G.R. No.

176229 October 19, 2011

HO WAI PANG, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the so-called Miranda Rights render
inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during such investigation. 1 "The admissibility of
other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not
affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation." 2

Petitioner Ho Wai Pang (petitioner) in this present recourse assails the June 16, 2006 Decision 3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 affirming the April 6, 1995 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 118 of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 91-1592, finding him and his co-accused, namely, Law Ka Wang, Chan
Chit Yue,5 Wu Hing Sum, Tin San Mao6 and Kin San Ho7 guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 15,
Article III8 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Also assailed is the
January 16, 2007 CA Resolution9 denying the motion for reconsideration thereto.

Factual Antecedents

On September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 in the evening, United Arab Emirates Airlines Flight No. 068 from
Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). Among the passengers were 13 Hongkong
nationals who came to the Philippines as tourists. At the arrival area, the group leader Wong Kwok Wah (Sonny
Wong) presented a Baggage Declaration Form to Customs Examiner Gilda L. Cinco (Cinco), who was then manning
Lane 8 of the Express Lane. Cinco examined the baggages of each of the 13 passengers as their turn came up. From
the first traveling bag, she saw few personal belongings such as used clothing, shoes and chocolate boxes which
she pressed. When the second bag was examined, she noticed chocolate boxes which were almost of the same
size as those in the first bag. Becoming suspicious, she took out four of the chocolate boxes and opened one of
them. Instead of chocolates, what she saw inside was white crystalline substance contained in a white transparent
plastic. Cinco thus immediately called the attention of her immediate superiors Duty Collector Alalo and Customs
Appraiser Nora Sancho who advised her to call the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and the police. Thereupon, she
guided the tourists to the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU) while bringing with her the four chocolate boxes earlier
discovered.

At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the other using the passenger manifest and further examined their
bags. The bag of Law Ka Wang was first found to contain three chocolate boxes. Next was petitioner’s bag which
contains nothing except for personal effects. Cinco, however, recalled that two of the chocolate boxes earlier
discovered at the express lane belong to him. Wu Hing Sum’s bag followed and same yielded three chocolate
boxes while the baggages of Ho Kin San, Chan Chit Yue and Tin San Mao each contained two or three similar
chocolate boxes. All in all, 18 chocolate boxes were recovered from the baggages of the six accused.

NARCOM Agent Neowillie de Castro corroborated the relevant testimony of Cinco pertaining to the presence of
the chocolate boxes. According to him, he conducted a test on the white crystalline substance contained in said
chocolate boxes at the NAIA using the Mandelline Re-Agent Test.10 The result of his examination11 of the white
crystalline substance yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Thereafter, the chocolate
boxes were bundled together with tape, placed inside a plastic bag and brought to the Inbond Section.

The following day, September 7, 1991, the 13 tourists were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
for further questioning. The confiscated stuff were turned over to the Forensic Chemist who weighed and
examined them. Findings show that its total weight is 31.1126 kilograms and that the representative samples were
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.12 Out of the 13 tourists, the NBI found evidence for violation of R.A.
No. 6425 only as against petitioner and his five co-accused.

Accordingly, six separate Informations all dated September 19, 1991 were filed against petitioner and his co-
accused. These Informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-1591 to 97. Subsequently, however,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation 13 which the trial court granted. The reinvestigation conducted gave
way to a finding of conspiracy among the accused and this resulted to the filing of a single Amended
Information14 under Criminal Case No. 91-1592 and to the withdrawal of the other Informations. 15 The Amended
Information reads:

That on or about September 6, 1991 in Pasay City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry and transport into the country without lawful authority, 31.112
kilograms, more or less, of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also popularly known as "SHABU", a regulated drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.16

After pleading not guilty to the crime charged,17 all the accused testified almost identically, invoking denial as their
defense. They claimed that they have no knowledge about the transportation of illegal substance (shabu) taken
from their traveling bags which were provided by the travel agency.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On April 6, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision18 finding all the accused guilty of violating Section 15, Article III of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Court finds the accused LAW KA WANG, CHAN CHIT yue, ho wai
pang, wu hing sum, tin sun mao, and kin san ho (ho kin san) guilty of Conspiracy in violating Section 15, Article III,
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended for having conspired to transport into the Philippines 31.112 kilograms of
methamp[h]etamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the PENALTY
OF IMPRISONMENT OF SIX (6) [sic] RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO PAY EACH (SIC) THE AMOUNT OF THIRTY (30)
THOUSAND PESOS (p30,000.00) each as FINE, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is being imposed pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7659 considering its applicability to the accused though retroactively for having a less stricter
penalty than that of life imprisonment provided in Republic Act No. 6425. The fine of ₱30,000.00 for each accused
is imposed pursuant to R.A. No. 6425 it being more favorable to the accused [than] that provided in R.A. No. 7659
WITH IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION AFTER SERVICE OF SENTENCE. The penalty of death cannot be imposed since the
offense was committed prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659.

Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against accused WONG KOK WAH @ SONNY WONG, CHAN TAK PIU, HO
WAI LING AND INOCENCIA CHENG.

SO ORDERED.19

From this judgment, all the accused appealed to this Court where the case records were forwarded to per Order of
the RTC dated May 10, 1995.20 Later, all the accused except for petitioner, filed on separate dates their respective
withdrawal of appeal.21 This Court, after being satisfied that the withdrawing appellants were fully aware of the
consequences of their action, granted the withdrawal of their respective appeals through a Resolution dated June
18, 1997.22 Per Entry of Judgment, 23 said Resolution became final and executory on July 7, 1997. Consequently,
petitioner was the only one left to pursue his appeal.

