G.R. No. 83190 August 4, 1992
to remit the
CEBU SEAMEN'S ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, SEAMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILS./DOMINICA C. NACUA, respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition seeks the reversal of the resolution of the Bureau of Labor
Relations 1 which affirmed the decision of the Med-Arbiter holding that the set
of officers of Seamen's Association of the Philippines headed by Dominica C.
Nacua, as president, was the lawful set of officers entitled to the release and
custody of the union dues as well as agency fees of said association. The
dispositive portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order of the Med-
Arbiter dated 13 July 1987 is hereby affirmed and the appeal
therefrom DISMISSED for lack of merit. (p. 39, Rollo)
The facts surrounding the controversy in this case, as stated in the
questioned resolution, is as follows:
The records show that sometime on 23 October 1950, a
group of deck officers and marine engineers on board
vessels plying Cebu and other ports of the Philippines
organized themselves into an association and registered the
same as a non-stock corporation known as Cebu Seamen's
Association, Inc. (CSAI), with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Later, on 23 June 1969, the same group
registered its association with this Bureau as a labor union
known as the Seamen's Association of the Philippines,
Incorporated (SAPI).
SAPI has an existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
with the Aboitiz Shipping Corporation which will expire on 31
December 1988. In consonance with the CBA said company
has been remitting checked-off union dues to said union until
February, 1987 when a group composed of members of said
union, introducing itself to be its new set of officers, went to
the company and claimed that they are entitled to the
remittance and custody of such union dues. This group,
headed by Manuel Gabayoyo claims that they were elected
as such on January 20, 1987 under the supervision of the
SEC.
On 26 May 1987, another group headed by Dominica C.
Nacua, claiming as the duly elected set of officers of the
union in an election held on 20 December 1986, filed a
complaint, for and in behalf of the union, against the Cebu
Seamen's Association, Inc. (CSAI) as represented by
Manuel Gabayoyo for the security of the aforementioned
CBA, seeking such relief, among others, as an order
restraining the respondent from acting on behalf of the union
and directing the Aboitiz Shipping Corp.
checked-off union dues for the months of March and April
1987.
On 10 June 1987, respondent CSAI filed its Answer/Position
Paper alleging that the complainant union and CSAI are one
and the same union; that Dominica C. Nacua and Atty.
Prospero Paradilla who represented the union had been
expelled as members/officers as of November 1984 for
lawful causes; and, that its set of officers headed by Manuel
Gabayoyo has the lawful right to the remittance and custody
of the corporate funds (otherwise known as union does) in
question pursuant to the resolution of the SEC dated 22 April
1987.
To bolster further its posture, on the following day, 11 June
1987, the respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint on the grounds, among others, that the SEC, not
the Med-Arbiter, has jurisdiction over the dispute as provided
under P.D. No. 902-A; that there can neither be a
complainant no respondent in the instant case as the parties
involved are one and the same labor union, and that Mrs.
Dominica C. Nacua and Atty. Prospero Paradilla have no
personality to represent the union as they had already been
expelled as members/officers thereof in two resolutions of
the Board of Directors dated November 1984 and January
17, 1987.
On 19 June 1987, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order denying
said motion but directing the Aboitiz Shipping Corporation to
remit the already checked-off union dues to the complainant
union through its officers end to continue remitting any
checked-off union dues until further notice. The Med-Arbiter
also set further hearing of the complaint on July 1, 1987.
On 19 June 1987, the respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of said order of 19 June 1987, reiterating its
previous position. Thereafter, the Med-Arbiter issued the
assailed Order. . . . (pp. 34 -35, Rollo)
From the decision of the Med-Arbiter, Cebu Seamen's Association headed by
Capt. Gabayoyo filed an appeal with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR).
The BLR, as already stated, affirmed the decision of the Med-Arbiter in a
resolution dated February 19, 1988. The Gabayoyo group appealed to the
Office of the Secretary, Department of Labor, which appeal was considered
as a motion for reconsideration of the BLR's decision. The said
appeal/motion for consideration was denied for lack of merit on April 11, 1988
(p. 42, Rollo) by the BLR.
Hence, this petition.
There are three issues presented for resolution in this petition, to wit:
 1 WHETHER OR NOT THE MED-ARBITER OF REGION VII
HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AT BAR.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINANT-APPELLEE
THE SEAMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
WAS REGISTERED AS A LABOR FEDERATION WITH THE
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS.
3 WHETHER OR NOT DOMINICA C. NACUA AND
PROSPERO PARADIL(L)A HAVE (THE) PERSONALITY TO
REPRESENT THE HEREIN COMPLAINANT-APPELLEE,
CONSIDERING THAT BOTH OF THEM HAVE BEEN
EXPELLED FROM THE ASSOCIATION "SEAMEN'S
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC." (FORMERLY
THE CEBU SEAMEN'S ASSOCIATION, INC.).
There is no doubt that the controversy between the aforesaid two sets of
officers is an intra-union dispute. Both sets of officers claim to be entitled to
the release of the union dues collected by the company with whom it had an
existing CBA. The controversy involves claims of different members/officers
to certain rights granted under the labor code.
Article 226 of the Labor Code vests upon the Bureau of Labor Relations and
Labor Relations Division the original and exclusive authority and jurisdiction
to act on all inter-union and intra-union disputes. Therefore, the Med-Arbiter
originally, and the Director on appeal, correctly assumed jurisdiction over the
controversy.
The determinative issue in this case is who is entitled to the collection and
custody of the union dues? Cebu Seamen's Association headed by
Gabayoyo or Seamen's Association of the Philippines headed by Nacua.
As stated in the findings of fact in the questioned resolution of Director Pura
Ferrer-Calleja, on October 23, 1950, a group of deck officers organized the
Cebu Seamen's Association, Inc., (CSAI), a non-stock corporation and
registered it with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The same
group registered the organization with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR)
as Seamen's Association of the Philippines (SAPI). It is the registration of the
organization with the BLR are not with the SEC which made it a legitimate
labor organization with rights and privileges granted under the Labor Code.
We gathered from the records that CSAI, the corporation was already
inoperational before the controversy in this case arose. In fact, on August 24,
1984 the SEC ordered the CSAI to show cause why its certificate of
registration should not be revoked for continuous inoperation (p. 343, Rollo).
There is nothing in the records which would show that CSAI answered said
show-cause order.
Also, before the controversy, private respondent Dominica Nacua was
elected president of the labor union, SAPI. It had an existing CBA with Aboitiz
Shipping Corporation. Before the end of the term of private respondent
Nacua, some members of the union which included Domingo Machacon and
petitioner Manuel Gabayoyo showed signs of discontentment with the
leadership of Nacua. This break-away group revived the moribund
corporation and issued an undated resolution expelling Nacua from
association (pp. 58-59, Rollo). Sometime in February, 1987, it held its own
election of officers supervised by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
It also filed a case of estafa against Nacua sometime in May, 1986 (p.
52, Rollo).
The expulsion of Nacua from the corporation, of which she denied being a
member, has however, not affected her membership with the labor union. In
fact, in the elections of officers for 1987-1989, she was re-elected as the
president of the labor union. In this connections, We cannot agree with the
contention of Gabayoyo that Nacua was already expelled from the union.
Whatever acts their group had done in the corporation do not bind the labor
union. Moreover, Gabayoyo cannot claim leadership of the labor group by
virtue of his having been elected as a president of the dormant corporation
CSAI.
Under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction,
decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by courts, except
when the former acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion.
Public respondent Bureau of Labor Relations correctly ruled on the basis of
the evidence presented by the parties that SAPI, the legitimate labor union,
registered with its office, is not the same association as CSAI, the
corporation, insofar as their rights under the Labor Code are concerned.
Hence, the former and not the latter association is entitled to the release and
custody of union fees with Aboitiz Shipping and other shipping companies
with whom it had an existing CBA. As correctly held by public respondent:
It is undisputed from the records that the election of the so-
called set of officers headed by Manuel Gabayoyo was
conducted under the supervision of the SEC, presumably in
accordance with its constitution and by-laws as well as the
articles of incorporation of respondent CSAI, and the
Corporation Code. That had been so precisely on the honest
belief of the participants therein that they were acting in their
capacity as members of the said corporation. That being the
case, the aforementioned set of officers is of the respondent
corporation and not of the complainant union. It follows,
then, that any proceedings, and actions taken by said set of
officers can not, in any manner, affect the union and its
members.
On the other hand, we rule and so hold that the other set of
officers headed by Dominica C. Nacua is the lawful set of
officers of SAPI and therefore, is entitled to the release and
custody of the union dues as well as the agency fees, if any,
there be. A record check with the Labor Organizations
(LOD), this Bureau, shows that SAPI has submitted to it for
file the list of this new set of officers, in compliance with the
second paragraph of Article 242 (c) of the Labor Code. This
 list sufficiently sustains the view that said officers were Petitioner is the incumbent bargaining agent for the bargaining unit
lawfully elected, in the absence of clear and convincing proof comprised of the regular monthly-paid rank and file employees of the three
to the contrary. (pp. 9-10, Rollo) divisions of San Miguel Corporation (SMC), namely, the San Miguel
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED. The questioned resolution of the Corporate Staff Unit (SMCSU), San Miguel Brewing Philippines (SMBP), and
Bureau of Labor Relations is AFFIRMED. the San Miguel Packaging Products (SMPP), in all offices and plants of SMC,
including the Metal Closure and Lithography Plant in Laguna. It had been the
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES G . R. No . 17 115 3 certified bargaining agent for 20 years from 1987 to 1997.
UNIONPHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL
WORKERS ORGANIZATION (SMCEUPTGWO), Present: Respondent is registered as a chapter of Pambansang Diwa ng
Petitioner, Manggagawang Pilipino (PDMP). PDMP issued Charter Certificate No. 112
YNARES-SANTIAGO, to respondent on 15 June 1999.[5] In compliance with registration
- versus - Chairperson, requirements, respondent submitted the requisite documents to the BLR for
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, the purpose of acquiring legal personality.[6] Upon submission of its charter
SAN MIGUEL PACKAGING PRODUCTS CHICO-NAZARIO, certificate and other documents, respondent was issued Certificate of
EMPLOYEES UNIONPAMBANSANG DIWA NG NACHURA, and Creation of Local or Chapter PDMP-01 by the BLR on 6 July 1999.
[7]
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO(SMPPEUPDMP), REYES, JJ. Thereafter, respondent filed with the Med-Arbiter of the DOLE Regional
[1]
Re spo nd e nt . Officer in the National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR), three separate petitions
Promulgated: for certification election to represent SMPP, SMCSU, and SMBP. [8] All three
petitions were dismissed, on the ground that the separate petitions
fragmented a single bargaining unit.[9]
September 12, 2007
x-------------------------------------------------x On 17 August 1999, petitioner filed with the DOLE-NCR a petition seeking
the cancellation of respondents registration and its dropping from the rolls of
legitimate labor organizations. In its petition, petitioner accused respondent
DECISION of committing fraud and falsification, and non-compliance with registration
requirements in obtaining its certificate of registration. It raised allegations
that respondent violated Articles 239(a), (b) and (c) [10] and 234(c)[11] of the
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Labor Code. Moreover, petitioner claimed that PDMP is not a legitimate labor
organization, but a trade union center, hence, it cannot directly create a local
or chapter. The petition was docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-9908-007-IRD.
[12]
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court, petitioner SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION- On 14 July 2000, DOLE-NCR Regional Director Maximo B. Lim issued an
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION Order dismissing the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, and
(SMCEU-PTGWO) prays that this Court reverse and set aside the (a) irregularity in the submission of documents by respondent. Regional Director
Decision[2] dated 9 March 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. Lim further ruled that respondent is allowed to directly create a local or
66200, affirming the Decision[3] dated 19 February 2001 of the Bureau of chapter. However, he found that respondent did not comply with the 20%
Labor Relations (BLR) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) membership requirement and, thus, ordered the cancellation of its certificate
which upheld the Certificate of Registration of respondent SAN MIGUEL of registration and removal from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations.
[13]
PACKAGING PRODUCTS EMPLOYEES UNIONPAMBANSANG DIWA NG Respondent appealed to the BLR. In a Decision dated 19 February 2001, it
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (SMPPEUPDMP); and (b) declared:
the Resolution[4] dated 16 January 2006 of the Court of Appeals in the same
case, denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned As a chartered local union, appellant is not required to
Decision. submit the number of employees and names of all its
members comprising at least 20% of the employees in the
The following are the antecedent facts: bargaining unit where it seeks to operate. Thus, the
revocation of its registration based on non-compliance with
 the 20% membership requirement does not have any basis
in the rules.
Further, although PDMP is considered as a trade union
center, it is a holder of Registration Certificate No. FED-
11558-LC issued by the BLR on 14 February 1991, which
bestowed upon it the status of a legitimate labor organization
with all the rights and privileges to act as representative of
its members for purposes of collective bargaining
agreement. On this basis, PDMP can charter or create a
local, in accordance with the provisions of Department Order
No. 9.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision of the Regional
Director dated July 14, 2000, canceling the registration of
appellant San Miguel Packaging Products Employees Union-
Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipino (SMPPEU-
PDMP) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant shall
hereby remain in the roster of legitimate labor organizations.
[14]
While the BLR agreed with the findings of the DOLE Regional Director
dismissing the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, and in upholding
that PDMP can directly create a local or a chapter, it reversed the Regional
Directors ruling that the 20% membership is a requirement for respondent to
attain legal personality as a labor organization.Petitioner thereafter filed a
Motion for Reconsideration with the BLR. In a Resolution rendered on 19
June 2001 in BLR-A-C-64-05-9-00 (NCR-OD-9908-007-IRD), the BLR
denied the Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed its Decision dated 19
February 2001.[15]
Invoking the power of the appellate court to review decisions of quasi-judicial
agencies, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 66200. The Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated 9 March
2005, dismissed the petition and affirmed the Decision of the BLR, ruling as
follows:
In Department Order No. 9, a registered federation or
national union may directly create a local by submitting to
the BLR copies of the charter certificate, the locals
constitution and by-laws, the principal office address of the
local, and the names of its officers and their addresses.
Upon complying with the documentary requirements, the
local shall be issued a certificate and included in the roster of
legitimate labor organizations. The [herein respondent] is an
affiliate of a registered federation PDMP, having been issued
a charter certificate. Under the rules we have reviewed,
there is no need for SMPPEU to show a membership of 20%
of the employees of the bargaining unit in order to be
recognized as a legitimate labor union.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, the assailed decision and resolution
of the BLR are AFFIRMED, and the petition is DISMISSED.
[16]
Subsequently, in a Resolution dated 16 January 2006, the Court of
Appeals denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned
Decision.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court where petitioner raises the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS NOT REQUIRED TO
SUBMIT THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AND NAMES OF
ALL ITS MEMBERS COMPRISING AT LEAST 20% OF THE
EMPLOYEES IN THE BARGAINING UNIT WHERE IT
SEEKS TO OPERATE.
The present petition questions the legal personality of respondent as
a legitimate labor organization.
Petitioner posits that respondent is required to submit a list of
members comprising at least 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit
before it may acquire legitimacy, citing Article 234(c) of the Labor Code which
stipulates that any applicant labor organization, association or group of
unions or workers shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the
rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon
issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following
requirements:
a. Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
b. The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal
address of the labor organization, the minutes of the
organizational meetings and the list of the workers who
participated in such meetings;
 c. The names of all its members comprising at least
twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the
bargaining unit where it seeks to operate;
d. If the applicant union has been in existence for one or
more years, copies of its annual financial reports; and
e. Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-laws of the
applicant union, minutes of its adoption or ratification
and the list of the members who participated in it.[17]
Petitioner also insists that the 20% requirement for registration of
respondent must be based not on the number of employees of a single
division, but in all three divisions of the company in all the offices and plants
of SMC since they are all part of one bargaining unit. Petitioner refers to
Section 1, Article 1 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), [18] quoted
hereunder:
ARTICLE 1
SCOPE
Section 1. Appropriate Bargaining Unit. The appropriate
bargaining unit covered by this Agreement consists of all
regular rank and file employees paid on the basis of fixed
salary per month and employed by the COMPANY in its
Corporate Staff Units (CSU), San Miguel Brewing Products
(SMBP) and San Miguel Packaging Products (SMPP) and in
different operations existing in the City of Manila and
suburbs, including Metal Closure and Lithography Plant
located at Canlubang, Laguna subject to the provisions of
Article XV of this Agreement provided however, that if during
the term of this Agreement, a plant within the territory
covered by this Agreement is transferred outside but within a
radius of fifty (50) kilometers from the Rizal Monument, Rizal
Park, Metro Manila, the employees in the transferred plant
shall remain in the bargaining unit covered by this
Agreement. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner thus maintains that respondent, in any case, failed to meet
this 20% membership requirement since it based its membership on the
number of employees of a single division only, namely, the SMPP.
There is merit in petitioners contentions.
A legitimate labor organization[19] is defined as any labor organization
duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, and
includes any branch or local thereof.[20] The mandate of the Labor Code is to
ensure strict compliance with the requirements on registration because a
legitimate labor organization is entitled to specific rights under the Labor
Code,[21] and are involved in activities directly affecting matters of public
interest. Registration requirements are intended to afford a measure of
protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining
unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union
funds or use the labor organization for illegitimate ends. [22] Legitimate labor
organizations have exclusive rights under the law which cannot be exercised
by non-legitimate unions, one of which is the right to be certified as the
exclusive representative[23] of all the employees in an appropriate collective
bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. [24] The acquisition of
rights by any union or labor organization, particularly the right to file a petition
for certification election, first and foremost, depends on whether or not the
labor organization has attained the status of a legitimate labor organization.
[25]
A perusal of the records reveals that respondent is registered with the BLR
as a local or chapter of PDMP and was issued Charter Certificate No. 112
on 15 June 1999. Hence, respondent was directly chartered by PDMP.
The procedure for registration of a local or chapter of a labor
organization is provided in Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor
Code, as amended by Department Order No. 9 which took effect on 21 June
1997, and again by Department Order No. 40 dated 17 February 2003. The
Implementing Rules as amended by D.O. No. 9 should govern the resolution
of the petition at bar since respondents petition for certification election was
filed with the BLR in 1999; and that of petitioner on 17 August 1999.[26]
The applicable Implementing Rules enunciates a two-fold procedure
for the creation of a chapter or a local. The first involves the affiliation of an
independent union with a federation or national union or industry union. The
second, finding application in the instant petition, involves the direct creation
of a local or a chapter through the process of chartering. [27]
A duly registered federation or national union may directly create a
local or chapter by submitting to the DOLE Regional Office or to the BLR two
copies of the following:
(a) A charter certificate issued by the federation or
national union indicating the creation or establishment
of the local/chapter;
(b) The names of the local/chapters officers, their
addresses, and the principal office of the local/chapter;
and
 (c) The local/chapters constitution and by-laws;
Provided, That where the local/chapters constitution
and by-laws is the same as that of the federation or
national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly.
All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified
under oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer of the
local/chapter and attested to by its President.[28]
The Implementing Rules stipulate that a local or chapter may be
directly created by a federation or national union. A duly constituted local or
chapter created in accordance with the foregoing shall acquire legal
personality from the date of filing of the complete documents with the BLR.
[29]
The issuance of the certificate of registration by the BLR or the DOLE
Regional Office is not the operative act that vests legal personality upon a
local or a chapter under Department Order No. 9. Such legal personality is
acquired from the filing of the complete documentary requirements
enumerated in Section 1, Rule VI.[30]
Petitioner insists that Section 3 of the Implementing Rules, as amended by
Department Order No. 9, violated Article 234 of the Labor Code when it
provided for less stringent requirements for the creation of a chapter or
local. This Court disagrees.
Article 234 of the Labor Code provides that an independent labor
organization acquires legitimacy only upon its registration with the BLR:
Any applicant labor organization, association or group of
unions or workers shall acquire legal personality and shall be
entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to
legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the
certificate of registration based on the following
requirements:
(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal
address of the labor organization, the minutes of the
organizational meetings and the list of the workers who
participated in such meetings;
(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty
percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit
where it seeks to operate;
(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or
more years, copies of its annual financial reports; and
(e) Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-laws of
the applicant union, minutes of its adoption or ratification,
and the list of the members who participated in it. (Italics
supplied.)
It is emphasized that the foregoing pertains to the registration of
an independent labor organization, association or group of unions or
workers.
However, the creation of a branch, local or chapter is treated
differently. This Court, in the landmark case of Progressive Development
Corporation v. Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment,
[31]
declared that when an unregistered union becomes a branch, local or
chapter, some of the aforementioned requirements for registration are no
longer necessary or compulsory. Whereas an applicant for registration of an
independent union is mandated to submit, among other things, the number of
employees and names of all its members comprising at least 20% of the
employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate, as provided
under Article 234 of the Labor Code and Section 2 of Rule III, Book V of the
Implementing Rules, the same is no longer required of a branch, local or
chapter.[32] The intent of the law in imposing less requirements in the case of
a branch or local of a registered federation or national union is to encourage
the affiliation of a local union with a federation or national union in order to
increase the local unions bargaining powers respecting terms and conditions
of labor.[33]
Subsequently, in Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Trajano [34] where the validity of
Department Order No. 9 was directly put in issue, this Court was unequivocal
in finding that there is no inconsistency between the Labor Code and
Department Order No. 9.
As to petitioners claims that respondent obtained its Certificate of
Registration through fraud and misrepresentation, this Court finds that the
imputations are not impressed with merit. In the instant case, proof to declare
that respondent committed fraud and misrepresentation remains
wanting. This Court had, indeed, on several occasions, pronounced that
registration based on false and fraudulent statements and documents confer
no legitimacy upon a labor organization irregularly recognized, which, at best,
holds on to a mere scrap of paper. Under such circumstances, the labor
organization, not being a legitimate labor organization, acquires no rights. [35]
This Court emphasizes, however, that a direct challenge to the legitimacy of
a labor organization based on fraud and misrepresentation in securing its
certificate of registration is a serious allegation which deserves careful
scrutiny. Allegations thereof should be compounded with supporting
circumstances and evidence. The records of the case are devoid of such
evidence. Furthermore, this Court is not a trier of facts, and this doctrine
applies with greater force in labor cases. Findings of fact of administrative
agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, such as the BLR, which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. [36]
Still, petitioner postulates that respondent was not validly and legitimately
created, for PDMP cannot create a local or chapter as it is not a legitimate
labor organization, it being a trade union center.
Petitioners argument creates a predicament as it hinges on the legitimacy of
PDMP as a labor organization. Firstly, this line of reasoning attempts to
predicate that a trade union center is not a legitimate labor organization. In
the process, the legitimacy of PDMP is being impugned, albeit
indirectly. Secondly, the same contention premises that a trade union center
cannot directly create a local or chapter through the process of chartering.
Anent the foregoing, as has been held in a long line of cases, the
legal personality of a legitimate labor organization, such as PDMP, cannot be
subject to a collateral attack. The law is very clear on this matter. Article 212
(h) of the Labor Code, as amended, defines a legitimate labor
organization[37] as any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE, and
includes any branch or local thereof.[38] On the other hand, a trade union
center is any group of registered national unions or federations organized for
the mutual aid and protection of its members; for assisting such members in
collective bargaining; or for participating in the formulation of social and
employment policies, standards, and programs, and is duly registered with
the DOLE in accordance with Rule III, Section 2 of the Implementing Rules.
[39]
The Implementing Rules stipulate that a labor organization shall be
deemed registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance
of its certificate of registration. Once a certificate of registration is issued to a
union, its legal personality cannot be subject to collateral attack. [40] It may be
questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance
with Section 5 of Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules. The
aforementioned provision is enunciated in the following:
Sec. 5. Effect of registration. The labor organization or
workers association shall be deemed registered and vested
with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate
of registration.Such legal personality cannot thereafter be
subject to collateral attack, but may be questioned only in an
independent petition for cancellation in accordance with
these Rules.
PDMP was registered as a trade union center and issued Registration
Certificate No. FED-11558-LC by the BLR on 14 February 1991. Until the
certificate of registration of PDMP is cancelled, its legal personality as a
legitimate labor organization subsists. Once a union acquires legitimate
status as a labor organization, it continues to be recognized as such until its
certificate of registration is cancelled or revoked in an independent action for
cancellation.[41] It bears to emphasize that what is being directly challenged is
the personality of respondent as a legitimate labor organization and not that
of PDMP. This being a collateral attack, this Court is without jurisdiction to
entertain questions indirectly impugning the legitimacy of PDMP.
Corollarily, PDMP is granted all the rights and privileges appurtenant
to a legitimate labor organization,[42] and continues to be recognized as such
until its certificate of registration is successfully impugned and thereafter
cancelled or revoked in an independent action for cancellation.
We now proceed to the contention that PDMP cannot directly create a local
or a chapter, it being a trade union center.
This Court reverses the finding of the appellate court and BLR on
this ground, and rules that PDMP cannot directly create a local or chapter.
After an exhaustive study of the governing labor law provisions, both
statutory and regulatory,[43] we find no legal justification to support the
conclusion that a trade union center is allowed to directly create a local or
chapter through chartering. Apropos, we take this occasion to reiterate the
first and fundamental duty of this Court, which is to apply the law. The
solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not
include the power to correct by reading into the law what is not written
therein.[44]
Presidential Decree No. 442, better known as the Labor Code, was
enacted in 1972. Being a legislation on social justice, [45] the provisions of the
Labor Code and the Implementing Rules have been subject to several
amendments, and they continue to evolve, considering that labor plays a
major role as a socio-economic force. The Labor Code was first amended by
Republic Act No. 6715, and recently, by Republic Act No. 9481. Incidentally,
the term trade union center was never mentioned under Presidential Decree
No. 442, even as it was amended by Republic Act No. 6715. The term trade
union center was first adopted in the Implementing Rules, under Department
Order No. 9.
Culling from its definition as provided by Department Order No. 9,
a trade union center is any group of registered national unions or federations
organized for the mutual aid and protection of its members; for assisting such
members in collective bargaining; or for participating in the formulation of
social and employment policies, standards, and programs, and is duly
registered with the DOLE in accordance with Rule III, Section 2 of the
Implementing Rules.[46] The same rule provides that the application for
registration of an industry or trade union center shall be supported by the
following:
(a) The list of its member organizations
and their respective presidents and, in the case
of an industry union, the industry where the
union seeks to operate;
(b) The resolution of membership of each
member organization, approved by the Board of
Directors of such union;
(c) The name and principal address of the
applicant, the names of its officers and their
addresses, the minutes of its organizational
meeting/s, and the list of member organizations
and their representatives who attended such
meeting/s; and
(d) A copy of its constitution and by-laws
and minutes of its ratification by a majority of the
presidents of the member organizations,
provided that where the ratification was done
simultaneously with the organizational meeting,
it shall be sufficient that the fact of ratification be
included in the minutes of the organizational
meeting.[47]
Evidently, while a national union or federation is a labor organization
with at least ten locals or chapters or affiliates, each of which must be a duly
certified or recognized collective bargaining agent; [48] a trade union center, on
the other hand, is composed of a group of registered national unions or
federations.[49]
The Implementing Rules, as amended by Department Order No. 9,
provide that a duly registered federation or national union may directly create
a local or chapter. The provision reads:
Section 1. Chartering and creation of a local/chapter. A duly
registered federation or national union may directly create a
local/chapter by submitting to the Regional Office or to the
Bureau two (2) copies of the following:
(a) A charter certificate issued by the federation or national
union indicating the creation or establishment of the
local/chapter;
(b) The names of the local/chapters officers, their addresses,
and the principal office of the local/chapter; and
(c) The local/chapters constitution and by-laws; provided that
where the local/chapters constitution and by-laws is the
same as that of the federation or national union, this fact
shall be indicated accordingly.
All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified
under oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer of the
local/chapter and attested to by its President.[50]
Department Order No. 9 mentions two labor organizations either of
which is allowed to directly create a local or chapter through chartering a duly
registered federation or a national union. Department Order No. 9 defines a
"chartered local" as a labor organization in the private sector operating at the
enterprise level that acquired legal personality through a charter certificate,
issued by a duly registered federation or national union and reported to the
Regional Office in accordance with Rule III, Section 2-E of these Rules. [51]
Republic Act No. 9481 or An Act Strengthening the Workers
Constitutional Right to Self-Organization, Amending for the Purpose
Presidential Decree No. 442, As Amended, Otherwise Known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines lapsed[52] into law on 25 May 2007 and became
effective on 14 June 2007.[53] This law further amends the Labor Code
provisions on Labor Relations.
Pertinent amendments read as follows:
SECTION 1. Article 234 of Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of
the Philippines, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
ART. 234. Requirements of Registration. A
federation, national union or industry
or trade union center or an independent
union shall acquire legal personality and
 shall be entitled to the rights and privileges
granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations upon issuance of the
certificate of registration based on the
following requirements:
(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their
addresses, the principal address of the labor
organization, the minutes of the
organizational meetings and the list of the
workers who participated in such meetings;
(c) In case the applicant is an independent
union, the names of all its members
comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of
all the employees in the bargaining unit
where it seeks to operate;
(d) If the applicant union has been in
existence for one or more years, copies of
its annual financial reports; and
(e) Four copies of the constitution and by-
laws of the applicant union, minutes of its
adoption or ratification, and the list of the
members who participated in it.
SECTION 2. A new provision is hereby inserted into the
Labor Code as Article 234-A to read as follows:
ART. 234-A. Chartering and Creation of a
Local Chapter. A duly registered federation
or national union may directly create a local
chapter by issuing a charter certificate
indicating the establishment of the local
chapter. The chapter shall acquire legal
personality only for purposes of filing a
petition for certification election from the
date it was issued a charter certificate.
The chapter shall be entitled to all other
rights and privileges of a legitimate labor
organization only upon the submission of the
following documents in addition to its charter
certificate:
(a) The names of the chapter's officers, their
addresses, and the principal office of the
chapter; and
(b) The chapter's constitution and by-laws:
Provided, That where the chapter's
constitution and by-laws are the same as
that of the federation or the national union,
this fact shall be indicated accordingly.
The additional supporting requirements shall
be certified under oath by the secretary or
treasurer of the chapter and attested by its
president. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 234 now includes the term trade union center, but interestingly, the
provision indicating the procedure for chartering or creating a local or
chapter, namely Article 234-A, still makes no mention of a trade union center.
Also worth emphasizing is that even in the most recent amendment
of the implementing rules,[54] there was no mention of a trade union center as
being among the labor organizations allowed to charter.
This Court deems it proper to apply the Latin maxim expressio unius
est exclusio alterius. Under this maxim of statutory interpretation, the
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. When certain persons or
things are specified in a law, contract, or will, an intention to exclude all
others from its operation may be inferred. If a statute specifies one exception
to a general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision,
other exceptions or effects are excluded.[55] Where the terms are expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to other matters. [56] Such is the case here. If its intent were
otherwise, the law could have so easily and conveniently included trade
union centers in identifying the labor organizations allowed to charter a
chapter or local. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded
therefrom, and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in
the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein. [57] The rule is
restrictive in the sense that it proceeds from the premise that the legislating
body would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had the
intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly
mentioned.[58] Expressium facit cessare tacitum. [59] What is expressed puts an
end to what is implied. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person,
object or thing omitted must have been omitted intentionally.
Therefore, since under the pertinent status and applicable implementing
rules, the power granted to labor organizations to directly create a chapter or
local through chartering is given to a federation or national union, then a
trade union center is without authority to charter directly.
The ruling of this Court in the instant case is not a departure from the
policy of the law to foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and
united labor movement,[60] and thus assure the rights of workers to self-
organization.[61] The mandate of the Labor Code in ensuring strict compliance
with the procedural requirements for registration is not without reason. It has
been observed that the formation of a local or chapter becomes a handy tool
for the circumvention of union registration requirements. Absent the
institution of safeguards, it becomes a convenient device for a small group of
employees to foist a not-so-desirable federation or union on unsuspecting co-
workers and pare the need for wholehearted voluntariness, which is basic to
free unionism.[62] As a legitimate labor organization is entitled to specific
rights under the Labor Code and involved in activities directly affecting public
interest, it is necessary that the law afford utmost protection to the parties
affected.[63] However, as this Court has enunciated in Progressive
Development Corporation v. Secretary of Department of Labor and
Employment, it is not this Court's function to augment the requirements
prescribed by law. Our only recourse, as previously discussed, is to exact
strict compliance with what the law provides as requisites for local or chapter
formation.[64]
In sum, although PDMP as a trade union center is a legitimate labor
organization, it has no power to directly create a local or chapter. Thus,
SMPPEU-PDMP cannot be created under the more lenient requirements for
chartering, but must have complied with the more stringent rules for creation
and registration of an independent union, including the 20% membership
requirement.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 09
March 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 66200
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Certificate of Registration of San Miguel
Packaging Products Employees UnionPambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang
Pilipino is ORDERED CANCELLED, and SMPPEU-PDMP DROPPED from
the rolls of legitimate labor organizations.
G.R. No. 96425 February 4, 1992
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, MED-ARBITER EDGARDO DELA CRUZ and
PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG PAGGAWA (KILUSAN)-TUCP, respondents.
Beltran, Bacungan & Candoy for petitioner.
Jimenez & Associates co-counsel for petitioner.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The controversy in this case centers on the requirements before a local or
chapter of a federation may file a petition for certification election and be
certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the petitioner's
employees.
Petitioner Progressive Development Corporation (PDC) filed this petition
for certiorari to set aside the following:
1) Resolution dated September 5, 1990, issued by respondent Med-Arbiter
Edgardo dela Cruz, directing the holding of the certification election among
the regular rank-and-file employees of PDC:
2) Order dated October 12, 1990, issued by the respondent Secretary of
Labor and Employment, denying PDC's appeal; and
3) Order dated November 12, 1990, also issued by the respondent Secretary,
denying the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
On June 19, 1990, respondent Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa
(KILUSAN) -TUCP (hereinafter referred to as Kilusan) filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification
election among the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner alleging that it is
a legitimate labor federation and its local chapter, Progressive Development
Employees Union, was issued charter certificate No. 90-6-1-153. Kilusan
claimed that there was no existing collective bargaining agreement and that
no other legitimate labor organization existed in the bargaining unit.
Petitioner PDC filed its motion to dismiss dated July 11, 1990 contending that
the local union failed to comply with Rule II Section 3, Book V of the Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, which requires the submission
of: (a) the constitution and by-laws; (b) names, addresses and list of officers
and/or members; and (c) books of accounts.
On July 16 , 1990, respondent Kilusan submitted a rejoinder to PDC's motion
to dismiss claiming that it had submitted the necessary documentary
requirements for registration, such as the constitution and by-laws of the
local union, and the list of officers/members with their addresses. Kilusan
further averred that no books of accounts could be submitted as the local
union was only recently organized.
In its "Supplemental Position Paper" dated September 3, 1990, the petitioner
insisted that upon verification with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), it
found that the alleged minutes of the organizational meeting was
unauthenticated, the list of members did not bear the corresponding
signatures of the purported members, and the constitution and by-laws did
not bear the signature of the members and was not duly subscribed. It
argued that the private respondent therefore failed to substantially comply
with the registration requirements provided by the rules. Additionally, it
prayed that Med-Arbiter Edgardo dela Cruz inhibit himself from handling the
case for the reason that he allegedly had prejudged the same.
In his September 5, 1990 resolution, Med Arbiter dela Cruz held that there
was substantial compliance with the requirements for the formation of the
chapter. He further stated that mere issuance of the charter certificate by the
federation was sufficient compliance with the rules. Considering that the
establishment was unorganized, he maintained that a certification election
should be conducted to resolve the question of representation.
Treating the motion for reconsideration filed by the PDC as an appeal to the
Office of the Secretary, Undersecretary Laguesma held that the same was
merely a "reiteration of the issues already ventilated in the proceedings
before the Med-Arbiter, specifically, the matter involving the formal
organization of the chapter." (Rollo, p. 20) PDC's motion for reconsideration
from the aforementioned ruling was likewise denied. Hence, this petition.
In an order dated February 25, 1991, the Court resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order enjoining the public respondents from carrying out the
assailed resolution and orders or from proceeding with the certification
election. (Rollo, pp. 37-39)
It is the petitioner's contention that a labor organization (such as the Kilusan)
may not validly invest the status of legitimacy upon a local or chapter through
the mere expedient of issuing a charter certificate and submitting such
certificate to the BLR (Rollo, p. 85) Petitioner PDC posits that such local or
chapter must at the same time comply with the requirement of submission
of duly subscribed constitution and by-laws, list of officers and books of
accounts. (Rollo, p. 35) PDC points out that the constitution and by-laws and
list of officers submitted were not duly subscribed. Likewise, the petitioner
claims that the mere filing of the aforementioned documents is insufficient;
that there must be due recognition or acknowledgment accorded to the local
or chapter by BLR through a certificate of registration or any communication
emanating from it. (Rollo, p. 86)
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the public respondent, avers that there
was a substantial compliance with the requirements for the formation of a
chapter. Moreover, he invokes Article 257 of the Labor Code which mandates
the automatic conduct by the Med-Arbiter of a certification election in any
establishment where there is no certified bargaining agreement.
The Court has repeatedly stressed that the holding of a certification election
is based on a statutory policy that cannot be circumvented. (Airtime
Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, 180 SCRA 749 [1989]; Belyca Corporation
v. Ferrer-Calleja, 168 SCRA 184 [1988]; George and Peter Lines, Inc. v.
Associated Labor Unions, 134 SCRA 82 [1986]). The workers must be
allowed to freely express their choice in a determination where everything is
open to their sound judgment and the possibility of fraud and
misrepresentation is eliminated.
But while Article 257 cited by the Solicitor General directs the automatic
conduct of a certification election in an unorganized establishment, it also
requires that the petition for certification election must be filed by a legitimate
labor organization. Article 242 enumerates the exclusive rights of a legitimate
labor organization among which is the right to be certified as the exclusive
representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining
unit for purposes of collective bargaining.
Meanwhile, Article 212(h) defines a legitimate labor organization as "any
labor organization duly registered with the DOLE and includes any branch or
local thereof." (Emphasis supplied) Rule I, Section 1 (j), Book V of the
Implementing Rules likewise defines a legitimate labor organization as "any
labor organization duly registered with the DOLE and includes any branch,
local or affiliate thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The question that now arises is: when does a branch, local or affiliate of a
federation become a legitimate labor organization?
Ordinarily, a labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon registration
with the BLR. Under Article 234 (Requirements of Registration):
Any applicant labor organization, association or group of
unions or workers shall acquire legal personality and shall be
entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to
legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the
certificate of registration based on the following
requirements:
(a) Fifty-pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal
address of the labor organization, the minutes of the
organizational meeting and the list of the workers who
participated in such meetings;
(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty
20% percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit
where it seek to operate;
(d) If the applicant has been in existence for one or more
years, copies , of its annual financial reports; and
(e) Four copies of the constitution and by-laws of the
applicant union, the minutes of its adoption or ratification and
the list of the members who participated in it.
And under Article 235 (Action on Application)
The Bureau shall act on all applications for registration within
thirty (30) days from filing.
All requisite documents and papers shall be certified under
oath by the secretary or the treasurer of the organization, as
the case may be, and attested to by its president.
Moreover, section 4 of Rule II, Book V of the Implementing Rules requires
that the application should be signed by at least twenty percent (20%) of the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and be accompanied by a
sworn statement of the applicant union that there is no certified bargaining
agent or, where there is an existing collective bargaining agreement duly
submitted to the DOLE, that the application is filed during the last sixty (60)
days of the agreement.
The respondent Kilusan questions the requirements as too stringent in their
application but the purpose of the law in prescribing these requisites must be
underscored. Thus, in Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
v. Secretary of Labor, 27 SCRA 40 (1969), the Court declared:
 The theory to the effect that Section 23 of Republic Act No.
875 unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and association
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is devoid of factual basis.
The registration prescribed in Paragraph (b) of said section
is not a limitation to the right of assembly or association,
which may be exercised with or without said registration. The
latter is merely a condition sine qua nonfor the acquisition of
legal personality by the labor organizations, associations or
unions and the possession of the "rights and privileges
granted by law to legitimate labor organizations." The
Constitution does not guarantee these rights and the
privileges, much less said personality, which are mere
statutory creations, for the possession and exercise of
which registration is required to protect both labor and the
public against abuses, fraud or impostors who pose as
organizers, although not truly accredited agents of the union
they purport to represent. Such requirement is a valid
exercise of the police power, because the activities in which
labor organizations, associations and unions of workers are
engaged affect public interest, which should be protected.
Furthermore, the obligation to submit financial statements,
as a condition for the non-cancellation of a certificate of
registration, is a reasonable regulation for the benefit of the
members of the organization, considering that the same
generally solicits funds or membership, as well as oftentimes
collects, on behalf of its members, huge amounts of money
due to them or to the organization. (Emphasis supplied)
But when an unregistered union becomes a branch, local or chapter of a
federation, some of the aforementioned requirements for registration are no
longer required. The provisions governing union affiliation are found in Rule
II, Section 3, Book V of the Implementing Rules, the relevant portions of
which are cited below:
Sec. 3. Union affiliation; direct membership with national
union. — An affiliate of a labor federation or national union
may be a local or chapter thereof or an independently
registered union.
a) The labor federation or national union concerned shall
issue a charter certificate indicating the creation or
establishment of a local or chapter, copy of which shall be
submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations within thirty (30)
days from issuance of such charter certificate.
b) An independently registered union shall be considered an
affiliate of a labor federation or national union after
submission to the Bureau of the contract or agreement of
affiliation within thirty (30) days after its execution.
xxx xxx xxx
e) The local or chapter of a labor federation or national union
shall have and maintain a constitution and by laws, set of
officers and books and accounts. For reporting purposes, the
procedure governing the reporting of independently
registered unions, federations or national unions shall be
observed.
Paragraph (a) refers to the local or chapter of a federation which did not
undergo the rudiments of registration while paragraph (b) refers to an
independently registered union which affiliated with a federation. Implicit in
the foregoing differentiation is the fact that a local or chapter need not be
independently registered. By force of law (in this case, Article 212[h]); such
local or chapter becomes a legitimate labor organization upon compliance
with the aforementioned provisions of Section 3.
Thus, several requirements that are otherwise required for union registration
are omitted, to wit:
(1) The requirement that the application for registration must be signed by at
least 20% of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit;
2) The submission of officers' addresses, principal address of the labor
organization, the minutes of organizational meetings and the list of the
workers who participated in such meetings;
3) The submission of the minutes of the adoption or ratification of the
constitution and by the laws and the list of the members who participated in
it.
Undoubtedly, the intent of the law in imposing lesser requirements in the
case of the branch or local of a registered federation or national union is to
encourage the affiliation of a local union with the federation or national union
in order to increase the local union's bargaining powers respecting terms and
conditions of labor.
The petitioner maintains that the documentary requirements prescribed in
Section 3(c), namely: the constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books
of accounts, must follow the requirements of law. Petitioner PDC calls for the
similar application of the requirement for registration in Article 235 that all
requisite documents and papers be certified under oath by the secretary or
the treasurer of the organization and attested to by the president.
In the case at bar, the constitution and by-laws and list of officers submitted
in the BLR, while attested to by the chapter's president, were not
certified under oath by the secretary. Does such defect warrant the
withholding of the status of legitimacy to the local or chapter?
In the case of union registration, the rationale for requiring that the submitted
documents and papers be certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer,
as the case may be, and attested to by president is apparent. The
submission of the required documents (and payment of P50.00 registration
fee) becomes the Bureau's basis for approval of the application for
registration. Upon approval, the labor union acquires legal personality and is
entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by law to a legitimate labor
organization. The employer naturally needs assurance that the union it is
dealing with is a bona fide organization, one which has not submitted false
statements or misrepresentations to the Bureau. The inclusion of the
certification and attestation requirements will in a marked degree allay these
apprehensions of management. Not only is the issuance of any false
statement and misrepresentation a ground for cancellation of registration
(see Article 239 (a), (c) and (d)); it is also a ground for a criminal charge of
perjury.
The certification and attestation requirements are preventive measures
against the commission of fraud. They likewise afford a measure of
protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining
unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union
funds or to use the union for dubious ends.
In the case of the union affiliation with a federation, the documentary
requirements are found in Rule II, Section 3(e), Book V of the Implementing
Rules, which we again quote as follows:
(c) The local chapter of a labor federation or national union
shall have and maintain a constitution and by-laws, set of
officers and books of accounts. For reporting purposes, the
procedure governing the reporting of independently
registered unions, federations or national unions shall be
observed.(Emphasis supplied)
Since the "procedure governing the reporting of independently registered
unions" refers to the certification and attestation requirements contained in
Article 235, paragraph 2, it follows that the constitution and by-laws, set of
officers and books of accounts submitted by the local and chapter must
likewise comply with these requirements. The same rationale for requiring
the submission of duly subscribed documents upon union registration exists
in the case of union affiliation. Moreover, there is greater reason to exact
compliance with the certification and attestation requirements because, as
previously mentioned, several requirements applicable to independent union
registration are no longer required in the case of formation of a local or
chapter. The policy of the law in conferring greater bargaining power upon
labor unions must be balanced with the policy of providing preventive
measures against the commission of fraud.
A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization only
upon submission of the following to the BLR:
1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor
federation or national union, and
2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the
books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by the secretary or
treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its
president.
Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter
does not become a legitimate labor organization.
In the case at bar, the failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to certify the
required documents under oath is fatal to its acquisition of a legitimate status.
We observe that, as borne out by the facts in this case, the formation of a
local or chapter becomes a handy tool for the circumvention of union
registration requirements. Absent the institution of safeguards, it becomes a
convenient device for a small group of employees to foist a not-so-desirable
federation or union on unsuspecting co-workers and pare the need for
wholehearted voluntariness which is basic to free unionism. The records
show that on June 16, 1990, Kilusan met with several employees of the
petitioner. Excerpts of the "Minutes of the Organizational/General
Membership Meeting of Progressive Development Employees Union (PDEU)
— Kilusan," are quoted below:
The meeting was formally called to order by Bro. Jose V.
Parungao, KILUSAN secretary for organization by explaining
to the general membership the importance of joining the
union. He explained to the membership why they should join
a union, and briefly explained the ideology of the
Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa-TUCP as a
democratically based organization and then read the
proposed Constitution and By-Laws, after which said
Constitution and By-Laws was duly and unanimously ratified
after some clarification.
Bro. Jose Parungao was also unanimously voted by the
group to act as the chairman of the COMELEC in holding the
organizational election of officers of the union.
Bro. Jose Parungao, officially opened the table for
nomination of candidates after which the election of officers
followed by secret balloting and the following were the duly
elected officers. (Original Record, p. 25)
The foregoing shows that Kilusan took the initiative and encouraged the
formation of a union which automatically became its chapter. On June 18,
1990, Kilusan issued a charter certificate in favor of PDEU-KILUSAN
(Records, page 1). It can be seen that Kilusan was moving very fast.
On June 19, 1990, or just three days after the organizational meeting,
Kilusan filed a petition for certification election (Records, pages 2 and 3)
accompanied by a copy each of the charter certificate, constitution and by-
laws and minutes of the organizational meeting. Had the local union filed an
application for registration, the petition for certification election could not have
been immediately filed. The applicant union must firstly comply with the "20%
signature" requirement and all the other requisites enumerated in Article 234.
Moreover, since under Article 235 the BLR shall act on any application for
registration within thirty (30) days from its filing, the likelihood is remote that,
assuming the union complied with all the requirements, the application would
be approved on the same day it was filed.
We are not saying that the scheme used by the respondents is per se illegal
for precisely, the law allows such strategy. It is not this Court's function to
augment the requirements prescribed by law in order to make them wiser or
to allow greater protection to the workers and even their employer. Our only
recourse is, as earlier discussed, to exact strict compliance with what the law
provides as requisites for local or chapter formation.
It may likewise be argued that it was Kilusan (the mother union) and not the
local union which filed the petition for certification election and, being a
legitimate labor organization, Kilusan has the personality to file such petition.
At this juncture, it is important to clarify the relationship between the mother
union and the local union. In the case of Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union
v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., 66 SCRA 512 [1975]), the Court held that the
mother union, acting for and in behalf of its affiliate, had the status of
an agent while the local union remained the basic unit of the association, free
to serve the common interest of all its members subject only to the restraints
imposed by the constitution and by-laws of the association. Thus, where as
in this case the petition for certification election was filed by the federation
which is merely an agent, the petition is deemed to be filed by the chapter,
the principal, which must be a legitimate labor organization. The chapter
cannot merely rely on the legitimate status of the mother union.
The Court's conclusion should not be misconstrued as impairing the local
union's right to be certified as the employees' bargaining agent in the
petitioner's establishment. We are merely saying that the local union must
first comply with the statutory requirements in order to exercise this right. Big
federations and national unions of workers should take the lead in requiring
their locals and chapters to faithfully comply with the law and the rules
instead of merely snapping union after union into their folds in a furious bid
with rival federations to get the most number of members.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution and orders
of respondent Med-Arbiter and Secretary of Labor and Employment,
respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order dated
February 25, 1991 is made permanent.
S.S. VENTURES INTERNATIONAL, G.R. No. 161690
INC.,
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,*
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
S.S. VENTURES LABOR UNION
(SSVLU) and DIR. HANS LEO Promulgated:
CACDAC, in His capacity as
Director of the Bureau of Labor July 23, 2008
Relations (BLR),
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Petitioner S.S. Ventures International, Inc. (Ventures), a PEZA-registered
export firm with principal place of business at Phase I-PEZA-Bataan Export
Zone, Mariveles, Bataan, is in the business of manufacturing sports
shoes. Respondent S.S. Ventures Labor Union (Union), on the other hand, is
a labor organization registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) under Certificate of Registration No. RO300-00-02-UR-
0003.
On March 21, 2000, the Union filed with DOLE-Region III a petition
for certification election in behalf of the rank-and-file employees of
Ventures. Five hundred forty two (542)signatures, 82 of which belong to
______________________
* Additional member as per Special Order No. 509 dated July 1, 2008.
terminated Ventures employees, appeared on the basic documents
supporting the petition.
On August 21, 2000, Ventures filed a Petition [1] to cancel the Unions
certificate of registration invoking the grounds set forth in Article 239(a) of the
Labor Code.[2] Docketed as Case No. RO300-0008-CP-002 of the same
DOLE regional office, the petition alleged the following:
(1) The Union deliberately and maliciously included the names of
more or less 82 former employees no longer connected with Ventures in its
list of members who attended the organizational meeting and in the
adoption/ratification of its constitution and by-laws held on January 9, 2000 in
Mariveles, Bataan; and the Union forged the signatures of these 82 former
employees to make it appear they took part in the organizational meeting and
adoption and ratification of the constitution;
(2) The Union maliciously twice entered the signatures of three
persons namely: Mara Santos, Raymond Balangbang, and Karen Agunos;
(3) No organizational meeting and ratification actually took place;
and
(4) The Unions application for registration was not supported by at
least 20% of the rank-and-file employees of Ventures, or 418 of the total
2,197-employee complement.Since more or less 82 of the 500 [3] signatures
were forged or invalid, then the remaining valid signatures would only
be 418, which is very much short of the 439 minimum (2197 total employees
x 20% = 439.4) required by the Labor Code.[4]
In its Answer with Motion to Dismiss,[5] the Union denied committing
the imputed acts of fraud or forgery and alleged that: (1) the organizational
meeting actually took place on January 9, 2000 at the Shoe City basketball
court in Mariveles; (2) the 82 employees adverted to in Ventures Ventures sought reconsideration of the above decision but was denied by the
petition were qualified Union members for, although they have been ordered BLR.
dismissed, the one-year prescriptive period to question their dismissal had
not yet lapsed; (3) it had complied with the 20%-member registration Ventures then went to the Court of Appeals (CA) on a petition for
requirement since it had 542 members; and (4) the double signatures were certiorari under Rule 65, the recourse docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74749.
inadvertent human error. On October 20, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision, [11] dismissing Ventures
petition. Ventures motion for reconsideration met a similar fate. [12]
In its supplemental reply memorandum[6] filed on March 20, 2001,
with attachments, Ventures cited other instances of fraud and Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45, petitioner Ventures
misrepresentation, claiming that the affidavits executed by 82 alleged Union raising the following grounds:
members show that they were deceived into signing paper minutes or were I.
harassed to signing their attendance in the organizational meeting. Ventures
added that some employees signed the affidavits denying having attended PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED RECKLESSLY
such meeting. AND IMPRUDENTLY, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
In a Decision dated April 6, 2001, Regional Director Ana C. Dione of DOLE- DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN
Region III found for Ventures, the dispositive portion of which reads: DISREGARDING THE SUBSTANTIAL AND
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE
PETITIONER SHOWING THAT RESPONDENT UNION
Viewed in the light of all the foregoing, this office PERPETRATED FRAUD, FORGERY,
hereby grants the petition. WHEREFORE, this office MISREPRESENTATION AND MISSTATEMENTS IN
resolved to CANCEL Certificate of Registration No. [RO300- CONNECTION WITH THE ADOPTION AND RATIFICATION
00-02-UR-0003] dated 28 February 2000 of respondent S.S. OF ITS CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS, AND IN THE
Ventures Labor Union-Independent. PREPARATION OF THE LIST OF MEMBERS WHO TOOK
PART IN THE ALLEGED ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING BY
So Ordered.[7] HOLDING THAT:

