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— Immanuel Kant
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I Introduction
In Kant’s moral theory the dignity of persons and their right to respect is
grounded in their freedom – their ability to subordinate their particular
desires and inclinations to the universal law of morality. To live up to this
freedom is the meaning of integrity, and so it is understandable that
more than anything else Kant treasured intellectual and moral integrity,
both in himself and in others. Kant is remembered by those who knew
him as the best model of his own moral doctrines: He valued the
impersonal universal in all those with whom he dealt more than their
individuality or particularity. An incident occurred about a week before
his death that has often been used to illustrate how Kant guided his
relationships with others by the disinterested interest of moral respect,
which he nonetheless called the “courtesy of the heart.” Desperately
weak, mentally unable to concentrate, and virtually blind, Kant insisted
on rising and remaining standing until his doctor had seated himself.
With great effort Kant then remarked that at least “the sense of humanity
has not yet abandoned me. (Sullivan, 1989: 1-3)
Our presentation of Kant’s thinking on morality will follow the same route
he journeyed. We will be guided by the following three questions: (1)
Foundations of Moral Values - 56
What can we know? [Kant had to analyze knowledge first.] (2) What
ought I to do? (3) What may I hope for?
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II What can I know?
Implication for what we can know: If space and time are merely ways in
which the mind orders things, then things can only be known by human
beings as they appear, that is, under the conditions of space and time (a
priori forms of sensibility), and never as they are in themselves.
Thus, we have Kant's famous distinction between phenomena: things
as they appear and noumena: things as they are in themselves.
According to Kant, all we can know are phenomena; this is the limit of
what we can know. Beyond the phenomenal world (i.e. the noumenal),
there can be no knowledge. 2
Kant says more about the conditions of the possibility of knowing. For
example, he discusses at length what he calls the a priori forms of
understanding and a priori forms of reasons. The former, like the a priori
forms of experience, constitute knowing. The latter are what he calls the
regulative ideas of reason. They do not constitute knowing, but they do
regulate the way we know and understand the world.
We will not go into the wearing discussion of these other a priori forms.
This matter is best left for a study of Kant’s philosophy or a study of his
epistemology. Besides, in the discussion of the a priori forms of
experience, the study of the possibility of synthetical a priori judgments,
we have all we need to proceed in our inquiry on Kant’s ethics. What we
should always keep in mind is Kant’s claim that our knowledge is a
composite of experience and ideas. In claiming this, Kant believed that
he has proven that there is indeed a necessary and universal component
in all knowing.
Summary: On the basis of what we have seen as Kant's response to
the problem of the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori, we can
make some general conclusions:
Foundations of Moral Values - 58
In his ethics, Kant's aim parallels that of the Critique. Here, it is "to seek
out and establish the supreme principle of morality." He wishes to
delineate the basic features of the situation in which moral decisions are
made, and so to clarify the special character of such decisions.
What Kant hopes is to be in a position to justify and defend, not every
individual moral judgment, but the principles in accordance with which
such judgments can be truly made.
We will glean from Kant's ethics that this does not tell us what we
ought to do concretely; it only presents us with the limit-boundary of
what is allowable by way of moral acts and decisions. In other words, his
theory seems to fence in an enclosure, outside of which would be the
realm where no moral person would dare venture.
Kant's task: As in his epistemology, the task is the isolation of the a priori
and therefore unchanging elements of morality. It is true that there are
different moral schemes in different societies, but we ask: (a) What is it
that makes these schemes moral? (b) What form must a precept have if
it is to be recognized as a moral precept?
Kant, as we can see, rejects any morality based on anything outside of
or other (also called heteronomous morality) than the moral subjectivity
itself.
In the context of what we have seen as his theory of knowledge, our
study of morality must be focused on the a priori--i.e., pure ethics. Thus,
the task of ethics is to seek out, and if possible to justify, the supreme
principle of morality.
For example, some of our ethical knowledge is composite. I say, for
instance, "I ought not to lie to my mother." I could not make this
statement unless I had experience both of my mother and myself. But
over and above the empirical, there is an assertion of obligation (duty).
