Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management
What Equivocality Teaches Us
about Crisis Communication
A lthough a relatively young field of study, crisis com-
munication is a very complex research area. This
complexity is derived from the mosaic of perspectives
utilized to study crisis communication and the disparate
meanings of crisis communication. Hence, it is critical to
start discussions of crisis communication by identifying
the parameters that guide author’s thinking. Crisis com-
munication can be broadly divided into organizational
crisis communication and disaster crisis communica-
tion. Organizational crisis communication examines
how corporations and other organizational actors
respond to crises that are somehow linked to the
organizational actors. An example would be an
explosion and fire at a sugar-processing facility or an
embezzlement scandal at a non-profit. Disaster crisis
communication includes the communicative demands
created by natural disasters and public health crises.
Examples would be tsunamis and flu outbreaks.
Disaster crisis communication is more complex than
organizational crisis communication. Disaster crisis
communication involves large-scale events that require
coordination of various entities, including public and
private actors. The majority of organizational crises
involve a much more restricted range of actors with a
smaller scope for the problem. Organizational crises
such as BP in the Gulf of Mexico and Union Carbide in
Bhopal are the exceptions that are more complex. Each
year, there are hundreds of product harm and chemical
releases crises that are small in scope and relatively
simple to address.
The five pieces in this issue of the Journal of Contin-
gencies and Crisis Management illustrate the complexity
of disaster crisis communication. The uncertainty and
equivocality associated with crises places immense
communicative demands on crisis managers. Uncer-
tainty involves a lack of information while equivocality
exists when there are multiple interpretations of infor-
mation. Disaster crisis communication typically must
deal with large amounts of both. I would like to employ
a Weickian lens to explore the five articles that com-
prise this issue. The social psychologist Karl Weick
noted people organize in an effort to reduce equivo-
cality. How people reduce equivocality depends upon
the complexity of the situation – how much equivocal-
ity exists. If the equivocality is low and something
people have encountered in the past, rules can be
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Volume 23 Number 3 September 2015
applied. Rules are standard operating procedures that
can be applied to the equivocal situation. If equivocality
is high, people need to apply cycles. Cycles are commu-
nication activities, such as meetings, designed to make
sense of the situation. High equivocality demands the
application of multiple cycles of interaction and infor-
mation sharing to create a shared meaning (Weick,
1979). Each of these five articles provides insights into
the communicative demands of disaster crisis commu-
nication and stimulates thinking about developing the
cycles necessary to cope with the equivocality endemic
to disasters.
The five articles cover the range of disaster crisis
communication from crisis team formation to the
effects of messages on target audiences. Two of the
articles focus on the teams tasked with responding to
disaster crises, two articles examine the role of the
news media in reporting disaster crises and one con-
siders ways to improve public compliance with crisis
messaging. Within each article we find challenges
created by equivocality that threaten the ability of
crisis managers to full their ultimate goal of protecting
and enhancing public safety during a disaster. I will
feature these challenges in my discussion of the arti-
cles and the larger communicative implications of the
works.
Crisis managers are the anchor of any crisis commu-
nication effort. Disaster crisis managers have the com-
plicated task of coordinating various actors and
resources when responding to a disaster. In ‘Crisis Man-
agement through Network Coordinators: Experiences
of Swedish Civil Defence Directors’, Wimelius and
Engberg studied the tension between the views of
‘coordination and cooperation’ and ‘command and
control’ among Swedish crisis managers at the County
Administrative Boards (CABs). These are the people
responsible for disaster responses in Sweden.The CABs
must coordinate multi-organizational operations but
have no authority to force municipalities or private
actors to comply. Public and private actors are to be
coordinated through a network state. Within this
network, problem solving is accomplished through
cooperation. The coordination mandate and coopera-
tive decision-making approach provide a resource for
creating cycles – general mechanisms for addressing
equivocality.