Aggrieved, the Union interposed a motion for reconsideration, a recourse A.

which appeared to have been forwarded to the Bureau of Labor Relations
(BLR). Although it would later find this motion to have been belatedly filed, THE 87 AFFIDAVITS OF ALLEGED UNION
the BLR, over the objection of Ventures which filed a Motion to Expunge, MEMBERS HAVE NO EVIDENTIARY
gave it due course and treated it as an appeal. WEIGHT.

Despite Ventures motion to expunge the appeal,[8] the BLR Director rendered B.
on October 11, 2002 a decision[9] in BLR-A-C-60-6-11-01, granting the Unions
appeal and reversing the decision of Dione. The fallo of the BLRs decision THE INCLUSION OF THE 82 EMPLOYEES IN THE
reads: LIST OF ATTENDEES TO THE JANUARY
9, 2000 MEETING IS AN INTERNAL
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The MATTER WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE
Decision of Director Ana C. Dione dated 6 April 2001 is WORKERS RIGHT TO SELF-
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. S.S. Ventures Labor ORGANIZATION AND OUTSIDE THE
Union-Independent shall remain in the roster of legitimate SPHERE OF INFLUENCE (OF) THIS
labor organizations. OFFICE (PUBLIC RESPONDENT IN THIS
SO ORDERED.[10] CASE) AND THE PETITIONER.

II.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED RECKLESSLY AND
IMPRUDENTLY, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AND EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN IGNORING AND
DISREGARDING THE BLATANT PROCEDURAL LAPSES
OF THE RESPONDENT UNION IN THE FILING OF ITS
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND APPEAL.
A.
BY GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED
BY THE RESPONDENT UNION DESPITE
THE FACT THAT IT WAS FILED BEYOND
THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.
B.
BY ADMITTING THE APPEAL FILED BY
ATTY. ERNESTO R. ARELLANO AND
HOLDING THAT THE SAME DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE FORUM SHOPPING UNDER
SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 28-91.
III.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED RECKLESSLY AND
IMPRUDENTLY, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AND EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN INVOKING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION AND
ILO CONVENTION NO. 87 TO JUSTIFY THE MASSIVE
FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION, MISSTATEMENTS AND
FORGERY COMMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT UNION.
[13]
The petition lacks merit.
The right to form, join, or assist a union is specifically protected by
Art. XIII, Section 3[14] of the Constitution and such right, according to Art. III,
Sec. 8 of the Constitution and Art. 246 of the Labor Code, shall not be
abridged. Once registered with the DOLE, a union is considered a legitimate
labor organization endowed with the right and privileges granted by law to
such organization. While a certificate of registration confers a union with
legitimacy with the concomitant right to participate in or ask for certification
election in a bargaining unit, the registration may be canceled or the union
may be decertified as the bargaining unit, in which case the union is divested
of the status of a legitimate labor organization. [15] Among the grounds for
cancellation is the commission of any of the acts enumerated in Art. 239(a)
[16]
of the Labor Code, such as fraud and misrepresentation in connection with
the adoption or ratification of the unions constitution and like documents. The
Court, has in previous cases, said that to decertify a union, it is not enough to
show that the union includes ineligible employees in its membership. It must
also be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud in
connection with the application for registration and the supporting
documents, such as the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-
laws or amendments thereto and the minutes of ratification of the constitution
or by-laws, among other documents.[17]
Essentially, Ventures faults both the BLR and the CA in finding that
there was no fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the Union sufficient to
justify cancellation of its registration. In this regard, Ventures makes much
of, first, the separate hand-written statements of 82 employees who, in gist,
alleged that they were unwilling or harassed signatories to the attendance
sheet of the organizational meeting.
We are not persuaded. As aptly noted by both the BLR and
CA, these mostly undated written statements submitted by Ventures on
March 20, 2001, or seven months after it filed its petition for cancellation of
registration, partake of the nature of withdrawal of union membership
executed after the Unions filing of a petition for certification election on March
21, 2000. We have in precedent cases [18] said that the employees withdrawal
from a labor union made before the filing of the petition for certification
election is presumed voluntary, while withdrawal after the filing of such
petition is considered to be involuntary and does not affect the same. Now
then, if a withdrawal from union membership done after a petition for
certification election has been filed does not vitiate such petition, is it not but
logical to assume that such withdrawal cannot work to nullify the registration
of the union? Upon this light, the Court is inclined to agree with the CA that
the BLR did not abuse its discretion nor gravely err when it concluded that
the affidavits of retraction of the 82 members had no evidentiary weight.
It cannot be over-emphasized that the registration or the recognition
of a labor union after it has submitted the corresponding papers is not
ministerial on the part of the BLR. Far from it. After a labor organization has
filed the necessary registration documents, it becomes mandatory for the
BLR to check if the requirements under Art. 234 [19] of the Labor Code have
been sedulously complied with.[20] If the unions application is infected by
falsification and like serious irregularities, especially those appearing on the
face of the application and its attachments, a union should be denied
recognition as a legitimate labor organization. Prescinding from these
considerations, the issuance to the Union of Certificate of Registration No.
RO300-00-02-UR-0003 necessarily implies that its application for registration
and the supporting documents thereof are prima facie free from any vitiating
irregularities.

Second, Ventures draws attention to the inclusion of 82 individuals to
the list of participants in the January 9, 2000 organizational meeting.
Ventures submits that the 82, being no longer connected with the company,
should not have been counted as attendees in the meeting and the
ratification proceedings immediately afterwards.
The assailed inclusion of the said 82 individuals to the meeting and
proceedings adverted to is not really fatal to the Unions cause for, as
determined by the BLR, the allegations of falsification of signatures or
misrepresentation with respect to these individuals are without basis. [21] The
Court need not delve into the question of whether these 82 dismissed
individuals were still Union members qualified to vote and affix their signature
on its application for registration and supporting documents. Suffice it to say
that, as aptly observed by the CA, the procedure for acquiring or losing union
membership and the determination of who are qualified or disqualified to be
members are matters internal to the union and flow from its right to self-
organization.
To our mind, the relevancy of the 82 individuals active participation in
the Unions organizational meeting and the signing ceremonies thereafter
comes in only for purposes of determining whether or not the Union, even
without the 82, would still meet what Art. 234(c) of the Labor Code requires to
be submitted, to wit:
Art. 234. Requirements of Registration.Any applicant labor
organization x x x shall acquire legal personality and shall be
entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to
legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the
certificate of registration based on the following
requirements:
xxxx
(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty
percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit
where it seeks to operate.
The BLR, based on its official records, answered the poser in the
affirmative. Wrote the BLR:
It is imperative to look into the records of respondent
union with this Bureau pursuant to our role as a central
registry of union and CBA records under Article 231 of the
Labor Code and Rule XVII of the rules implementing Book V
of the Labor Code, as amended x x x.
In its union records on file with this Bureau,
respondent union submitted the names of [542] members x x
x. This number easily complied with the 20% requirement,
be it 1,928 or 2,202 employees in the establishment. Even
subtracting the 82 employees from 542 leaves 460 union
members, still within 440 or 20% of the maximum total of
2,202 rank-and-file employees.
Whatever misgivings the petitioner may have with
regard to the 82 dismissed employees is better addressed in
the inclusion-exclusion proceedings during a pre-election
conference x x x. The issue surrounding the involvement of
the 82 employees is a matter of membership or voter
eligibility. It is not a ground to cancel union registration.
(Emphasis added.)
The bare fact that three signatures twice appeared on the list of those who
participated in the organizational meeting would not, to our mind, provide a
valid reason to cancel Certificate of Registration No. RO300-00-02-UR-0003.
As the Union tenably explained without rebuttal from Ventures, the double
entries are no more than normal human error, effected without malice. Even
the labor arbiter who found for Ventures sided with the Union in its
explanation on the absence of malice.[22]
The cancellation of a unions registration doubtless has an impairing
dimension on the right of labor to self-organization. Accordingly, we can
accord concurrence to the following apt observation of the BLR: [F]or fraud
and misrepresentation [to be grounds for] cancellation of union registration
under Article 239 [of the Labor Code], the nature of the fraud and
misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the
consent of a majority of union members.[23]
In its Comment, the Union points out that for almost seven (7) years following
the filing of its petition, no certification election has yet been conducted
among the rank-and-file employees. If this be the case, the delay has gone
far enough and can no longer be allowed to continue. The CA is right when it
said that Ventures should not interfere in the certification election by actively
and persistently opposing the certification election of the Union. A
certification election is exclusively the concern of employees and the
employer lacks the legal personality to challenge it. [24] In fact, jurisprudence
frowns on the employers interference in a certification election for such
interference unduly creates the impression that it intends to establish a
company union.[25]

Ventures allegations on forum shopping and the procedural lapse supposedly

committed by the BLR in allowing a belatedly filed motion for reconsideration
need not detain us long. Suffice it to state that this Court has consistently
ruled that the application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases may
be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice. [26] So it must be in this
case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution

dated October 20, 2003 and January 19, 2004, respectively, of the CA
are AFFIRMED. S.S. Ventures Labor Union shall remain in the roster of
legitimate labor organizations, unless it has in the meantime lost its
legitimacy for causes set forth in the Labor Code. Costs against petitioner.
 MARIWASA SIAM CERAMICS, INC., G.R. No. 183317 violation of Article 239[6] of the same code.The case was docketed as Case
Petitioner, No. RO400-0506-AU-004.

Present: On August 26, 2005, the Regional Director of DOLE IV-A issued an Order
granting the petition, revoking the registration of respondent, and delisting it
CORONA, J., from the roster of active labor unions.
- versus - Chairperson, Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR).
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, In a Decision[7] dated June 14, 2006, the BLR granted respondents appeal
PERALTA, and and disposed as follows
DEL CASTILLO,* JJ.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal by
AND EMPLOYMENT, CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Mariwasa Siam Ceramics,
LABOR RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND Inc. (SMMSC-Independent) is hereby GRANTED, and the
EMPLOYMENT, REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF DOLE Decision dated 26 August 2005 by DOLE-Region-IV-A
REGIONAL OFFICE NUMBER IV-A & Director Maximo B. Lim is hereby REVERSED and SET
SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MARIWASA ASIDE. Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Mariwasa Siam
SIAM CERAMICS, INC. (SMMSC-INDEPENDENT), Ceramics, Inc. (SMMSC-Independent), under Registration
Respondents. Certificate No. RO400-200505-UR-002, remains in the roster
Promulgated: of legitimate labor organizations.

December 21, 2009 SO DECIDED.[8]

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the BLR denied it in a
Resolution[9] dated February 2, 2007.
DECISION
Petitioner sought recourse with the Court of Appeals (CA) through a Petition
NACHURA, J.: for Certiorari; but the CA denied the petition for lack of merit.

