01 AFP RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION BENEFITS • Section 21 provides for disqualifications based on

SYSTEM V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES privileged communications.

G.R No. 188956. March 20, 2013. Villarama Jr. J. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of
TOPIC: Testimonial Evidence witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may be
impeached by the party against whom he was called.
FACTS: The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes
1. AFP-RSBS filed an application for Registration of Title the operation of causes of disability other than those
over 3 parcels of land located in Taguig City, before the mentioned in the Rules.
RTC of Pasig. A reading of the pertinent law and jurisprudence would show
2. The 3 parcels of land constitute a land grant by virtue of that Ms. Aban is qualified to testify as a witness for the
Presidential Proclamation No. 1218, issued by President petitioner since she possesses the qualifications of being
Ramos. able to perceive and being able to make her perceptions
3. The application was filed by Mr. Azcueta, the the known to others. Furthermore, she possesses none of the
Executive VP and Chief Operating Officer of AFP-RSBS, disqualifications described above.
who was duly authorized to do so by the Board of
Trustees, as evidenced by a notarized Secretary’s
Certificate.
4. After due posting and publication, and since there was no
opposition, the court issued an order of general default
and allowed AFP-RSBS to present evidence ex-parte.
5. AFP-RSBS presented Ms. Aban, the VP and Head of its
Asset Enhancement Office.
6. Ms. Aban testified that:
• the subject properties were acquired by the
petitioner through a land grant under
Presidential Proclamation No. 1218;
• the Republic and AFP-RSBS was in open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious, and peaceful
possession and occupation of the subject
properties;
• AFP-RSBS exercised control over them in the
concept of owner, and likewise assumed the
obligations of an owner; and
• AFP-RSBS has been paying the real estate
taxes on the subject properties; and the subject
properties are not mortgaged, encumbered, or
tenanted.
7. Sunsequnty, AFP-RSBS submitted its Formal offer of
Evidence.
8. RTC- Pasig granted the application. However, the OSG
filed an MR and argued that AFP-RSBS failed to prove
that it has personality to own the property and that AFP-
RSBS failed to show that the witness it presented was
duly authorized to appear for and in its behalf.
9. The MR of the OSG was granted, on the ground that
AFP-RSBS failed to prosecute its case.

ISSUE: Whether AFP-RSBS presented its duly authorized

representative to prosecute the case-YES

HELD:
There is no substantive or procedural rule which requires a
witness for a party to present some form of authorization to
testify as a witness for the party presenting him or her. No law
or jurisprudence would support the conclusion that such
omission can be considered as a failure to prosecute on the
part of the party presenting such witness.

All that the Rules require of a witness is that the witness

possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided therein. Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence provides:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications – Except as provided
in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive,
and perceiving, can make known their perception to others,
may be witnesses.
Cavili v. Judge Florendo speaks of the disqualifications:

Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific

disqualifications.
• Section 19 disqualifies those who are mentally
incapacitated and children whose tender age or
immaturity renders them incapable of being
witnesses.
• Section 20 provides for disqualification based on
conflicts of interest or on relationship.

EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS – PART 5 (TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE): JUDGE SIA (G02) | 1

02 SUNGA-CHAN VS. CHUA arisen”. Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of
G.R. No. 143340, August 15, 2001 Lamberto, latter being the plaintiff.

FACTS: Lilibeth’s reliance alone on the “Dead Man’s Statue” to defeat

• Lamberto Chua alleged that in 1977, he verbally Lamberto’s claim cannot prevail over the factual findings that a
entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the partnership was established between Lamberto and
distribution of Shellane LPG. For business Jacinto. Based not only on the testimonial evidence, but the
convenience, Lamberto and Jacinto allegedly agreed documentary evidence as well, they considered the evidence
to register the business name of their partnership, for Lamberto as sufficient to prove the formation of a
SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER, under the partnership, albeit an informal one.
name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. Both
Lamberto and Jacinto contributed P100,000.00 to the
partnership, with the intention that the profits would
be equally divided between them.
• The partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager,
assisted by Josephine Sy, sister-in-law of
Lamberto. Upon Jacinto’s death in the later part of
1989, his daughter, Lilibeth took over the operations
of Shellite without Lamberto’s consent. Despite
Lamberto’s repeated demands for accounting, she
failed to comply.
• On June 22m 1992, Lamberto filed a complaint
against Lilibeth with the RTC. RTC decided in favor
of Lamberto.
• Lilibeth questions the correctness of the finding that
a partnership existed between Lamberto and
Jacinto. In the absence of any written document to
show such partnership between Lamberto and
Jacinto, Lilibeth argues that these courts were
proscribed from hearing the testimonies of Lamberto
and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged
partnership three (3) years after Jacinto’s death.
• To support the argument, Lilibeth invokes the “DEAD
MAN’S STATUTE OR SURVIVORSHIP RULE”
under Sec. 23, Rule 130. Lilibeth thus implores this
Court to rule that the testimonies of Lamberto and his
alter ego, Josephine, should not have been admitted
to prove certain claims against a deceased person
(Jacinto).

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the “DEAD MAN’S STATUTE” applies to this
case so as to render inadmissible Lamberto’s testimony and
that if his witness, Josephine. – NO.

HELD:
No. The “Dead Man’s Statute” provides that if one party to the
alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death,
insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not
entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own contradicted
and unexplained account of the transaction.

Lilibeth filed a compulsory counterclaim against Lamberto in

their answer before the RTC, and with the filing of their
counterclaim, Lilibeth herself effectively removed this case
from the ambit of the “Dead Man’s Statute”. Well entrenched
is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or
representatives of the estate that sets up the counterclaim,
Lamberto, may testify to occurrences before the death of the
deceased to defeat the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant
in the counterclaim, Lamberto is not disqualified from testifying
as to matters of fact occurring before the death of the
deceased, said action not having been bought against but by
the estate or representatives of the deceased.

The testimony of Josephine is not covered by the “Dead Man’s

Statute” for the simple reason that she is not “a party or
assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a
case is prosecuted”. Lamberto offered the testimony of
Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership
between Lamberto and Jacinto. Lilibeth’s insistence that
Josephine is the alter ego of Lamberto does not make her an
assignor because of the term “assignor” of a party means
“assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the
assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has

EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS – PART 5 (TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE): JUDGE SIA (G02) | 2

