Volume 28.

4 December 2004 819±38 International Journal of Urban and Regional Research

Participatory Democracy and Political

Opportunism: Municipal Experience in Italy
and Spain (1960±93)*
ÂN
CLEMENTE J. NAVARRO YA Ä EZ

The normative theory of democracy indicates that the development of participatory

forms of government can happen in political communities of limited size. However, the
objective of this article is to analyse the reasons that may underlie the origin of
initiatives of this sort at the municipal level, while also showing the importance that
institutional factors present in the local political structure may also have.
Specifically, it will be postulated that the opportunities for participation that these
forms of associative democracy entail will be subject to strategies of political
opportunism, since municipal governments will set such processes in motion only
where the local political system presents a favourable structure for this. We attempt to
show this through an empirical analysis of experiences in Italian and Spanish
municipalities.
The first section briefly presents the contributions on participatory democracy
offered by contemporary political theory. The second section presents the hypothesis of
political opportunism. The third section offers a brief analysis of the dynamics of the
Italian and Spanish local political systems, to set in context the empirical analysis
carried out as a comparative study of cases in the fourth section. The article closes with
some brief conclusions, showing the limitations facing democratization processes of
this sort when they are subjected to strategies of political opportunism.

Participatory democracy: the supply of opportunities

for participation at the municipal level
It is well known that, since its origins, democratic theory has established certain rules on
the fit between scale and form of government: as the scale diminishes, the possibilities for
the citizenry to participate in the work of the government, that is, for the development of
participatory democracy, increase (Dahl and Tufte, 1973). However, contemporary
thought has been fleshing out this model of government in two ways. On the one hand, it
has pointed out that participatory democracy has to be built up on the foundation of
representative democracy based on electoral competition, which has to be supplemented
by mechanisms favouring direct participation by citizens (Held, 1986). On the other hand,
it has highlighted the relevance of interest representation groups for democratic
development, not only to channel citizens' demands, but also to adopt an active stance
in decision-making processes, or even in administering certain governmental policies,
services or programmes. Taken together, these initiatives are becoming known as
associative democracy (Hirst, 1994; Cohen and Rogers, 1995; Fung, 2003).
The same direction is taken by current neo-localist ideas, which point out that, in
addition to the virtues of contact and personal knowledge deriving from reduced size,

* Translated from Spanish by Iain L. Fraser.

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9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA
820 Ân
Clemente J. Navarro Ya Äez

the municipal scale and municipal government offer advantages over higher levels for
the provision of services or establishing a developmental dynamic by incorporating
civil actors into decision-making processes and service provision (Goetz and Clarke,
1990). This new urban governance, as Cassese and Wright (1996) call it, is seen as
generating new and more efficient forms of democratic government, a point reflected in
the European Union's various programmes and initiatives of a local nature (Le GaleÁs,
1998).
Thus, for both contemporary democratic theory and the neo-localist approaches, the
minimum definition of participatory democracy would contain at least three elements:
institutional reforms to enable electorally based democracy to be supplemented by other
modes of political participation, in which are present interest representation groups, and
a reduced scale of government.
This type of process has indeed been set in motion in various municipalities in
Western democracies since the 1960s (Burns et al., 1994; King and Stoker, 1996;
Pratchett and Wilson, 1996; Navarro, 1998). Among the cases, those of Italy and Spain
stand out Ð not just because the initiatives there reflect the three elements mentioned,
but also because they have been pursued by at least three-quarters of the municipalities
in the form of political institutions of a formal nature, such as the Regolamenti di
Decentramento e Partecipazione dei Cittadini (RDP) and the Reglamentos de
ParticipacioÂn Ciudadana (RPC), respectively.
These processes mean that municipal governments, and the parties or coalitions in
them, offer opportunities of non-electoral participation, redistributing part of the power
obtained through electoral processes. Thus, in principle, electoral processes are not
required to reach government. Accordingly, we must ask why a municipal government
should decide to redistribute its power by offering certain opportunities for
participation, thus broadening the structure of participation opportunities offered by
electorally based democracy.

The genesis of the processes of municipal democratization:

powerful coalitions and political opportunism
To address this issue, we must pay attention to the action system through which the
processes come about, that is, the features of the local political systems, the institutional
rules delimiting access to and exercise of political power, and the actors present and their
patterns of interaction. Accordingly, our basic analytical framework will be as shown in
Figure 1.1 The present section will be devoted to an in-depth analysis of this system.

The nature of the local political systems: the action system

Although the municipalities of Continental Europe are the outcome of processes of
political and administrative decentralization from central government, as regards their
constitutional status, they are autonomous units of government, independent of higher
units of government in developing particular public policies (Norton, 1994). Among
their powers, they offer opportunities for participation, or a public policy of citizen
participation, although there are certain limits on the form this may take, as laid down in
Spain by the 1985 Ley Reguladora de Bases de ReÂgimen Local (Act regulating the
bases of local government Ð law 7/1985), and in Italy by the 1976 Norma sul
Decentramento e la Partecipazione dei Cittadini nell'amministrazione comunale
(Regulation on decentralization and citizen participation in municipal government Ð
law 278/1976) and the 1990 Ordinamento sulla Autonomia Locale (Regulations on
local autonomy Ð law 142/1990).

