G.R. No.

L-50908 January 31, 1984

MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA and ENRIQUE D. BAUTISTA, petitioners,

vs.
ALFREDO L. JUINIO, ROMEO F. EDU and FIDEL V. RAMOS, respondents.

Facts:

Letter of Instruction No. 869, issued on May 31, 1979 tends to response to the protracted oil crisis that dates
back to 1974.

This letter of instruction banned the use of private motor vehicles with H and EH plates on week-ends and
holidays from "[12:00] a.m. Saturday morning to 5:00 a.m. Monday morning, or 1:00 a.m. of the holiday to
5:00 a.m. of the day after the holiday with the exemption of the following vehicles: (a) S (Service); (b) T
(Truck); (e) DPL (Diplomatic); (d) CC (Consular Corps); (e) TC (Tourist Cars).

It was then alleged by petitioners that "while the purpose for the issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable, to wit,
energy conservation, the provision banning the use of H and EH [vehicles] is unfair, discriminatory,
[amounting to an] arbitrary classification" and thus in contravention of the equal protection
clause. 5 Moreover, for them, such Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process, more specifically, "of their
right to use and enjoy their private property and of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings, reunions
and outings on week-ends and holidays," inviting attention to the fact that others not included in the ban
enjoying "unrestricted freedom."

Issue:

WON the LOI violates equal protection.

It is true, of course, that there may be instances where a police power measure may, because of its arbitrary,
oppressive or unjust character, be held offensive to the due process clause and, therefore, may, when
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding, be declared void on its face. This is not one of them. A recital
of the whereas clauses of the Letter of Instruction makes it clear.

In the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so where the assailed
governmental action deals with the use of one's property, the latter is accorded much leeway. That is settled
law. What is more, it is good law. Due process, therefore, cannot be validly invoked. As stressed in the cited
Ermita-Malate Hotel decision: "To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police
power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does 'to all the great public needs.' It would be, to paraphrase another leading
decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its
competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put,
police power is 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to
the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.' " 23
Tano vs Socrates
On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-
92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL
LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY
1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF
The said ordinance purpose was to effectively free our City Sea Waters from Cyanide and other Obnoxious
substance[s], and shall cover all persons and/or entities operating within and outside the City of Puerto
Princesa who is are (sic) directly or indirectly in the business or shipment of live fish and lobster outside the
City.

To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order No. 23, Series
of 1993 dated January 22, 1993 which reads as follows:

In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No. PD 426-14-74, otherwise known as
"AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY
BUSINESS, TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION ANY
OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYOR'S
PERMIT" and "City Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH
AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998,
you are hereby authorized and directed to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing
live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port
within the jurisdiction of the City to any point of destinations [sic] either via aircraft or seacraft.

The purpose of the inspection is to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the required Mayor's Permit
issued by this Office and the shipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued by the local office of the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and as to compliance with all other existing rules and regulations
on the matter.

Any cargo containing live fish and lobster without the required documents as stated herein must be held for
proper disposition.

On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted
Resolution No. 33 entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING,
POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC
ORGANISMS FOR A PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS"
The petitioners assailed that those Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and
unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and
7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
WON office order no 23 and ordinance number 2 is violative of the constitutional rights
HELD:
The ordinances in question are police power measures, enacted by the Province of Palawan and the City of
Puerto Princesa, pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991 which makes it in fact their duty to enact
measures to "protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the
environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing.
It is true that police power can be exercised through the general welfare clause. But, while police power is
inherent in a state, it is not so in municipal corporations or local governments. In order that a local government
may exercise police power, there must be a legislative grant which necessarily sets the limits for the exercise
of the power. 5 In this case, Congress has enacted the Local Government Code which provides the standards
as well as the limitations in the exercise of the police power by the local government unit.
MIRASOL VS DPWH

1. On January 10, 2001, petitioners filed before the trial court a Petition for Declaratory
Judgment with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction docketed as Civil
Case No. 01-034. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of the following administrative
issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000, entitled "Limited
Access Highway Act" enacted in 1957:

a. DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1968;

b. DPWH Department Order No. 74, Series of 1993;

c. Art. II, Sec. 3(a) of the Revised Rules on Limited Access Facilities promulgated in
199[8] by the DPWH thru the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB).

2. Previously, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. 2000, DPWH issued on June 25, 1998
Department Order (DO) No. 215 declaring the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll
Expressway as limited access facilities.

3. Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners

sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances. Moreover,
petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along the entire
breadth of North and South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll
Expressway under DO 215.

Petitioners assail the DPWH’s failure to provide "scientific" and "objective" data on the danger of
having motorcycles plying our highways. They attack this exercise of police power as baseless and
unwarranted. Petitioners belabor the fact that there are studies that provide proof that motorcycles are
safe modes of transport. They also claim that AO 1 introduces an unreasonable classification by
singling-out motorcycles from other motorized modes of transport. Finally, petitioners argue that AO 1
violates their right to travel.

ISSUE:
WHETHER AO 1 AND DO 123 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.5

HELD:
The use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of the police
power of the state.33 The police power is far-reaching in scope and is the "most essential, insistent and
illimitable" of all government powers.34 The tendency is to extend rather than to restrict the use of
police power. The sole standard in measuring its exercise is reasonableness.35 What is "reasonable"
is not subject to exact definition or scientific formulation. No all-embracing test of reasonableness
exists,36 for its determination rests upon human judgment applied to the facts and circumstances of
each particular case.37
The regulation affects the right to peaceably assemble. The exercise of police power involves
restriction, restriction being implicit in the power itself. Thus, the test of constitutionality of a police
power measure is limited to an inquiry on whether the restriction imposed on constitutional rights is
reasonable, and not whether it imposes a restriction on those rights.

THE PETITION WA DISMISSED