03 JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City, Branch 29 and
Pairing Judge, Branch 30 vs. ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and
ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA,
A.C. No. 5921; March 10, 2006
FACTS:
1. The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for
plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion in a civil case for
unlawful detainer against defendant Federico
Barrientos. MTC of Cabanatuan City rendered
judgment in favor of Veneracion
2. Barrientos appealed to the RTC. The case was
raffled to the branch where Judge Lacurom was
sitting as pairing judge.
3. Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution reversing the
earlier judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion. It
ordered Veneracion to CEASE and DESIST from
ejecting the defendant-appellant Federico Barrientos
from the 1,000sq.m homelot covered by a TCT, and
the smaller area of 147sm, w/in the 1,000 sq.m.
covered by another TC and Barrientos is ordered to
pay Veneracion P10K for the house
4. Veneracion’s counsel filed a MR:
language contained in the motion used of
the following words and phrases:
abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity,
horrendous mistake, horrible error,
boner, and an insult to the judiciary and
an anachronism in the judicial process.
5. Velasco-Jacoba claimed that she did not actually
participate in the case and that she disavowed
deliberate intent to degrade the honor of the Court.
6. She explained that the words used were merely
articulating their feelings of shock and disbelief at the
sudden reversal of the case.
7. Judge found her guilty of contempt sentencing her of
imprisonment for 5 days and P1k fine.
8. Velasco-Jacoba moved for MR. She recounted that
on her way out of the house for an afternoon hearing,
Atty. Ellis Jacoba ("Jacoba") stopped her and said
"O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka
mahuli." (Sign this as it is due today, or it might not
be filed on time.) She signed the pleading handed to
her without reading it, in "trusting blind faith" on her
husband of 35 years with whom she "entrusted her
whole life and future."
9. This pleading turned out to be the motion which
Jacoba drafted but could not sign because of his
then suspension from the practice of law.
10. Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had
found her guilty of contempt without conducting any
hearing. She accused Judge Lacurom of harboring
"a personal vendetta," ordering her imprisonment
despite her status as "senior lady lawyer of the IBP
Nueva Ecija Chapter, already a senior citizen, and a
grandmother many times over." At any rate, she
argued, Judge Lacurom should have inhibited
himself from the case out of delicadeza bec
Veneracion had already filed against him criminal
cases before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Cabanatuan City and before the Ombudsman for
violation of RA 3019
11. Judge Lacorum issued another order directing Atty.
Jacoba to explain why he should not be held in
contempt.
12. Atty. Jacoba denied preparing the motion.
13. Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule of
evidence.
14. Atty. Jacoba was found guilty of contempt and was
sentenced to pay a P500 fine.
15. Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against
the counsels before the IBP.
16. IBP Commissioner recommended the Suspension of
counsels from the practice for 6 mos.; found that they
were prone to using offensive and derogatory
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS – PART 5 (TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE): JUDGE SIA (G02) |
remarks and phrases amounting to discourtesy and
disrespect.
17. IBP Board: Reduced it to 3 months.
18. Velasco-Jacoba, MR
ISSUE: Whether the marital privilege rule could be invoked
(NO)
HELD:
• The evidence as regards Jacoba, his name does not
appear in the 30 July 2001 motion. He asserts the
inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacoba’s statement pointing to
him as the author of the motion.
SC:
1. Jacoba's answer with Second Motion for
Inhibition did not contain a denial of his
wife’s account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly
admitted authorship of the motion by
stating that he "trained his guns and fired at
the errors which he perceived and believed
to be gigantic and monumental."
2. Velasco-Jacoba’s version of the facts more
plausible: (1) her reaction to the events was
immediate and spontaneous, unlike
Jacoba’s defense which was raised only
after a considerable time had elapsed from
the eruption of the controversy; and (2)
Jacoba had been counsel of record for
Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836,
supporting Velasco-Jacoba’s assertion that
she had not "actually participated" in the
prosecution of the case.
• No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July
2001 motion greatly exceeded the vigor required of
Jacoba to defend ably his clients cause. Even
Velasco-Jacoba acknowledged that the words
created a cacophonic picture of total and utter
disrespect.
• Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation, praying that
Judge Lacurom await the outcome of the petition for
certiorari before deciding the contempt charge
against him. This petition for certiorari anchors some
of its arguments on the premise that the motion was,
in fact, Jacoba’s handiwork.
• The marital privilege rule, being a rule of
evidence, may be waived by failure of the
claimant to object timely to its presentation or by
any conduct that may be construed as implied
consent.
o This waiver applies to Jacoba who
impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July
2001 motion.
NOTES:
• Respondent spouses have both been the subject
of administrative cases. In an Administrative Case,
Jacoba was suspended from the practice of law for a
period of 6 mos. for "his failure to file an action for
the recovery of possession of property despite the
lapse of 2 1/2 years from receipt by him of P550
which his client gave him as filing and sheriff’s fees."
• In another Administrative Case, Jacoba was once
again found remiss in his duties when he failed to file
the appellant’s brief, resulting in the dismissal of his
client’s appeal. - penalty of one year suspension.
• As for Velasco-Jacoba, only recently this Court fined
her P5k for appearing in barangay conciliation
proceedings on behalf of a party, knowing fully well
the prohibition contained in Sec 415 of the Local
Government Code.
• In this case: Velasco-Jacoba - by signing the motion,
she certified that she had read it, knew it to be
meritorious, and not for the purpose of delaying the
case.It has been their practice to sign each other’s
pleadings because of their implicit trust for each
other. And by her own admission, she violated the
ROC on Ethics w/c is a ground for disciplinary action.
3
04 MERCADO V. VITRIOLO
A.C. No. 5108, May 26, 2005
FACTS:
1. Rosa Mercado is a Senior Education Program Specialist
of the Standards Development Division, Office of
Programs and Standards while Atty. Vitriolo is a Deputy
Executive Director IV of the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED).
2. Complainant’s husband filed for annulment of their
marriage with the RTC of Pasig City. This annulment case
had been dismissed by the trial court, and the dismissal
became final and executory on July 15, 1992.
3. Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died.
On February 7, 1994, respondent entered his appearance
before the trial court as collaborating counsel for
complainant.
4. It also appears that on April 13, 1999, respondent filed a
criminal action against complainant before the Office of
the City Prosecutor, Pasig City for falsification of public
document.
a. Respondent alleged that complainant made
false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of
her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More
specifically, complainant allegedly indicated in
said Certificates of Live Birth that she is married
to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their
marriage was solemnized on April 11, 1979,
when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G.
Mercado and their marriage took place on April
11, 1978.
5. Rosa denied the accusations. Also she cited other
charges against respondent that are pending before or
decided upon other tribunals. Further, Rosa alleged that
the said criminal complaint for falsification of public
document disclosed confidential facts and information
relation to the civil case for annulment, then handled by
the respondent as her counsel. She claims that filing the
criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of
breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client
relationship, and should be disbarred.
6. Respondent filed a MTD, alleging that the complaint for
disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and irrelevant
because all the allegations leveled against him are
subject of separate fact-finding bodies. Respondent
maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents against complainant
does not violate the rule on privileged communication
between attorney and client because the bases of the
falsification case are two certificates of live birth which are
public documents and in no way connected with the
confidence taken during the engagement of respondent
as counsel.
7. IBP Board of Governors found respondent guilty of
violating the rule on privileged communications between
attorney and client, recommending his suspension from
practice of law for one year.
8. Rosa, upon receiving the IBP recommendations, wrote
Chief Justice Davide a letter of desistance, as she has
now found forgiveness for those who wronged her.
paramount importance to the administration of justice. One
rule adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client
privilege: an attorney is to keep inviolate his clients secrets or
confidence and not to abuse them. Thus, the duty of a lawyer
to preserve his client’s secrets and confidence outlasts the
termination of the attorney-client relationship, and continues
even after the clients death.
Factors essential to establish the existence of the privilege:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a
prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by
reason of this relationship that the client made the
communication.
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney
in his professional capacity.
Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that
the evidence on record fails to substantiate complainants
allegations. We note that complainant did not even specify the
alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent.
All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked
specificity. She contends that respondent violated the rule on
privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action
against her for falsification of public documents because the
criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for
annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however,
spell out these facts which will determine the merit of her
complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game
as to the existence of facts which the complainant must prove.
Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the
IBP. Without any testimony from the complainant as to the
specific confidential information allegedly divulged by
respondent without her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible
to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged
communication. Such confidential information is a crucial link
in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to
merely assert the attorney-client privilege. The burden of
proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party
asserting the privilege.

ISSUE: WON respondent violated the rule of priviledge

communication between attorney and client when he filed
a criminal case for falsification of public document
against his former client