This duty, in general or particular, cannot be known merely from my
experience.
It is to deal with this aspect of morality that is untainted by its
empirical manifestations, the nature of duty as such, which is the task of
pure ethics.
The need for pure ethics is thus quite strong in Kant. "A morally good
action must not only accord with duty, but it must be willed for the sake
of duty. If we fail to grasp the nature of duty in its purity, we may be
tempted to act merely for the sake of pleasure or convenience." (Paton,
1967: 24)
How does Kant view morality?
GOOD WILL. First of all, Kant says: "It is impossible to conceive anything
at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without
qualification, except a good will. [393]"3 What does it mean for a person
to have a “good will”?
To clarify Kant's assertion about the good will, we ought to pay
attention to "without qualification":
(i) A good will alone can be good in itself, or can be an absolute or
unconditioned good. That is – it is a good will alone which is good in
whatever context it may be found.
[A good will alone is good in all circumstances and in that sense is an
absolute/unconditioned good. Other so-called good things are good only
conditionally.]
(ii) Thus--it is not good in one context and bad in another. It is not
good as means to an end and bad as means to another. It is not good if
somebody happens to want it and bad if he doesn't. Its goodness is not
conditioned by its relation to a context or to an end or to a desire. It is
good on the basis of itself and nothing else. 4
By focusing on the "good will," Kant eliminates the idea that morality
can be based on our natural states and inclinations (vs. Natural Law
theory). As we will see later, he does not begrudge us pleasure and
Foundations of Moral Values - 60
Each did his "best" and what he earnestly attempted and the
motives which led him to do what he did are the proper objects of
moral judgment; what he accomplishes lies to a large extent be-
yond his control.5
What is duty then? A Second Question: What kind of intention makes a
person morally good? Kant’s answer to this question – we ought to do
our duty because it is what we ought to do. In other words, we must act
from the motive of duty.
This answer gives rise to a Third Question: What does it mean for a
person to act “from duty”? Here Kant introduces the notion of respect for
the law. “Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law.” For
Kant, since dutifulness abstracts from any ends we may desire, it requires
us to comply with the moral law out of respect for it, regardless of any
desires we may have and regardless of anything further we may or may
not achieve. (Sullivan, 1996: 32)
*Transition: The previous discussion attempted to thresh out what duty
means in the context of popular moral philosophy. Now we must examine
"duty" in itself. What is it? (A more positive presentation of what duty
means.)
*Recall: Kant seems to liken the problem here to that of the Citique of
Pure Reason. In the CPR, he tried to show how we can be justified in
making synthetic judg-ments a priori, i.e., assert of a certain subject a
predicate which can neither be seen by analysis to be implied in the
subject, nor discovered by experience to belong to it.
Here, in ethics, Kant is also engaged in a similar project. He wants to
show we can be justified in asserting the categorical imperative which is
a priori (universal, unconditional) even if this includes empirical elements.
Moral laws, e.g. "Do not make deceitful promises," are after all
synthetic judgments a priori.
CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE. This is the crux of the matter. In the investigation
of the cat-egorical imperative, Kant hopes to be able to show the
"unconditioned" in confor-mity to duty which sort of defines the morality
of an act.
(1) First formulation of the categorical imperative: the formula of the
universal law (the supreme principle of morality)
(1.1) Just by examining the categorical imperative (in contrast to
hypothetical) one can see that the one, absolute demand is universality.
This is a demand of reason itself. It cannot be that the command of duty
to action is applicable only to one and not all people.
Thus, according to Kant, the categorical imperative could be
formulated:
Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time
will that it should become a universal law. [421]
Note a: Kant is here simply formulating the categorical imperative,
incorporating, as it were, universality as a necessary element in the
supreme principle of morality. This is, as it were, the form that the
categorical imperative would take. We are not concerned with the matter
(stealing, lying, adultery, etc.) but the form of morality. On the other
hand, its concern for the form is precisely for the sake of getting the
matter right.
Note b: In the Foundations, Kant follows this up with examples of how
the universal law can be applied to concrete situations where there is a
demand to action.
