James Power 1

Is the insistence that there are criteria in behaviour for ‘inner processes’ a form of
behaviourism?

For a logical behaviourist, ascribing a mental state to a person says that they are disposed to
act in a particular way. For example, to say that a person is sad is just to say that they are
disposed to cry. While this characterisation is very simplistic, it captures the essence of most
behaviourist theories of the mind: what is important about mental concepts is the way in which
they are expressed.
It would not be proper to say that Wittgenstein in any part of the Investigations
formulates a theory of the mind in any traditional sense. This is because his investigations into
mental states are undertaken with a specific focus on the grammar of our concepts, rather than
on metaphysical questions. Still, he often discusses mental states in terms of their criteria and
symptoms, leading some to interpret his views as being broadly in line with a behaviouralist
view of the mind.
It is my opinion that Wittgenstein’s views on mental states, or ‘inner processes’, should
not be characterised as a form of behaviourism. This is mainly due to the fact that it is clear in
the Investigations that the subjective character of experience, while it may not be possible to
articulate, nor be a useful thing to investigate, does in fact exist and is an essential part of the
human form of life, and thus our language.
I will proceed to examine Wittgenstein’s use of the terms ‘criteria’ and ‘symptoms’ in
the Blue Book and the Investigations, and also look at some different interpretations of these
terms and their bearing on the problem of other minds.

In the Blue Book, Wittgenstein first mentions the terms ‘criteria’ and ‘symptoms’ in relation to
the question of how it is possible to know whether a person is in a particular state. He uses the
example of a patient with angina, who exhibits the criterion of having bacillus in his blood, and
also exhibits the symptom of having an inflamed throat. Both are indicators of the fact that the
person has angina, yet the criterion is so by definition, whereas the symptom is so by hypothesis.
The point he demonstrates is that criteria are logically connected to a phenomenon, in such a
way a change in criteria results in a change in the concept of the phenomenon. Symptoms, on
the other hand, are simply correlated with a phenomenon, so that if a symptom was found to
be an incorrect indicator, then this would have no resulting change in the concept.
It is tempting at this point to attempt to recreate such an example using a mental concept
such as pain. However, it would be difficult to express the difference between criteria and
symptoms of pain using words on a page. This difficulty is due to the fact that criteria for pain
are something that are recognised by people sharing the same form of life, when examining the
behaviour of a person: we can all tell when another person is in pain from their behaviour, yet
it is difficult to pin down what the specific criteria are. More easy to describe are symptoms of
pain. If a person clutches their foot in a sudden and intense movement, we might infer that they
have a pain in their foot. Similarly, however, this might have just been an itch, or an involuntary
tick. Many symptoms of pain offer defeasible support for believing that a person is in pain, yet
there are also criteria that when present seem to induce a certainty of judgement that is difficult
to express.
Does this demonstrate a behaviourist attitude of Wittgenstein? I think not. In the
passage in the Blue Book his explicit aim is to investigate how it is possible to know how such-
and-such is the case, and he does this by examining the grammar of the terms we use. His point
is simply that when we come to examine mental concepts like pain, for example, particular
attention should be paid to how we move from observation of external behaviour to knowledge
of inner states or processes. This is clearly not an attempt at reduction of mental concepts to
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behavioural criteria, since he has remained agnostic about the question of one’s own mental
states, and our access to them.

Wittgenstein also discusses the relationship between criteria and symptoms in the
Investigations. Beginning at §354, he discusses an example of raining. In this case, he considers
that a skeptic might attempt to argue that all indicators of rain are simply symptoms, and that
there are no indefeasible criteria for it being raining. Some indicators of rain that he lists are
the barometer falling, the sensations of wet and cold, and certain visual impressions. Prima
facie we might consider the barometer falling to be a symptom of rain, for rain is not always
contemporaneous with low pressure. On the other hand, we would be inclined to say that
sensations of wet and cold are criteria for rain, along with the visual sensations of seeing rain
fall. A skeptical challenge to this view, however, might be that our senses could be deceived:
I could be hallucinating, for example.
Again, let us attempt to transpose this example on to one involving mental concepts.
The skeptical challenge then is reframed as such: if one observes a person whose behaviour is
characteristic of pain, for example, then it is still possible that they are acting and thus not
actually feeling pain; similarly, a person may not be exhibiting any of the behaviour of pain,
yet they could just be hiding it. This appears to demonstrate that no matter what information
can be gained through observation of another’s behaviour, it is possible to be mistaken about
the particular internal state that they are in. In other words, what once might have been
considered to be criteria for a certain internal process, now appear to be mere symptoms.
What we have elicited here is perhaps the most devastating criticism of behaviourist
theories of the mind: behaviour isn’t enough to guarantee that a person is in such-and-such, or
even any, internal state. It would seem strange, therefore, that if Wittgenstein were to raise this
objection during the Investigations, that he would also be committed to a form of behaviourism.
I will proceed, therefore, to discuss Wittgenstein’s views on the nature of critera and
the importance that they have in gaining knowledge of other’s minds, or at least, other’s internal
states or processes.

An important distinction that Wittgenstein makes throughout the course of the Investigations
is that of where to locate mental states, inner states, inner processes, etc. (whatever we wish to
call them). Behaviourist theories of the mind locate concepts like ‘pain’, etc., in the body. This
is for the reason that it is the body that is the subject of behaviour: behaviourists are focused
on the way in which a person acts, or is disposed to act, in order to ascribe particular inner
states to them.
Considering the aforementioned difficulty that behaviourism faces, other theories of
the mind have sought to locate mental concepts in different places, for example, in the mind or
brain. These theories face a corresponding difficulty, however, of accounting for the bridge
between the body and the mind/brain. Thus, what is really needed is a theory that takes the seat
of mental concepts to be the person as a whole. This is the line of thought that Wittgenstein
takes up.
In various parts of the Investigations, Wittgenstein attempts to rid us of the ideas both
that our mental concepts are related to either the body or the mind, or some specific physical
being. The question should not be whether a dog can feel pain, whether a machine can think,
or whether a stone can be conscious. Instead, it should be about what form of life we inhabit.
Humans inhabit one particular and complex form of life that is characterised by the specific
ways in which we behave. And it is for this reason that behaviour is so important to being able
to ascribe particular internal processes to a person.
James Power 3

So Wittgenstein is not a behaviourist in the sense that he sees mental concepts as being
solely about a person’s behaviour, or dispositions to behave in a certain way. Rather he sees
behaviour as crucially important to even being able to ascribe mental concepts to something.