1 The framework is based on the revision of the neo-Weberian paradigm by Boudon (1986) in terms of
situational logic.
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Participatory democracy and political opportunism 821

Figure 1 Basic analytical framework

Just like central governments, however, the municipalities are constituted as electoral
polyarchies: access to and use of power is determined by electoral competition.
Accordingly, electoral victory guarantees the monopoly of governmental power, along
with use of the political and administrative apparatus and the municipal resources
through the ComisioÂn de Gobierno or the Giunta Comunale (the executive body); its
exercise limited only by the opposition that other parties or coalitions may exert through
the Pleno Municipal or Consiglio Comunale (town council). It follows that the parties'
main objective lies in maximizing votes so as to obtain power. Accordingly, the main
interest of the party controlling the municipal government is to be re-elected. Lastly, the
ruling party can make use of the municipal resources as it sees fit to favour its re-
election (Downs, 1973; 1991). This, along with their constitutional status, implies that
the municipal governments possess a monopoly on the supply of opportunities for
participation at the municipal level.
To the above, it should be added that, at this level of government, there is a broad
and varied associational network. Moreover, the interaction between the political class
and the citizenry is more intense and constant than at higher levels. For this reason, the
local political class needs direct anchorages in the local community to gain election
success and subsequently pursue its work (Owens, 1998; Rao, 1998), and belonging to
interest representation groups stands out.2
However, the majority of local associations are public interest groups, since their
purpose is to secure public goods which they present in the form of citizenship rights
of particular social groups (Berry, 1977). This means they present considerable
structural constraints in relation to the phenomenon being analysed here.
Specifically, this has to do with collective actions subject to decreasing marginal
yields, since as cooperation increases the value of new individual support decreases,
even to the point of lacking effect or becoming negative (Marwell and Oliver, 1993:
40). This often results in small, unstable groups, made up of a small civic elite or
critical mass which Ð having a high interest in securing certain public goods and
large resources Ð bears the costs of mobilization and organization that collective
action entails (Oliver, 1984).

2 In fact, members of the local political class commonly belong to one or more local groups or
associations simultaneously (Balme, 1989: 140; Moyser and Parry, 1989: 160±2; Parry et al., 1992:
352).
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Clemente J. Navarro Ya Äez

It follows from the above that these are structurally dependent groups. The influence
they are able to exercise depends more on obtaining external resources than relying on
those supplied by their members. In practice, it depends on the position the group
occupies in the local network of associations and on the overlap maintained in relation
to other political actors (groups, parties, or especially, municipal government): the more
central the position and the higher the degree of overlap, the greater will be their access
to information and resources, and accordingly their ability to exert influence (Knoke,
1990: 69±74).
Moreover, the intensity and extent of the inter-relation between local parties and
associations may point to the existence of network parties, which build up a broad set of
local associations around themselves. Usually this model is present with greater
frequency among mass parties than among cadre parties or bureaucratic-electoralist
parties, since mass parties, to a greater extent than the others, make mobilization of the
citizenry into an important power resource (Panebianco, 1982). More specifically, it has
been the parties of the left, like the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) in Italy or the
Partido Comunista de EspanÄa (PCE) Ð and at certain periods the Partido Socialista
Obrero EspanÄol (PSOE) Ð in Spain, that have come closest to this model (Manoukiam,
1968; Gunther et al., 1986).
However, as well as the web of links between parties and associations at the local
level, also relevant in the network of inter-relations of the municipal political class are
its vertical connections, and not only because the organizational development of the
parties has been parallel to the process of political and administrative decentralization,
but especially because they have to adapt the strategies of political combat and
competition they employ to various territorial contexts (Lange, 1975). In this sense, the
similarity or otherwise of parties in local and central government may be a relevant
factor in the local dynamic itself (Boyne, 1996; Page et al., 1992). This is partly because
the distribution of resources from central to municipal government will be more
beneficial for the latter when both political classes belong to the same party (Salmon,
1995).
Another reason is that the municipal terrain is ground on which the parties can either
support or else seek to undermine the electoral legitimacy enjoyed by the party in
central government. Specifically, for parties in opposition at the central level, municipal
autonomy and democratization may take on the features of a partisan policy, an
occasion to structure the exercise of opposition with a view to enlarging social and
electoral support. In return, municipalities controlled by the party in government will
seek to accentuate aspects associated with the management of local affairs and the
provision of services, giving municipal policy a pattern closer to that of substantial
policy.3
Thus access to the centre, defined as similarity existing between the parties
governing both levels, can act as an incentive or an inhibitor of politicization and
electoral confrontation taking place at the municipal level, especially in municipal
systems like those of Italy or Spain, where central government plays a fundamental role
in the distribution of resources to local governments (Navarro, 1998: 89±96).

Supply of and demand for participation: coalitions and political opportunism

As indicated above, the processes of democratization under analysis presuppose a
supply of public-interest `participation opportunities'. In this sense, it may be helpful to
use the analogy of the market to analyse the genesis of this public policy, taking as
demand actors the public interest groups, and as suppliers the municipal political class,
and more specifically, the one in a position of government.
In this sense it is to be expected that in situations marked by high political
confrontation, especially in the absence of legislation regulating the processes of

3 The concepts of partisan policy and substantial policy are taken from Dente and Regonini (1987) and
from their application by Subirats (1991) to the Spanish case specifically.
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Participatory democracy and political opportunism 823

Table 1 System of action for municipal democratization

Internal elements
Institutional factors · Constitutional status:
general competence over
local affairs
· Monopoly of the supply of
opportunities for participation
· Electoral competition as means of
access to and exercise of political
power
The actors and their · Parties: electoral maximization
interests and control of municipal
resources
· Local groups and associations:
demand for participation and
structural dependency
· Network parties: intensity of
interrelation between parties and
local groups
External elements
· Political and administrative
decentralization: interrelation
with central government to
pursue certain public policies
· National legislation on the supply
of public-interest `opportunities
for political participation'
· Access to the centre: similarity
between parties or coalitions of
parties governing at local and
central level

municipal democratization, access to the centre will be a relevant variable in the

