Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J : p
This case concerns the complaint for the disbarment of Atty. Marie
Frances E. Ramon for violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibilityand the Lawyer's Oath for deceiving the complainants in order to
obtain the substantial amount of P350,000.00 on the pretext of having the
foreclosed asset of the latter's mother redeemed.
Antecedents
In the period from 2002 to 2011, the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) sent several demand letters to Carmelita T.
Vedaño 1regarding her unpaid obligations secured by the mortgage covering
her residential property in Novaliches, Caloocan City. 2 To avoid the foreclosure
of the mortgage, Carmelita authorized her children, Verlita Mercullo and
Raymond Vedaño (complainants herein), to inquire from the NHMFC about the
status of the obligations. Verlita and Raymond learned that their mother's
arrears had amounted to P350,000.00, and that the matter of the mortgage was
under the charge of respondent Atty. Ramon, but who was not around at that
time.
On June 20, 2012, Carmelita received a letter from the sheriff of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Caloocan City, stating that her property would be
put up for auction in July 2013. Verlita and Raymond thus went to the NHMFC
to see the respondent, who advised them about their right to redeem the
property within one year from the foreclosure. 3
In August 2013, Verlita and Raymond called up the respondent, and
expressed their intention to redeem the property by paying the redemption
price. The latter agreed and scheduled an appointment with them on August
30, 2013.
On August 30, 2013, the respondent arrived at the designated meeting
place at around 1:30 p.m., carrying the folder that Verlita and Raymond had
seen at the NHFMC when they inquired on the status of their mother's property.
After the respondent had oriented them on the procedure for redemption, the
complainants handed P350,000.00 to the respondent, who signed an
acknowledgment receipt. 4The respondent issued two acknowledgment
receipts for the redemption price and for litigation expenses, 5 presenting to the
complainants her NHMFC identification card. Before leaving them, she
promised to inform them as soon as the documents for redemption were ready
for their mother's signature. 6
On September 4, 2013, the respondent met with Verlita and handed a
letter 7that she had signed, along with the special power of attorney (SPA) for
Carmelita's signature. 8 The letter reads:
Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff
Regional Trial Court
Caloocan City
Re: Redemption of the property covered by EJF No. 7484-2013
Dear Atty. Dabalos,
Please assist Ms. Carmelita Vedano, through her Attorney-in-Fact in
redeeming the property covered by EJF No. 7484-2013. Please provide
the necessary computation as to the full redemption amount in order for
Ms. Vedano to redeem the same.
Thank you.
Truly yours,
(Sgd.)
Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon
Verlita and Raymond went to the NHMFC on September 9, 2013 to follow
up on the redemption, but discovered that the respondent had already ceased
to be connected with the NHMFC. On September 20, 2013, they met with her
at Branch 145 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati City where she was
attending a hearing. She informed them that the redemption was under
process, and that the certificate of redemption would be issued in two to three
weeks time. 9 CAIHTE
Evil intent was not essential in order to bring the unlawful act or omission
of the respondent within the coverage of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. 20 The Code exacted from her not only a firm respect for the law
and legal processes but also the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in
dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted by them pursuant to their
fiduciary relationship. 21
Yet another dereliction of the respondent was her wanton disregard of
the several notices sent to her by the IBP in this case. Such disregard could
only be wrong because it reflected her undisguised contempt of the
proceedings of the IBP, a body that the Court has invested with the authority to
investigate the disbarment complaint against her. She thus exhibited her
irresponsibility as well as her utter disrespect for the Court and the rest of the
Judiciary. It cannot be understated that a lawyer in her shoes should comply
with the orders of the Court and of the Court's duly constituted authorities, like
the IBP, the office that the Court has particularly tasked to carry out the specific
function of investigating attorney misconduct. 22
The respondent deserves severe chastisement and appropriate
sanctions. In this regard, the IBP Board of Governors recommended her
suspension for two years from the practice of law, and her return of the amount
of P350,000.00 to the complainants. The recommended penalty is not
commensurate to the gravity of the misconduct committed. She merited a
heavier sanction of suspension from the practice of law for five years. Her
professional misconduct warranted a longer suspension from the practice of
law because she had caused material prejudice to the clients' interest. 23 She
should somehow be taught to be more ethical and professional in dealing with
trusting clients like the complainants and their mother, who were innocently too
willing to repose their utmost trust in her abilities as a lawyer and in her
trustworthiness as a legal professional. In this connection, we state that the
usual mitigation of the recommended penalty by virtue of the misconduct being
her first offense cannot be carried out in her favor considering that she had
disregarded the several notices sent to her by the IBP in this case. As to the
return of the P350,000.00 to the complainant, requiring her to restitute with legal
interest is only fair and just because she did not comply in the least with her
ethical undertaking to work on the redemption of the property of the mother of
the complainants. In addition, she is sternly warned against a similar infraction
in the future; otherwise, the Court will have her suffer a more severe penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS ATTY. MARIE FRANCES
E. RAMONguilty of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath; SUSPENDS HER FROM THE
PRACTICE OF LAW FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS EFFECTIVE FROM
NOTICE, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will
be dealt with more severely; ORDERS her to return to the complainants the
sum of P350,000.00 within 30 days from notice, plus legal interest of 6% per
annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment;
and DIRECTS her to promptly submit to this Court written proof of her
compliance within the same period of 30 days from notice of this decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant,
to be appended to Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon's personal record as an
attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Mercullo v. Ramon, A.C. No. 11078, [July 19, 2016])
A.C. No. 8172
ALEX NULADA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ORLANDO S.