Petitioner filed his Brief24 on April 6, 1998 while the brief25 for the respondent People of the Philippines was filed
on August 27, 1998 through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Per Resolution 26 dated August 30, 2004, this
Court referred the appeal to the CA for proper disposition and determination pursuant to this Court’s ruling in
People v. Mateo.27

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On June 16, 2006, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC. While conceding that
petitioner’s constitutional right to counsel during the custodial investigation was indeed violated, it nevertheless
went on to hold that there were other evidence sufficient to warrant his conviction. The CA also rebuked
petitioner’s claim that he was deprived of his constitutional and statutory right to confront the witnesses against
him. The CA gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and quoted with favor the trial court’s
ratiocination regarding the existence of conspiracy among the accused.

Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration28 which the CA denied in its Resolution29 dated January
16, 2007.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following grounds:

WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS
UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION BOTH BY THE CUSTOMS OFFICIALS AND BY THE NBI INVESTIGATORS, THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING EVIDENCE TAKEN DURING THE CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE FAILED TO
ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF A CONSPIRACY.

IV

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRESENT PROOF
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO OVERTURN THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE ACCORDED TO PETITIONER BY
THE CONSTITUTION.30

OUR RULING

The petition lacks merit.

Section 12, Article III of the Constitution prohibits as evidence only confessions and admissions of the accused as
against himself.

Anent the error first assigned, petitioner takes issue on the fact that he was not assisted by a competent and
independent lawyer during the custodial investigation. He claimed that he was not duly informed of his rights to
remain silent and to have competent counsel of his choice. Hence, petitioner faults the CA in not excluding
evidence taken during such investigation.

While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial questioning by the customs
authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12 31 of Article III of the Constitution,
we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision prohibits as evidence are only
confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself. Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste, 32 the Court categorically
ruled that "the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible ‘only the extrajudicial confession or
admission made during custodial investigation.’ The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to
the issue and [are] not otherwise excluded by law or rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or taken in the
course of custodial investigation."

In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during his custodial investigation. The
prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted from him as evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no
statement was taken from petitioner during his detention and subsequently used in evidence against him. Verily,
in determining the guilt of the petitioner and his co-accused, the trial court based its Decision on the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated shabu. As the Court held in People v.
Buluran,33 "[a]ny allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to
cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their
conviction." Hence, petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in not excluding evidence taken during the custodial
investigation deserves scant consideration.

Petitioner cannot take refuge in this Court’s ruling in People v. Wong Chuen Ming34 to exculpate himself from the
crime charged. Though there are semblance in the facts, the case of Ming is not exactly on all fours with the
present case. The disparity is clear from the evidence adduced upon which the trial courts in each case relied on in
rendering their respective decisions. Apparently in Ming, the trial court, in convicting the accused, relied heavily on
the signatures which they affixed on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags. The Court construed the
accused’s act of affixing their signatures thereon as a tacit admission of the crime charged. And, since the accused
were not informed of their Miranda rights when they affixed their signatures, the admission was declared
inadmissible evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional rights. In ruling against the
accused, the trial court also gave credence to the sole testimony of the customs examiner whom it presumed to
have performed his duties in regular manner. However, in reversing the judgment of conviction, the Court noted
that said examiner’s testimony was not corroborated by other prosecution witnesses.

On the other hand, petitioner’s conviction in the present case was on the strength of his having been
caught inflagrante delicto transporting shabu into the country and not on the basis of any confession or admission.
Moreover, the testimony of Cinco was found to be direct, positive and credible by the trial court, hence it need not
be corroborated. Cinco witnessed the entire incident thus providing direct evidence as eyewitness to the very act
of the commission of the crime. As the Court held in People v Dela Cruz, 35 "[n]o rule exists which requires a
testimony to be corroborated to be adjudged credible. x x x Thus, it is not at all uncommon to reach a conclusion of
guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single witness despite the lack of corroboration, where such testimony is
found positive and credible by the trial court. In such a case, the lone testimony is sufficient to produce a
conviction."

Indeed, a ruling in one case cannot simply be bodily lifted and applied to another case when there are stark
differences between the two cases. Cases must be decided based on their own unique facts and applicable law and
jurisprudence.

Petitioner was not denied of his right to confrontation.

Turning now to the second assigned error, petitioner invokes the pertinent provision of Section 14(2) of Article III
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution providing for the right to confrontation, viz:

Section 14. x x x

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However,
after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right to know and understand what the witnesses testified to.
According to him, only a full understanding of what the witnesses would testify to would enable an accused to
comprehend the evidence being offered against him and to refute it by cross-examination or by his own
countervailing evidence.

In refutation, the OSG countered that petitioner was given the opportunity to confront his accusers and/or the
witnesses of the prosecution when his counsel cross-examined them. It is petitioner’s call to hire an interpreter to
understand the proceedings before him and if he could not do so, he should have manifested it before the court.
At any rate, the OSG contends that petitioner was nevertheless able to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses
and that such examination suffices as compliance with petitioner’s right to confront the witnesses against him.

We agree with the OSG.

As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register any objection to the presentation of the prosecution’s
evidence particularly on the testimony of Cinco despite the absence of an interpreter. Moreover, it has not been
shown that the lack of an interpreter greatly prejudiced him. Still and all, the important thing is that petitioner,
through counsel, was able to fully cross-examine Cinco and the other witnesses and test their credibility. The right
to confrontation is essentially a guarantee that a defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution.
In People v. Libo-on,36 the Court held:

The right to confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the person facing
criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-
examine them on their charges. The chief purpose of the right of confrontation is to secure the opportunity for
cross-examination, so that if the opportunity for cross-examination has been secured, the function and test of
confrontation has also been accomplished, the confrontation being merely the dramatic preliminary to cross-
examination.

Under the circumstances obtaining, petitioner’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was not
impaired.

Conspiracy among the accused was duly established.