DOI: 10.1111/1468-5973.12088
126
The CABs are to orchestrate complex networks in a
system that has no command structure and where their
own roles are ambiguous. Oddly, the equivocality begins
within the crisis management team as their own roles
are subject to multiple interpretations.The cooperative
and network approaches add further equivocality to the
process. Different sides are open to how they interpret
their place within the networks.Training, as part of crisis
preparation, becomes a critical cycle. Through training
and preparation, the various actors can clarify their
roles and responsibilities within the network.
The need for preparation for crises and the role of
crisis managers is a theme shared with the article ‘Com-
munication Challenges in CBRN Terrorism Crises:
Expert Perceptions’ by Vos.This study used a qualitative
survey of emergency managers from a variety of coun-
tries to garner insights into their preparedness for
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorist
threats (CBRN). CBRN are considered anxiety produc-
ing but there is limited preparation because the risk is
perceived as low in likelihood. Anxiety is a function of
people’s lack of understanding about CBRN terrorism.
Uncertainty surrounds CBRN terrorism because there
is very little ability to predict the events and the topics
are complex. Hence, the researchers found a need to
inform people but the respondents noted the danger of
misinformation creating panic.Although there is a need
for people to prepare for CBRN terrorism events,
discussing the topic can create fear and polarization in
society. There is equivocality with CBRN terrorism
events because interpretations of the threats can be so
variable.There is a need for cycles to reduce the uncer-
tainty and equivocality evoked by CBRN.
A preparedness paradox emerged in the respond-
ents’ comments.The preparedness paradox is a lack of
motivation to prepare because the events are complex
and likelihood is low. It becomes easy for crisis manag-
ers and others to ignore CBRN terrorism because the
odds of such an event are remote and the topic difficult
to understand and to explain. As in the study by
Wimelius and Engberg, the article identifies the need
for greater preparation.Again, the preparation tasks can
serve as cycles that help to reduce the uncertainty
created by CBRN terrorism crises. Part of that prepa-
ration is finding ways to explain the complex problem
to people and to shape how they should respond to
such events. The Sellnow and Sellnow article offers
some insights into helping to teach people about proper
disaster responses.TheVos article links to the two news
media studies in this issue as well. How the CBRN
terrorism threats are presented to people (the news
media would be a vital part of such efforts) can deter-
mine whether people learn how to prepare or are
moved to fear and panic.The role of the news media in
disaster communication is the next topic to be dis-
cussed. I will end with the IDEA model because it
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management
Volume 23 Number 3 September 2015
W.Timothy Coombs
provides a specific set of recommendations for over-
coming some of the problems identified in the other
four articles.
The two articles that examine media coverage and
disaster communication involve two different types of
disasters. ‘Simulating and Dissimulating News: Spanish
Media Coverage of the Swine Flu Virus’ examines a
common health-related threat. ‘Bringing Home the
Crisis: How U.S. Evening News Framed the 2011 Japan
Nuclear Crisis’ involves the nuclear radiation releases
by the Fukushima disaster, an anomalous health-related
threat. Although different crises, different media chan-
nels and different countries were used in the studies,
the conclusions from the two studies are eerily similar.
Cortiη̃as-Rovira, Pont-Sorribes and Marcos exam-
ined how Spanish newspapers covered the swine flu
virus. They examined how both the news and editorial
coverage reported the risk associated with the swine
flu. The purpose was to determine if the swine flu
coverage illustrated socially responsible journalism or
sensationalism and scaremongering. The tenor of the
newspaper coverage matters because of its influence on
the readers. Socially responsible reporting of the health
crisis could help to reduce reader equivocality by
helping them to understand the situation more accu-
rately. Sensationalism over-reports the risks and can
create anxiety, fear and a sense of danger. The authors
note that risk is socially constructed and the newspaper
play a role in shaping how their readers construct the
risk of swine flu.
Why would the news media seek to make the situ-
ation worse by over-emphasizing the risk of swine flu?
