Professional Documents
Culture Documents
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other
individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul
Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the
infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as
part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered
into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded
guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was
accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen
(14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation
with the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18
June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of
probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the
probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to
Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal
conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar
Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the
Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the
attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge
Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11
April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months
from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June
1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his
Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to
everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of
good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified.2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is
stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as
having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the
applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he
must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements
necessary to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of bad
character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have
acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted
himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such
character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance,
but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to
do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper.
Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his
advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are
committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals
with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of
the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx4
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359,
210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate
from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in
the practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for
admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly
apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a
minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission
to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that
the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a
candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be
successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been
admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far
more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for
disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan:6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right
to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued
only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it.
Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to
separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the
profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss:7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and
professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is
not to punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the examination
into learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only
protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of
the cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents give?
They are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the
court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law,
and it is of the highest possible consequence that both those who have not such
qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall
not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of
greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice
are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10
Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the
law unless he covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the
attorney is more important, if anything, to the public and to the proper administration of
justice than legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the
applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are
that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an
ornament to his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his community — a Quirk,
a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those
seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly
broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to
practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California
Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that
he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension,
could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment
proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which tends to show the
applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no
doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts
declared to be causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek
admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct
expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a
general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with
inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal
system as we know it.12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of
the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely
accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to
the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws
on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had
failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who
had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all
of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a
useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings
inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was
totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was
then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court
is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has
purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress
that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated
not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also,
and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the
attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration,
evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good
moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may
consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community
who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a
significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by
Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the
senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to
show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to
the ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof,
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any,
of Raul Camaligan.
B.M. No. 1222 April 24, 2009
RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN, Petitioner,
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This treats the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated November 10,
2008 filed by petitioner Danilo de Guzman. He prays that this Honorable Court "in the
exercise of equity and compassion, grant petitioner’s plea for judicial clemency, and
thereupon, order his reinstatement as a member in good standing of the Philippine
Bar."1
To recall, on February 4, 2004, the Court promulgated a Resolution, in B.M. No. 1222,
the dispositive portion of which reads in part:
WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating
Committee, hereby resolves to —
(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon his
receipt of this RESOLUTION;
xxxx
The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law during the
2003 Bar Examinations. Petitioner at that time was employed as an assistant lawyer in
the law firm of Balgos & Perez, one of whose partners, Marcial Balgos, was the
examiner for Mercantile Law during the said bar examinations. The Court had adopted
the findings of the Investigating Committee, which identified petitioner as the person
who had downloaded the test questions from the computer of Balgos and faxed them to
other persons.
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended the reinstatement of
petitioner in the Philippine Bar. In a Report dated January 6, 2009, the OBC rendered its
assessment of the petition, the relevant portions of which we quote hereunder:
Petitioner narrated that he had labored to become a lawyer to fulfill his father’s
childhood dream to become one. This task was not particularly easy for him and his
family but he willed to endure the same in order to pay tribute to his parents.
Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he already imposed upon himself the
duty of rendering service to his fellowmen. At 19 years, he started his exposure to public
service when he was elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of Barangay
Tuktukan, Taguig City. During this time, he initiated several projects benefiting the youth
in their barangay.
Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up Bachelor of Arts in Political
Science and eventually pursuing Bachelor of Laws. In his second year in law school, he
was elected as the President of the Student Council of the Institute of Law of the Far
Eastern University (FEU). Here, he spearheaded various activities including the conduct
of seminars for law students as well as the holding of bar operations for bar examinees.
Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and student leader, petitioner still
managed to excel in his studies. Thus, he was conferred an Academic Excellence
Award upon his graduation in Bachelor of Laws.
Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner immediately entered government
service as a Legal Officer assigned at the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig.
Simultaneously, he also rendered free legal services to less fortunate residents of
Taguig City who were then in need of legal assistance.
In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the Associate Lawyers at the Balgos and
Perez Law Offices. It was during his stay with this firm when his craft as a lawyer was
polished and developed. Despite having entered private practice, he continued to
render free legal services to his fellow Taguigeños.
Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate, petitioner’s flourishing career was cut
short as he was stripped of his license to practice law for his alleged involvement in the
leakage in the 2003 Bar Examinations.
Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself inside his house to avoid the
rather unavoidable consequences of his disbarment.
On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new lease in life when he was taken
as a consultant by the City Government of Taguig. Later, he was designated as a
member of the Secretariat of the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). For the next
five (5) years, petitioner concentrated mainly on rendering public service.
Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of his act which unfortunately,
compromised the integrity of the bar examinations. As could be borne from the records
of the investigation, he cooperated fully in the investigation conducted and took
personal responsibility for his actions. Also, he has offered his sincerest apologies to
Atty. Balgos, to the Court as well as to all the 2003 bar examinees for the unforeseen
and unintended effects of his actions.
Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his mistakes and has taken the said
humbling experience to make him a better person.
Meanwhile, as part of his Petition, petitioner submitted the following testimonials and
endorsements of various individuals and entities all attesting to his good moral
character:
1) Resolution No. 101, Series of 2007, "Resolution Expressing Full Support to Danilo G.
De Guzman in his Application for Judicial Clemency, Endorsing his Competence and
Fitness to be Reinstated as a Member of the Philippine Bar and for Other Purposes"
dated 4 June 2007 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, City of Taguig;
2) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang
Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Southeast People’s Village
Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA) kay Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang
Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang
Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 1
June 2007 of the Southeast People’s Village Homeowners Association, Inc.
(SEPHVOA), Ibayo-Tipas, City of Taguig;
3) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang
Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Residente ng Mauling
Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong
Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang
Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 1
June 2007 of the Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC), Lower
Bicutan, City of Taguig;
4) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang
Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG
KENDI) Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa
Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa
Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado"
dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood
Association, Inc. (SAMANA), Sta. Ana, City of Taguig;
5) "An Open Letter Attesting Personally to the Competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De
Guzman as to Warrant the Grant of Judicial Clemency and his Reinstatement as
Member of the Philippine Bar" dated 8 June 2007 of Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino,
Laogan, Trespeses and Llantino Law Offices;
6) "Testimonial to the Moral and Spiritual Competence of Danilo G. De Guzman to be
Truly Deserving of Judicial Clemency and Compassion" dated 5 July 2007 of Rev. Fr.
Paul G. Balagtas, Parish Priest, Archdiocesan Shrine of St. Anne;
7) "Testimonial Letter" dated 18 February 2008 of Atty. Loreto C. Ata, President, Far
Eastern University Law Alumni Association (FEULAA), Far Eastern University (FEU);
8) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang
Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran,
Inc. (SABISKA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng
Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang
Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 8 July 2008 of the
Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA);
9) Board Resolution No. 02, Series of 2008, "A Resolution Recognizing the
Contributions of Danilo G. De Guzman to the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB)
– Taguig City, Attesting to his Utmost Dedication and Commitment to the Call of Civic
and Social Duty and for Other Purposes" dated 11 July 2008 of the People’s Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB);
10) "A Personal Appeal for the Grant of Judicial Forgiveness and Compassion in Favor
of Danilo G. De Guzman" dated 14 July 2008 of Atty. Edwin R. Sandoval, Professor,
College of Law, San Sebastian College – Recoletos;
11) "An Open Letter Personally Attesting to the Moral competence and Fitness of Danilo
G. De Guzman" dated 5 September 2008 of Mr. Nixon F. Faderog, Deputy Grand
[Kn]ight, Knights of Columbus and President, General Parent-Teacher Association,
Taguig National High School, Lower Bicutan, Taguig City;
12) "Testimonial Letter" dated 5 September 2008 of Atty. Primitivo C. Cruz, President,
Taguig Lawyers League, Inc., Tuktukan, Taguig City;
13) "Testimonial Letter" dated 21 October 2008 of Judge Hilario L. Laqui, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trail Court (RTC), Branch 218, Quezon City; and
14) "Testimonial Letter" dated 28 October 2008 of Justice Oscar M. Herrera, former
Justice, Court of Appeals and former Dean, Institute of Law, Far Eastern University
(FEU).
