Property
concept of an owner.
Jenestor B. Caldito and Maria
Filomena T. Caldito v Isagani V.
Obando And Gereon V. Obando
G.R. No. 181596 January 30,
2017 THIRD DIVISION
(Reyes, J.:)
Issue on Ownership
FACTS
The case is about a complaint
of quieting of ownership over a
parcel of land filed by petitioner
Spouses Caldito against
respondents Obando. A certain
Spouses Ballesteros sold the subject
parcel of land to the Spouses
Caldito. Spouses Caldito attempted
to build a house on the subject
parcel of land but the respondents
Obandos prevented them from
completing the same. The
respondents Obando averred that
the Spouses Ballesteros were not
the owners and possessors of the
subject parcel of land, the lot was
inherited by their father, Paterno,
from its original owner Felipe, and
they have been paying the real
property taxes for the entire
property. They asserted that the
petitioners are buyers in bad faith
since their family had been in
possession of the entire Lot and had
been in. open, peaceful and
uninterrupted possession of the
whole property up to the present or
for more than 30 years in the
RULING
Spouses Caldito did not
proved ownership over the lot.
Spouses Caldito’s cause of action
relates to an action to quiet title
which has two indispensable
requisites, namely: (1) the plaintiff
or complainant has a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the
real property subject of the action;
find (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding claimed
to be casting cloud on his title must
be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.
From the foregoing provisions,
it is clear that the petitioners' cause
of action must necessarily fail
mainly in view of the absence of the
first requisite since the petitioners
were not able to prove equitable title
or ownership over the subject parcel
of land. While the Spouses Caldito
submitted official receipts and tax
declarations to prove payment of
taxes, nowhere in the evidence was
it shown that Spouses Ballesteros
declared the subject parcel of land
in their name for taxation purposes
or paid taxes due thereon. True, a
tax declaration by itself is not
sufficient to prove ownership.
Nonetheless, it may serve as
sufficient basis for inferring
possession. In fact, what the
petitioners presented as their pieces
of evidence are receipts and tax
declarations which they, as the new
owners of the subject parcel of land,
have paid. Thus, the Spouses
Calditos could not also rely on these
tax declarations and receipts
because those are of recent vintage
and do not reflect the fact that their
predecessors-in-interest have been
paying realty taxes for the subject
parcel of land. While respondent
Obandos’ presentation of the tax
declarations and tax receipts which
all are of ancient era indicate
possession in the concept of an
owner by the respondents and their
predecessors-in-interests. The tax
declarations in the name of Paterno
take on great significance because
the respondents can tack their claim
of ownership to that of their father.
It is worthy to note that the
respondents' father Paterno to
whom they inherited the entire Lot
paid the taxes due under his name
and subsequently, the respondents
paid the taxes due after the death of
Paterno. Granting without admitting
that Felipe's possession of
Lot cannot be tacked with the
respondent Obandos’ possession,
the latter's possession can be tacked
with that of Paterno. Thus, from the
time of the filing of the quieting of
title by the Spouses Calditos in
2003, respondents Obandos’ have
been in possession of the entire Lot
in the concept of an owner for
almost 42 years. This period of time
is sufficient to vest extraordinary
acquisitive prescription over the
property on the respondents. As
such, it is immaterial now whether
the respondents possessed the
property in good faith or not.
IVQ Landholdings, Inc. v Reuben
Barbosa G.R. No. 193156, January
18, 2017 FIRST DIVISION
(Leonardo-De Castro, J.:)
Quieting of Title
FACTS
Barbosa filed a Petition for
Cancellation and Quieting of Titles
against IVQ. Averring that he
bought from a certain Therese
Vargas a parcel of land and that he
took possession of the subject
property and paid real estate taxes
thereon in the name of Therese
Vargas. However, Barbosa learned
that Therese Vargas's name was
cancelled and replaced with that of
IVQ in the tax declaration of the
subject property. IVQ supposedly
bought the subject property from a
certain Jorge Vargas III who
acquired it from Kawilihan
Corporation. Barbosa argued that
even without considering the
authenticity of Jorge Vargas III's
title, Therese Vargas's title bore an
earlier date. IVQ countered that the
alleged title from where Barbosa's
title was allegedly derived from was
the one that was fraudulently
acquired and that Barbosa was
allegedly part of a syndicate that
falsified titles for purposes of "land
grabbing." They argued that it was
questionable that an alleged lot
owner would wait for 30 years before
filing an action to quiet title.
