POLICARPIO vs.
MANILA TIMES Issue:
May 30, 1962
Facts:
Plaintiff Lumen Policarpio seeks to recover damages
from Manila Times by reason of the publication in the
Saturday and the Daily Mirror of two articles which
are claimed to be per se defamatory, libelous and
false and jeopardize her integrity and good name.
These articles were about the charges against her
which caused her to be separated from her service as
the executive secretary of the local UNESCO
National Commission. Plainitff maintains that the
effect of these false statements was to give the
general impression that she was guilty or at least
probably guilty of the crimes of malversation of
public funds and estafa. Likewise, she asserted that
there are other inaccuracies in the news item. 1
1 "PALACE OPENS INVESTIGATION OF RAPS
AGAINST POLICARPIO
Alba Probes Administrative Phase of
Fraud Charges Against Unesco Woman
Official; Fiscal Sets Prelim Quiz
Of Criminal Suit on Aug. 22.
The administrative phase of two-pronged investigation Miss
Lumen Policarpio, head of the Unesco national commission
here, opened in Malacañan before Col. Crisanto V. Alba.
The judicial inquiry of charges filed by Herminia D. Reyes,
also the complainant in the Malacañan case before the
Presidential Complaints and Action Commission, will be
conducted by Fiscal Manases G. Reyes on Aug. 22 at 2 p.m.
Miss Policarpio stands accused by Reyes of having
malversed public property and of having fraudulently sought
reimbursement of supposed official expenses.
Colonel Alba, at the start of his investigation at the
Malacañan Park, clarified that neither he nor the PCAC had
initiated the criminal action before the city fiscal's office.
The complaint before the fiscal was started by an
information she naming Herminia D. Reyes as complainant
and citing other persons as witnesses. Fiscal Reyes set
preliminary investigation of these charges for Aug. 22.
Miss Reyes, technical assistant of the Unesco, stated at the
Palace inquiry that during 1955 Miss Policarpio allegedly
used several sheets of government stencils for her private
and personal use, such as for French lessons, contracts of
sale of pianos and for invitations of the League of Women
Voters of which she (Miss Policarpio) is an officer. The
Unesco commission here functions under the Office of the
President.
The charge was filed with the PCAC, and the PCAC
endorsed it to Colonel Alba for investigation.
Miss Policarpio this morning was not represented by an
lawyer. Federico Diaz, lawyer representing complainant
Miss Reyes, petitioned for the suspension of Miss
Policarpio, executive secretary of the Unesco.
Whether or not Manila Times had acted maliciously
in publishing the aforementioned articles.
Held:
Yes. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in
the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any
person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith,
without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial legislative or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
Alba did not act immediately on the petition. He said he was
holding a hearing on the petition on August 15.
During this morning's investigation three witness appeared.
The first witness was Atty. Antonio Lopez of the PCAC who
brought with him 18 sheets of stencil which were allegedly
used by Miss Policarpio for her personal use. These sheets
were admitted as temporary exhibits.
The second witness was Federico Vergara of the Unesco
who said that he received four of the 18 sheets, but he could
not identify which of the sheets he had received.
The third witness was Francisco Manalo who certified on the
charge of oppression in office against Miss Policarpio.
The other charge of Miss Reyes corresponded to supposed
reimbursements sought by Miss Policarpio for a trip to
Quezon Province and to Pangasinan. On the first, Miss
Reyes' complaint alleged the Unesco official had asked for
refund of expenses for use of her car when, Miss Reyes
claimed she had actually made the trip aboard an army plane.
Miss Reyes also said Miss Policarpio was absent from the
Bayambang conference for which she also sought allegedly
refund of expenses.
The complainant had previously been ordered relieved of her
Unesco post by Miss Policarpio and had later sued at the
Palace and before the Court for payment of her salary.
The title of the article of August 11, 1956 — "WOMAN
OFFICIAL SUED" — was given prominence with a 6-
column (about 11 inches) banner headline of one-inch types.
Admittedly, its sub-title — "PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO
PIO ON FRAUD" — printed in bold one-centimeter types,
is not true. Similarly, the statement in the first paragraph of
the article, to the effect that plaintiff "was charged with
malversation and estafa in complaints filed with the city
fiscal's office by the Presidential Complaint and Action
Commission" — otherwise known as PCAC — is untrue, the
complaints for said offenses having been filed by Miss
Reyes. Neither is it true that said "criminal action was
initiated as a result of current administrative, investigation",
as stated in the second paragraph of the same article.
 any other act performed by public officers in
the exercise of other functions.
In the case at bar, aside from containing information
derogatory to the plaintiff, the article presented her
in a worse predicament than that in which she, in fact,
was. In other words, said article was not a fair and
true report of the proceedings there in alluded to.
What is more, its sub-title – “PCAC RAPS L.
POLICARPIO ON FRAUD” – is a comment or remark,
besides being false. Accordingly, the defamatory
imputations contained in said article are “presumed
to be malicious”.
Lopez publisher and owner of Manila Chronicle and
Gatbonton (Editor) v. Court of Appeals and Cruz
(1970)
Ponente: Fernando, J.
Facts:
1. January 1956 – Front-page story on the
Manila Chronicle à Fidel Cruz, sanitary
inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands,
sent distress signals to US Airforce planes
which forwarded such message to Manila
2. An American Army plane dropped
emergency sustenance kits on the beach of
the island which contained, among other
things, a two way radio set. Using the radio
set Cruz reported to the authorities in
Manila that the locals were living in terror
due to a series of killings committed on the
island since Christmas of 1955.
3. Philippine defense forces (scout rangers)
were immediately deployed to the babuyan
claro. They were led by Major Wilfredo
Encarnacion who discovered that Cruz only
fabricated the story about the killings to get
attention. Cruz merely wanted
transportation home to Manila.
4. Major Encarnacion branded the fiasco as a
“hoax” à the same word to be used by the
newspapers who covered the same.
5. January 13, 1956 - This Week Magazine of
the Manila Chronicle, edited by Gatbonton
devoted a pictorial article to it. It claimed
that despite the story of Cruz being a hoax it
brought to light the misery of the people
living in that place, with almost everybody
sick, only 2 individuals able to read and write
and food and clothing being scarce
6. January 29, 1956 - This Week Magazineà in
the "January News Quiz" made reference to
Cruz as “a health inspector who suddenly
felt "lonely" in his isolated post, cooked up a
story about a murderer running loose on the
island of Calayan so that he could be ferried
back to civilization.” à Called it “Hoax of the
year”
7. In both issues photos of a Fidel Cruz were
published but both photos were of a
different person of the same name à Fidel G.
Cruz former mayor, business man,
contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan.
8. January 27, 1957 à published statements
correcting their misprint and explained that
confusion and error happened due to the
rush to meet the Jan 13th issue’s deadline
9. Cruz sued herein petitioners for libel in CFI
Manila. Cruz won and was awarded P11,000
in damages (5k actual, 5k moral, 1k
attorney’s fees)
10. CA affirmed CFI decision hence this case
Issue:
1. WON petitioners should be held liable for
their error in printing the wrong Fidel Cruz’s
photo in relation to the “hoax of the year”?
2. WON such error is sufficient ground for an
action for libel to prosper?
Held:
Yes they are liable but damages awarded to Cruz is
reduced to P1,000.00
Ratio:
1. Mistake is no excuse to absolve publishers
because libel is harmful on its face by the
fact that it exposes the injured party to more
than trivial ridicule, whether it is fact or
opinion is irrelevant.
2. Citing Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui à libel is
"malicious defamation, expressed either in
writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or
the like, ..., tending to blacken the memory
of one who is dead or to impeach the
honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the
alleged or natural defects of one who is
alive, and thereby "pose him to public
hatred, contempt, or ridicule,"
3. Citing standard treatise of Newell on
Slander and Libel à "Publication of a
person's photograph in connection with an
article libelous of a third person, is a libel on
the person whose picture is published,
where the acts set out in the article are
imputed to such person."
4. In this case à 3rd person was Cruz à his
picture being published beside the article
imputes him as the purveyor of the hoax of
the year
5. Libel cannot be used to curtail press
freedom however it also cannot claim any
talismanic immunity form constitutional
limitations
6. State interest in press freedom à citing
Justice Malcolm: Full discussion of public
affairs is necessary for the maintenance of
good governance… “Public officials must
not be too thin-skinned with reference to
 comments on official acts”…”of course
criticism does not authorize defamation.
Nevertheless, as an individual is less than
the state, so must expected criticism be
born for the common good.”
7. So long as it was done in good faith, the
press should have the legal right to have and
express their opinions on legal questions. To
deny them that right would be to infringe
upon freedom of the press.
8. “Last word on the subject” à Citing
Quisumbing v. Lopez: Press should be given
leeway and tolerance as to enable them to
courageously and effectively perform their
important role in our democracy
9. Freedom of the press ranks high in the
hierarchy of legal values
10. TEST of LIABLITY à must prove there was
actual malice in publishing the story/photo!
(Note: but this was not done in this case)
11. Citing Concepcion, CJ. à Correction of error
in publishing does not wipe out the
responsibility arising from the publication of
the original article
Correction = Mitigating circumstance not a justifying
circumstance!
U.S. v Bustos G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918
J. Malcolm
Facts:
In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a petition to
the Executive Secretary regarding charges against
Roman Punsalan, the justice of the peace of
Macabebe. They wanted to oust him from his office.
Specific allegations against him included bribery
charges, involuntary servitude, and theft.
The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not all the
charges were proved. But, the judge still found him
guilty.
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the victim
of prosecution and one Jaime, an auxiliary justice,
instigated the charges against him for personal
reasons. He was acquitted.
The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor
General but it wasn’t acted upon.
Criminal action was instituted aganst the residents
by Punsalan.
The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty
and sentenced them to pay 10 pesos or suffer
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire
the objection made by Punsalan. The trial court
denied the motion. All except 2 of the defendants
appealed. Making assignments of error.
1. The court erred in overruling motion for retrial.
2. Error in not holding that the libelous statement
was not privileged
3. Error in not acquitting defendants
4. Evidence failed to show gult of defendants beyond
reasonable doubt.
5. Erred in making defendants prove that the libelous
statements were true.
6. Error in sustaining the prosecution’s objection to
the introduction in evidence by the accused of the
affidavits upon which the petition forming the basis
of the libelous charge was based.
7. Erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire
the objection in advertently interposed by their
counsel to the admission in evidence of the
expediente administrativo out of which the
accusation in this case arose.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendants and appellants are
guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the
peace in Pampanga.
Held: Yes. Defendants acquitted.
Ratio:
Freedom of speech was nonexistent in the country
before 1900. There were small efforts at reform made
by the La Solidaridad. The Malolos Constitution, on
the other hand, guaranteed freedom of speech.
During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself
laid down the tenet Magna Charta of Philippine
Liberty when he wrote, “that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of
the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and
petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
This was in the Philippine Bill.
In the Amrican cases it was held, there were
references to “public opinion should be the constant
source of liberty and democracy.” It also said “the
guaranties of a free speech and a free press include
the right to criticize judicial conduct. The
administration of the law is a matter of vital public
concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced
is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the
people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a
judge the same as any other public officer, public
opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted
terrorization of public opinion on the part of the
judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort.”
“It is a duty which everyone owes to society or to the
State to assist in the investigation of any alleged
misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of
any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or
the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the
facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire
into and punish them.”
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary
consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the part of free speech. Assembly
means a right on the part of citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs.
Petition means that any person or group of persons
can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate
branch or office of the government for a redress of
grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning
must, of course, assume responsibility for the
charges made.
Public policy has demanded protection for public
opinion. The doctrine of privilege has been the result
of this. Privilged communications may in some
instances afford an immunity to the slanderer. Public
policy is the “unfettered administration of justice.”
Privilege is either absolute or qualified. Qualified
privilege is prima facie which may be lost by proof of
malice. This is apparent in complaints made in good
faith against a public official’s conduct having a duty
in the matter. Even if the statements were found to
be false, the protection of privilege may cover the
individual given that it was in good faith. There must
be a sense of duty and not a self-seeking motive.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-
matter in which the party communicating has an
interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is
privileged, if made to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty, although it contained
criminatory matter which without this privilege
would be slanderous and actionable.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from
defamatory words. Privilege destroys that
presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on
the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the
defendant the existence of malice as the true motive
of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of
probable cause will amount to proof of malice.
It is true that the particular words set out in the
information, if said of a private person, might well be
considered libelous per se. The charges might also
under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a
libel of a government official. As a general rule words
imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace
dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct
touching him in his office are actionable. But as
suggested in the beginning we do not have present a
simple case of direct and vicious accusations
published in the press, but of charges predicated on
affidavits made to the proper official and thus
qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been
proved by the prosecution. Further, although the
charges are probably not true as to the justice of the
peace, they were believed to be true by the
petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action.
Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or
misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends
and the motives of these citizens— to secure the
removal from office of a person thought to be venal
— were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the
privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly
seize on a frivolous matter but on instances which not
only seemed to them of a grave character, but which
were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first
instance to convince him of their seriousness. No
undue publicity was given to the petition. The
manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice
of the peace was proper.
G.R. No. 126466 January 14, 1999
ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a. ART BORJAL and
MAXIMO SOLIVEN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO
WENCESLAO, respondents.
Facts:
1. A civil action for damages based on
libel was filed before the court
against Borjal and Soliven for
writing and publishing articles that
are allegedly derogatory and
offensive against Francisco
Wenceslao, attacking among
others the solicitation letters he
send to support a conference to be
launch concerning resolving
matters on transportation crisis
that is tainted with anomalous
activities.
2. Wenceslao however was never
named in any of the articles nor was
the conference he was organizing.
The lower court ordered petitioners
to indemnify the private
respondent for damages which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. A
petition for review was filed before
the SC contending that private
respondent was not sufficiently
identified to be the subject of the
published articles.
Issue:
Whether or not there are sufficient grounds
to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel?
Ruling of the Case:
1. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential
that the victim be identifiable although it is
not necessary that he be named. It is also
not sufficient that the offended party
recognized himself as the person attacked
or defamed, but it must be shown that at
least a third person could identify him as the
object of the libelous publication. These
requisites have not been complied with in
the case at bar. The element of
identifiability was not met since it was
Wenceslaso who revealed he was the
 organizer of said conference and had he not
done so the public would not have known.
2. The concept of privileged communications
is implicit in the freedom of the press and
that privileged communications must be
protective of public opinion. Fair
commentaries on matters of public interest
are privileged and constitute a valid defense
in an action for libel or slander.
The doctrine of fair comment
means that while in general every
discreditable imputation publicly
made is deemed false, because
every man is presumed innocent
until his guilt is judicially proved,
and every false imputation is
deemed malicious, nevertheless,
when the discreditable imputation
is directed against a public person
in his public capacity, it is not
necessarily actionable. In order
that such discreditable imputation
to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false
allegation of fact or a comment
based on a false supposition. If the
comment is an expression of
opinion, based on established
facts, then it is immaterial that the
opinion happens to be mistaken, as
long as it might reasonably be
inferred from the facts.
3. The questioned article dealt with matters of
public interest as the declared objective of
the conference, the composition of its
members and participants, and the manner
by which it was intended to be funded no
doubt lend to its activities as being
genuinely imbued with public interest.
Respondent is also deemed to be a public
figure and even otherwise is involved in a
public issue. The court held that freedom of
expression is constitutionally guaranteed
and protected with the reminder among
media members to practice highest ethical
standards in the exercise thereof.
VASQUEZ VS CA GR No. 118971 September 15,
1999
Facts:
Sometime in April 1986, petitioner and some 37
families from Tondo Foreshore Area went to see then
NHA general Manager Lito Atienza regarding their
complaint against their barangay Chairman, Jaime
Olmedo. After the meeting, petitioner and his
companions were interviewed by reporters of the
newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa. The article was
published containing such statements from the
petitioner imputing that Olmedo, through
connivance with NHA officials, was able to obtain
title to several lots in the area and that he was
involved in illegal activities such as attempted
murder, gambling and stealing. Olmeda filed a
complaint for libel.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of libel
Held: Elements of libel under Art. 353 of RPC: (a)
allegation of a discreditable act or condition
concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c)
identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of
malice.
An allegation is defamatory if it ascribes to a person
the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status or circumstance which tends to
dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or
which tends to blacken the memory of one who is
dead.
There is publication if the material is communicated
to a third person – it is not required that the person
defamed has read or heard about the libelous
remark. In determining the meaning of any
publication alleged to be libelous the words shall be
taken in their ordinary sense.
To satisfy the element of identifiability, it must be
shown that at least a third person or stranger was
able to identify the defamed person as an object of
the defamatory statement.
Under Art. 361 of RPC, if the defamatory statement
is made against a public official with respect to the
discharge of his official duties and functions and the
truth of the allegation is shown, the accused will be
entitled to an acquittal even though he does not
prove the imputation was published with good
motives and for justifiable ends. Even if the
defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach
if it relates to official conduct, unless the public
official concerned proves that the statement was
made with actual malice – that is with knowledge is
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not. In this case, petitioner was able to prove his
allegation of land grabbing based on a letter of NHA
Inspector General, and the memoranda of the NHA
general manager. With regard to those charge of
involvement in illegal activities there are in fact
charges filed, the truth of which were not in issue.
G.R. No. 128959
September 30, 2005
CIRIACO BOY GUINGUING
VS.
COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
1. On Oct. 13, 1991 Lim published a paid
advertisement at the SUNDAY POST, a
weekly publication in Visayas and
Mindanao, edited and published by
petitioner GUINGUING, containing pictures
of arrests made and records of criminal
cases filed against CISER TORRALBA.
2. CISER TORRALBA is a radio broadcast
journalist of DYLA and DYFX based in Cebu
city.
3. TORRALBA filed a complaint against LIM
and GUINGUING asserting that the paid
advertisement was libelous and sought for
damages against LIM and the petitioner.
4. LIM claimed that TORRALBA made
defamatory attacks against him and his
family over his radio programs, so he opted
for paid advertisement to answer his
attacks.
5. After the trial, the lower court concluded
that the publication in question was indeed
libelous.
6. In the appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the RTCʼ s decision and modified the penalty
imposed.
7. Petitioner sought for the reversal of the
decision by the CA with the Supreme Court,
contending that as a publisher and a
member of the press, the decision of the
lower courts of the complaint against him
constitutes an infringement of his
constitutional right to freedom of speech
and of the press.
8. In the re-examination of the evidences and
contentions of the petitioner, it has been
established that the pieces of information in
said publication/advertisement were indeed
actually true.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication of the advertisement
paid for by Lim and published by Guingguing is
libelous.
RULING:
1. The assailed resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated July 29, 1996 and October 3,
1996 respectively are reversed and set aside.
Petitioner is ACQUITTED of the charge of
libel.
2. Actual malice is not proven in the
publication of the advertisement
3. TORRALBA is a public figure.
SUPREME COURT:
“To this end, the publication of the advertisement
by petitioner and LIM cannot be deemed by this
Court to have been done with actual malice. Aside
from the fact that the information contained in the
said publication was true, the intention to let the
public know the character of their radio
commentator can be at best subsumed under the
mantle of having been done with good motives and
for justifiable ends. The advertisement in question
falls squarely within the bounds of constitutionally
protected expression under ART.3 Sec. 4 of the 1987
Constitution.
Being a radio commentator on issues of
corruption by public officials, irregularities in
government, deems the complainant TORRALBA, as
a public figure. By entering this line of work,
complainant in effect, gave the public a legitimate
interest in his life. He likewise gave them a stake in
finding out if he himself had the integrity and the
character to have the right to criticize others of their
conduct.”
MALICE:
“When the offender, in performing an act or in
incurring an omission, has the intention to do an
injury to the person, property or right of another,
such offender acts with malice. If the act or omission
is punished by the RPC, the offender is liable for
intentional felony.” (Reyes p.37)
ART. 3 SEC. 4 1987 CONSTITUTION STATES:
“No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.”
SOLIVEN v. MAKASIAR
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues
were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were
denied due process when informations for libel were
filed against them although the finding of the
existence of a prima faciecase was still under review
by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the
President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights
of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge
issued a warrant for his arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any,
to determine probable cause; and (3) whether or not
the President of the Philippines, under the
Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings
against the petitioners through the filing of a
complaint-affidavit.