Citing the case of In Re: Carlos S. Basa, petitioner pleaded that he be afforded the
same kindness and compassion in order that, like Atty. Basa, his promising future may
not be perpetually foreclosed. In the said case, the Court had the occasion to say:
Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California
and the Philippine Islands. Recently, he was charged in the Court of First Instance of
the City of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent, was found guilty in a
decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. De Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was
sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven months and eleven days
of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed
down by the second division of the Supreme Court.
xxxx
When come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by
the court, we do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the
criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the other
hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in order that
so promising a career may not be utterly ruined.
Petitioner promised to commit himself to be more circumspect in his actions and
solemnly pledged to exert all efforts to atone for his misdeeds.
There may be a reasonable ground to consider the herein Petition.
In the case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyer’s Oath (Bar Matter 712),
which may be applied in the instant case, the Court said:
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros
Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal
profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath, the Court recognizes that Mr.
Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications
show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public
service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts, to atone for the death
of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial
notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
xxxx
Meanwhile, in the case of Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia (Administrative
Case No. 2984), the Court [in] deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia to the
practice of law stated:
The Court will take into consideration the applicant’s character and standing prior to the
disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his
conduct subsequent to the disbarment and the time that has elapsed in between the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement.
Petitioner was barely thirty (30) years old and had only been in the practice of law for
five (5) years when he was disbarred from the practice of law. It is of no doubt that
petitioner had a promising future ahead of him where it not for the decision of the Court
stripping off his license.
Petitioner is also of good moral repute, not only before but likewise, after his
disbarment, as attested to overwhelmingly by his constituents, colleagues as well as
people of known probity in the community and society.
Way before the petitioner was even admitted to the bar, he had already manifested his
intense desire to render public service as evidenced by his active involvement and
participation in several social and civic projects and activities. Likewise, even during and
after his disbarment, which could be perceived by some as a debilitating circumstance,
petitioner still managed to continue extending his assistance to others in whatever
means possible. This only proves petitioner’s strength of character and positive moral
fiber.
However, still, it is of no question that petitioner’s act in copying the examination
questions from Atty. Balgos’ computer without the latter’s knowledge and consent, and
which questions later turned out to be the bar examinations questions in Mercantile Law
in the 2003 Bar Examinations, is not at all commendable. While we do believe that
petitioner sincerely did not intend to cause the damage that his action ensued, still, he
must be sanctioned for unduly compromising the integrity of the bar examinations as
well as of this Court.
We are convinced, however, that petitioner has since reformed and has sincerely
reflected on his transgressions. Thus, in view of the circumstances and likewise for
humanitarian considerations, the penalty of disbarment may now be commuted to
suspension. Considering the fact, however, that petitioner had already been disbarred
for more than five (5) years, the same may be considered as proper service of said
commuted penalty and thus, may now be allowed to resume practice of law.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that the
instant Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated 10 November 2008 of
petitioner DANILO G. DE GUZMAN be GRANTED. Petitioner’s disbarment is now
commuted to suspension, which suspension is considered as served in view of the
petitioner’s five (5) year disbarment. Hence, petitioner may now be allowed to resume
practice of law.
The recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is well-taken in
part.1avvphi1.zw+ We deem petitioner worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting
his penalty to seven (7) years suspension from the practice of law, inclusive of the five
(5) years he has already served his disbarment.
Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.2
While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows
how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose. 3
In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of disbarment
imposed on the lawyer, we have taken into account the remorse of the disbarred
lawyer4 and the conduct of his public life during his years outside of the bar. 5 For
example, in Valencia v. Antiniw, we held:
However, the record shows that the long period of respondent's disbarment gave him
the chance to purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance,
and to demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up once again to the exacting
standards of conduct demanded of every member of the bar and officer of the court.
During respondent's disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to date for his
professional infraction, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies and pleas for
reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show that he has
regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and
unblemished record as an elected public servant, as attested to by numerous civic and
professional organizations, government institutions, public officials and members of the
judiciary.6
And in Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia,7 we noted:
Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejia’s disbarment, it also cannot
close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the
petitioner and the length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of
disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court
takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other
transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has
learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted long enough. x
xx
Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering the
gravity of his transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner has redirected focus
since his disbarment towards public service, particularly with the People’s Law
Enforcement Board. The attestations submitted by his peers in the community and other
esteemed members of the legal profession, such as retired Court of Appeals Associate
Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval and Atty.
