MODULE 2
HEIRS OF TAN V POLLESCAS
The case of Garchitorena v. Panganiban which the Tan Heirs invoked to justify the
extinguishment of leasehold relation does not appear on page 339 of Volume 8 of
the Supreme Court Reports Annotated. What is printed on such page is the case of
Republic v. Perez with docket number L-16112 and promulgated on 29 June 1963.
For making a wrong citation, the Court admonishes Atty. Jesus S. Anonat, counsel
for the Tan Heirs, to be more careful when citing jurisprudence. The Court reminds
him of his duty not to knowingly misquote the text of a decision or authority lest he
be guilty of misleading the Court.
ALLIED BANK CORP V CA
Preliminary Matter: Misquoting Decisions of the Supreme Court
The phrase "[r]efusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination
where employee cited reason for said refusal, such as that of being away from the
family" does not appear anywhere in the Dosch decision. Galanida's counsel lifted
the erroneous phrase from one of the italicized lines in the syllabus of Dosch found
in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated ("SCRA").
The reporter writes the syllabus for the convenience of lawyers in reading the
reports. A syllabus is not a part of the court's decision. A counsel should not cite a
syllabus in place of the carefully considered text in the decision of the Court.
In short, they deliberately made the quote from the SCRA syllabus appear as the
words of the Supreme Court. We admonish them for what is at the least patent
carelessness, if not an outright attempt to mislead the parties and the courts taking
cognizance of this case.
IN RE: JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO
The mistake of Justice Del Castillo's researcher is that, after the Justice had decided
what texts, passages, and citations were to be retained including those from
Criddle-Descent and Ellis, and when she was already cleaning up her work and
deleting all subject tags, she unintentionally deleted the footnotes that went with
such tags — with disastrous effect.
This was what happened in the attributions to Ellis and Criddle-Descent. The
researcher deleted the subject tags and, accidentally, their accompanying footnotes
that served as reminder of the sources of the lifted passages. With 119 sources
cited in the decision, the loss of the 2 of them was not easily detectable.
Petitioners of course insist that intent is not material in committing plagiarism
since all that a writer has to do, to avoid the charge, is to enclose lifted portions
with quotation marks and acknowledge the sources from which these were taken.
But petitioners' theory ignores the fact that plagiarism is essentially a form of fraud
where intent to deceive is inherent. Their theory provides no room for errors in
research, an unrealistic position considering that there is hardly any substantial
written work in any field of discipline that is free of any mistake. The theory places
an automatic universal curse even on errors that, as in this case, have reasonable
and logical explanations.
No Misconduct
On occasions judges and justices have mistakenly cited the wrong sources, failed to
use quotation marks, inadvertently omitted necessary information from footnotes
or endnotes. But these do not, in every case, amount to misconduct. Only errors
that are tainted with fraud, corruption, or malice are subject of disciplinary action.
No Inexcusable Negligence
Finally, petitioners assert that, even if they were to concede that the omission was
the result of plain error, Justice Del Castillo is nonetheless guilty of gross
inexcusable negligence. They point out that he has full control and supervision over
his researcher and should not have surrendered the writing of the decision to the
latter.
But this assumes that Justice Del Castillo abdicated the writing of the Vinuya
decision to his researcher, which is contrary to the evidence adduced during the
hearing. In every sense, Justice Del Castillo was in control of the writing of the
report to the Court, which report eventually became the basis for the decision, and
determined its final outcome.
There is a basic reason for individual judges of whatever level of courts, including
the Supreme Court, not to use original or unique language when reinstating the
laws involved in the cases they decide. Their duty is to apply the laws as these are
written. But laws include, under the doctrine of stare decisis, judicial interpretations
of such laws as are applied to specific situations. Under this doctrine, Courts are "to
stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point."
Once the Court has "laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are
substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties or property are the same."
And because judicial precedents are not always clearly delineated, they are quite
often entangled in apparent inconsistencies or even in contradictions, prompting
experts in the law to build up regarding such matters a large body of commentaries
or annotations that, in themselves, often become part of legal writings upon which
lawyers and judges draw materials for their theories or solutions in particular cases.
And, because of the need to be precise and correct, judges and practitioners alike,
by practice and tradition, usually lift passages from such precedents and writings, at
times omitting, without malicious intent, attributions to the originators.
MODULE 3
CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND
CANDOR TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID
HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of
a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision
or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by
repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY
OTHERS.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language
or behavior before the Courts.
GIMENO V ZAIDE
Use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in professional dealings
As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide, in the reply that he drafted in the
Ombudsman case, called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist." And in another
case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide used the following demeaning and
immoderate language in presenting his comment against his opposing counsel:
Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND
HUMILIATION in the whole Justice System, and the Department of Justice in
particular, where the taxpayers paid for her salary over her
incompetence and poor performance as a prosecutor. . . This is a
clear manifestation that the Public prosecutor suffers serious mental
incompetence as regard her mandate as an Assistant City Prosecutor.
This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of
his words — a conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court.
While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language
abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to
abstain from any offensive personality and to refrain from any act prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or a witness. In keeping with the dignity of
the legal profession, a lawyer's language even in his pleadings, must be dignified.
Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide is found GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice and for using intemperate, offensive and, abusive language in
violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. His notarial commission, if existing, is hereby
REVOKED, and he is declared DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a
notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED for one (1)
year from the practice of law.
SABERON V LARONG
Respondent, in-house counsel and acting corporate secretary of the bank, filed an
Answer with Affirmative Defenses 3 to the Petition stating, inter alia,
5. That this is another in the series of blackmail suits filed by plaintiff