The answer is the commercial interests that drive the
newspapers. Newspapers need to attract readers to
generate revenue.The front-page stories that dramatize
risk are one way to sell newspapers. The desire to sell
newspapers is selected over telling the truth about the
swine flu risk.The differences between the editorial and
the news story coverage provide evidence of this profit
motive behind scaremongering. The editorial pages,
hidden inside the newspapers, were responsible while
the front-page news stories were the most sensational
– amplified the risk.
What we find in this study of Spanish newspapers and
swine flu is a failure of a potential cycle.The newspaper
coverage could be a mechanism for reducing equivocal-
ity. The newspapers and the readers have a chance to
increase message clarity through acting, responding and
adjusting. The Spanish newspapers failed to create an
effective cycle. Instead, the newspapers helped to create
a worst case interpretation of the swine flu.The swine
flu risk was overstated, seemingly to sell more newspa-
pers, creating an interpretation that would be more
harmful than helpful to the readers. Risk expert Peter
Sandman noted risk communication often involves cor-
recting misperceptions of risk. At times people think a
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
What Equivocality Teaches Us about Crisis Communication
risk is too high or too low and the experts seek to help
people reach a more accurate interpretation of the risk.
The Spanish newspapers were purposefully creating an
overly inflated view of the swine flu risk for what would
appear to be personal gain.
The situation with the US television coverage of the
radiation risk from the Fukushima disaster had a similar
failure to reduce equivocality.This study used framing to
guide the analysis of the news stories. Frames help to
shape how those consuming the news interpret the
events being reported in the news. Framing can even
influence people’s attitudes about events, organizations
and people in the news.The news can become a framing
contest between those seeking to preserve the status
quo and those hoping to create change. Framing for
disasters matter because the crises can generate risk
and the frames can shape how people will interpret that
risk. In turn, how people interpret the risk can influence
their subsequent behaviours.The media frames related
to the radiation risk created by the Fukushima disaster
could serve to create anxiety or to reassure US citizens
that the radiation would not affect them.
A nuclear disaster is unique in part because of the
fear people have with radiation.The authors noted that
the nuclear power issue itself is a tension between the
need for power (progress) and fear over nuclear acci-
dents (runaway potential). The analysis found that the
news stories relied heavily upon lay people rather than
experts to explain the nature of the radiation risk.The
experts that were used often provided contradictory
information. Ultimately, the news stories increased
uncertainty about the radiation risk from the
Fukushima disaster. The news frames had a strong
element of uncertainty and anxiety that played into the
existing public fears about nuclear power.Again, we see
a failure of a potential cycle involving the news media
and its consumers. The Fukushima disaster created
equivocality for US citizens. There were multiple inter-
pretations of what the potential risk was for people in
the United States. The US television news did little to
reduce equivocality. Instead, the US television news cov-
erage seemed to increase the equivocality in part
because it chose to use lay sources and contradictory
expert sources. Both articles examining news coverage
of disasters found that the news media served to
increase rather than to decrease the equivocality about
the risks associated with the crisis.The implications are
that the news media seems to making it more difficult
for crisis managers seeking to reduce the equivocality
surrounding the disaster risks.
So far, I have identified the many communication
challenges the articles in this issue have illuminated. As
noted earlier, the IDEA model presented in the article
‘A Receiver-based Approach to Effective Instructional
Crisis Communication’ offers a solution to some of the
problems risk creates for disaster communication.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
127
Sellnow and Sellnow developed the IDEA model to aid
crisis managers seeking to help people protect them-
selves during a disaster.They noted there is a dangerous
assumption that telling people what to do during a
disaster is the same as getting people to enact the
desired behaviour. Just because you tell people to do
something does not mean they will do it even if the
behaviour is in their own best interests. This is a
common mistake in public communication, confusing
informing with persuading. People can interpret an
informative message in many different ways – simple
informative messages can be equivocal.
The IDEA model is derived from instructional com-
munication and involves internalization, distribution,
explanation and action. The effectiveness of instruc-
tional communication is measured through affective,
cognitive and behavioural learning outcomes, not simple
information sharing. IDEA is a learning cycle model.