Lorenzo Ata, and the ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas testify to
his positive impact on society at large since the unfortunate events of 2003.
Petitioner’s subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope that
if he were to reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a lawyer
would redound to the general good and more than mitigate the stain on his record.
Compassion to the petitioner is warranted. Nonetheless, we wish to impart to him the
following stern warning:
"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws.
He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override
the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues
recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate
and dangerous elements of the body politic."8
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Judicial Clemency and
Compassion is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The disbarment of DANILO G. DE
GUZMAN from the practice of law is hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS
SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW, reckoned from February 4, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 6148 January 22, 2013
FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO, Respondent.
RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) filed by respondent Edmundo L.
Macarubbo (respondent) who seeks to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.
Records show that in the Decision1 dated February 27, 2004, the Court disbarred
respondent from the practice of law for having contracted a bigamous marriage with
complainant Florence Teves and a third marriage with one Josephine Constantino while
his first marriage to Helen Esparza was still subsisting, which acts constituted gross
immoral conduct in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The dispositive portion of the subject Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality
and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. He is likewise ORDERED to show
satisfactory evidence to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and to this Court that he
is supporting or has made provisions for the regular support of his two children by
complainant.
Let respondent’s name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.2
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal for Compassion and
Mercy3 which the Court denied with finality in the Resolution4 dated June 1, 2004. Eight
years after or on June 4, 2012, respondent filed the instant Petition (For Extraordinary
Mercy)5 seeking
judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. The Court initially treated
the present suit as a second motion for reconsideration and accordingly, denied it for
lack of merit in the Resolution dated September 4, 2012.6 On December 18, 2012, the
same petition was endorsed to this Court by the Office of the Vice President7 for re-
evaluation, prompting the Court to look into the substantive merits of the case.
In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency,8 the Court laid down the following guidelines in
resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not
be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the
community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period
of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem
himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal
acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. 9
(Citations omitted)
Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other
candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral
character.10
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds the instant petition
meritorious.
Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in
the legal profession and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children
by complainant Teves and maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown by the
herein attached pictures.11 Records also show that after his disbarment, respondent
returned to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his time tending an orchard
and taking care of his ailing mother until her death in 2008. 12 In 2009, he was appointed
as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the
position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/ Office-In-Charge in the Assessor’s
Office, which office he continues to serve to date.13 Moreover, he is a part-time
instructor at the University of Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas College during the
School Year 2011-2012.14 Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-civic
activities by helping his neighbors and friends who are in dire need.
The following documents attest to respondent’s reformed ways: (1) Affidavit of Candida
P. Mabborang;15 (2) Affidavit of Reymar P. Ramirez;16 (3) Affidavit of Roberto D.
Tallud;17 (4) Certification from the Municipal Local Government Office; 18 (5) Certification
by the Office of the Municipal Agriculturist/Health Officer, Social Welfare Development
Officer;19 (6) Certification from the Election Officer of Enrile, Cagayan;20 (7) Affidavit of
Police Senior Inspector Jacinto T. Tuddao;21 (8) Certifications from nine (9) Barangay
Chairpersons;22 (9) Certification from the Office of the Provincial Assessor; 23 (10)
Certification from the Office of the Manager, Magsaka ca Multi-Purpose Cooperative;24
and (11) Certification of the Office of the Federation of Senior Citizens, Enrile Chapter. 25
The Office of the Municipal Treasurer also certified that respondent has no monetary
accountabilities in relation to his office26 while the Office of the Human Resource
Management Officer attested that he has no pending administrative case.27 He is not
known to be involved in any irregularity and/or accused of a crime. Even the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) attested that he has no record on file as of May 31,
2011.28
Furthermore, respondent’s plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, Cagayan Chapter29 and by his former and present colleagues. 30
His parish priest, Rev. Fr. Camilo Castillejos, Jr., certified that he is faithful to and puts
to actual practice the doctrines of the Catholic Church.31 He is also observed to be a
regular churchgoer.32 Records further reveal that respondent has already settled his
previous marital squabbles,33 as in fact, no opposition to the instant suit was tendered
by complainant Teves. He sends regular support34 to his children in compliance with the
Court’s directive in the Decision dated February 27, 2004.
The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time respondent was
disbarred and recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer product of Lemu National
High School,35 and his fourteen (14) years of dedicated government service from 1986
to July 2000 as Legal Officer of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports;
Supervising Civil Service Attorney of the Civil Service Commission; Ombudsman Graft
Investigation Officer; and State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice. 36 From the
attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds that respondent has sufficiently
atoned for his transgressions. At 5837 years of age, he still has productive years ahead
of him that could significantly contribute to the upliftment of the law profession and the
betterment of society. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even
remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who
have reformed their ways,38 as in this case.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered .reinstated to the practice of law.1âwphi1 He
is, however, reminded that such privilege is burdened with conditions whereby
adherence. to the rigid standards of intellect, moral uprightness, and strict compliance
with the rules and the law are continuing requirements.39
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. Respondent
Edmundo L. Macarubbo is hereby ordered REINSTATED in the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC September 19, 2007
RE: LETTER OF JUDGE AUGUSTUS C. DIAZ, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 37, APPEALING FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a letter dated July 18, 2007, Judge Augustus C. Diaz, presiding judge of Branch 37 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, informed the Court that he is an applicant
for judgeship in one of the vacant Regional Trial Court branches in Metro Manila. In
connection therewith, he was interviewed by the Judicial and Bar Council on July 10,
2007. He was told to seek judicial clemency due to the fact that he was once fined
₱20,000 "for not hearing a motion for demolition." He claims that this lapse happened
only once as a result of "oversight." He requests judicial clemency and, in particular,
that he be allowed to "again be nominated to one of the vacant branches of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila or in any of the cities where [his] application [is being]
considered."
In a subsequent letter,1 Judge Diaz stated that he has been the presiding judge of
Branch 37 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City since March 1, 1995. He
expressed deep remorse for the lapse for which he was held administratively liable in
Alvarez v. Diaz.2 He confessed that "[t]he stain of the penalty has taught [him] a bitter
lesson" and promised to avoid the commission of the same or similar acts. He submitted
himself to the judicious discretion of this Court for whatever action the Court may take
on his plea for judicial clemency.
In Alvarez, Judge Diaz was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he granted
the following motions: (1) a motion for execution which was fatally defective for lack of
notice to the defendant and (2) a motion for demolition without notice and hearing. His
action on the motion for demolition also made him liable for grave abuse of authority. 3
He was fined ₱20,000.4
Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council provides:
SEC. 5. Disqualification. – The following are disqualified from being nominated for
appointment to any judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman:
1. Those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases;
2. Those with pending criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals; and
3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in an administrative
case, where the penalty imposed is at least a fine of more than ₱10,000, unless he
has been granted judicial clemency. 5 (emphasis supplied)
Under the said provision, Judge Diaz is disqualified from being nominated for
appointment to any judicial post, until and unless his request for judicial clemency is
granted.
Concerned with safeguarding the integrity of the judiciary, this Court has come down
hard6 and wielded the rod of discipline against members of the judiciary who have fallen
short of the exacting standards of judicial conduct. 7 This is because a judge is the
visible representation of the law and of justice.8 He must comport himself in a manner
that his conduct must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the
performance of his official duties but also as to his behavior outside his sala and as a
private individual.9 His character must be able to withstand the most searching public
scrutiny because the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to
the preservation of the people’s faith in the judicial system.101âwphi1
Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with
the preservation of public confidence in the courts. The Court will grant it only if there is
a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise
are indispensable.11
In the exercise of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts
and all personnel thereof,12 the Court lays down the following guidelines in resolving
requests for judicial clemency:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation.13 These shall include but should not
be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the
community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty14 to ensure a
period of reformation.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem
himself.15
4. There must be a showing of promise16 (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal
acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service. 17
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
In this case, Judge Diaz expressed sincere repentance for his past malfeasance. He
humbly accepted the verdict of this Court in Alvarez. Three years have elapsed since
the promulgation of Alvarez. It is sufficient to ensure that he has learned his lesson and
that he has reformed. His 12 years of service in the judiciary may be taken as proof of
his dedication to the institution. Thus, the Court may now open the door of further
opportunities in the judiciary for him.
Accordingly, the letter dated July 18, 2007 of Judge Augustus C. Diaz is hereby
NOTED. His request for judicial clemency is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.