Speculative and Anthropological Criticism of Religion - A Theological Orientation To Hegel

Speculative and Anthropological Criticism of Religion: A Theological Orientation to Hegel
and Feuerbach
Author(s): Walter Jaeschke
Source: Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Sep., 1980), pp. 345-
364
Published by: Oxford University Press
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The Journal of the American Academy of Religion, XLVIII/3
Speculative and Anthropological

Criticism of Religion:
A Theological Orientation
to Hegel and Feuerbach
Walter Jaeschke
ABSTRACT
In Feuerbach's estimation, Hegelian philosophy had provided the

"last place of refuge" for theology. Furthermore, he believed that h
own philosophy had destroyed that refuge. Feuerbach accepted t
Hegelian view of the history of philosophy as an irreversible process
which a particular philosophical position obtains its legitimation by
sublating the immanent contradictions of the position previous to i
Thus, he saw the validation for his own concept of religion as comi
not from an immediate analysis of the phenomena in question, but
from that concept's negation of the Hegelian position.
But Feuerbach's position does not in fact arise out of a dialectica
overcoming of Hegel's concept of religion. It is, rather, a pure "heter
thesis" and, therefore, does not prove the necessity of an immanen
philosophical-historical progression from a speculative to an anthropo
logical concept of religion. The author suggests that if we wish
attribute argumentative power to the model of a philosophico-histori
cal progression, then it is more correct to assert an immanent progr
sion from an anthropological to a speculative concept of religio
Indeed, this is the direction in which Hegel's understanding of religi
moved. In his earlier thinking, Hegel understood religion in terms th
foreshadow Feuerbach's position. But Hegel was able to take up
religion on a metaphysical level as well and, thereby, to sublate the
anthropological concept of religion in the speculative. Thus, the que
tion in dispute between Hegel and Feuerbach is this: Can one go
beyond the anthropological standpoint to a speculative one, or does
such a move simply force one beyond the already correctly overcom
religious alienation of the self and establish a new and more sophist
cated form of alienation?
After a discussion of the critical and the apologetic dimensions of
Hegel's speculative concept of religion, the article examines the validity
of Feuerbach's arguments against that concept. The author concludes
346 Walter Jaeschke
that, whatever the p

religion built on a su
structure, his critique
religion.
" egelian philosophy is the lastAsplace

for theology. onceofCatholic
refuge, theologians
the last rational support
became de facto
Aristotelians in order to fight Protestantism, so must Protestant
theologians now become de jure Hegelians in order to fight 'atheism'"
(Feuerbach, 3:238).
This advice given by Feuerbach in his Provisional Theses (1843) was
followed at that time by only a few theologians. Today even in Catholic
theology there are those who claim that Hegel could signify for our age
what Thomas Aquinas was to the church in the Middle Ages, though
these continue to constitute a dwindling minority. On the other hand,
however, theology has long since abandoned those diatribes which,
practically speaking, formed an opinio communis, a generalized attitude,
toward Feuerbach's work. This raving attitude toward Feuerbach was
most prevalent where theologians showed no inkling of Feuerbach's
own origin in German Idealist philosophy. Even today theologians have
surely not become full-fledged followers of Feuerbach. Nevertheless, we
see increasing indications that currently, due to a willingness to dialogue
with Feuerbach, there are developing the beginnings of a productive
theological appropriation of his thought. This has even reached the point
of cautiously accepting Feuerbach's projectionist theory as a phenomen-
ologically suitable analysis of faith (H.-M. Barth). No longer is Feuer-
bach classed, as he was by the earlier Karl Barth, merely as one of the
Assyrians or Babylonians whom God occasionally needed in order to call
Jerusalem to order (K. Barth:207). Today he is rather considered like
one of the prophets, whose words, of course, were not always valued;
but lack of esteem in no way prejudices the truth of a prophetic word.
Both the productive appropriation and the rejection of Feuerbach's
Walter Jaeschke, who since 1974 has been connected with the Hegel archives at
the Ruhr-University at Bochum, Germany, studied philosophy under Dieter
Henrich and theology under Carsten Colpe and Helmut Gollwitzer at the Free
University of Berlin, taking his doctorate in 1974 with a dissertation entitled Die
Suche nach den eschatologischen Wurzeln der Geschichtsphilosophie (Munich,
1976). He is editor of the Science of Logic in the new edition of Hegel's works
and is at work on a monograph concerning Hegel's philosophy of religion. At
the meeting of the AAR in New York in 1979, he presented to the Nineteenth-
Century Theology Group a paper, "Hegel's Philosophy of Religion: The Quest
for a Critical Edition," which appeared in The Owl of Minerva.
Hegel and Feuerbach 347
In this regard, one can cite as