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue
moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the
Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the
Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's
finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A
second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on
April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the
Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Executive
Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these
developments, petitioners' contention that they
have been denied the administrative remedies
available under the law has lost factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner
Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law
in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact
that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he
filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in
effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by
filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not
require that the respondent in a criminal case actually
file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is
required is that the respondent be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so
minded.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls
for an interpretation of the constitutional provision
on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent
provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the
people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after
examination nder oath or
affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word
"determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants
to "other responsible officers as may be authorized
by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran
that the Constitution now requires the judge to
personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in his determination of probable cause for
the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an
accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive
and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In
satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and
his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report
and the supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and,
on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if
on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he
may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to
aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence
of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise
judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints
instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously
adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for
the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure
therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this
resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has
deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with
regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a
finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that
"the reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to
file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings
ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her
complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to
be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under
the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran,
would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of
immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness
stand, she would be exposing herself to possible
contempt of court or perjury.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the
privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free
from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job
that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's
time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to
the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any
other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an
accused in a criminal case in which the President is
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as
a defense to prevent the case from proceeding
against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would
prevent the President from waiving the privilege.
Thus, if so minded the President may shed the
protection afforded by the privilege and submit to
the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to
exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be
assumed and imposed by any other person.
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that
he could not be held liable for libel because of the
privileged character or the publication, the Court
reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such a
defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate
after receiving the evidence of the parties.
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel
case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on
press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage
to rule on the point.
The petitions fail to establish that public
respondents, through their separate acts, gravely
abused their discretion as to amount to lack of
jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and
prohibition prayed for cannot issue.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to
DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and
83979. The Order to maintain the status
quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en
banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the
Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Griño-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Ayer Production PTY Ltd. V Capulong (1988)
FACTS:
Pivate respondent Juan Ponce Enrile filed an action in
the RTC of Makati to enjoin the petitioners from
producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution," a
documentary of the EDSA Revolution in 1986 on the
ground that it violated his right to privacy. Petitioners
contended that the movie would not involve his
private life not that of his family. But the trial court
issued a writ of preliminary injunction and ordered
petitioners to desist from making the movie making
reference whatsoever to Ponce Enrile. This, this
action for certiorari.
HELD: Freedom of speech and expression includes
freedom to produce motion pictures and to exhibit
them. What is involved is a prior restraint by the
Judge upon the exercise of speech and of expression
by petitioners. Because of the preferred character of
speech and of expression, a weighty presumption of
invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint. The
Judge should have stayed his hand considering that
the movie was yet uncompleted and therefore there
was no "clear and present danger." The subject
matter of the movie does not relate to the private life
of Ponce Enrile. The intrusion is no more than
necessary to keep the film a truthful historical
account. He is, after all, a public figure. The line of
equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case
between freedom of speech and of expression and
the right of privacy may be marked out in terms of a
requirement that the proposed motion picture must
be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of
facts. There must be no showing of a reckless
disregard of truth.Notes: Ayer sought to produce a
movie on the 4-day revolution. Enrile, who had
previously been asked for the use of his character in
the movie and had refused the offer, sued to enjoin
the filming because he did not want any mention of
his and his family's name. The SC lifted the injunction
issued by the lower court on the ground that it
amounted to prior restraint, which is no better if
imposed by the courts than if imposed by
administrative bodies or by ecclesiatical officials.In
Ayer, the reference to Enrile is unavoidable because
his name is part of history and this cannot be changed
or altered; thus his name can be used so long as only
his public life is dwelled only. But in Lagunzad,
although Moises Padilla was also a public figure, the
movie dealth with both the public and private lives of
Moises Padilla.
CRISTINELLI S. FERMIN vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
[G.R. No. 157643; March 28, 2008] Constitutional
Law| Freedom of the Press|Freedom of Expression|
FACTS:
Spouses Annabelle Rama and Eduardo (Eddie)
Gutierrez, filed a libel suit against Cristinelli S. Fermin
and Bogs C. Tugas. Fermin as a publisher and Tugas
as an Editor-in-Chief of Gossip Tabloid printed and
circulated an article that depicts Rama as a fugitive
from justice and a swindler.
RTC rendered a decision finding Fermin and Tugas
guilty of Libel. On appeal, Tugas was acquitted on
account of non-participation in the publication
article. Fermin submits that being similarly situated
with Tugas, she is also entitled to an acquittal, as a
publisher she did not participated nor consented to
the preparation and publication of the libelous
article. Fermin raised that the said article is not
libelous and is protected by the mantle of freedom of
the press.
ISSUE:
Whether the questioned article is protected by the
mantle of the Freedom of the Press and is within the
realm of fair and honest comment.
HELD:
Petitioner cannot take refuge in the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press.
Although a wide latitude is given to critical
utterances made against public officials in the
performance of their official duties, or against public
figures on matters of public interest, such criticism
does not automatically fall within the ambit of
constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances
are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officer’s
performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of
public interest involving public figures, the same may
give rise to criminal and civil liability. While
complainants are considered public figures for being
personalities in the entertainment business, media
people, including gossip and intrigue writers and
commentators such as petitioner, do not have the
unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity by
indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious
comments, whether in broadcast media or in print,
about their personal lives.
Freedom of expression is man’s birthright –
constitutionally protected and guaranteed, and that
it has become the singular role of the press to act as
its “defensor fidei” in a democratic society. But it is
also worth keeping in mind that the press is the
servant, not the master, of the citizenry, and its
freedom does not carry with it an unrestricted
hunting license to prey on the ordinary citizen.
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the conviction
of petitioner for libel is upheld.
Diaz vs. People, G.R. No. 159787, May 25, 2007
(1st Division), J. Sandoval Gutierrez
Facts:
Manny Pichel and Ogie Diaz, managing editor and
writer, respectively for Bandera, were accused of
conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping each other, with the malicious purpose of
impeaching the integrity, honor and reputation of
one Florinda Bagay. The accused were alleged to
have feloniously written and published an article
about the sexual activities of certain “Miss S” and
Philip Henson, in which through the words and
phrases used in the article meant and conveyed false
and malicious imputations that this “Miss S” is a
sexual pervert and possesses lascivious and immoral
habits. Florinda Bagay, who happened to use
“Patricia Santillan” as her screen name, claims that
she was this “Miss S” being referred to in the said
article.
The RTC convicted the Diaz and Pichel of the crime
of libel. The Court of Appeals sustained the
conviction of Diaz but acquitted Pichel.
Issue:
Whether or not the article published by petitioners
fall under the crime of libel.
Held:
No. The elements of the crime of libel are the
following: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be
malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the
victim must be identifiable.
In the case at bar, the first element is present. In
determining whether a statement is defamatory, the
words used are to be constructed in their entirely and
should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood in
another sense. In the instant case, the article in
question details the sexual activities of a certain
“Miss S” and one “Philip Henson” who had a romantic
liaison. In their ordinary sense, the words used cast
aspersion upon the character, integrity, and
reputation of “Miss S.”
As to the element of malice, since on its face the
article is defamatory, there is a presumption that the
offender acted with malice. In Article 354 of the same
Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to
be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention
and justifiable motive for making it is shown. There
was neither good reason nor motive why the subject
article was written except to embarrass “Miss S” and
injure her reputation.
On the element of publication, there can be no
question that the article appeared in the December
28, 1991 issue of Bandera, a local tabloid.
The last element of libel is that the victim be
identifiable, although it is not necessary that the
person be named. It is enough if by intrinsic reference
the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains
matters of description or reference to facts and
circumstances from which others reading the article
may know the person alluded to, or if the latter is
pointed out by extraneous circumstance so that
those knowing such person could and did understand
that he was the person referred to.
The libelous article, while referring to “Miss S,” does
not give a sufficient description or other indications
which identify “Miss S.” In short, the article fails to
show that “Miss S” and Florinda Bagay are one and
the same person.
Although the article is libelous, Florinda Bagay could
not have been the person defamed therein. In Uy
Tioco v. Yang Shu Wen, where the requirement for an
identified or identifiable victim has not been
complied with, the case for libel must be dismissed.
Judgment reversed and Petitioner acquitted.
Disini, et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R.
No. 203335, 11 February 2014
Constitutional law; Unsolicited commercial
communications, also known as “spam” is entitled to
protection under freedom of expression. To prohibit
the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a
person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited
commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial
speech is a separate category of speech which is not
accorded the same level of protection as that given
to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of
expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection.
The State cannot rob him of this right without
violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Unsolicited advertisements are
legitimate forms of expression.
FACTS:
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal
code and, in effect, the libel provisions of the
cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of
“presumed malice” even when the latest
jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher
standard of “actual malice” as a basis for conviction.
Petitioners argue that inferring “presumed malice”
from the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue
of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime
Prevention Act on cyberlibel affected the
requirement of “actual malice” as opposed to
“presumed malice” as basis for conviction of libel.
RULING:
The prosecution bears the burden of proving the
presence of actual malice in instances where such
element is required to establish guilt. The defense of
absence of actual malice, even when the statement
turns out to be false, is available where the offended
party is a public official or a public figure, as in the
cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal (the
Executive Director, First National Conference on
Land Transportation). Since the penal code and
implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel
against private persons, the Court recognizes that
these laws imply a stricter standard of “malice” to
convict the author of a defamatory statement where
the offended party is a public figure. Society’s
interest and the maintenance of good government
demand a full discussion of public affairs.
But, where the offended party is a private individual,
the prosecution need not prove the presence of
malice. The law explicitly presumes its existence
(malice in law) from the defamatory character of the
assailed statement. For his defense, the accused
must show that he has a justifiable reason for the
defamatory statement even if it was in fact true.
In Re Emil P. Jurado | 243 SCRA 299 (1995)
FACTS:
Emiliano P. Jurado, a lawyer and a journalist who
writes in a newspaper of general circulation (Manila
Standard) wrote about alleged improprieties and
irregularities in the judiciary over several months
(from about October 1992 to March 1993). Other
journalists had also been making reports or
comments on the same subject. At the same time,
anonymous communications were being extensively
circulated, by hand and through the mail, about
alleged venality and corruption in the courts.
What was particularly given attention by the
Supreme Court was his column entitled “Who will
judge the Justices?” referring to a report that six
justices, their spouses and children and
grandchildren (a total of 36 persons) spent a vacation
in Hong Kong, and that luxurious hotel
accommodations and all their other expenses were
paid by a public utility firm and that the trip was
arranged by the travel agency patronized by this
public utility firm.
This column was made amidst rumors that a
Supreme Court decision favorable to the public utility
firm appears to have been authored by a lawyer of
the public utility firm. The seed of the proceeding at
bar was sown by the decision promulgated by this
Court on August 27, 1992, in the so-called
“controversial case” of “Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company v. Eastern Telephone
Philippines, Inc. (ETPI),” G.R. No, 94374. In that
decision the Court was sharply divided; the vote was
9 to 4, in favor of the petitioner PLDT. Mr. Justice
Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., wrote the opinion for the
majority.
The Chief Justice issued an administrative order
creating an ad hoc committee to investigate the said
reports of corruption in the judiciary. A letter affidavit
was also received from the public utility, denying the
allegations in Jurado's column. The Supreme Court
then issued a resolution ordering that the matter
dealt with in the letter and affidavit of the public
utility company be docketed and acted upon as an
official Court proceeding for the determination of
whether or not the allegations made by Jurado are
true.
ISSUE #1:
WON Jurado can invoke the principles of press
freedom to justify the published writings.
HELD:
NO. Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate,
may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free
speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and
deliberately published about a public official, should
enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false statement
and the false statement made with reckless disregard
of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.
The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm for
the proper exercise of any right, constitutional or
otherwise, viz.: “ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.” The provision is
reflective of the universally accepted precept of
“abuse of rights,” “one of the most dominant
principles which must be deemed always implied in
any system of law.”
Requirement to exercise bona fide care in
ascertaining the truth of the statements when
publishing statements which are clearly defamatory
to identifiable judges or other public officials. Judges,
by becoming such, are rightly regarded as voluntarily
subjecting themselves to norms of conduct which
embody more stringent standards of honesty,
integrity, and competence than are commonly
required from private persons. Nevertheless, persons
who seek or accept appointment to the Judiciary
cannot reasonably be regarded as having forfeited
any right to private honor and reputation. For to so
rule will be to discourage all save those who feel no
need to maintain their self-respect from becoming
judges.
The public interest involved in freedom of speech and
the individual interest of judges (and for that matter,
all other public officials) in the maintenance of
private honor and reputation need to be
accommodated one to the other. And the point of
adjustment or accommodation between these two
legitimate interests is precisely found in the norm,
which requires those, who, invoking freedom of
speech, publish statements which are clearly
defamatory to identifiable judges or other public
officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the
truth of the statements they publish. The norm does
not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of
what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit
the reckless disregard of private reputation by
publishing or circulating defamatory statements
without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth
thereof.
Note: In this case, Jurado failed to reliably confirmed
that raw intelligence or reports he received
surrounding the corruption in the Judiciary.
Moreover, some of his reports were completely
untrue because he did not bother to make any further
verification.
ISSUE #2:
WON the court has the power to cite him for
contempt.
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court has inherent power to
punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of
justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court
including lawyers and all other persons connected in
any manner with a case before the Court. The power
to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own
protection against improper interference with the
due administration of justice." Contempt is
punishable, even if committed without relation to a
pending case.
Jurado would also claim that the Court has no
administrative supervision over him as a member of
the press or over his work as a journalist, and asks
why he is being singled out, and, by being required to
submit to a separate administrative proceeding,
treated differently than his other colleagues in media
who were only asked to explain their reports and
comments about wrongdoing in the judiciary to the
Ad Hoc Committee.
The answer is that upon all that has so far been said,
the Court may hold anyone to answer for utterances
offensive to its dignity, honor or reputation which
tend to put it in disrepute, obstruct the
administration of justice, or interfere with the
disposition of its business or the performance of its
functions in an orderly manner. Jurado has not been
singled out. What has happened is that there have
been brought before the Court, formally and in due
course, sworn statements branding his reports as lies
and thus imposing upon him the alternatives of
substantiating those reports or assuming
responsibility for their publication.
Jurado would have the Court clarify in what capacity
— whether a journalist, or as a member of the bar —
he has been cited in these proceeding. Thereby he
resurrects the issue he once raised in a similar earlier
proceeding: that he is being called to account as a
lawyer for his statements as a
journalist.
This is not the case at all. Upon the doctrines and
principles already inquired into and cited, he is open
to sanctions as journalist who has misused and
abused press freedom to put the judiciary in clear and
present to the danger of disrepute and of public
obdium and opprobrium, detriment and prejudice of
the administration of justice. That he is at the same
time a member of the bar has nothing to do with the
setting in of those sanctions, although it may
aggravate liability.
Jurado’s actuations, in the context in which they were
done, demonstrate gross irresponsibility, and
indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he
might cause to the name and reputation of those of
whom he wrote.
ISSUE & RATIO.
They constitute contempt of court, directly tending
WON there was a grave abuse of discretion by
as they do to degrade or abase the administration of
respondent Board in classifying Kapit sa Patalim
justice and the judges engaged in that function. By
“For Adults Only” without deletion or cut. – YES.
doing them, he has placed himself beyond the circle
of reputable, decent and responsible journalists who xxx There was an abuse of discretion. Nonetheless,
live by their Code or the “Golden Rule” and who strive there are not enough votes to maintain that such an
at all times to maintain the prestige and nobility of abuse can be considered grave.
their calling.
“The adult classification given the film
GONZALES v. KALAW KATIGBAK serves as a warning to theater operators and viewers
that some contents of Kapit are not fit for the young.
SUMMARY. The Board of Review for Motion Pictures
Some of the scenes in the picture were taken in a
and Television (BRMPT) gave Lino Brocka’s film a
theater-club and a good portion of the film shots
“For Adults Only” classification with certain changes
concentrated on some women erotically dancing
and deletions in the film. The petitioners claimed that
naked, or at least nearly naked, on the theater stage.
the classification was without basis. In its answer,
Another scene on that stage depicted the women
respondent Board stated that petitioner company
kissing and caressing as lesbians. And toward the end
has an option to have the film reclassified to For-
of the picture, there exists scenes of excessive
General- Patronage if it would agree to remove the
violence attending the battle between a group of
obscene scenes; however, petitioners refused the
robbers and the police. The vulnerable and imitative
“For Adults Only” classification and instead filed this
in the young audience will misunderstand these
suit for certiorari. The issue raised was whether or not
scenes.”
there was a grave abuse of discretion by respondent
Board in classifying Kapit sa Patalim “For Adults DECISION.
Only” without deletion or cut; which the Court ruled
in the affirmative. Nonetheless, there are not enough Petition DISMISSED on the ground that there are not
votes to maintain that such an abuse can be enough votes for a ruling that there was a grave
considered grave, so the petition was dismissed. abuse of discretion in the classification of Kapit sa
Patalim as “For Adults Only.”
DOCTRINE. “All ideas having even the slightest
redeeming social importance--unorthodox ideas,
controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing
PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
climate of opinion--have the full protection of the
guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach [178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO.80806; 5 OCT 1989]
upon the limited area of more important interests. But
implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the Facts:
rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut
social importance.” (Roth test). Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of
FACTS. Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special
Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau,
 In a resolution of a sub-committee of respondent Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan
Board, a permit to exhibit Lino Brocka’s film Kapit Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from
sa Patalim under the classification “For Adults dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers
Only,” with certain changes and deletions along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and
enumerated was granted. other reading materials believed to be obscene,
 A motion for reconsideration was filed by pornographic and indecent and later burned the
petitioners stating that the classification of the film
seized materials in public at the University belt along
“For Adults Only” was without legal and factual
C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor
basis.
Bagatsing and several officers and members of
 On November 12, 1984, respondent Board
released its decision: “xxx the Board, after a review various student organizations.
of the resolution of the sub-committee and an Among the publications seized, and later burned,
examination of the film, Resolves to affirm in toto
was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-
the ruling of the subcommittee. Considering,
edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.
however, certain vital deficiencies in the
application, the Board further Resolves to direct Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for
the Chairman of the Board to Withheld the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against
issuance of the Permit to exhibit until these
Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as
deficiencies are supplied.” Hence this petition.
superintendent of Western Police District of the City
of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their
agents from confiscating plaintiff’s magazines or
from preventing the sale or circulation thereof
claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and
educational magazine which is not per se obscene,
and that the publication is protected by the
Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and
of the press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for
issuance of a temporary restraining order against
indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of
plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending
hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction.
The Court granted the temporary restraining order.
The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO.
RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was
affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom
of expression of the petitioner.
Held:
Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the
state has the right to protect society from
pornographic literature that is offensive to public
morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author,
publishers and sellers of obscene publications.
However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the
pictures here in question were used not exactly for
art's sake but rather for commercial purposes, the
pictures are not entitled to any constitutional
protection. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of
obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences
and into whose hands a publication or other article
charged as being obscene may fall." Another is
whether it shocks the ordinary andcommon sense of
men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture
is obscene or indecent must depend upon the
circumstances of the case and that the question is to
be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense
of the community reached by it." The government
authorities in the instant case have not shown the
required proof to justify a ban and to warrant
confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not
possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said
materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing
them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of
asearch warrant. The court provides that the
authorities must apply for the issuance of a search
warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity
seizure is in order and that;
1. The authorities must convince the court that the
materials sought to be seized are obscene and pose a
clear and present danger of an evil substantive
enough to warrant State interference and action;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the
same are indeed obscene. The question is to be
resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge’s
sound discretion;
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
Aglipay v. Ruiz GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil
201) First Division, Laurel (p): 5 concur.
Facts:
In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the
dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of
postage stamps commemorating the celebration in
the City of Manila of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman
Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio
Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine
Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he
considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto,
Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the
matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of
the protest of the petitioner’s attorney, the Director
of Posts publicly announced having sent to the
United States the designs of the postage for printing.
The said stamps were actually issued and sold though
the greater part thereof remained unsold. The
further sale of the stamps was sought to be
prevented by the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in
violation of the Constitution.
Held:
Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not
inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is
not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion
as a profession of faith to an active power that binds
and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And,
in so far as it instills into the minds the purest
principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and
highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the
preamble of their Constitution, implored “the aid of
Divine Providence, in order to establish a
government that shall embody their ideals, conserve
and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote
the general welfare, and secure to themselves and
their posterity the blessings of independence under a
regime of justice, liberty and democracy,” they
thereby manifested their intense religious nature and
placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the
destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence
of religion in human society is recognized here as
elsewhere. Act 4052 contemplates no religious
purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is
the discretionary power to determine when the
issuance of special postage stamps would be
“advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the
phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not
authorize the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to
appropriate, use or apply of public money or property
for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or
church. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage
stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to
favor a particular church or religious denominations.
The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit
of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money
derived from the sale of the stamps given to that
church. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps was
to take advantage of an event considered of
international importance to give publicity to the
Philippines and its people and attract more tourists to
the country. Thus, instead of showing a Catholic
chalice, the stamp contained a map of the
Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an
inscription that reads “Seat XXXIII International
Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” The Supreme
Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition,
without pronouncement as to costs.