Magsaysay Maritime Corporation is a domestic corporation and the local
manning agent of the vessel MV "Fossanger" and of petitioner Wastfel-Larsen
Management A/S.
Respondent Lobusta is a seaman who has worked for Magsaysay Maritime
Corporation since 1994.[4] In March 1998, he was hired again as Able Seaman
Lobusta boarded MV "Fossanger". After two months, he complained of breathing
difficulty and back pain. while the vessel was in Singapore, Lobusta was diagnosed
to be suffering from severe acute bronchial asthma with secondary infection and
lumbosacral muscle strain. Dr. C K Lee certified that Lobustawas fit for discharge on
1998, for repatriation for further treatment.
Upon repatriation, Dr. Robert Lim, an Orthopedic Surgeon opined that Lobusta needs
surgery. spine surgery is good. However, the Pulmonologist opined that Lobusta's
obstructive airway disease needs to be monitored regularly and that Lobusta needs to be
on bronchodilator indefinitely. Hence, Lobusta should be declared disabled with a
suggested disability grading of 10-20%.[11] The suggestion was not heeded and Lobusta's
treatment continued.
Petitioners "then faced the need for confirmation and grading by a second opinion" and
"it took the parties time to agree on a common doctor, until they agreed on Dr. Camilo
Roa."[15] Dr. Roa's clinical summary states that Lobusta is not physically fit to
resume his normal work as a seaman due to the persistence of his symptoms; that
his asthma will remain chronically active and that he needs multiple controller
medications for his asthma.
Lobusta filed a complaint[17]for disability/medical benefits against petitioners
before NLRC
Magsaysay Maritime Corporation suggested that Lobusta be examined by another
company-designated doctor for an independent medical examination. The parties
agreed on an independent medical examination by Dr. Annette M. David, whose
findings it was agreed upon, would be considered final. Mr. Lobusta ought not to be
considered fit to return to work as an Able Seaman.
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering petitioners to pay Lobusta (a) US$2,060 as
medical allowance, (b) US$20,154 as disability benefits, and (c) 5% of the awards as
attorney's fees.
Lobusta appealed. The NLRC dismissed his appeal. NLRC ruled that Lobusta's
condition may only be considered permanent partial disability. While Dr. David
suggested that Lobusta's prospects as seafarer may have been restricted by his bronchial
asthma, Dr. David also stated that the degree of impairment is mild.
CA declared that Lobusta is suffering from permanent total disability and increased
the award of disability benefits in his favor to US$60,000,
Hence, this petition
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in applying the provisions of the Labor Code instead
of the provisions of the POEA contract in determining Lobusta's disability, and in ruling
that the mere lapse of 120 days entitles Lobusta to total and permanent disability
benefits.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE POEA CONTRACT CONSIDERS THE MERE LAPSE OF
MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) DAYS AS TOTAL AND PERMANENT
DISABILITY.
Held:
Petitioners are mistaken that it is only the POEA Standard Employment Contract that
must be considered in determining Lobusta's disability.
(1)that the standard employment contract for seafarers was formulated by the POEA
pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 247 "to secure the best terms and
conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance
therewith," and "to promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas";
(2) that Section 29 of the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract itself provides
that all rights and obligations of the parties to the contract, including the annexes
thereof, shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, international
conventions, treaties and covenants where the Philippines is a signatory; and (3) that
even without this provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that
the Civil Code expressly subjects it to the special laws on labor unions, collective
bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor
and similar subjects.
The standard terms of the POEA Standard Employment Contract agreed
upon are intended to be read and understood in accordance with Philippine
laws, particularly, Articles 191 to 193 of the Labor Code, as amended, and the
applicable implementing rules and regulations in case of any dispute, claim or
grievance.
Thus, the CA was correct in applying the Labor Code provisions in Lobusta's claim for
disability benefits.
Applying the foregoing considerations, we agree with the CA that Lobusta
suffered permanent total disability.
the maximum 240-day medical treatment period had already expired. May
22, 1998 to December 16, 1999 is 19 months or 570 days. In Remigio, unfitness to work
for 11-13 months was considered permanent total disability. So it must be in this case.
And Dr. David's much later report that Lobusta "ought not to be considered fit to return
to work as an Able Seaman" validates that his disability is permanent and total as
provided under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and the Labor Code, as
amended.
In fact, the CA has found that Lobusta was not able to work again as a seaman and that
his disability is permanent "as he has been unable to work since 14 May 1998 to the
present or for more than 120 days.
Thus, we affirm the award to Lobusta of US$60,000 as permanent total disability
benefits, the maximum award under Section 30 and 30-A of the 1996 POEA Standard
Employment Contract.