PAULMA,respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p
RESOLUTION
SERENO, J : p
After the husband of complainant picked up the Memorandum for filing, respondent
never saw or heard from him again and thus assumed that the husband heeded
his advice and settled the case. When respondent received an Order from the CA
requiring him to file a comment on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Duigan, he
"instructed his office staff to contact Mr. Hernandez thru available means of
communication, but to no avail." 11 Thus, when complainant's husband went to the
office of respondent to tell the latter that the Sheriff of the RTC had informed
complainant of the CA's Resolution dismissing the case, respondent was just as
surprised. The lawyer exclaimed, "KALA KO BA NAKIPAG AREGLO NA
KAYO." 12
In his 5 January 2009 Report, 13 IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R.
Villadolid, Jr. found that respondent violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (the Code). He recommended that respondent be
suspended from practicing law from 3 to 6 months.
The board of governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XIX-2010-452 on 28
August 2010. Therein, they resolved to adopt and approve the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent was suspended
from the practice of law for six months.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 14 He prayed for the relaxation of
the application of the Canons of the Code. On 14 January 2012, the IBP board of
governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-17 15 partly granting his Motion and
reducing the penalty imposed to one-month suspension from the practice of law.
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, acting Director for Bar Discipline
Dennis A.B. Funa, through a letter 16 addressed to then Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona, transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment Complaint against
respondent.
We adopt the factual findings of the board of governors of the IBP. This Court,
however, disagrees with its Decision to reduce the penalty to one-month
suspension. We thus affirm the six-month suspension the Board originally imposed
in its 28 August 2010 Resolution.
Respondent insists that he had never met complainant prior to the mandatory
conference set for the disbarment Complaint she filed against him. However, a
perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal filed in the appellate court revealed that he
had signed as counsel for the defendant-appellants therein, including complainant
and her husband. 17 The pleading starts with the following sentence:
"DEFENDANT[S]-APPELLANTS, by counsel, unto this Honorable Court submit
the Memorandum and further allege that: . . . ." 18 Nowhere does the document say
that it was filed only on behalf of complainant's husband. ScTaEA
It is further claimed by respondent that the relation created between him and
complainant's husband cannot be treated as a "client-lawyer" relationship, viz.:
It is no more than a client needing a legal document and had it prepared
by a lawyer for a fee. Under the factual milieu and circumstances, it could
not be said that a client entrusted to a lawyer handling and prosecution of
his case that calls for the strict application of the Code; . . . 19
As proof that none of them ever intended to enter into a lawyer-client relationship,
he also alleges that complainant's husband never contacted him after the filing of
the Memorandum of Appeal. According to respondent, this behavior was "very
unusual if he really believed that he engaged" the former's services. 20
Complainant pointed out in her Reply 21 that respondent was her lawyer, because
he accepted her case and an acceptance fee in the amount of P7,000.
According to respondent, however, "[C]ontrary to the complainant's claim that he
charged P7,000 as acceptance fee," "the fee was only for the preparation of the
pleading which is even low for a Memorandum of Appeal: . . . ." 22
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and
gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause. 23 Once a lawyer agrees to
handle a case, it is that lawyer's duty to serve the client with competence and
diligence. 24Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty.
According to respondent, he merely drafted the pleading that complainant's
husband asked from him. Respondent also claims that he filed a Memorandum of
Appeal, because he "honestly believed" that this was the pleading required, based
on what complainant's husband said.