Respecting the third assigned error, we uphold the trial court’s finding of conspiracy which was quoted by the
appellate court in its assailed Decision, and which we once again herein reproduce with approval:

On the allegation of conspiracy, the Court finds [no] direct evidence to conclude conspiracy. However, just like in
other cases where conspiracy is not usually established by direct evidence but by circumstantial evidence, the
Court finds that there are enough circumstantial evidence which if taken together sufficiently prove conspiracy.
First, it cannot be denied that the accused somehow have known each other prior to their [departure] in Hong
Kong for Manila. Although Law Ka Wang denied having known any of the accused prior to the incident in NAIA,
accused Ho Wai Pang identified him as the one who assisted him in the supposed tour in the Philippines to the
extent of directly dealing with the travel agency and [that] Law Ka Wang was the one who received the personal
things of Ho Wai Pang allegedly to be place[d] in a bag provided for by the travel agency. Accused Wu Hing Sum
has been known to accused Ho Kin San for about two to three years as they used to work as cooks in a restaurant
in Hong Kong. Accused Ho Wai Ling, who is still at large, is know[n] to accused Chan Chit Yue, Wu Hing Sum and Ho
Kin San. These relationships in a way can lead to the presumption that they have the capability to enter into a
conspiracy. Second, all the illegal substances confiscated from the six accused were contained in chocolate boxes
of similar sizes and almost the same weight all contained in their luggages. The Court agrees with the finding of the
trial prosecutor that under the given circumstances, the offense charged [c]ould have been perpetrated only
through an elaborate and methodically planned conspiracy with all the accused assiduously cooperating and
mutually helping each other in order to ensure its success.37

We find no cogent reason to reverse such findings.

"Conspiracy is [the] common design to commit a felony."38 "[C]onspiracy which determines criminal culpability
need not entail a close personal association or at least an acquaintance between or among the participants to a
crime."39"It need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into
and pursue a common design."40 "The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually
inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some
complete whole" as we ruled in People v. Mateo, Jr.41 Here, it can be deduced from petitioner and his co-accused’s
collective conduct, viewed in its totality, that there was a common design, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments in bringing about the crime committed.

Petitioner’s guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Finally, petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He makes capital
on the contention that no chocolate boxes were found in his traveling bag when it was examined at the ICU. He
claimed that it was his co-accused Sonny Wong who took charge in ascribing upon him the possession of the two
chocolate boxes.

Petitioner’s contentions fail to persuade.

True, when principal prosecution witness Cinco first testified on June 3, 1992, she declared that she did not see
any chocolate boxes but only personal effects in petitioner’s bag. 42 Nonetheless, she clarified in her succeeding
testimony that she recalls taking the two chocolate boxes from petitioner’s bag when they were still at the
counter. This sufficiently explained why Cinco did not find any chocolate boxes from petitioner’s bag when they
were at the ICU.43 To us, this slight clash in Cinco’s statements neither dilute her credibility nor the veracity of her
testimony.

The trial court’s words on this matter when it resolved petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence in its Order 44 of February
16, 1993 is quite enlightening. Thus –

In claiming that the evidences [sic] presented by the prosecution is insufficient to command conviction, the
Demurrer went on to say that the testimony of Hilda Cinco is either conjectural or hearsay and definitely missed its
mark in incriminating accused, Ho Wai Pang, because she even testified that she found nothing inside the hand-
carried luggage of Ho Wai Pang (pp. 48-49, TSN, June 3, 1992). But that was when investigation was going on at the
Intensive Counting Unit (ICU). However, the same Hilda Cinco later on testified that from the express lane in going
to the ICU, after the discovery of shabu, she was already carrying with her four (4) chocolate boxes, two of [which]
taken from the bag of Tin Sun Mau and the other two retrieved from the luggage of herein movant, Ho Wai Pang.
Categorically, Cinco admitted it was the reason that at the ICU, Ho Wai Pang’s bag was already empty (pp. 53-54,
TSN, June 3, 1992), but she nonetheless recognized the bag and could recall the owner thereof, pointing to Ho Wai
Pang. Such testimony is not hearsay evidence. They are facts from the personal perception of the witness and out
of her personal knowledge. Neither is it conjectural.45

Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must be considered in its entirety
instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and
anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. "In ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated
by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered." 46 Also, where there is
nothing in the records which would show a motive or reason on the part of the witnesses to falsely implicate the
accused, identification should be given full weight. Here, petitioner presented no evidence or anything to indicate
that the principal witness for the prosecution, Cinco, was moved by any improper motive, hence her testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit.1avvphi1

Verily, the evidence adduced against petitioner is so overwhelming that this Court is convinced that his guilt has
been established beyond reasonable doubt. Nothing else can speak so eloquently of his culpability than the
unassailable fact that he was caught red-handed in the very act of transporting, along with his co-accused, shabu
into the country. In stark contrast, the evidence for the defense consists mainly of denials.

Petitioner tried to show that he was not aware of the shabu inside his luggage considering that his bag was
provided by the travel agency. However, it bears stressing that the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a malum
prohibitum because it is punished as an offense under a special law. As such, the mere commission of the act is
what constitutes the offense punished and same suffices to validly charge and convict an individual caught
committing the act so punished regardless of criminal intent. Moreover, beyond his bare denials, petitioner has
not presented any plausible proof to successfully rebut the evidence for the prosecution. "It is basic that
affirmative testimony of persons who are eyewitnesses of the events or facts asserted easily overrides negative
testimony."47

All told, we are convinced that the courts below committed no error in adjudging petitioner guilty of transporting
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu into the country in violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425,
as amended.

Penalty

As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate court, we find the same in accord
with law and jurisprudence. It should be recalled that at the time of the commission of the crime on September 6,
1991, Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already amended by Presidential Decree No. 1683.48 The decree provided
that for violation of said Section 15, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from ₱20,000.00
to ₱30,000.00 shall be imposed. Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 765949 further introduced new amendments to
Section 15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. Under the new amendments, the
penalty prescribed in Section 15 was changed from "life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
₱20,000.00 to ₱30,000.00" to "reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from ₱500,000.00 to ₱10 million".
On the other hand, Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 amended Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new
penalty provided by the amendatory law shall be applied depending on the quantity of the dangerous drugs
involved.