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to annul the Decision[2] dated December 20, 2007 and the
Resolution[3] dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
98332.
The antecedent facts are as follows
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was likewise
denied, hence, this petition based on the following grounds
Review of the Factual Findings of the Bureau of
Labor Relations, adopted and confirmed by the Honorable
Court of Appeals is warranted[;]

On May 4, 2005, respondent Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Mariwasa The Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred in
Siam Ceramics, Inc. (SMMSC-Independent) was issued a Certificate of ruling that the affidavits of recantation cannot be given
Registration[4] as a legitimate labor organization by the Department of Labor credence[;]
and Employment (DOLE), Region IV-A.
The Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred in
On June 14, 2005, petitioner Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. filed a Petition ruling that private respondent union complied with the 20%
for Cancellation of Union Registration against respondent, claiming that the membership requirement[; and]
latter violated Article 234[5] of the Labor Code for not complying with the 20%
requirement, and that it committed massive fraud and misrepresentation in
 The Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred
when it ruled that private respondent union did not commit
misrepresentation, fraud or false statement.[10]
The petition should be denied.
The petitioner insists that respondent failed to comply with the 20% union
membership requirement for its registration as a legitimate labor organization
because of the disaffiliation from the total number of union members of 102
employees who executed affidavits recanting their union membership.
It is, thus, imperative that we peruse the affidavits appearing to have
been executed by these affiants.
The affidavits uniformly state
Ako, _____________, Pilipino, may sapat na gulang, regular
na empleyado bilang Rank & File sa Mariwasa Siam
Ceramics, Inc., Bo. San Antonio, Sto. Tomas, Batangas,
matapos na makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay malaya
at kusang loob na nagsasaad ng mga sumusunod:
1. Ako ay napilitan at nilinlang sa pagsapi sa Samahan ng
mga Manggagawa sa Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc.
o SMMSC-Independent sa kabila ng aking pag-
aalinlangan[;]
2. Aking lubos na pinagsisihan ang aking pagpirma sa sipi
ng samahan, at handa ako[ng] tumalikod sa
anumang kasulatan na aking nalagdaan sa
kadahilanan na hindi angkop sa aking pananaw ang
mga mungkahi o adhikain ng samahan.
SA KATUNAYAN NANG LAHAT, ako ay lumagda ng
aking pangalan ngayong ika-____ ng ______, 2005 dito sa
Lalawigan ng Batangas, Bayan ng Sto. Tomas.
____________________
Nagsasalaysay
Evidently, these affidavits were written and prepared in advance, and the pro
forma affidavits were ready to be filled out with the employees names and
signatures.
The first common allegation in the affidavits is a declaration that, in
spite of his hesitation, the affiant was forced and deceived into joining the
respondent union. It is worthy to note, however, that the affidavit does not
mention the identity of the people who allegedly forced and deceived the
affiant into joining the union, much less the circumstances that constituted
such force and deceit. Indeed, not only was this allegation couched in very
general terms and sweeping in nature, but more importantly, it was not
supported by any evidence whatsoever.
The second allegation ostensibly bares the affiants regret for joining
respondent union and expresses the desire to abandon or renege from
whatever agreement he may have signed regarding his membership with
respondent.
Simply put, through these affidavits, it is made to appear that the
affiants recanted their support of respondents application for registration.
In appreciating affidavits of recantation such as these, our ruling
in La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations[11] is enlightening, viz.
On the second issuewhether or not the withdrawal of 31
union members from NATU affected the petition for
certification election insofar as the 30% requirement is
concerned, We reserve the Order of the respondent Director
of the Bureau of Labor Relations, it appearing undisputably
that the 31 union members had withdrawn their support to
the petition before the filing of said petition. It would be
otherwise if the withdrawal was made after the filing of the
petition for it would then be presumed that the withdrawal
was not free and voluntary. The presumption would arise that
the withdrawal was procured through duress, coercion or for
valuable consideration. In other words, the distinction must
be that withdrawals made before the filing of the petition are
presumed voluntary unless there is convincing proof to the
contrary, whereas withdrawals made after the filing of the
petition are deemed involuntary.
The reason for such distinction is that if the withdrawal or
retraction is made before the filing of the petition, the names
of employees supporting the petition are supposed to be
held secret to the opposite party. Logically, any such
withdrawal or retraction shows voluntariness in the absence
of proof to the contrary. Moreover, it becomes apparent that
such employees had not given consent to the filing of the
 petition, hence the subscription requirement has not been
met.
When the withdrawal or retraction is made after the petition
is filed, the employees who are supporting the petition
become known to the opposite party since their names are
attached to the petition at the time of filing. Therefore, it
would not be unexpected that the opposite party would use
foul means for the subject employees to withdraw their
support.[12]
In the instant case, the affidavits of recantation were executed after the
identities of the union members became public, i.e., after the union filed a
petition for certification election on May 23, 2005, since the names of the
members were attached to the petition. The purported withdrawal of support
for the registration of the union was made after the documents were
submitted to the DOLE, Region IV-A. The logical conclusion, therefore,
following jurisprudence, is that the employees were not totally free from the
employers pressure, and so the voluntariness of the employees execution of
the affidavits becomes suspect.
It is likewise notable that the first batch of 25 pro forma affidavits shows that
the affidavits were executed by the individual affiants on different dates
from May 26, 2005 until June 3, 2005, but they were all sworn before a
notary public on June 8, 2005.
There was also a second set of standardized affidavits executed on
different dates from May 26, 2005 until July 6, 2005. While these 77 affidavits
were notarized on different dates, 56 of these were notarized on June 8,
2005, the very same date when the first set of 25 was notarized.
Considering that the first set of 25 affidavits was submitted to the
DOLE on June 14, 2005, it is surprising why petitioner was able to submit the
second set of affidavits only on July 12, 2005.
Accordingly, we cannot give full credence to these affidavits, which were
executed under suspicious circumstances, and which contain allegations
unsupported by evidence. At best, these affidavits are self-serving. They
possess no probative value.
A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. For this
reason, retractions are looked upon with disfavor and do not automatically
exclude the original statement or declaration based solely on the
recantation. It is imperative that a determination be first made as to which
between the original and the new statements should be given weight or
accorded belief, applying the general rules on evidence. In this case,
inasmuch as they remain bare allegations, the purported recantations should
not be upheld.[13]
Nevertheless, even assuming the veracity of the affidavits of recantation, the
legitimacy of respondent as a labor organization must be affirmed. While it is
true that the withdrawal of support may be considered as a resignation from
the union, the fact remains that at the time of the unions application for
registration, the affiants were members of respondent and they comprised
more than the required 20% membership for purposes of registration as a
labor union. Article 234 of the Labor Code merely requires a 20% minimum
membership during the application for union registration. It does not mandate
that a union must maintain the 20% minimum membership requirement all
throughout its existence.[14]
Respondent asserts that it had a total of 173 union members at the time it
applied for registration. Two names were repeated in respondents list and
had to be deducted, but the total would still be 171 union members. Further,
out of the four names alleged to be no longer connected with petitioner, only
two names should be deleted from the list since Diana Motilla and T.W.
Amutan resigned from petitioner only on May 10, 2005 and May 17, 2005,
respectively, or after respondents registration had already been
granted. Thus, the total union membership at the time of registration was
169. Since the total number of rank-and-file employees at that time was 528,
169 employees would be equivalent to 32% of the total rank-and-file workers
complement, still very much above the minimum required by law.
For the purpose of de-certifying a union such as respondent, it must be
shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in
connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or
amendments thereto; the minutes of ratification; or, in connection with the
election of officers, the minutes of the election of officers, the list of voters, or
failure to submit these documents together with the list of the newly elected-
appointed officers and their postal addresses to the BLR. [15]
The bare fact that two signatures appeared twice on the list of those
who participated in the organizational meeting would not, to our mind,
provide a valid reason to cancel respondents certificate of registration. The
cancellation of a unions registration doubtless has an impairing dimension on
the right of labor to self-organization. For fraud and misrepresentation to be
grounds for cancellation of union registration under the Labor Code, the
nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling
enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members.
In this case, we agree with the BLR and the CA that respondent
could not have possibly committed misrepresentation, fraud, or false
statements. The alleged failure of respondent to indicate with mathematical
precision the total number of employees in the bargaining unit is of no
moment, especially as it was able to comply with the 20% minimum
membership requirement. Even if the total number of rank-and-file
employees of petitioner is 528, while respondent declared that it should only
be 455, it still cannot be denied that the latter would have more than
complied with the registration requirement.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed December 20,
2007 Decision and the June 6, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
[G.R. No. 131235. November 16, 1999]
UST FACULTY UNION (USTFU), GIL Y. GAMILLA, CORAZON QUI, NORMA
CALAGUAS, IRMA POTENCIANO, LUZ DE GUZMAN, REMEDIOS
GARCIA, RENE ARNEJO, EDITHA OCAMPO, CESAR REYES,
CELSO NIERRA, GLICERIA BALDRES, MA. LOURDES MEDINA,
HIDELITA GABO, MAFEL YSRAEL, LAURA ABARA, NATIVIDAD
SANTOS, FERDINAND LIMOS, CARMELITA ESPINA, ZENAIDA
FAMORCA, PHILIP AGUINALDO, BENEDICTA ALAVA and
LEONCIO CASAL, petitioners vs. Dir. BENEDICTO ERNESTO R.
BITONIO JR. of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Med-Arbiter TOMAS
F. FALCONITIN of The National Capital Region, Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE), EDUARDO J. MARIO JR., MA. MELVYN
ALAMIS, NORMA COLLANTES, URBANO ALABAGIA, RONALDO
ASUNCION, ZENAIDA BURGOS, ANTHONY CURA, FULVIO M.
GUERRERO, MYRNA HILARIO, TERESITA MEER, FERNANDO
PEDROSA, NILDA REDOBLADO, RENE SISON, EVELYN TIROL
and ROSIE ALCANTARA, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
There is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for the right
reasons,[1] and in the present case, in the right forum by the right
parties. While grievances against union leaders constitute legitimate
complaints deserving appropriate redress, action thereon should be made in
the proper forum at the proper time and after observance of proper
procedures. Similarly, the election of union officers should be conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the unions constitution and bylaws, as well
as the Philippine Constitution and the Labor Code. Specifically, while all
legitimate faculty members of the University of Santo Tomas (UST) belonging
to a collective bargaining unit may take part in a duly convened certification
election, only bona fide members of the UST Faculty Union (USTFU) may
participate and vote in a legally called election for union officers. Mob
hysteria, however well-intentioned, is not a substitute for the rule of law.
The Case
The Petition for Certiorari before us assails the August 15, 1997
Resolution[2] of Director Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio Jr. of the Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR) in BLR Case No. A-8-49-97, which affirmed the
February 11, 1997 Decision of Med-Arbiter Tomas F. Falconitin. The med-
arbiters Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
the election of USTFU officers conducted on October 4, 1996 and its election
results as null and void ab initio.
Accordingly, respondents Gil Gamilla, et al are hereby ordered to cease and
desist from acting and performing the duties and functions of the legitimate
officers of [the] University of Santo Tomas Faculty Union (USTFU) pursuant
to [the] unions constitution and by-laws (CBL).
The Temporary Restraining Order (TRO ) issued by this Office on December
11, 1996 in connection with the instant petition, is hereby made and declared
permanent.[3]
Likewise challenged is the October 30, 1997 Resolution [4]of Director
Bitonio, which denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The factual antecedents of the case are summarized in the assailed
Resolution as follows:
Petitioners-appellees [herein Private Respondents] Marino, et. al. (appellees)
are duly elected officers of the UST Faculty Union (USTFU). The union has a
subsisting five-year Collective Bargaining Agreement with its employer, the
University of Santo Tomas (UST). The CBA was registered with the Industrial
Relations Division, DOLE-NCR, on 20 February 1995. It is set to expire on 31
May 1998.
On 21 September 1996, appellee Collantes, in her capacity as Secretary
General of USTFU, posted a notice addressed to all USTFU members
announcing a general assembly to be held on 05 October 1996.Among
others, the general assembly was called to elect USTFUs next set of
officers. Through the notice, the members were also informed of the
constitution of a Committee on Elections (COMELEC) to oversee the
elections. (Annex B, petition)
On 01 October 1996, some of herein appellants filed a separate petition with
the Med-Arbiter, DOLE-NCR, directed against herein appellees and the
members of the COMELEC. Docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-001,
the petition alleged that the COMELEC was not constituted in accordance
with USTFUs constitution and by-laws (CBL) and that no rules had been
issued to govern the conduct of the 05 October 1996 election.
On 02 October 1996, the secretary general of UST, upon the request of the
various UST faculty club presidents (See paragraph VI, Respondents
Comment and Motion to Dismiss), issued notices allowing all faculty
members to hold a convocation on 04 October 1996 (See Annex C Petition;
Annexes 4 to 10, Appeal). Denominated as [a] general faculty assembly, the
convocation was supposed to discuss the state of the unratified UST-USTFU
CBA and status and election of USTFU officers (Annex 11, Appeal)
On 04 October 1996, the med-arbiter in Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-001
issued a temporary restraining order against herein appellees enjoining them
from conducting the election scheduled on 05 October 1996.
Also on 04 October 1996, and as earlier announced by the UST secretary
general, the general faculty assembly was held as scheduled. The general
assembly was attended by members of the USTFU and, as admitted by the
appellants, also by 'non-USTFU members [who] are members in good
standing of the UST Academic Community Collective Bargaining Unit' (See
paragraph XI, Respondents Comment and Motion to Dismiss). On this
occasion, appellants were elected as USTFUs new set of officers by
acclamation and clapping of hands (See paragraphs 40 to 50, Annex '12',
Appeal).
The election of the appellants came about upon a motion of one Atty. Lopez,
admittedly not a member of USTFU, that the USTFU CBL and 'the rules of
the election be suspended and that the election be held [on] that day' (See
--paragraph 39, Idem.)
On 11 October 1996, appellees filed the instant petition seeking injunctive
reliefs and the nullification of the results of the 04 October 1996
election. Appellees alleged that the holding of the same violated the
temporary restraining order issued in Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-
001. Accusing appellants of usurpation, appellees characterized the election
as spurious for being violative of USTFUs CBL, specifically because the
general assembly resulting in the election of appellants was not called by the
Board of Officers of the USTFU; there was no compliance with the ten-day
notice rule required by Section 1, Article VIII of the CBL; the supposed
elections were conducted without a COMELEC being constituted by the
Board of Officers in accordance with Section 1, Article IX of the CBL; the
elections were not by secret balloting as required by Section 1, Article V and
Section 6, Article IX of the CBL, and, the general assembly was convened by
faculty members some of whom were not members of USTFU, so much so
that non-USTFU members were allowed to vote in violation of Section 1,
Article V of the CBL.
On 24 October 1996, appellees filed another urgent ex-parte motion for a
temporary restraining order, this time alleging that appellants had served the
former a notice to vacate the union office. For their part, appellants moved to
dismiss the original petition and the subsequent motion on jurisdictional
grounds. Both the petition and the motion were captioned to be for
Prohibition, Injunction with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order. According to the appellants, the med-arbiter has no
jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition, 'including the ancillary remedies of
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, which are merely incidental to
the main petition for PROHIBITION' (Paragraph XVIII3, Respondents
Comment and Motion to Dismiss). Appellants also averred that they now
constituted the new set of union officers having been elected in accordance
with law after the term of office of appellees had expired. They further
maintained that appellees scheduling of the 5 October 1996 elections was
illegal because no rules and regulations governing the elections were
promulgated as required by USTFUs CBL and that one of the members of
the COMELEC was not a registered member of USTFU. Appellants likewise
noted that the elections called by the appellees should have been postponed
to allow the promulgation of rules and regulations and to 'insure a free, clean,
honest and orderly elections and to afford at the same time the greater
majority of the general membership to participate' (See paragraph V,
Idem). Finally, appellants contended that the holding of the general faculty
assembly on 04 October 1996 was under the control of the Council of
College/Faculty Club Presidents in cooperation with the USTFU Reformist
Alliance and that they received the Temporary Restraining Order issued in
Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-001 only on 07 October 1996 and were not
aware of the same on 04 October 1996.
On 03 December 1996, appellants and UST allegedly entered into another
CBA covering the period from 01 June 1996 to 31 May 2001 (Annex 11,
appellants Rejoinder to the Reply and Opposition).
Consequently, appellees again moved for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to prevent appellants from making further representations
that [they] had entered into a new agreement with UST.Appellees also
reiterated their earlier stand that appellants were usurping the formers duties
and functions and should be stopped from continuing such acts.
On 11 December 1996, over appellants insistence that the issue of
jurisdiction should first be resolved, the med-arbiter issued a temporary
restraining order directing the respondents to cease and desist from
performing any and all acts pertaining to the duties and functions of the
officers and directors of USTFU.
In the meantime, appellants claimed that the new CBA was purportedly
ratified by an overwhelming majority of USTs academic community on 12
December 1996 (Annexes 1 to 10, Idem). For this reason, appellants moved
for the dismissal of what it denominated as appellees petition for prohibition
on the ground that this had become moot and academic. [5]
Petitioners appealed the med-arbiters Decision to the labor secretary,
[6]
who transmitted the records of the case to the Bureau of Labor Relations
which, under Department Order No. 9, was authorized to resolve appeals of
intra-union cases, consistent with the last paragraph of Article 241 of the
Labor Code.[7]
The Assailed Ruling
Agreeing with the med-arbiter that the USTFU officers purported
election held on October 4, 1994 was void for having been conducted in
violation of the unions Constitution and Bylaws (CBL), Public Respondent
Bitonio rejected petitioners contention that it was a legitimate exercise of their
right to self-organization. He ruled that the CBL, which constituted the
covenant between the union and its members, could not be suspended
during the October 4, 1996 general assembly of all faculty members, since
that assembly had not been convened or authorized by the USTFU.
 Director Bitonio likewise held that the October 4, 1996 election could not
be legitimized by the recognition of the newly elected set of officers by UST
or by the alleged ratification of the new CBA by the general membership of
the USTFU. Ruled Respondent Bitonio:
"This submission is flawed. The issue at hand is not collective bargaining
representation but union leadership, a matter that should concern only the
members of USTFU. As pointed out by the appellees, the privilege of
determining who the union officers will be belongs exclusively to the
members of the union. Said privilege is exercised in an election proceeding
in accordance with the union's CBL and applicable law.
To accept appellants' claim to legitimacy on the foregoing grounds is to invest
in appellants the position, duties, responsibilities, rights and privileges of
USTFU officers without the benefit of a lawful electoral exercise as defined in
USTFU's CBL and Article 241(c) of the Labor Code. Not to mention the fact
that labor laws prohibit the employer from interfering with the employees in
the latter' exercise of their right to self-organization. To allow appellants to
become USTFU officers on the strength of management's recognition of
them is to concede to the employer the power of determining who should be
USTFU's leaders. This is a clear case of interference in the exercise by
USTFU members of their right to self-organization.[8]
Hence, this Petition.[9]
The Issues
The main issue in this case is whether the public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to recognize the officers elected during
the October 4, 1996 general assembly. Specifically, petitioners in their
Memorandum urge the Court to resolve the following questions: [10]
(1) Whether the Collective Bargaining Unit of all the faculty members in that
General Faculty Assembly had the right in that General Faculty Assembly to
suspend the provisions of the Constitution and By-Laws of the USTFU
regarding the elections of officers of the union[.]
(2) Whether the suspension of the provisions of the Constitution and By-
Laws of the USTFU in that General Faculty Assembly is valid pursuant to the
constitutional right of the Collective Bargaining Unit to engage in peaceful
concerted activities for the purpose of ousting the corrupt regime of the
private respondents[.]
(3) Whether the overwhelming ratification of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement executed by the petitioners in behalf of the USTFU with the
University of Santo Tomas has rendered moot and academic the issue as to
the validity of the suspension of the Constitution and By-Laws and the
elections of October 4, 1996 in the General Faculty Assembly[.]
The Courts Ruling
The petition is not meritorious. Petitioners fail to convince this Court that
Director Bitonio gravely abused his discretion in affirming the med-arbiter and
in refusing to recognize the binding effect of the October 4, 1996 general
assembly called by the UST administration.
First Issue: Right to Self-Organization and Union Membership
At the outset, the Court stresses that National Federation of Labor
(NFL) v. Laguesma[11] has held that challenges against rulings of the labor
secretary and those acting on his behalf, like the director of labor relations,
shall be acted upon by the Court of Appeals, which has concurrent
jurisdiction with this Court over petitions for certiorari. However, inasmuch as
the memoranda in the instant case have been filed prior to the promulgation
and finality of our Decision in NFL, we deem it proper to resolve the present
controversy directly, instead of remanding it to the Court of Appeals. Having
disposed of the foregoing procedural matter, we now tackle the issues in the
present case seriatim.
Self-organization is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Philippine
Constitution and the Labor Code. Employees have the right to form, join or
assist labor organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining or for their
mutual aid and protection.[12] Whether employed for a definite period or not,
any employee shall be considered as such, beginning on his first day of
service, for purposes of membership in a labor union.[13]
Corollary to this right is the prerogative not to join, affiliate with or assist
a labor union.[14] Therefore, to become a union member, an employee must,
as a rule, not only signify the intent to become one, but also take some
positive steps to realize that intent. The procedure for union membership is
usually embodied in the unions constitution and bylaws. [15] An employee who
becomes a union member acquires the rights and the concomitant
obligations that go with this new status and becomes bound by the unions
rules and regulations.
When a man joins a labor union (or almost any other democratically
controlled group), necessarily a portion of his individual freedom is
surrendered for the benefit of all members. He accepts the will of the majority
of the members in order that he may derive the advantages to be gained
from the concerted action of all. Just as the enactments of the legislature
bind all of us, to the constitution and by-laws of the union (unless contrary to
good morals or public policy, or otherwise illegal), which are duly enacted
through democratic processes, bind all of the members. If a member of a
union dislikes the provisions of the by-laws, he may seek to have them
amended or may withdraw from the union; otherwise, he must abide by
them. It is not the function of courts to decide the wisdom or propriety of
legitimate by-laws of a trade union.
On joining a labor union, the constitution and by-laws become a part of the
members contract of membership under which he agrees to become bound
by the constitution and governing rules of the union so far as it is not
inconsistent with controlling principles of law. The constitution and by-laws of
an unincorporated trade union express the terms of a contract, which define
the privileges and rights secured to, and duties assumed by, those who have
become members. The agreement of a member on joining a union to abide
by its laws and comply with the will of the lawfully constituted majority does
not require a member to submit to the determination of the union any
question involving his personal rights.[16]
 Petitioners claim that the numerous anomalies allegedly committed by
the private respondents during the latters incumbency impelled the October
4, 1996 election of the new set of USTFU officers. They assert that such
exercise was pursuant to their right to self-organization.
Petitioners frustration over the performance of private respondents, as
well as their fears of a fraudulent election to be held under the latters
supervision, could not justify the method they chose to impose their will on
the union. Director Bitonio aptly elucidated:[17]
The constitutional right to self-organization is better understood in the context
of ILO Convention No. 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of Right to
Organize), to which the Philippines is signatory.Article 3 of the Convention
provides that workers organizations shall have the right to draw up their
constitution and rules and to elect their representatives in full freedom, free
from any interference from public authorities. The freedom conferred by the
provision is expansive; the responsibility imposed on union members to
respect the constitution and rules they themselves draw up equally so. The
point to be stressed is that the unions CBL is the fundamental law that
governs the relationship between and among the members of the union. It is
where the rights, duties and obligations, powers, functions and authority of
the officers as well as the members are defined. It is the organic law that
determines the validity of acts done by any officer or member of the
union. Without respect for the CBL, a union as a democratic institution
degenerates into nothing more than a group of individuals governed by mob
rule.
Union Election vs. Certification Election
A union election is held pursuant to the unions constitution and bylaws,
and the right to vote in it is enjoyed only by union members. A union election
should be distinguished from a certification election, which is the process of
determining, through secret ballot, the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of
the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, for purposes of collective
bargaining.[18] Specifically, the purpose of a certification election is to
ascertain whether or not a majority of the employees wish to be represented
by a labor organization and, in the affirmative case, by which particular labor
organization.[19]
In a certification election, all employees belonging to the appropriate
bargaining unit can vote.[20] Therefore, a union member who likewise belongs
to the appropriate bargaining unit is entitled to vote in said election. However,
the reverse is not always true; an employee belonging to the appropriate
bargaining unit but who is not a member of the union cannot vote in the union
election, unless otherwise authorized by the constitution and bylaws of the
union. Verily, union affairs and elections cannot be decided in a non-union
activity.
In both elections, there are procedures to be followed. Thus, the
October 4, 1996 election cannot properly be called a union election, because
the procedure laid down in the USTFUs CBL for the election of officers was
not followed. It could not have been a certification election either, because
representation was not the issue, and the proper procedure for such election
was not followed. The participation of non-union members in the election
aggravated its irregularity.
Second Issue: USTFUs Constitution and ByLaws Violated
The importance of a unions constitution and bylaws cannot be
overemphasized. They embody a covenant between a union and its
members and constitute the fundamental law governing the members rights
and obligations.[21] As such, the unions constitution and bylaws should be
upheld, as long as they are not contrary to law, good morals or public policy.
We agree with the finding of Director Bitonio and Med-Arbiter Falconitin
that the October 4, 1996 election was tainted with irregularities because of
the following reasons.
First, the October 4, 1996 assembly was not called by the USTFU. It
was merely a convocation of faculty clubs, as indicated in the memorandum
sent to all faculty members by Fr. Rodel Aligan, OP, the secretary general of
the University of Santo Tomas.[22] It was not convened in accordance with the
provision on general membership meetings as found in the USTFUs CBL,
which reads:
ARTICLE VIII-MEETINGS OF THE UNION
Section 1. The Union shall hold regular general membership meetings at
least once every three (3) months. Notices of the meeting shall be sent out
by the Secretary-General at least ten (10) days prior to such meetings by
posting in conspicuous places, preferably inside Company premises, said
notices. The date, time and place for the meetings shall be determined by the
Board of Officers.[23]
Unquestionably, the assembly was not a union meeting. It was in fact a
gathering that was called and participated in by management and non-union
members. By no legal fiat was such assembly transformed into a union
activity by the participation of some union members.
Second, there was no commission on elections to oversee the election,
as mandated by Sections 1 and 2 of Article IX of the USTFUs CBL, which
provide:
ARTICLE IX - UNION ELECTION
Section 1. There shall be a Committee on Election (COMELEC) to be
created by the Board of Officers at least thirty (30) days before any regular or
special election. The functions of the COMELEC include the following:
a) Adopt and promulgate rules and regulations that will ensure a
free, clean, honest and orderly election, whether regular or
special;
b) Pass upon qualifications of candidates;
c) Rule on any question or protest regarding the conduct of the
election subject to the procedure that may be promulgated by
the Board of Officers; and
d) Proclaim duly elected officers.
Section 2. The COMELEC shall be composed of a chairman and two
members all of whom shall be appointed by the Board of Officers.
 xxx xxx xxx[24]
Third, the purported election was not done by secret balloting, in
violation of Section 6, Article IX of the USTFUs CBL, as well as Article 241 (c)
of the Labor Code.
The foregoing infirmities considered, we cannot attribute grave abuse of
discretion to Director Bitonios finding and conclusion. In Rodriguez v.
Director, Bureau of Labor Relations,[25] we invalidated the local union
elections held at the wrong date without prior notice to members and
conducted without regard for duly prescribed ground rules. We held that the
proceedings were rendered void by the lack of due process -- undue haste,
lack of adequate safeguards to ensure integrity of the voting, and the
absence of the notice of the dates of balloting.
Third Issue: Suspension of USTFUs CBL
Petitioners contend that the October 4, 1996 assembly suspended the
unions CBL. They aver that the suspension and the election that followed
were in accordance with their constituent and residual powers as members of
the collective bargaining unit to choose their representatives for purposes of
collective bargaining. Again they cite the numerous anomalies allegedly
committed by the private respondents as USTFU officers. This argument
does not persuade.
First, as has been discussed, the general faculty assembly was not the
proper forum to conduct the election of USTFU officers. Not all who attended
the assembly were members of the union; some, apparently, were even
disqualified from becoming union members, since they represented
management. Thus, Director Bitonio correctly observed:
Further, appellants cannot be heard to say that the CBL was effectively
suspended during the 04 October 1996 general assembly. A union CBL is a
covenant between the union and its members and among members
(Johnson and Johnson Labor Union-FFW, et al. v. Director of Labor
Relations, 170 SCRA 469). Where ILO Convention No. 87 speaks of a
unions full freedom to draw up its constitution and rules, it includes freedom
from interference by persons who are not members of the union. The
democratic principle that governance is a matter for the governed to decide
upon applies to the labor movement which, by law and constitutional
mandate, must be assiduously insulated against intrusions coming from both
the employer and complete strangers if the 'protection to labor clause' of the
constitution is to be guaranteed. By appellants own evidence, the general
faculty assembly of 04 October 1996 was not a meeting of USTFU. It was
attended by members and non-members alike, and therefore was not a
forum appropriate for transacting union matters. The person who moved for
the suspension of USTFUs CBL was not a member of USTFU. Allowing a
non-union member to initiate the suspension of a unions CBL, and non-union
members to participate in a union election on the premise that the unions
CBL had been suspended in the meantime, is incompatible with the freedom
of association and protection of the right to organize.
If there are members of the so-called academic community collective
bargaining unit who are not USTFU members but who would nevertheless
want to have a hand in USTFUs affairs, the appropriate procedure would
have been for them to become members of USTFU first. The procedure for
membership is very clearly spelled out in Article IV of USTFUs CBL. Having
become members, they could then draw guidance from Ang Malayang
Manggagawa Ng Ang Tibay v. Ang Tibay, 103 Phil. 669. Therein the
Supreme Court held that if a member of the union dislikes the provisions of
the by-laws he may seek to have them amended or may withdraw from the
union; otherwise he must abide by them. Under Article XVII of USTFUs CBL,
there is also a specific provision for constitutional amendments. What is clear
therefore is that USTFUs CBL provides for orderly procedures and remedies
which appellants could have easily availed [themselves] of instead of
resorting to an exercise of their so-called residual power'. [26]
Second, the grievances of the petitioners could have been brought up
and resolved in accordance with the procedure laid down by the unions
CBL[27]and by the Labor Code.[28] They contend that their sense of
desperation and helplessness led to the October 4, 1996 election. However,
we cannot agree with the method they used to rectify years of inaction on
their part and thereby ease bottled-up frustrations, as such method was in
total disregard of the USTFUs CBL and of due process. The end never
justifies the means.
We agree with the solicitor generals observation that the act of
suspending the constitution when the questioned election was held is an
implied admission that the election held on that date [October 4, 1996] could
not be considered valid under the existing USTFU constitution xxx. [29]
The ratification of the new CBA executed between the petitioners and
the University of Santo Tomas management did not validate the void October
4, 1996 election. Ratified were the terms of the new CBA, not the issue of
union leadership -- a matter that should be decided only by union members
in the proper forum at the proper time and after observance of proper
procedures.
Epilogue
In dismissing this Petition, we are not passing upon the merits of the
mismanagement allegations imputed by the petitioners to the private
respondents; these are not at issue in the present case. Petitioners can bring
their grievances and resolve their differences with private respondents in
timely and appropriate proceedings. Courts will not tolerate the unfair
treatment of union members by their own leaders.When the latter abuse and
violate the rights of the former, they shall be dealt with accordingly in the
proper forum after the observance of due process.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
G.R. No. L-50283-84 April 20, 1983
DOLORES VILLAR, ROMEO PEQUITO, DIONISIO RAMOS, BENIGNO
MAMARALDO, ORLANDO ACOSTA, RECITACION BERNUS, ANSELMA
ANDAN, ROLANDO DE GUZMAN and RITA LLAGAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, as Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Labor,
AMIGO MANUFACTURING INCORPORATED and PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), respondents.
Aniceto Haber for petitioners.
Roberto T. Neri for respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:
Petition for review by certiorari to set aside the Order dated February 15,
1979 of respondent Deputy Minister Amado G. Inciong affirming the Decision
of the OIC of Regional Office No. 4 dated October 14, 1978 which jointly
resolved RO4-Case No. T-IV-3549-T and RO4-Case No. RD 4-4088-77-T.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioners were members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, a duly
registered labor organization which, at the time of the present dispute, was
the existing bargaining agent of the employees in private respondent Amigo
Manufacturing, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company). The Company and
the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU had a collective bargaining agreement
governing their labor relations, which agreement was then about to expire on
February 28, 1977. Within the last sixty (60) days of the CBA, events
transpired giving rise to the present dispute.
On January 5, 1977, upon written authority of at least 30% of the employees
in the company, including the petitioners, the Federation of Unions of Rizal
(hereinafter referred to as FUR) filed a petition for certification election with