HELD: NO

RATIO:
In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on
him special powers of trust and confidence. Their relationship
is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The
relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature
that is required by necessity and public interest. he
preservation and protection of that relation will encourage a
client to entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS – PART 5 (TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE): JUDGE SIA (G02) | 4
05 CHAN V. CHAN
GR 179786, July 24, 2013
FACTS:
• Josielene Chan sought the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Johnny Chan. Josielene said Johnny failed to
support the family, and she also said a psychiatrist
diagnosed Johnny as mentally deficient due to his
incessant drinking and drug use. Johnny resists the claim,
saying that it was Josielene who was the one who failed
in her wifely duties.
• The couple agreed to undergo counselling, but when they
reached the hospital, 2 men fforcibly held Johnny and
gave him an injection.
• The marriage relations got worse when the police
temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated crime and
released her only after the case against her ended.
• Hence, the marriage could no longer be repaired.
• During pre-trial, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth
claim form that Johnny attached to his answer (where he
attempted to prove that he was forcibly confined at the
hospital’s rehab unit)
• The Philhealth claim form showed a physician’s
handwritten note that Johnny suffered from
methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.
• Thereafter, Josielene sought a subpoena duces tecum to
Medical City, requesting Johnny’s medical records when
he was confined. Josielene sought to be allowed to
present such medical records in evidence.
• Johnny opposed, saying the medical records were
covered by physician-patient privilege.
• RTC upheld Johnny’s position, and denied Josielene’s
motion.
• CA affirmed the RTC decision. The Ca said that if
courts allowed such petitions, then patients would be left
with no assurance that their disclosures to physicians
would be kept confidential.
• The CA said that the physician-patient privilege covers
not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates and
hospital records.
• The CA said that although the privilege can be
waived, Johnny never waived the privilege.
• By attaching his Philhealth claim form in his answer,
he only did so for the limited purpose of showing his
alleged forcible confinement.
ISSUE: Did Johnny waive the physician-patient privilege?
NO.
• Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his
answer to the petition before the RTC that he had been
confined in a hospital against his will and in fact attached
to his answer a Philhealth claim form covering that
confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the
privileged character of its records.
• Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132
• SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given
in evidence, the remainder admissible.— When part of an
act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in
evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject
may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached
act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in
evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing
or record necessary to its understanding may also be
given in evidence.
• But, trial in the case had not yet begun.
• Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had
already presented the Philhealth claim form in
evidence and waived the physician-patient privilege
• Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case
when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of
his hospital records would again be premature.
ISSUE: Can the Josielene’s motion succeed if it were
treated as a motion for production of documents? NO.
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS – PART 5 (TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE): JUDGE SIA (G02) |
• Under the Civil Procedure rules on Discovery, the
inspection of documents does not cover those which are
privileged.
• Josielene says that the physician-patient privilege only
covers “testimonial” evidence, and should not cover
hospital records.
• However, to allow the disclosure during discovery
procedure of the hospital records—the results of tests
that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s
illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him—would
be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible
without the patient’s consent.
• Physician memorializes all these information in the
patient’s records.
• Disclosing them would be the equivalent of
compelling the physician to testify on privileged
matters he gained while dealing with the patient,
without the latter’s prior consent.
*Other issue RE: Prematurity of Josielene’s subpoena
duces tecum
• Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence
must be made after the offer of such evidence for
admission in court. Thus:
SEC. 36. Objection.— Objection to evidence offered
orally must be made immediately after the offer is
made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of
the oral examination of a witness shall be made as
soon as the grounds therefor shall become
reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to
within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a
different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be
specified.
• Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial,
Josielene’s request for subpoena duces tecum is
premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before
making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records.
• It is when those records are produced for examination at
the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their
admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure.
The physician-patient privilege in Section 24(c), Rule 130
of the Rules of Evidence quoted above is about non-
disclosure of privileged matters.
Leonen, concurring:
Josielene Chan should have availed of the following mode of
discovery: the physical and mental examination or
persons, which may be granted by the court upon showing
good cause. Had this mode been availed of, then:
• If Johnny would request a copy of the report, then
Josielene would be entitled to any past or future medical
report involving the same physical or mental condition.
And upon motion, the Court may order Johnny to deliver
those medical reports if Josielene would request them.
More importantly, if Johnny requested a copy of the
examination report, or he takes the examining physician’s
deposition, he waives his privilege when the testimony of the
physician is taken.
5
06 IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND
CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF BIRTH of
EMMA K LEE v CA
FACTS
1. Sps Lee and Keh entered in PH as immigrants from
China. They had 11 children.
2. Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu to
serve as housemaid. The Lee-Keh children believed that
Tiu left the household and moved to another property of
Lee nearby and had a relation with him.
3. Keh died. Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu’s children w/
Lee claimed that they were children of Lee and Keh.
4. Lee-Keh children requested NBI to investigate.
5. NBI concluded that it is obvious that it is not Keh’s
children, but a younger woman, most probably Tiu; that
Lee is in a quandary in fixing the age of Keh possibly to
conform with his grand design of making his 8 children as
their own legitimate children, elevating status of his
second family.
6. The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records,
the eldest of the Lees other children, Marcelo Lee (who
was recorded as the 12th child of Lee and Keh), was born
of a 17-year-old mother, when Keh was already 38 years
old at the time. Another of the Lees other children,
Mariano Lee, was born of a 23-year-old mother, when
Keh was then already 40 years old, and so forth. In other
words, by the hospital records of the Lees other children,
Kehs declared age did not coincide with her actual age
when she supposedly gave birth to such other children,
numbering eight.
7. Lee-Keh children filed petitions for the deletion from
certificate of live birth of Emma Lee (child of Tiu) the
name Keh and replace with Tiu as mother’s name.
8. Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request
for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to
compel Tiu, to testify.
9. RTC granted, but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena
saying it was violation on rule on parental privilege.
10. RTC quashed the subpoena for being unreasonable and
oppressive considering that Tiu was already very old and
that the obvious object of the subpoena was to badger
her into admitting that she was Emma Lees mother.
11. Lee-Keh filed certiorari before CA. CA ruled that only a
subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad testificandum,
may be quashed for being oppressive or unreasonable
under Rule 21 of ROC. CA also held that Tius advanced
age alone does not render her incapable of testifying. The
party seeking to quash the subpoena for that reason must
prove that she would be unable to withstand the rigors of
trial, something that petitioner Emma Lee failed to do.
ISSUE: WON TC may compel Tiu to testify in the correction of
entry case?
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
• The grounds cited unreasonable and oppressive are
proper for subpoena ad duces tecum or for the
production of documents and things in the
possession of the witness, a command that has a
tendency to infringe on the right against invasion of
privacy.
• Lee-Keh children have the right to file the action for
correction of entries in the certificates of birth of Lees
other children, Emma Lee included. The Court
recognized that the ultimate object of the suit was to
establish the fact that Lees other children were not
children of Keh.
• Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh
childrens action, obviously, they would want Tiu to
testify or admit that she is the mother of Lees other
children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had
died and so could not give testimony that Lees other
children were not hers. The Lee-Keh children have,
therefore, a legitimate reason for seeking Tius
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS – PART 5 (TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE): JUDGE SIA (G02) |
testimony and, normally, the RTC cannot deprive
them of their right to compel the attendance of such
a material witness.
Parental privilege
• But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other objections
to requiring Tiu to come to court and testify: a)
considering her advance age, testifying in court
would subject her to harsh physical and emotional
stresses; and b) it would violate her parental right
not to be compelled to testify against her
stepdaughter.
• Regarding the physical and emotional punishment
that would be inflicted on Tiu if she were compelled
at her age and condition to come to court to testify,
petitioner Emma Lee must establish this claim to the
satisfaction of the trial court. About five years have
passed from the time the Lee-Keh children sought
the issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to appear before
the trial court.The RTC would have to update itself
and determine if Tius current physical condition
makes her fit to undergo the ordeal of coming to
court and being questioned. If she is fit, she must
obey the subpoena issued to her.
• Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to
testify against her stepdaughter, petitioner Emma
Lee, invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Evidence, which reads:
o SECTION 25. Parental and filial
privilege.- No person may be
compelled to testify against his
parents, other direct
ascendants, children or other
direct descendants.
• The above is an adaptation from a similar
provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that
applies only in criminal cases. But those who
revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to
extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions,
whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed
against parents and other direct ascendants or
descendants.
• But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege,
claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner
Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them
because the rule applies only to direct
ascendants and descendants, a family tie
connected by a common ancestry. A
stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her
stepmother.
• Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify
against petitioner Emma Lee
6
07 ESTRADA v DISIERTO
FACTS FROM MARCH 2001 CASE:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings
involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of
corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was
impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment
proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more
serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada
were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when
11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in
suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result,
the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire
prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel
resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.
In this case, SC ruled that Estrada actually resigned as all the
elements of valid resignation was present. It was also evident
in Angara Diary which shows that he was tired and he didn’t
want it any more – he is tired of red tape, intrigue and
bureaucracy. And that the diary clearly is a high grade
evidence that Estrada resigned.
FACTS, APRIL 2001 case:
1. For resolution are petitioner’s MR and Omnibus
motion of the Court’s decision of March 2001
2. Petitioner specifically raises an issue whether the
Angara diary is inadmissible for being violative of
hearsay evidence, best evidence, authentication,
admissions and res inter alios acta?
ISSUE: WON the Angara diary is admissible?
HELD: Yes
RATIO:
HEARSAY:
• The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the
cases at bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was not
furnished a copy of the Angara Diary. Nor can he
feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the said Diary
was frequently referred to by the parties in their
pleadings.
o It was also extensively used by Secretary
of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral
arguments.Thus, petitioner had all the
opportunity to contest the use of the Diary
but unfortunately failed to do so.
• Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was
an out of court statement, still its use is not covered
bythe hearsay rule. Evidence is called hearsay when
its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on
the competency and credibility of some persons
other than the witness by whom it is sought to
produce it. There are three reasons for excluding
hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross examination;
(2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence
of the oath. Not at all hearsay evidence, however, is
inadmissible as evidence.
o A complete analysis of any hearsay
problem requires that we further
determine whether the hearsay evidence
is one exempted from the rules of
exclusion. A more circumspect
examination of our rules of exclusion
will show that they do not cover
admissions of a party and the Angara
Diary belongs to this class. Section 26 of
Rule 130 provides that the act, declaration
or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him. It
has long been settled that these
admissions are admissible even if they
are hearsay.
o The Angara Diary contains direct
statements of petitioner which can be
categorized as admissions of a party: his
proposal for a snap presidential election
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS – PART 5 (TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE): JUDGE SIA (G02) |
where he would not be a candidate; his
statement that he only wanted the five-day
period promised by Chief of Staff Angelo
Reyes; his statements that he would leave
by Monday if the second envelope would
be opened by Monday and Pagod na
pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang
masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape,
bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont
want any more of this its too painful. Im
tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the
intrigue). I just want to clear my name, then
I will go. We noted that days before,
petitioner had repeatedly declared that he
would not resign despite the growing
clamor for his resignation. The reason for
the meltdown is obvious - - - his will not to
resign has wilted.
• It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not
the diary of the petitioner, hence, non-binding on
him. The argument overlooks the doctrine
of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a
partys reaction to a statement or action by another
person when it is reasonable to treat the partys
reaction as an admission of something stated or
implied by the other person
o In the Angara Diary, the options of the
petitioner started to dwindle when the
armed forces withdrew its support from him
as President and commander-in-
chief. Thus, Executive Secretary Angara
had to ask Senate President Pimentel to
advise petitioner to consider the option
of dignified exit or resignation. Petitioner
did not object to the suggested option but
simply said he could never leave the
country. Petitioners silence on this and
other related suggestions can be taken as
an admission by him.
RES INTER ALIOS ACTA
• Petitioner further contends that the use of
the Angara diary against him violated the rule
on res inter alios acta. The rule is expressed in
section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: The
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, except as
hereinafter provided.
o The res inter alios acta rule has several
exceptions. One of them is provided in
section 29 of Rule 130 with respect
to admissions by a co-partner or agent.
o Executive Secretary Angara as such was
an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the
Little President. Indeed, he was
authorized by the petitioner to act for
him in the critical hours and days before
he abandoned Malacaang Palace. Thus,
according to the Angara Diary, the
petitioner told Secretary Angara: Mula
umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed, ikaw na
lang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa huli,
ikaw pa rin.
o This statement of full trust was made by
the petitioner after Secretary Angara
briefed him about the progress of the
first negotiation. True to this trust, the
petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he
would already leave Malacaang after taking
their final lunch on January 20, 2001 at
about 1:00 p.m. The Angara Diary quotes
the petitioner as saying to Secretary
Angara: ed, kailangan ko na bang umalis?
(Do I have to leave now?)[18] Secretary
Angara told him to go and he did. Petitioner
cannot deny that Secretary Angara headed
his team of negotiators that met with the
team of the respondent Arroyo to discuss
7
 the peaceful and orderly transfer of power
after his relinquishment of the powers of
the presidency.
o Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf
of the petitioner in the crucial days before
respondent Arroyo took her oath as
President.Consequently, petitioner is
bound by the acts and declarations of
Secretary Angara.
o Under our rules of evidence, admissions
of an agent (Secretary Angara) are
binding on the principal
(petitioner).[19] Jones very well explains
the reasons for the rule, viz: What is
done, by agent, is done by the principal
through him, as through a mere
instrument.

BEST EVIDENCE:
• It is true that the Court relied not upon the original
but only copy of the Angara Diary as published in
the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6,
2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however,
violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his
book on evidence, states that:
Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial
courts discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent
does not bona fide dispute the contents of the
document and no other useful purpose will be served by
requiring production.
• Petitioner cites the case of State prosecutors v.
Muro,[28] which frowned on reliance by courts on
newspaper accounts. In that case, Judge Muro was
dismissed from the service for relying on a
newspaper account in dismissing eleven (11) cases
against Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos. There is
a significant difference, however, between
the Muro case and the cases at bar. In
the Muro case, Judge Muro dismissed the cases
against Mrs. Marcos on the basis of a newspaper
account without affording the prosecution the
basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of
a written comment or on oral argument. . .(this is) not
only a blatant denial of elementary due process to
the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith
and partiality. In the instant cases, however,
the petitioner had an opportunity to object to the
admissibility of the Angara Diary when he filed his
Memorandum dated February 20, 2001, Reply
Memorandum dated February 22, 2001,
Supplemental Memorandum dated February 23,
2001, and Second Supplemental memorandum
dated February 24, 2001. He was therefore not
denied due process. In the words of Wigmore, supra,
petitioner had been given an opportunity to inspect
the Angara Diary but did not object to its
admissibility. It is already too late in the day to raise
his objections in an Omnibus Motion, after
the Angara Diary has been used as evidence and a
decision rendered partly on the basis thereof.

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08 DYNAMIC SIGNMAKER V. POTONGAN

EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS – PART 5 (TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE): JUDGE SIA (G02) | 9

09 ALFELOR VS. HALASAN

EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS – PART 5 (TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE): JUDGE SIA (G02) | 10

10 SHRIMP SPECIALISTS INC. V. FUJI-TRIUMPH RULING: No. As correctly ruled by the CA, the statement "to
G.R. No. 168756, December 7, 2009 inform in advance in case the same checks cannot be
deposited for failure to replace the defective feeds" is not
FACTS: expressed in definite, certain and unequivocal language that
1. Shrimp Specialists (SS) and Fuji (F) entered into a Fuji admitted to delivering defective feeds.
Distributorship Agreement, under which F agreed to
supply prawn feeds on credit basis to SS. As held in CMS Logging, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it is a rule
2. In 1987, SS began purchasing prawn feeds from F that 'a statement is not competent as an admission where
and paid for them in the regular course of business. it does not, under a reasonable construction, appear to
3. From 3 June 1989 to 24 July 1989, F delivered admit or acknowledge the fact which is sought to be
prawn feeds, and SS issued 9 postdated checks as proved by it.' An admission or declaration to be
payment. Shrimp Specialists alleges that it issued a competent must have been expressed in definite, certain
stop-payment order for the checks because it and unequivocal language.
discovered that earlier deliveries were contaminated
with aflatoxin. Even assuming that Fuji admitted that the feeds delivered
4. SS states that it continued to purchase prawn feeds were defective, the question of whether Fuji had replaced the
from Fuji, but the stocks were still contaminated with feeds is a factual matter not usually reviewable in a petition
aflatoxin. filed under Rule 45.
5. F denies that the feeds were contaminated. F asserts
that SS requested to put on hold the deposit of the Whether Fuji delivered defective feeds, or whether the
checks due to insufficient funds. Fuji adds that when statement is tantamount to an admission that the feeds
the checks were presented for payment, the drawee delivered were defective, or whether Fuji failed to replace
bank dishonored all the checks due to a stop- defective feeds, are questions of fact which necessitate an
payment order. examination of the probative value of the evidence adduced
6. In January 1990, Ervin Lim, Fuji's owner, and before the trial court.
Edward Lim SS' Finance Officer agreed that SS
would issue another set of checks to cover the ones Based on the evidence on record, representative from SS
issued earlier. This agreement was reduced into even acknowledged receipt of feeds in good order and
writing and signed by both parties on behalf of their condition, hence, SS' argument is contrary to the evidence on
corporations. Part of their agreement stated “To record.
inform in advance in case the above checks cannot
be deposited for failure to replace the defective The factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
feeds.” appellate court, are generally binding on the Supreme Court.
7. However, upon presentment of the replacement After a careful review of the records, the Court finds no reason
checks, these were again dishonored due to another to disturb the factual findings of the trial court and the
stop-payment order issued by SS. appellate court.
8. This prompted F to file a criminal case against SS for
anti-bouncing check law. However, the criminal Petition denied.
charge was dismissed.
9. F filed another case, this time a civil action for
recovery of sum of money for the value of the
checks.
10. The trial court ruled in favor of F. It held that the
written agreement signed by Edward Lim and Ervin
Lim does not suffice to convince the court that the
feeds delivered by Fuji were defective. The trial court
explained that even if the agreement mentions Fuji
as having to replace the defective feeds, this
statement is not tantamount to an express admission
of the defective quality of the feeds that were
delivered. It ordered SS to pay F P767,427 for the
prawn feeds delivered from June to July 1989,
among others.
11. On appeal to CA, the latter affirmed the ruling of trial
court. The CA declared that the portion in the
agreement, which states "to inform in advance in
case the same checks cannot be deposited for
failure to replace the defective feeds," is too
nebulous to be taken as an admission on the part of
Fuji's representative that the feeds earlier delivered
were defective. The CA doubted if Fuji really
acknowledged that its earlier feeds were defective
because the agreement was just to acknowledge
receipt of the checks. To be an admission of any
breach of warranty, the evidence must be clear and
convincing.
12. On appeal to SC, SS argued that the provision "to
inform in advance in case the same checks cannot
be deposited for failure to replace the defective
feeds" clearly shows that Fuji admitted that the feeds
delivered were defective, otherwise, there would be
no reason to include the statement in an agreement
that merely acknowledged receipt of the checks.

ISSUE: WON the statement amounts to F admission.

EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS – PART 5 (TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE): JUDGE SIA (G02) | 11

11 PEOPLE VS. LAUGA
615 SCRA 548, G.R. NO. 186228 MARCH 15, 2010
FACTS:
Prosecution’s version of facts:
• In March 2000, AAA was raped by her father. AAA was
a 13 yr old minor when this happened.
• It happened after father had a drinking spree with the
neighbors and AAA was alone at home. She was alone
because her mother decided to leave because of her
father’s habit of mauling the latter when drunk and her
brother went out with neighbors.
• I was at around 10:00 o clock PM when her father came
back home and proceeded in raping her. There was a
penetration of penis in her vagina.
• Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying.
Appellant claimed he scolded her for staying out late.
BBB decided to take AAA with him. While on their way
to their maternal grandmother’s house, AAA recounted
her harrowing experience with their father. Upon
reaching their grandma’s house, they told their grandma
and uncle of the incident, after which, they sought the
assistance of Moises Boy Banting.
• Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house
wearing only his underwear. He invited appellant to the
police station. At the police outpost, he admitted to him
that he raped AAA because he was unable to control
himself.
• The next day, AAA had herself examined by the
Municipal Health Officer. The latter issued a MedCert
demonstrating the vagina’s laceration1.
Defendant’s version of facts:
• There was no food on that day when AAA arrived. He
confronted her but she answered back. He was
infuriated thus he kicker her buttocks.
• He then left for work
• At 3PM, he went back home. There was nobody but
him. He prepared his dinner and slept but was
awakened by members of “Bantay Bayan” headed by
Moises. The latter detained him because of AAA’s
accusation.
Trial proper:
On trial, 3 witnesses testified for the prosecution:
1. AAA
2. BBB- brother of AAA
3. Moises- “Bantay Bayan”
RTC and CA found him guilty.
Defendant-appellant however, filed a notice of appeal because,
according to him, (1) there were inconsistencies in the testimonies
of AAA and her brother BBB;51 (2) his extrajudicial confession
before Moises Boy Banting was without the assistance of a
counsel, in violation of his constitutional right;52 and (3) AAA’s
accusation was ill-motivated2.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the EJC of Bantay Bayan that is done
without a counsel is inadmissible? - Yes
2. Whether or not Inconsistencies which refer to minor,
trivial or inconsequential circumstances strengthen the
credibility of the witnesses? - Yes
3. Whether or not the Court is dissuaded from giving full
credence to the testimony of a minor complainant by
motives of feuds, resentment, or revenge? – No.
HELD:
1. Barangay-based volunteer organization in the nature of
watch groups, as in the case of the “bantay bayan3,” are
1 “hyperemic vulvae with 4 o’clock & 6 o’clock freshly lacerated hymen; (+)
minimal to moderate bloody discharges 2° to an alleged raping incident
2 He believed that the charge against him was ill-motivated because he
sometimes physically abuses his wife in front of their children after engaging
in a heated argument, and beats the children as a disciplinary measure.
3 A “bantay bayan” is a group of male residents living in an area organized
for the purpose of keeping peace in their community deemed a law
enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the
Constitution as stated in the case of Manglan and People v. Buendia. If we
are also to consider EO 309, they can be deemed as the fifth in the
composition of the Peace and Order Committee- “(5) at least three (3)
Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS – PART 5 (TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE): JUDGE SIA (G02) |
recognized by the local government unit to perform
functions relating to the preservation of peace and order
at the barangay level. Any inquiry a bantay bayan
makes has the color of a state-related function and
objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his
constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section
12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda
Rights, is concerned, and an extrajudicial confession
taken from a suspect by such bantay bayan without a
counsel is inadmissible in evidence.
2. The testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of
BBB. Both testified that they sought the help of a
“bantay bayan.” Their respective testimonies differ only
as to when the help was sought for, which this Court
could well attribute to the nature of the testimony of
BBB, a shortcut version of AAA’s testimony that
dispensed with a detailed account of the incident. At any
rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the
assailed inconsistency is too trivial to affect the veracity
of the testimonies. In fact, inconsistencies which refer to
minor, trivial or inconsequential circumstances even
strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they erase
doubts that such testimonies have been coached or
rehearsed.
3. Appellant’s contention that AAA charged him of rape
only because she bore grudges against him is likewise
unmeritorious.
a. This Court is not dissuaded from giving full
credence to the testimony of a minor
complainant by motives of feuds, resentment
or revenge. As correctly pointed out by the
Court of Appeals: Indeed, mere disciplinary
chastisement is not strong enough to make
daughters in a Filipino family invent a charge
that would not only bring shame and
humiliation upon them and their families but
also bring their fathers into the gallows of
death.
b. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it
is unbelievable for a daughter to charge her
own father with rape, exposing herself to the
ordeal and embarrassment of a public trial
and subjecting her private parts to
examination if such heinous crime was not in
fact committed. No person, much less a
woman, could attain such height of cruelty to
one who has sired her, and from whom she
owes her very existence, and for which she
naturally feels loving and lasting gratefulness.
Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a
certain amount of psychological depravity for
a young woman to concoct a story which
would put her own father to jail for the most of
his remaining life and drag the rest of the
family including herself to a lifetime of shame.
It is highly improbable for [AAA] against whom
no proof of sexual perversity or loose morality
has been shown to fake charges much more
against her own father. In fact her testimony is
entitled to greater weight since her accusing
words were directed against a close relative.
____________________________________
Court’s Ruling:
Lauga is guilty. The law provides, in part, that rape is committed,
among others, “[b]y a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman” “through force, threat or intimidation.” The death penalty
shall be imposed if it is committed with aggravating/qualifying
circumstances, which include, “[w]hen the victim is under eighteen
(18) years of age and the offender is a parent.” However, since DP
is suspended, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay AAA
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative well-known in
his community.”
12
12 SALAPUDDIN VS. COURT OF APPEALS

EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS – PART 5 (TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE): JUDGE SIA (G02) | 13