activation of a supply of opportunities for participation. In particular, municipal
governments with poor access to the centre will seek to make municipal autonomy and
democratization into a partisan policy, an important feature in their exercise of
opposition, presenting themselves as defenders of local interests and models of
participatory democracy against central government or local governments with access
to the centre. It is accordingly to be expected that they will become offerors of
opportunities for participation. In return, municipalities with access to the centre will
accentuate their concern with management of local affairs, within the framework of
action the same party is carrying out at the central level; they will thus be less likely to
act as offerors. They may go further and base themselves on the legislative vacuum in
order to limit Ð or deny Ð the supply.
In any case, there will be a period of institutional innovation, in which the
democratizing processes will contain a high expressive component, in the sense of
displaying themselves as examples of models of participatory government. The
adoption of legislation will, by favouring the conversion of democratization into a
substantial policy, open up a phase of normalization or adjustment. This will cramp
localist resources, and legitimate, and therefore facilitate, the offer by those
municipalities with access to the centre, which can adapt government action to what
their own party is doing at the central level. In short, the legislation will act as a
resource or as a limitation according to the degree of access to the local political system.
However, in order to govern legitimately, the local political class has no need to
make offers of participation. It should follow that, in the genesis of the democratizing
process, the presence of a certain demand for participation articulated through public
interest groups will also count. But these must be powerful groups, central to the local
associative network, and capable of carrying out a mobilization exercise that can
jeopardize the electoral legitimacy of the municipal government or the pursuit of all or
part of its political programme Ð its agenda. For in any case, it is the municipal
government that has the monopoly of supply. Accordingly, along with demand, there
must be, as a necessary condition, a certain predisposition to make the offer. This will
be determined both by the external factors commented on above Ð access to the centre
and the existence of legislation Ð and by other factors of an internal nature. Among the
internal factors will be whether or not the party is close to the network type of party.
The offer of opportunities for participation presupposes a certain redistribution of
power, and it must therefore be assumed that the predisposition to succeed will increase
in proportion to the interrelation there is between the party Ð supply Ð and the groups
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Clemente J. Navarro Ya Äez

Ð demand. Moreover, to the extent that between the two actors certain norms of trust
develop, they will possess certain similarities in their belief systems, in their perception
of the problems facing the local community and the way they ought to be solved.4
More specifically, it should be pointed out that the offer of opportunities for
participation, and the process of institutional reform it implies, must be based on a
powerful coalition (Lanzalaco, 1995). This will come about when the actors perceive
that their joint action is more beneficial than individual action or alliance with other
actors (Ordershook, 1992). For this to be the case, they must, on the one hand, perceive
that the resources they exchange are vital, and on the other, they must be certain that
they will be exchanged, and in a way beneficial to both parties. In the case being
analysed here, it has to be assumed that the resources the political class and the groups
exchange are, respectively, opportunities for participation Ð capacity for influencing
municipal policy Ð and influence over the citizens, whether to broaden electoral
support or to set public policies in motion.
What has been stated would imply that the combination of demand and willingness
for supply, given both the presence of a network party and poor access to the centre,
will give rise to the formation of a localist coalition, marked by a high degree of
politicization and social mobilization. In this coalition, parties and groups will seek to
present themselves to the outside as defending the interests of the community;
internally, however, they will try to create models of government and political styles
that are exemplary vis-aÁ-vis other levels of government and other parties or coalitions,
especially if no legislation exists that regulates and legitimates these processes.
Thus, it must be assumed that this will be the framework or structure of opportunities
in which the municipal offer of participation is most likely. The failure of local
coalitions, the slackening of political confrontation and the conversion of municipal
policy into substantial policy through the adoption of state legislation will act as factors
inhibiting supply, and contrariwise where the local political system has a high level of
access to the centre.
It may follow from the above that, as a whole, the offer of opportunities for
participation is a public policy subject to practices of political opportunism, since the
demand for participation will be channelled and satisfied provided that it is beneficial to
the municipal government, when the local political structure presents a favourable
framework for making the offer compatible with electoral victory. This means that local
governments will develop strategies adapted to the framework of opportunities offered
by the local political system, and also that in the genesis of the process of
democratization, a certain conditional responsiveness will result, as an induced effect of
the very institutional logic which, both internally and externally, articulates the
functioning of the local political systems. How, then, has the offer of opportunities for
participation come about in reality?

Structure of opportunities for municipal democratization

in Italy and Spain (1960±90)
In both Italy and Spain, three-quarters of the municipalities set afoot democratization
initiatives from the early 1990s in the form of the Regolamenti di Decentramento e
Partecipazione dei Cittadini or Reglamentos de ParticipacioÂn Ciudadana, respectively.
In the Italian case, the initiatives centred on the creation of decentralization bodies
called district councils (Consigli di Circoscrizione), which were regulated at the
national level by law 278 of 1976. On these councils, as well as representatives of

4 In this sense, Levi (1990) refers to the need for certain norms of fairness to exist in order for stable
standards of interaction leading to the creation of institutions to develop. From an empirical
viewpoint, Clark (1995) has shown that these count as one of the principal power resources the
groups depend on in order to be considered influential by the local political class.
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Participatory democracy and political opportunism 825

political parties, there are bodies to run services and committees by sector or policy
area, into which groups and associations are integrated. In the Spanish case, the
initiatives are similar, whether in the form of district councils or sectoral councils
(health, social services, education etc.). As in Italy, the legislative vacuum was filled in
1985 with the adoption of the Ley Reguladora de Bases de ReÂgimen Local (Act to
regulate the Bases of Local Government Ð LRBRL).
In general, the legislation in both cases draws on experience gathered previously.
Our hypotheses, however, give an account of different processes of genesis or models of
democratization in terms of the most relevant features of the municipal political system:
access to the centre, demand for participation, and presence of a network party. In this
sense, before going on to an empirical analysis of the experiences we shall give an
account of the evolution of the municipal political systems in both countries, that is, the
structure of political opportunities in relation to the development of processes of
municipal democratization.