(1.2) Unpacking the universal law:
(1.21) This formulation of the principle of morality summarizes a
procedure for deciding whether an act is morally permissible, i.e.,
whether or not an act contemplated upon is being done for duty's sake.
(1.22) "Maxim": When you are contemplating doing a particular action,
you are to ask what rule you would be following if you were to do that
action. This will be the maxim of the act. The maxim is thus the
subjective principle in the categorical imperative. This is the rule of
action a person follows as part of his own policy of living.
Kant: Categorical Imperative - 65
(1.23) Universal Law: Then you are to ask whether you would be
willing for that rule to be followed by everyone all the time. That would
make it a universal law.
(1.24) Conclusion: To act or not to act: If so, the rule may be followed,
and the act is permissible. However, if you would not be willing for
everyone to follow the rule, then you may not follow it, and the act is
morally impermissible.
(1.3) The Self-defeating Test
This is a follow up on the universalization principle. To help us decide
whether we can consent to others' following the universalized rule, we
need to apply the "self-defeating" test. We must see whether in our
allowing others to follow the rule there is not a contradiction in our action.
When embarking on a certain course of action I must ask: Does the
universalizing of the principle of my action result in a contradiction? If so,
the action fails the test and must be rejected as immoral.8
But it is important to see what is meant here by "contradiction." It is
not a logical contradiction as often as a practical one.
The question posed:
Can I consent to others' acting simultaneously according to the
same rule I use without undermining my own ability to act in
accordance with it?
use people, to achieve our purpose, no matter how good those purposes
may be.
For example: Borrowing money from a friend (Kant's own example).
The idea of treating your friend as an end is allowing him to make up his
own mind.14
In the end, the imperative to treat humanity as an end always is
grounded on the human being: he is not only material, part of the causal
chain of cause and effect in nature (phenomenal realm). He is also a free,
spiritual being who constitutes a kind of rupture in that physical chain of
cause and effect. Moreover, the human being has the capacity and the
dignity to posit for his action ends or goals that truly issue from him, as
rational being. The human being, as rational will, wills himself as end.
(3) 3rd formulation: Law of Autonomy: Act always on that maxim of
such a will in us as can at the same time look upon itself as making
universal law.
This formulation focuses on the fact that it is every individual who
legislates. Recall: In the first formulation, the rational human being,
acting in conformity to the unconditional exigencies of reason, decrees
that his maxim become a universal law. In the second formulation, the
rational human being is an end in himself because he is rational, and to
be treated as one is itself a demand of his rationality.
In both formulations, we cannot but notice that as rational will the
human being himself legislates the universal law. Hence – the third
formulation: the law of autonomy:
Note: In contrast to the first formulation, here law is legislated for
everyone; in the law of autonomy, law is legislated by everyone. In
obeying the moral law an individual obeys a law which he recognizes.
Morality, therefore, only demands what the human being ought to
demand to himself/herself and of others as rational will.
(1.5) Limits of the Categorical Imperative
(1.51) The Categorical Imperative is implausible. As a principle
governing the universality and hence absoluteness of moral rules, it does
not seem to be plausible. It says, after all, that moral rules (imperatives
of duty), without exception, hold in all circumstances.
But let us look at the rule against lying (Case of the Inquiring
Murderer). There are other absolute moral rules, but this seems to have
been Kant's favorite case.
Kant's arguments: the prohibition of lying follows straightaway from
the categorical imperative. We could not will that it be a universal law
that we should lie, because it would be self-defeating. . . .
In argument form:
You should do only those actions that conform to rules that you could
will to be adopted universally;
Foundations of Moral Values - 70
If you were to lie, you would be following the rule "It is permissible to
lie";
This rule could not be adopted universally, because it would be self-
defeating: people would stop believing one another, and then it would do
no good to lie.
Therefore, you should not lie.
Elizabeth Anscombe (in Journal of Philosophy, 1958) summarizes the
problem thus:
Kant's own rigoristic convictions on the subject of lying were so
intense that it never occurred to him that a lie could be relevantly
described as anything but just a lie (e.g. as "a lie in such-and-such
circumstances"). His rule about universalizable maxims is useless
without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant de-
scription of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it.
But lies are never simply just lies! They are always lies "in such-and-
such circumstances." Moreover, the difficulty seems to arise in step (2).
The crucial point is that there are many ways to formulate the rule; some
of them might not be "universalizable" in Kant's sense but some would
be. [Main contention here: It is possible to specify more than one rule.]
For instance, our maxim could be: "It is permissible to lie when doing
so would save someone's life." We could will this to be made a "universal
law," and it would not be self-defeating.
In general, the central difficulty in Kant's whole approach in the
Categorical Imperative seems to be this: for any action a person might
contemplate, it is possible to specify more than one rule.
(1.52) Response to Objection
We are tempted to make exceptions to the rule against lying because
in some cases we think the consequences of truthfulness would be bad
and the consequences of lying good. However, we can never be certain
about what the consequences of our actions will be; we cannot know that
good results will follow. For instance, as Rachels writes:
After you have honestly answered the murderer's question as to
whether his intended victim is at home, it may be that he has
slipped out so that he does not come in the way of the murderer,
and thus that the murder may not be committed. But if you had
lied and said he was not at home when he had really gone out
without your knowing it, and if the murderer had then met him as
he went away and murdered him, you might justly be accused as
the cause of his death. For if you had told the truth as far as you
knew it, perhaps the murderer might have been apprehended by
the neighbors while he searched the house and thus the deed
might have been prevented. Therefore, whoever tells a lie,
however well intentioned he might be, must answer for the
consequences, however unforeseeable they were, and pay the
penalty for them....
Kant: Categorical Imperative - 71
Kant did confront this problem but only once and then only in a
very summary fashion. Morality is based on reason, and reason
cannot impose practical contradictions. . . . Therefore, he argued
that, even when there is a conflict between moral rules, at any
given moment we can have only one duty. A genuine conflict
between duties, a conflict such that we have a duty to try to act at
the same time on incompatible rules, cannot arise. ‘Two conflicting
Foundations of Moral Values - 72
This case shows how one duty has stronger ground. Note that the other
duty is not denied as a duty. What is affirmed is that there is one duty
that must be performed. (And so the perform the other, albeit also a
duty, will be acting contrary to duty.
In conflicts, then, the stronger ground of obligation should prevail.
“Since it is a requirement of reason that we not be simultaneously bound
by two conflicting duties, then, in Kant’s theory, once we conscientiously
decide where out duty lies, the other rule is regarded as not actually
obligating us here and now” (Sullivan, 104).
Kant: Categorical Imperative - 73
know on the one hand, and a noumenal world which is beyond our ability
to know.
But Kant then transforms the question into: What may I hope for?
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IV What May I Hope For?
Given the assumed fact that the human being lives in a dichotomous
world, "is there hope for some ultimate unity that would make sense of
this broken, dual world?"
This poses the question of the human being's final end, a unity of the
empirical world with the ends and ideals of the moral world. Is the
human being hopelessly caught in between this dichotomous world? 18
Note: We would normally go about seeking a solution for the question
of unity in some "intrinsic final end" in organic beings or one ultimate
purpose of the empirical world (world as a whole!), but paradoxically, our
experience (empirical) does not bear this out:
"Organisms eventually die" and give way to the operations of nature;
and the world as a whole appears to be the playground of pure chance
and the operations of blind, mechanical forces.
Kant's Solution "... lies in the moral imperative itself, for it alone
provides us in all of human experience with something that is absolutely
necessary, though only in a moral sense."
Hence, we see Kant being consistent: the question of the human be-
ing's/thing's final end cannot be a matter of some end or object annexed
or affixed from the outside.
Man alone, or more exactly, the community of human persons, in
their dignity as free, spiritual beings and ends in themselves, are
the necessary final ends of all human action and of the empirical
world.19
Meaning: The end of everything seems to be for Kant the demand of
morality itself. (Like: the act seeks an end beyond but in its own
fulfillment). And since the demand of morality (which is a demand of
rationality) is posited by the human being himself, then the end is "a
recognition and the realization of human persons as ends in themselves."