draws in his comparison of
"From derision in the name of
turned to pity in the name of
life" (91). It is not necessary to
compassion in order to acknow
thy" constitutes a conceptually
discussion, which is the only k
It would then appear consiste
oughly critical situation would
tion and immunization, but le
the nearest at hand: the retrea
avenue might have appeared
seems to have been closed by
Feuerbach at the beginning of
lated his position. Contrary
Feuerbach certainly did not b
the basis of Hegelian speculat
ship of his philosophy to Hege
Fichte had once described the
cism. Fichte held that neither of the two could refute the other
scientifically and that the choice of one or the other depended
what type of person one was (195). Rather, Feuerbach claimed to ha
resolved the immanent contradictions in Hegel's speculative interpr
tion of Christianity, to have refuted theology in principle and not m
from the standpoint of theology itself, as Hegel did (3:267).
Feuerbach's conviction that he had irrevocably gone beyond Heg
is widely accepted even today. However, the very schema of a p
sophico-historical falsification by which Feuerbach legitimated his
tique of Christianity is itself recognizably Hegelian. It presumes a
of the history of philosophy as an irreversible process progressing
rigorous scientific continuity. Within this process each philosop
position respectively obtains its legitimation by itself, presenting
sublation of the immanent contradictions of the position previous
Hegel had grounded the truth of his philosophy in the sublat
(Aufheben) of the contradictions found in systems previous to his
He claimed to have taken up such systems' moments of truth into
own system. Similarly, Feuerbach linked the validity of his attemp
the negation of Hegel's. In fact, he made this linkage so close th
did not see the sources of the evidence for his own standpoint
immediate analysis of the explicitly treated phenomena and especia
that of religious consciousness. Rather, he located the evidence for
validity of his thought in the successful negation of Hegel's philos
alone. For Feuerbach, the identification of the alienated essence of
human with the human "can be deduced not in a positive way, but
out of the Hegelian philosophy and as the negation of that philosop
348 Walter Jaeschke
This identification can o

is grasped as the total n
This sentence, taken f
to Feuerbach's adequat
equally defines the co
can be criticized.
Since the present situ
image of an irresistib
appear inopportune no
Young Hegelians" or es
should be able to ask,
whether Feuerbach is j
We can ask what the co
to for a theological orie
however, not an exte
seriously, that is, if we
critique is indeed the on
II
Several of the arguments against Hegel's speculative philosophy of

religion are already found in Feuerbach's shorter writings from around
the end of the 1830s, that is, before his formal break with Hegel in
1839. In 1838, during the course of the discussion about David
Friedrich Strauss's Leben Jesu, Feuerbach saw it necessary to defend
Hegel's philosophy of religion against an attack by Heinrich Leo. Leo
was an earlier Hegelian who went over to Hengstenberg's neoorthodoxy
and to the political restoration party connected with it. Feuerbach had
originally drafted the small, very important writing On Philosophy and
Christianity (2:261-330) as a review of Leo's written indictment of
Hegel. It gives particulars concerning the already existing differences in
Hegel's and Feuerbach's concepts of religion. Feuerbach rejected the
accusation that Hegel's thought was not Christian, first of all by
reference to the difference of dimension between religion and philoso-
phy of religion. The latter was seen as the philosophical comprehension
of the truth of religion. Philosophy grasps Christianity, but is not itself
Christian. However, Hegel's theologically orthodox and politically reac-
tionary opponents contested the right to make such a distinction. On the
contrary, their demand for a Christian philosophy destroyed such a
differentiation. Either one had to teach Christian philosophy, or one did
not belong as professor of philosophy at a state university.
Over against this restorative demand, Feuerbach made use of an
argument quite untypical for a Hegelian: he asserted the radical differ-
ence between philosophy and religion. Philosophy was assigned the area
of reason, whereas religion was assigned the area of feeling and heart.
This division, which was expressed here for the first time in all its
sharpness, remained fundamental in Feuerbach's later writings.
On the basis of such a divisi

