SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION v. EDNA A.

AZOTE
G.R. No. 209741 April 15, 2015
DOCTRINE:
Although an SSS member is free to designate a beneficiary, the designation must always
conform to the statute. To blindly rely on the form submitted by the deceased-member
would subject the entire social security system to the whims and caprices of its members
and would render the SS Law inutile.

FACTS:
 On June 19, 1992, respondent Edna and Edgardo, a member of the Social Security
System (SSS), were married. Their union produced six children.
 In 1994, Edgardo submitted Form E-4 to the SSS with Edna and their three older
children as designated beneficiaries.
 Thereafter or on September 7, 2001, Edgardo submitted another Form E-4 to the SSS
designating his three younger children as additional beneficiaries.
 On January 13, 2005, Edgardo passed away. Shortly thereafter, Edna filed her claim
for death benefits with the SSS as the wife of a deceased-member. It appeared,
however, from the SSS records that Edgardo had earlier submitted another Form E-4
on November 5, 1982 with a different set of beneficiaries, namely: Rosemarie Azote
(Rosemarie), as his spouse; and Elmer Azote (Elmer), as dependent, born on October
9, 1982. Consequently, Edna’s claim was denied.
 Her children were adjudged as beneficiaries and she was considered as the legal
guardian of her minor children. The benefits, however, would be stopped once a child
would attain the age of 21.
 On March 13, 2007, Edna filed a petition with the SSC to claim the death benefits,
lump sum and monthly pension of Edgardo. She insisted that she was the legitimate
wife of Edgardo.
 In its answer, the SSS averred that there was a conflicting information in the forms
submitted by the deceased.
 Summons was published in a newspaper of general circulation directing Rosemarie to
file her answer. Despite the publication, no answer was filed, and Rosemarie was
subsequently declared in default.

SSC RULING: Edna is NOT ENTITLED to the benefits. The SSC dismissed Edna’s petition for
lack of merit. Citing Section 24(c) of the SS Law, it explained that although Edgardo filed the
Form E-4 designating Edna and their six children as beneficiaries, he did not revoke the
designation of Rosemarie as his wife beneficiary, and Rosemarie was still presumed to be his
legal wife.
CA RULING: Reversed SSC decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is entitled to claim the SSS death benefit and pension of
Edgardo?

HELD:
NO. Under R. A. No. 8282, the law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death, only the legal
spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the latter’s SS benefits.
As a social security program of the government, Section 8 (e) and (k) of the said law
expressly provides who would be entitled to receive benefits from its deceased-member, to
wit:

SEC. 8. Terms Defined. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall, unless the
context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:
xxxx
(e) Dependents - The dependents shall be the following:

(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried,
not gainfully employed, and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-
one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently
incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and
(3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.
xxxx

(k) Beneficiaries - The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent
legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the
primary beneficiaries of the member: Provided, That the dependent illegitimate children
shall be entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally
adopted children: Provided, further, That in the absence of the dependent legitimate,
legitimated children of the member, his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled
to one hundred percent (100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the dependent parents who
shall be the secondary beneficiaries of the member. In the absence of all the foregoing, any
other person designated by the member as his/her secondary beneficiary.

Applying Section 8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282, it is clear that only the legal
spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the latter’s
SS benefits. In this case, there is a concrete proof that Edgardo contracted an
earlier marriage with another individual as evidenced by their marriage contract.
Edgardo even acknowledged his married status when he filled out the 1982 Form
E-4 designating Rosemarie as his spouse.

The updated Form E-4 of Edgardo was not determinative of Edna’s status and eligibility to
claim the death benefits of deceased-member. Although an SSS member is free to designate
a beneficiary, the designation must always conform to the statute. To blindly rely on the
form submitted by the deceased-member would subject the entire social security system to
the whims and caprices of its members and would render the SS Law inutile.

Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to determine the validity of marriages, it is
required by Section 4(b) (7) of R.A. No. 8282 to examine available statistical and economic
data to ensure that the benefits fall into the rightful beneficiaries. The existence of two Form
E-4s designating, on two different dates, two different women as his spouse is already an
indication that only one of them can be the legal spouse. It should be emphasized that the
SSC determined Edna’s eligibility on the basis of available statistical data and documents on
their database as expressly permitted by Section 4(b) (7) of R.A. No. 8282.

SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs. TERESA G.

FAVILA
G.R. No. 170195 March 28, 2011
DOCTRINE:
A spouse who claims entitlement to death benefits as a primary beneficiary under the Social
Security Law must establish two qualifying factors, to wit: (1) that he/she is the legitimate
spouse; and (2) that he/she is dependent upon the member for support.