The IBP Investigating Commissioner's observation on this matter, in the 5 January
2009 Report, is correct. Regardless of the particular pleading his client may have
believed to be necessary, it was respondent's duty to know the proper pleading to
be filed in appeals from RTC decisions, viz.:
Having seen the Decision dated 18 June 2002 of the trial court,
respondent should have known that the mode of appeal to the Court of
Appeals for said Decision is by ordinary appeal under Section 2(a) Rule
41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In all such cases, Rule
44 of the said Rules applies. 25
When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice of
Appeal. Consequently, what should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed cases
or Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the appellant's
brief be filed after the records of the case have been elevated to the CA.
Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know this procedure. Canon 5 of the
Code reads: cdrep
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
(Hernandez v. Padilla, A.C. No. 9387 (Resolution), [June 20, 2012], 688 PHIL
|||
329-338)
On February 16, 2005, the IBP ordered the respondent to submit a verified
comment pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 6 of the Rules of Court as it appeared
that the respondent's undated comment filed with the Court was not verified. 9
On March 15, 2005, respondent through counsel requested for an additional fifteen
(15) days from March 17, 2005, or until April 1, 2005, within which to comply due
to his medical confinement. 10
Thereafter, on April 4, 2005, the respondent filed a second motion 11 for extension
praying for another 20 days, or until April 22, 2005, alleging that he was still
recovering from his illness.
On August 3, 2005, the case was set for mandatory conference. 12 The respondent
failed to appear; thus, the IBP considered the respondent in default for his failure
to appear and for not filing an answer despite extensions granted. The case was
then submitted for report and recommendation. 13
Based on the records of the case, Investigating Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala made the following findings:
[O]n or before the period from 15 April 1997 to 22 July 1997, respondent
with the help and in connivance and collusion with a certain Andres Magat
("Magat"), by using false pretenses and deceitful words, [wilfully] and
illegally committed fraudulent acts to the effect that respondent would
expedite the titling of the land belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay
City, who were the acquaintance of complainants.
Respondent and Magat convinced complainants that if they finance and
deliver to them the amount of [P]495,000.00 as advance money, they
would expedite the titling of the subject land. Respondent represented
himself to be the lawyer of William Gatchalian, the owner of Plastic City
located at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, who was allegedly
the buyer of the subject land once it has been titled. Respondent and
Magat also represented that they have contacts at NAMREA, DENR,
CENRO and the Register of Deeds which representation they knew to be
false, fraudulent and were only made to induce complainants to give and
deliver to them the amount of [P]495,000.00. Once in possession of the
said amount, far from complying with their obligation to expedite and
cause the titling of the subject land, respondent and Magat [wilfully],
unlawfully and illegally misappropriated, misapplied and converted the
said amount to their personal use and benefit and despite demand upon
them to return the said amount, they failed and refused to do so. TaISEH
In view of the deceit committed by respondent and Magat, complainants
filed a complaint for Estafa against the former before the Third Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. In
the preliminary investigation conducted by the said court, it finds sufficient
grounds to hold respondent and Magat for trial for the crime of Estafa
defined under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. The case was transmitted to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Pampanga for appropriate action as per Order dated 7
December 1998.
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Pampanga conducted a re-investigation of the case. During
the re-investigation thereof, Magat was willing to reimburse to
complainants the amount of [P]200,000.00 because according to him the
amount of [P]295,000.00 should be reimbursed by respondent
considering that the said amount was turned over to respondent for
expenses incurred in the documentation prior to the titling of the subject
land. Both respondent and Magat requested for several extensions for
time to pay back their obligations to the complainants. However, despite
extensions of time granted to them, respondent and Magat failed to fulfil
their promise to pay back their obligation. Hence, it was resolved that the
offer of compromise was construed to be an implied admission of guilt.
The Asst. Provincial Prosecutor believes that there was no reason to
disturb the findings of the investigating judge and an Information for Estafa
was filed against respondent and Magat on 8 July 1999 before the
Regional Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga.
The failure of the lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite
due notice on several occasions and appear on the scheduled hearings
set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and
illustrates his despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer which deserves
disciplinary sanction . . . .
From the facts and evidence presented, it could not be denied that
respondent committed a crime that import deceit and violation of his
attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of
which he was bound to'obey the laws of the land.' The commission of
unlawful acts, specially crimes involving moral turpitude, acts of
dishonesty in violation of the attorney's oath, grossly immoral conduct and
deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers (Rule 138,
Section 27, RRC). ATHCac
In her Comment, 20 Fidela explained that it took them quite some time in filing the
administrative case because they took into consideration the possibility of an
amicable settlement instead of a judicial proceeding since it would stain the
respondent's reputation as a lawyer; that the respondent went into hiding which
prompted them to seek the assistance of CIDG agents from Camp Olivas in order
to trace the respondent's whereabouts; that the respondent was duly accorded the
opportunity to be heard; and finally, that no restitution of the P200,000.00 plus
corresponding interest has yet been made by the respondent.