against the ideologues of the C
its subordination. This he did
the fundamental theorem of
identity of content between p
Feuerbach's apology for th
successful in turning back t
religion was not Christian. Bu
already under attack furthe
criticism than had the origin
with Hegel's concept of religi
appear unacceptable. Rather, H
phy and religion was in prin
confirmed the accusation of
philosophy. He nevertheless m
ting material while pulling th
This strategy of argumentatio
others, both right- and left
reconcilability of Hegel's philo
Feuerbach's assertion of a to
religion required further anch
in the then sharp controversy
philosophy. Feuerbach's design
losophy should have been m
Hegelian theorem that religion
only in differing form. Howe
interest to establish a peacefu
phy. He eliminated the possib
positing the necessarily anti-C
anity. Feuerbach could grou
glaring opposition to Hegel-
concept of Christianity. He id
anity" and of course then co
character of the modern wor
and so forth.
Especially in the small but i
the Writing: "The Essence of C
of this major work, Feuerbach
(in opposition to Schleiermach
of religion. Hegel had located
of in heart and feeling. With
is not to be thought of ind
145-63). However, Feuerbach
ered an immanent destruction
rather draws out the consequ
tion of religion found in the
350 Walter Jaeschke
with Hegel, so Feuerba

from philosophy in the
following through, how
ence and lost from vi
pertaining to the defin
from the philosophica
return to it, so that th
naturally enough. As Howard L. Williams has recently stressed
(136-56), however, this philosophical dimension is the only one Hegel
thematized, since it is indeed the only one which can form the object of
a philosophy of religion.
In contradiction to Feuerbach's claim, his concept of religion does
not rest on a theoretical overcoming of the Hegelian concept of religion.
But it also does not depend only upon his controversy with the
ideologues of the Christian restoration. Already in his Thoughts on Death
and Immortality (1830) Feuerbach spoke roughly of the opposition
between religion and philosophy; and even earlier, in the 1828 letter
with which he sent his dissertation to Hegel, he had shown his shifting
attitude toward the question by the challenge "to truly destroy [Christi-
anity], to bore it into the ground of truth" (1:356), and to grant to
philosophy Christianity's place in the spiritual life of the age. Finally, if
we trust the autobiographical sketch of 1846, already back in 1824
Feuerbach had gone "in a highly divided, unhappy, indecisive condi-
tion" to Berlin in order to study with Hegel. Already then Feuerbach
had questioned "the combat between philosophy and theology, the
necessity that one must either sacrifice philosophy to theology or
theology to philosophy" (Bolin:12-13). Feuerbach at no time accepted
the speculative concept of religion, not even before his formal break
with Hegel. His concept of religion had not, as he proposed, arisen out
of a dialectical overcoming of Hegel's position; it has to be considered
rather as a pure "heterothesis," as a different thesis, which, however, is
not the result of an immanent dialectical sublation of previous contradic-
tions. The roots of his concept can be traced back even to Feuerbach's
early years. His criterion was that his philosophy could be made
comprehensible only out of the negation of the Hegelian. At least for
the historico-genetic posing of the question, to which Feuerbach himself
gave great weight, this self-appointed criterion is not verified. The
necessity of a philosophico-historical immanent progressing from a
speculative to an anthropological concept of religion is therewith in no
way proved. That which in his specific argument against the speculative
concept of religion might be able to convince will be discussed in what
follows.
III
If we want to attribute argumentative power to the model of a

philosophico-historical progression, it is more correct to assert an imma-
nent progression from an anthropological to a speculative concept of
religion. The justification for such a movement has until now been
satisfactorily researched neither in connection with the conflict sur-
rounding Feuerbach's position nor in any other context. Hegel's transi-
tion from his earlier efforts, which he made both in Tiibingen and at the
beginning of his time in Bern (1792-94), to the speculative concept of
religion, which is present since the later Jena years, constitutes precisely
such a development from the anthropological to the speculative. As a
student in Tiibingen, Hegel designated feeling, heart, and imagination
as the locus of religion. This concept of religion stands in contrast to the
orthodox understanding of religion as a relationship of the human to
God, a relationship established through God's revelation. However, it
was the Enlightenment's moral concept of God and religion which
formed the primary opponent. While some traces of this concept of
religion recall either Rousseau or Hoelderlin, other tendencies can be
read as foreshadowing Feuerbach's projectionist thesis; for example,
Hegel's assertion that "it has been reserved in the main for our epoch
to vindicate, at least in theory, the human ownership of the treasures
formerly squandered on heaven" (1971:159). In these years, Hegel
treated religion only within the confines of an analysis of humankind's
needs. Even in 1800, in his last letter from Frankfurt, Hegel asserted
the same. In looking back he said that his scientific construction had
begun from the subordinated needs of humanity and only now estab-
lished itself as a system (Hoffmeister:59). At the end of the Frankfurt
period, we find Hegel's insight that recourse to a myth-constructing
imagination of humankind would by itself not be sufficient to under-
stand the phenomenon of religion. As Feuerbach, so too Hegel is
convinced "that there lies in human nature itself the need both to
acknowledge a being higher than the human activity in our consciou
ness and to make the intuition of this being's fullness the vivify
center of life." Hegel, however, is equally convinced that "an examin
tion of this question cannot be thoughtfully and thoroughly pur
without becoming in the end a metaphysical treatment of the relati
between the finite and the infinite" (1971:176).
Hegel was able to work out this position only after his transfer
Jena, after the discovery of the possibility of a rational knowledge of
Absolute in speculative philosophy. The result of this metaphysi
analysis of religion gave rise to the insight that the structure of relig
is the structure of self-consciousness, therewith the structure of reas
and finally of Spirit itself.
352 Walter Jaeschke
From this result of t

followed, however, not
way of proceeding. Th
a new, deeper dimensio
religion, we can also fi
time remarks in which Feuerbach could have seen his task fulfilled: the
task of identifying God unambiguously with the essence of the species.
For Hegel, ancient religion is the product of the spirit of the people
(Volksgeist). Christianity bursts the bounds of this Volksgeist religion.
However, it does this not because it is revealed by God, but because its
content is the very fate of humanity. In a certain conscious contrast to
the interpretation of antiquity in Schiller's famous poem The Gods of
Greece, Hegel sees the anthropological character of religion manifesting
itself more clearly in Christianity than in the Greek forms of the gods.
Jesus is the national god of the human race because he is the representa-
tive of the species: the individual human form of Jesus "expressed in its
history the whole history of the empirical reality of the human species";
"the history of God is the history of the whole race, and each individual
traverses this whole history of the race" (Rosenkranz:137,138). So far
Hegel and Feuerbach are in wide-ranging agreement.
The question of the difference between these two thinkers arises
first because for Hegel this history of humanity has an additional,
deeper meaning. It expresses in itself the structure of reason, and only
to that extent is it the history of humanity. Therefore the insight into
the anthropological constitution of religion does not necessarily exclude
the assumption of a rational constitution of the same. This latter simply
takes place on another level, but is the treatment of the same object.
Hegel's transition from the anthropological to the speculative concept of
religion occurs not as a total break with the earlier point of view, but as
the completion of the anthropological dimension through posing the
question on another and, according to Hegel's understanding, deeper
level. Hegel in no way contests the anthropological dimension; he
simply denies that it might be the only one.
The extent to which Hegel's philosophy of religion constantly kept
this anthropological dimension in view is shown by his concept of the
reconciliation which was achieved in Christianity. Hegel worked out his
understanding on the basis of the concept of "need" (Bediirfnis). This
construction is already found when Hegel was in Jena, though in no
later philosophy of religion lecture is it more pregnantly carried through
than in the last lecture we still possess from 1827. Of course, as in
Hegel's system in general, anthropology constitutes only one, and indeed
the lowest, level of Spirit. So the anthropological concept of religion is
likewise-in the Hegelian double-sense of the word-"sublated" in the
speculative. Religion is not, as for Feuerbach, the alienated self-
consciousness of humanity but the self-consciousness of the absolute
Spirit in human spirit. For, according to Hegel, the human essence can
be grasped only through the co

of humanity that recourse w
conviction that whoever declar
the risk of cutting short the
disputed question between H
constitute the final horizon
understand him- or herself? O
beyond the anthropological sta
attempt at a speculative foun
forced beyond the religious sel
essence, an alienation that ha
establishment of what was mer
alienation. To this extent Hege
at the standpoint of religion
overcome.
IV
Before we can give an answer to the question of the alienational