RULING
In an action to quiet title, the
plaintiffs or complainants must
demonstrate a legal or an equitable
title to, or an interest in, the subject
real property. Likewise, they must
show that the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding that
purportedly casts a cloud on their
title is in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy. This point
is clear from Article 476 of the Civil
Code, stating that whenever there is
cloud on title to real property or any
interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is in
truth and in fact invalid, ineffective,
voidable or unenforceable, and may
be prejudicial to said title, an action
may be brought to remove such
cloud or to quiet title. An action may
also be brought to prevent a cloud
from being cast upon title to real
property or any interest therein.
In the instant case, the trial
court and the Court of Appeals
adjudicated the subject property in
favor of Barbosa and directed the
cancellation of IVQ's certificate of
title. And the trial court found that
IVQ failed to establish its claim of
ownership over the subject property,
given the inconsistent statements on
how the property was transferred
from Kawilihan Corporation to Jorge
Vargas III and eventually to IVQ.
Before this Court, however, IVQ
adduced new pieces of documentary
evidence that tended to cast doubt
on the veracity of Barbosa's claim of
ownership. The Court is aware that
the aforesaid evidence belatedly
introduced by IVQ are not
technically newly-discovered
evidence, given that the same could
have been discovered and produced
at the trial of the case had IVQ
exercised reasonable diligence in
obtaining them. Nonetheless, we
find that the evidence cannot simply
be brushed aside on this ground
alone. The same are too material to
ignore and are relevant in ultimately
resolving the question of ownership
of the subject property. Without
ruling on the merits of this case, the
Court finds that there is a need to
reassess the evidence adduced by
the parties to this case and
thereafter reevaluate the findings of
the lower courts.
 Manuel L. Bautista, et al. v
Margarito L. Bautista G.R. No.
202088 March 8, 2017 SECOND
DIVISION
(Peralta, J.:)
Implied Trust
FACTS
The Bautista siblings
established a lending business
through a common fund from the
proceeds of the sale of a parcel of
coconut land they inherited from
their mother Consorcia Lantin
Bautista. Amelia V.
Mendoza (Amelia) obtained a There is an implied trust
loan from Florencia Bautista and
secured the same with a real estate
mortgage. Amelia and Florencia
executed another Kasulatan ng
Pagdaragdag ng Sanla. Amelia
allegedly sold the subject property to
Margarito Bautista through
a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan.
Florencia filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Second Owner's
Duplicate of TCT. She alleged that
she was the mortgagee of the
subject property, and that she could
not locate, despite diligent search,
the owner's duplicate title in her
possession, which she misplaced.
Petitioners tried to oppose the
issuance. However, the trial court
granted the same. Petitioners
subsequently instituted a Complaint
for Partition, Petitioners averred that
Margarito and the others refused to
heed their oral and written demands
for the partition of the properties
they co-owned. Margarito asserted
that he exclusively owns the
property in controversy since he
used his personal funds in
purchasing the land. RTC ruled in
favor of the petitioners and declared
that property was commonly owned
by the siblings. The CA ruled that
Margarito's name was an
indefeasible and incontrovertible
title to the property and has more
probative weight than the
blank Kasulatan adduced by the
petitioners. Consequently,
petitioners' action for partition and
accounting cannot be acted upon
because they failed to prove that
they are co-owners of the property.
RULING
when a property is sold and the
legal estate is granted to one party
but the price is paid by another for
the purpose of having the beneficial
interest of the property. This is
sometimes referred to as a purchase
money resulting trust, the elements
of which are: (a) an actual payment
of money, property or services, or an
equivalent, constituting valuable
consideration; and (b) such
consideration must be furnished by
the alleged beneficiary of a resulting
trust. A trust, which derives its
strength from the confidence one
reposes on another especially
between families, does not lose that
character simply because of what
appears in a legal document.
In the case, Margarito failed to
prove that Amelia conveyed the
property exclusively in his name.