For Kant -
the necessary final end and purpose of all things and of all human
striving is the realization of the civil society, a state of laws, where
each human person is protected in his dignity and freedom as an
end in himself and guaranteed access to a minimum of material
goods as befits his dignity as a human person.20
But even this historical action of the human community is not enough
to close the dichotomy between the two worlds. In the end -
there must be a future life for man, hence personal immortality. . .
. Furthermore, . . . ultimately, there must be a Supreme Being, a
Kant: Categorical Imperative - 75
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V Conclusion and Summary
According to Kant, then, the various rules of morality are based upon a
Moral Law that is pure and a priori. It is pure in that it does not contain
concepts borrowed from experience of the world and based upon natural
inclinations, and it is a priori in that it is necessarily valid always and for
everyone.
The Categorical Imperative gives expression to this Moral Law by
indicating its applicability to all persons, its equal recognition of all
persons and its free acknowledgment by all persons. It is not in itself a
prescription for particular actions, but violations of particular moral rules
can be shown to go against it.
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*Add Notes:
(1) For Kant, the human being as freedom is one who belongs to an
ideal world of reason, a kingdom of ends, as well as one who belongs to
an empirical world of physical determinism.
(1.1) Explanation: When the actions and choices of human beings are
regarded as events in the spatio-temporal world they must be subject to
empirical laws, and hence they cannot be free but must be determined.
For example: If we adopt the position of theoretical observers trying to
explain human beings' actions, then inevitably we regard some act, say,
of malicious lying as the act of a person whose heredity, education and
environment made it certain that he would act in this way. (Empirical
perspective)
An yet, we impute this person's offence to him and blame him for it.
When we do this, we are no longer explaining his action as a psychologist
might, but are considering it in the light of practical reason. (Perspective
of practical reason)
As a natural event his act was inevitable, but nevertheless he ought
not to have done it. If he ought not to have told this lie but nevertheless
did, it must have been possible for him to have refrained from telling it,
and since all the natural impulses and desires and circumstances brought
it about, some non-natural motive must have been available to him to
enable him to desist from the lie.
Thus – Kant claims "another causality, that of freedom" must have
been able to alter his conduct, even though in fact it did not.
In other words – Kant considers that everything a person does is in
principle subject to scientific explanation in terms of natural causes, and
is hence determined. This is how the person appears to an observer. But
in spite of this the person is held responsible for his actions, and this can
only mean that he could have acted differently, and this, in turn, means
that reason, "another causality," could have initiated a different series of
actions without itself being an effect of any previous cause.
The practical attitude involved in the imputation of responsibility
presupposes that the will is free to initiate actions which, when looked at
from a purely theoretical point of view, can be fully explained as effects of
causes, and might, furthermore, be predicted with certainty.23
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15
“Negative duties specify what is morally forbidden and require us to limit our
pursuit of happiness by the demands of morality. Kant described negative duties
as narrow, strict, rigorous, and perfect, for any action violating them is morally
wrong (421n, 424). We may never, for example, violate the respect owed another
person, regardless of the reasons we may have for wanting to do so. . .
“Positive duties also obligate us absolutely – just as seriously as negative duties.
We may not be indifferent to or ignore them, for eventually we would have to
contradict the maxim allowing everyone to ignore them (423-4). Yet Kant
described them as wide, limited, and imperfect obligations (424).
16
Roger J. Sullivan, An Introduction to Kant’s Ethics (Cambridge University Press,
1994), 99.
17
Note: This implication, as far as Kant's basic idea is concerned, is good and true.
But he seems to go too far when he claims that rules are absolute. All it takes is
that when we violate a rule, we do so for a reason that we would be willing for
anyone to accept were they in the same situation.
18
Cf. Reyes, 64-66.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
See Kant [433-434]
23
H. B. Acton, Kant's Moral Philosophy (London: St. Martin's Press, 1970), 45-46.