Internalization is about attracting and maintaining audi-
ence attention. Distribution involves utilizing channels
that should reach the target audience. Explanations of
the risk must be short and understandable to the target
audience. Action means that crisis managers provide
specific behaviours target audiences can take to protect
themselves from the dangers created by the crisis. Inter-
nalization, distribution and explanation are elements
that should be well known to anyone with a public
relations background because they are essential ele-
ments of basic public relations actions (e.g., Heath &
Coombs, 2005).
Action is a unique point and reflects the persuasive
nature of disaster crisis messages and avoids the trap of
equating informing with persuading. The Monroe moti-
vated sequence, a technique for constructing persuasive
presentations, was developed in the 1930s. The final
element of the motivated sequence was action. Action
involves the speaker telling the audience what they
needed to do to solve the problem the speaker had
identified earlier in the presentation (Monroe, 1975).
Many businesses still use the Monroe motivated
sequence to guide sales presentations because you end
with a specific action such as ‘buy our product or
service’. Disaster managers must be very specific in
telling target audiences what they need to do to protect
themselves from harm.
The authors conducted an experiment involving an
Escherichia coli outbreak.Two stories were created: one
using a typical crisis message and the other using a
message developed using the IDEA model. Respondents
in the IDEA condition viewed the message as more
effective and were more likely to return the tainted
ground beef (action) than those in the typical crisis
message condition. The results demonstrate the IDEA
model is effective at getting people to engage in the
desired behaviour during a crisis. The action step
creates specificity, thereby reducing equivocality for the
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Volume 23 Number 3 September 2015
128
target audience. The behavioural actions for the target
audience are clear and not plagued by multiple inter-
pretations or multiple options.The IDEA model can be
a useful mechanism for guiding cycles that should help
people to reduce equivocality.
The five articles in this issue capture the range of
disaster crisis communication challenges from the
creation of crisis teams to effects of disaster crisis
communication on the target audiences. Equivocality
seems to be endemic throughout the disaster crisis
communication process. It begins with the crisis teams
themselves. Those charged with addressing disasters
do not always have a clear understanding of their own
roles in the process. Moreover, the crisis teams are
expected to help coordinate a network response that
might involve a collection of public and private actors.
Often times the success of the network is predicated
on the persuasive skill of the crisis managers to
create a cooperative spirit among the actors. Effective
cooperation during a crisis is dependent in part of
preparation for the disaster. By working together
prior to a crisis, the equivocality generated when
multi-actor networks are formed can be reduced.
Preparation and training can create a better under-
standing of the roles and responsibilities of the actors
in the network.
The results of the news media analyses of disasters
are disappointing for disaster crisis managers. The
news media seemingly work against disaster crisis com-
munication by increasing rather than decreasing the
equivocality emerging from the events.The news media
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management
Volume 23 Number 3 September 2015
W.Timothy Coombs
do not seem to be a viable mechanism for developing
cycles that can reduce equivocality. The results would
suggest that the crisis managers must rely upon other
communicative mechanisms for creating cycles. Messag-
ing from the crisis managers themselves would appear
to be the most reliable methods of developing cycles to
help target audiences reduce disaster-related equivocal-
ity. The IDEA model provides guidance for crisis man-
agers seeking to reduce equivocality about what target
audiences should do to protect themselves from the
dangers associated with the disaster. Crisis managers
can use the IDEA model to develop messages they use
to initiate cycles with target audiences. As a whole,
these articles improve our understanding of disaster
crisis communication by identifying problematic areas in
the disaster crisis communication process and offering
some ideas for coping with those challenges.
W. Timothy Coombs
Department of Communication
Texas A&M University
456 Ross St, College Station, TX 77843
wtcoombs@hotmail.com
References
Heath, R.L. and Coombs, W.T. (2005), Today’s public relations: An introduction.
Sage.
Monroe, A.H. (1975), The motivated sequence. Principles of Speech Communica-
tion, 241–257.
Weick, K.E. (1979), The Social Psychology of Organizing, (2nd edn), Addison-
Wesley, Reading, MA.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd