Recognition and Moral Obligation (Makale, Honneth)

Recognition and Moral Obligation
Author(s): AXEL HONNETH and John Farrell

Source: Social Research, Vol. 64, No. 1, The Decent Society (SPRING 1997), pp. 16-35
Published by: The New School
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40971157
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Recognition
and Moral
Obligation* / BY AXEL HONNETH
It is indeed the case that in one form or another the

of "recognition" has always played an essential role in p
philosophy. Thus, in the ethics of classical antiqu
conviction was prevalent that only that person whose m
action could enjoy social esteem in the polis was able
good life; the moral philosophy of the Scottish Enlight
is guided by the idea that public recognition or disa
represents the social mechanism by means of wh
individual is prompted to acquire desirable virtues;
Kant, finally, the concept of "respect" assumes the fun
a highest moral principle in the sense that it incorpora
core of the categorical imperative to treat every other
only as an end in him- or herself. However, in non
classical writers- of course, with the major exception of
who in this respect was the solitary standard-setting th
was the principle of recognition as such made the corne
of ethics; for all the indirect importance it enjoyed
specifics of these models, the concept was always outsh
other conceptual determinations, ones considered
fundamental.
This constellation did not change significantly until the

emergence, in the course of the past twenty years, of a number
* I would like to thank Alessandro Ferrara and Charles Larmoie for valuable
suggestions and criticisms, which I have not at all been able to take fully into account.
Furthermore I am grateful to Hilal Sezgin, who helped me greatly while stylistically
reworking the manuscript.
SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 64, No. 1 (Spring 1997)
RECOGNITION AND MORAL OBLIGATION 17
of political debates and social movements that c

consideration of the idea of recognition;
discussions on multiculturalism or in the theoretical self-
understanding of feminism, it quickly became evident t

what constituted a common exemplar was the normative i
that individuals or social groups have to gain recognition
respect in their "difference" (Taylor, 1992). From here it
only a small step to the generalized insight that the mor
quality of social relations cannot be measured solely in terms
the fair or just distribution of material goods; rather, o
notion of justice is also very closely linked to how, and as wha
subjects mutually recognize each other. Thus, from politi
questions there gradually emerged the substance for
moral-philosophical discussion whose starting point is th
notion that it must be possible to elaborate the normativ
content of morality on the basis of specific forms of recipro
recognition: what we mean when we speak of the "moral poin
of view" refers primarily to desirable features or ones that m
be legitimately expected of relationships that subjects enj
with one another.
The politico-philosophical study that Avishai Margalit (1996)

published a year ago under the title The Decent Society is without
doubt also to be seen as part of this general tendency to turn
normatively to categories of recognition. For a number of good
reasons, Margalit does indeed abstain, within the framework of
this study, from determining the institutional foundations of a
decent society in positive terms; instead, the desirable features
of such a society are to be outlined only in a negative manner
by identifying those institutional practices by means of which
moral subjects justifiably see themselves injured and humili-
ated. But in attempting to obtain an overview of wrongful
forms of institutional humiliation, Margalit also has to grant
that he cannot completely do without identifying positive
modes of conduct; this is the case because what must be
regarded, with good reasons, as morally reprehensible
humiliation becomes evident only on the condition of having a
18 SOCIAL RESEARCH
notion of how human subject

Thus, Margalit's proposal lea
coincides with the general
recognition: a decent societ
institutional practices and me
affected in the sense that each can see him- or herself
recognized as a member of the human community.
With such a proposal, however, only the basis is laid for th
attempt to evince the normative principles of a theory
society directly from the moral implications of the concept
recognition; for as soon as this path has been opened, it quic
becomes evident how numerous, necessarily, the problems
that are connected to the draft of such a model. Today, t
discussion of a morality of recognition is largely determined
efforts to tackle these difficulties systematically. A fir
problem presented by such an approach is the seman
diversity of the key category itself. In contrast to the concep
"respect," which since Kant has had relatively clear contours
moral philosophy, the concept of "recognition" is no
determined in any definitive way, neither in philosophy nor
ordinary language. Thus, in the context of justifying a femin
ethics, the concept is currently used above all to characte
the type of loving concern and care empirically exemplified
the mother-child relationship (Hirschmann, 1989); within
context of discourse ethics, on the other hand, "recogniti
serves to designate the mutual respect for both the particul
ity and the equality of all other persons, whereby the discurs
conduct of participants in argumentation presents the parad
matic case of this form of respect (Habermas, 1990; Wing
1993); and, finally, within the setting of attempts to furthe
develop communitarianism, the category of recognition is us
today to characterize the ways in which unfamiliar mode
life are esteemed and how this process typically unfolds wit
the framework of societal solidarity (Taylor, 1992).
From these numerous applications of the concept th
follows, as a second problem, the circumstance that the mor
content of the concept of recognition also seem

the imputed meaning. Thus, it may indeed
speak of universal rights and duties wit
recognition of the moral autonomy of al
whereas such a formulation would hardly be
the forms of recognition associated with car
that extent, it may be assumed that the var
"recognition" are linked in each case to
perspectives. From this plurality, finally, t
question as to whether the various moral points
single root in the sense that they can be norm
together; and so we touch upon the problem o
moral implications underlying each of the v
recognition.
Of course it is not possible to clarify at all sat
complex questions in the first sketch of a the
However, we can start with the differentiatio
Hegel already carried out on the concept of
provide initial insight into the various meanin
phenomenon of recognition appears in mor
discussions today. We can then attempt
systematic relationship between morality an
unearthing phenomenologically the special ch
injuries. Initially outlining moral phenomenon
manner facilitates the attempt, in a further s
the positive meaning of recognition for moral
become evident that it still makes sense to
three-part division that Hegel introduced.
finally, will consist of a brief survey of the c
current issues in moral philosophy that f
concept of recognition developed here.
Hegel and Recognition
At the end of the eighteenth and the be

nineteenth century, when Hegel set to work o
20 SOCIAL RESEARCH
the developmental history of hu

the help of the concept of "reco
a whole series of philosophical p
and notions had taken on lead
(1973, chap. 10), influenced by
anthropological assumption th
primarily by the need to attain
"respect" and "honour"; in his cr
process, Rousseau (1973) went so
it was not until human beings s
that they began to lose the calm
peaceable life was said to be secu
finally, in contrast to such a neg
conclusion in his foundation o
develop consciousness of their
one another to make use of th
recognize each other as free bei
contradictory- as these though
gether they were able, in the e
fruition that the self-consciousn
dent upon the experience of s
dency toward pessimism did in
seau's political anthropology to the
order or personal authority w
recognition; but it was possible
conceptions that, in leading the
rely upon the respect or esteem
The pure claim of a necessa
consciousness and intersubjec
course be sufficient for the e
writings; if the task was to e
recognition could bring about
ethical life, then a further ex
dynamic relationship that had t
jective acquisition of self-consci
ment of entire societies. The answers Heg

found to these complex questions in the course
his first system drafts constitute the core o
"struggle for recognition"; it includes the v
challenging idea that ethical progress unfol
three levels of increasingly more demand
recognition, and an intersubjective struggle m
each of these levels, a struggle that subjects co
have their identity claims confirmed.
What is special about this model consists fir
thesis that goes way beyond Fichte, namely that
mutual recognition have to be distinguished
intersubjective presuppositions for the devel
consciousness have been uncovered; the mechanism of
reciprocally granting a sphere of individual freedom - the one
Fichte had in mind in his justification of natural law- does
indeed explain the formation of a subjective legal conscious-
ness, but this does not at all imply that the positive
self-understanding of a free person has been grasped in its
entirety. For that reason, Hegel adds to legal (rights-based)
recognition, which was meant to include roughly what Kant
understood by moral respect, two more forms of reciprocal
recognition, to which particular levels of the individual
relation-to-self (Selbstverhältnis) have to correspond: in love,
which Hegel in his early work understands in the very
emphatic sense of Hölderlin's philosophy of unity, subjects
recognize each other in the unique nature of their needs, so
that they can attain emotional security in the articulation of the
claims raised by their drives; and finally, in the state's sphere of
ethical life there obtains a form of recognition that allows
subjects to esteem one another in those attributes that
contribute to the reproduction of the societal order. In his
early writings Hegel seems to have been convinced that the
transition from one sphere of recognition to another is
generated in each particular case by a struggle for respect for a
subject's self-comprehension as it grows in stages: the demand
22 SOCIAL RESEARCH
to be recognized in newer and

person leads, so to speak, to an
resolution can only consist in e
recognition (Honneth, 1995, c
Of course Hegel is not a suffic
to be able to actually conceive
construction of modern socie
bounded by the parameters se
sees in this process is the totali
have to perform with one a
construct a common world of
his early model of a struggle fo
multilayered that it has tri
approaches in moral philosoph
1979; Wildt, 1982; Honneth, 19
of Spirit that Hegel (1977) r
with a conception in which t
system take greater effect; fr
social reality is no longer ex
process of conflict formation
outcome of the dialectical self
the Philosophy of Right Hege
tiation between the family, civi
again reflects the early distin
recognition; and it is this divisio
today to further develop Hegel'
a practical philosophy (Hardim
Moral Injuries and the Self-
Today, if we connect up with

order to introduce a concept o
point is usually a phenomenolo
(Honneth, 1995; Wingert, 199
pp. 304-5; Margalit, 1996, for
central part in this negativist procedure is play

that the circumstances experienced as "unju
appropriate key for an initial anticipatory e
internal connection between morality and reco
basis of the criteria that affected subjects t
distinguish between a moral misdeed and
constraint, one can easily show that in the mo
must always be the aspect of recognition be
denied, whereas in the latter case such a refere
omitted. Thus, a physical injury becomes a
whenever the subject affected has no choice bu
action that intentionally disregards it in an es
its well-being; it is not solely the bodily pain
accompanying consciousness of not being re
own self-understanding that constitutes th
moral injury here. It is no different in the case
acquires the specific quality of a moral injus
due to it, a subject is not taken seriously in a
its relation-to-self; as in the case of symbo
humiliation, it is the disrespect of persona
transforms an action or utterance into a mora
If conclusions are drawn, with generalizin
these examples, there emerge the premis
together, clarify the constitutive connectio
injury and recognition that is withheld:
(a) Only those living beings who can relat
their own lives in the sense of being voliti
about their own well-being are morally vulner
reference to the qualitative standards of one's
at all possible to explain what constituent of a
injured or encroached upon whenever we
injuries and not merely damage, ill luck, or co
(b) If the makeup of moral injury has been e
reference to the practical relation-to-self, the s
apply to the condition of its possibility. Tha
are at all vulnerable in their conduct with one another follows
24 SOCIAL RESEARCH
from the fact that they can co

self-relation (Selbstbeziehung) o
affirmative reactions on the pa
reference to these intersubjec
pletely impossible to explain
when a specific aspect of his
destroyed by certain actions, ut
(c) If the characteristic feature
persons being disregarded i
self-relation- whose intersubje
fundamentally dependent upo
link to a psychological fact: the
is necessarily accompanied by
expectation of the subject affe
fulfillment is among the co
identity. Because it destroys an
individual's capability to act, ev
act of personal harm.
If, with the aid of these prem
the extent to which the charact
consists in the withdrawal or r
chosen path of a negative just
another step in the argument
presented, we can attempt to
injustice in such a way that an i
of the domain of moral phen
course, it is necessary to make
particular aspects that will ser
such a differentiation. Among
able, the most appropriate seem
criteria of differentiation in
experiences; in this way it is
disclosure of the moral sph
perspective of the subjects affe
this requirement follows fro
individual relation-to-self: mo
being all the more serious, the more fundam

self-relation is that they encroach upon or
connection is plausible, then a quasi-empirical
drafted, one that divides the spectrum o
according to the particular level affected in th
each level in the practical relationship to th
corresponds a separate type of injustice,
corresponds to a specific degree of mental h
These few reflections alone are sufficient to show that a
negative proof procedure cannot manage without anticipatin

those structures upon which the object domain in question has
to be presumptively based. In the case of the project
undertaken here, there is evidently a need for preknowledge
about the stages or levels that the practical relation-to-self
encompasses; for without knowledge of this kind it is not
possible to specify what and how many aspects of the
self-relation are to be meaningfully distinguished in order to
tie the distinction in forms of moral injury to them. The
approaches from which we may most probably expect
clarification in this respect present, in the area of philosophy,
various models of a theory of the person; in psychology, on the
other hand, they contribute diverse theories on infant
development. That is why it makes sense to gather arguments
developed there in order to gain reference points for
differentiating aspects of the self-relation.
In the form of an extreme simplification, it can be claimed
that there is a certain agreement between these two research
areas today, insofar as three levels of the practical self-relation
are distinguished from one another- whereby "self-relation"
refers to the consciousness or feeling that a person has of him-
or herself with regard to the capabilities and rights this person
enjoys (see comparable proposals in Habermas, 1992; Tu-
gendhat, 1986). Undisputed is a first, genetically primary level
at which subjects relate to themselves in such a way that they
conceive of their physical needs and desires as a part of their
own person that can be articulated; this kind of elementary
26 SOCIAL RESEARCH
certainty about the value of

"self-confidence," after a use
rived by E. H. Erikson (1980).
differences in the details, it
form of the practical self-relat
being a morally accountable
Kantian tradition, such a type
one's own judgment can be ca
Finally, there is also agreem
self- relation which takes effec
or valuable capabilities; for th
value of one's own capabilities,
obvious choice (Tugendhat, 19
If these forms of self-relatio
the sense that under normal c
of necessary presuppositions, t
types of moral injury that co
harm. Here it is easy to see tha
in this way owes its character t
subject is disregarded or not r
(a) From what has been said
rob a person of the certainty
well-being have to be consid
destroyed by an act of that kin
one's own needs enjoy in othe
disregards the condition of all
of this class are physical abuse,
(b) Innumerable are the cas
characteristic feature is the dis
ity of persons. What is harmed
is the self-respect we acqui
judgment recognized by oth
typical examples ranges here
and fraud to the case of the di
a legal system.
(c) Finally, a third class of m
those cases in which it is made known to one or m

through humiliation and disrespect that their
not enjoy any recognition; such acts harm the fe
socially significant within a concrete communi
continuum of examples ranges from the harml
greeting (Tugendhat, 1993, p. 305) to the se
stigmatization.
Proceeding on the basis of these provisional diff
there would be a number of possibilities to
further and clarify the field of moral injuries;
the important question of the relations of inclusi
between the various classes (Wingert, 1993, pp
would be of primary interest to examine cl
individual case the stature of the recognitio
However, the reflections presented so far have
function of providing a first proof for the
between morality and recognition, and doing so
manner: if it is correct to say that the core of m
located in the refusal of recognition, then t
inversely, that moral attitudes are connected wit
of recognition. From this close connection, fur
could draw the additional conclusion that, in a po
the various types of moral injuries have
corresponding forms of recognition.
Forms of Recognition
The negative proof procedure applied so far

series of specifications that provisionally have
psychological or anthropological character. A
certain extent the case in Hegel, the first step in
morality of recognition consists in the essential p
possibility of moral injuries follows from the int
of the human life form: human beings are vuln
specific manner we call "moral" because- th
28 SOCIAL RESEARCH
identity to the construction of a

from the beginning, dependent
tion of other human beings (H
a positive concept of moralit
anthropological premise, then
concept the purpose of prote
referred to: what is understood
is the network of attitudes tha
human beings from injuries tha
cative presuppositions of thei
negative determinations, the a
runs: morality is the quintes
mutually obligated to adopt in
conditions of our personal integ
As is clearly evident, however, a
our notion of morality with this
The various attitudes, which take
point of view, are introduced wit
considered desirable because it s
it is, in contrast to the Kant
conception of the good accordin
scope of the morally right ca
associated with such a dedifferen
however can be controlled if a m
made between the encompassin
and their specific justification. T
of morality follows for us from t
a collective institution for securi
the justification of moral right
conducted only with regard to
With the help of an idea from Lu
can clarify how such a different
or consequentialist inferences
from an ethical determination
even though morality as a who
integrity of human subjects, a m
not "because it brings about a state in the worl

as good, but because it respects certain rights o
However, the moral attitudes that are now to
as forms of recognition do actually follow f
determination of the function of morality. For
adopting the moral perspective serves to protec
injuries indicates the particular character
corresponding attitudes: because, with these
intersubjective conditions are to be secur
human subjects can preserve their integrity
consist in as many forms of recognition as th
morally injurious disrespect. That, in the
attitudes themselves have to assume the character of forms of
recognition depends on the property of the conditions that

are, as it were, to be created by them: human subjects can
develop an intact self-relation only by virtue of the fact that
they see themselves affirmed or recognized according to the
value of certain capabilities and rights. And that the number of
modes of recognition is to correspond to the number of forms
of moral injuries that could previously be distinguished follows
from the common reference to the integrity requirements of
human subjects: it is the same levels of the practical
relation-to-self that can be injured by practices of disrespect,
while they themselves are to be constituted by corresponding
forms of recognition. If consequences are drawn from this line
of thought, then it becomes evident that the moral point of
view has to encompass not just one but three independent
modes of recognition:
(a) With reference to the first level of its practical
relation-to-self, the individual is recognized as precisely this, as
an individual whose needs and desires are of unique value to
another person; for this kind of recognition, which has the
character of unconditional concern {Zuwendung), concepts such
as "care" or "love" can be found in the tradition of moral
philosophy.
(b) With reference to the second level of its practical
30 SOCIAL RESEARCH
relation-to-self, the individual

ascribed the same moral accou
being; for this kind of recognit
universal equal treatment, the
meanwhile established itself in deference to the Kantian
tradition.
(c) With reference to the third level of its practical

relation-to-self, finally, the individual is recognized as a person
whose capabilities are of constitutive value to a concrete
community; for this kind of recognition, which has the
character of a particular esteem, there are no corresponding
moral concepts in the philosophical tradition, but it may well
be a good idea to refer here to concepts such as "solidarity" or
"loyalty."
With these three forms of recognition we have identified the
moral attitudes that, taken together, constitute the standpoint
whose adoption secures the conditions of our personal
integrity. But the asymmetries obtaining between the individ-
ual forms in respect of the scope of the relation of recognition
draw attention to a further difficulty: what in terms of moral
action is demanded or expected here relates to a circle of
subjects whose size varies with the type of recognition. Thus, it
is obvious that attitudes of unconditional care may be
legitimately expected of subjects only in those cases in which
mutual bonds rest on an affective foundation; moral respect,
on the other hand, designates a form of recognition that can be
expected of all subjects equally; and in the case of esteem,
finally, it seems to be the case that the moral action
corresponding to it possesses an obligating character only
within the framework of concrete communities. From this
qualification, however, we can draw the paradoxical conclusion
that the moral point of view describes a perspective that
obligates the subjects to actions that differ according to the
kind of intersubjective relationship. How the result hinted at
here is to be understood more precisely will not, of course,
become evident until the moral content of the individual forms
of recognition themselves are briefly conside

section.
The Morality of Recognition
The moral rights and duties that correspond to each of the

circumscribed forms of recognition follow from the specific
structure of the relation-to-self which is, as it were, first to be
created or strengthened by these forms: to recognize a subject
in a certain aspect of its personal integrity cannot mean
anything but carrying out those actions or adopting those
attitudes that allow this subject to reach the appropriate
understanding of its own person. It is this internal link with
particular duties or rights that makes it at all possible to speak
of a "morality" of recognition: the relations of recognition,
which we have so far viewed in terms of the functional aspect
of the constitution of practical relations to the self, are by their
very nature so formed that they incorporate moral actions
(Leistungen). A similar idea prompted Hegel (1967) in his
Philosophy of Right to distinguish three levels of ethical life
according to the kind of underlying obligations in each
particular case. According to his notion, only the person who
adopts those duties and rights that, as institutional enabling
conditions, underlie the family, society, and the state can attain
full consciousness of his or her freedom under the conditions
of modern societies (Hardimon, 1994, part II). If the place of
concrete institutions is taken by the three forms of recognition
developed here, then at a more abstract level there obtains the
same conditional relation between personal integrity, social
interaction, and moral obligation that Hegel already had in
mind: the corresponding rights and duties represent in each
case the moral implications of the relations of recognition that
subjects have to maintain with one another in order to secure
jointly the conditions of their personal integrity.
From this point one can now appreciate more fully the
32 SOCIAL RESEARCH
obligations representing the