13 PEOPLE VS. JOSE CACHUELA AND BENJAMIN
IBANEZ
(GR 191752; JUNE 10, 2013)
FACTS:
• Prosecution’s evidence revealed that on July 23,
2004, accused Ibanez went to Weapons System
Corporation (WSC) on board an old car and told
Henessy, WSC’s Secretary and Sales
Representative that he was the one who bought a
gun barrel from their gun show in SM Megamall.
Ibanez inquired from Henessy about the schedule
and rates of firing range, membership fee and asked
the days when there are many people and if
Henessy is the only female employee.
• On July 26, around 9 am, Henessy arrived at WSC
but no one opened the door so she went to the back
of the office where the firing range was located and
called Zaldy, another WSC’s employee, who
answered that he could not open the door because
his hands were tied. Henessy called Sian, their
operations manager and the police arrived.
• They saw Zaldy handcuffed to the vault and he
informed the police that the company’s gunsmith,
Rex was inside the firing range. The police saw the
lifeless body of Rex and the autopsy revealed that he
suffered several gunshot wounds caused by a .45
pistol.
• NBI received an information from an asset that the
group of Cachuela was involved in the robbery of
WSC and killing of the employee and that they are
looking for prospective buyers of firearms. The NBI
formed an entrapment team and proceeded to
Bacoor, Cavite where they met Nabilgas, who told
them that he had been sent by Cachuela and Ibañez
to look for buyers of firearms. The police introduced
themselves and told Nabilgas that they were
conducting an entrapment operation against the
suspects of the robbery at WSC. Nabilgas
surrendered to the police, and gave the names of the
other persons involved in the crime.
• Thereafter, the asset contacted Cachuela and
informed him that Nabilgas had already talked to the
buyers, and that they would like to see the firearms
being sold. Cachuela set up a meeting with the
buyers at a gasoline station in Naic, Cavite. NBI
Special Investigator Lino, Supervising Agent Abiera
and the asset went to the agreed place. Cachuela
brought them inside his house and showed them
several firearms. When the agents inquired from
Cachuela whether the firearms had legal
documentation, the latter sensed that the meeting
was a set-up so the NBI agents arrested Cachuela
and they recovered 4 firearms, including a .9 mm
Bernardelli with serial number T1102-03E000151.
• The NBI conducted a follow-up operation on Ibañez
whom the asset also contacted. Ibañez directed the
asset to bring the prospective buyers to his
residence in Imus, Cavite to meet them and the NBI
agents saw him inside a Nissan California car. Lino,
Abiera and the asset entered the car, and Ibañez
brought out 2 firearms, and showed them to the
agents. The agents asked whether the guns had
legal documentation; they then arrested Ibañez when
they sensed that he was already becoming
suspicious. The agents recovered two guns from
Ibañez, viz.: a .45 Glock 30 with serial number FML
245 and a .45 Llama with serial number 04490Z.
• At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy pointed to the
Cachuela and Ibanez, during a police line-up, as the
persons responsible for the robbery at WSC and for
the killing of Rex. Nabilgas also executed a
handwritten confession implicating the appellants
and Zaldy in the crime. The prosecution filed an
Information for robbery with homicide before the RTC
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS – PART 5 (TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE): JUDGE SIA (G02) |
against the appellants, Nabilgas and Zaldy. During
trial, Zaldy died.
• RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt; ordered them
to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of
Rex P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00
as moral damages, pay Hector C. Rodriguez,
Jr. P1,563,300.00, for value of the firearms and
ammunitions stolen from WSC. Nabilgas acquitted
on ground of reasonable doubt.
• CA: RTC affirmed with modifications only in the
amounts awarded. CA based its ruling on
circumstantial evidence that the appellants robbed
WSC and killed Rex during the course of the
robbery. CA ruled that the totality of the
circumstances point to the appellants as the
perpetrators of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide.
ISSUES:
1. WON Zaldy’s out-of-court identification admissible?
NO.
2. WON Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession admissible?
NO.
3. WON Nabilgas’ confession binds the appellants?
NO.
RULING: Court affirmed CA with modification on amounts
awarded.
1.) Lino testified that Zaldy identified the appellants as the
persons involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of
Rex in a police line-up held at the NBI Main Office on Taft
Avenue, Manila. Zaldy did not testify in court since he was
brought to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), and
subsequently died there during the trial. For this reason, Court
examined with greater scrutiny Lino’s testimony regarding
Zaldy’s alleged out-of-court identification.
• People v. Algarme explains the procedure for out-
of-court identification and the test to determine its
admissibility, as follows:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police
in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the
suspect alone is brought face-to-face with the
witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots
where photographs are shown to the witness to
identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups
where a witness identifies the suspect from a group
of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving
the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court
identification of suspects, courts have adopted the
totality of circumstances test where they consider the
following factors, viz.: (1) the witness' opportunity to
view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the
witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the
accuracy of any prior description, given by the
witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Lino merely stated that Zaldy, during a police line-up, identified
the appellants as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC
and in the killing of Rex. Lino did not state when and how the
line-up had been conducted. Hence, Lino’s failure to state
relevant details surrounding the police line-up is a glaring
omission that renders unreliable Zaldy’s out-of-court
identification. No way exists for the courts to evaluate the
factors used in determining the admissibility and
reliability of out-of-court identifications.
2.) The records also show that Nabilgas executed an
extrajudicial confession at the NBI Main Office, where he
implicated the appellants and Zaldy in the crime charged.
During trial, he repudiated this confession, and claimed that he
had been tortured by the NBI agents, and that he was forced
to copy a previously prepared statement.
14
 • Court ruled that Nabilgas’ extrajudicial
confession is inadmissible in evidence. The
Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial
confession, to be admissible, must satisfy the
following requirements: "(1) the confession must
be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the
assistance of a competent and independent
counsel, preferably of the confessant's choice;
(3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in
writing."
• Nabilgas was already under custodial
investigation by the authorities when he
executed the alleged written confession. "A
custodial investigation is understood x x x as x x
x any questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant manner. x x x It begins when
there is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime and the investigation has started
to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e.,
when the police investigator starts interrogating
or exacting a confession from the suspect in
connection with an alleged offense.
• In People v. Rapeza, the lawyer called to be present
during custodial investigations should, as far as
reasonably possible, be the choice of the individual
undergoing questioning or if furnished by the police,
the lawyer should be competent, independent and
prepared to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of
the accused, as distinguished from one who would
merely be giving a routine, peremptory and
meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional
rights.
• Court ruled that Nabilgas’ confession was not
made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel because Atty. Melita Go,
was provided by the very same agency
investigating him, the NBI itself despite Nabilgas’
open declaration to the agency’s investigators
that he already had a lawyer in the person of
Atty. Donardo Paglinawan, which the latter
confirmed.
• Nabilgas also testified that Atty. Go did not disclose
that she was a lawyer to assist him and merely
represented herself to be a mere witness to the
confession. Nothing on record show that Atty. Go
ascertained whether Nabilgas’ confession was made
voluntarily, if he fully understood the nature and the
consequence of his extrajudicial confession and its
impact on his constitutional rights. Hence, it is not the
kind of assistance required of lawyers in a custodial
investigation.
made while the declarant was engaged in
carrying out the conspiracy.
• Exception does not apply in the present case
since there was no other piece of evidence
presented, aside from the extrajudicial
confession, to prove that Nabilgas conspired
with the appellants in committing the crime
charged. Conspiracy cannot be presumed and
must be shown as distinctly and conclusively as
the crime itself. Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted
by the trial court due to insufficiency of evidence
to prove his participation in the crime.
• In view of the inadmissibility of Zaldy’s out-of-court
identification and Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession,
the prosecution’s case rests purely on circumstantial
evidence. "Circumstantial evidence consists of proof
of collateral facts and circumstances from which the
main fact in issue may be inferred based on reason
and common experience. These circumstances
must be consistent with one another, and the only
rational hypothesis that can be drawn therefrom must
be the guilt of the accused."
• Court held that no doubt exists that their primary
objective was to rob WSC, and that the killing of Rex
was done on occasion, or by reason, of the robbery.
However, another WSC employee – Zaldy – was not
killed, but merely tied to the vault and was one of the
accused in this case after the Office of the City
Prosecutor found probable cause to indict him in the
crime, as the robbery could have been the result of
an "inside job." Unfortunately, Zaldy was unable to
testify during trial since the RTC ordered that he be
brought to the NCMH for treatment.
• Accordingly, Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession
(which we ruled to be inadmissible) was the only
evidence linking Zaldy to the crime. For lack of
evidence, we cannot make any definite conclusion
and can only speculate on Zaldy’s involvement in the
crime charged.

3.) Therefore, Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is

inadmissible in evidence against the appellants in view of
the res inter alios acta rule. This rule provides that the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant
and is not admissible against his or her co-accused
because it is considered as hearsay against them.
• An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an
admission made by a conspirator under Section
30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This provision
states that the act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy, and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the
co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, in order that the admission of a
conspirator may be received against his or her
co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the
conspiracy be first proved by evidence other
than the admission itself; (b) the admission
relates to the common object; and (c) it has been

EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS – PART 5 (TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE): JUDGE SIA (G02) | 15

14 PEOPLE V. BOKINGCO
G.R. No. 187536, August 10, 2011
FACTS:
On 31 July 2000, an Information was filed against appellants
charging them of the crime of murder. On arraignment,
Bokingco entered a guilty plea while Col pleaded not
guilty. During the pre-trial, Bokingco confessed to the crime
charged.
The victim, Pasion and his wife, Elsa, were residing in a house
in Angeles City. Pasion owned a pawnshop, which formed part
of his house. He also maintained two (2) rows of apartment
units at the back of his house. The 2nd row was still under
construction at the time of his death. Appellants, who were
staying in Apartment No. 3, were among the 13 construction
workers employed by Pasion.
The prosecution’s evidence show that at around 1:00 a.m. on
29 February 2000, Vitalicio, Pasion’s brother-in-law, was spin-
drying his clothes inside his apartment when Pasion came
from the front door, passed by him and went out of the back
door. A few minutes later, he heard a commotion from
Apartment No. 3. He headed to said unit to check. He peeped
through a screen door and saw Bokingco hitting something on
the floor. Upon seeing Vitalicio, Bokingco allegedly pushed
open the screen door and attacked him with a hammer in his
hand. A struggle ensued and Vitalicio was hit several times.
Vitalicio bit Bokingcos neck and managed to push him
away. Bokingco tried to chase Vitalicio but was eventually
subdued by a co-worker. Vitalicio proceeded to his house and
was told by his wife that Pasion was found dead in the kitchen
of Apartment No. 3. Vitalicio went back to Apartment No. 3 and
saw Pasions body lying flat on the kitchen floor. Pasion and
Vitalicio were brought to the hospital. Pasion expired a few
hours later while Vitalicio was treated for his injuries.
Elsa testified that she was in the masters bedroom on the
second floor of the house when she heard banging sounds
and her husbands moans. She immediately got off the bed
and went down. Before reaching the kitchen, Col blocked her
way. Elsa asked him why he was inside their house
but Col suddenly ran towards her, sprayed tear gas on her
eyes and poked a sharp object under her chin. Elsa was
wounded when she bowed her head to avoid the tear
gas. Col then instructed her to open the vault of the pawnshop
but Elsa informed him that she does not know the combination
lock. Elsa tried offering him money but Col dragged her
towards the back door by holding her neck and pulling her
backward. Before they reached the door, Elsa saw Bokingco
open the screen door and heard him tell Col: tara, patay na
siya. Col immediately let her go and ran away with
Bokingco. Elsa proceeded to Apartment No. 3. Thereat, she
saw her husband lying on the floor, bathed in his own blood.
PO3 Quirino Dayrit was stationed at Police Station No. 4
in Barangay Salakot, Balibago, Angeles City. At 1:20 a.m. of
29 February 2000, he received a phone call regarding the
incident. He, together with a certain P/Insp. Maniago,
proceeded to Apartment No. 3 and conducted an
investigation. He noticed a pool of blood on the cemented floor
of the kitchen. He also saw a claw hammer with a green lead
pipe handle approximately 13 inches long near the kitchen
sink. A lead pipe measuring 40 inches and a chisel were also
found in the nearby construction site. The police went
to Angeles University Medical Center afterwards. PO3 Dayrit
saw Pasion lying in one of the beds while Vitalicio was still
loitering around the emergency room. He approached Vitalicio
and Elsa who both informed him of the incident. He prepared a
police report on the same day narrating the result of his
investigation.
Evelyn Gan, the stenographic reporter of Prosecutor Lucina
Dayaon, jotted down notes during the preliminary
investigation. She attests that Bokingco admitted that he
conspired with Col to kill Pasion and that they planned the
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS – PART 5 (TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE): JUDGE SIA (G02) |
killing several days before because they got fed up with
Pasion.
With the necropsy report prepared by Dr. Joven G. Esguerra,
he concluded that the injuries sustained by Pasion on his skull
proved fatal.
Appellants testified on their own behalf. Bokingco recalled that
he was sleeping in Apartment No. 3 at around 1:20 a.m. on 29
February 2000 when he was awakened by Pasion who
appeared to be intoxicated. The latter wanted to know why he
did not see Bokingco at the construction site on 28 February
2000. When Bokingco replied that he just stayed at the
apartment the whole day, Pasion suddenly hit him in the
head. This prompted Bokingco to take a hammer and hit
Pasion. They both struggled and Bokingco repeatedly hit
Pasion. Bokingco escaped to Manila right after the incident.
He was subsequently arrested in Mindanao on 11 June
2000. During the cross-examination, Bokingco admitted that
he harbored ill feelings towards Pasion.
Col confirmed that he was one of the construction workers
employed by Pasion. He however resigned on 26 February
2000 because of the deductions from his salary. He went
home to Cainta, Rizal, where he was apprehended and
brought to Camp Olivas. Upon reaching the camp, he saw
Bokingco who pointed to him as the person who killed
Pasion. He insisted that he doesnt know Bokingco very well.
1. TC found appellants guilty of murder and sentenced them
to death. CA found Col guilty and reduced sentence to
reclusion perpetua. Appellants filed MR noting the
absence of other evidence, aside from Bokingcos
admission, to prove that conspiracy existed in the instant
case. Appellants maintained that the admission made by
Bokingco cannot be used as evidence against his alleged
co-conspirator. Appellants also took exception to the
findings of the lower courts that the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation,
nighttime and abuse of confidence attended the
commission of the crime. Pursuant to the MR, CA
modified its decision to include Bokingco’s criminal
liability.
2. Appellants filed a notice of appeal. In its Resolution dated
26 October 2009, this Court required the parties to submit
their Supplemental Briefs within 30 days from notice
thereof if they so desire. Appellants manifested that they
are no longer filing a Supplemental Brief and are adopting
their arguments in the Appellants Brief submitted before
the Court of Appeals. The appellee likewise manifested
that it is dispensing with the filing of a Supplemental
Brief. The instant case was thus submitted for
deliberation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the qualifying circumstances were properly
appreciated to convict appellant Bokingco of murder. NO
2. Whether appellant Col is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as a co-conspirator.
HELD/RATIO:
1. NO. A downgrade of conviction from murder to homicide
is proper for Bokingco for failure of the prosecution to
prove the presence of the qualifying circumstances.
On the basis of his extrajudicial confession, Bokingco was
charged for murder qualified by evident premeditation and
treachery. However, appellants maintain that they could not be
convicted of murder. Treachery cannot be appreciated to
qualify the crime to murder in the absence of any proof of the
manner in which the aggression was commenced.
Bokingco admitted in open court that he killed Pasion. But the
admitted manner of killing is inconsistent with evident
premeditation. It is indispensable to show how and when the
plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before
16
it was carried out. In the instant case, no proof was shown as
to how and when the plan to kill was devised.
It was during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco
mentioned his and Cols plan to kill Pasion. Bokingcos
confession was admittedly taken without the assistance of
counsel in violation of Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.
provides that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating
to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator provided that the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than by such act or
declaration. In order that the admission of a conspirator may
be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary
that first, the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than
the admission itself; second, the admission relates to the
common object; and third, it has been made while the
declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. As we
have previously discussed, we did not find any sufficient
evidence to establish the existence of
conspiracy. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession has no
probative value and is inadmissible in evidence
against Col.
Bokingcos judicial admission exculpated Col because
Bokingco admitted that he only attacked Pasion after the latter
hit him in the head. All told, an acquittal for Col is in order
because no sufficient evidence was adduced to implicate him.

In the instant case, the extrajudicial confession is

inadmissible against Bokingco because he was not
assisted at all by counsel during the time his confession
was taken before a judge.

The finding that nighttime attended the commission of the

crime is anchored on the presumption that there was evident
premeditation. Having ruled however that evident
premeditation has not been proved, the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime cannot be properly
appreciated. There was no evidence to show that Bokingco
purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the commission of the
offense.

Abuse of confidence could not also be appreciated as an

aggravating circumstance in this case. Taking into account
that fact that Bokingco works for Pasion, it may be conceded
that he enjoyed the trust and confidence of Pasion. However,
there was no showing that he took advantage of said trust to
facilitate the commission of the crime.

2. NO. This Court is well aware of the policy to accord

proper deference to the factual findings of the trial court,
owing to their unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct,
and attitude under grueling examination. However, this
rule admits of exceptions, namely: when certain facts of
substance and value likely to change the outcome of the
case have been overlooked by the lower court.

Indeed, in order to convict Col as a principal by direct

participation in the case before us, it is necessary that
conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved. The finding
of conspiracy was premised on Elsa’s testimony that
appellants fled together after killing her husband and the
extrajudicial confession of Bokingco. Nobody witnessed the
commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the
apartment where Pasion was being attacked by Bokingco. In
fact, he was at Elsa’s house and allegedly ordering her to
open the pawnshop vault. At the most, Cols actuations can be
equated to attempted robbery, which was actually the initial
information filed against appellants before it was amended, on
motion of the prosecution, for murder.

In as much as Bokingcos extrajudicial confession is

inadmissible against him, it is likewise inadmissible
against Col, specifically where he implicated the latter as
a cohort. Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration or omission of another. Res inter alios acta alteri
nocere non debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial
confession is binding only on the confessant, is not
admissible against his or her co-accused, and is
considered as hearsay against them. An exception to
the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a
conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS – PART 5 (TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE): JUDGE SIA (G02) | 17
15 TAN SIOK KUAN AND PUTE CHING v. FELICISIMO a. Though the CA upheld MeTC’s jurisdiction,
"BOY" HO, RODOLFO C. RETURTA, VICENTE M. SALAS, saying that the allegations make a case for
AND LOLITA MALONZO PEREZ, J.: unlawful detainer and that the complaints were
filed within 1 year from respondents' receipt of
the demand letters, it nevertheless agreed with
FACTS:
respondents that petitioners have materially
1. This case stems from 7 separate complaints for unlawful
failed to prove their right to eject respondents on
detainer filed by petitioners Tan Siu Kuan and Pute Ching
the strength of being lessors. Moreover, CA
against defendants Avelino Bombita (Bombita), Felix
sustained respondents' invocation of the principle
Gagarin (Gagarin), Bernardo Napolitano (Napolitano),
of res inter alios acta,
Felicisimo "Boy" Ho (Ho), Rodolfo Returta (Returta), Vicente
ISSUE:
Salas (Salas), and Lolita Malonzo (Malonzo).
1. Whether a lessor-lessee relationship was properly
2. They alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land,
established— NO.
along with the improvements, located at Apollo Street, San
2. Whether the invocation of the principle of res inter allos acta
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, and covered by TCT
has merit— YES
Nos. 279014 and 279015; that they have been leasing
portions of said property to the defendants since 1972; and
RATIO:
that on February 7, 2003 they notified defendants in writing
1. The evidence on record generates a negative conclusion.
of their failure to pay rentals in the amount as follows:
Except for petitioners' bare claims, they have not shown any
(1) BOMBITA: P17.5k from March 1997 to Dec.
evidence of a lease between them and respondents, be it
2002;
express or implied. As keenly observed by the CA, there
(2) GAGARIN: P16k from Sept. 1997 to Dec.
was no mention of how and when the alleged contract of
2002
lease started, there was no proof of prior payment of rentals
(3) HO: P28.7k from Dec. 1996 to Dec. 2002
or any prior demand for such payment considering
(4) MALONZO: P21.6k from Jan 1997 to Dec
petitioners' allegation that respondents failed to pay rentals
2002
since 1997 and that the case was instituted only in 2003.
(5) NAPOLITANO: P16k from Sept. 1997 to Dec
2002
2. There is merit in respondents' invocation of the principle
(6) RETURTA: P23.7k from July 1996 to Dec
of res inter alios acta or that principle which states that "the
2002
right of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration
(7) SALAS: P22.7k from Aug 1997 to Dec 2002
or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided,
3. Defendants were given 10 days to pay the rentals due or
among which are: (1) admission by third party, (2)
vacate the premises, but defendants allegedly ignored
admission by co-partner or agent, (3) admission by
petitioners' demand, warranting the filing of the complaints
conspirator, and (4) admission by privies."
for unlawful detainer.
4. Bombita, Gagarin, and Napolitano (defendants) argued that:
In the case of Tamargo v. Awingan, the Court expounded on the
- the lease agreements are void ab initio
rationale behind the principle of res inter alios acta. Citing People v.
because petitioners are Chinese nationals
vda. De Ramos, the Court held that: On a principle of good faith and
who are not entitled to own real property in
mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and
the Philippines.
are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it
- they also claim to have been in possession would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a
of the premises since 1968 or some 35
man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and
years ago, thus plaintiffs action cannot be
if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought
one for ejectment or unlawful detainer,
their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
but accion publiciana which must be filed
before the RTC.
In the present case, petitioners failed to establish that the
5. On the other hand, Ho, Returta, Salas, and Malonzo
defendants' alleged implied admission of a lessor-lessee relationship
maintained that:
falls under the exceptions to the principle of res inter alios acta as to
- they have been in possession of the make such admission binding upon respondents. Although defendants
premises for 37 years without any rentals
and respondents were all defendants in the complaints for unlawful
being paid to any landlord
detainer filed by petitioners, it is very clear that defendants and
- that there are no existing lease contracts respondents espoused different defenses. Contrary to defendants'
- Respondents also asserted that they have position, respondents, as early as the filing of their response to
started possessing said property in 1966 by petitioners' demand letter, firmly and consistently denied the existence
building residential houses, and that they of any lease contract between them and petitioners over the subject.
have been in continuous possession since
then. Petition Denied.
- that petitioners presented only photocopies
of the subject TCTs and that when they Note: On whether the Joint MR of the RTC Decision was timely filed, a
presented such to the Register of Deeds of close review of the records yields the finding that it was. Respondents
Quezon City for verification as to how such received the Decision dated May 6, 2005 on May 15, 2005, and they
were transferred from the mother titles TCT filed the MR only on June 29, 2005. However, as explained by
Nos. 12505 and 12506, said office informed respondents, the statement that they received the RTC Decision on
them that there is no single transaction May 15, 2005 was inadvertent and erroneous. The records, particularly
recorded in the aforesaid mother titles. the certified true copies of the registry return slips from the RTC show
- Lastly, even assuming that petitioners' titles that the RTC Decision was simultaneously mailed by the RTC to the
are authentic, their cause of action should parties only on June 7, 2005. Thus, as correctly maintained by
have been accion publiciana considering respondents, they could not have received the RTC Decision on May
that respondents are in possession and that 15, 2005 or before the said decision was mailed to them. Respondents
no lease contract exists between the then clarified that they received the RTC Decision on June 15,
parties. 2005. As such, the filing of the Joint Motion for Reconsideration on
6. MeTC: ruled in favor of petitioners. June 29, 2005 was timely and the RTC Decision was not yet final and
a. It held that defendants impliedly admitted the executory.
existence of lease contracts and, as such, they
cannot deny the consequent lessor-lessee
relationship following the rule that a tenant is not
permitted to deny the title of his landlord.
b. that since petitioners were able to show that the
property in question was registered under their
name, and since respondents merely denied the
existence of a lessor-lessee relationship between
them and petitioners, petitioners' averments must
prevail following the tenet that in weighing
contradictory declarations and statements,
greater weight must generally be given to
positive testimony.
7. RTC affirmed the MeTC. CA reversed the RTC.

EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS – PART 5 (TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE): JUDGE SIA (G02) | 18

16 PEOPLE VS. TUNIACO ET. AL.

EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS – PART 5 (TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE): JUDGE SIA (G02) | 19