Although Margarito has a certificate
of title and such is a best proof of
ownership of a piece of land, the
mere issuance of the same in the
name of any person does not
foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be under co-
ownership with persons not named
in the certificate or that the
registrant may only be a trustee or
that other parties may have
acquired interest subsequent to the
issuance of the certificate of title.
The principle that a trustee who
puts a certificate of registration in
his name cannot repudiate the trust
by relying on the registration is one
of the well-known limitations upon a
title. Although the property was
titled under the name of Margarito,
the surrounding circumstances as
to its acquisition speak of the intent
that the equitable or beneficial
ownership of the property should
belong to the Bautista siblings.
Province Of Camarines Sur,
Represented By Governor Luis
Raymund F. Villafuerte, Jr., v
Bodega Glassware, Represented
By Its Owner Joseph D. Cabral
G.R. No. 19419 March 22, 2017
THIRD DIVISION
(Jardeleza, J.:)
Unlawful Detainer
FACTS
Petitioner through its
Provincial Governor donated parcel
of land to the Camarines Sur
Teachers' Association, Inc. (CASTEA)
through a Deed of Donation Inter
Vivas. The Deed of Donation
included an automatic revocation
clause which set forth the
conditions that Donee shall use the
donated land for no other purpose
except the construction of its
building to be owned and to be
constructed by the Donee to house
its offices to be used by the said
Camarines Sur Teachers'
Association, Inc., in connection with
its functions under its charter and
by-laws. The condition likewise does
not allow the Donee to sell,
mortgage or encumber the property
including any and all improvements
thereon in favor of any party and
provided. Likewise, it set forth the
construction of buildings shall
commence within one (1) from the
execution of the donation
(September 28, 1966) otherwise, the
donation shall be deemed
automatically revoked and voided
and of no further force and effect.
However, CASTEA entered into a
Contract of Lease with Bodega, over
the donated property wherein it
leased the property commencing on
September 1, 1995 and ending on
September 15, 2015. Bodega took
actual possession of the property on
September 1, 1995. Sometime in
July 2005, Petitioner requested
Bodega regarding the property, and
to show proof of ownership or any
document as legal basis for its
possession. Bodega failed to present
proof, petitioner left bodega
undisturbed and merely tolerated its
possession of the property.
 Subsequently, petitioner
intended to use the property for its
projects and demanded Bodega
vacate the property and surrender
its peaceful possession. Bodega
refused. It prompted petitioner to
revoke the donation made to
CASTEA pursuant to the automatic
revocation clause in the Deed of
Donation and asserts the it violated
the set forth conditions in the Deed
when it leased the property to
bodega. Thereafter, petitioner filed
an action for unlawful detainer
against Bodega before MTC and
prayed for vacating the and
surrender of the property in
possession of respondent.
Bodega anchors its right of
possession on its Contract of Lease
with CASTEA. It insists that the
Contract of Lease is valid because
CASTEA is the owner of the
property.
RULING
An action for unlawful
detainer, refers to a situation where
the current occupant of the property
initially obtained possession
lawfully. This possession only
became unlawful due to the
expiration of the right to possess
which may be a contract, express or
implied, or by mere tolerance.
An action for unlawful
detainer must allege and establish
the following key jurisdictional facts:
(1) initially, possession of property
by the defendant was by contract
with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession
became illegal upon notice by
plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of
possession; (3) thereafter, the
defendant remained in possession of
the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof;
and (4) within one year from the last
demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment. When in an
unlawful detainer action, the party
seeking recovery of possession
alleges that the opposing party
occupied the subject property by
mere tolerance, this must be alleged
clearly and the acts of tolerance
established. Further, the party
seeking possession must identify the
source of his or her claim as well as
satisfactorily present evidence
establishing it.
In this case, petitioner alleged
that as early as 2005, it had asked
Bodega to present proof of its legal
basis for occupying the property.
Bodega, however, failed to heed this
demand. For several years,
petitioner merely tolerated Bodega's
possession by allowing it to continue
using its building and conducting
business on the property. Petitioner
demanded that Bodega vacate the
property in November 2007. This
presents a clear case of unlawful
detainer based on mere tolerance.