The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion perpetua under R.A. No. 7659 rather
than life imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659 could be given retroactive application, it being more
favorable to the petitioner in view of its having a less stricter punishment.

We agree. In People v. Doroja,50 we held:

In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled (a) that the amendatory law, being more
lenient and favorable to the accused than the original provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, should be accorded
retroactive application, x x x.

And, since "reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and considering the rule that criminal
statutes with a favorable effect to the accused, have, as to him, a retroactive effect", 51 the penalty imposed by the
trial court upon petitioner is proper. Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of imprisonment, which is
reclusion perpetua, as well as the amount of fine imposed by the trial court upon petitioner, the same being more
favorable to him.

WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed June 16, 2006 Decision and January 16,
2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012

RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,1 Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in
CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 20112 and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.

Statement of the Facts and of the Case

The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the version of the prosecution, are as
follows:

PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic
enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, he saw the accused,
who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a
motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance
which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the
accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of
the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of
municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that
he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may
have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which
was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one
(1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it;
that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon
his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4)
plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.3

Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the charge of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued.

During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the prosecution. On the
other hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion.

In its 19 February 2009 Decision,4 the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs 5 committed
on 10 March 2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a
traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic
sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-
serving and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13)
years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱ 300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its proper
disposition and destruction in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.6

Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision.

On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 1
September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the
Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January 2012.

Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:

(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID.

(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE
RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.

(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.

(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic). 7

Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that
the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged
with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented
to the search conducted upon him.

On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus:

It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this case by Police Officers Alteza and
Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle
drivers and riders thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The accused himself
admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the time when he was flagged down by the said police officers,
albeit he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the part of the apprehending officers to
flag down and arrest the accused because the latter was actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a
violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto violating the
said Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. x x x. 8

We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an
appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though
unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those
that the parties raised as errors.9

First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was
not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of
an offense.10 It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary
submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of
the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an
intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other
to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. 11

Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic
violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. — Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly
deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued
pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the
license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall
authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and
date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid
thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a
ground for the suspension and/or revocation of his license.

Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual12 provides the following procedure for flagging
down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:

SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept
and will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when applicable: x
xx

m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR).
Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any of the vehicle’s
occupants;

At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been
"under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take
him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station
may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that
the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down "almost in front" of
that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to
take petitioner into custody.

In Berkemer v. McCarty,13 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether the roadside
questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation.
The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal
arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length
of time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:

It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the "freedom of action" of the driver
and the passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime either to ignore a
policeman’s signal to stop one’s car or, once having stopped, to drive away without permission. x x x

However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent.
Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of
situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a traffic
stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-
incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.

Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be induced "to speak
where he would not otherwise do so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist
pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last only a
few minutes. A motorist’s expectations, when he sees a policeman’s light flashing behind him, are that he will be
obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and
registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on
his way. In this respect, questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse
interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will
continue until he provides his interrogators the answers they seek. See id., at 451.

Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at
the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the
knowledge that the officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some
pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of the situation substantially offset these
forces. Perhaps most importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x

In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop," see Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort
explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The
similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained
pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda.

xxx xxx xxx

We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to pass. It is settled that the
safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a
"degree associated with formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist
who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him "in
custody" for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. See
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.)

The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only subjected to modest questions
while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should
have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the
functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered "under arrest" at the
time that his traffic citation was being made.

It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a
crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest
need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated
as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.

This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on
the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may
be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officer’s issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic
citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.

Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon being flagged down
for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were
not complied with.

This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the
latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be
informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make
could be used against them.14 It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were
complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.

In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person apprehended due
to a traffic violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive
suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial setting
itself," "which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist," and as much as possible to free courts from the
task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were
voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of
misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.

If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was flagged down for a traffic violation and
while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second time—
after the police officers allegedly discovered the drugs—as he was already in their custody.

Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.

The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v)
customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. 15 None of the above-
mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.

It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain
view." It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner’s pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not
immediately apparent.16

Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by
clear and convincing evidence.17 It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the
consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While
the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not
suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely "told" to take out
the contents of his pocket.18

Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all
the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent
and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a
public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the
education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant’s
belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment
in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is
the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was
obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given. 19 In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at
the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh
heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.

Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While the rule normally applies when a police
officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the
stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons. 20

In Knowles v. Iowa,21 the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person for speeding and
correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to
conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no justification for a full-blown search when
the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as
ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown:
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the "search incident to arrest" exception: (1) the
need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at
trial. x x x But neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception is sufficient to
justify the search in the present case.

We have recognized that the first rationale—officer safety—is "‘both legitimate and weighty,’" x x x The threat to
officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In
Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves "danger to an officer" because of "the extended exposure
which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station." 414 U. S., at 234-
235. We recognized that "[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant
proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest." Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on
the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and "is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a
formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973)
("Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take
conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence").

This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic stop.1âwphi1 It plainly
is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the concern for officer safety in this context
may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by
itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the search
authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from
danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers,
Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a "patdown" of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they
may be armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry patdown" of the passenger
compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate
control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a full search of the
passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453
U. S. 454, 460 (1981).

Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to arrest—the need to discover
and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary
to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either
on the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car. (Emphasis supplied.)

The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his
arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. 22

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures.23 Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public
welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles
of government.24

The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.25 The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the
crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the
acquittal of the accused.26

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
32516 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region,
Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz
y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from detention, unless his continued confinement
is warranted by some other cause or ground.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180308 June 19, 2012

PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, ENRIQUE L. LOCSIN AND MANUEL D. ANDAL, Petitioners,

vs.
SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES, HON. SEN. RICHARD GORDON AND HON. SEN.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assails and seeks to enjoin the implementation of and nullify
Committee Report No. 3121 submitted by respondents Senate Committees on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and on Public Services (respondents Senate Committees) on June 7, 2007 for allegedly having
been approved by respondent Senate of the Republic of the Philippines (respondent Senate) with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

The Factual Antecedents

The Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Philippine
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), a government-sequestered organization in which the Republic
of the Philippines holds a 35% interest in shares of stocks. 2 Petitioner PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC),
meanwhile, is a private corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws and a holding company
whose main operation is collecting the money market interest income of PHILCOMSAT.