character of speculation, there remains one problem to be discussed. To
what extent is it justified or even necessary to identify the speculative
interpretation of religion as a speculative critique of religion? Several
times Hegel has stressed that his philosophy of religion had as goal not
the destruction of religion but its preservation. According to his well-
known position, the single task of philosophy, and especially of his
philosophy, was to comprehend the Idea of Christianity. But this very
sentence harbors the point from which a speculative critique of religion
originates, if we accent the fact that the task of philosophy is to
comprehend the Idea of Christianity. Philosophy can only grasp this idea
if it itself can produce the Idea. The program of Hegel's philosophy of
religion in this respect is none other than the one Lessing sketched in
the late Enlightenment period. Lessing wanted neither the total jettison-
ing of all positive religion in the name of reason, which was the popular
conception of the Enlightenment, nor the conditionless subjugation of
thought to the teaching of positive religion, since this would amount to
a sacrifice of the intellect. He wanted to form the revealed truths into
truths of reason. Out of itself, however, reason cannot produce the
teachings of positive religion without changing them; it can produce
only those which are implicitly rational. If reason tried anything else, it
would be rewarded only with well-deserved laughter. The possibility of
such a comprehending constitutes the condition of the possibility of any
philosophy of religion at all. This is the case so long as philosophy of
religion is not to build up a merely external theory of its object.
Philosophy of religion is, rather, to develop religion's content out of
grasping reason. Of course, it is in no way necessary, or even simply to
be taken for granted, that there is such a thing as philosophy of religion
354 Walter Jaeschke
in this sense of the

whether reason is cap
If, however, it should
ty, then the converti
presupposed.
Reason can take th
revelation into truth
would again be a posit
change of form from
hension content is a
the content of relig
comprehending thoug
truth of faith loses it
lines which cannot be
of reason. This assert
it is known-does not
and philosophy have the same content. It would be a simplistic
misunderstanding of the Hegelian concept of the identity of content
between religion and philosophy if that identity were conceived as a
tranquil, constantly available tautology. This identity is to be understood
as a "dialectical," living identity, one not excluding difference, but itself
fully realized only as the result of a process of mediation.
As far as philosophy is concerned, this mediation lies in the fact that
philosophy comprehends itself as speculative science of the Absolute. It
does not grasp itself merely as "what is called the cognition of man," as
Hegel once disdainfully formulated it (1977:65). Such a mediation is
likewise requisite as far as religion is concerned. This thesis of identity is
not equally valid for all religions, but for their concept, and in its full
sense only for the religion which is adequate to its concept. As is well
known, this religion is for Hegel the Christian religion. However, the
Christian religion is the absolute religion only to the extent that it
expresses its concept, and that means to the extent it is understood in
the sense of the speculative concept of religion.
In looking at a current theological orientation to Hegel, it seems to
me to be most important to draw attention to the fundamental meaning
of this unavoidable difference between faith and speculation, and to do
this more strongly than is usually the case. In this regard, the question
of Hegel's personal religious convictions is, in terms of philosophy,
simply not to be discussed. This includes the question of whether in his
philosophy of religion Hegel made this or that remark, be it on the
incarnation, the resurrection, or any other theme. Only that alone which
is at all thinkable for a philosophy of religion is philosophically impor-
tant. This is also the fully justified, though constantly misunderstood,
critique made by speculative theism, especially by I. H. Fichte, but also
by C. H. Weisse, K. Ph. Fischer, and J. Sengler. They said it was not at
all a question of this or that orthodox-appearing citation but of whether
these remarks are simply a