FACTS:
 On August 5, 2002, respondent Teresa G. Favila (Teresa) filed a Petition before
petitioner SSC. She averred therein that after she was married to Florante Favila
(Florante) on January 17, 1970, the latter designated her as the sole beneficiary in
the E-1 Form he submitted before petitioner Social Security System (SSS).
  When they begot their children Jofel, Floresa and Florante II, her husband likewise
designated each one of them as beneficiaries.
 When Florante died on February 1, 1997, his pension benefits under the SSS were
given to their only minor child at that time, Florante II, but only until his emancipation
at age 21.
 Believing that as the surviving legal wife she is likewise entitled to receive Florante’s
pension benefits, Teresa subsequently filed her claim for said benefits before the SSS.
 In its Answer, SSS averred that the claim for Florante’s pension benefits was initially
settled in favor of Teresa as guardian of the minor Florante II. SSS also alleged that
Estelita Ramos, sister of Florante, wrote a letter stating that her brother had long
been separated from Teresa.
 She alleged therein that the couple lived together for only ten years and then
decided to go their separate ways because Teresa had an affair with a married man.

SSC RULING: The SSC ruled that she is DISQUALIFIED from claiming the death benefits
because she was deemed not dependent for support from Florante due to marital infidelity.
CA RULING: The CA REVERSED the SSC decision. It gave weight to the fact that she is a
primary beneficiary because she is the lawful surviving spouse of Florante and in addition,
she was designated by Florante as such beneficiary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Teresa is a primary beneficiary in contemplation of the Social Security Law as
to be entitled to death benefits accruing from the death of Florante?

HELD:
NO. A spouse who claims entitlement to death benefits as a primary beneficiary under the
Social Security Law must establish two qualifying factors, to wit: (1) that he/she is the
legitimate spouse; and (2) that he/she is dependent upon the member for support.

There is no question that Teresa was Florante’s legal wife. However, Teresa failed to show
that despite their separation she was dependent upon Florante for support at the time of his
death.

Aside from Teresa’s bare allegation that she was dependent upon her husband for support
and her misplaced reliance on the presumption of dependency by reason of her valid and
then subsisting marriage with Florante, Teresa has not presented sufficient evidence to
discharge her burden of proving that she was dependent upon her husband for support at
the time of his death. She could have done this by submitting affidavits of reputable and
disinterested persons who have knowledge that during her separation with Florante, she
does not have a known trade, business,
profession or lawful occupation from which she derives income sufficient for her support and
such other evidence tending to prove her claim of dependency. While we note from the
abovementioned SSS Memorandum that Teresa submitted affidavits executed by Napoleon
Favila and Josefina Favila, same only pertained to the fact that she never remarried nor
cohabited with another man. On the contrary, what is clear is that she and Florante had
already been separated for about 17 years prior to the latter’s death as Florante was in fact,
living with his common law wife when he died. Suffice it to say that "whoever claims
entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by
substantial evidence."

Hence, for Teresa’s failure to show that despite their separation she was
dependent upon Florante for support at the time of his death, Teresa cannot
qualify as a primary beneficiary.1âwphi1 Hence, she is not entitled to the death
benefits accruing on account of Florante’s death.
ROMARICO J. MENDOZA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 183891 August 3, 2010
DOCTRINE:
The term "managing head" in Section 28(f) is used, in its broadest connotation, not to any
specific organizational or managerial nomenclature.

FACTS:
 An Information was filed against petitioner, being the proprietor of Summa Alta Tierra
Industries, Inc. (SATII), for failure and/or refusal to remit the SSS premium
contributions in favor of its employees, in violation of Sec. 22(a) and (d) in relation to
Sec. 28 of Republic Act No. 8282, as amended.
 The monthly premium contributions of SATII employees to SSS which petitioner
admittedly failed to remit covered the period August 1998 to July 1999 amounting to
P421, 151.09 inclusive of penalties. After petitioner was advised by the SSS to pay
the above-said amount, he proposed to settle it over a period of 18 months which
proposal the SSS approved.
 Despite the grant of petitioner’s request for several extensions of time to settle the
delinquency in installments, petitioner failed, hence, his indictment.
 Petitioner maintains that the managing head or president or general manager of a
corporation is not among those specifically mentioned as liable in the above-quoted
Section 28(f). And he calls attention to an alleged congenital infirmity in the
Information in that he was charged as "proprietor" and not as director of SATII.

RTC RULING: Found Mendoza GUILTY for failure to remit the Social Security System (SSS)
premium
contributions of employees of the SATII of which he was president.
CA RULING: AFFIRMED the RTC decision

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mendoza is guilty of violating RA 8282 (SSS Law)?

HELD:
YES. Section 28(f) of the Act reads:
(f) If the act or omission penalized by this Act be committed by an association, partnership,
corporation or any other institution, its managing head, directors or partners shall be liable
for the penalties provided in this Act for the offense.

The provision of the law being clear and unambiguous, petitioner’s interpretation that a
"proprietor," as he was designated in the Information, is not among those specifically
mentioned under Sec. 28(f) as liable, does not lie. For the word connotes management,
control and power over a business entity. No need to resort to statutory construction for
Section 28(f) of the Social Security Law imposes penalty on: (1) the managing head; (2)
directors; or (3) partners, for offenses committed by a juridical person. The term "managing
head" in Section 28(f) is used, in its broadest connotation, not to any specific organizational
or managerial nomenclature. To heed petitioner’s reasoning would allow unscrupulous
businessmen to conveniently escape liability by the creative adoption of managerial titles.

The Court AFFIRMS the petitioner’s conviction for violation of Section 22(a) and (d), in
relation to Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8282, and the petitioner is thus sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.