MAGSAYSAY MITSUI OSK MARINE v. JUANITO G. BENGSON

Facts:
Since the year 1986 Bengson[4] has been working as a seafarer for Magsaysay
Mitsui OSK Marine, Inc. from his first position as Deck Cadet until his present position
as Third Mate Officer. On 2007, at the age of 45, [Bengson] entered into his 22nd
contract of employment with Magsaysay, Inc. The contract was for a duration of nine
(9) months Prior to his deployment, [Bengson] underwent and passed the Pre-
Employment Medical Examination (PEME) and was found to be "fit for sea duty".
Thereafter, [Bengson] boarded the ship and performed his assigned tasks.
2007, Bengson suddenly experienced difficulty in breathing and numbness
on half of his body. Thinking that it was caused by fatigue, he rested for a while. After
two hours, he still felt numbness over his half body prompting him to ask for assistance.
he was confined for three days. (CT) Scan of the head showed a "small hematoma in
the left part of the crane". Due to his incapacity to work, his immediate
repatriation was arranged.
Upon [Bengson's] arrival in the Philippines, he was immediately brought to the
Manila Doctors Hospital for confinement under the supervision of company-
designated-physician Dr. Agbayani. Upon [Bengson's] discharge on 2007, his
Medical Abstract/Discharge Summary showed that he had a stroke.
Dr. Agbayani issued n Initial Out-Patient Consult Report which stated that
[Bengson's] illness of "hematoma in the cranium" was not work-related.
Bengson] thus filed his disability compensation claim (total permanent disability claim)
against Magsaysay, Inc. However his claim was outrightly denied
Labor Arbiter issued his Decision to pay complainant
Petitioners appealed to the NLRC setting aside the Labor Arbiter's decision
In a Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA Bengson sought to set aside the above NLRC
which was GRANTED. The CA held that Bengson's exposure to different hazards on
board petitioners' vessel, the performance of his functions as Third Mate, and the
extraordinary physical and mental strain required by his position caused him to suffer his
present illness, which requires continuous medication to date.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied the same. Hence, the
present Petition.
Bengson argued that his illness is work-related and was contracted as a result of the
pressure, stress, and demands of his work as well as the long period of service with
petitioners
petitioners' main defense is that Bengson’s "small hematoma on the left cranium"
has already been declared by the company-designated physician to be not
work-related, and is not included in (POEA-SEC) list of occupational diseases
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed serious error in law when it disregarded the
expert opinion of the company-designated physician that Respondent's illness is not
work-related.
Held:
NO.
In many cases decided in the past, this Court has held that cardiovascular disease,
coronary artery disease, and other heart ailments are compensable.
In the present case, petitioners flatly claim that Bengson's hypertensive cardio-
vascular disease is not compensable on the sole basis of its company-
designated physician Agbayani's declaration that such illness is not work-related.
Having worked for petitioners since 1988 under employment contracts that were
continuously renewed, it can be said that respondent spent much of his productive years
with petitioners; his years of service certainly took a toll on his body, and he could not
have contracted his illness elsewhere except while working for petitioners. To be sure,
the Court has ruled that "the list of illnesses/diseases in Section 32-A[40] does not
preclude other illnesses/diseases not so listed from being compensable. The
POEA-SEC cannot be presumed to contain all the possible injuries that
render a seafarer unfit for further sea duties."[41] And equally significant, "it is
not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work
resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity."
In Alpha Ship Management Corporation v. Calo it was held that an employee's
disability becomes permanent and total when so declared by the company-
designated physician, or, in case of absence of such a declaration either of fitness or
permanent total disability, upon the lapse of the 120 or 240-day treatment period under
Article 192 (c) (1) of the Labor Code and Rule X, Section 2 of the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation Commission, while the employee's disability continues
and he is unable to engage in gainful employment during such period, and the
company-designated physician fails to arrive at a definite assessment of the
employee's fitness or disability.
Bengson was repatriated on October 21, 2007. Agbayani issued an Initial Out-Patient
Consult Report which stated that respondent's illness was not work-related. As a result
of such adverse declaration, respondent underwent medication and rehabilitation under
Agbayani's supervision until February 2008. However, Agbayani did not make a
definite assessment of respondent's fitness or disability, even up to this day;
thus, respondent's medical condition remains unresolved.

PEDRO LIBANG, JR., PETITIONER, VS. INDOCHINA SHIP MANAGEMENT

INC., MR. MIGUEL SANTOS AND MAJESTIC CARRIERS, INC.,
RESPONDENTS.