Petitioners Enrique L. Locsin and Manuel D. Andal are both directors and corporate officers of PHC, as well as
nominees of the government to the board of directors of both POTC and PHILCOMSAT.3 By virtue of its interests in
both PHILCOMSAT and POTC, the government has, likewise, substantial interest in PHC.

For the period from 1986 to 1996, the government, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), regularly received cash dividends from POTC. In 1998, however, POTC suffered its first loss. Similarly, in
2004, PHC sustained a ₱7-million loss attributable to its huge operating expenses. By 2005, PHC's operating
expenses had ballooned tremendously. Likewise, several PHC board members established Telecommunications
Center, Inc. (TCI), a wholly-owned PHC subsidiary to which PHC funds had been allegedly advanced without the
appropriate accountability reports given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT. 4

On February 20, 2006, in view of the losses that the government continued to incur and in order to protect its
interests in POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, during the Second Regular Session of
the Thirteenth Congress of the Philippines, introduced Proposed Senate Resolution (PSR) No. 455 5 directing the
conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and
the mismanagement committed by their respective board of directors. PSR No. 455 was referred to respondent
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, which conducted eleven (11) public hearings 6 on
various dates. Petitioners Locsin and Andal were invited to attend these hearings as "resource persons."

On June 7, 2007, respondents Senate Committees submitted the assailed Committee Report No. 312, where it
noted the need to examine the role of the PCGG in the management of POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC. After due
proceedings, the respondents Senate Committees found overwhelming mismanagement by the PCGG and its
nominees over POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, and that PCGG was negligent in performing its mandate to preserve
the government's interests in the said corporations. In sum, Committee Report No. 312 recommended, inter
alia, the privatization and transfer of the jurisdiction over the shares of the government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT
to the Privatization Management Office (PMO) under the Department of Finance (DOF) and the replacement of
government nominees as directors of POTC and PHILCOMSAT.
On November 15, 2007, petitioners filed the instant petition before the Court, questioning, in particular, the haste
with which the respondent Senate approved the challenged Committee Report No. 312. 7 They also claim that
respondent Senator Richard Gordon acted with partiality and bias and denied them their basic right to
counsel,8 and that respondent Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, despite having voluntarily recused himself from the
proceedings in view of his personal interests in POTC, nonetheless continued to participate actively in the
hearings.9

Issues Before The Court

The basic issues advanced before the Court are: (1) whether the respondent Senate committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in approving Committee Resolution No. 312; and (2)
whether it should be nullified, having proposed no piece of legislation and having been hastily approved by the
respondent Senate.

The Court's Ruling

The respondents Senate Committees' power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has been passed upon and upheld in
the consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio,10 which cited Article
VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, as follows:

"The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected."

The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this
case the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective
discharge.11

On this score, the respondents Senate Committees cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312, given its
constitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries. Nor can the respondent Senate be faulted for doing so on
the very same day that the assailed resolution was submitted. The wide latitude given to Congress with respect to
these legislative inquiries has long been settled, otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 would be rendered
pointless.12 1âwphi1

Hence, on the basis of the pronouncements in the Sabio case, and as suggested 13 by the parties in their respective
pleadings, the issues put forth in the petition14 have become academic.

Corollarily, petitioners Locsin and Andal's allegation15 that their constitutionally-guaranteed right to counsel was
violated during the hearings held in furtherance of PSR No. 455 is specious. The right to be assisted by counsel can
only be invoked by a person under custodial investigation suspected for the commission of a crime, and therefore
attaches only during such custodial investigation.16 Since petitioners Locsin and Andal were invited to the public
hearings as resource persons, they cannot therefore validly invoke their right to counsel.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199877 August 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA, Accused-Appellant.

VILLARAMA, JR.,*

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is an automatic appeal from the Decision1 dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 03685. The CA affirmed the Decision2 dated October 1, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City,
Branch 268, finding Arturo Lara (Lara) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.

On June 14, 2001, an Information3 charging Lara with robbery with homicide was filed with the RTC:

On or about May 31, 2001, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, armed
with a gun, conspiring and confederating together with one unidentified person who is still at-large, and both of
them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain, and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and divest from Joselito M. Bautista
cash money amounting to ₱ 230,000.00 more or less and belonging to San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc.
represented by Enrique Sumulong; that on the occasion of said robbery, the said accused, with intent to kill, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot said Joselito M. Bautista with the said
gun, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.4

Following Lara’s plea of not guilty, trial ensued. The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses: Enrique Sumulong
(Sumulong), SPO1 Bernard Cruz (SPO1 Cruz) and PO3 Efren Calix (PO3 Calix).

Sumulong testified that: (a) he was an accounting staff of San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. (San Sebastian); (b) on
May 31, 2001 and at around 9:00 in the morning, he withdrew the amount of ₱ 230,000.00 from the Metrobank-
Mabini Branch, Pasig City to defray the salaries of the employees of San Sebastian; (c) in going to the bank, he rode
a pick-up and was accompanied by Virgilio Manacob (Manacob), Jeff Atie (Atie) and Joselito Bautista (Bautista); (d)
he placed the amount withdrawn in a black bag and immediately left the bank; (e) at around 10:30 in the morning,
while they were at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, Lara suddenly appeared at the
front passenger side of the pick-up and pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na ang pera, iyong bag, nasaan?"; (f)
Bautista, who was seated at the back, shouted, "Wag mong ibigay"; (g) heeding Bautista’s advice, he threw the bag
in Bautista’s direction; (h) after getting hold of the bag, Bautista alighted from the pick-up and ran; (i) seein
Bautista, Lara ran after him while firing his gun; (j) when he had the chance to get out of the pick-up, he ran
towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of San Sebastian to relay the incident; (k) when he went back to
where the pick-up was parked, he went to the rear portion of the vehicle and saw blood on the ground; (l) he was
informed by one bystander that Bautista was shot and the bag was taken away from him; (m) when barangay
officials and the police arrived, he and his two (2) other companions were brought to the police station for
investigation; (n) on June 7, 2001, while on his way to Barangay Maybunga, Pasig City, he saw Lara walking along
Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City; (o) he alerted the police and Lara was thereafter arrested; and
(p) at the police station, he, Atie and Manacob identified Lara as the one who shot and robbed them of San
Sebastian’s money.5
SPO1 Cruz testified that: (a) he was assigned at the Follow-Up Unit of the Pasig City Police Station; (b) at around
7:55 in the evening of June 7, 2001, Sumulong went to the police station and informed him that he saw Lara
walking along Dr. Pilapil Street; (c) four (4) police officers and Sumulong went to Dr. Pilapil Street where they saw
Lara, who Sumulong identified; (d) they then approached Lara and invited him for questioning; (e) at the police
station, Lara was placed in a line-up where he was positively identified by Sumulong, Manacob and Atie; and (f)
after being identified, Lara was informed of his rights and subsequently detained. 6

PO3 Calix testified that: (a) he was a member of the Criminal Investigation Unit of the Pasig City Police Station; (b)
on May 31, 2001, he was informed of a robbery that took place at the corner of Mercedes and Market Avenues,
Pasig City; (c) he, together with three (3) other police officers, proceeded to the crime scene; (d) upon arriving
thereat, one of the police officers who were able to respond ahead of them, handed to him eleven (11) pieces of
empty shells and six (6) deformed slugs of a 9mm pistol; (e) as part of his investigation, he interviewed Sumulong,
Atie, Manacob at the police station; and (f) before Bautista died, he was able to interview Bautista at the hospital
where the latter was brought after the incident.7

In his defense, Lara testified that: (a) he was a plumber who resided at Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel, Pasig City; (b)
on May 31, 2001, he was at his house, digging a sewer trench while his brother, Wilfredo, was constructing a
comfort room; (c) they were working from 8:00 in the morning until 3:00 in the afternoon; (d) on June 7, 2001 and
at around 7:00 in the evening, while he was at the house of one of his cousins, police officers arrived and asked
him if he was Arturo Lara; (e) after confirming that he was Arturo Lara, the police officers asked him to go with
them to the Barangay Hall; (f) he voluntarily went with them and while inside the patrol car, one of the policemen
said, "You are lucky, we were able to caught you in your house, if in another place we will kill you" (sic); (g) he was
brought to the police station and not the barangay hall as he was earlier told where he was investigated for
robbery with homicide; (h) when he told the police that he was at home when the subject incident took place, the
police challenged him to produce witnesses; (i) when his witnesses arrived at the station, one of the police officers
told them to come back the following day; (j) while he was at the police line-up holding a name plate, a police
officer told Sumulong and Atie, "Ituru nyo na yan at uuwi na tayo"; and (k) when his witnesses arrived the
following day, they were told that he will be subjected to an inquest.8

To corroborate his testimony, Lara presented one of his neighbors, Simplicia Delos Reyes. She testified that on May
31, 2001, while she was manning her store, she saw Lara working on a sewer trench from 9:00 in the morning to
5:00 in the afternoon.9 Lara also presented his sister, Edjosa Manalo, who testified that he was working on a sewer
line the whole day of May 31, 2001.10

On October 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Lara of robbery with homicide in a Decision,11 the dispositive portion of
which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused ARTURO LARA Y Orbista GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) as amended
by Republic Act 7659, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, with
all the accessory penalties prescribed by law.

Accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
Php230,000.00 representing the money carted by the said accused.

SO ORDERED.12

The RTC rejected Lara’s defense of alibi as follows:

The prosecution’s witness Enrique Sumulong positively identified accused Arturo Lara as the person who carted
away the payroll money of San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc., on May 31, 2001 at around 10:30 o’clock in the
morning along the corner of Mercedez and Market Ave., Pasig City and the one who shot Joselito Bautista which
caused his instantaneous death on the same day. As repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, "For alibi to prosper,
an accused must show he was at some other place for such a period of time that it was impossible for him to have
been at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime" (People versus Bano, 419 SCRA 697).
Considering the proximity of the distance between the place of the incident and the residence of the accused
where he allegedly stayed the whole day of May 31, 2001, it is not physically impossible for him to be at the crime
scene within the same barangay. The positive identification of the accused which were categorical and consistent
and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses, should prevail over the alibi and denial of
the accused whose testimony was not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence (People versus Aves 420
SCRA 259).13 (Emphasis supplied)

On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly attended his conviction. First, that he was arrested
without a warrant under circumstances that do not justify a warrantless arrest rendered void all proceedings
including those that led to his conviction. Second, he was not assisted by counsel when the police placed him in a
line-up to be identified by the witnesses for the prosecution in violation of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution. The police line-up is part of custodial investigation and his right to counsel had already attached.
Third, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed to
present a witness who actually saw him commit the alleged acts. Sumulong merely presumed that he was the one
who shot Bautista and who took the bag of money from him. The physical description of Lara that Sumulong gave
to the police was different from the one he gave during the trial, indicating that he did not have a fair glimpse of
the perpetrator. Moreover, this gives rise to the possibility that it was his unidentified companion who shot
Bautista and took possession of the money. Hence, it cannot be reasonably claimed that his conviction was
attended with moral certainty. Fourth, the trial court erred in discounting the testimony of his witnesses. Without
any showing that they were impelled by improper motives in testifying in his favor, their testimonies should have
been given the credence they deserve. While his two (2) witnesses were his sister and neighbor, this does not by
itself suggest the existence of bias or impair their credibility.

The CA affirmed Lara’s conviction. That Lara was supposedly arrested without a warrant may not serve as a ground
to invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction considering its belated invocation. Any objections to the
legality of the warrantless arrest should have been raised in a motion to quash duly filed before the accused enters
his plea; otherwise, it is deemed waived. Further, that the accused was illegally arrested is not a ground to set
aside conviction duly arrived at and based on evidence that sufficiently establishes culpability:

Appellant’s avowal could hardly wash.

It is a shopworn doctrine that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. In
voluntarily submitting himself to the court by entering a plea, instead of filing a motion to quash the information
for lack of jurisdiction over his person, accused-appellant is deemed to have waived his right to assail the legality of
his arrest. Applying the foregoing jurisprudential touchstone, appellant is estopped from questioning the validity of
his arrest since he never raised this issue before arraignment or moved to quash the Information.

What is more, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered
upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. The warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all
other proceedings including those leading to the conviction of the appellants and his co-accused, nor can the state
be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to their culpability. 14 (Citations
omitted)

As to whether the identification of Lara during the police line-up is inadmissible as his right to counsel was
violated, the CA ruled that there was no legal compulsion to afford him a counsel during a police line-up since the
latter is not part of custodial investigation.
Appellant’s assertion that he was under custodial investigation at the time he was identified in a police line-up and
therefore had the right to counsel does not hold water. Ingrained in our jurisdiction is the rule that an accused is
not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually not a part of custodial
investigation. An exception to this rule is when the accused had been the focus of police attention at the start of
the investigation. In the case at bench, appellant was identified in a police line-up by prosecution witnesses from a
group of persons gathered for the purpose. However, there was no proof that appellant was interrogated at all or
that a statement or confession was extracted from him. A priori, We refuse to hearken to appellant’s hollow cry
that he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel given the hard fact that during the police line-up, the
accusatory process had not yet commenced.

Assuming ex hypothesi that appellant was subjected to interrogation sans counsel during the police line-up, it does
not in any way affect his culpability. Any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant
and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes
the basis of their conviction. Here, appellant was convicted based on the testimony of a prosecution witness and
not on his alleged uncounseled confession or admission.15 (Citations omitted)

The CA addressed Lara’s claim that the prosecution’s failure to present a witness who actually saw him commit the
crime charged as follows:

Third. Appellant takes umbrage at the alleged failure of the prosecution to present an eyewitness to prove that he
shot the victim and took the money.

Such posture is unpersuasive.

Contrary to appellant’s assertion, prosecution witness Sumulong actually saw him shoot Bautista, the victim.
Sumulong vividly recounted, viz:

"Q When you said that "tinutukan ka", aside from this act was there any other words spoken by this person?

A There was, sir.

Q What did he say?

A "Nasaan ang bag ilabas mo yung pera", sir.

Q Where were you looking when this person approached you?

A I was looking at his face, sir.

Q And upon hearing those words, what did you do?

A I put out the money, sir, because I got afraid at that time.

Q Did you hand over the black bag containing the money to him?

A No, sir, because one of my companion(s) shouted not to give the money or the bag so I immediately threw away
the bag at the back seat, sir.

Q And how long approximately was that person standing by your car window?

A Five (5) to ten (10) minutes, sir.

Q And after you have thrown the black bag containing money to the back of the vehicle, what did that person do?

A I saw Joey alight(ed) from the vehicle carrying the bag and ran away, sir, and I also saw somebody shoot a gun?

Q Who was firing the gun?

A The one who held-up us, sir.

Q By how, do you know his name?

A No, sir.

Q But if you can see him again, (were) you be able to recognize him?

A Yes, sir.

Q If he is in the courtroom, will you be able to recognize him?

A Yes, sir.

Q Please look around and please tell this Honorable Court whether indeed the person you saw holding you up at
that time is in court?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please stand up and tap his shoulder to identify him?

Interpreter:

The witness tap the shoulder of a person sitting on the first bench of the courtroom wearing yellow t-shirt and
black pants who when ask identify himself as Arturo Lara (sic).

Q And when as you said Joey got the bag. Alighted from the vehicle and ran away with it, what did the accused do?
(sic)

A He shot Joey while running around our vehicle, sir.

Q Around how many shots according to your recollection were fired?

A There were several shots, more or less nine (9) shots, sir.

x x x x x x"

"Q So, you did not personally notice what had transpired or happened after you stepped down from the Nissan
pick-up, that is correct?

A There was, sir, my companion Joselito Bautista was shot.

Q When you heard the gunfire, you were already proceeding towards that store to call your office by phone, that is
correct?

A Not yet, sir, we were still inside the vehicle.

Q And was Joselito Bautista at the rear of the Nissan Sentra when you heard this gunfire?

A Yes, sir.

Q And so he was at the back, so the shooter was also at the back of the vehicle, that is correct?

A Yes, sir, he went towards the rear portion of the vehicle, he followed Joselito Bautista and shot him.

Q So, to be clear, when Joselito Bautista ran to the rear, this alleged holdup(p)er followed him?

A Yes, sir.
Q And that was the time(,) you heard this gunfire? A Yes, sir.

Q So, you did not personally see who fired that firearm?

A Because at that time he was the one holding the gun, sir.

Q So, you are presuming that he was the one who fired the gun because he was holding the gun, am I correct?

A Yes, sir."

xxxx

Under Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following
requisites concur:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Here, the following circumstantial evidence are tellingly sufficient to prove that the guilt of appellant is beyond
reasonable doubt, viz:

1. While the vehicle was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, appellant suddenly
emerged and pointed a gun at prosecution witness Sumulong, demanding from him to produce the bag containing
the money.

2. Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the bag to the victim who was then seated at the backseat of the vehicle.

3. The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the bag.

4. Appellant chased and fired several shots at the victim.

5. The victim sustained several gunshot wounds.

6. The police officers recovered from the scene of the crime six deformed empty shells. 16 (Citations omitted and
emphasis supplied)

Finally, the CA found that Lara’s alibi failed to convince. Specifically:

Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that positive identification of the accused, where categorical and
consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi
and denial of appellants, whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.

