Case 83.

Bengzon vs Drilon, 208 SCRA 133 (1992)

FACTS: In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that
were “repealed” during the time of former President Marcos which pertain to retirement
benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions. However,
the President vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not
give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court
asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed
(by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject
of a previous case. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non-publication and in
effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for
1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however
did the allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund
Adjustment”; included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different branches
of the government; among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices
of the judiciary.
However, the President again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the
retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is
already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted petitioner and several other retired judges and justices to question the
constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by herein
respondent
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations
bill is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to
them in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no
power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president
have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to
the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the
president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority
to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in
the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot
be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive
must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto
the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which
pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items covering obligations
to the other departments of the government.
Case 84: Bolinao Electronics vs. Valencia

FACTS: Petitioners operate and own television (channel 9) and radio stations which are
situated in Luzon. They were summoned by respondent, then Secretary of Communications,
for operating even after their permit has expired. Respondent claimed that because of CBN’s
continued operation sans license and their continuing operation had caused damages to his
department, hence this petition. Records show, the appropriation for Philippine Broadcasting
Service (intervenor) as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of
the Republic of the Philippines, comes with the condition that no portion of such appropriation
be used for the operation of TV stations in Luzon. The President vetoed the condition attached
to the said appropriation.
ISSUES: Whether or not the President’s act of vetoing a condition for an appropriation is
unconstitutional or not.

HELD: No, under the Constitution, it is a general rule that the President must approve and
disapprove a measure as a whole but appropriation measures are exceptions to that rule. In
the present case, it was construed that the President approved the specific item in the
appropriation considering that the condition was the only portion he vetoed and approval of
an item signified the approval of everything included with it (the condition).
Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been violated by the refusal of CBN to cease
operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation to operate the
Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963
Budget of the Republic of the Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations
particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then there can be no
damage; and if there are expenditures made by Valencia’s department they are in fact in
violation of the law and they cannot claim damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that
the then president vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he
may not legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill.
Case 85: Gonzalez vs. Hechanova, G.R. No. 21897, (1963)
FACTS:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign rice to be
purchased from private sources. Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said
implementation because RA No. 3542 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207,
prohibits the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration or any
other government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be authorized
by the President of the Philippines, and by or on behalf of the Government of the
Philippines. They add that after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any other
government agency from importing rice and corn, S. 10 of RA 3542 indicates that only
private parties may import rice under its provisions. They contended that the government
has already constitute valid executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma, that in case
of conflict between RA 2207 and 3542, the latter should prevail and the conflict be
resolved under the American jurisprudence.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Executive indirectly impounded the budget appropriated by
Congress for the procurement of rice from domestic sources by using the same to
procure the grain from foreign sources.

HELD: Yes. The responded impounded the appropriated budget for the procurement of
rice. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted
by Congress. He may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the
latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments
that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the
present case, it is expressed by Congressed through RA 2207 and 3542 that the
Government must prefer products from domestic sources so as to boost productivity
except when the President authorizes the importation of such products through any
agency he may designate resulting from extreme need or measure to strengthen national
security. It was insufficiently shown by the respondents that there was an extreme need
nor an activated measure to strengthen national security so as to justify the importation
the products from the foreign countries.
The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements
has been sufficiently established. Even assuming that said contracts may properly
considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void,
from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of
Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American
constitutional system enter into executive agreements without previous legislative
authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited
by statutes enacted prior thereto.