On June 21, 2008, Fidela filed a Manifestation 21 stating that the RTC rendered a
decision in the criminal case for Estafa finding the accused, Atty. Bernardo and
Magat "guilty of conspiracy in the commission of Estafa under Article 315 par. 2
(a) of the Revised Penal Code and both are sentenced to suffer six (6) years and
one (1) day ofPrision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of Reclusion Temporalas maximum." 22
In a Letter 23 dated March 23, 2009, addressed to the IBP, Fidela sought the
resolution of the present action as she was already 86 years of age. Later, an Ex-
parte Motion to Resolve the Case 24 dated September 1, 2010 was filed by the
complainants. In another Letter dated October 26, 2011, Fidela, being 88 years
old, sought for Atty. Bernardo's restitution of the amount of P200,000.00 so she
can use the money to buy her medicine and other needs.
The Court adopts and agrees with the findings and conclusions of the IBP.
It is first worth mentioning that the respondent's defense of prescription is
untenable. The Court has held that administrative cases against lawyers do not
prescribe. The lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending
act to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase the administrative
culpability of a lawyer. Otherwise, members of the bar would only be emboldened
to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as
long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a
chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they
ought to answer for. 25 CITcSH
Further, consistent with his failure to file his answer after he himself pleaded for
several extensions of time to file the same, the respondent failed to appear during
the mandatory conference, as ordered by the IBP. As a lawyer, the respondent is
considered as an officer of the court who is called upon to obey and respect court
processes. Such acts of the respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront
on the court's authority which can not be countenanced.
It can not be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the administration of
justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only
legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. In so doing, the people's faith and confidence in the judicial system is
ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined — whether in their professional or in their
private capacity — for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and
good demeanor. 26
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. — A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. — A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
There is no question that the respondent committed the acts complained of. He
himself admitted in his answer that his legal services were hired by the
complainants through Magat regarding the purported titling of land supposedly
purchased. While he begs for the Court's indulgence, his contrition is shallow
considering the fact that he used his position as a lawyer in order to deceive the
complainants into believing that he can expedite the titling of the subject properties.
He never denied that he did not benefit from the money given by the complainants
in the amount of P495,000.00. IcCDAS
As the records reveal, the RTC eventually convicted the respondent for the crime
of Estafa for which he was meted the penalty of sentenced * to suffer six (6) years
and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
ofReclusion Temporal as maximum. Such criminal conviction clearly undermines
the respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. Rule 138, Section 27
provides that:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party without authority to do so.
In view of the foregoing, this Court has no option but to accord him the punishment
commensurate to all his acts and to accord the complainants, especially the 88-
year-old Fidela, with the justice they utmost deserve. acAESC
PER CURIAM : p
The complainants were forced to give money to the judge, because they
feared that the judge would be biased against them unless they gave in to his
demands. But when they ultimately sensed that they were being fooled about
their case, they consulted Larry Sevilla, their mediamen friend, and narrated to
Sevilla all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. They agreed that
the details should be released to the media. The expose was published in
the Newsmaker, a local newspaper.
Thereafter, the respondent and Judge Dizon, Jr. made several attempts
to appease the complainants by sending gifts and offering to return a portion of
the money, but the complainants declined the offers.
According to the complainants, the respondent demanded P25,000.00
as his expenses in securing the testimony of Soledad Elevencionado-Provido
in Iloilo City to be used as evidence in their civil case. In addition, the
respondent requested the complainants to borrow P60,000.00 from the bank
because he wanted to redeem his foreclosed Isuzu Elf, and because he needed
to give P11,000.00 to his nephew who was due to leave for work abroad.
B. Evidence for the Respondent
In his verified comment dated March 22, 2006, 10 the respondent
confirmed that the complainants engaged him as their counsel in Civil Case No.
6209. His version follows.
On December 22, 1997, the respondent introduced Manuel to Judge
Dizon, Jr. inside the East Royal Hotel's coffee shop. The respondent stayed at
a distance, because he did not want to hear their conversation. Later, Manuel
approached the respondent and gave him P2,000.00. When the respondent
asked what the money was for, Manuel replied that it was in appreciation of the
former's introducing the latter to the judge. The respondent stated that Manuel
did not mention what transpired between the latter and the judge; and that the
judge did not tell him (respondent) what transpired in that conversation.