Facts:
On 2002, Libang entered into a nine-month employment contract[4] with Indochina Ship
Management, Inc (ISMI) as a Cook for the vessel M/V Baltimar Orion
On March 2003, while Libang was on board M/V Baltimar Orion, he experienced
numbness on the left side of his face, difficulty in hearing from his left ear, blurred vision
of his left eye and speech problem. Libang obtained medical attention and was later
admitted for three days in a hospital in Dominican Republic, where he was found to be
suffering from high blood pressure at 180/110 mmHg. Libang was unable to again join
M/V Baltimar Orion even after he was discharged from the hospital.
Libang was eventually repatriated on April 2003. Two days later, he reported to ISMI and
was endorsed for medical attention to the company-designated physician, Dr. Lim who
merely issued a medical certificate and certified that he is under his care
Considering Dr. Lim's failure to assess Libang's disability despite his health
status, the latter sought medical attention and assessment from another
doctor, Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo (Dr. Vicaldo) of the Philippine Heart Center who certified
that

 He is now unfit to resume work as seaman in any capacity.

 His illness is considered work aggravated.

Per an affidavit executed by Dr. Lim, Libang still regularly received medical treatment
and supervision from Dr. Lim's clinic
Libang filed with the NLRC a complaint for disability benefit, damages and attorney's fees
against ISMI
Labor Arbiter granted
Feeling aggrieved, ISMI and Santos, together with Majestic, appealed the LA's decision to
the NLRC. The latter dismissed the appeal. In sustaining the LA's finding that Libang was
entitled to disability benefit, the NLRC considered the reasonable connection between the
nature of Libang's work as a cook and the development of his illness. The NLRC rejected
the claim that Libang's illness was pre-existing, citing the fact that the claimant was
required to undergo a pre-employment medical examination and was then certified by
company-designated physicians to be physically fit to work.
CA rendered its decision granting the petition for certiorari. For the CA, the lone
assessment made by Dr. Vicaldo could not have justified the LA's and NLRC's finding of
a Grade VI disability. The POEA-SEC requires the company-designated physician to be
the one to make a disability assessment of a seafarer.
Libang's motion for reconsideration was denied Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue:
whether or not the CA erred in finding that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when
it declared Libang entitled to disability benefit.
Held:
YES
The CA erred in finding that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
declared Libang entitled to the disability benefit.
It bears emphasis that the CA did not nullify the ruling of the NLRC upon a finding
that Libang's illnesses were pre-existing or not work-related. The appellate court's
annulment of the NLRC decision was based on an entirely different basis that
pertained to proof of disability.
The CA rejected the NLRC's decision upon finding that Libang's disability was
based solely on a medical certificate issued by Dr. Vicaldo. In his affidavit dated
July 16, 2004, Dr. Lim again confirmed that Libang was diagnosed to have hypertension,
right middle cerebral artery infarct vs. brainstem infarct and diabetes mellitus 2. Libang
was even said to be under his medical care and treatment from April 10, 2003 to January
5, 2004. In none of these issuances, however, did Dr. Lim indicate a complete
evaluation of Libang's illnesses and an assessment of his disability or fitness
to work.
Rather than making a full assessment of Libang's health condition, disability or fitness,
Dr. Lim only reasoned in his medical certificate that "[Libang's] hypertension could
be pre-existing" and that "it [was] difficult to say whether [his diabetes mellitus and small
pontine infarct] are pre-existing or not." His assessment was evidently uncertain
and the extent of his examination for a proper medical diagnosis was
incomplete.
Clearly, there was a breach by Dr. Lim of his obligation as the company-
designated physician. Although Libang repeatedly argued that Dr. Lim failed to
give an assessment of his illness, herein respondents and Dr. Lim failed to explain
and justify such failure. the company-designated physician is expected to arrive
at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness or permanent disability
within the 120 or 240 days, as the case may be; otherwise, he shall be deemed totally
and permanently disabled.
Given the failure of Dr. Lim to fully evaluate Libang's illness, disability or fitness to work,
the seafarer was justified in seeking the medical expertise of his physician of
choice. The NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in considering Dr.
Vicaldo's assessment. As against an incomplete evaluation by Dr. Lim, the medical
certificate issued by Dr. Vicaldo included a determination of the disability grade that
applied to Libang's condition.
The respondents could not be allowed to benefit from their physician's
inaction or refusal to disclose the results of the diagnostic tests performed upon
Libang, the extent of the patient's illnesses, and the effect of the severity of these illnesses
on his fitness or disability. The respondents even failed to sufficiently dispute the finding
of the LA and NLRC that Libang's illnesses had resulted in a Grade VI disability.
All told, the labor tribunals acted reasonably when they relied upon the
findings of Dr. Vicaldo. The CA then erred in holding that the NLRC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing its resolutions that favored Libang.