whether they can also be grou
speculative philosophy of relig
In view of the well-known
between right and left inter
religion, it appears to me no
easier, question to decide wh
religion could at all take up w
boundaries are drawn rather
traditional religion. Indeed, a
contain itself within these boundaries if it does not wish to lose its
philosophical character. Surely, because of this limitation, it is a possibl
strategy of immunization to contest philosophy's right to speak i
questions of religion or to object that, in spite of any philosophic
doubt concerning religion's scientific basis, religion forms a living pow
which even in modern society far outweighs the role of philosophy. Bu
insofar as philosophy is given the right to participate in the discussion,
must be accepted that philosophy, precisely when it takes its characte
seriously and is not a disguised theology, can to some extent not
reproduce the assertions of religion and, again, to some extent can
reproduce them only in decisively changed form. This changed form o
the other hand affects the truth claim of traditional religion. If, for
example, the speculative philosophy of religion interprets Christology i
such a way that not one single determinate self-consciousness, but sel
consciousness overall, is the absolute Being (Wesen), it necessarily
changes the meaning of the religious presentation. This latter erects th
self-consciousness precisely as individual and believes it finds the trut
in holding fast to the individuality of this self-consciousness. Thi
religious presentation indeed does not locate truth in the transition fro
individuality to the universality of reason. The speculative philosophy o
religion, on the contrary, transposes the individualized expressions of
religion into universal sentences, and thereby it unavoidably transcen
the truth claim of traditional religion.
Whether the speculative concept of religion is experienced more as
a critique of, or an apology for, religion depends only on whether one
accepts the premises which constitute the base of its origin. The
speculative concept of religion as the self-consciousness of the absolut
Spirit must to a great extent appear arbitrary if it is not comprehende
as the necessary result of the preceding discussion on philosophy
religion.
The theologico-historical conditions of the genesis of this concept o
religion lie in the insight into the impossibility of a historical groundin
of Christianity and have found their classic formulation in Lessin
controversial writings. The philosophico-historical conditions, on t
other hand, lie in Kant's critique of the form of the philosophic
knowledge of God current in the eighteenth century, that is, in t
356 Walter Jaeschke
critique of natural t
conception of his Sc
astonishing sharpness
is obscured by Hegel's
So long as the rationa
only form of philoso
the slightest objecti
following alternative:
God based on theore
of God as a postulat
shifting of religion to
all possible, a new an
overcomes the inade
traditional way of gra
also the dominant wa
finite which, howeve
the traditional conce
realm of the possible.
cal concept of God, and also the only possible restitution of the
ontological proof of God, is Hegel's new, speculative interpretation and,
concomitant with it, the dissolution of the concept of God into the
speculative concept of religion as the concept of the "absolute Spirit."
Religion is not a relationship of consciousness to God as to an object of
this consciousness, but "the Divine Spirit's knowledge of itself through
the mediation of finite spirit" (1962:206), self-consciousness of the
absolute Spirit as the dialectical identity of the divine and human spirit.
This speculative concept of religion appeared to Hegel to be the only
way to explain religion philosophically after the loss of the objective
basis of religion as well as after the critique of the God concept of
rationalist metaphysics.
An example may make clear the importance of this change. The
just-named grounds eliminate the possibility of making room within a
philosophical system for a section proper to "speculative theology"
separate from the philosophy of religion. This follows convincingly from
the insight into the justification of the Kantian critique of the rationalis-
tic knowledge of God. Philosophy of religion is indeed the discipline
which succeeded the rationalistic natural theology. But it can legitimately
be this only if it does not again set itself up as vulnerable to the attacks
which must be raised against natural theology or in general against a
concept of God which grasps God as an object of human knowing
foreign to self-consciousness. It is impossible to speak of the Absolute if
the human knowledge of the Absolute could not be comprehended as
the Absolute's self-knowing.
A short time later there was an attempt to make retrogressive the
modification of the conception of system which formed an unavoidable
consequence of the speculative concept of religion. The primary reason
for this attempt at a revision

the critical consequences of
current level of the philosoph
Here belong the many attem
tive theism," in conscious opp
to conclude philosophy again
interpreted Hegel's philosophy
Hegelians did, but they raised
the speculative restrictions
theistic philosophy of religi
under the condition of a total
be consistent, those who wish
against Hegel but on the bas
posthumous corrections to his
speculative theology possible.
Karl Rosenkranz, the repre
unquestionable witness to th
system. He became aware of
systematic conception for the
obliged, along with his so-c
undertake a sharp surgical in
system. His revision of the sy
and religion, together with th
The philosophy of the absolut
Hegel, art, religion, and philo
what in the style of speculati
system in favor of concludin
place of the philosophy of r
unavoidable step. For-so Ro
did, work out the philosophy
religion, then this would give
was to be the absolute Spirit. N
Here the necessity of a re
religion as a presupposition of
becomes palpable. For, accor
stands Hegel as to identify no
understands Hegel in no oth
Rosenkranz shared the hesit
form of the Hegelian philo
however, to be a right-wing H
changes undertaken by him l
theists undertook a compar
having overcome Hegel. As
only allege that the changes
since Hegel could have though
358 Walter Jaeschke
to the specific Hegelian

stand religion like Fe
meant this, the revisio
Time does not permit
themes in the philosop
Hegel's Christology. M
speculative interpretat
hardly less revolutiona
critique of religion. Th
even more threatening
further ado laugh at t
Feuerbach's critique, at
explains the embitter
contemporary theolog
religion must take flig
was perceived as criti
either Hegel's diagnosi
sophical basis or his in
history of theology an
no motive was even see
Whether the speculat
as critical or apologeti
of the aporetic constit
previously unquestione
ment's critique of the
of the historical foun
evident way to really s
in reason and, on the o
form of a speculative p
valid the alternatives d
of religious content
transformation of reli
loss of the specific con
hand, shares Hegel's d
conception in the fo
conditions under whic
conditions of the specu
does not in any way le
the trivial sense that r
but also in the essent
Christianity for its hi
subjectivity and especi
of Christianity" - "the
There were perhaps only two interpreters who grasped the unity of
the critical and apologetic moments of the speculative philosophy of
religion: Strauss and Feuerbach. For Strauss's critical presentation of the
life of Jesus was made possible first of all by Hegel's insight that the
content of Christianity was to be salvaged not in history but only in the
concept. And Feuerbach's critique that Hegel's position formed the last
great attempt to reestablish Christianity (Feuerbach 3:279-80) was
motivated by Hegel's offer to provide a more secure basis for Christiani-
ty in the concept. On this point there is no dissonance between Hegel
and Feuerbach. They disagree only about how this offer is to be valued
and, further, about whether this offered refuge in the speculative
concept can protect religion also from the anthropological critique.
Behind Feuerbach's emotional and political attacks against a reestab-
lishment of Christianity on the basis of the Hegelian concept there
stands a serious philosophical motive. In Feuerbach's eyes, Hegel's
speculative philosophy of religion formed one step along the way to
modern philosophy: the step from theism to pantheism. As is well
known, it is a popular objection to Hegel's philosophy of religion that it
teaches pantheism. This objection is most clearly distinguished by the
fact that such critics are satisfied to assert pantheism, as if this spared
them any further discussion. Not so for Feuerbach. He criticized
Hegelian pantheism because in his eyes Hegel constituted only the first
stage along the way from theism to atheism. The pantheistic speculation
eliminated the contradictions exposed in the concept of religious projec-
tion, contradictions concerning the theistic form of the God concept.
But at the same time this speculation entangled itself in new contradic-
tions. Its result was therefore only a new structure of alienation in place
of the old one and not the required sublation of all human self-
alienation. Feuerbach also argued that this speculation negated theology
only on the level of theology. It did not form the promised contradic-
tion-free resolution of theology in general.
Concerning the systematic necessity of Feuerbach's resolution of
theism into anthropotheism, the decisive question is how far he was
successful in proving such contradictions in the conception of the
speculative philosophy of religion and how far he was able to sublate
them in his own proposal. The mere assertion that Hegel formed the
last refuge of Christian theology is no adequate critique, even though,
in the situation of the reactionary period prior to the 1848 revolution,
which was politically and theologically tense in equal measure, it was no
longer experienced as an affirmative expression, as with Hegel, but as a
devastating critique.
Feuerbach's critique of religion in the Essence of Christianity and later
in his Lectures on the Essence of Religion was accomplished above all in
two methodological steps. The first step showed the anthropological
character, and that meant in Feuerbach's view also the anthropological
360 Walter Jaeschke
origin, of the predicat

this step the critique a
these predicates, at the
possible assertions conc
about the human, then
subject, although a neg
more negative step in
of subject and predicat
the sentence "God is love" is changed into the sentence "Love is
divine." This second step properly grounds anthropotheism, since divini-
ty is now applied to love, which in the first step was seen to belong to
the human essence. In this way all the statements of religion can be
interpreted as statements about the human. Not as statements about
individuals, of course, but about the species. Religion taken as a whole
is then understood as the self-consciousness of humanity, but of course
as an alienated, self-misunderstanding self-consciousness.
The attacks which Feuerbach can raise against religion by means of
these methodological steps carry much weight. Here I would prefer,
however, not to discuss possible attempts to refute these attacks, but to
emphasize that both these steps of the anthropological critique do not
affect the speculative concept of religion precisely because the specula-
tive concept of religion has as one of its strongest motives a critique of
the subject-predicate structure and also of the subject-object relation.
For the speculative interpretation we have been discussing it is also
completely misleading to speak of the assumption of a divine subject to
which predicates are applied and which is opposed to self-consciousness
as a separated individual. For the speculative grasping of religion it is
indeed a historical fact that religion had for the most part so understood
itself. Consciousness was seen as standing over against a divine Being
and did not arrive at the recognition of its identity with this object.
Therefore such a consciousness, which is not in harmony with the
concept of religion, remains unhappy. Likewise, the speculative interpre-
tation did not understand religion on the basis of a personal relationship
of the believer to God. For the speculative interpretation as well as for
the anthropological interpretation, the Divine Being is the essence of
humanity and of nature. For otherwise, Hegel says, "It would indeed be
a being which was nothing" (1975:53). The speculative concept of
religion is in any case unaffected by Feuerbach's critique only if this
concept is suitably interpreted, and that means, if it is not interpreted in
a right-wing Hegelian fashion. This appears paradoxical. However, not
only is it correct on the basis of interpretation, but it is also decisive in
view of a current theological orientation to Hegel's philosophy. Other-
wise this orientation would run into a dead end. The right-wing
Hegelian presupposition of human immortality, of the personhood of
God, as well as of the transition from Idea to Fact all fall victim to
Feuerbach's critique, as they, when considered as philosophical presup-
positions, have already fallen to Kant's critique of special metaphysics.
Feuerbach was continually

traditional religion and the
said, between common and s
with Hegel, Feuerbach remain
Hegel. This is in no way imm
Sbach's claim that, unlike B
explained as a development of
as arising out of opposition to
a better distinguishing by m
Hegel's philosophy of religio
out at great length the argum
traditional religion, his argum
(3:227) of the speculative ph
weak. They remain weak in th
well as in the Provisional Theses
Future. Indeed, both give a
Hegelian philosophy. But the
other hand would not seem
point of view of speculative p
and provoke, but do not demo
It is not possible, without f
object to Hegel's reduction o
saying that what is involved h
that God is placed in somethi
subject and is not recognized
very essence of the human an
decisive question both concern
phy of religion as well as conc
cal critique is whether Hege
reason to the human misunde
well as of the human person.
had worked it out in his Sci
one cannot raise against the
objection that in the specula
solved remnant of alienatio
understands the self-consciou
consciousness of God through
What this also expresses is t
human and at the disposal o
then argue that Feuerbach's c
which would reject Hegel's off
any case, if such an ontothe
nonsensual superstition, as
absolute Spirit is also necess
be-the concept of the abstrac
Spirit (3:226-27).
362 Walter Jaeschke
Concerning the po
theological appeal to H
the discussion of Heg
of objective thought,
of finite subjectivity,
of finite subjectivit
structure upon which
polemic against this c
because it contains t
from the point of vie
In this sense at least,
positions was not at
speaking, during the
philosophy as well a
against speculation.
anthropological direct
position. Rather, theo
Theology seems to h
speculative and anthr
question of philosophi
common in Hegel's an
the suspicion that suc
to ignoring the proble
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The author expresses deepest thanks to Dale M. Schlitt for trans

German manuscript into English. This essay is a slightly reworked ve
lecture given at Emory University, Vanderbilt University, and Willia
WORKS CONSULTED
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1976 "Glaube als Projektion. Zur Auseinandersetzung mit
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Barth, Karl
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Vortrage. Vol. 2. Munich: Chr. Kaiser.
Bolin, Wilhelm
1891 Ludwig Feuerbach, sein Wirken und seine Zeitgenossen.
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Feuerbach, Ludwig
1828 Brief an Hegel. In Werke in sechs Bdnden. Vol. 1. Ed.
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1839 Uber Philosophie und Christentum in Beziehung auf den
der Hegelschen Philosophie gemachten Vorwurf der Un-
christlichkeit (On Philosophy and Christianity). In
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1844 G. W.F. Hegels Leben. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Schott, Uwe
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Speculative and Anthropological Criticism of Religion - A Theological Orientation To Hegel

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Speculative and Anthropological Criticism of Religion: A Theological Orientation to Hegel

Speculative and Anthropological

In Feuerbach's estimation, Hegelian philosophy had provided the

that, whatever the p

" egelian philosophy is the lastAsplace

In this regard, one can cite as

This identification can o

Several of the arguments against Hegel's speculative philosophy of

On the basis of such a divisi

with Hegel, so Feuerba

If we want to attribute argumentative power to the model of a

From this result of t

be grasped only through the co

Before we can give an answer to the question of the alienational

in this sense of the

these remarks are simply a

for this attempt at a revision

to the specific Hegelian

origin, of the predicat

Feuerbach was continually

The author expresses deepest thanks to Dale M. Schlitt for trans

Fichte, Johann Gottlieb

Hoffmeister, J., ed.

Thies, Erich, ed.

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