[herein complainant Jose C. Saberon] and his wife to coerce the Bank and Mr.
Bonpin for financial gain —
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the
bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their
clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language
abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation
of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language
even in his pleadings must be dignified.
It is of no consequence that the allegedly malicious statements of respondent were
made not before a court but before the BSP.
Thus, while respondent is guilty of using infelicitous language, such transgression is
not of a grievous character as to merit respondent's disbarment. In light of
respondent's apologies, the Court finds it best to temper the penalty for his
infraction which, under the circumstances, is considered simple, rather than grave,
misconduct.
WHEREFORE, complainant's petition is partly GRANTED. Respondent, Atty.
Fernando T. Larong, is found guilty of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT for using intemperate
language. He is FINED P2,000 with a stern WARNING that a repetition of this or
similar act will be dealt with more severely.
NG V ALAR
On appeal, the NLRC rendered a Decision affirming the decision of the LA.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Inhibit (MRMI),
pertinent portions of which read:
We cannot help suspecting that the decision under consideration
was merely copied from the pleadings of respondents-appellees with
very slight modifications
If labor arbiter Santos was cross-eyed in his findings of fact
The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both its moral
and intellectual integrity, replete with implied accusations of partiality, impropriety
and lack of diligence. Respondent used improper and offensive language in his
pleadings that does not admit any justification.
Respondent's assertion that the NLRC not being a court, its commissioners, not
being judges or justices and therefore not part of the judiciary; and that
consequently, the Code of Judicial Conduct does not apply to them, is unavailing. In
Lubiano v. Gordolla, the Court held that respondent became unmindful of the fact
that in addressing the NLRC, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an
oath-bound servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics.
Respondent's argument that labor practitioners are entitled to some latitude of
righteous anger is unavailing. It does not deter the Court from exercising its
supervisory authority over lawyers who misbehave or fail to live up to that standard
expected of them as members of the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, we find respondent Atty. Benjamin C. Alar GUILTY of violation of
Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is imposed a fine of
P5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
ADEZ REALTY V CA
Meanwhile, the Court adverts to the Petition for Review filed in behalf of petitioner
Adez Realty, Inc., by ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY. On pages 2-4 of the Petition,
counsel purports to quote, as he does, the questioned decision when he alleges —
"The facts of the case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are the following:
xxx xxx xxx
'After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered the questioned order dated
November 20, 1984, without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez
Realty , granting the applicant's petition for reconstitution in the name of the
deceased Elias Eugenio'"
However, the phrase "without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez
Realty, in the above quoted second paragraph on page 3 of the Petition for Review,
is not found in the decision penned by Associate Justice Manuel C. Herrera for
respondent Court of Appeals. It now appears as part of a material statement of fact
in the decision of the court a quo when actually it is not. This to Us is a prima facie
case of attempting to mislead this Court, a serious offense which constitutes willful
disregard of a lawyer's solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with
truth.
ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within five (5) days from
notice why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for intercalating a material fact
in the judgment of the court a quo thereby altering and modifying its factual
findings with the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a
favorable
The case at bar, although akin to the aforementioned cases, has more serious and
far reaching repercussions. Those who attempt to misguide this Court, the last
forum for appeal, should be dealt with more severely lest We be made unwilling
instruments of inequity and injustice. Indeed, counsel has demonstrated his wanton
disregard for truth and fair play even before the Highest Court of the land. Worse,
he compounded his unprofessional mischief by laying the blame on his hapless
secretary whose duty it was simply to obey him.
WHEREFORE, We find ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, counsel for petitioner, guilty
of intercalating a material fact in a judicial Decision elevated to Us on certiorari,
thereby altering its factual findings with the apparent purpose, and no other, of
misleading the Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment, and thus miserably
failing to live up to the standards expected of him as a member of the Philippine
Bar. Consequently, ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY is hereby DISBARRED effective
immediately from the practice of law.
HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO V FLORIDO
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James
Benedict C. Florido for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer "by manufacturing,
flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals Resolution/Order."
The lawyer's arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court
and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly addressed
by one gentleman to another. By calling complainant, a "sly manipulator of truth" as
well as a "vindictive congenital prevaricator", hardly measures to the sobriety of
speech demanded of a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
MANAHAN V FLORES
Atty. Flores filed a Letter of even date stating as follows:
If only to give your Honor another chance to prove your pro plaintiff
sentiment, I am hereby filing the attached Motion which [you may once
more] assign to the waste basket of [nonchalance].
With the small respect that still remains, I have asked the defendant to look
for another lawyer to represent him for I am no longer interested in this
case because I feel I cannot do anything right in your sala.
Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of
the court, Atty. Flores is expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03,
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain
from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Atty. Flores failed in this respect.
However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and not commensurate with
the infractions committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the first
infraction committed by respondent. Also, we are not prepared to impose on the
respondent the penalty of one-year suspension for humanitarian reasons.
Respondent manifested before this Court that he has been in the practice of law for
half a century. Thus, he is already in his twilight years. Considering the foregoing,
we deem it proper to fine respondent in the amount of P5,000.00 and to remind
him to be more circumspect in his acts and to obey and respect court processes.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED in the amount of P5,000.00
with STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with
more severely.
TIONGCO V AGUILAR TAMBUNTING V CA