The structures of opportunities: municipal government,

demand for participation and access to the centre
Until the early 1990s the dynamic of the Italian political system can be described as an
age-old confrontation between two political subcultures. On one side, the bianca or
Catholic subculture, with a territorial enclave in the northwest of the country. Its actors
were parish groups and bodies with a Catholic orientation, like Azione Cattolica, and
the party Democrazia Cristiana (DC), which governed at the central level during the
whole period of analysis. On the other, the rossa or socialist subculture, in the central
regions of Italy, represented by the PCI and its collateral organizations (ANCI,
UNISPORT, etc.), acted as the main opposition force. The Partito Socialista Italiano
(PSI), though part of the socialist subculture, left its alliance with the PCI towards the
end of the 1970s, and subsequently formed governments with the DC at the central level
and in some local governments (Galli, 1996).
As regards local government in particular, from the 1940s, the parties of the left,
especially the PCI, appeared as defenders of political and administrative decentraliza-
tion; whereas the DC produced discourse and political action less interested in
decentralization (Rampulla, 1985). In fact, one of the most important arguments in the
PCI's opposition discourse between the late 1970s and early 1980s was `democratic
planning', bringing the processes and organs of decision closer to the citizens, as a way
to set afoot a model of participatory democracy (Stefanini, 1977). Indeed, the PCI made
decentralization, of municipal government in particular, into a partisan policy, a point
around which its political confrontation with the DC was articulated, both at the local
level and in its exercise of opposition at the central level (Dente et al., 1978).
However, the political confrontation between the two subcultures began to slacken in
the early 1980s, beginning a growing process of political secularization, in which the
frontiers between them were blurring, with the party bases extending from their
traditional sectors to broader ones, and the associations and groups linked to them
starting to gain independence (Pasquino, 1980).5
Similarly, the `localist argument' lost force, giving rise to growing processes of
decentralization: first, with the adoption of law 278/1976 regulating and legitimating
the processes of decentralization and participation at the municipal level; and second,
with the setting up of the regional governments from the mid-1970s, progressively
seizing the attention of the parties and public opinion, to the detriment of the local level.
In this way, decentralization, and in particular the municipal sphere, turned into a
substantial policy tied up with the day-to-day exercise of government, with attention

5 Electoral competitiveness at the national level: the percentage difference in votes between the DC
and PCI went from 12.9 in 1963, to 4.3 in 1976, to 8.3 in 1979, 3 in 1983 and 7.7 in 1987 (Vallauri, 1994:
235). By contrast, in their analysis of electoral programmes between 1946 and 1979, Mastropaolo
and Slater (1987) show the progressive rapprochement between the DC and PCI.
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Clemente J. Navarro Ya Äez

becoming increasingly centred on the management and provision of services associated

with the extension and decentralization of the welfare state (Dente, 1980).
But while this is the overall framework describing a substantial change from
polarization to political secularization, and from municipalism as a partisan policy to
management of local affairs as substantial policy, it is equally true that major changes
were happening in the municipal associative web. Specifically, the actors who were
protagonists of the cycle of protests that came about between the late 1960s and the
mid-1970s articulated an intense demand for participation and democratization,
supported by the PCI and its groups to the point of absorbing them, increasing PCI
membership and electoral support (Lange et al., 1992), as well as its presence in
municipal governments between 1975 and 1985 (Martinotti, 1985). The DC, in a
position of government, adopted a posture of confrontation (Pasquino, 1980), along
with which went a progressive breakdown of the social base and part of the collateral
groups of the DC, as a consequence, in large part, of the Second Vatican Council
(Cappello and Diamanti, 1995).
The contact and openness of the rossi organizations, however, led them in the mid-
1980s to start to become independent of the party, at the same time as new associations
and groups were arising, in a crystallization of the mobilizations of the previous decade
(Steffanazzi, 1988). Both, including those of Catholic origin, shifted from strategies of
single-party alliances to others of a multi-party nature, where likelihood of access to
resources was increasingly counting for more than ideological affinity (CENSIS, 1991);
something that points to a substantial move from ideological belief systems to others of
pragmatic patterns, where the bonds between groups and parties are more diffuse
(Diani, 1989).
In general, the Spanish case presents certain similarities to the Italian one. Thus,
prior to the adoption of the LRBRL in 1985 (law 7/1985), and especially during the first
democratic municipal administrations (1979±83), decentralization and municipal
democratization emerged as a central point in the exercise of opposition carried out
by the municipal coalition of parties of the left (PSOE and PCE) against the central
government of the UCD (UnioÂn de Centro DemocraÂtico), in a framework favourable in
general to the pursuit of partisan policies, marked by high political and electoral
confrontation, high levels of social mobilization and an agenda of action centring on
institutional reform of the state (Maravall, 1985; Subirats, 1991).
On the other hand, this was a time when the Citizens' Associations (Asociaciones de
Vecinos or AAVVs) were articulating an intense demand for participation and
democratization at the municipal level in the big cities, maintaining intense contact, and
even simultaneous membership, with parties of the left, basically the PCE. In fact, both
actors set up intense localist coalitions of a democratizing nature (Castells, 1986).
However, the PSOE electoral victory at the central level in 1982, its control of some
40% of municipalities as from 1983, the adoption of the LRBRL in 1985 and the PCE's
successive crises brought a notable downward turn.
In the first place, the legislation regulated and legitimated the processes of
democratization at the municipal level, inhibiting the localist recourse in the party
confrontation. Second, there was intense demobilization among the AAVVs, whether as
an offshoot of that coming about in the PCE, or because many of their leaders moved on
to take up posts of political responsibility in municipal governments (Capo et al., 1988).
Third, the development of the Comunidades AutoÂnomas (regional governments) started,
relegating the municipal sphere to second place on party agendas and in public opinion.
Lastly, a growing process of decentralization of the welfare state began, so that on the
action agenda of local political elites, municipal administration came to occupy a pre-
eminent position over mobilization and social participation (Brugue and GomaÁ, 1998).
Thus, the 1980s can be seen as a period in which local politics took on the features of
a substantial policy, and in which the democratizing demand of the AAVVs
disappeared. Along with this, the new local groups tended to display belief systems
of a pragmatic nature, without intense overlaps with the parties, remote from the more
ideological systems the AAVVs presented (Urrutia, 1992).
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Participatory democracy and political opportunism 827

During this phase, the Partido Popular (PP), the former Alianza Popular (AP),
emerged as the main party of opposition. In contrast with the left parties, however, it
has a weaker organizational structure, and especially a weaker link with the new local
groups, as previously with the AAVVs (Gunther et al., 1986). It did not, therefore, give
rise to the formation of coalitions with groups demanding participation at the local
level. Its discourse insists on municipal decentralization, as a means to secure greater
capacity to influence the political system as a whole, but without insisting on the aspect
of citizen participation.6
The local elections of 1991 brought a new downward turn, as the PP managed to
erode the municipal power of the PSOE. Electoral competitiveness at the municipal
level rose steadily and, with it, local matters began to become repoliticized, again
adopting features bringing them close to the model of partisan policies.7 But the local
associative networks no longer presented the levels of overlap with party formations
present in the late 1970s, for which the parties did not have the civic actors with whom
to set up localist coalitions.
All in all, in both countries different periods can be described according to the level
of political confrontation, the existence or otherwise of legislation, the feature marking
local politics, the presence of a demand for participation and the level of overlap present
in relation to the various political formations, as shown in schematic form in Tables 2
and 3. It follows that, according to our hypotheses, in each of these periods the
processes of genesis or models of democratization will be different.
Specifically, in accordance with our hypotheses, the following must be postulated:
1 At times of high political confrontation and, especially, of absence of legislation,
where local politics present the features of partisan policy, the main offerors of
participation will be municipal governments with low levels of access to the centre.
An example is the local governments of the PCI or left coalitions (PCI+PSI) until the
late 1960s in Italy.
2 If the above is combined with the existence of intense demand for participation, the
offer of participation will come from localist coalitions, made up of municipal
governments with low levels of access to the centre and groups demanding that these
localist coalitions overlap with them, with the intention of combining social and
electoral opposition. This might be the case of the PCE/PSOE coalition and AAVVs
in Spain prior to adoption of the LRBRL, or the PCI local governments and
collective mobilizations between 1969 and 1975 in Italy.
3 The adoption of legislation, and inhibition of the localist recourse it implies, will
result in the incorporation of municipal governments with access to the centre into
the processes of democratization. This will be the case of the DC or PSOE in Italy
and Spain after 1976 and 1985, respectively.
4 In general, if local politics takes on the features of substantial policy, mainly because
of the existence of legislation, the offer of opportunities of participation will come
indifferently from municipal governments with or without access to the centre, with
no need for demand or overlap; though in any case the increase in electoral
competitiveness will act as an incentive for this, as is to be expected from 1991 in
Spain or during the decade 1975±85 in Italy.

6 In the debate on the `Balance sheet of the left municipalities' held by the television programme La
Clave on 4 February 1983, months before the 1983 municipal elections, one can note the posture in
this respect of each of the party representatives present. The interviews were done in the context
of a wider investigation on this issue point in the same direction (Navarro, 1999).
7 According to data from Delgado (1998: 229), municipal electoral competitiveness, calculated as the
difference between votes obtained by the two big parties, went from 3.4 in 1979 (UCD±PSOE), to 16
between 1983 and 1987 (PSOE±PP), 13 in 1991 (PSOE±PP), and 4.4 in 1995 (PSOE±PP). On the thesis
 and Goma
of local repoliticization, cf. Brugue Á (1998).
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Clemente J. Navarro Ya Äez

Table 2 Periods in the Italian local political systems (1960±84)*

Innovation 1 Innovation 2 Adjustment 1 Adjustment 2
(1960±68) (1969±75) (1976±80) (1981±85)
Political ++ ++ ++ -
confrontation
Local politics Partisan policy Partisan policy Partisan policy Substantial policy
Demand ± ++ + ±
Overlap ++ ++ + ±
DC with Bianchi Bianchi Bianchi ±
Associations Associations Associations
PCI with Rossi Rossi Rossi ±
Associations Associations and Associations
mobilizations
Hypothesis on Governments with Localist coalitions Governments with Municipal
actors promoting low access to (PCI) high access to governments in
the initiative the centre (PCI+PSI) the centre (DC) general (DC)
Municipalities 7.7% 56.4% 24.4% 11.5%
pursuing the
initiative
(total 78)

* Plus signs indicate presence of the feature concerned, minus signs its absence.

Genesis and spread of municipal democratization in Italy

and Spain (1960±93): data, analysis and results
In the previous sections we have set up the hypothesis that the presence or absence of
certain features in local political systems Ð access to the centre, demand for
participation and overlap Ð increase or reduce the probability of processes of
democratization appearing. Accordingly, testing the hypothesis means determining
what specific combination of these features at a particular moment favours the
emergence of the phenomenon under analysis to a greater extent than other
configurations. We must thus adopt a strategy centred on comparison of cases,
understood as specific combinations of attributes or variables (Ragin, 1987).

Table 3 Periods in the Spanish local political systems (1979±93)*

Innovation Adjustment 1 Adjustment 2
(1979±84) (1985±90) (1991±95)
Political confrontation ++ ± +
Local politics Partisan policy Substantial policy Partisan policy
Demand ++ ± ±
Overlap ++ ± ±
PCI and PSOE with AAVV ± ±
UCD or PP with ± ± ±
Hypotheses on actors Localist coalitions Governments with Governments with
promoting the initiative (PSOE+PCE) access to the centre (PSOE) access to the centre
(PSOE)
Municipalities pursuing 24.2 45.2 30.6
the initiative (total 74)

International Journal of Urban and Regional Research ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004
Participatory democracy and political opportunism 829

Data and method of analysis

It thus seemed relevant to apply the methodology of qualitative comparative analysis
(QCA) proposed by Ragin (1987). Through comparison of cases, this methodology
enables one to ascertain which minimum combination of features Ð or independent
variables Ð produces a given phenomenon (or dependent variable). More specifically,
it shows which variable(s) introduced into the analysis is necessary and/or sufficient to
cause the appearance of the phenomenon being analysed. For this, one gathers the
information referring to the presence (coded 1) or absence (coded 0) of the dependent
variable and each of the variables considered as independent. Subsequently, one carries
out a minimization (or reduction) of the information to arrive at a definition of which
variable or minimal combination of independent variables is common to the appearance
of a phenomenon (or dependent variable).8
The use of this methodology is also justified by the empirical corpus on which we
are doing the analysis. This consists of two studies on Italian and Spanish
municipalities sponsored by the Associazione Nazionale dei Comuni Italiani (1984)
and the FederacioÂn EspanÄola de Municipios y Provincias (1993), respectively. Thus,
data are supplied on the three fundamental variables of our model, but only for those
municipalities that have embarked on the initiative. This means our analysis must be
taken as a comparative study of cases representing the set of `democratizing
municipalities'. Additionally, our comparison centres, fundamentally, on determining
the similarities and differences between the municipalities starting the initiatives at
different periods, to derive the patterns Ð modal configurations Ð existing at each
moment: that is, what structure of opportunities underlies the democratization
process.9
Accordingly, information is gathered regarding access to the centre, demand for
participation and overlap existing in each municipality for the various periods, taking as
the dependent variable the existence or otherwise of a participation regulation, as an
indicator of the democratization process, for each of the periods defined. Using the
convention that capitals represent the presence of a feature and small letters its
absence,10 the + sign is to be interpreted as `or' and the absence of this sign as `and', our
model, expressed in terms of the QCA, is as follows:11