relation of recognition. Where
through which the value of indi
are duties to care emotionally, on
or an asymmetrical manner to
relationship; the typical case o
here is the relationship of paren
case of a reciprocal obligation i
ship in a friendship. If it is, on
recognition through which
individual is strengthened, then
tions of universal equal treatm
the duty to respect and treat e
the same moral accountability is
it is that form of recognition
individual capabilities is streng
duties to demonstrate solidarity (
that apply to all members
community; here one may th
consideration we owe to each o
jointly in the realization of a pr
As is already becoming eviden
consequence of the moral theo
notion that deviates from all t
crucial point: between the thre
taken together are to constitu
there cannot be a harmonious relation, rather there has to
obtain a relation of constant tension. True, according to what
has been said so far, the three patterns of recognition do
indeed designate moral attitudes that cannot come into
conflict with one another, insofar as they possess an
obligating character solely within the framework of disparate
forms of social relationships: thus, friendships can be
maintained only if they are pervaded by moral attitudes that
differ from those in other interactive relationships in that
they contain aspects of unconditional care. But which of the
various relations of recognition is to be pref

raise conflicting claims at the same momen
from the perspective of the moral conce
here, in any way be decided in advance: the
view comprises three moral attitudes that c
ranked from some superior vantage point.
the entire domain of the moral is pervaded
can be resolved only in individual responsib
situations we are obligated to accord recogn
that follows from the kind of social relatio
case of conflict we have to decide accordi
guidelines which of our bonds is to be gran
course, here there is a normative restrictio
decisions, following from the universal cha
recognition mode of respect possesses; be
recognize all human beings as persons who e
to autonomy, for moral reasons we may
relationships whose realization would requi
those rights.
This last reference indicates that, strict
morality of recognition also follows the int
always prevailed in the Kantian tradition of m
in the case of a moral conflict, the rights al
equal respect for their individual autonomy
priority. But with regard to the description of
the structure of such a conflict, the conceptio
differs considerably from all Kantian premise
and inclination that normally confront one an
various obligations, which without exceptio
character because they lend expression to a d
of recognition in each case. With this ins
evident that, in addition to the Kantian
tradition of an ethics of care as well as communitarian models
may claim a legitimate place in a morality of recognition: in
each of the three traditions, one of those moral attitudes is
articulated that correspond to the three forms of recognition
34 SOCIAL RESEARCH
with which, taken together, w

as human beings.
(Translated by Jo
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Recognition and Moral Obligation (Makale, Honneth)

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Recognition and Moral Obligation (Makale, Honneth)

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Recognition and Moral Obligation

Author(s): AXEL HONNETH and John Farrell

It is indeed the case that in one form or another the

This constellation did not change significantly until the

SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 64, No. 1 (Spring 1997)

of political debates and social movements that c

understanding of feminism, it quickly became evident t

The politico-philosophical study that Avishai Margalit (1996)

notion of how human subject

content of the concept of recognition also seem

Hegel and Recognition

At the end of the eighteenth and the be

the developmental history of hu

ment of entire societies. The answers Heg

to be recognized in newer and

Moral Injuries and the Self-

Today, if we connect up with

central part in this negativist procedure is play

from the fact that they can co

being all the more serious, the more fundam

negative proof procedure cannot manage without anticipatin

certainty about the value of

those cases in which it is made known to one or m

The negative proof procedure applied so far

identity to the construction of a

not "because it brings about a state in the worl

recognition depends on the property of the conditions that

relation-to-self, the individual

(c) With reference to the third level of its practical

of recognition themselves are briefly conside

The Morality of Recognition

The moral rights and duties that correspond to each of the

obligations representing the

various relations of recognition is to be pref

with which, taken together, w

Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan. (London: Dent, 1973).

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