the Med-Arbiter's Office, Regional Office No. 4 of the Ministry of Labor and
Employment. The petition was, however, opposed by the Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions (hereinafter referred to as PAFLU) with
whom, as stated earlier, the Amigo Employees Union was at that time
affiliated. PAFLU's opposition cited the "Code of Ethics" governing inter-
federation disputes among and between members of the Trade Unions
Congress of the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as TUCP). Consequently,
the Med-Arbiter indorsed the case to TUCP for appropriate action but before
any such action could be taken thereon, the petitioners disauthorized FUR
from continuing the petition for certification election for which reason FUR
withdrew the petition.
On February 7, 1977, the same employees who had signed the petition filed
by FUR signed a joint resolution reading in toto as follows:
Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan
1. TUMIWALAG bilang kasaping Unyon ng Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) at kaalinsabay
nito, inaalisan namin ang PAFLU ng kapangyarihan na
katawanin kami sa anumang pakikipagkasundo (CBA) sa
Pangasiwaan ng aming pinapasukan at kung sila man ay
nagkasundo o magkakasundo sa kabila ng pagtitiwalag na
ito, ang nasabing kasunduan ay hindi namin pinagtitibay at
tahasang aming itinatakwil/tinatanggihan;
2. BINABAWI namin ang aming pahintulot sa Federation of
Unions of Rizal (FUR) na katawanin kami sa Petition for
Certification Election (RO4-MED Case No. 743-77) at/o sa
sama-samang pakikipagkasundo sa aming patrons;
3. PANATILIHIN na nagsasarili (independent) ang aming
samahan, AMIGO EMPLOYEES' UNION, alinsunod sa
Artikulo 240 ng Labor Code;
4. MAGHAIN KAAGAD ang aming Unyong nagsasarili, sa
pamumuno ng aming pangsamantalang Opisyal na
kinatawan, si Ginang DOLORES VILLAR, ng Petition for
Certification Election sa Department of Labor, para kilalanin
ang aming Unyong nagsasarili bilang Tanging kinatawan ng
mga manggagawa sa sama-samang pakikipagkasundo
(CBA);
5. BIGYAN ng kopya nito ang bawa't kinauukulan at ang
mga kapasiyahang ito ay magkakabisa sa oras na
matanggap ng mga kinauukulan ang kani-kanilang sipi nito. 1
Immediately thereafter or on February 9, 1977, petitioner Dolores Villar,
representing herself to be the authorized representative of the Amigo
Employees Union, filed a petition for certification election in the Company
before Regional Office No. 4, with the Amigo Employees Union as the
petitioner. The Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU intervened and moved for
the dismissal of the petition for certification election filed by Dolores Villar,
citing as grounds therefor, viz: (a) the petition lacked the mandatory requisite
of at least 30% of the employees in the bargaining unit; (2) Dolores Villar had
no legal personality to sign the petition since she was not an officer of the
union nor is there factual or legal basis for her claim that she was the
authorized representative of the local union; (3) there was a pending case for
the same subject matter filed by the same individuals; (4) the petition was
barred by the new CBA concluded on February 15, 1977; (5) there was no
valid disaffiliation from PAFLU; and (6) the supporting signatures were
procured through false pretenses.
Finding that the petition involved the same parties and causes of action as
the case previously indorsed to the TUCP, the Med-Arbiter dismiss the
petition filed by herein petitioner Villar, which dismissal is still pending appeal
before the Bureau of Labor Relations.
In the meantime, on February 14, 1977, the Amigo Employees Union- PAFLU
called a special meeting of its general membership. A Resolution was
thereby unanimously approved which called for the investigation by the
PAFLU national president, pursuant to the constitution and by-laws of the
Federation, of all of the petitioners and one Felipe Manlapao, for
"continuously maligning, libelling and slandering not only the incumbent
officers but even the union itself and the federation;" spreading 'false
propaganda' that the union officers were 'merely appointees of the
management', and for causing divisiveness in the union.
Pursuant to the Resolution approved by the Amigo Employees Union-
PAFLU, the PAFLU, through its national President, formed a Trial Committee
to investigate the local union's charges against the petitioners for acts of
disloyalty inimical to the interest of the local union, as well as directing the
Trial Committee to subpoena the complainants (Amigo Employees Union-
PAFLU) and the respondents (herein petitioners) for investigation, to conduct
the said investigation and to submit its findings and recommendations for
appropriate action.
And on the same date of February 15, 1977, the Amigo Employees Union-
PAFLU and the Company concluded a new CBA which, besides granting
additional benefits to the workers, also reincorporated the same provisions of
the existing CBA, including the union security clause reading, to wit:
ARTICLE III
UNION SECURITY WITH RESPECT TO PRESENT
MEMBERS
All members of the UNION as of the signing of this
Agreement shall remain members thereof in good standing.
Therefore, any members who shall resign, be expelled, or
shall in any manner cease to be a member of the UNION,
shall be dismissed from his employment upon written
request of the UNION to the Company. 2
Subsequently, petitioners were summoned to appear before
the PAFLU Trial Committee for the aforestated investigation
of the charges filed against them by the Amigo Employees
Union-PAFLU. Petitioners, however, did not attend but
requested for a "Bill of Particulars" of the charges, which
charges were stated by the Chairman of the committee as
follows:
1. Disaffiliating from PAFLU and affiliating with the
Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR).
2. Filling petition for certification election with the Bureau of
Labor Relations and docketed as Case No. R04-MED-830-
77 and authorizing a certain Dolores Villar as your
authorized representative without the official sanction of the
mother Federation- PAFLU.
3. Maligning, libelling and slandering the incumbent officers
of the union as well as of the PAFLU Federation.
4. By spreading false propaganda among members of the
Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU that the incumbent union
officers are 'merely appointees' of the management.
5. By sowing divisiveness instead of togetherness among
members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU.
6. By conduct unbecoming as members of the Amigo
Employees Union- PAFLU which is highly prejudicial to the
union as well as to the PAFLU Federation.
All these charges were formalized in a resolution of the
incumbent officers of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU
dated February 14, 1977. 3
Not recognizing PAFLU's jurisdiction over their case, petitioners again
refused to participate in the investigation rescheduled and conducted on
March 9, 1979. Instead, petitioners merely appeared to file their Answer to
the charges and moved for a dismissal.
Petitioners contend in their Answer that neither the disaffiliation of the Amigo
Employees Union from PAFLU nor the act of filing the petition for certification
election constitute disloyalty as these are in the exercise of their
constitutional right to self-organization. They further contended that PAFLU
was without jurisdiction to investigate their case since the charges, being
intra-union problems within the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, should be
conducted pursuant to the provisions of Article XI, Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of
the local union's constitution and by-laws.
The complainants, all of whom were the then incumbent officers of the Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU, however, appeared and adduced their evidence
supporting the charges against herein petitioners.
Based on the findings and recommendations of the PAFLU trial committee,
the PAFLU President, on March 15, 1977, rendered a decision finding the
petitioners guilty of the charges and disposing in the last paragraph thereof,
to wit,
Excepting Felipe Manlapao, the expulsion from the AMIGO
EMPLOYEES UNION of all the other nine (9) respondents,
Dionisio Ramos, Recitation Bernus, Dolores Villar, Romeo
Dequito, Rolando de Guzman, Anselma Andan, Rita Llagas,
Benigno Mamaradlo and Orlando Acosta is hereby ordered,
and as a consequence the Management of the employer,
AMIGO MANUFACTURING, INC. is hereby requested to
terminate them from their employment in conformity with the
security clause in the collective bargaining agreement.
Further, the Trial Committee is directed to investigate Felipe
Manlapao when he shall have reported back for duty. 4
Petitioners appealed the Decision to the PAFLU, citing the same grounds as
before, and in addition thereto, argued that the PAFLU decision cannot
legally invoke a CBA which was unratified, not certified, and entered into
without authority from the union general membership, in asking the Company
to terminate them from their employment. The appeal was, likewise, denied
by PAFLU in a Resolution dated March 28, 1977.
After denying petitioner's appeal, PAFLU on March 28, 1977 sent a letter to
the Company stating, to wit,
We are furnishing you a copy of our Resolution on the
Appeal of the respondent in Administrative Case No. 2,
 Series of 1977, Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU vs. Dionisio
Ramos, et al.
In view of the denial of their appeal and the Decision of
March 15, 1977 having become final and executory we
would appreciate full cooperation on your part by
implementing the provision of our CBA on security clause by
terminating the respondents concerned from their
employment.5
This was followed by another letter from PAFLU to the Company dated April
25, 1977, reiterating the demand to terminate the employment of the
petitioners pursuant to the security clause of the CBA, with a statement
absolving the Company from any liability or damage that may arise from
petitioner's termination.
Acting on PAFLU's demand, the Company informed PAFLU that it will first
secure the necessary clearances to terminate petitioners. By letter dated
April 28, 1977, PAFLU requested the Company to put petitioners under
preventive suspension pending the application for said clearances to
terminate the petitioners, upon a declaration that petitioners' continued stay
within the work premises will "result in the threat to the life and limb of the
other employees of the company."6
Hence, on April 29, 1977, the Company filed the request for clearance to
terminate the petitioners before the Department of Labor, Regional Office No.
4. The application, docketed as RO4-Case No. 7-IV-3549-T, stated as cause
therefor, "Demand by the Union Pursuant to the Union Security Clause," and
further, as effectivity date, "Termination-upon issuance of clearance;
Suspension-upon receipt of notice of workers concerned." 7 Petitioners were
then informed by memorandum dated April 29, 1977 that the Company has
applied for clearance to terminate them upon demand of PAFLU, and that
each of them were placed under preventive suspension pending the
resolution of the said applications. The security guard was, likewise, notified
to refuse petitioners entry into the work premises. 8
In an earlier development, on April 25, 1977, or five days before petitioners
were placed under preventive suspension, they filed a complaint with
application for preliminary injunction before the same Regional Office No. 4,
docketed as RO4-Case No. RD-4-4088-77-T, praying that after due notice
and hearing, "(1) A preliminary injunction be issued forthwith to restrain the
respondents from doing the act herein complained of, namely: the dismissal
of the individual complainants from their employment; (2) After due hearing
on the merits of the case, an Order be entered denying and/or setting aside
the Decision dated March 15, 1977 and the Resolution dated March 28,
1977, issued by respondent Onofre P. Guevara, National President of
respondent PAFLU; (3) The Appeal of the individual complainants to the
General Membership of the complainant AMIGO EMPLOYEES UNION,
dated March 22, 1977, pursuant to Sections 2, 3, 4 & 5, Article XI in relation
of Section 1, Article XII of the Union Constitution and By-Laws, be given due
course; and (4) Thereafter, the said preliminary injunction be made
permanent, with costs, and with such further orders/reliefs that are just and
equitable in the premises."9
In these two cases filed before the Regional Office No. 4, the parties adopted
their previous positions when they were still arguing before the PAFLU trial
committee.
On October 14, 1977, Vicente Leogardo, Jr., Officer-in-Charge of Regional
Office No. 4, rendered a decision jointly resolving said two cases, the
dispositive portion of which states, to wit,
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered granting the application of the Amigo
Manufacturing, Inc., for clearance to terminate the
employment of Dolores D. Villar, Dionisio Ramos, Benigno
Mamaraldo, Orlando Acosta, Recitacion Bernus, Anselma
Andan, Rolando de Guzman, and Rita Llagas. The
application of oppositors, under RO4-Case No. RD-4-4088-
77, for a preliminary injunction to restrain the Amigo
Manufacturing, Inc. from terminating their employment and
from placing them under preventive suspension, is hereby
DISMISSED. 10
Not satisfied with the decision, petitioners appealed to the Office of the
Secretary of Labor. By Order dated February 15, 1979, the respondent
Amado G. Inciong, Deputy Minister of Labor, dismissed their appeal for lack
of merit. 11
Hence, the instant petition for review, raising the following issues:
A. Is it not error in both constitutional and statutory law by
the respondent Minister when he affirmed the decision of the
RO4-Officer-in-Charge allowing the preventive suspension
and subsequent dismissal of petitioners by reason of the
exercise of their right to freedom of association?
B. Is it not error in law by the respondent Minister when he
upheld the decision of the RO4 OIC which sustained the
availment of the respondent PAFLU's constitution over that
of the local union constitution in the settlement of intra-union
dispute?
C. Is it not error in law amounting to grave abuse of
discretion by the Minister in affirming the conclusion made by
the RO4 OIC, upholding the legal applicability of the security
clause of a CBA over alleged offenses committed earlier
than its conclusion, and within the 60-day freedom period of
an old CBA? 12
The main thrust of the petition is the alleged illegality of the dismiss of the
petitioners by private respondent Company upon demand of PAFLU which
invoked the security clause of the collective bargaining agreement between
the Company and the local union, Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU.
Petitioners contend that the respondent Deputy Minister acted in grave
abuse of discretion when he affirmed the decision granting the clearance to
terminate the petitioners and dismissed petitioners' complaint, and in support
thereof, allege that their constitutional right to self-organization had been
impaired. Petitioner's contention lacks merit.
It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to legal objection. It
is implicit in the freedom of association ordained by the Constitution. 13 But
this Court has laid down the ruling that a closed shop is a valid form of union
security, and such provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a
restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the
Constitution. 14
In the case at bar, it appears as an undisputed fact that on February 15,
1977, the Company and the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU entered into a
Collective Bargaining Agreement with a union security clause provided for in
Article XII thereof which is a reiteration of the same clause in the old CBA.
The quoted stipulation for closed-shop is clear and unequivocal and it leaves
no room for doubt that the employer is bound, under the collective bargaining
agreement, to dismiss the employees, herein petitioners, for non- union
membership. Petitioners became non-union members upon their expulsion
from the general membership of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU on
March 15, 1977 pursuant to the Decision of the PAFLU national president.
We reject petitioners' theory that their expulsion was not valid upon the
grounds adverted to earlier in this Decision. That PAFLU had the authority to
investigate petitioners on the charges filed by their co-employees in the local
union and after finding them guilty as charged, to expel them from the roll of
membership of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU is clear under the
constitution of the PAFLU to which the local union was affiliated. And
pursuant to the security clause of the new CBA, reiterating the same clause
in the old CBA, PAFLU was justified in applying said security clause. We find
no abuse of discretion on the part of the OIC of Regional Office No. 4 in
upholding the validity of the expulsion and on the part of the respondent
Deputy Minister of Labor in sustaining the same. We agree with the OIC's
decision, pertinent portion of which reads:
Stripped of non-essentials, the basic and fundamental issue
in this case tapers down to the determination of WHETHER
OR NOT PAFLU HAD THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE
OPPOSITORS AND, THEREAFTER, EXPEL THEM FROM
THE ROLL OF MEMBERSHIP OF THE AMIGO
EMPLOYEES UNION-PAFLU.
Recognized and salutary is the principle that when a labor
union affiliates with a mother union, it becomes bound by the
laws and regulations of the parent organization. Thus, the
Honorable Secretary of Labor, in the case of Amador Bolivar,
et al. vs. PAFLU, et al., NLRC Case No. LR-133 & MC-476,
promulgated on December 3, 1973, declared-
When a labor union affiliates with a parent organization or
mother union, or accepts a charter from a superior body, it
becomes subject to the laws of the superior body under
whose authority the local union functions. The constitution,
by-laws and rules of the parent body, together with the
charter it issues pursuant thereto to the subordinate union,
constitute an enforceable contract between the parent body
and the subordinate union, and between the members of the
subordinate union inter se. (Citing Labor Unions, Dangel and
Shriber, pp. 279-280).
It is undisputable that oppositors were members of the
Amigo Employees Union at the time that said union affiliated
with PAFLU; hence, under the afore-quoted principle,
oppositors are bound by the laws and regulations of PAFLU.
Likewise, it is undeniable that in the investigation of the
charges against them, oppositors were accorded 'due
process', because in this jurisdiction, the doctrine is deeply
entrenched that the term 'due process' simply means that the
parties were given the opportunity to be heard. In the instant
case, ample and unmistakable evidence exists to show that
the oppositors were afforded the opportunity to present their
evidence, but they themselves disdained or spurned the said
opportunity given to them.
PAFLU, therefore, correctly and legally acted when, pursuant
to its Constitution and By-Laws, it conducted and proceeded
with the investigation of the charges against the oppositors
and found them guilty of acts prejudicial and inimical to the
interests of the Amigo Employees Union- PAFLU, to wit: that
of falsely and maliciously slandering the officers of the union;
spreading false propaganda among the members of the
Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU; calling the incumbent
officers as mere appointees and robots of management;
calling the union company-dominated or assisted union;
committing acts unbecoming of the members of the union
and destructive of the union and its members.
Inherent in every labor union, or any organization for that
matter, is the right of self-preservation. When members of a
labor union, therefore, sow the seeds of dissension and strife
within the union; when they seek the disintegration and
destruction of the very union to which they belong, they
thereby forfeit their rights to remain as members of the union
which they seek to destroy. Prudence and equity, as well as
the dictates of law and justice, therefore, compelling
mandate the adoption by the labor union of such corrective
and remedial measures in keeping with its laws and
regulations, for its preservation and continued existence; lest
by its folly and inaction, the labor union crumble and fall.
Correctly and legally, therefore, the PAFLU acted when, after
proper investigation and finding of guilt, it decided to remove
 the oppositors from the list of members of the Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU, and thereafter, recommended to
the Amigo Manufacturing, Inc.; the termination of the
employment of the oppositors. 15
We see no reason to disturb the same.
The contention of petitioners that the charges against them being intra-union
problems, should have been investigated in accordance with the constitution
and by-laws of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU and not of the PAFLU, is
not impressed with merit. It is true that under the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code, in case of intra-union disputes, redress must
first be sought within the organization itself in accordance with its constitution
and by-laws. However, it has been held that this requirement is not absolute
but yields to exception under varying circumstances. Thus, in Kapisanan ng
mga Manggagawa sa MRR vs. Hernandez, 20 SCRA 109, We held:
In the case at bar, noteworthy is the fact that the complaint
was filed against the union and its incumbent officers, some
of whom were members of the board of directors. The
constitution and by-laws of the union provide that charges for
any violations thereof shall be filed before the said board.
But as explained by the lower court, if the complainants had
done so the board of directors would in effect be acting as
respondent investigator and judge at the same time. To
follow the procedure indicated would be a farce under the
circumstances, where exhaustion of remedies within the
union itself would practically amount to a denial of justice or
would be illusory or vain, it will not be insisted upon,
particularly where property rights of the members are
involved, as a condition to the right to invoke the aid of a
court.
The facts of the instant petition stand on all fours with the aforecited case
that the principle therein enunciated applies here as well. In the case at bar,
the petitioners were charged by the officers of the Amigo Employees Union-
PAFLU themselves who were also members of the Board of Directors of the
Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU. Thus, were the petitioners to be charged
and investigated according to the local union's constitution, they would have
been tried by a trial committee of three (3) elected from among the members
of the Board who are themselves the accusers. (Section 2, Article 11,
Constitution of the Local Union). Petitioners would be in a far worse position
had this procedure been followed. Nonetheless, petitioners admit in their
petition that two (2) of the six (6) charges, i.e. disaffiliation and filing a petition
for certification election, are not intra-union matters and, therefore, are
cognizable by PAFLU.
Petitioners insist that their disaffiliation from PAFLU and filing a petition for
certification election are not acts of disloyalty but an exercise of their right to
self-organization. They contend that these acts were done within the 60-day
freedom period when questions of representation may freely be raised.
Under the peculiar facts of the case, We find petitioners' insistence
untenable.
In the first place, had petitioners merely disaffiliated from the. Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU, there could be no legal objections thereto for it
was their right to do so. But what petitioners did by the very clear terms of
their "Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan" was to disaffiliate the Amigo Employees
Union-PAFLU from PAFLU, an act which they could not have done with any
effective consequence because they constituted the minority in the Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU.
Extant from the records is the fact that petitioners numbering ten (10), were
among the ninety-six (96) who signed the "Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan"
whereas there are two hundred thirty four (234) union members in the Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU. Hence, petitioners constituted a small minority for
which reason they could not have successfully disaffiliated the local union
from PAFLU. Since only 96 wanted disaffiliation, it can be inferred that the
majority wanted the union to remain an affiliate of PAFLU and this is not
denied or disputed by petitioners. The action of the majority must, therefore,
prevail over that of the minority members. 16
Neither is there merit to petitioners' contention that they had the right to
present representation issues within the 60-day freedom period. It is true, as
contended by petitioners, that under Article 257 of the Labor Code and
Section 3, Rule 2, Book 2 of its Implementing Rules, questions of exclusive
bargaining representation are entertainable within the sixty (60) days prior to
the expiry date of an existing CBA, and that they did file a petition for
certification election within that period. But the petition was filed in the name
of the Amigo Employees Union which had not disaffiliated from PAFLU, the
mother union. Petitioners being a mere minority of the local union may not
bind the majority members of the local union.
Moreover, the Amigo Employees Union, as an independent union, is not duly
registered as such with the Bureau of Labor Relations. The appealed
decision of OIC Leogardo of Regional Office No. 4 states as a fact that there
is no record in the Bureau of Labor Relations that the Amigo Employees
Union (Independent) is registered, and this is not disputed by petitioners,
notwithstanding their allegation that the Amigo Employees Union is a duly
registered labor organization bearing Ministry of Labor Registration
Certification No. 5290-IP dated March 27, 1967. But the independent union
organized after the "Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan" executed February 7,
1977 could not have been registered earlier, much less March 27, 1967
under Registration Certificate No. 5290-IP. As such unregistered union, it
acquires no legal personality and is not entitled to the rights and privileges
granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the
certificate of registration. Article 234 of the New Labor Code specifically
provides:
Art. 234. Requirements of Registration.—Any applicant labor
organization, association, or group of unions or workers shall
acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights
 and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations upon issuance of the certificate of
registration. ....
In Phil. Association of Free Labor Unions vs. Sec. of Labor, 27 SCRA 40, We
had occasion to interpret Section 23 of R.A. No. 875 (Industrial Peace Act)
requiring of labor unions registration by the Department of Labor in order to
qualify as "legitimate labor organization," and We said:
The theory to the effect that Section 23 of Republic Act No.
875 unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and association
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is devoid of factual basis.
The registration prescribed in paragraph (b) of said
section 17 is not a limitation to the right of assembly or
association, which may be exercised with or without said
registration. The latter is merely a condition sine qua non for
the acquisition of legal personality by labor organizations,
associations or unions and the possession of the 'rights and
privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations.'
The Constitution does not guarantee these rights and
privileges, much less said personality, which are mere
statutory creations, for the possession and exercise of which
registration is required to protect both labor and the public
against abuses, fraud, or impostors who pose as organizers,
although not truly accredited agents of the union they purport
to represent. Such requirement is a valid exercise of the
police power, because the activities in which labor
organizations, associations and union or workers are
engaged affect public interest, which should be protected.
Simply put, the Amigo Employees Union (Independent) Which petitioners
claim to represent, not being a legitimate labor organization, may not validly
present representation issues. Therefore, the act of petitioners cannot be
considered a legitimate exercise of their right to self-organization. Hence, We
affirm and reiterate the rationale explained in Phil Association of Free Labor
Unions vs. Sec. of Labor case, supra, in order to protect legitimate labor and
at the same time maintain discipline and responsibility within its ranks.
The contention of petitioners that the new CBA concluded between Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU and the Company on February 15, 1977 containing
the union security clause cannot be invoked as against the petitioners for
offenses committed earlier than its conclusion, deserves scant consideration.
We find it to be the fact that the union security clause provided in the new
CBA merely reproduced the union security clause provided in the old CBA
about to expire. And since petitioners were expelled from Amigo Employees
Union-PAFLU on March 28, 1982 upon denial of their Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision expelling them, the CBA of February 15,
1977 was already applicable to their case. The "closed-shop provision" in the
CBA provides:
All members of the UNION as of the signing of this
Agreement shall remain members thereof in good standing.
Therefore, any members who shall resign, be expelled, or
shall in any manner cease to be a member of the UNION,
shall be dismissed from his employment upon written
request of the UNION to the Company. (Art. III)
A closed-shop is a valid form of union security, and a provision therefor in a
collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of
association guaranteed by the Constitution. (Manalang, et al. vs. Artex
Development Co., Inc., et al., L-20432, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 561).
Where in a closed-shop agreement it is stipulated that union members who
cease to be in good standing shall immediately be dismissed, such dismissal
does not constitute an unfair labor practice exclusively cognizable by the
Court of Industrial Relations. (Seno vs. Mendoza, 21 SCRA 1124).
Finally, We reject petitioners' contention that respondent Minister committed
error in law amounting to grave abuse of discretion when he affirmed the
conclusion made by the RO4 OIC, upholding the legal applicability of the
security clause of a CBA over alleged offenses committed earlier than its
conclusion and within the 60-day freedom period of an old CBA. In the first
place, as We stated earlier, the security clause of the new CBA is a
reproduction or reiteration of the same clause in the old CBA. While
petitioners were charged for alleged commission of acts of disloyalty inimical
to the interests of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU in the Resolution of
February 14, 1977 of the Amigo Employees Union- PAFLU and on February
15, 1977 PAFLU and the Company entered into and concluded a new
collective bargaining agreement, petitioners may not escape the effects of
the security clause under either the old CBA or the new CBA by claiming that
the old CBA had expired and that the new CBA cannot be given retroactive
enforcement. To do so would be to create a gap during which no agreement
would govern, from the time the old contract expired to the time a new
agreement shall have been entered into with the union. As this Court said
in Seno vs. Mendoza, 21 SCRA 1124, "without any agreement to govern the
relations between labor and management in the interim, the situation would
well be productive of confusion and result in breaches of the law by either
party. "
The case of Seno vs. Mendoza, 21 SCRA 1124 mentioned previously needs
further citation of the facts and the opinion of the Court, speaking through
Justice Makalintal who later became Chief Justice, and We quote:
It appears that petitioners other than Januario T. Seno who is
their counsel, were members of the United Seamen's Union
of the Philippines. Pursuant to a letter-request of the Union
stating that they 'had ceased to be members in good
standing' and citing a closed shop clause in its bargaining
agreement with respondent Carlos A. Go Thong & Co., the
latter dismissed said petitioners. Through counsel,
petitioners requested that they be reinstated to their former
 positions and paid their backwages, otherwise they would
picket respondents' offices and vessels. The request was
denied on the ground that the dismissal was unavoidable
under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. ...
We, therefore, hold and rule that petitioners, although entitled to disaffiliate
from their union and form a new organization of their own, must, however,
suffer the consequences of their separation from the union under the security
clause of the CBA.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Order appealed
from affirming the joint decision of the OIC of Regional Office No. 4 in RO4-
Case No. T-IV-3549-T and RO4 Case No. RD-4-4088-77-T granting
clearance to terminate petitioners as well as dismissing their complaint with
application for preliminary injunction, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
G.R. No. 78131 January 20, 1988
EDUARDO TANCINCO, OSCAR E. BARTOLO, DANIEL DE LEON, EDDIE
POE, VIRGILIO SAN PEDRO, MA. LUISA QUIBIN, FE MUDLONG and
HENRY MADRIAGA, petitioners,
vs.
DIRECTOR PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, EDWIN LACANILAO, BOYET
DALMACIO, JOSEFINO ESGUERRA, TESSIE GATCHALIAN, LITO CUDIA
and DING PAGAYON, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the Resolution of
February 12, 1987 and the Decision of December 10, 1986 of the Bureau of
Labor Relations *in BLR Case No. A922186, setting aside the order of July
25, 1986 which decreed the inclusion and counting of the 56 segregated
votes for the determination of the results of the election of officers of Imperial
Textile Mills Inc. Monthly Employees Association (ITM-MEA).
Private respondents are the prime organizers of ITM-MEA. While said
respondents were preparing to file a petition for direct certification of the
Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of ITM's bargaining unit,
the union's Vice-President, Carlos Dalmacio was promoted to the position of
Department Head, thereby disqualifying him for union membership. Said
incident, among others led to a strike spearheaded by Lacanilao group,
respondents herein. Another group however, led by herein petitioners staged
a strike inside the company premises. After four (4) days the strike was
settled. On May 10, 1986 an agreement was entered into by the
representatives of the management, Lacanilao group and the Tancinco group
the relevant terms of which are as follows:
"1. That all monthly-paid employees shall be United under
one union, the ITM Monthly Employees Association (ITM-
MEA), to be affiliated with ANGLO;
2. That the management of ITM recognizes ANGLO as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the monthly-paid
employees;
3. That an election of union officers shall be held on 26 May
l986, from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.;
4. That the last day of filing of candidacy shall be on l9 May
l986 at 4:00 p.m.;
5. That a final pre-election conference to finalize the list of
qualified voters shall be held on 19 May 1986, at 5:00
p.m.;" 1
On May 19, 1986, a pre-election conference was held, but the parties failed
to agree on the list of voters. During the May 21, 1986 pre-election
conference attended by MOLE officers, ANGLO through its National
Secretary, a certain Mr. Cornelio A. Sy made a unilateral ruling excluding
some 56 employees consisting of the Manila office employees, members of
Iglesia ni Kristo, non-time card employees, drivers of Mrs. Salazar and the
cooperative employees of Mrs. Salazar. Prior to the holding of the election of
union officers petitioners, 2 through a letter addressed to the Election
Supervisor, MOLE San Fernando Pampanga, protested said ruling but no
action was taken. On May 26, 1986, the election of officers was conducted
under the supervision of MOLE wherein the 56 employees in question
participated but whose votes were segregated without being counted.
Lacanilao's group won. Lacanilao garnered 119 votes with a margin of three
(3) votes over Tancinco prompting petitioners to make a protest. Thereafter,
petitioners filed a formal protest with the Ministry of Labor Regional Office in
San Fernando, Pampanga 3 claiming that the determination of the
qualification of the 56 votes is beyond the competence of ANGLO. Private
respondents maintain the contrary on the premise that definition of union's
membership is solely within their jurisdiction.
On the basis of the position papers submitted by the parties MOLE's Med
Arbiter 4 issued an order dated July 25, 1986 directing the opening and
counting of the segregated votes. 5 From the said order private respondents
appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) justifying the
disenfranchisement of the 56 votes. Private respondents categorized the
challenged voters into four groups namely, the Manila Employees, that they
are personal employees of Mr. Lee; the Iglesia ni Kristo, that allowing them to
vote will be anomalous since it is their policy not to participate in any form of
union activities; the non-time card employees, that they are managerial
employees; and the employees of the cooperative as non-ITM
employees. 6 On December 10, 1986, BLR rendered a decision 7 holding the
exclusion of the 56 employees as arbitrary, whimsical, and wanting in legal
basis 8 but set aside the challenged order of July 26, 1986 on the ground that
51 ** of 56 challenged voters were not yet union members at the time of the
election per April 24, 1986 list submitted before the Bureau. 9 The decision
directed among others the proclamation of Lacanilao's group as the duly
elected officers and for ITM-MEA to absorb in the bargaining unit the
challenged voters unless proven to be managerial employees. 10 Petitioners'
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Dissatisfied with the turn of events narrated above petitioners elevated the
case to this Court by way of the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioners allege that public respondent director of Labor
Relations committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the Med-Arbiter to
disregard the 56 segregated votes and proclaim private respondents as the
duly elected officers of ITM-MEA whereas said respondent ruled that the
grounds relied upon by ANGLO for the exclusion of voters are arbitrary,
whimsical and without legal basis.
The petition is impressed with merit. The record of the case shows that public
respondent categorically declared as arbitrary, whimsical and without legal
basis the grounds 11 relied upon by ANGLO in disenfranchising the 56 voters
in question. However, despite said finding public respondent ruled to set
aside the Resolution of July 25, 1986 of the Med-Arbiter based on its own
findings 12 that 51 of the 56 disenfranchised voters were not yet union
members at the time of the election of union officers on May 26, 1986 on the
ground that their names do not appear in the records of the Union submitted
to the Labor Organization Division of the Bureau of Labor on April 24, 1986.
The finding does not have a leg to stand on. Submission of the employees
names with the BLR as qualified members of the union is not a
condition sine qua non to enable said members to vote in the election of
union's officers. It finds no support in fact and in law. Per public respondent's
findings, the April 24, 1986 list consists of 158 union members
only 13 wherein 51 of the 56 challenged voters' names do not appear.
Adopting however a rough estimate of a total number of union members who
cast their votes of some 333 14 and excluding therefrom the 56 challenged
votes, if the list is to be the basis as to who the union members are then
public respondent should have also disqualified some 175 of the 333 voters.
It is true that under article 242(c) of the Labor Code, as amended, only
members of the union can participate in the election of union officers. The
question however of eligibility to vote may be determined through the use of
the applicable payroll period and employee's status during the applicable
payroll period. The payroll of the month next preceding the labor dispute in
case of regular employees 15 and the payroll period at or near the peak of
operations in case of employees in seasonal industries. 16
In the case before Us, considering that none of the parties insisted on the
use of the payroll period-list as voting list and considering further that the 51
remaining employees were correctly ruled to be qualified for membership,
their act of joining the election by casting their votes on May 26, 1986 after
the May 10, 1986 agreement is a clear manifestation of their intention to join
the union. They must therefore be considered ipso facto members thereof
Said employees having exercised their right to unionism by joining ITM-MEA
their decision is paramount. Their names could not have been included in the
list of employee submitted on April 24, 1986 to the Bureau of Labor for the
agreement to join the union was entered into only on May 10, 1986. Indeed
the election was supervised by the Department of Labor where said 56
members were allowed to vote. Private respondents never challenged their
right to vote then.
The Solicitor General in his manifestation agreed with petitioners that public
respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion in deciding the issue on
the basis of the records of membership of the union as of April 24, 1986
when this issue was not put forward in the appeal.
It is however the position of private respondents that since a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) has been concluded between the local union
and ITM management the determination of the legal question raised herein
may not serve the purpose which the union envisions and may destroy the
cordial relations existing between the management and the union.
We do not agree. Existence of a CBA and cordial relationship developed
between the union and the management should not be a justification to
frustrate the decision of the union members as to who should properly
represent them in the bargaining unit. Neither may the inclusion and counting
of the 56 segregated votes serve to disturb the existing relationship with
management as feared by herein private respondents. Respondents
themselves pointed out that petitioners joined the negotiating panel in the
recently concluded CBA. This fact alone is conclusive against herein
petitioners and hence will estop them later if ever, from questioning the CBA
which petitioners concurred with. Furthermore, the inclusion and counting of
the 56 segregated votes would not necessarily mean success in favor of
herein petitioners as feared by private respondents herein. Otherwise, could
this be the very reason behind their fears why they made it a point to nullify
said votes?
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED.
The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on May 13, 1987 is
hereby made permanent. The questioned Resolution of February 12, 1987
and the Decision of December 10, 1986 are hereby set aside for being null
and void and the Order of July 25, 1986 of the Mediator Arbiter is hereby
declared immediately executory.
G.R. No. L-62306 January 21, 1985
KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PINAGYAKAP (KMP), ISAGANI
GUTIERREZ, FLORENCIA CARREON, JOSE FLORES, DENNIS ALINEA,
ELADIO DE LUNA and CRISANTO DE VILLA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CRESENCIANO TRAJANO, DIRECTOR OF THE
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, CATALINO SILVESTRE, and CESAR
ALFARO, respondents.
Jose C. Espinas for petitioners.
Balagtas P. Ilagan for private respondents.
RELOVA, J.:
Petitioners seek to annul the resolution and order, dated August 13 and
October 19, 1982, respectively, of public respondent Director Cresenciano B.
Trajano of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor and Employment,
in BLR Case No. A-0100-82 (RO4-A-LRD-M-9-35-81), entitled: "Catalino
Silvestre, et al., vs. Kapisanan ng Manggagawang Pinagyakap (KMP) Labor
Union and its Officers" affirming Med-Arbiter Antonio D. Cabibihan's order
dated April 28, 1982, directing the said Union to hold and conduct, pursuant
to its constitution and by-laws and under the supervision of the Bureau of
Labor Relations, a general membership meeting, to vote for or against the
expulsion or suspension of the herein petitioner union officers.
Records show that on June 30, 1981 a written request for accounts
examination of the financial status of the Kapisanan ng Manggagawang
Pinagyakap (KMP) Labor Union (Union for brevity), the existing labor union
at Franklin Baker Company in San Pablo City, was filed by private
respondent Catalino Silvestre and thirteen (13) other employees, who are
also members of the said Union. Acting on said request, Union Account
Examiner Florencio R. Vicedo of the Ministry of Labor and Employment
conducted the necessary investigation and, thereafter, submitted a report,
with the following findings:
A. Disallowed expenditures — P1,278.00, as reflected in the
following breakdown:
1. January 9, 1980 — Excess claim for refund P1.00
2. March 13, 1980 — Payment for sound system P90.00
3. March 12, 1980 — Picture taking, entrance fee in Manila
Zoo with Atty. Delos Santos P75.00
4. March 24, 1980 — Payment for sound System P90.00
5. July 16, 1980 — Jeep hired P264.00
6. August 30, 1980 — Partial payment of traveling expenses
disallowed P68.00
7. October 30, 1980 — Representation expenses P180.00
8. May 31, 1981 — Payment for long distance call P10.00
9. May 31, 1981— Payment for legal expenses P500.00
TOTAL............................................................. P1,278.00
B. Respondent union officers failed to keep, maintain and
submit for verification the records of union accounts for the
years 1977, and 1978, 1979, or purposely suppressed the
same;
C. Respondent union officers failed to maintain segregated
disbursement receipts in accordance with the five (5)
segregated union funds (general fund, educational funds,
mutual aid fund, burial assistance fund and union building
fund) for which they maintained a distinct and separate bank
accounts for each.
D. The Union's constitution and by-laws is not ratified by the
general membership hence, illegal. (pp. 27-28, Rollo)
Based on the foregoing revelations, private respondents filed with the
Regional Office No. IV-A, Quezon City, Ministry of Labor and Employment, a
petition docketed as R04-ALRD-M- 9-35-81, for the expulsion of the union
officers on the ground that they committed gross violation of the Labor Code,
specifically paragraphs (a), (b), (g), (h), (j) and (k) of Article 242; and, the
constitution and by-laws of the Union, particularly the provisions of Sections
6 and 7 thereof.
In their Answer, the union officers denied the imputation and argued that the
disallowed expenditures were made in good faith; that the same conduced to
the benefit of the members; and, that they are willing to reimburse the same
from their own personal funds. They likewise asserted that they should not
be held accountable for the non-production of the books of accounts of the
Union for the years 1977, 1978 and 1979 because they were not the officers
then and not one of the former officers of the Union had turned over to them
the records in question. Further, they averred that the non-ratification of the
constitution and by-laws of the Union and the non-segregation of the Union
funds occurred before they became officers and that they have already been
correcting the same.
On April 28, 1982, Med-Arbiter Antonio D. Cabibihan ordered the holding of a
referendum, to be conducted under the supervision of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, to decide on the issue of whether to expel or suspend the union
officers from their respective positions.
Petitioners appealed the said order of Med-Arbiter Cabibihan to herein public
respondent Director Trajano of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of
Labor, Manila, claiming that the same is not in accordance with the facts
contained in the records and is contrary to law. They pointed out that the
disallowed expenditures of P1,278.00 were made in good faith and not used
for the personal benefit of herein union officers but, instead, contributed to
the benefit of the members. On the alleged failure to maintain and submitted
the books of accounts for the years 1977, 1978 and 1979, they argued that
they were elected in 1980 only and, therefore, they could not be made
responsible for the omissions of their predecessors who failed to turn over
union records for the questioned period. Anent their alleged failure to
maintain segregated disbursement receipts in accordance with the five (5)
segregated funds, petitioners maintained that the same did not result to any
loss of funds and such error in procedure had already been corrected. They
also demonstrated that there would be a general election on October 4,
1982, at which time, both the election and the desired referendum could be
undertaken to determine the membership at minimum expense. They prayed
that the resolution on the issue be held in abeyance.
Private respondents, on the other hand, claimed that the Med-Arbiter erred in
calling a referendum to decide the issue. They reiterated that the appropriate
action should be the expulsion of the herein union officers.
On August 13, 1982, public respondent Director Trajano dismissed both
appeals of petitioners and private respondents and affirmed in toto the order
of Med-Arbiter Cabibihan.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 13,
1982 of Public respondent Director Trajano, reiterating their arguments in
their appeal and further clarifying that what the Union Account Officer
Florencio R. Vicedo found was that the amount of P1,278.00 was not
supported by official receipts and therefore should not be allowed as
disbursement from the union funds; and that he did not say that the amount
was converted by them for their own personal benefit. They, likewise,
informed public respondent Director Trajano that in the general election held
on October 4, 1982, all of them, except petitioners Ambrocio dela Cruz and
Eliseo Celerio, who ran for the positions of Vice-President and member of the
Board of Directors, respectively, were elected by the overwhelming majority
of the members, while private respondents Catalino Silvestre and Cesar
Alfaro who also ran for the position of Auditor, lost. Thereafter, they moved
for the dismissal of the appeal for having been rendered moot and academic
by their re-election.
On October 19, 1982, public respondent Director Trajano issued the second
questioned order denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition which We find meritorious for the following reasons:
1. If herein union officers (also petitioners) were guilty of the alleged acts
imputed against them, said public respondent pursuant to Article 242 of the
New Labor Code and in the light of Our ruling in Duyag vs. Inciong, 98 SCRA
522, should have meted out the appropriate penalty on them, i.e., to expel
them from the Union, as prayed for, and not call for a referendum to decide
the issue;
2. The alleged falsification and misrepresentation of herein union officers
were not supported by substantial evidence. The fact that they disbursed the
amount of P1,278.00 from Union funds and later on was disallowed for failure
to attach supporting papers thereon did not of itself constitute falsification
and/or misrepresentation. The expenditures appeared to have been made in
good faith and the amount spent for the purpose mentioned in the report, if
concurred in or accepted by the members, are reasonable; and
3. The repudiation of both private respondents to the highly sensitive position
of auditor at the October 4, 1982 election, is a convincing manifestation and
demonstration of the union membership's faith in the herein officers'
leadership on one hand and a clear condonation of an act they had allegedly
committed.
By and large, the holding of the referendum in question has become moot
and academic. This is in line with Our ruling in Pascual vs. Provincial Board
of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 471, which We quote:
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done
prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be
to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers.
When the people have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave Ms faults or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the
court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically
overrule the will of the people.
ACCORDINGLY, the resolution and order, dated August 13 and October 19,
1982, respectively, of public respondent Director Cresenciano B. Trajano of
the Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor, Manila in BLR Case No. A-
0100-82 (RO4-A-LRD-M-9-35-81) are SET ASIDE and, the petition for
expulsion of herein union officers in R04-A-LRD-M-9-35-81 is hereby
DISMISSED for having been rendered moot and academic by the election of
herein union officers in the general membership meeting/election held on
October 4, 1982.
Peninsula Employees Union (PEU) v Esquivel, et. al.
G.R. No. 218454; 2016
Topic:
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe
By: Myk
FACTS
1.) Dec 2007 – PEU’s Board of Directors passed a local resolution
stating that it was then affiliated with the NUWHRAIN and the direct
membership of its individual members.
2.) Beginning Jan 2009 PEU-NUWHRAIN sought to increase the union
dues from 1% to 2% of the rank and file employees, brought about
by PEU’s affiliation with NUWHRAIN, which supposedly requires its
affiliates to remit to it 2% of their monthly salaries.
3.) Oct 2008 – the OSEC resolved the collective bargaining deadlock
between PEU-NUWHRAIN and The Peninsula Manila Hotel (Hotel),
ordering the parties to execute a CBA incorporating therein arbitral
award.
4.) Mar 2009 – PEU-NUWHRAIN requested the OSEC for
Administrative Intervention for Dispute Avoidance (AIDA) in relation
to the issue of its entitlement to collect the 2% increase from the non-
PEU members.
5.) Non-PEU members averred:
a. The new CBA is unenforceable since there is still no written
CBA formally signed and executed by PEU-NUWHRAIN and
the Hotel.
b. 2% agency fee is exorbitant and unreasonable
c. PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the mandatory
requirements for the increase.
6.) OSEC – the PEU-NUWHRAIN has the right to collect the union dues
from non-PEU members pursuant to the expired CBA but denied the
2% increase since (a) it failed to show that its general membership
approved the same; (b) the minutes of the meeting merely stated
that there was a need to update the individual check off authorization
to implement the 2% increase.
 7.) PEU-NUWHRAIN moved for reconsideration attaching thereto
copies of the approval of the 2%; individual check off authorizations;
pay slips of some members showing the deduction of 2% from the
salaries beginning Jan 2009.
8.) OSEC (Mar 2012) – granted the increase. The decision was
appealed by the herein respondents to the CA.
9.) CA – reinstated the previous decision of the OSEC since it failed to
comply with the requisites for a valid check off since Oct 2008
meeting did not show the increase in union dues and that the
document showing the approval of the increase surfaced only after
the OSEC issued its first decision.
ISSUE
WON the CA erred in ruling that PEU-NUWHRAIN had no right to collect the
increase.
HELD
No, the CA was correct.
DOCTRINE
1.) The rule is that the recognized CB union which successfully
negotiated with the CBA with the employer is given the right to collect
a reasonable fee called "agency fee" from non-union members who
are employees of the appropriate bargaining unit, in an amount
equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by union members, in
case they accept the benefits under the CBA.
2.) While the collection of agency fees is recognized by Article 259 of the
LC the legal basis of the union's right to agency fees is neither
contractual nor statutory, but quasi-contractual, deriving from the
established principle that non-union employees may not unjustly
enrich themselves by benefiting from employment conditions
negotiated by the bargaining union.
3.) The LC mandates the submission of 3 documentary requisites to
justify a valid levy of increased union dues:
a. an authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all
the members at the general membership meeting duly called
for the purpose;
b. the secretary's record of the minutes of the meeting, which
shall include the list of all members present, the votes cast,
the purpose of the special assessment or fees and the
recipient of such assessment or fees;46 and
c. individual written authorizations for check-off duly signed by
the employees concerned.
RATIO
1.) In the case at bar, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to show compliance with
the foregoing requirements. It attempted to remedy the "inadvertent
omission" of the matter of the approval of the deduction of two
percent (2%) union dues from the monthly basic salary of each union
member through the General Membership Resolution (GMR)
2.) It can be gleaned from the documents that while the matter of
implementing the two percent (2%) union dues was taken up during
the PEU-NUWHRAIN's 8th General Membership Meeting on Oct
2008, there was no sufficient showing that the same had been duly
deliberated and approved.
a. The minutes of the Assembly itself belie PEU-NUWHRAIN's
claim that the increase in union dues and the corresponding
check-off were duly approved since it merely stated that "the
[two percent (2%)] Union dues will have to be
implemented,"53 meaning, it would still require the
submission of such matter to the Assembly for deliberation
and approval Such conclusion is bolstered by the silence of
the October 28, 2008 GMR on the matter of two percent
(2%) union dues, in contrast to the payment of 10%
attorney's fees from the CBA backwages which was clearly
spelled out as having been "discussed and approved." 54
b. Thus if indeed majority of the members of [PEU-
NUWHRAIN] approved the increase in union dues, the same
should have been mentioned in the minutes of the meeting,
and reflected in the GMR of the same date.
3.) Having failed to establish due deliberation and approval of the
increase in union dues from one percent (1%) to two percent (2%),
as well as the deduction of the two percent (2%) union dues during
PEU-NUWHRAIN's 8th General Membership Meeting on October 28,
2008, there was nothing to confirm, affirm, or ratify through the July
1, 2010 GMR.
4.) The SC held that the GMR, by itself, cannot justify the collection of
two percent (2%) agency fees from the non-PEU members beginning
July 2010. The Assembly was not called for the purpose of approving
the proposed increase in union dues and the corresponding check-
off, but merely to "confirm and affirm" a purported prior action which
PEU-NUWHRAIN, however, failed to establish.
5.) Also there was no individual check-off authorizations can proceed
therefrom, and the submission of the November 2008 check-off
authorizations56 becomes inconsequential. Jurisprudence states that
the express consent of the employee to any deduction in his
compensation is required to be obtained in accordance with the
steps outlined by the law, which must be followed to the
letter;57 however, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply. Thus, the CA
correctly ruled that there is no legal basis to impose union dues and
 agency fees more than that allowed in the expired CBA, i.e., at one
percent (1%) of the employee's monthly basic salary
FALLO
In fine, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the CA in granting
petitioner's certiorari petition, and finding that the OSEC gravely abused its
discretion in declaring PEU-NUWHRAIN's entitlement to collect two percent
(2%) agency fees from the non-PEU members beginning July 2010. The
OSEC's March 6, 2012 Order is patently contrary to law, hence, imbued with
grave abuse of discretion correctible through certiorari.58
[G.R. No. 115949. March 16, 2000]
EVANGELINE J. GABRIEL, TERESITA C. LUALHATI, EVELYN SIA,
RODOLFO EUGENIO, ISAGANI MAKISIG, and DEMETRIO
SALAS, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT and SIMEON SARMIENTO, JESUS CARLOS MARTINEZ
III, ALBERT NAPIAL, MARVIN ALMACIN, ROGELIO MATEO, GLENN
SIAPNO, EMILIANO CUETO, SALOME ATIENZA, NORMA V. GO, JUDITH
DUDANG, MONINA DIZON, EUSEBIO ROMERO, ISAGANI MORALES,
ELISEO BUENAVENTURA, CLEMENTE AGCAMARAN, CARMELITA
NOLASCO, JOVITA FERI, LULU ACOSTA, CAROL LAZARO, NIDA ARRIZA,
ROMAN BERNARDO, DOMINGO B. MACALDO, EUGENE PIDLAOAN, MA.
SOCORRO T. ANGOB, JOSEPHINE ALVAREZ, LOURDES FERRER,
JACQUILINE BAQUIRAN, GRACIA R. ESCUADRO, KRISTINA
HERNANDEZ, LOURDES IBEAS, MACARIO GARCIA, BILLY TECSON,
ALEX RECTO III, LEBRUDO, JOSE RICAFORTE, RODOLFO MORADA,
TERESA AMADO, ROSITA TRINIDAD, JEANETTE ONG, VICTORINO LAS-
AY, RANIEL DAYAO, OSCAR SANTOS, CRISTINA SALAVER, VICTORIA
ARINO, A.H. SAJO, MICHAEL BIETE, RED RP, GLORIA JUAT, ETHELINDA
CASILAN, FAMER DIPASUPIL, MA. HIDELISA POMER, MA. CHARLOTTE
TAWATAO, GRACE REYES, ERNIE COLINA, ZENAIDA MENDOZA,
PAULITA ADORABLE, BERNARDO MADUMBA, NESTOR NAVARRO,
EASTER YAP, ALMA LIM, FELISA YU, TIMOTEO GANASTRA, REVELITA
CARTAJENAS, ANGELITO CABUAL, ROBERTA TAN, DOMINADOR TAPO,
GRACE LIM, GADIANE JEMIE, CHRISTHDY DAUD, BENEDICTO ACOSTA,
JESUSA ACOSTA, MA. AVELINA ARYAP, EVELYN BENITEZ, ESTERITA
CHU, EVANGELINE CHU, BETTY CINCO, RICARDO CONNEJO,
MANULITO EVALO, FRANCIS LEONIDA, GREGORIO NOBLEZA,
RODOLFO RIVERAL, ELSA SIA, CLARA SUGBO, EDGARDO TABAO,
MANUEL VELOSO, MARLYN YU, ABSALON BUENA, WILFREDO
PUERTO, FLORENTINA PINGOL, MARILOU DAR, FE MORALES, MALEN
BELLO, LORENA TAMAYO, CESAR LIM, PAUL BALTAZAR, ALFREDO
GAYAGAS, DUMAGUETE EMPLOYEES, CEBU EMPLOYEES, OZAMIZ
EMPLOYEES, TACLOBAN EMPLOYEES AND ALL OTHER SOLIDBANK
UNION MEMBERS, respondents. C alrsc
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari seeking to reverse partially the
Order[1] of public respondent dated June 3, 1994, in Case No. OS-MA-A-8-
170-92, which ruled that the workers through their union should be made to
shoulder the expenses incurred for the professional services of a lawyer in
connection with the collective bargaining negotiations and that the
reimbursement for the deductions from the workers should be charged to the
unions general fund or account.
The records show the following factual antecedents:
Petitioners comprise the Executive Board of the SolidBank Union, the duly
recognized collective bargaining agent for the rank and file employees of
Solid Bank Corporation. Private respondents are members of said union.
Sometime in October 1991, the unions Executive Board decided to retain
anew the service of Atty. Ignacio P. Lacsina (now deceased) as union
counsel in connection with the negotiations for a new Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA). Accordingly, on October 19, 1991, the board called a
general membership meeting for the purpose. At the said meeting, the
majority of all union members approved and signed a resolution confirming
the decision of the executive board to engage the services of Atty. Lacsina as
union counsel.
As approved, the resolution provided that ten percent (10%) of the total
economic benefits that may be secured through the negotiations be given to
Atty. Lacsina as attorneys fees. It also contained an authorization for
SolidBank Corporation to check-off said attorneys fees from the first lump
sum payment of benefits to the employees under the new CBA and to turn
over said amount to Atty. Lacsina and/or his duly authorized representative. [2]
The new CBA was signed on February 21, 1992. The bank then, on request
of the union, made payroll deductions for attorneys fees from the CBA
benefits paid to the union members in accordance with the abovementioned
resolution.
On October 2, 1992, private respondents instituted a complaint against the
petitioners and the union counsel before the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) for illegal deduction of attorneys fees as well as for
quantification of the benefits in the 1992 CBA.[3] Petitioners, in response,
moved for the dismissal of the complaint citing litis pendentia, forum
shopping and failure to state a cause of action as their grounds. [4]Sccal r
On April 22, 1993, Med-Arbiter Paterno Adap of the DOLE- NCR issued the
following Order:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Respondents
Union Officers and Counsel are hereby directed to
immediately return or refund to the Complainants the illegally
deducted amount of attorneys fees from the package of
benefits due herein complainants under the aforesaid new
CBA.
"Furthermore, Complainants are directed to pay five percent
(5%) of the total amount to be refunded or returned by the
 Respondent Union Officers and Counsel to them in favor of
Atty. Armando D. Morales, as attorneys fees, in accordance
with Section II, Rule VIII of Book II (sic) of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code."[5]
On appeal, the Secretary of Labor rendered a Resolution [6] dated December
27, 1993, stating:
"WHEREFORE, the appeal of respondents Evangeline
Gabriel, et. al., is hereby partially granted and the Order of
the Med-Arbiter dated 22 April 1993 is hereby modified as
follows: (1) that the ordered refund shall be limited to those
union members who have not signified their conformity to the
check-off of attorneys fees; and (2) the directive on the
payment of 5% attorneys fees should be deleted for lack of
basis.
SO ORDERED."[7]
On Motion for Reconsideration, public respondent affirmed the said Order
with modification that the unions counsel be dropped as a party litigant and
that the workers through their union should be made to shoulder the
expenses incurred for the attorneys services. Accordingly, the reimbursement
should be charged to the unions general fund/account. [8]
Hence, the present petition seeking to partially annul the above-cited order of
the public respondent for being allegedly tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The sole issue for consideration is, did the public respondent act with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged order? Calrsp ped
Petitioners argue that the General Membership Resolution authorizing the
bank to check-off attorneys fee from the first lump sum payment of the
benefits to the employees under the new CBA satisfies the legal
requirements for such assessment.[9] Private respondents, on the other hand,
claim that the check-off provision in question is illegal because it was never
submitted for approval at a general membership meeting called for the
purpose and that it failed to meet the formalities mandated by the Labor
Code.[10]
In check-off, the employer, on agreement with the Union, or on prior
authorization from employees, deducts union dues or agency fees from the
latters wages and remits them directly to the union.[11] It assures continuous
funding for the labor organization. As this Court has acknowledged, the
system of check-off is primarily for the benefit of the union and only indirectly
for the individual employees.[12]
The pertinent legal provisions on check-offs are found in Article 222 (b) and
Article 241 (o) of the Labor Code.
Article 222 (b) states:
"No attorneys fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any
kind arising from any collective bargaining negotiations or
conclusions of the collective agreement shall be imposed on
any individual member of the contracting union: Provided,
however, that attorneys fees may be charged against union
funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any
contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the
contrary shall be null and void." (Underscoring ours)
Article 241 (o) provides:
"Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no
special assessment, attorneys fees, negotiation fees or any
other extraordinary fees may be checked off from any
amount due to an employee without an individual written
authorization duly signed by the employee. The authorization
should specifically state the amount, purpose and
beneficiary of the deduction." (Emphasis ours.)
Article 241 has three (3) requisites for the validity of the special assessment
for unions incidental expenses, attorneys fees and representation expenses.
These are: 1) authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the
members at the general membership meeting called for the purpose; (2)
secretarys record of the minutes of the meeting; and (3) individual written
authorization for check off duly signed by the employees concerned. Sce dp
Clearly, attorneys fees may not be deducted or checked off from any amount
due to an employee without his written consent.
After a thorough review of the records, we find that the General Membership
Resolution of October 19, 1991 of the SolidBank Union did not satisfy the
requirements laid down by law and jurisprudence for the validity of the ten
percent (10%) special assessment for unions incidental expenses, attorneys
fees and representation expenses. There were no individual written check off
authorizations by the employees concerned and so the assessment cannot
be legally deducted by their employer.
Even as early as February 1990, in the case of Palacol vs. Ferrer-
Calleja[13] we said that the express consent of employees is required, and this
consent must be obtained in accordance with the steps outlined by law,
which must be followed to the letter. No shortcuts are allowed. In Stellar
Industrial Services, Inc. vs. NLRC[14] we reiterated that a written individual
authorization duly signed by the employee concerned is a condition sine qua
non for such deduction.
These pronouncements are also in accord with the recent ruling of this Court
in the case of ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union Members vs. ABS-
CBN Broadcasting Corporation, et. al.,[15] which provides:
"Premises studiedly considered, we are of the irresistible
conclusion and, so find that the ruling in BPIEU-ALU vs.
NLRC that (1) the prohibition against attorneys fees in Article
222, paragraph (b) of the Labor Code applies only when the
payment of attorneys fees is effected through forced
contributions from the workers; and (2) that no deduction
must be take from the workers who did not sign the check-off
authorization, applies to the case under consideration."
(Emphasis ours.)
We likewise ruled in Bank of the Philippine Island Employees Union-
Association Labor Union (BPIEU-ALU) vs. NLRC,[16]
" the afore-cited provision (Article 222 (b) of the Labor Code)
as prohibiting the payment of attorneys fees only when it is
effected through forced contributions from workers from their
own funds as distinguished from the union funds. The
purpose of the provision is to prevent imposition on the
workers of the duty to individually contribute their respective
shares in the fee to be paid the attorney for his services on
behalf of the union in its negotiations with management. The
obligation to pay the attorneys fees belongs to the union and
cannot be shunted to the workers as their direct
responsibility. Neither the lawyer nor the union itself may
require the individual worker to assume the obligation to pay
attorneys fees from their own pockets. So categorical is this
intent that the law makes it clear that any agreement to the
contrary shall be null and void ab initio." (Emphasis
ours.) Edp sc
From all the foregoing, we are of the considered view that public respondent
did not act with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the workers through
their union should be made to shoulder the expenses incurred for the
services of a lawyer. And accordingly the reimbursement should be charged
to the unions general fund or account. No deduction can be made from the
salaries of the concerned employees other than those mandated by law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Order dated June 3,
1994, of respondent Secretary of Labor signed by Undersecretary
Bienvenido E. Laguesma is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 70067 September 15, 1986
CARLOS P. GALVADORES, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
MANGGAGAWA NG KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS (FIWU), PHILIPPINE
LONG DISTANCE COMPANY (PLDT), and JOSE C. ESPINAS, respondents.
Dante A. Carandang for petitioners.
Jose C. Espinas for respondents.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioner employees of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT) and members of respondent Free Telephone Workers Union, now the
Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (simply referred to hereinafter
as the Union), question the legality of the check-off for attorney's fees
amounting to P1M, more or less, of respondent Atty. Jose C. Espinas
(hereinafter referred to as "Respondent Counsel") from the monetary benefits
awarded to PLDT employees in a deadlocked collective bargaining
agreement negotiations between the PLDT and the Union.
The case stemmed from the following facts:
Respondent Counsel has been the legal counsel of respondent Union since
1964. For his services, he was hired on a case to case contingent fee basis.
On September 7, 1983, he received a letter from the Union President
reading:
The Free Telephone Workers Union once again request you
to appear as counsel in the on going labor dispute at PLDT.
In consideration of your services therein, the union binds
itself to compensate you for your fees and expenses therein
on a contingent basis. The amount shall be 10% of any
improvement, with retroactive effect, of the PLDT's last offer
to the deadlock in CBA negotiations which we know will
result in a compulsory arbitration. A supporting board
resolution will later confirm the letter. 1
PLDT's "last offer" referred to on the wage increases was: P230 for the first
year of the proposed CBA; P100 for the second year; and P90 for the third
year. 2
On September 9, 1983, the Minister of Labor and Employment assumed
jurisdiction over all unresolved issues in the bargaining deadlock between
PLDT and the Union and proceeded to resolve the same by compulsory
arbitration.
On October 23, 1983, the Minister of Labor awarded across-the-board wage
increases of P 330/month effective November 9, 1982; P155/month effective
November 9, 1983, and P155/month effective November 9, 1984, in addition
to the Christmas bonus of 1/2 month pay per employee effective December,
1983, and other fringe benefits. As will be noted, there were improvements
obtained from PLDT's "last offer."
On October 29, 1983, the Executive Board of the Union passed a resolution
requesting PLDT to deduct P115.00 per employee for the legal services
extended to the Union by respondent Counsel.
On November 2, 1983, petitioners initially numbering 600 and finally 5,258,
filed a letter-complaint before the MOLE through their authorized
representative, petitioner Carlos Galvadores assailing the imposition of
P130.00 (later corrected to P155.00) per employee as attorney's fees of
respondents counsel. Annexed to the complaint were the written statements
of the employee authorizing Galvadores to act for and in their behalf.
Petitioners took the position that the attorney's fees of respondent counsel
were not only unreasonable but also violative of Article 242(o) of the Labor
Code; and that he deductions cannot given legal effect by a mere Board
resolution but needs the ratification by the general membership of the Union.
Respondents Union and Counsel, on the other hand, proferred the argument
that the attorney s fees being exacted pertained to his services during
compulsory arbitration proceedings and cannot be considered as negotiation
fees or attorney's fees within the context of Article 242(o) of the Labor Code
and that contrary to petitioners' claim that Respondent Counsel surfaced only
as lawyer of the Union when the employees themselves engaged in mass
action to force a solution to the deadlock in their negotiations, he appeared
continuously from September 8, 1983 until the decision in the case was
rendered on October 23, 1983. Petitioners proposed a solution offering to
pay P10.00 per employee, but Respondent Counsel refused.
In the meantime, on November 4, 1983, PLDT filed notice that assessment
had been withheld from the differential pay due petitioners but that the same
would not be turned over to the Union without prior MOLE authority so as not
to involve management in the intra-union disagreement.
February 13, 1984, the Minister of Labor referred the dispute to the Bureau of
Labor Relations for being intra-union nature. Several hearings were held by
that Bureau.
On March 22, 1984, the Union filed a Manifestation to the effect that about
6,067 members of the Union ratified the October 29, 1983 resolution of the
legislative council in a plebiscite called for that purpose. On the basis thereof,
Counsel moved for the payment of his legal fees under the September 7,
1983 contract.
Petitioners questioned the plebiscite on the ground that Question No. 2,
which reads:
Question No. 2. Do you approve of the use of P1 million
(P500,000.00 to be withdrawn from PECCI and another
P500,000.00 from IBAA) from our CBA negotiation fund
together with the attorney's fees (P1 million) that was
collected and to be loaned to the MKP/FTWU as our
counterpart of the seed money to start the housing program
as agreed by the PLDT management and our union panel
and included in the award of the MOLE?
was misleading and deceptive as it assumed that there was no dispute
regarding the deduction of attorney's fees from the monetary benefits
awarded to PLDT employees.
On February 18, 1985, respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations
dismissed petitioners' complaint for lack of merit reasoning that "the outcome
of the plebiscite negates any further question on the right of the union
counsel to collect the amount of P115 from each of the employees involved."
It is this Decision that is assailed by petitioners principally on the ground that
the individual written authorization of an the employees must first be obtained
before any assessment can be made against the monetary benefits awarded
to them pursuant to Article 242(o) of the Labor Code; and that assuming that
Respondent Counsel is entitled to attorney's fees, the same should be taken
from Union funds.
In their Comment, respondents Union and Counsel argue that compulsory
arbitration is a "mandatory activity" and an exception to Article 242(o) of the
Labor Code, and that the Union members approved the questioned
deduction in the plebiscite of January, 1984, under the condition that P lM of
the same would be made available for the Union's housing project.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General agrees with petitioners that the issue
presented is squarely covered by Article 222(b) of the Labor Code, as
amended by P.D. No. 1691 so that attorney's fees, if legally payable, can only
be charged against Union funds.
The Court resolved to give due course.
Article 222(b) of the Labor Code provides:
Article 222. Appearance and Fees.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) No attorney's fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of
any kind arising from any collective bargaining negotiations
or conclusion of the collective bargaining agreement shall be
imposed on any individual member of the contracting union;
Provided, however, that attorney's fees may be charged
against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the
parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort
to the contrary shall be null and void.
While Article 242 of the same Code reads:
Art. 242. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor
organization. The following are the rights and conditions of
membership in a labor organization:
xxx xxx xxx
(o) Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no
special assessment, attorney's fees, negotiation fees or any
other extraordinary fees may be checked off "from any
amount due an employee without individual written
authorization duly signed by the employee. The authorization
should specifically state the amount, purpose and
beneficiary of the deduction.
The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code also provide that
deductions from wages of the employees may only be made by the employer
in cases authorized by law, including deductions for insurance premiums
advanced by the employer on behalf of the employees as well as union dues
where the right to check-off is authorized in writing by the individual
employee himself. 3
The provisions are clear. No check-offs from any amounts due employees
may be effected without individual written authorizations duly signed by the
employee specifically stating the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the
deduction. The required individual authorizations in this case are wanting. In
fact, petitioner employees are vigorously objecting. The question asked in the
plebiscite, besides not being explicit, assumed that there was no dispute
relative to attorney's fees.
Contrary to respondent Union's and Counsel's stand, the benefits awarded to
PLDT employees still formed part of the collective bargaining negotiations
although placed already under compulsory arbitration. This is not the
"mandatory activity" under the Code which dispenses with individual written
authorizations for check-offs, notwithstanding its "compulsory" nature. It is a
judicial process of settling disputes laid down by law. Besides, Article 222(b) NARDITO C. ALVAREZ, JAIME T.
does not except a CBA, later placed under compulsory arbitration, from the VALERIANO, JOHNSON S.
ambit of its prohibition. The cardinal principle should be borne in mind that REYES, GAUDENCIO JIMENEZ,
employees are protected by law from unwarranted practices that diminish JR., GAVINO R. VIDANES,
their compensation without their knowledge and consent. 4 ARNALDO G. TAYAO, BONIFACIO
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed Decision of February 18, 1985 rendered by F. CIRUJANO, EDGARDO G.
respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, is hereby SET ASIDE. CADVONA, MAXIMO A. CAOC,
The attorney's fees herein involved may be charged against Union funds JOSE O. MACLIT, JR., LUZMINDO
pursuant to Article 222(b) of the Labor Code, as may be agreed upon D. ACORDA, JR., LEMUEL R.
between them. RAGASA, and GIL G. DE VERA,
EMILIO E. DIOKNO, VICENTE R. G.R. No. 168475 Respondents.
ALCANTARA, ANTONIO Z.
VERGARA, JR., DANTE M. TONG,
JAIME C. MENDOZA, ROMEO M.
MACAPULAY, ROBERTO M.
MASIGLAT, LEANDRO C. Promulgated:
ATIENZA, ROMULO AQUINO, Present:
JESUS SAMIA, GAUDENCIO July 4, 2007
CAMIT, DANTE PARAO, ALBERTO YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
MABUGAT, EDGARDO Chairperson,
VILLANUEVA, JR., FRANCISCO AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
ESCOTO, EDGARDO SEVILLA, CHICO-NAZARIO, and
FELICITO MACASAET, and JOSE NACHURA, JJ.
Z. TULLO, x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Petitioners,
DECISION
- versus -

HON. HANS LEO J. CACDAC, in CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

his capacity as Director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations, DOLE,
MANILA, MED-ARBITER This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
TRANQUILINO C. Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the nullification of the Decision [1] and
REYES, EDGARDO DAYA, PABLO Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83061, dated 17
LUCAS, LEANDRO M. TABILOG, June 2004 and 10 June 2005, respectively, which dismissed petitioners
REYNALDO ESPIRITU, JOSE Petition for Certiorari and denied their Motion for Reconsideration thereon.
VITO, ANTONIO DE LUNA,
ARMANDO YALUNG, EDWIN The Facts
LAYUG, NARDS PABILONA,
REYNALDO REYES, EVANGELINE The First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees
ESCALL, ALBERTO ALCANTARA, (FLAMES) is a legitimate labor organization which is the supervisory union of
ROGELIO CERVITILLO, Meralco. Petitioners and private respondents are members of FLAMES.
MARCELINO MORELOS,
FAUSTINO ERMINO, JIMMY S. On 1 April 2003, the FLAMES Executive Board created the
ONG, ALFREDO ESCALL, Committee on Election (COMELEC) for the conduct of its union elections
scheduled on 7 May 2003.[3] The COMELEC was composed of petitioner
Dante M. Tong as its chairman, and petitioners Jaime C. Mendoza and
Romeo M. Macapulay as members. Subsequently, private respondents
Jimmy S. Ong, Nardito C. Alvarez, Alfredo J. Escall, and Jaime T.
Valeriano filed their respective certificates of candidacy. On 12 April 2003, the
COMELEC rejected Jimmy S. Ongs candidacy on the ground that he was not
a member of FLAMES. Meanwhile, the certificates of candidacy of Nardito C.
Alvarez, Alfredo J. Escall, and Jaime T. Valeriano were similarly rejected on
the basis of the exclusion of their department from the scope of the existing
collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The employees assigned to the
aforesaid department are allegedly deemed disqualified from membership in
the union for being confidential employees.
On 24 April 2003, private respondents Jimmy S. Ong, Nardito C. Alvarez,
Alfredo J. Escall, Jaime T. Valeriano (Ong, et al.), and a certain Leandro M.
Tabilog filed a Petition[4]before the Med-Arbitration Unit of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE). They prayed, inter alia, for the nullification of
the order of the COMELEC which disallowed their candidacy. [5] They further
prayed that petitioners be directed to render an accounting of funds with full
and detailed disclosure of expenditures and financial transactions; and that a
representative from the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) be designated to
act as chairman of the COMELEC in lieu of petitioner Dante M. Tong. [6]
On 30 April 2003, DOLE-NCR Regional Director Alex E. Maraan issued an
Order[7] directing DOLE personnel to observe the conduct of the FLAMES
election on 7 May 2003.[8]
On 2 May 2003, petitioners filed a Petition[9] with the COMELEC seeking the
disqualification of private respondents Edgardo Daya, Pablo Lucas, Leandro
Tabilog, Reynaldo Espiritu, Jose Vito, Antonio de Luna, Armando Yalung,
Edwin Layug, Nards Pabilona, Reynaldo Reyes, Evangeline Escall, Alberto
Alcantara, Rogelio Cervitillo, Marcelino Morelos, and Faustino Ermino
(Daya, et al.). Petitioners alleged that Daya, et al., allowed themselves to be
assisted by non-union members, and committed acts of disloyalty which are
inimical to the interest of FLAMES. In their campaign, they allegedly colluded
with the officers of the Meralco Savings and Loan Association (MESALA) and
the Meralco Mutual Aid and Benefits Association (MEMABA) and exerted
undue influence on the members of FLAMES.
On 6 May 2003, the COMELEC issued a Decision, [10] declaring Daya, et al.,
officially disqualified to run and/or to participate in the 7 May 2003 FLAMES
elections. The COMELEC also resolved to exclude their names from the list
of candidates in the polls or precincts, and further declared that any vote cast
in their favor shall not be counted.According to the COMELEC, Daya, et al.,
violated Article IV, Section 4(a)(6) [11] of the FLAMES Constitution and By-
Laws (CBL) by allowing non-members to aid them in their campaign. Their
acts of solicitation for support from non-union members were deemed
inimical to the interest of FLAMES.
On 7 May 2003, the COMELEC proclaimed the following candidates,
including some of herein petitioners as winners of the elections, to wit [12]:
NAME POSITION
Emilio E. Diokno President
Vicente P. Alcantara Executive Vice President External
Antonio Z. Vergara, Jr. Executive Vice President Internal
Alberto L. Mabugat Vice-President Organizing
Roberto D. Masiglat, Jr. Vice-President Education
Leandro C. Atienza Vice-President Chief Steward
Felito C. Macasaet Secretary
Edgardo R. Villanueva Asst. Secretary
Romulo C. Aquino Treasurer
Jesus D. Samia Asst. Treasurer
Gaudencio C. Camit Auditor
Rodante B. [Parao] Asst. Auditor
Jose Z. Tullo Central Coordinator
Bernardo C. Sevilla North Coordinator
Francis B. Escoto South Coordinator
On 8 May 2003, private respondents Daya, et al., along with Ong, et
al., filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE-NCR, a Petition [13] to: a)
Nullify Order of Disqualification; b) Nullify Election Proceedings and Counting
of Votes; c) Declare Failure of Election; and d) Declare Holding of New
Election to be Controlled and Supervised by the DOLE. The Petition was
docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-0304-002-LRD.
On 14 May 2003, another group led by private respondent
Gaudencio Jimenez, Jr., along with private respondents Johnson S. Reyes,
Gavino R. Vidanes, Arnaldo G. Tayao, Bonifacio F. Cirujano, Edgardo G.
Cadavona, Maximo A. Caoc, Jose O. Maclit, Jr., Luzmindo D. Acorda, Jr.,
Lemuel R. Ragasa and Gil G. de Vera (Jimenez, et al.) filed a Petition with
the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE-NCR against petitioners to nullify the 7
May 2003 election on the ground that the same was not free, orderly, and
peaceful.It was docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-0305-004-LRD, which was
subsequently consolidated with the Petition of Daya, et al. and the earlier
Petition of Ong, et al.
Meanwhile, the records show that a subsequent election was held
on 30 June 2004, which was participated in and won by herein private
respondents Daya, et al. The validity of the 30 June 2004 elections was
assailed by herein petitioners before the DOLE [14] and taken to the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88264 on certiorari, which case does not
concern us in the instant Petition. The Court of Appeals, in the aforesaid
case, rendered a Decision[15] dated 12 January 2007, upholding the validity of
the 30 June 2004 elections, and the declaration of herein private
respondents Daya, et al., as the duly elected winners therein.
The Decision of the Med-Arbiter
On 7 July 2003, Med-Arbiter Tranquilino B. Reyes, Jr. issued a
Decision[16] in favor of private respondents, Daya, et al. However, the petition
of Jimenez, et al., was dismissed because it was premature, it appearing that
the COMELEC had not yet resolved their protest prior to their resort to the
Med-Arbiter. Finally, the Petition of Ong, et al., seeking to declare themselves
as bona fide members of FLAMES was ordered dismissed.
The Med-Arbiter noted in his decision that during a conference which
was held on 15 May 2003, the parties agreed that the issue anent the
qualifications of private respondents Ong, et al. had been rendered moot and
academic.[17]
The Med-Arbiter reversed the disqualification imposed by the
COMELEC against private respondents Daya, et al. He said that the
COMELEC accepted all the allegations of petitioners against private
respondents Daya, et al., sans evidence to substantiate the same. Moreover,
he found that the COMELEC erred in relying on Article IV, Section 4(a) (6) of
the CBL as basis for their disqualification. The Med-Arbiter read the aforesaid
provision to refer to the dismissal and/or expulsion of a member from
FLAMES, but not to the disqualification of a member as a candidate in a
union election. He rationalized that the COMELEC cannot disqualify a
candidate on the same grounds for expulsion of members, which power is
vested by the CBL on the Executive Board. The Med-Arbiter also held that
there was a denial of due process because the COMELEC failed to receive
private respondents Daya, et al.s motion for reconsideration of the order of
their disqualification. The COMELEC was also found to have refused to
receive their written protest in violation of the unions CBL. [18]
Lastly, the Med-Arbiter defended his jurisdiction over the case. He
concluded that even as the election of union officers is an internal affair of the
union, his office has the right to inquire into the merits and conduct of the
election when its jurisdiction is sought.[19]
The decretal portion of the Med-Arbiters Decision states, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [P]etition
to Nullify the Order of Disqualification; Nullify Election
proceedings and counting of Votes; and Declare a Failure of
Elections is hereby granted. The disqualification of [private
respondent] Ed[gardo] Daya, et al., is hereby considered as
null and void. Perforce, the election of union officers of
FLAMES on May 7, 2003 is declared a failure and a new
election is ordered conducted under the supervision of the
Department of Labor and Employment.
The [P]etition to conduct an accounting of union
funds and to stop the release of funds to [petitioner]
Diokno, et al., is ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
And the Petition to Declare [private respondents]
Jimmy Ong, Alfredo [E]scall, Nardito Alvarez, and Jaime
Valeriano as members of FLAMES is hereby ordered
dismissed for lack of merit.
The [P]etition to Nullify the election filed by [private
respondents] Gaudencio Jimenez, et al., is likewise ordered
dismissed.[20]
Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal before the Director of the BLR.
The Ruling of the BLR Director
On 3 December 2003, the Director of the BLR issued a Resolution,
[21]
affirming in toto the assailed Decision of the Med-Arbiter.
Public respondent Director Hans Leo J. Cacdac ruled, inter alia, that the
COMELECs reliance on Article IV, Section 4(a) (6) of the CBL, as a ground
for disqualifying private respondents Daya, et al., was premature. He echoed
the interpretation of the Med-Arbiter that the COMELEC erroneously resorted
to the aforecited provision which refers to the expulsion of a member from
the union on valid grounds and with due process, along with the requisite 2/3
vote of the Executive Board. Hence, the COMELEC cut short the expulsion
proceedings in disqualifying private respondents Daya, et al.[22] The BLR
Director further held that the case involves a question of disqualification on
account of the alleged commission by private respondents Daya, et al., of
illegal campaign acts, which acts were not specifically mentioned in the
guidelines for the conduct of election as issued by the COMELEC. Likewise,
on the alleged refusal of private respondents Daya, et al., to submit to the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC by failing to file a petition to nullify its order of
disqualification, the BLR Director deemed the same as an exception to the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus:
 By themselves, such acts could not be taken as repugnant of
COMELECs authority. Sensing that they were prejudiced by
the disqualification order, it was only incumbent upon [private
respondents Daya, et al.] to seek remedy before a body,
which they thought has a more objective perspective over
the situation. In short, they opted to bypass the
administrative remedies within the union. Such a move could
not be taken against [private respondents Daya, et al.]
considering that non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
is justified in instances where it would practically amount to a
denial of justice, or would be illusory or vain, as in the
present controversy.[23]
The BLR Director disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The Decision of Med-Arbiter Tranquilino B. Reyes,
DOLE-NCR, dated 7 July 2003 is AFFIRMED in its entirety.
Let the records of this case be returned to the DOLE-NCR
for the immediate conduct of election of officers of the First
Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees
(FLAMES) under the supervision of DOLE-NCR personnel.
[24]
Subsequently, petitioners sought a reversal of the 3 December
2003 Resolution, but the BLR Director issued a Resolution dated 10
February 2003,[25] refusing to reverse his earlier Resolution for lack of merit.
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition
for Certiorari.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals found petitioners appeal to be bereft of merit.
The appellate court held that the provision relied upon by the COMELEC
concerns the dismissal and/or expulsion of union members, which power is
vested in the FLAMES Executive Board, and not the COMELEC. It affirmed
the finding of the BLR Director that the COMELEC, in disqualifying private
respondents Daya, et al., committed a procedural shortcut. It held:
Without the requisite two-thirds (2/3) vote of the Executive
Board dismissing and/or expelling private respondents for
acts contemplated thereunder, the COMELEC was clearly
violating the unions constitution and bylaws (sic) by utilizing
the aforequoted provision in its said May 6, 2003 decision
and, in the process, arrogating unto itself a power it did not
possess. As the document embodying the covenant between
a union and its members and the fundamental law governing
the members rights and obligations, it goes without saying
that the constitution and bylaws (sic) should be upheld for as
long as they are not contrary to law, good morals or public
policy.[26]
On the matter of the failure of private respondents Daya, et al. to
come up with 30 percent (30%) members support in filing the Petition to
Nullify the COMELECs Decision before the Med-Arbiter, the Court of Appeals
said that the petition did not involve the entire membership of FLAMES, so
there was no need to comply with the aforesaid requirement. Furthermore,
the appellate court applied the exception to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies on the ground, inter alia, that resort to such a
remedy would have been futile, illusory or vain. [27] Indeed, the Court of
Appeals emphasized that private respondents Daya, et al., were directed by
the COMELEC to file their Answer to the petition for their disqualification only
on 5 May 2003. Private respondents Daya, et al., filed their Answer on 6 May
2003. On the same day, the COMELEC issued its Decision disqualifying
them. A day after, the 7 May 2003 election was held. The Court of Appeals
further stressed that private respondents Daya, et al.s efforts to have their
disqualification reconsidered were rebuffed by the COMELEC; hence, they
were left with no choice but to seek the intervention of the BLR, [28] which was
declared to have jurisdiction over intra-union disputes even at its own
initiative under Article 226[29] of the Labor Code.
Petitioners sought a reconsideration of the 17 June 2004 Decision of
the Court of Appeals, but the same was denied in a Resolution [30] dated 10
June 2005.
Hence, the instant Petition.
At the outset, petitioners contend that the instant Petition falls under
the exceptions to the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. They
implore this Court to make factual determination anent the conduct of the 7
May 2003 elections. They also question the jurisdiction of the BLR on the
case at bar because of the failure of private respondents Daya, et al., to
exhaust administrative remedies within the union. It is the stance of petitioner
that Article 226[31] of the Labor Code which grants power to the BLR to
resolve inter-union and intra-union disputes is dead law, and has been
amended by Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6715, whereby the conciliation,
mediation and voluntary arbitration functions of the BLR had been transferred
to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board.
Petitioners similarly assert that the 7 May 2003 election was
conducted in a clean, honest, and orderly manner, and that private
respondents, some of whom are not bona fide members of FLAMES, were
validly disqualified by the COMELEC from running in the election. They also
rehashed their argument that non-members of the union were allowed by
private respondents Daya, et al., to participate in the affair. They challenge
the finding of the BLR Director that the reliance by the COMELEC on Article
IV, Section 4(a)(6) of the CBL, was premature. Petitioners insist that the
COMELEC had the sole and exclusive power to pass upon the qualification
of any candidate, and therefore, it has the correlative power to disqualify any
candidate in accordance with its guidelines.
For their part, private respondents Daya, et al., maintain that the
Petition they filed before the DOLE-NCR Med-Arbiter questioning the
disqualification order of the COMELEC and seeking the nullification of the 7
May 2003 election involves an intra-union dispute which is within the
jurisdiction of the BLR. They further claim that the COMELEC, in
disqualifying them, mistakenly relied on a provision in the FLAMES CBL that
addresses the expulsion of members from the union, and no expulsion
proceedings were held against them. Finally, they underscore the finding of
the appellate court that there was disenfranchisement among the general
membership of FLAMES due to their wrongful disqualification which
restricted the members choices of candidates. They reiterate the conclusion
of the Court of Appeals that had the COMELEC tabulated the votes cast in
their favor, there would have been, at least, a basis for the declaration that
they lost in the elections.
Issues
Petitioners attribute to the Court of Appeals several errors to substantiate
their Petition.[32] They all boil down, though, to the question of whether the
Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the
jurisdiction of the BLR to take cognizance of the case and then upheld the
ruling of the BLR Director and Med-Arbiter, nullifying the COMELECs order of
disqualification of private respondents Daya et al., and annulling the 7 May
2003 FLAMES elections.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
We affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals upholding the
jurisdiction of the BLR. Article 226 of the Labor Code is hereunder
reproduced, to wit:
ART. 226. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS. The Bureau of
Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the
regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have
original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative
or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union
and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or
problems arising from or affecting labor-management
relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or
nonagricultural, except those arising from the
implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements which shall be the subject of grievance
procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.
The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor
cases before it, subject to extension by agreement of the
parties.
The amendment to Article 226, as couched in Republic Act No. 6715,
[33]
which is relied upon by petitioners in arguing that the BLR had been
divested of its jurisdiction, simply reads, thus:
Sec. 14. The second paragraph of Article 226 of the
same Code is likewise hereby amended to read as follows:
"The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) calendar days to
act on labor cases before it, subject to extension by
agreement of the parties."
This Court in Bautista v. Court of Appeals, [34] interpreting Article 226
of the Labor Code, was explicit in declaring that the BLR has the original and
exclusive jurisdiction on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts. We said that
since Article 226 of the Labor Code has declared that the BLR shall have
original and exclusive authority to act on all inter-union and intra-union
conflicts, there should be no more doubt as to its jurisdiction. As defined, an
intra-union conflict would refer to a conflict within or inside a labor union,
while an inter-union controversy or dispute is one occurring or carried on
between or among unions.[35] More specifically, an intra-union dispute is
defined under Section (z), Rule I of the Rules Implementing Book V of the
Labor Code, viz:
 (z) Intra-Union Dispute refers to any conflict between
and among union members, and includes all disputes or
grievances arising from any violation of or disagreement
over any provision of the constitution and by-laws of a union,
including cases arising from chartering or affiliation of labor
organizations or from any violation of the rights and
conditions of union membership provided for in the Code.
The controversy in the case at bar is an intra-union dispute. There is no
question that this is one which involves a dispute within or inside FLAMES, a
labor union. At issue is the propriety of the disqualification of private
respondents Daya, et al., by the FLAMES COMELEC in the 7 May
2003 elections. It must also be stressed that even as the dispute involves
allegations that private respondents Daya, et al., sought the help of non-
members of the union in their election campaign to the detriment of FLAMES,
the same does not detract from the real character of the controversy. It
remains as one which involves the grievance over the constitution and
bylaws of a union, and it is a controversy involving members of the
union. Moreover, the non-members of the union who were alleged to have
aided private respondents Daya, et al., are not parties in the case. We are,
therefore, unable to understand petitioners persistence in placing the
controversy outside of the jurisdiction of the BLR. The law is very clear. It
requires no further interpretation. The Petition which was initiated by private
respondents Daya, et al., before the BLR was properly within its cognizance,
it being an intra-union dispute. Indubitably, when private respondents
Daya, et al., brought the case to the BLR, it was an invocation of the power
and authority of the BLR to act on an intra-union conflict.
After having settled the jurisdiction of the BLR, we proceed to determine if
petitioners correctly raised the argument that private respondents Daya, et
al., prematurely sought the BLRs jurisdiction on the ground that they failed to
exhaust administrative remedies within the union. On this matter, we affirm
the findings of the Court of Appeals which upheld the application by the BLR
Director of the exception to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In this regard, this Court is emphatic that before a party is allowed to seek
the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed
of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving
the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his jurisdiction when such remedy should be exhausted
first before the courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation
of courts judicial intervention is fatal to ones cause of action. [36]
Verily, there are exceptions to the applicability of the doctrine.
[37]
Among the established exceptions are: 1) when the question raised is
purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act
complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial
intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage
will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; 9) when the subject of the
proceeding is private land; 10) in quo warranto proceedings;[38] and 11) where
the facts show that there was a violation of due process.[39] As aptly
determined by the BLR Director, private respondents Daya, et al., were
prejudiced by the disqualification order of the COMELEC. They endeavored
to seek reconsideration, but the COMELEC failed to act thereon. [40] The
COMELEC was also found to have refused to receive their written protest.
[41]
The foregoing facts sustain the finding that private respondents Daya, et
al., were deprived of due process. Hence, it becomes incumbent upon
private respondents Daya, et al., to seek the aid of the BLR. To insist on the
contrary is to render their exhaustion of remedies within the union as illusory
and vain.[42] These antecedent circumstances convince this Court that there
was proper application by the Med-Arbiter of the exception to the rule of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, as affirmed by the BLR Director, and
upheld by the Court of Appeals.
We cannot accept, and the Court of Appeals rightfully rejected, the
contention of petitioners that the private respondents Daya, et al.s complaint
filed before the Med-Arbiter failed to comply with the jurisdictional
requirement because it was not supported by at least thirty percent (30%) of
the members of the union. Section 1 of Rule XIV of the Implementing Rules
of Book V mandates the thirty percent (30%) requirement only in cases
where the issue involves the entire membership of the union, which is clearly
not the case before us. The issue is obviously limited to the disqualification
from participation in the elections by particular union members.
Having resolved the jurisdictional cobwebs in the instant case, it is now apt
for this Court to address the issue anent the disqualification of private
respondents and the conduct of the 7 May 2003 elections.
On this matter, petitioners want this Court to consider the instant case as an
exception to the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; hence,
importuning that we make findings of fact anew. It bears stressing that in a
petition for review on certiorari, the scope of this Courts judicial review of
decisions of the Court of Appeals is generally confined only to errors of law,
[43]
and questions of fact are not entertained. We elucidated on our fidelity to
this rule, and we said:
Thus, only questions of law may be brought by the parties
and passed upon by this Court in the exercise of its power to
review. Also, judicial review by this Court does not extend to
 a reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which
the proper labor tribunal has based its determination. [44]
It is aphoristic that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done
through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
because as earlier stated, this Court is not a trier of facts; it reviews only
questions of law.[45] The Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and
weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. [46] This is
already outside the province of the instant Petition for Certiorari. While there
may be exceptions to this rule, petitioners miserably failed to show why the
exceptions should be applied here. With greater force must this rule be
applied in the instant case where the factual findings of the Med-Arbiter were
affirmed by the BLR Director, and then, finally, by the Court of Appeals. The
findings below had sufficient bases both in fact and in law. The uniform
conclusion was that private respondents Daya, et al., were wrongfully
disqualified by the COMELEC; consequently, the FLAMES election should be
annulled.
On the issue of disqualification, there was a blatant misapplication by the
COMELEC of the FLAMES CBL. As has been established ad nauseam, the
provision[47] relied upon by the COMELEC in disqualifying private
respondents Daya, et al., applies to a case of expulsion of members from the
union.
In full, Article IV, Section 4 (a) (6) of the FLAMES CBL, provides, to wit:
Section 4(a). Any member may be DISMISSED and/or
EXPELLED from the UNION, after due process and
investigation, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the Executive
Board, for any of the following causes:
xxxx
(6) Acting in a manner harmful to the interest and
welfare of the UNION and/or its MEMBERS.[48]
We highlight five points, thus:
First, Article IV, Section 4(a)(6) of the FLAMES CBL, embraces
exclusively the case of dismissal and/or expulsion of members from the
union. Even a cursory reading of the provision does not tell us that the same
is to be automatically or directly applied in the disqualification of a candidate
from union elections, which is the matter at bar. It cannot be denied that the
COMELEC erroneously relied on Article IV, Section 4(a)(6) because the
same does not contemplate the situation of private respondents Daya, et
al. The latter are not sought to be expelled or dismissed by the Executive
Board. They were brought before the COMELEC to be disqualified as
candidates in the 7 May 2003 elections.
Second, the aforecited provision evidently enunciates with clarity the
procedural course that should be taken to dismiss and expel a member from
FLAMES. The CBL is succinct in stating that the dismissal and expulsion of a
member from the union should be after due process and investigation, the
same to be exercised by two-thirds (2/3) vote of the Executive Board for any
of the causes[49] mentioned therein. The unmistakable directive is that in
cases of expulsion and dismissal, due process must be observed as laid
down in the CBL.
Third, nevertheless, even if we maintain a lenient stance and
consider the applicability of Article IV, Section 4(a)(6) in the disqualification of
private respondents Daya, et al., from the elections of 7 May 2003, still, the
disqualification made by the COMELEC pursuant to the subject provision
was a rank disregard of the clear due process requirement embodied
therein. Nowhere do we find that private respondents Daya, et al. were
investigated by the Executive Board. Neither do we see the observance of
the voting requirement as regards private respondents Daya, et al. In all
respects, they were denied due process.
Fourth, the Court of Appeals, the BLR Director, and the Med-Arbiter
uniformly found that due process was wanting in the disqualification order of
the COMELEC. We are in accord with their conclusion. If, indeed, there was
a violation by private respondents Daya, et al., of the FLAMES CBL that
could be a ground for their expulsion and/or dismissal from the union, which
in turn could possibly be made a ground for their disqualification from the
elections, the procedural requirements for their expulsion should have been
observed. In any event, therefore, whether the case involves dismissal
and/or expulsion from the union or disqualification from the elections, the
proper procedure must be observed. The disqualification ruled by the
COMELEC against private respondents Daya, et al., must not be allowed to
abridge a clear procedural policy established in the FLAMES CBL. If we
uphold the COMELEC, we are countenancing a clear case of denial of due
process which is anathema to the Constitution of the Philippines which
safeguards the right to due process.
Fifth, from another angle, the erroneous disqualification of private
respondents Daya, et al., constituted a case of disenfranchisement on the
part of the member-voters of FLAMES. By wrongfully excluding them from
the 7 May 2003 elections, the options afforded to the union members were
clipped. Hence, the mandate of the union cannot be said to have been
rightfully determined. The factual irregularities in the FLAMES elections
clearly provide proper bases for the annulment of the union elections of 7
May 2003.
On a final note, as it appears that the question of the qualifications
of private respondents Ong, et al. had been rendered moot and academic,
[50]
we do not find any reason for this Court to rule on the matter. As borne out
by the records, the question had been laid to rest even when the case was
still before the Med-Arbiter.[51]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 17 June 2004, and its Resolution dated 10 June 2005 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 83061 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
G.R. No. L-47775 July 5, 1980
JULIAN DUYAG, ARMANDO OLIVARES, JOSE ECHEVARIA, ALEJANDRO
SEVILLA and FELIMON GUINGON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMANDO G. INCIONG, as Acting Director of Labor Relation
CARMELO C. NORIEL, as Director of Labor Relations, RICA R. MANALAD,
HONORATO K. LEANO, EDUARDO AMPARO and SANTOS
PUERTO, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the removal of private respondents as union officers due
to alleged irregularities and anomalies in the administration of the affairs of
the union.
On January 14, 1977, the five petitioners, who are arrastre checkers of E.
Razon, Inc. in the South Harbor, Port Area, Manila as well as bona
fide members of the Associated Port Checkers and Workers Union, filed with
Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor a complaint containing
several charges against the four private respondents, who, respectively, are
the president (for more than twenty years), treasurer, vice-president and
auditor of the union.
The record reveals the following facts, some of which are admitted or not
denied by the private respondents, whiny the other facts are supported by
substantial evidence which is summarized in the decisions of the med-arbiter
and the Director of Labor Relations:
Unauthorized increases in union dues. — for arrastre checkers, the monthly
union dues amount to ten pesos, as fixed in section 2(b), article VI of the
union's constitution and bylaws approved on September 5,1969.
The monthly union dues were increased by two pesos in the resolution of
September 1, 1970 and by five pesos in the resolution of March 14, 1972.
However, those two resolutions are void because they were not approved by
three-fourths of all the members of the board of directors, as required in
article VII of the union's constitution and by-laws, dealing with amendments.
For March, April and May, 1973, the respondents without the benefit of any
board resolution caused to be collected an additional one peso, thus
increasing the union dues to eighteen pesos.
For April and May, 1975, the respondents caused to be collected monthly
union dues amounting to nineteen pesos or another increase of one peso.
And for the first semester of 1976, a deduction of eight pesos and fifty
centavos was made from the mid-year bonus without any board resolution
authorizing such deduction. In prior years, no deduction for union dues was
made from the mid-year bonus.
The med-arbiter concluded that the increases in union dues and the
deduction from the mid-year bonus are void because the same were
collected in contravention of the constitution and by-laws.
Moreover, their collection was not covered by any check-off authorization nor
evidenced by any receipt and was in contravention of the Labor Code. The
amounts collected were not duly accounted for. The Labor Code provides:
ART. 242. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor
organization. — The following are the rights and conditions
of membership in a labor organization:
xxxxxxxxx
(g) No officer, agent or member of a labor organization shall
collect any fees, dues, or other contributions in its behalf or
make any disbursement of its money or funds unless he is
duly authorized pursuant to its constitution and by-laws;
(h) Every payment of fees, dues or other contributions by a
member shall be evidenced by a receipt signed by the officer
or agent making the collection and entered into the record of
the organization to be kept and maintained for the purpose;
xxx xxx xxx
(n) No special assessment or other extraordinary fees may
be levied upon the members of a labor organization unless
authorized by a written resolution of a majority of all the
members at a general membership meeting duly caned for
the purpose. The secretary of the organization shall record
the minutes of the meeting including the list of all members
present, the votes cast, the purpose of the special
assessment or fees and the recipient of such assessments
or fees. The record shall be attested to by the president;
(o) Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no
special assessments, attorney's fees, negotiation fees or any
other extraordinary fees may be checked off from any
amount due to an employee without an individual written
authorization duly signed by the employee. The authorization
should specifically state the amount, purpose and
beneficiary of the deduction; and
xxx xxx xxx.
The foregoing legal provisions apply squarely to the unauthorized deductions
from the wages of the arrastre checkers.
For such unauthorized collection of union dues, the responsibility of
respondent Ricardo R. Manalad, as union president, is not denied.
Withholding of union members' share in the profits amounting to P18,640.09.
— E. Razon, Inc., the arrastre operator, paid to the union on December 18.
1973 the sum of P25,684.61 as its share of the profits (profit-share) for the
period from May to October, 1973. Instead of distributing the whole amount
to the union members, the dents paid to them only P19,974 and retained the
of P5,710.61 which had not been accounted for.
The Labor Arbiter found that other amounts were withheld by the
respondents from the union's profit-shares for subsequent periods. The total
amount withheld is P18,640.09 or P18.570.63, as shown in page 8 of private
respondents' memorandum.
With specific reference to the profit-share amounting to P22,559.50 paid by
E. Razon, Inc. for the period from November, 1973 to February, 1974, the
respondents deposited the amount in the account of the union's Cooperative
Credit Union of which respondent Manalad was also the president. Later, the
respondents withdrew the said amount, distributed among the union
members the sum of P20,848 and withheld the balance of P1,711.50, which
respondent Manalad and the union treasurer, respondent Honorato K. Leano
appropriated as follows:
Manalad — Filipinas Bank and Trust Com pany, Manila
Hilton Branch Chock No. 352966 dated March 22, 1975,
drawn to cash................. P1.000.00
Leaño — Filipinos Rank and Trust Company, Manila Hilton
Branch Chock No. 352967 dated March 22, 1975, drawn to
cash............................ 559.50
Leaño — Filipinos Bank and Trust Company Manila Hilton
Branch Check No. 352968 dated March 22,1975, drawn to
cash............................. 152.00
TOTAL ......................................... P1, 711.50
The med-arbiter found that the modus operandi resorted to by the
respondents with respect to the profit-share amounting to P22,559.50 was
followed by them as to the deductions from the profit-shares for the other
periods.
He surmised that the union officers must have deducted a considerable
amount from the profit-shares because they started that practice in 1966
when E. Razon, Inc. and Guacods Marine Terminals, Inc. commenced the
profit-share program
However, during the pendency of the case in this Court, the private
respondents submitted a resolution dated November 25, 1977 wherein more
than ninety percent of the union members allegedly ratified the deductions
from the mid-year bonus and profit-shares and authorized future deductions
(pp. 921 and 1615-6, Rollo).
Although the said resolution rendered this aspect of the case moot, it cannot
obliterate the violations of the constitution and by-laws and the Labor Code
already committed by respondents Manalad and Leano The deduction of
union dues from the mid-year bonus and the withholding of part of the profit-
shares were illegal and improper at the time they were made.
Disbursements exceeding P500 which were not authorized by the board of
directors. — Section 4(d), article IV of the union's constitution and by-laws
provides that the board of directors may "authorize and approve all
disbursements from union fund where the amount involved is more than
P500 and without that authorization or approval in due form, no such
disbursements will be allowed by the Treasurer
Respondent Manalad made the following disbursements of union funds in an
amount exceeding P500 without the requisite authorization of the board of
directors:
Respondents Manalad and Leaño, also without prior board authorization,
withdrew on twenty-three occasions union funds in the aggregate sum of
P43,026.80 deposited in Savings Account No. 5953 of the Manila Hilton
Branch of the Filipinos Bank and Trust Company (Annexes GG to GG-22).
The sum of P3,500 was paid to respondent Amparo pursuant to a resolution
dated July 12, 1971 which was approved by only six members of the board of
directors, instead of fourteen members, as required in the constitution and
by-laws of the union.
Maladministration of welfare fund. — Respondent Manalad allowed the
application of the funds of the union's Welfare Plan to the following
extraneous purposes:
1. On March 31, and April 6 and 14, 1973, the sum of P5,000
was taken from the Pacific Memorial Plan collections and
loaned to the union's Cooperative Credit Union, Inc.
2. On October 7, 1973, the sum of P1,500 was loaned to the
same cooperative for organizational expenses.
3. On August 7, 1971, the sum of P200 was taken from the
welfare fund for advance representation expenses of
Manalad.
4. On December 18, 1971, the sum of P1,600 was taken
from the welfare fund to cover cash advances to Marcelino
Melegrito to be repaid upon the release of his credit union
loan on March 8, 1973.
According to the complainants, those disbursements were not authorized by
the board of directors.
Respondents Manalad, Amparo and Puerto approved the payment of
retirement benefits amounting to (1) P3,500 to Miguel de Leon on June 21,
1976; (2) P7,000 to Eduardo Topacio on July 30, 1976 and (3) P7,000 to
Roberto Victoria on August 4, 1976.
According to the complainants, the three employees did not deserve
retirement benefits because they had been dismissed for prolonged
absences and they had ceased to be members of the Welfare Plan.
Membership in another union. — Respondents Manalad, Amparo and Puerto
are also officers of the Philippine Technical Clerical Commercial Employees
Association, another labor union.
Their membership in the latter union is manifestly violative of section 9,
article III of the constitution and by-laws of the arrastre checkers' union which
provides that an elected officer shall be deemed disqualified if he becomes a
member of another organization.
In this connection, the complainants presented evidence to prove that
because of that interlocking stewardship of the arrastre checkers' union and
the other union, the respondents improperly channeled to the latter funds of
the arrastre checkers' union.
Thus, on December 17, 1976 and March 29, June 9 and August 31, 1976,
Manalad approved payments by the arrastre checkers' union to the other
union of the sums of P1,000, P250 and P1,250.
Conflict of interest on the part of Manalad. — Respondent Manalad
organized a family corporation known as the Comet Integrated Stevedoring
Services, Inc. whose rank-and-file employees are also members of the
arrastre checkers' union. Thus, Manalad has functioned in the dual capacity
of labor leader and employer, not to mention the fact that he is also an officer
of another labor union, PTCCEA.
As head of the arrastre checkers' union, he issued customs passes for the
checkers of his family-owned stevedoring firm to facilitate their rendition of
services to some shipping companies.
The complainants contend that such a situation has involved Manalad in a
conflict of interest: if he favors his stevedoring firm, he is bound to jeopardize
the interests of the arrastre checkers' union of which he is the president.
Under these facts, the med-arbiter in his decision of August 29, 1977 ordered
the removal of the private respondents as officers of the union and directed
them to reimburse to the members thereof the amounts illegally collected
from them.
The private respondents appealed to the Director of Labor Relations who in
his decision of November 9, 1977 reversed the is not necessary and that the
five com tsn have the right and personality to institute the proceeding for the
removal of the respondents, to recover the amounts illegally collective or
decision of the med-arbiter.
The Director held that resort to intra-union remedies is not necessary and
that the five complainants have the rights and personality to institute the
proceedings for the removal of the respondents, to recover the amount
illegally collected orwithheld from them and to question illegal disbursements
and expenditure of union funds.
However, the Director ruled that the power to remove the union officers rests
in the members and that the Bureau of Labor Relations generally has nothing
to do with the tenure of union officers which "is a political question".
The Director further ruled that his office has jurisdiction to look into the
charge of illegal disbursements of union funds. He directed the Labor
Organization Division of the Bureau to examine the books of account and
financial records of the union and to submit a report on such examination.
The motions for reconsideration filed by the parties were denied by the
Undersecretary of Labor in his resolution of January 25, 1978 (he was then
Acting Director of Labor Relations). He ruled that the expulsion of union
officers is the prerogative of the members of the union.
That decision of the Director is assailed in these special civil actions of
certiorari and prohibition filed on February 10, 1978. The petitioners pray that
the four union officers be expelled.
The case has been simplified by the admission of the private respondents in
page 13 of their memorandum that the Bureau of Labor Relations has
unquestionably the power to remove erring union officers under the last
paragraph of Article 242 of the Labor Code.
That paragraph provides that any violation of the rights and conditions of
union membership as enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (p) of Article 242,
"shall be a ground for cancellation of union registration or expulsion of officer
from office, whichever is appropriate. At least thirty percent (30%) of all the
members of a union or any member or members specially concerned may
report such violation to the Bureau (of labor Relations). The Bureau shall
have the power to hear and decide any reported violation to mete the
appropriate penal
Nevertheless, the private respondents qualify their admission with the
opinion that the Bureau of Labor Relations should remove the guilty union
officers only when the members could not do so under the union's
constitution and by-laws and that the removal should be subject to review by
the Minister of Labor.
The Office of the Solicitor General, as amicus curiae, has taken the
unqualified stand that the Bureau is empowered to expel from the union any
officer found guilty of violating any of the rights and conditions of union
membership specified in article 242.
In this appeal, the Director of Labor Relations maintains his view that the
power of removal belongs to the union members, since the power to choose
the officers belongs to them, and that the med-arbiter and the Director should
simply assist the union members in enforcing its constitution and by-laws.
We hold that the Labor Arbiter did not err in removing the respondents as
union officers. The membership of Manalad and Puerto in another union is a
sufficient ground for their removal under the constitution and by-laws of the
union. In Manalad's case, his organization of a family-owned corporation
competing with. the union headed by him renders it untenable that he should
remain as union president.
We hold further that Med Puerto and Leano violated the rights and conditions
of membership in the union within the meaning of Article 242. Hence, on that
ground their expulsion from office is also justified.
The petitioners are entitled to the refund of the union dues illegally collected
from them. The union should be the proper refund.
The Director of Labor Relations erred in holding that, as a matter of policy,
the tenure of union office being a "political question is, generally, a matter
outside his Bureau's jurisdiction and should be pa upon by the union
members themselves.
After hearing and even without submitting the matter to the union members,
e union officials may be removed by the Director of Labor decisions as
clearly provided him "we 242.
The Director should apply the law and not make policy considerations prevail
over its clear intent and meaning. "The majority of the laws need no
interpretation or construction. They require only application, and if there were
more application and less construction, there would be more stability in the
law, and more people would know what the law is." Lizarraga Hermanos vs.
Yap Tico 24 Phil. 504, 513).
The labor officials should not hesitate to enforcement strictly the law and
regulations governing trade unions even if that course of action would curtail
the so-called union autonomy and freedom from government interference.
For the protection of union members and in order that the affairs of the union
may be administered honestly, labor officials should be vigilant and watchful
in monitoring and checking the administration of union affairs.
Laxity, permissiveness, neglect and apathy in supervising and regulating the
activities of union officials would result in corruption and oppression. Internal
safeguards within the union can easily be ignored or swept aside by abusive,
arrogant and unscrupulous union officials to the prejudice of the members.
It is necessary and desirable that the Bureau of Labor Relations and the
Ministry of Labor should exercise close and constant supervision over labor
unions, particularly the handling of their funds, so as to forestall abuses and
venalities.
Hence, the Director acted correctly in ordering an examination of the books
and records of the union. The examination should include a verification of the
charge that the petty loans extended by the union to its members were
usurious and that the fee for the issuance of cheeks is unwarranted since the
loans were made in cash.
WHEREFORE, (1) that portion of the decision of the med-arbiter, removing
respondents Manalad, Leano and Puerto as union officers, is affirmed.
(Respondent Amparo is no longer an officer of the union.)
(2) We also affirm that portion of the decision of the Director of Labor
Relations, directing the Bureau's Labor Organization Division to examine the
books of accounts and records of the Associated Port Checkers and Workers
Union and to submit a report on such examination within a reasonable time.
(3) We declare that the five petitioners are entitled to a refund of the union
dues illegally collected from them. The Director of Labor Relations is ordered
to require the union to make the refund within twenty days from notice to his
counsel of the entry of judgment in this case. Costs against the private
respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 76579-82. August 31, 1988.]
BENEDICTO RODRIGUEZ, etc., Petitioner, v. HON. DIRECTOR, BUREAU
OF LABOR RELATIONS, CARLOS GALVADORES and LIVI
MARQUEZ, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 80504. August 31, 1988.]
REY C. SUMANGIL, VIRGILIO V. HERNANDEZ, Et Al., Petitioners, v.
MANOLITO PARAN, ROSALINDA DE GUZMAN, FREE TELEPHONE
WORKERS UNION, PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., and
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Respondents.
Conrado Leaño for petitioner in G.R No. 76579-82 and private respondent in
G.R. No. 80504.
DECISION
NARVASA, J.:
The above entitled special civil actions of certiorari were separately instituted
but have been consolidated because they involve disputes among
employees of the Philippines Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT),
who are members of the same union, the Free Telephone Workers Union
(FTWU). The disputes concern the validity of the general elections for union
officers in 1986, and the increase of union dues adopted and put into effect
by the incumbent officers subsequent to said
elections.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
G.R. Nos. 76579-82: Controversy Respecting Elections of Officers
Assailed by the petitioners in G.R. No. 76579-82 are (1) the decision dated
October 10, 1986 of the Director of Labor Relations (BLR) annulling the
elections of officers of the labor union above mentioned, FTWU, and (2) the
resolution dated October 30, 1986, denying their motion for reconsideration
of the decision.
The union’s by-laws provide for the election of officers every three (3) years,
in the month of July. Pursuant thereto, the union’s Legislative Council set the
provincial elections for its officers on July 14 to 18, 1986, and those for Metro
Manila on July 25, 1986.
The same Council also quite drastically raised the fees for the filing of
certificates of candidates which had therefore ranged from P75.00 to
P100.00. The filing fee for each candidate for president of the labor
organization was increased to P3,000; that for each candidate for vice-
president, secretary-general, treasurer and auditor, to P2,000.00; and that for
assistant secretary, assistant treasurer and assistant auditor, to P1,000.00
each.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Bureau of Labor Relations Cases: Nos. LRD-M-7-503-86 & LRD-M-7-504-86
Although the increased fees were paid in due course by the candidates, no
less than two complaints were filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations for
their invalidation as excessive, prohibitive and arbitrary. One, docketed as
Case No. LRD-M-7-503-86, was presented by Rey Sumangil, a candidate for
president, and the members of his slate. The other, Case No. LRD-M-7-504-
86, was filed by Carlos Galvadores, also a presidential candidate, and his
group. Impleaded as respondents in both complaints were Benedicto
Rodriguez, the Chairman of the Commission on Elections of the union, and
the incumbent union officers, headed by the president, Manolito Paran.
Acting on the complaints, the Med-Arbiter issued on July 8, 1986 a
restraining order against the enforcement of the new rates of fees.
Other BLR Cases: Nos. LRD-M-7-557-86 and LRD-M-7-559-86
It appears that notwithstanding the cases questioning the candidates’ fees,
the elections for the provinces of Visayas and Mindanao and certain areas of
Luzon were nevertheless held on July 21 and 22, 1986, which are dates
different from those specified by the Legislative Council (i.e., July 14 to 18,
1986). The validity of the elections was very shortly challenged on the ground
of lack of (1) due notice and (2) adequate ground rules. Carlos Galvadores
and his fellow candidates filed on July 22, 1986 a petition with the BLR,
docketed as Case No. LRD-M-7557-86, praying that the Union’s COMELEC
be directed to promulgate ground rules for the conduct of the provincial
elections. On the day following, Livi Marquez, a candidate for vice-president,
together with other candidates in his ticket, filed another petition against the
same Union COMELEC and Manolito Paran, the union president - docketed
as Case No. LRD-M-7-559-86 - seeking to restrain the holding of the
elections scheduled on July 25, 1986 in the Metro Manila are until (1) ground
rules therefor had been formulated and made known to all members of the
labor organization, and (2) the issue of the filing fees had been finally
decided. In connection with these complaints, a temporary restraining order
was issued on July 23, 1986 prohibiting the holding of elections on July 25,
1986.
The restraining order notwithstanding, the Union COMELEC proceeded with
the general elections in all the PLDT branches in Metro Manila on July 25,
1986. It then reported that as of July 15, 1986 the number of qualified voters
was 9,429 of which 6,903 actually voted, the percentage of turn-out being
73%, and that those who obtained the highest number of votes for the
various elective positions were:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Manolito Paran President 3,030 votes
Eduardo de Leon 1st Vice-President 2,185 votes
Efren de Lima 2nd Vice-President 2,806 votes
Roger Rubio Secretary General 2,462 votes
Virgilio Tulay Asst. Sec. General 2,924 votes
Rosalinda de Guzman Treasurer 2,659 votes
Filmore Dalisay Asst. Treasurer 2,525 votes
Damiana Yalung Auditor 2,942 votes
Jaime Pineda Asst. Auditor 3,082 votes
Livi Marquez and Carlos Galvadores, and their respective groups, forthwith
filed separate motions praying that the COMELEC be declared guilty of
contempt for defying the temporary restraining order, and for the nullification
not only of the Metro Manila elections of July 25, 1986 but also the provincial
elections of July 21 and 22, 1986.
The four (4) cases were jointly decided by Med-Arbiter Rasidali Abdullah on
August 28, 1986. His judgment denied the petitions to nullify the elections, as
well as the motion for contempt, but invalidated the increase in rates of filing
fees for certificates of candidacies. The judgment accorded credence to the
Union COMELEC’s averment that it had not received the restraining order on
time. It took account, too, of the fact that the turn-out of voters was 73%,
much higher than the turn-out of 62% to 63% in prior elections, which fact, in
the Med-Arbiter’s view was a clear manifestation of the union members’
desire to go ahead with the elections and express their will therein.
This judgment was however overturned by the Officer-in-Charge of Labor
Relations, on appeal seasonably taken. The OIC’s decision, dated October
10, 1986 nullified the general elections in the provinces and Metro Manila on
the ground of (1) lack of notice to the candidates and voters, (2) failure to
disseminate the election ground rules to all parties concerned, and (3)
disregard of the temporary restraining order of the Med-Arbiter. The decision
stressed the following points: 1
"The undue haste with which the questioned general elections were held
raises doubts as to its validity. In its desire to conduct the elections as
scheduled, the respondents unwittingly disregarded mandatory procedural
requirements. The respondents’ pretensions that the appellants were duly
furnished with the ground rules/guidelines of the general elections and that
the same were properly disseminated to the qualified voters of the union are
not supported by the records.
"x x x
"Moreover, the Union’s Comelec did not follow the schedule of election
outlined in the guidelines. Specifically, the guidelines fixed the elections in
Visayas-Mindanao on July 14, 16 and 18, 1986, in Northern Luzon, on July
16, 17, 18 and 21, 1986 and in Southern Luzon on July 16,17 and 18,1986
(records, pp. 67-70). Surprisingly, however, the Union’s Comelec conducted
the elections in Northern and Southern Luzon on July 21, and 22, 1986 and
in Visayas-Mindanao on July 25, 1986 without proper notice to the
appellants.
"Accordingly, the unwarranted failure of the Union’s Comelec to duly furnish
the appellants the guidelines and properly disseminate the same to the
voters, and the holding of the elections not in accordance with the schedule
set by the guidelines and in open defiance of the July 23, 1986 Restraining
Order, precipitated an uncalled for confusion among the appellants’
supporters and unduly prevented them from adopting the appropriate
electoral safeguards to protect their interests. Under the circumstances, this
Office is constrained to invalidate the general elections held on July 21, 22
and 25, 1986 and declare the results thereof null and void.
"Furthermore, only 6,903 out of the 9,426 qualified voters trooped to the polls
during the July 21, 22 and 25, 1986 general elections. Considering the
closeness of the result of the elections, the 2,056 qualified voters, if they
were able to cast their votes, could have drastically altered the results of the
elections. But more important, the disenfranchisement of the remaining 27%
qualified voters is a curtailment of Trade Unionism implicitly ordained in the
worker’s right to self-organization explicitly protected by the Constitution.
"x x x
"The submission of the respondents that they did not receive a copy of the
injunctive order is completely rebuffed by the records. It appears that the
same was received and signed by a certain Cenidoza for respondent
Manolito Paran at 4:30 P.M. of July 23,1986 and by respondent Benedicto
Rodriguez himself, also on July 23, 1986 at 4:30 P.M. In the case of
Manolitao Paran, the restraining order in question was served at his
office/postal address at Rm. 310 Regina Bldg., Escolta, Manila."cralaw
virtua1aw library
It is this decision of the BLR Officer-in-Charge which is the subject of
the certiorari actions filed in this Court by Benedicto Rodriguez, the chairman
of the Union COMELEC, and docketed as G.R. Nos. 76579-82. He claims
the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion considering that (a)
the Med-Arbiter had found no fraud or irregularity in the elections; (b) the
election was participated in by more than 73% of the entire union
membership; and (c) the petition for nullity was not supported by 30% of the
general membership.
G.R. No. 80504: Controversy Respecting Labor Union Dues
The terms of office of the old officers (Manolito Paran, Et. Al.) ended in
August, 1986. However, the new set of officers (headed by the same
Manolito Paran) apparently could not assume office under a new term
because of the proceedings assailing the validity of the elections pending
before the Bureau of Labor Relations. What happened was that the old
officers continued to exercise the functions of their respective offices under
the leadership of Manolito Paran.
On January 17, 1987, the Legislative Council of the union passed a
resolution which generated another controversy. That resolution increased
the amount of the union dues from P21.00 to P50.00 a month. It was then
presented to the general membership for ratification at a referendum called
for the purpose. Rey Sumangil and his followers objected to the holding of
the referendum. When their objection went unheeded, they and their
supporters, all together numbering 829 or so, boycotted the referendum and
formally reiterated their protest against it. Subsequently the union officers
announced that the referendum has resulted in a ratification of the increased
union dues.
On March 1, 1987 Manolito Paran requested the PLDT to deduct the union
dues at the new, increased rates, from the salaries of all union members and
dispense with their individual written authorizations therefor. PLDT acceded
to the request and effected the check-off of the increased dues for the payroll
period from March 1 to March 15, 1987.
BLR Case No. NCR-OD-M-7-3-206-87
Once again Rey Sumangil and his followers hired themselves off to the
Bureau of Labor Relations. They filed a petition on March 26, 1987
challenging the resolution for the increase in union dues, docketed as BLR
Case No. NCR-OD-M-73-206-87. They contended that since the terms of the
members of the Legislative Council who approved the resolution had already
expired in August, 1986, and their reelection had been nullified by the
Bureau, they had no authority to act as members of the council;
consequently, it could not be said that the resolution for the increase of union
dues had been approved by 2/3 vote of the Council members, as provided by
the union constitution and by laws; hence, the resolution was void. They
further contended that there had been no valid ratification of the resolution
because the plebiscite had been "rigged."cralaw virtua1aw library
Once again Rey Sumangil and his group were unsuccessful in proceedings
at the level of the Med-Arbiter. The latter denied their petition on the ground
of lack of support of at least 30% of all members of the union, citing Article
242 of the Labor Code which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 242. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization. — . . .
Any violation of the above rights and conditions of membership shall be a
ground for cancellation of union registration and expulsion of officer from
office, whichever is appropriate. At least thirty percent (30%) of all the
members of a union or any member or members specially concerned may
report such violation to the Bureau. The Bureau shall have the power to hear
and decide any reported violation to mete the appropriate penalty."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Again Sumangil and his group went up on appeal to the Director of Labor
Relations, before whom they raised the issue of whether or not the petition in
fact had the support of at least 30% of the members, and said 30%-support
was indeed a condition sine qua non for acquisition by the Med-Arbiters (in
the Labor Relations Division in a Regional Office of the MOLE) of jurisdiction
over the case. Again Sumangil and his followers were successful in their
appeal.
On July 1, 1987 the Director of Labor Relations rendered a decision
reversing that of the Med-Arbiter. The Director ordered the cessation of the
collection of the twenty-nine peso increase and the return of the amounts
already collected. In the first place, according to her, the petition was
supported by 6,022 signatures, a number comprising more than 30% of the
total membership of the union (10,413). In the second place, the Director
ruled, even assuming the contrary, the lack of 30%-support will not preclude
the BLR from taking cognizance of the petition where there is a clear
violation of the rights and conditions of union membership because Article
226 of the Labor Code, expressly confers on it the authority to act on all intra-
union and inter-union conflicts and grievances affecting labor and
management relations, at the instance of either or both parties. The provision
cited reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 226. Bureau of Labor Relations. — The Bureau of Labor Relations and
the Labor Relations division in the Regional Offices of the Department of
Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative
or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union
conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting
labor management relations . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
As regards Article 242 of the Labor Code, relied upon by the Med-Arbiter, the
Director expressed the new that the 30%-support therein provided is not
mandatory, and is not a condition precedent to the valid presentation of a
grievance before the Bureau of Labor Relations. The Director ruled, finally,
that Sumangil and the other union members had a valid grievance calling for
redress, since the record disclosed no compliance with the requirement that
the resolution for the increase of union dues be passed by at least 2/3 vote of
the members of the Legislative Council and be ratified by a majority of the
entire membership at a plebiscite.
But not long afterwards, the Director reversed herself. The Manggagawa sa
Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (MKP) — with which Paran’s Union, the FTWU, is
affiliated — intervened in the case and moved for reconsideration of her
decision. By resolution dated October 1, 1987, the Director set aside her
decision of July 1, 1987 and entered a new one dismissing the petition of
Sumangil and company, in effect affirming the Med-Arbiter’s order. The
Director opined that the intervenor (MKP) was correct in its contention that
there was no 30%-membership-support for the petition, since only 829
members had signed their support therefor, as correctly found by the Med-
Arbiter, and because of this, the BLR never acquired jurisdiction over the
case. According to her: 2
"The rationale for such requirement is not difficult to discern. It is to make
certain that there is a prima facie case against prospective respondents
whether it be the union/or its officers and thus forestall nuisance or
harassment petitions complaints. The requirement was intended to shield the
union from destabilization and paralyzation coming from adventurous and
ambitious members or non-members engaged in union politics under the
guise of working for the union welfare.
". . . As found out by the Med-Arbiter in the Office of origin all signatures
except that of 829 were obtained without the knowledge of the signatories. At
this point we cannot permit 829 members to ‘rock the boat.’ so to speak, of a
union which has at present ten thousand four hundred and thirteen (10,413)
passengers."cralaw virtua1aw library
In an effort to set aside this reversing resolution of the Labor Relations
Director, Rey Sumangil and his group have come to this Court via the instant
special civil action of certiorari. In their petition they insist that the support of
30% of the union membership is not a jurisdictional requirement for the
ventilation of their grievance before the BLR, and assuming the contrary, they
have proven that 3,501 workers had in fact joined in the petition, constituting
33% of the total membership. They also emphasize the validity of their
grievance, drawing attention to the absence of the requisite 2/3 vote
essential for validity of any resolution increasing the rates of union dues, and
the doubtful result of the referendum at which the resolution had allegedly
been ratified.
Three issues are thus presented to the Court in these cases. The first
involves the validity of the 1986 general elections for union officers; the
second, whether or not 30%-membership support is indispensable for
acquisition of jurisdiction by the Bureau of Labor Relations of a complaint for
alleged violation of rights and conditions of union members; and third, the
validity of the increase in union dues.
The General Elections of 1986
A review of the record fails to disclose any grave abuse of discretion tainting
the adjudgment of respondent Director of Labor Relations that the general
elections for union officers held in 1986 were attended by grave irregularities,
rendering the elections invalid. That finding must thus be sustained.
The dates for provincial elections were set for July 14 to 18, 1986. But they
were in fact held on July 21 to 22, 1986, without prior notice to all voting
members, and without ground rules duly prescribed therefor. The elections in
Metro Manila were conducted under no better circumstances. It was held on
July 25, 1986 in disregard and in defiance of the temporary restraining order
properly issued by the Med-Arbiter on July 23, 1986, notice of which
restraining order had been regularly served on the same date, as the proofs
adequately show, on both the Union, President, Manolito Paran, and the
Chairman of the Union COMELEC, Benedicto Rodriguez. Moreover, as in the
case of the provincial elections, there were no ground rules or guidelines set
for the Metro Manila elections. Undue haste, lack of adequate safeguards to
ensure integrity of the voting, and absence of notice of the dates of balloting,
thus attended the elections in the provinces and in Metro Manila. They
cannot but render the proceedings void.
The claim that there had been a record-breaking voter turnout of 73%, even if
true, cannot purge the elections of their grave infirmities. The elections were
closely contested. For example, in the presidential contest, Manolito Paran
appeared to have won over Rey Sumangil by only 803 votes, and in the vice-
presidential race, Eduardo de Leon won over Dominador Munar by only 204
votes. These results would obviously have been affected by the ballots of the
2,056 voters who had been unable to cast their votes because of lack of
notice of actual dates of the elections.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
It goes without saying that free and honest elections are indispensable to the
enjoyment by employees and workers of their constitutionally protected right
to self-organization. That right "would be diluted if in the choice of the officials
to govern . . . (union) affairs, the election is not fairly and honestly
conducted," and the labor officers concerned and the courts have the duty "to
see to it that no abuse is committed by any official of a labor organization in
the conduct of its affairs." 3
The Matter of 30%-Support for Complaints for Violations of Union
Membership Rights
The respondent Director’s ruling, however, that the assent of 30% of the
union membership, mentioned in Article 242 of the Labor Code, was
mandatory and essential to the filing of a complaint for any violation of rights
and conditions of membership in a labor organization (such as the arbitrary
and oppressive increase of union dues here complained of), cannot be
affirmed and will be reversed. The very article relied upon militates against
the proposition. It states that a report of a violation of rights and conditions of
membership in a labor organization may be made by" (a)t least thirty percent
(30%) of all the members of a union or any member or members specially
concerned." 4 The use of the permissive "may" in the provision at once
negates the notion that the assent of 30% of all the members is mandatory.
More decisive is the fact that the provision expressly declares that the report
may be made, alternatively by "any member or members specially
concerned." And further confirmation that the assent of 30% of the union
members is not a factor in the acquisition of jurisdiction by the Bureau of
Labor Relations is furnished by Article 226 of the same Labor Code, which
grants original and exclusive jurisdiction to the Bureau, and the Labor
Relations Division in the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor, over
"all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or
problems arising from or affecting labor management relations," making no
reference whatsoever to any such 30%-support requirement. Indeed, the
officials mentioned are given the power to act "on all inter-union and intra-
union conflicts (1) "upon request of either or both parties" as well as (2) "at
their own initiative." There can thus be no question about the capacity of Rey
Sumangil and his group of more than eight hundred, to report and seek
redress in an intra-union conflict involving a matter they are specially
concerned, i.e., the rates of union dues being imposed on them.
These considerations apply equally well to controversies over elections. In
the cases at bar, the petition to nullify the 1986 union elections could not be
deemed defective because it did not have the assent of 30% of the union
membership. The petition clearly involved an intra-union conflict - one directly
affecting the right of suffrage of more than 800 union members and the
integrity of the union elections - over which, as the law explicitly provides,
jurisdiction could be assumed by the Labor Relations Director or the Med-
Arbiters "at their own initiative" or "upon request of either or both
parties."cralaw virtua1aw library

The assumption of jurisdiction by the Med-Arbiter and the Labor Relations
Director over the cases at bar was entirely proper. It was in fact their duty to
do so, given the facts presented to them. So this Court has had occasion to
rule: 5
"The labor officials should not hesitate to enforce strictly the law and
regulations governing trade unions even if that course of action would curtail
the so-called union autonomy and freedom from government interference.
"For the protection of union members and in order that the affairs of the union
may be administered honestly, labor officials should be vigilant and watchful
in monitoring and checking the administration of union affairs.
"Laxity, permissiveness, neglect and apathy in supervising and regulating the
activities of union officials would result in corruption and oppression. Internal
safeguards within the union can easily be ignored or swept aside by abusive,
arrogant and unscrupulous union officials to the prejudice of the members.
"It is necessary and desirable that the Bureau of Labor Relations and the
Ministry of Labor should exercise close and constant supervision over labor
unions, particularly the handling of their funds, so as to forestall abuses and
venalities."cralaw virtua1aw library
As regards the final issue concerning the increase of union dues, the
respondent Director found that the resolution of the union’s Legislative
Council to this effect 6 does not bear the signature of at least two-thirds (2/3)
of the members of the Council, contrary to the requirement of the union
constitution and by-laws; and that proof is wanting of proper ratification of the
resolution by a majority of the general union membership at a plebiscite
called and conducted for that purpose, again in violation of the constitution
and by-laws. The resolution increasing the union dues must therefore be
struck down, as illegal and void, arbitrary and oppressive. The collection of
union dues at the increased rates must be discontinued; and the dues thus
far improperly collected must be refunded to the union members or held in
trust for disposition by them in accordance with their charter and rules, in line
with this Court’s ruling in a parallel situation, 7 viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . All amounts already collected must be credited accordingly in favor of
the respective members either for their future legal dues or other
assessments or even delinquencies, if any. And if this arrangement regarding
the actual refund of what might be excessive dues is not acceptable to the
majority of the members, the matter may be decided in a general meeting
called for the purpose."cralaw virtua1aw library
WHEREFORE, in G.R. Nos. 76579-82, the petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED, no grave abuse of discretion or other serious error having been
shown in the decision of the respondent Director of Labor Relations, said
decision — ordering the holding of new elections for officers of the Free
Telephone Workers Union — being on the contrary in accord with the facts
and the law, but in the G.R. No. 80504, the petition for certiorari is granted,
the challenged order dated October 1, 1987 is set aside, and the decision of
July 1, 1987 of the Labor Relations Director reinstated, modified only as to
the treatment of the excess collections which shall be disposed of in the
manner herein indicated. Costs against petitioner in G.R. Nos. 7657982 and
private respondents (except the PLDT) in G.R. No. 80504.
G.R. No. 201595, January 25, 2016
ALLAN M. MENDOZA, Petitioner, v. OFFICERS OF MANILA WATER
EMPLOYEES UNION (MWEU), NAMELY, EDUARDO B. BORELA,
BUENAVENTURA QUEBRAL, ELIZABETH COMETA, ALEJANDRO
TORRES, AMORSOLO TIERRA, SOLEDAD YEBAN, LUIS RENDON,
VIRGINIA APILADO, TERESITA BOLO, ROGELIO BARBERO, JOSE
CASAÑAS, ALFREDO MAGA, EMILIO FERNANDEZ, ROSITA
BUENAVENTURA, ALMENIO CANCINO, ADELA IMANA, MARIO
MANCENIDO, WILFREDO MANDILAG, ROLANDO MANLAPAZ, EFREN
MONTEMAYOR, NELSON PAGULAYAN, CARLOS VILLA, RIC
BRIONES,AND CHITO BERNARDO, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the April 24, 2012 Decision2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari3 in CA-
G.R.SP No. 115639.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner was a member of the Manila Water Employees Union (MWEU), a
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)-registered labor organization
consisting of rank-and-file employees within Manila Water Company (MWC).
The respondents herein named - Eduardo B. Borela (Borela), Buenaventura
Quebral (Quebral), Elizabeth Cometa (Cometa), Alejandro Torres (Torres),
Amorsolo Tierra (Tierra), Soledad Yeban (Yeban), Luis Rendon (Rendon),
Virginia Apilado (Apilado), Teresita Bob (Bolo), Rogelio Barbero (Barbero),
Jose Casanas (Casanas), Alfredo Maga (Maga), Emiiio Fernandez
(Fernandez), Rosita Buenaventura (Buenaventura), Almenio Cancino
(Cancino), Adela Imana, Mario Mancenido (Mancenido), Wilfredo Mandilag
(Mandilag), Rolando Manlapaz (Manlapaz), Efren Montemayor
(Montemayor), Nelson Pagulayan, Carlos Villa, Ric Briones, and Chito
Bernardo - were MWEU officers during the period material to this Petition,
with Borela as President and Chairman of the MWEU Executive Board,
Quebral as First Vice-President and Treasurer, and Cometa as Secretary. 4
In an April 11, 2007 letter,5 MWEU through Cometa informed petitioner that
the union was unable to fully deduct the increased P200.00 union dues from
his salary due to lack of the required December 2006 check-off authorization
from him. Petitioner was warned that his failure to pay the union dues would
result in sanctions upon him. Quebral informed Borela, through a May 2,2007
letter,6 that for such failure to pay the union dues, petitioner and several
others violated Section l(g), Article IX of the MWEU's Constitution and By-
Laws.7 In turn, Borela referred the charge to the MWEU grievance cornrnittee
for investigation.
On May 21, 2007, a notice of hearing was sent to petitioner, who attended
the scheduled hearing. On June 6, 2007, the MWEU grievance committee
recommended that petitioner be suspended for 30 days.
In a June 20, 2007 letter,8 Borela informed petitioner and his corespondents
of the MWEU Executive Board's "unanimous approval" 9 of the grievance
committee's recommendation and imposition upon them of a penalty of 30
days suspension, effective June 25,2007.
In a June 26, 2007 letter10 to Borela, petitioner and Ms co-respondents took
exception to the imposition and indicated their intention to appeal the same
to the General Membership Assembly in accordance with Section 2(g), Article
V of the union's Constitution and By-Laws,11 which grants them the right to
appeal any arbitrary resolution, policy and rule promulgated by the Executive
Board to the General Membership Assembly. In a June 28, 2007
reply,12 Borela denied petitioner's appeal, stating that the prescribed period
for appeal had expired.
Petitioner and his co-respondents sent another letter13 on July 4, 2007,
reiterating their arguments and demanding that the General Membership
Assembly be convened in order that their appeal could be taken up. The
letter was not acted upon.
Petitioner was once more charged with non-payment of union dues, and was
required to attend an August 3, 2007 hearing.14 Thereafter, petitioner was
again penalized with a 30-day suspension through an August 21, 2007
letter15 by Borela informing petitioner of the Executive Board's "unanimous
approval"16 of the grievance committee recommendation to suspend him
effective August 24, 2007, to which he submitted a written reply, 17 invoking
his right to appeal through the convening of the General Membership
Assembly. However, the respondents did not act on petitioner's plea.
Meanwhile, MWEU scheduled an election of officers on September 14, 2007.
Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for Vice-President, but he was
disqualified for not being a member in good standing on account of his
suspension.
On October 2, 2007, petitioner was charged with non-payment of union dues
for the third time. He did not attend the scheduled hearing. This time, he was
meted the penalty of expulsion from the union, per "unanimous approval" 18 of
the members of the Executive Board. His pleas for an appeal to the General
Membership Assembly were once more unheeded.19
In 2008, during the freedom period and negotiations for a new collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) with MWC, petitioner joined another union, the
Workers Association for Transparency, Empowerment and Reform, All-
Filipino Workers Confederation (WATER-AFWC). He was elected union
President. Other MWEU members were inclined to join WATER-AFWC, but
MWEU director Torres threatened that they would not get benefits from the
new CBA.20
The MWEU leadership submitted a proposed CBA which contained
provisions to the effect that in the event of retrenchment, non-MWEU
members shall be removed first, and that upon the signing of the CBA, only
MWEU members shall receive a signing bonus.21
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
On October 13,2008, petitioner filed a Complaint 22 against respondents for
unfair labor practices, damages, and attorney's fees before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Quezon City, docketed as NLRC Case
No. NCR-10-14255-08. In his Position Paper and other written
submissions,23petitioner accused the respondents of illegal termination from
MWEU in connection with the events relative to his non-payment of union
dues; unlawful interference, coercion, and violation of the rights of MWC
employees to self-organization - in connection with the proposed CBA
submitted by MWEU leadership, which petitioner claims contained provisions
that discriminated against non-MWEU members. Petitioner prayed in his
Supplemental Position Paper that respondents be held guilty of unfair labor
practices and ordered to indemnify him moral damages in the amount of
P100,000.00, exemplary damages amounting to P50,000.00, and 10%
attorney's fees.
In their joint Position Paper and other pleadings, 24 respondents claimed that
the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the dispute, which is intra-union in
nature; that the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) was the proper venue, in
accordance with Article 226 of the Labor Code25 and Section 1, Rule XI of
Department Order 40-03, series of 2003, of the DOLE; 26 and that they were
not guilty of unfair labor practices, discrimination, coercion or restraint.
On May 29, 2009, Labor Arbiter Virginia T. Luyas-Azarraga issued her
Decision27 which decreed as follows:
Indeed the filing of the instant case is still premature. Section 5, Article X-
Investigation Procedures and Appeal Process of the Union Constitution and
By-Laws provides that:
Section 5. Any dismissed and/or expelled member shall have the rights to
appeal to the Executive Board within seven (7) days from the date of notice
of the said dismissal and/or expulsion, which in [turn] shall be referred to the
General Membership Assembly. In case of an appeal, a simple majority of
the decision of the Executive Board is imperative. The same shall be
approved/disapproved by a majority vote of the general membership
assembly in a meeting duly called for the purpose.
On the basis of the foregoing, the parties shall exhaust first all the
administrative remedies before resorting to compulsory arbitration. Thus,
instant case is referred back to the Union for the General Assembly to act or
deliberate complainant's appeal on the decision of the Executive Board.
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, instant case is referred back to
the; Union level for the General Assembly to act on complainant's appeal.
SO ORDERED.28ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission
Petitioner appealed before the NLRC, where the case was docketed as
NLRC LAC No. 07-001913-09. On March 15, 2010, the NLRC issued its
Decision,29 declaring as follows:
Complainant30 imputes serious error to the Labor Arbiter when she decided
as follows:
a. Referring back the subject case to the Union level
for the General Assembly to act on bis appeal.
b. Not ruling that respondents are guilty of ULP as
charged.
c. Not granting to complainant moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.
Complainant, in support of his charges, claims that respondents restrained or
coerced him in the exercise of his right as a union member in violation of
paragraph "a", Article 249 of the Labor Code,31 particularly, in denying him
the explanation as to whether there was observance of the proper procedure
in the increase of the membership dues from P100.00 to P200.00 per month.
Further, complainant avers that he was denied the right to appeal his
suspension and expulsion in accordance with the provisions of the Union's
Constitution and By-Laws. In addition, complainant claims that respondents
attempted to cause the management to discriminate against the members of
WATER-AFWC thru the proposed CBA.
Pertinent to the issue then on hand, the Labor Arbiter ordered that the case
be referred back to the Union level for the General Assembly to act on
complainant's appeal. Hence, these appeals.
After a careful look at all the documents submitted and a meticulous review
of the facts, We find that this Commission lacks the jurisdictional competence
to act on this case.
Article 217 of the Labor Code,32 as amended, specifically enumerates the
cases over which the Labor Arbiters and the Commission have original and
exclusive jurisdiction. A perusal of the record reveals that the causes of
action invoked by complainant do not fall under any of the enumerations
therein. Clearly, We have no jurisdiction over the same.
Moreover, pursuant to Section 1, Rule XI, as amended, DOLE Department
Order No. 40-03 in particular, Item A, paragraphs (h) and (j) and Item B,
paragraph (a)(3), respectively, provide:
"A. Inter-Intra-Union disputes shall include:
"(h) violation of or disagreements over any provision of the Constitution and
By-Laws of a Union or workers' association.
"(j) violation of the rights and conditions of membership in a Union or
workers' association.
"B. Other Labor Relations disputes, not otherwise covered by Article 217 of
the Labor Code, shall include -
"3. a labor union and an individual who is not a member of said union."
Clearly, the above-mentioned disputes and conflict fall under the jurisdiction
of the Bureau of Labor Relations, as these are inter/intra-union disputes.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Labor Arbiter a quo dated May 29, 2009 is
hereby declared NULL and VOID for being rendered without jurisdiction and
the instant complaint is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,34 but in a June 16, 2010
Resolution,35 the motion was denied and the NLRC sustained its Decision.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Petition for Certiorari36 filed with the CA and docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 115639, petitioner sought to reverse the NLRC Decision and be awarded
his claim for damages and attorney's fees on account of respondents' unfair
labor practices, arguing among others that his charge of unfair labor
practices is cognizable by the Labor Arbiter; that the fact that the dispute is
inter- or intra-union in nature cannot erase the fact that respondents were
guilty of unfair labor practices in interfering and restraining him in the
exercise of his right to self-organization as member of both MWEU and
WATER-AFWC, and in discriminating against him and other members
through the provisions of the proposed 2008 CBA which they drafted; that his
failure to pay the increased union dues was proper since the approval of said
increase was arrived at without observing the prescribed voting procedure
laid down in the Labor Code; that he is entitled to an award of damages and
attorney's fees as a result of respondents' illegal acts in discriminating
against him; and that in ruling the way it did, the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion.
On April 24, 2012, the CA issued the assailed Decision containing the
following pronouncement:
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner's causes of action against MWEU are inter/intra-union disputes
cognizable by the BLR whose functions and jurisdiction are largely confined
to union matters, collective bargaining registry, and labor education. Section
1, Rule XI of Department Order (D.O.) No. 40-03, Series of 2003, of the
Department of Labor and Employment enumerates instances of inter/intra-
union disputes, viz:
Section 1. Coverage. - Inter/intra-union disputes shall
include:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
(b) conduct of election of union and workers' association officers/nullification
of election of union and workers' association officers;
(c) audit/accounts examination of union or workers' association funds;
xxxx
(g) validity/invalidity of impeachment/ expulsion of union and workers'
association officers and members;
xxxx
(j) violations of or disagreements over any provision in a union or workers'
association constitution and by-laws;
xxxx
(l) violations of the rights and conditions of union or workers' association
membership;
xxxx
(n) such other disputes or conflicts involving the rights to self-organization,
union membership and collective bargaining -
(1) between and among legitimate labor organizations;
(2) between and among members of a union or workers' association.
In brief, "Inter-Union Dispute" refers to any conflict between and among
legitimate labor unions involving representation questions for purposes of
collective bargaining or to any other conflict or dispute between legitimate
labor unions. "Intra-Union Dispute" refers to any conflict between and among
union members, including grievances arising from any violation of the rights
and conditions of membership, violation of or disagreement over any
provision of the union's constitution and by-laws, or disputes arising from
chartering or affiliation of union. On the other hand, the circumstances of
unfair labor practices (ULP) of a labor organization are stated in Article 249 of
the Labor Code, to wit:
Article 249. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. It shall be unlawful
for labor organization, its officers, agents, or representatives to commit any of
the following unfair labor practices:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization; Provided, That the labor organization shall have the
right to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership;
(b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee, including discrimination against an employee with respect
to whom membership in such organization has been denied or
terminated on any ground other than the usual terms and conditions
under which membership or continuation of membership is made
available to other members;
xxxx
Applying the aforementioned rules, We find that the issues arising from
petitioner's right to information on the increased membership dues, right to
appeal his suspension and expulsion according to CBL provisions, and right
to vote and be voted on are essentially intra-union disputes; these involve
violations of rights ;and conditions of union membership. But his claim that a
director of MWEU warned that non-MWEU members would not receive CBA
benefits is an inter-union dispute. It is more of an "interference" by a rival
union to ensure the loyalty of its members and to persuade non-members to
join their union. This is not an actionable wrong because interfering in the
exercise of the right to organize is itself a function of self-organizing. 37 As
long as it does not amount to restraint or coercion, a labor organization may
interfere in the employees' right to self-organization. 38 Consequently, a
determination of validity or illegality of the alleged acts necessarily touches
on union matters, not ULPs, and are outside the scope of the labor arbiter's
jurisdiction.
As regards petitioner's other accusations, i.e., discrimination in terms of
meting out the penalty of expulsion against him alone, and attempt to cause
the employer, MWC, to discriminate against non-MWEU members in terms of
retrenchment or reduction of personnel, and signing bonus, while We may
consider them as falling within the concept of ULP under Article 249(a) and
(b), still, petitioner's complaint cannot prosper for lack of substantial
evidence. Other than his bare allegation, petitioner offered no proof that
MWEU did not penalize some union members who failed to pay the
increased dues. On the proposed discriminatory CBA provisions, petitioner
merely attached the pages containing the questioned provisions without
bothering to reveal the MWEU representatives responsible for the said
proposal. Article 249 mandates that "x x x only the officers, members of the
governing boards, representatives or agents or members of labor
associations or organizations who have actually participated in, authorized or
ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable." Plain accusations
against all MWEU officers, without specifying their actual participation, do not
suffice. Thus, the ULP charges must necessarily fail.
In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is
necessary to establish the case for or against a party. Substantial evidence is
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. Petitioner failed to discharge the burden of
proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations of ULP in his complaint. The
NLRC, therefore, properly dismissed the case.
FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.39ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, the instant Petition.
Issue
In an August 28, 2013 Resolution,40 this Court resolved to give due course to
the Petition, which claims that the CA erred:
A. IN DECLARING THAT THE PRESENCE OF INTER/INTRA-
UNION CONFLICTS NEGATES THE COMPLAINT FOR
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES AGAINST A LABOR
ORGANIZATION AND ITS OFFICERS, AND IN AFFIRMING
THAT THE NLRC PROPERLY DISMISSED THE CASE FOR
ALLEGED LACK OF JURISDICTION.
B. IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UNDER ARTICLE 249(a)
AND (b) OF THE LABOR CODE.
C. IN DECLARING THAT THE THREATS MADE BY A UNION
OFFICER AGAINST MEMBERS OF A RIVAL UNION IS (sic)
MERELY AN "INTERFERENCE" AND DO NOT AMOUNT
TO "RESTRAINT' OR "COERCION".
D. IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO PRESENT
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN PROVING RESPONDENTS'
SPECIFIC ACTS OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES.
E. IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE SOLIDARILY
LIABLE TO PETITIONER FOR MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES, AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.41
Petitioner's Arguments
Praying that the assailed CA dispositions be set aside and that respondents
be declared guilty of unfair labor practices under Article 249(a) and (b) and
adjudged liable for damages and attorney's fees as prayed for in bis
complaint, petitioner maintains in his Petition and Reply 42 that respondents
are guilty of unfair labor practices which he clearly enumerated and laid out
in his pleadings below; that these unfair labor practices committed by
respondents fall within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter; that the Labor
Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA failed to rule on his accusation of unfair labor
practices and simply dismissed his complaint on the ground that his causes
of action are intra- or inter-union in nature; that admittedly, some of his
causes of action involved intra- or inter-union disputes, but other acts of
respondents constitute unfair labor practices; that he presented substantial
evidence to prove that respondents are guilty of unfair labor practices by
failing to observe the proper procedure in the imposition of the increased
monthly union dues, and in unduly imposing the penalties of suspension and
expulsion against him; that under the union's constitution and by-laws, he is
given the right to appeal his suspension and expulsion to the general
membership assembly; that in denying him his rights as a union member and
expelling him, respondents are guilty of malice and evident bad faith; that
respondents are equally guilty for violating and curtailing his rights to vote
and be voted to a position within the union, and for discriminating against
non-MWEU members; and that the totality of respondents' conduct shows
that they are guilty of unfair labor practices.
Respondent's Arguments
In their joint Comment,43 respondents maintain that petitioner raises issues of
fact which are beyond the purview of a petition for review on certiorari; that
the findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive; that the Labor Arbiter,
NLRC, and CA are one in declaring that there is no unfair labor practices
committed against petitioner; that petitioner's other allegations fall within the
jurisdiction of the BLR, as they refer to intra- or inter-union disputes between
the parties; that the issues arising from petitioner's right to information on the
increased dues, right to appeal his suspension and expulsion, and right to
vote and be voted upon are essentially intra-union in nature; that his
allegations regarding supposed coercion and restraint relative to benefits in
the proposed CBA do not constitute an actionable wrong; that all of the acts
questioned by petitioner are covered by Section 1, Rule XI of Department
Order 40-03, series of 2003 as intra-/inter-union disputes which do not fall
within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter; that in not paying his union dues,
petitioner is guilty of insubordination and deserved the penalty of expulsion;
that petitioner failed to petition to convene the general assembly through the
required signature of 30% of the union membership in good standing
pursuant to Article VI, Section 2(a) of MWEU's Constitution and By-Laws or
by a petition of the majority of the general membership in good standing
under Article VI, Section 3; and that for his failure to resort to said remedies,
petitioner can no longer question his suspension or expulsion and avail of his
right to appeal.
Our Ruling
The Court partly grants the Petition.
In labor cases, issues of fact are for the labor tribunals and the CA to resolve,
as this Court is not a trier of facts. However, when the conclusion arrived at
by them is erroneous in certain respects, and would result in injustice as to
the parties, this Court must intervene to correct the error. While the Labor
Arbiter, NLRC, and CA are one in their conclusion in this case, they erred in
failing to resolve petitioner's charge of unfair labor practices against
respondents.
It is true that some of petitioner's causes of action constitute intra-union
cases cognizable by the BLR under Article 226 of the Labor Code.
An intra-union dispute refers to any conflict between and among union
members, including grievances arising from any violation of the rights and
conditions of membership, violation of or disagreement over any provision of
the union's constitution and by-laws, or disputes arising from chartering or
disaffiliation of the union. Sections 1 and 2, Rule XI of Department Order No.
40-03, Series of 2003 of the DOLE enumerate the following circumstances
as inter/intra-union disputes x x x.44ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
However, petitioner's charge of unfair labor practices falls within
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters, pursuant to Article
217 of the Labor Code. In addition, Article 247 of the same Code provides
that "the civil aspects of all cases involving unfair labor practices, which may
include claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages,
attorney's fees and other affirmative relief, shall be under the jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiters."
Unfair labor practices may be committed both by the employer under Article
248 and by labor organizations under Article 249 of the Labor Code, 45 which
provides as follows:
ART. 249. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. - It shall be unfair
labor practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or
representatives:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization. However, a labor organization shall have the right to prescribe
its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership;
(b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee, including discrimination against an employee with respect to
whom membership in such organization has been denied or to terminate an
employee on any ground other than the usual terms and conditions under
which membership or continuation of membership is made available to other
members;
(c) To violate the duty, or refuse to bargain collectively with the employer,
provided it is the representative of the employees;
(d) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to
pay or deliver any money or other things of value, in the nature of an
exaction, for services which are not performed or not to be performed,
including the demand for fee for union negotiations;
(e) To ask for or accept negotiation or attorney's fees from employers as part
of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
(f) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers,
members of governing boards, representatives or agents or members of
labor associations or organizations who have actually participated in,
authorized or ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable. (As
amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 130, August 21, 1981).
Petitioner contends that respondents committed acts constituting unfair labor
practices - which charge was particularly laid out in his pleadings, but that the
Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA ignored it and simply dismissed his
complaint on the ground that his causes of action were intra- or inter-union in
nature. Specifically, petitioner claims that he was suspended and expelled
from MWEU illegally as a result of the denial of his right to appeal his case to
the general membership assembly in accordance with the union's
constitution and bylaws. On the other hand, respondents counter that such
charge is intra-union in nature, and that petitioner lost his right to appeal
when he failed to petition to convene the general assembly through the
required signature of 30% of the union membership in good standing
pursuant to Article VI, Section 2(a) of MWEU's Constitution and By-Laws or
by a petition of the majority of the general membership in good standing
under Article VI, Section 3.
Under Article VI, Section 2(a) of MWEU's Constitution and By-Laws, the
general membership assembly has the power to "review revise modify affirm
repeal [sic] resolution and decision of the Executive Board and/or committees
upon petition of thirty percent (30%) of the Union in good standing," 46 and
under Section 2(d), to "revise, modify, affirm or reverse all expulsion
cases."47 Under Section 3 of the same Article, "[t]he decision of the Executive
Board may be appealed to the General Membership which by a simple
majority vote reverse the decision of said body. If the general Assembly is not
in session the decision of the Executive Board may be reversed by a petition
of the majority of the general membership in good standing." 48 And, in Article
X, Section 5, "[a]ny dismissed and/or expelled member shall have the right to
appeal to the Executive Board within seven days from notice of said
dismissal and/or expulsion which, in [turn] shall be referred to the General
membership assembly. In case of an appeal, a simple majority of the
decision of the Executive Board is imperative. The same shall be
approved/disapproved by a majority vote of the general membership
assembly in a meeting duly called for the purpose." 49
In regard to suspension of a union member, MWEU's Constitution and By-
Laws provides under Article X, Section 4 thereof that "[a]ny suspended
member shall have the right to appeal within three (3) working days from the
date of notice of said suspension. In case of an appeal a simple majority of
vote of the Executive Board shall be necessary to nullify the suspension."
Thus, when an MWEU member is suspended, he is given the right to appeal
such suspension within three working days from the date of notice of said
suspension, which appeal the MWEU Executive Board is obligated to act
upon by a simple majority vote. When the penalty imposed is expulsion, the
expelled member is given seven days from notice of said dismissal and/or
expulsion to appeal to the Executive Board, which is required to act by a
simple majority vote of its members. The Board's decision shall then be
approved/ disapproved by a majority vote of the general membership
assembly in a meeting duly called for the purpose.
The documentary evidence is clear that when petitioner received Borela's
August 21, 2007 letter informing him of the Executive Board's unanimous
approval of the grievance committee recommendation to suspend him for the
second time effective August 24, 2007, he immediately and timely filed a
written appeal. However, the Executive Board - then consisting of
respondents Borela, Tierra, Bolo, Casafias, Fernandez, Rendon,
Montemayor, Torres, Quebral, Pagulayan, Cancino, Maga, Cometa,
Mancenido, and two others who are not respondents herein - did not act
thereon. Then again, when petitioner was charged for the third time and
meted the penalty of expulsion from MWEU by the unanimous vote of the
Executive Board, his timely appeal was again not acted upon by said board -
this time consisting of respondents Borela, Quebral, Tierra, Imana, Rendon,
Yeban, Cancino, Torres, Montemayor, Mancenido, Mandilag, Fernandez,
Buenaventura, Apilado, Maga, Barbero, Cometa, Bolo, and Manlapaz.
Thus, contrary to respondents' argument that petitioner lost his right to
appeal when he failed to petition to convene the general assembly through
the required signature of 30% of the union membership in good standing
pursuant to Article VI, Section 2(a) of MWEU's Constitution and By-Laws or
by a petition of the majority of the general membership in good standing
under Article VI, Section 3, this Court finds that petitioner was illegally
suspended for the second time and thereafter unlawfully expelled from
MWEU due to respondents' failure to act on his written appeals. The required
petition to convene the general assembly through the required signature of
30% (under Article VI, Section 2[a]) or majority (under Article VI, Section 3) of
the union membership does not apply in petitioner's case; the Executive
Board must first act on his two appeals before the matter could properly be
referred to the general membership. Because respondents did not act on his
two appeals, petitioner was unceremoniously suspended, disqualified and
deprived of his right to run for the position of MWEU Vice-President in the
September 14, 2007 election of officers, expelled from MWEU, and forced to
join another union, WATER-AFWC. For these, respondents are guilty of
unfair labor practices under Article 249 (a) and (b) - that is, violation of
petitioner's right to self-organization, unlawful discrimination, and illegal
termination of his union membership - which case falls within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters, in accordance with Article 217 of
the Labor Code.
The primary concept of unfair labor practices is stated in Article 247 of the
Labor Code, which states:
Article 247. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for prosecution
thereof. — Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers
and employees to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of
both labor and management, including their right to bargain collectively and
otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual
respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and
stable labor-management relations.
"In essence, [unfair labor practice] relates to the commission' of acts that
transgress the workers' right to organize."50 "[A]ll the prohibited acts
constituting unfair labor practice in essence relate to the workers' right to self-
organization."51 "[T]he term unfair labor practice refers to that gamut of
offenses defined in the Labor Code which, at their core, violates the
constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization." 52
Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the 'right to self-organization and
to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes
of collective bargaining.' This is made plain by no less than three provisions
of the Labor Code of the Philippines. Article 243 of the Code provides as
follows:
ART. 243. Coverage and employees' right to self-organization. — All persons
employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in
religious, charitable, medical, or educational institutions whether operating for
profit or not, shall have the right to serf-organisation and to form, join, or
assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes or collective
bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed
people, ratal workers and those without any definite employers may form
labor organizations for their , mutual aid and protection.
Article 248 (a) declares it to be an unfair labor practice for an employer,
among others, to 'interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise
of their right to self-organization.' Similarly, Article 249 (a) makes it an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization to 'restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their rights to self-organization...'
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The right of self-organization-includes the right to organize or affiliate with a
labor union or determine which of two or more unions in an establishment to
join, and to engage in concerted activities with co-workers for purposes of
collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing, or for
their mutual aid and protection, i.e., the protection, promotion, or
enhancement of their rights and interests.53ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As members of the governing board of MWEU, respondents are presumed to
know, observe, and apply the union's constitution and by-laws. ' Thus, their
repeated violations, thereof and their disregard of petitioner's rights as a
union member - their inaction on his two appeals which resulted in his
suspension, disqualification from running as MWEU officer, and subsequent
expulsion without being accorded the foil benefits of due process - connote
willfulness and bad faith, a gross disregard of his rights thus causing untold
suffering, oppression and, ultimately., ostracism from MWEU. "Bad faith
implies breach of faith and willful failure to respond to plain and well
understood obligation."54 This warrants an award of moral damages in the
amount of P100,000.00. Moreover, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly
or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs
any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the
latter for damages:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
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(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes
not contrary to law;
In Vital-Gozon v. Court of Appeals,55 this Court declared, as follows:
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. They may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. The instances
when moral damages may be recovered are, inter alia, 'acts and actions
referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 of the Civil Code,'
which, in turn, are found in the Chapter on Human Relations of the
Preliminary Title of the Civil Code. x x x
Under the circumstances, an award of exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, as prayed for, is likewise proper. "Exemplary damages are
designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially deleterious
consequences, and their imposition is required by public policy to suppress
the wanton acts of the offender."56 This should prevent respondents from
repeating their mistakes, which proved costly for petitioner.
Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, '[e]xemplary or corrective damages are
imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.' As this court
has stated in the past: 'Exemplary damages are designed by our civil law to
permit the courts to reshape behaviour that is socially deleterious in its
consequence by creating negative incentives or deterrents against such
behaviour.'57ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Finally, petitioner is also entitled to attorney's fees equivalent to 10per cent
(10%) of the total award. The unjustified acts of respondents clearly
compelled him to institute an action primarily to vindicate his rights and
protect his interest. Indeed, when an employee is forced to litigate and incur
expenses to protect his rights and interest, he is entitled to an award of
attorney's fees.58
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed April 24,
2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 115639 is
hereby MODIFIED, in that all of the respondents - except for Carlos Villa, Ric
Briones, and Chito Bernardo - are declared guilty of unfair labor practices
and ORDERED TO INDEMNIFY petitioner Allan M. Mendoza the amounts of
P100,000.00 as and by way of moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees equivalent to 10 per cent (10%) of the total
award.