PDˆEC‡L‡AC‡D‡O

where PD is the process of democratization, whether the RDP in Italy or the RPC in
Spain, EC is the political confrontation (electoral competitiveness), L is the existence of
national legislation regulating the process, AC is the access to the centre, D is the
demand for participation, and O is the overlap.

8 Information minimization and the final solution have been done using the QCA program; see the
fourth section (Data and method of analysis).
9 Specifically, for each period defined we compare the features of municipalities that have started the
process with the others that begin later. For instance, the analysis of the first period includes all the
cases, but the analysis for the last period only includes those that started during that time, taking as
the criterion of comparison the theoretically possible configurations of combinations of the three
independent variables.
10 The process for operationalizing each variable, and the technical sheet for each study, are to be
found in Appendix 2. The variables `political confrontation' and `legislation', being of a contextual
nature, are to be taken as constant for all municipalities in a given period.
11 PD=AC+D+S means that the democratization process comes about where there is access to the
centre, where there is demand or where there is overlap (these are sufficient but not necessary
causes). In contrast, the function PD=AC D S means that the process comes about where the three
conditions are simultaneously present.
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004
830 Ân
Clemente J. Navarro Ya Äez

Table 4 The processes of municipal democratization in Italy (1960±84):

results of the QCA. Model: PD=AC+D+O
Period of Period of Period of Period of
innovation 1 innovation 2 adjustment 1 adjustment 2
(1960±68) (1969±75) (1976±80) (1981±84)
Political confrontation EC EC EC ec
Legislation l l L L
Hypothesis DP= ac acDO ACDO ACdo
Solution DP= ac ac+dO+Do AC+O+d ACo+d
Intersection DP= ac acDO ACDO ACdo
Empirical pd PD pd PD pd PD pd PD
solutions
AC D O 4 0 2 2 1 1 0 1
ac d O 13 2 3 10 1 2 0 1
ac D O 11 1 1 10 0 1 ± ±
ac D O 7 2 0 7 ± ± ± ±
AC d O 11 0 11 0 4 7 0 4
AC d O 10 0 5 5 2 3 0 2
ac d O 13 1 3 10 1 2 0 1
AC D O 3 0 3 0 0 3 ± ±
Subtotal 72 6 28 44 9 19 0 9
Total 78 72 28 9

Source: Own processing of data from CENSIS (1988) and application of QCA

Results and interpretation

The results of the analysis for Italy and Spain, 78 and 52 municipalities respectively, are
presented in Tables 4 and 6.12. They show, for each period, the hypothesis
operationalized in terms of the QCA methodology, the solution arrived at, and the
intersection between the hypothesis and the final solution, which shows the extent to
which the hypothesis is confirmed (Ragin, 1987). Also presented are the numbers of
municipalities for each of the combinations or configurations empirically found in the
data for each period.
The results reached in the analysis of the Italian case show that, as postulated in the
hypotheses, during the period of innovation prior to adoption of the legislation
regulating the process at the national level (1976), the process of democratization was
pursued chiefly by municipalities with poor access to the centre (RDP=ac).
Subsequently, in the period of adjustment, it was the municipalities with a high degree
of access to the centre (AC) that embarked on the initiative. Accordingly, the results fit
even better than indicated in the previous sections.
Thus, during the period 1960±8, marked by a sharp confrontation between the rossa
and bianca subcultures, access to the centre appears to be a necessary and sufficient
cause to explain the phenomenon (PD=ac). That is, the innovating municipalities are
those headed by parties in opposition at the national level (PCI). By contrast, with the
emergence of an intense demand for participation in the ensuing period (1959±75), the
process was set afoot in the same type of municipality, but especially where there was

12 In the Spanish case the number of municipalities with regulations rises to 77 cases. But lack of some
of the information used to construct the independent variables means that the number of cases
eligible for analysis reduces to 52.
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004
Participatory democracy and political opportunism 831