'. . . Truly, it is hard to imagine that this Honorable Court had read the
petition and the annexes attached thereto and hold that the same has
"failed to suf􀁃ciently show that the respondent Court had committed a
grave abuse of discretion in rendering the questioned judgment . . .'
respondent Judge as having been 'crafted in order to fool
the winning party'; as a 'hypocritical judgment in plaintiffs' favor'; one 'you could
have sworn it was the Devil who dictated it';
In the Comment on the petitioner's Motion for Recusation, the Solicitor General
prays that Attys. Raymundo A. Armovit, Miguel R. Armovit and Rafael R. Armovit, be
disciplinarily dealt with by this Court for allegedly using abusive and intemperate
language against respondent judge which betrays disrespect to the trial court.
Indeed, in the Motion for Reconsideration, counsels for petitioner describe as
"unparalleled for sheer malevolence" respondent judge's allegedly erroneous
assumptions.

by describing the respondent Judge as a 'liar,' 'perjurer,' or 'blasphemer.
In his 2-page Compliance, dated 11 October 1994, he alleges that:
"If the undersigned has called anyone a 'liar' 'thief' 'per􀁃dious' and 'blasphemer' it
is because he is in fact a liar, thief, per􀁃dious and a blasphemer; 'this Honorable
[sic] First Division, however, forget, that the undersigned alsp [sic] called him a
'robber' (Petition, pp. 13 bottom; 14, bottom), a 'rotten manipulator' (Petition, p. 11
line 26) and 'abetter' of graft and shady deals (Petition, p. 12, bottom, p. 13 top);
On the other hand, if the undersigned called anybody 'cross-eyed,' it must be
because he is indeed cross-eyed — particularly when he sees but 􀁃ve (5) letters in
an eight (8) letter-word; Indeed, it must be a lousy Code of Professional
Responsibility and therefore stands in dire need of amendment which punishes
lawyer who truthfully expose incompetent and corrupt judges before this
Honorable Supreme Court; It is therefore, respectfully submitted, that for all his
pains, the undersigned does not deserve or is entitled to the honors of being dealt
with administratively or otherwise."
Petitioner's lawyers further stated: "Petitioner's counsel, citing the above
proceedings, contested the trial judge's baseless, nay despotic attempt to muzzle
his right to be heard in his defense . . ." The trial judge's actions were also branded
as an "obviously unholy rush to do petitioner in . . ."
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the
bar, in pursuing their duty to advance the interests of their clients, to use strong
language. But this privilege is not a license to malign our courts of justice.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED
with FINALITY. Attys. Raymundo A. Armovit, Miguel R. Armovit and Rafael R.
Armovit are hereby ordered to pay a FINE of P500.00 each with a stern WARNING
that a repetition of this or similar act and language will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to their records.

"WITH THE UNDERSIGNED'S RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES — AND UNDYING LOVE

(Constitution, Preamble, 66 word)."

Moreover, while he tried to justify as true his descriptions of the respondent

judge as a "liar," "thief," per􀁃dious," and "blasphemer" he did not offer any excuse
for his use of the rest of the intemperate words enumerated in the resolution.
Worse, feeling obviously frustrated at the incompleteness of the Court's
enumeration of the intemperate words or phrases, he volunteered to point out that
in addition to those so enumerated, he also called the respondent judge a "robber,"
"rotten manipulator," "abettor" of graft and corruption, and "cross-eyed.

That Atty. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds of decency and propriety in making
the false and malicious insinuation against this Court, particularly the Members of
the First Division, and the scurrilous characterizations of the respondent judge is,
indeed, all too obvious.

WHEREFORE, for such violation, ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO is hereby ordered to

pay a Fine of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) and WARNED that the commission
of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
YARED V ILARDE

It is his belief that counsel for petitioner, Atty. Marciana Deguma, "a rambunctious
wrestler-type female of 52 who does not wear a dress which is not red, and who
stampedes into the courtroom like a mad fury and who speaks slang English to
conceal her faulty grammar," is impelled by less than noble reasons in serving as
counsel for petitioner. Her ulterior motive? "[T]o please and tenderize and sweeten
towards her own self the readily available Carmelo M. Tiongco," a retired police
major described by respondent Tiongco as Atty. Deguma's "niño bonito," "an
unmarried mestizo with curly hair who lives with plaintiff for being houseless" who
rents a place on the subject property sought to be recovered by petitioner. Atty.
Deguma, apparently an unmarried maiden of a certain age, is variously described by
respondent Tiongco as "a love-crazed female Apache [who] is now ready to skin
defendant alive for not being a bastard," and a "horned spinster and man-hungry
virago and female bull of an Amazon who would stop at nothing to molest, harrass
(sic) and injure defendant — if only to please and attract police-major Carmelo
Tiongco Junior — the deeply desired object of her unreciprocated affections — who
happens not to miss every chance to laugh at her behind her back." He claims that
Atty. Deguma, a lawyer with the Public Attorney's Office, is engaged in a game of
one-upmanship with a fellow employee, in that "she happens to be ambitious
enough to secretly (that what she thought) plot to put one over her office-mate
who simply netted a corporal (if not a private) by aiming at no less than an IMDC
major — hoping to catch him by sheer brass and audacity." In so doing, Atty.
Deguma is using the PAO as a "marriage bureau for her own benefit." Respondent
Tiongco predicts that nothing good will come out of opposing counsel's scheme
since, quoting Voltaire, "outside of virtue, ther's (sic) no happiness."

Respondent Tiongco has achieved a remarkable feat of character assassination. His

verbal darts, albeit entertaining in a fleeting way, are cast with little regard for
truth. However, he does nothing more than to obscure the issues, and his reliance
on the fool's gold of gossip betrays only a shocking absence of discernment. To this
end, it will be wise to give him an object lesson in the elementary rules of courtesy
by which we expect members of the bar to comport themselves.

We are aghast at the facility with which respondent Atty. Jose B. Tiongco concocts
accusations against the opposing party and her counsel, although it is of public
record that in Tiongco v. Deguma, et al., we dismissed as totally unfounded his
charge of fraudulent conspiracy and public scandal against petitioner, Major
Tiongco, Atty. Deguma and even the latter's superior at the Public Attorney's Office,
Atty. Napoleon G. Pagtanac. His lexicon of insults, though entertaining, do not find a
ready audience in us, and he should be, as he is hereby, warned accordingly.