All the more, to establish alibi the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Physical
impossibility "refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the
place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places. Appellant miserably failed
to prove the physical impossibility of his presence at the locus criminis at the time of the perpetration of the
felonious act. He himself admitted that his house was just a stone’s throw (about three minutes away) from the
crime scene.17 (Citations omitted)

In a Resolution18 dated February 1, 2012, this Court accepted the appeal as the penalty imposed was reclusion
perpetua and the parties were afforded an opportunity to file their supplemental briefs. Both parties waived their
right to do so, stating that they would adopt the allegations in their respective briefs that they filed with the CA.
Issues

The present review of Lara’s conviction for robbery with homicide gives rise to the following issues:

a. whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in the police line-up is inadmissible because
Lara stood therein without the assistance of counsel;

b. whether Lara’s supposedly illegal arrest may be raised for the first time on appeal for the purpose of nullifying
his conviction;

c. whether there is sufficient evidence to convict Lara; and

d. whether Lara’s alibi can be given credence so as to exonerate him from the crime charged.

Our Ruling

This Court resolves to deny the appeal.

Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired through compulsory process such as a warrant of
arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. 19 Any
objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters
his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An accused submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court upon
entering a plea and participating actively in the trial and this precludes him invoking any irregularities that may
have attended his arrest.20

Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient ground to reverse and set aside a conviction that
was arrived upon a complaint duly filed and a trial conducted without error. 21 As Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure of the accused to assert any ground
of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to
quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based
on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.

II

Contrary to Lara’s claim, that he was not provided with counsel when he was placed in a police line-up did not
invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction. That he stood at the police line-up without the assistance of
counsel did not render Sumulong’s identification of Lara inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed to have
arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the
starting point or a part of custodial investigation. As this Court previously ruled in People v. Amestuzo:22

The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called
Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation
starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on
a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the
person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right
to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. This was settled in the case of
People vs. Lamsing and in the more recent case of People vs. Salvatierra. The right to be assisted by counsel
attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in a police
line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process. This is because during a police line-up, the
process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant
who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up.23(Citations omitted)

III

It is apparent from the assailed decision of the CA that the finding of guilt against Lara is based on circumstantial
evidence. The CA allegedly erred in this wise considering that only direct and not circumstantial evidence can
overcome the presumption of innocence.

However, well-settled is the rule that direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Even in the absence of direct evidence,
conviction can be had if the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with each other
and to the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypothesis that he is not. 24

Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, circumstantial evidence sufficed to convict
upon the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

It is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted of the crime for which he is charged. Resort to
circumstantial evidence is essential since to insist on direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons
free and denying proper protection to the community.25

As the CA correctly ruled, the following circumstances established by the evidence for the prosecution strongly
indicate Lara’s guilt: (a) while the vehicle Sumulong, Atie, Manacob and Bautista were riding was at the
intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, he appeared at the front passenger side thereof armed with a gun;
(b) while pointing the gun at Sumulong who was at the front passenger seat, Lara demanded that Sumulong give
him the bag containing the money; (c) instead of giving the bag to Lara, Sumulong gave it to Bautista who was
seated at the back of the pick-up; (d) when Bautista got hold of the bag, he alighted and ran towards the back of
the pick-up; (e) Lara ran after Bautista and while doing so, fired his gun at Bautista’s direction; (f) Bautista
sustained several gunshot wounds; and (g) Bautista’s blood was on the crime scene and empty shells were
recovered therefrom.

Indeed, in cases of robbery with homicide, the taking of personal property with intent to gain must itself be
established beyond reasonable doubt. Conclusive evidence proving the physical act of asportation by the accused
must be presented by the prosecution. It must be shown that the original criminal design of the culprit was
robbery and the homicide was perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery.26 The mere presence of the accused at the crime scene is not enough to implicate him. It
is essential to prove the intent to rob and the use of violence was necessary to realize such intent.

In this case, Lara’s intent to gain is proven by Sumulong’s positive narration that it was Lara who pointed the gun at
him and demanded that the bag containing the money be turned over to him. That Lara resorted to violence in
order to actualize his intent to gain is proven by Sumulong’s testimony that he saw Lara fire the gun at the
direction of Bautista, who was running away from the pick-up in order to prevent Lara from taking possession of
the money.

Notably, the incident took place in broad daylight and in the middle of a street. Thus, where considerations of
visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear to be biased against the accused, his or her assertions as to
the identity of the malefactor should be normally accepted. 27

Lara did not allege, much less, convincingly demonstrate that Sumulong was impelled by improper or malicious
motives to impute upon him, however perjurious, such a serious charge. Thus, his testimony, which the trial court
found to be forthright and credible, is worthy of full faith and credit and should not be disturbed. If an accused had
nothing to do with the crime, it is against the natural order of events and of human nature and against the
presumption of good faith that a prosecution witness would falsely testify against the former.28

IV

In view of Sumulong’s positive identification of Lara, the CA was correct in denying Lara’s alibi outright. It is well-
settled that positive identification prevails over alibi, which is inherently a weak defense. Such is the rule, for as a
defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and difficult to disapprove. 29

Moreover, in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere
else when the offense was committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so far away that it was
not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time
of its commission. Due to its doubtful nature, alibi must be supported by clear and convincing proof.

In this case, the proximity of Lara’s house at the scene of the crime wholly negates his alibi. Assuming as true Lara’s
claim and that of his witnesses that he was digging a sewer trench on the day of the incident, it is possible that his
witnesses may not have noticed him leaving and returning given that the distance between his house and the
place where the subject incident took place can be negotiated, even by walking, in just a matter of minutes. Simply
put, Lara and his witnesses failed to prove that it is well-nigh impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

In fine, the assailed decision of the CA is affirmed in all respects.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
03685 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.