demand and/or overlap. Therefore, this is a process where what counts is the intensity of
demand and the degree to which the parties maintain connections with the groups from
which they are emerging.
This could indicate that the opposition, in aiming to combine social and electoral
pressure, pursues the process with some independence of demand or overlap, although it
is even more clear where these are present (as shown by the intersection between
hypothesis and function resulting from minimization). By contrast, municipal
governments with access to the centre during a period of high political confrontation,
absence of national legislation, and when the opposition is making local autonomy one
of its basic arguments, thus maintaining overlaps with the groups making the demands,
will set the process in motion in the presence of demand (RDP=Do, two cases), but
especially where there is overlap (RPD=dO, five cases); that is, when they can limit the
risk of seeing their capacity for government eroded.
By contrast, the appearance of legislation in 1976 (law 278) brought the definitive
incorporation of those municipal governments with access to the centre Ð those able to
combine municipal participation with the national policy of heeding the demand for
participation. At this time, local democratization turned into a substantial policy.
Moreover, during the last analysis period (1980±84), when the process of political
secularization began, electoral confrontation slackened and the local sphere occupied less
space on the parties' agenda and programmes; lack of demand, as well as lack of overlap
in municipal governments with access to the centre, emerged as necessary causes for
pursuit of processes of democratization (RDP=ACo+d). This brought, in particular, the
inclusion of municipalities of the south of the country Ð a bianca-rossa zone of
traditional pro-government orientation and poor civic and associational development
(Table 5).
De facto, in general terms, the parties circumscribe their action mainly to territorial
areas of their own political subculture, and where they act as network parties with a
high overlap with local groups (Table 5). However, they also do so in mixed areas when
a demand for participation arises (1969±75) Ð in both cases, or where there is national
legislation Ð in the case of municipalities run by the government party (AC). In
general, it can be concluded that the initiative is set in motion to a greater extent by
municipalities with poor access to the centre and in the absence of relevant legislation,
showing the opportunist use of the offer of participation; that is, as a partisan policy.
Those municipalities with access to the centre use it especially at a time when there is
already legislation making the action of government at the local and state levels
compatible; that is, participation as a substantial policy.
The Spanish case presents similar patterns (Table 6). During the phase of
institutional innovation (1976±85), it is local governments with poor access to the
centre that set the process going, whereas those with greater access do so during the
adjustment phase (1986±93). More specifically, in the former case, marked by a high
level of political and electoral confrontation, where local autonomy and citizen
participation are elements present among the parties in opposition at the central level,
regulations are adopted in those local political systems that combine low access to the
centre, demand for participation and overlap between the groups making it (chiefly
AAVVs) and the municipal government (PCE or PSOE); that is, a localist coalition
headed by parties in opposition at the central level (RPC=acDO).13
Following adoption of law 7/1985, in a framework of low electoral competitiveness
in which the party governing at the central level controlled a good part of the municipal
governments, participation regulations were adopted in those local political systems
with access to the centre (PSOE), or else in those where there was no demand or no
overlap (RPC=AC+d+o). It may be that this was an initiative joined indifferently by
municipal governments with or without access to the centre, and arose chiefly on the
initiative of this actor, with participation of local groups being indeterminate. Here we

13 In fact, one of the objectives of the `pact for progress' established at the local level between the
PSOE and PCI lay in democratizing municipal governments (Caballero, 1992).
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research

832
Table 5 Political subcultures, access to the centre and period of adoption of regulations in Italian municipalities (1960±84)*

Political subculture (geopolitical zone)

Access to centre Period Bianca (northwest) Bianca-Rossa Rossa-Bianca Rossa (centre) Total
or southern or industrial(northwest) (n)
(south and islands)
Innovation 1960±68 100 (0)
AC 1969±75 43 28.5 28.5 100 (7)
Adjustment 1975±80 27 19 27 27 100 (15)
1980±84 14 86 100 (7)
ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004

Innovation 1960±68 17 33 50 100 (6)

ac 1969±75 5 10 36 49 100 (37)
Adjustment 1976±80 100 100 (5)
1980±84 100 100 (2)

Clemente J. Navarro Ya
Total (n) 14 (11) 19 (15) 30 (23) 37 (29) 100 (78)

* Boxes with no figures indicate there were no cases. It should be recalled that situation AC is for the Democrazia Cristiana, and ac for the PCI, essentially.
Source: Own processing of CENSIS data (1988)

ÂnÄez
Participatory democracy and political opportunism 833

Table 6 The processes of municipal democratization in Spain (1979±93):

results of the QCA. Model: PD=AC+D+O
Period of Period of Period of
innovation adjustment 1 adjustment 2
(1976±85) (1986±90) (1991±93)
Political EC ec EC
confrontation
Legislation l L L
Hypothesis PD= acDO AC+do AC
Solution PD= acDO AC+d+o AC+do
Intersection PD= acDO AC+do ACdo
Empirical rpc RPC rpc RPC rpc RPC
solutions
ac D O 0 10 Ð Ð Ð Ð
AC D O 9 0 3 6 0 3
AC d o 11 0 5 6 0 5
AC D o 5 0 2 3 0 2
AC d O 7 0 3 4 0 3
ac D o 1 3 0 1 Ð Ð
ac D o 1 1 0 1 Ð Ð
ac d o 4 0 2 2 0 2
Subtotal 38 14 15 23 0 15
Total 52 38 15

Source: Own processing on basis of Survey of Citizen Participation by FEMP (1993) and application of QCA

should highlight the legitimizing effect brought about by the national legislation,
making possible the adaptation of the action of government at the local and central
levels, and inhibiting the localist recourse using democratization by the parties in
opposition.
Lastly, in the third period, the pattern previously present appears more clearly.
Regulations are adopted either in municipalities governed by the same party as in
central government, independently of the presence or absence of demand or overlap, or
else in the case when neither of these two conditions exist (RPC=AC+do).
Fundamentally, we thus have a government initiative in which active participation by
citizens counts for little, in a period when the municipal power held by the party in
government is beginning to erode; or else an initiative of governments with poor access
to the centre (PP), which without constituting network parties, take up the offer of
participation when it involves no risk Ð that is, when there is no demand.
Taken together, the results show patterns common to both countries. On the one
hand, we note that the actor leading the democratizing initiatives during the period of
innovation is the party that is in opposition at the central level; whereas during the
period of adjustment, once the legislation legitimizing these processes appears, the main
actor is the party in government at the central level. Thus, lack of legislation appears to
be a resource for the exercise of opposition, and it may be deduced from this that these
initiatives take on the form of a partisan policy in the overall exercise of opposition
carried out by the parties with restricted access to the centre (PD=EP l ac). This is even
more clear when the parties can combine social and electoral opposition without
endangering their electoral support, that is, by forming a localist coalition with the
groups demanding participation based on intense relations of overlap (PD=EP l acDO).
This last pattern also seems to be common to those municipalities with access to the
centre, as long as they are controlled by a network party which, thanks to its overlap
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004
834 Ân
Clemente J. Navarro Ya Äez

with the local associational web, minimizes the risk of seeing local power eroded, as in
the case of the DC. But their incorporation comes about particularly once legislation is
adopted, with a certain independence of the existence of demand and overlap (PD=L
AC). The opposite occurs among municipal governments with less access, since
national regulation means that municipal autonomy and democratization take on
patterns closer to a substantial policy than a partisan policy, with management of local
affairs moving to the foreground to the detriment of social participation as such.