Now that we have examined some of Wittgenstein’s views on the nature of criteria and
symptoms, and the importance of behaviour in ascribing inner processes to persons, I will now
look to some interpretations of Wittgenstein’s views and their impact on the question of
knowledge about others’ minds.
We have seen how behaviour is the way in which we recognise how persons share a
form of life and are thus are capable of having mental concepts ascribed to them. It is
problematic however, as to how certain we can be that a particular inner process is present in
a person if their behaviour is indicative of this. In other words, how is it that we are licensed in
saying that a person is in pain, upon observation of their behaviour.
As we have mentioned previously, it seems possible that a person can both display
criteria for pain, yet not be experiencing the corresponding inner process, and also that a person
can experience the inner process of pain, while not displaying any criteria for pain. If, therefore,
appearances provide at best defeasible support for believing a particular inner process is
present, then how is it possible to have knowledge that a person is, say, in pain?
One possible response to this problem is to suggest that there is a necessary connection
between criteria and inner processes. And, following Wittgenstein’s account of necessity, this
is merely a convention, such that whenever certain criteria are observed we, by convention,
ascribe a particular inner process to a person. This, of course, relies on the criteria only
obtaining when there is in fact an inner process present. In this way then, there is some
difference between the case in which a person is displaying pain-behaviour with the
corresponding inner process, and the case in which a person is displaying pain-behaviour
without the corresponding inner process, if they were acting for example. However, this seems
an implausible suggestion, for it does seem possible that appearances can be completely
similar, yet in one case the inner process is present, and in the other it is absent.
An alternative suggestion is put forward by John McDowell. He argues for what has
been termed the disjunctive theory of appearance. Put simply, he argues that two appearances
can be evidentially similar in all respects, while resisting the entailment that it is not possible
to know whether or not a person’s behaviour is indicative of a specific inner process. Thus, an
appearance of pain can be mere appearance, that is, where there is no corresponding inner
process, or it can be an appearance in which the fact that there is an inner process makes itself
perceptually manifest. In this way then, to satisfy the criteria for pain, for example, is for the
inner process of pain to be manifest in its appearance. In the case where there is pain without
the corresponding inner process, it simply appears that the criteria for pain are satisfied.
Prima facie, McDowell’s argument is unconvincing to me. It is simply supposed that
there is some perceptual difference between veridical behaviour and acting, whether or not this
difference is manifest to the observer. I think here, perhaps a pragmatic style of argument may
be more useful in order to bolster the distinction between criteria for and symptoms of the
existence of internal processes.
We can establish the existence alone of other minds by recourse to a form of life
argument as presented earlier. We can say that it is enough for a person to treat another as a
person in order for us to countenance the existence of other minds. We do not similarly treat
stones or plants, etc., as such because they do not inhabit a form of life that is similar enough
to ours.
In addition to this, I would suggest that we can distinguish between veridical and mere
appearance of a particular inner process occurring in another person by way of strength of
evidence. Clearly there is a great deal of skill exhibited in expressing a feeling like pain. The
James Power 4

fact that it comes natural to us, and is so difficult to pin down are two reasons for believing that
it is extremely difficult to fake. This, therefore provides us with at least one reason to consider
that in very few cases will the criteria for inner processes be satisfied without the fact obtaining.
Moreover, in cases in which the criteria do come close to being satisfied, say in the example
of an extremely skilled actor attempting to express pain, we might say that in order for such an
expression to seem authentic, the person is actually going to have to simulate that feeling within
themselves: this is the entire philosophy behind method acting. And finally, despite whether
the actor comes close to exhibiting the criteria sufficient to merit ascribing pain to him, we will
be able to ascribe at least some inner process to him. That is to say, mental concepts are likely
to be vague, and therefore their criteria will likely be so as well: there are many varieties of
pain, and what may seem like pain to another might seem like anger or frustration. Our
terminology of ‘mere’ appearance seems misguided then. If any person is going to come close
to fulfilling the criteria for a specific inner process, then we can say that enough of something
will be happening internally for the ascription of the inner process to that person not to be too
problematic.
What does this mean for Wittgenstein’s view, in terms of being a form of behaviourism,
then? I consider that some pragmatic defence of criteria being enough to countenance the
existence of inner processes within a person to be consistent with Wittgenstein’s views. As I
have attempted to argue, it would be extremely difficult for a person to feign a complex inner
process without some process related to that which it being simulated actually obtaining.
Crucially, though, this is not a style of behaviourism. The mental concepts employed when
discussing these problems are not simply a reflection of behaviour, nor behavioural
dispositions. Behaviour and behavioural dispositions are simply a symptom of the shared form
of life we inhabit. And it is through this shared form of life that we can recognise similarities
in the internal processes that occur among us.

McDowell, J. (1982) ‘Criteria, Defeasibility & Knowledge’, Proceedings of the British Academy, 68
McGinn, M (2013) Routledge Guidebook to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, 2nd edition,
London: Routledge
Witherspoon, C. (2011) ‘Wittgenstein on Criteria and the Problem of Other Minds’ in Kuusela, O. and
McGinn, M. eds. (2011) The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, Oxford: OUP.
Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations
Wittgenstein, L., The Blue and Brown Books