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Which critique of human rights do you find most convincing, if any? (Refer to at least one of

Marxism or utilitarianism)

The Marxist critique of human rights is the most convincing. To understand Marx’s

perspective on human rights we must understand the context within which Marx and Engels were

writing, before we can see how the Marxist critique. The bulk of Marx’s critique is taken from parts

of his early writings, in the mid-1840s, with some further development in the late 1870s. Marx was

writing at a time of turmoil within the European empires. Aristocratic rule was being toppled by the

growing bourgeois class, through their uniting with the working and peasant classes. In turn, the

bourgeois governments were being challenged by risings of the working and peasant classes.

Nowhere had this dynamic been more pronounced than France which saw decades of coups,

revolutions, and restorations. With each successive shift in power the new ruling elites enacted laws

which solidified their power, reflected the developing property relations, and resulting social

structures (Marx, K. 2010b.) Marx argued that “… the emancipation of the working class is the

abolition of every class …” and that through the process of industrialisation and ensuing struggles

“capital has created for this mass [the working class] a common situation, common interests. … In

the struggle [against capital], of which we have noted only a few phases, this mass becomes united,

and constitutes itself as a class for itself.” (Marx, K., 2009b, Chpt.2 part 5) Furthermore, Marx

argued that “[t]he emancipation of the working class must be achieved by the working class

itself.” (Engels, F. & Marx, K. 1932b)

Enlightenment philosophers such as Locke and Kant developed their ideas in tandem with

the development of capitalist social relations. In doing so they act as a Zeitgeist, reflecting the

consciousness created as a part of this process. Their influence can be seen in the Declaration of

Human and Civic Rights of France, “… natural, unalienable and sacred rights of man … born and

remain free and equal in rights …” (Conseil Constitutionnel, 2002), and the Charters of Freedom of

the U.S., “[w]e hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are

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endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights …” (National Archives, 1776.) Their

influence is reflected today in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of the U.N., “…

recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the

human family …” (United Nations, 1948), which forms the basis of contemporary human rights

law. We can also see a progression as social relations and global influences change. Human rights

are now extended beyond men. The inclusion of the term “dignity” is a result of the evolution of

human rights theory outside of western-centred philosophy, as the UDHR was written by a

committee of global states. However at least a partial genesis to the rights of western philosophy is

clear and so many of Marx’s criticisms retain validity.

So far we have hinted towards the four pillars which form the primary Marxist criticisms of

human rights. Firstly, through positioning themselves as natural or endowed by a creator, human

rights are presumed to be ahistorical and not the result of human interactions. Secondly, through

their content and manner of creation, they reinforce exploitative social structures. Thirdly, through

their claims of equal enjoyment by all people, they hide the nature through which exploitation

happens. Finally, through being established by the ruling elites, they do not generate self-

organisation necessary for the proletariat to emancipate itself (Teeple, G., 2009.)

Marx, rejecting static understandings of human nature as naïve reinforcements of class

divisions (Blackledge, P., 2007), instead writes of species-being. Ideas cannot be separated from the

material actions and interactions of people. Following from this, institutions of the state and the

ideals expressed that construct how the state operates such as morality, religion, and laws, are

products of material interaction. These ideas cannot exist outside of the material conditions through

which they are produced and transferred. Nor do these ideas come to existence through anything

other than these interactions; “[l]ife is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by

life.” (Engels, F. & Marx, K., 1932a, Chpt.1.) The individuals who produce ideas and institutions

are themselves products of the society within which they exist (Marx, K. 2005.) Early foundations

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of human rights stem from the premise of being natural rights. “[S]acred” (Conseil Constitutionnel,

2002), “endowed by [a] Creator” (National Archives, 1776) leading to their inalienable nature: they

cannot be removed from a person, rights exist simply through merit of being. As mentioned

previously, this language remains in the preamble of the UDHR. The document solidifies this

premise with the line “… disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts

which have outraged the conscience of mankind …” (United Nations, 1948.) This assertion acts to

totalise human rights across the globe and throughout time. In doing so human rights are treated as

transcendent, separating them from the human interaction which is necessary to generate them

(Kolakowski, L., 1983.) This is further reinforced in the emphasis of liberty within human rights, an

understanding of liberty that goes to the extent of of being able to do anything up to the point at

which it would affect another person. In focussing only on the individual, the logic of human rights

leads to egoism, the person is separated from the community (Marx, K., 2010a.) Rather than

establishing ways for people to better interact, human rights establish ways in which people should

avoid interaction, negative freedoms (Kolakowski, L., 1983.) This creates a false reality. Through

separating the individual from the state, creating an artificial civil society perceived to be under the

state. In actuality the state is a creation of the interactions of civil society (Marx, K., 2000.)

Consistent throughout the evolution of human rights is the protection of the right to property

and with that the right to not be deprived of property. Private property creates the mode through

which the capitalist may exploit the worker. If land is made private property it ceases to be common

property, at which point its use is denied to others. Yet the act of claiming land is one which has

been passed down and solidified from custom into law. In doing so the interests of those who

happen to have claimed the most are defended whilst those who have no claim to land are denied

recognition (Marx, K., 1996.) Instead of enabling freedom, the right to property creates other people

as barriers to the freedom of the individual (Marx, K., 2010a.) The proletariat, without property of

their own, must work to produce commodities for the capitalist, who owns the land and the

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factories, to sell. The commodity is then sold by the capitalist, a portion of the profits are given to

the worker in exchange for their labour and they are able to buy the necessities to live. The right to

own private property is enshrined in laws and as a human right, inalienable, yet no justification is

provided for the material relationship that is developed from this. To Marx this creates the worker

as a commodity in the eyes of the capitalist. A worker without work therefore has no value within

capitalist society. They become externalised and demonised as thieves or beggars who exist outside

of accepted society (Marx, K., 2009a.) The enshrinement of security in human rights law provides

justifications for laws to defend private property. To enforce such laws there must also exist police

and other state apparatus, such as courts and prisons (Marx, K., 2010a.) In this way the equal right

to private property, and importantly the defence thereof, is a right for capitalist society to maintain

an unequal distribution of private property. The legal framework is provided to maintain and further

class antagonisms (Corlett, J.A., 2005.) This process can be seen in Chile where small-holdings

producing domestic foods are forced out of business and must sell to larger farms, leading to the

condensation of economic power. (Gwynne, R. & Kay, C., 1997.) Global markets make the right to

property moot even for those who have some; to continue to be able to financially compete

expensive modernisation and technological advancement is necessary. Businesses which aren’t

large enough to take the cost are eventually forced under.

To Marx the bourgeois revolution represented a necessary development. As the mode of

production changed and capitalism superseded feudalism in economic power the bourgeois classes

took the form of emancipators (Marx, K., 2000.) In wresting state power from the control of the

aristocracy they brought to the fore new understandings of social freedom. Yet those understandings

of social freedom when codified into a legal framework, by nature of the class relations from which

they developed, remained predicated on a continuation of oppression. The ultimate goal, for Marx,

is that a class take power which has no egoistic self-interest (Blackledge, P., 2012.) Marx criticises

human rights as a rallying call for change because the revolution must come from a group which

“claims no particular right because no particular wrong, but wrong generally, is perpetuated

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against it …” (Marx, K., 2000, Intro.) The nature of Marx and Engels’ critiques of rights avoid

situating themselves within a moralistic framework. Engels argues that morality cannot be

abstracted from class relations, that “it has either justified the domination and the interests of the

ruling class, or ever since the oppressed class became powerful enough, it has represented its

indignation against this domination and the future interests of the oppressed.” (Engels, F., 2010.)

Instead the criticism is centred in the dialectical materialist method. That doesn’t mean Marx was

free from normative assertions, such as the phenomenological concepts of alienation and species-

being (Kolakowski, L., 1983.) Marx doesn’t criticise every right of each declaration and bill. He

chooses to specifically to polemicise around certain rights, namely those which function to support

the capitalist structures of society (Corlett, J.A., 2005.)

It is important to recognise the changing content of human rights doctrine since Marx’s time.

Inclusions of the right to work, the right to equal pay for equal work, the right to form and

participate in trade unions, and holiday time represent substantial gains for workers compared to the

19th century. Further rights, such as provisions for medical care, food, housing, and security for the

unemployed are also present in the UDHR. While it still contains the rights Marx accused of being

egoist, the “right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community …” (United Nations,

1948) also shows the introduction of new dynamics. Yet the rights which create an obligation for

action cannot force a state to have the resources to make such provisions possible (Lukes, S., 1985.)

As the content of human rights doctrine develops, so too does the theory surrounding it. The

indivisibility of rights, the argument that rights cannot be enjoyed piecemeal but must exist as a

whole with basic living standards being no less important than the right to vote, is also a substantial

step in moving away from a relativistic, individualistic understanding of rights (Boyd, C.M.J.,

2009.)

Even so human rights are not immune to selective application within states and nations.

Ultimately the capacity to enforce them comes from the actions of governments themselves rather

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than a transcendental body. While a Muslim woman may exert the free choice to wear a veil in the

majority of global north states, that doesn’t prevent them from being mistreated by individuals or

groups within a state. Human rights continue to present the idea or appearance of choice or

freedoms while having no facility to ensure they come to pass (Žižek, S., 2005.) Indeed the same is

true of states which base themselves around Marxist ideas. The human rights abuses of Communist

run China and the U.S.S.R., when it existed, are many and well documented; with censorship, secret

police, political prisoners, and so on (Tay, A.E.S., 1978.) In attempting to resolve the question of

how law functions within a socialist state Pashukanis came to the conclusion that as law was

founded in ideology it should therefore be be subject to the political whims of the state, creating an

arbitrary and unpredictable legal system (Lukes, S., 1985.) This then raises unresolved holes in the

Marxist theory regarding rights. Does the adamant anti-rights language develop an ideology which

is then used to solidify power by the ruling elite of a party? Does Marx’s critique develop

unfounded hypothesis for how society can function without grounded legalism? Perhaps as a result

of this unresolved contradiction many Marxists today have taken up the rhetoric of human rights. At

the same time, the more accustomed society becomes to the concept of human rights the harder

political engagement becomes without reference to them (Boyd, C.M.J., 2009.)

The Marxist critique of human rights is not without difficulty. Marx did not write one

straight forward book on the subject and so his critique and the philosophical concepts which form

its basis are dispersed throughout various writings from various times. Serious mistakes have been

made in the name of a hyper-orthodox enactment of Marx’s criticism of human rights and law.

Marx viewed the journey to communism as being one which drives history forwards through acts of

emancipation, not one intended to replace one set of ruling elites with another. The real strength of

Marx’s critique of human rights is that he pushes for an understanding of human rights away from

an abstract, constant, absolute. Instead, through understanding human material interactions and the

conditions under which these occur, we are able to develop an understanding of human rights as

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they are as opposed to a mystified form. We can better analyse the power relationships which

human rights represent and reinforce, in doing so develop a constructive discussion about the nature

and value of human rights. Most importantly Marx does not present human rights as something

which the state will grant out of benevolence but a set of social relations which only developed, can

only be sustained, and can only be changed through human action.

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