Political opportunism and conditional responsiveness:

scale or political structure?
The above analyses seem to show that the genesis of the processes of democratization is
subject to strategies of political opportunism, since municipal governments will set
about offering opportunities of participation provided the situation of their respective
local political systems, both internally and externally, presents a favourable structure of
opportunities.
In brief, this strategy takes the shape of utilization of municipal democratization as a
partisan policy within the general framework of political confrontation by the parties in
opposition, and especially by setting up localist coalitions, in their endeavour to
combine social and electoral opposition. By contrast, when democratization takes on
features of a substantial policy, particularly because of the presence of legislation in
that respect, a favourable framework is created for those municipalities with access to
the centre, which take advantage of the opportunity. Previously, they would only pursue
the initiative if, acting as a network party, they maintained high levels of overlap with
the local groups.
It follows from this that the discussion and initiation of municipal democratization
are subject to strategies whereby municipal governments seek to adapt the offer to the
structure of opportunities offered by the local political system. These adaptive strategies
point to a certain political opportunism, since they channel and incorporate into
government the demand for participation, as long as it is beneficial to them, or at least
does not undermine their principal interest: winning elections. Therefore, this involves
governments which, by contrast with those not offering opportunities of participation,
show a high degree of responsibility (accountability) if there is a demand for
participation, though of a conditional nature, dependent on the interrelation Ð overlap
Ð they maintain with the local groups.
However, the political opportunism has to be understood as an institutionally
induced adaptive strategy, in the sense that it is a function both of the interests of the
municipal government and of the structure of opportunities offered by the local political
system. On the one hand, this is because the municipal government has to make
electoral victory compatible with the inclusion of the groups in municipal government,
if only because in order to do so it must control the government. What seems
determinant here is the existence of a network party that guarantees the development of
norms of fairness and an exchange of resources beneficial to both participants. On the
other hand, it is because the municipal government must make its action, and therefore
the decision to make the offer or not, compatible with the action its own party is
carrying out at higher levels of government, where what counts is not just the pursuit of
specific public policies, but also the existence or otherwise of legislation legitimizing
the process. That is, its action is pursued in the light of the framework set by the
institutional design that central government sets up for local governments, as regards
both its intricate relations with the development of policies and services and its
economic dependence on the central government, and to form itself into an electoral
polyarchy.
The above findings have implications in relation to current thinking about local
government and participatory democracy. Thus, and contrary to what the normative
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004
Participatory democracy and political opportunism 835

theory of democracy or current neo-localist approaches postulate, the development of

models of participatory government depends not only on the size of the community, but
also, and especially, on the political structure: in the first place, because it is a matter of
institutional reforms effected within the democracy of party competition, the
institutional logic of which imposes restrictions on the action of government Ð
electoral victory; as a consequence of this, and in the second place, because this victory
must be made compatible with the offer of opportunities for participation, which
depends in every case on the existence or otherwise of a network party Ð of overlap;
and lastly, because the municipal governments, though autonomous entities from a
constitutional viewpoint, are tightly constrained by, or even depend on, the political and
institutional dynamics present in the political system as a whole.
In sum, the development of participatory democracy Ð in its form of associative
democracy Ð seems, apart from the stumbling block of the size of the community, to
come up against limits in the political structure as such. This is perhaps why the
classical authors, from Aristotle to Montesquieu, insisted not just on scale as a way to
guarantee interpersonal acquaintance and access to government, but also on the political
structure that ought to characterize the participatory politeia: namely, direct
participation and reduced, but autonomous, units of government.

Clemente J. Navarro Ya Ä ez (cnavyan@dts.upo.es), Political Sociology Centre, Pablo de

Ân
Olavide University, Carretera de Utrera, Km. 1, 41013 Seville, Spain

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Appendix 1 Ð Technical sheets of studies

Italian case: survey on urban decentralization (CENSIS)
· Done by: ANCI (Associazone Nazionale dei Comuni Italiani) and CENSIS (1984).
· Source of data: database developed on basis of annexes in CENSIS (1988).
· Date done: 1987±8.
· Universe: Italian municipalities with district councils.
· Method of gathering information: postal survey (self-filled questionnaire).
· Final sample: 78 municipalities, 63 provincial capitals and 15 smaller towns.

Spanish case: survey on citizen participation by FEMP

· Done by: FEMP (FederacioÂn EspanÄola de Municipios y Provincias).
· Source of data: survey database.
· Date done: 1993±4.
· Universe: Spanish municipality members of FEMP, with 20,000 or more inhabitants.
· Method of gathering information: postal survey (self-filled questionnaire).
· Final sample: 118 municipalities (60% with Reglamento de ParticipacioÂn
Ciudadana).

International Journal of Urban and Regional Research ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004
838 Ân
Clemente J. Navarro Ya Äez

Appendix 2 Ð Operationalization of variables

Access to the centre:
· AC: high access to the centre, where the party or coalition in the municipal
government at the time of adoption of decentralization through district councils is the
same as in government at the central level;
· ac: low access to the centre, where the party or coalition in the municipal
government at the time of adoption of decentralization through district councils is
different from the one in government at the central level.

· Demand for participation:

· D: demand exists, if decentralization arises as an initiative of groups, or at least in
joint fashion between groups and municipal government;
· d: no demand exists, where decentralization is an initiative of municipal
government.

· Overlap:
· in the Italian case:
· O: overlap exists, where relations between groups and municipal government
are collaborative, according to interviewees;
· s: no overlap exists, where relations between groups and municipal government
are conflictual, according to interviewees;

· in the Spanish case:

· O: overlap exists, where relations between groups and municipal government
are collaborative and the former are integrated into joint commissions to draw
up the participation regulations, according to interviewees;
· o: no overlap exists, where relations between groups and municipal
government are not collaborative and the former are not integrated into joint
commissions to draw up the participation regulations, according to
interviewees.

International Journal of Urban and Regional Research ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004