Two days later, the respondent again visited the complainants at their
house in General Santos City on board the judge's Nissan pick-up driven by the
judge's driver, in order to receive the P80,000.00 from the complainants. The
amount was being borrowed by the judge for his swimming pool. Later on, the
judge told the respondent to keep P30,000.00 as a token of their friendship.
After Manuel handed the P80,000.00, the respondent and the judge's driver
headed towards Davao City, where, according to the judge's instruction, they
redeemed the judge's wristwatch for P15,000.00 from a pawnshop. The driver
brought the remaining amount of P35,000.00 to the judge in his home.
On January 27, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. visited the respondent at the
latter's house to ask him to execute an affidavit. Declining the request at first,
the respondent relented only because the judge became physically weak in his
presence and was on the verge of collapsing. Nonetheless, the respondent
refused to notarize the document. IDcHCS
In that affidavit dated January 27, 1998, 11 the respondent denied that
Judge Dizon, Jr. asked money from the complainants; and stated that he did
not see the complainants handing the money to the judge. He admitted that he
was the one who had requested the judge to personally collect his unpaid
attorney's fees from the complainants with respect to their previous and
terminated case; and that the judge did not ask money from the complainants
in exchange for a favorable decision in their case.
On January 28, 1998, the respondent returned to the complainants'
residence, but was surprised to find complainant Lolita crying aloud. She
informed him that the judge was again asking an additional P30,000.00
although they had given him P30,000.00 only the week before. She divulged
that the judge had told her that their case would surely lose because: (a) they
had engaged a counsel who was mahinang klase; (b) the judge hearing Civil
Case No. 5645 in Iloilo and the woman who had testified in Civil Case No. 6029
had not been presented; and (c) they would have to spend at least P10,000.00
for said judge's accommodations in General Santos City. 12
On January 31, 1998, Judge Dizon, Jr. went to the house of the
respondent, but the latter was not home. The judge left a note addressed to the
complainants, and instructed the respondent's secretary to deliver the note to
the complainants along with a gift (imported table clock). 13 According to the
respondent, the complainants consistently refused to accept the gift several
times; it was later stolen from his house in Cebu City.
On February 1, 1998, the respondent delivered the note and gift to the
complainants, but the latter refused to receive it, telling him that they
were nolonger interested to continue with the case. At the same time, the
complainants assured him that they bore no personal grudge against him,
because they had a problem only with Judge Dizon, Jr.
On February 24, 1998, the respondent went to the National Bureau of
Investigation Regional Office, Region XI, and the Philippine National Police
Regional Office, Region XI, both in Davao City, to request the investigation of
the matter. 14
On March 2, 1998, the respondent paid Judge Dizon, Jr. a visit upon the
latter's request. In that meeting, the respondent told the judge about the refusal
of the complainants to accept the judge's gift and about their decision not to
continue with the case. 15
On the next day, Judge Dizon, Jr. sent a note to the respondent to inform
him that the judge had raised the amount that he had borrowed from the
complainants. 16 The judge requested the respondent to tell the complainants
that he (Judge Dizon, Jr.) was going to return whatever he had borrowed from
them. However, the complainants informed the respondent that he should tell
the judge that they were no longer interested in getting back the money.
The respondent made a follow-up at the NBI and PNP Regional Offices
in Davao City of his request for assistance after Manuel mentioned to him that
he (Manuel) knew of many armed men ready at any time to help him in his
problem with the judge. ECAaTS
229)
G.R. Nos. 151809-12 (April 12, 2005)
A.C. No. 4018 (March 8, 2005)
DECISION
PER CURIAM : p
This is a verified petition for disbarment 1 filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for
having been found guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of
Register of Deeds of Marawi City.
It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative
case earlier filed by complainant against respondent. In said case, which was
initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), complainant
charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona
Abdullah, 2 Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli
Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and manipulating the criminal complaint filed
against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting
Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of
respondent. 3
The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The
investigating officer, Enrique Basa, absolved respondent of all the charges
brought against him, thus: HaEcAC
It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to
prove his case but that he has no case at all against respondent Mosib
Ali Bubong. Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully
recommended that the complaint against respondent be dismissed for
lack of merit and evidence. 4
The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in a
report dated 08 September 1992, then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon
exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the
custody of documents. He, however, found respondent guilty of grave
misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the
criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad
Bauduli Datu and the latter's co-accused. As a result of this finding, Secretary
Drilon recommended respondent's dismissal from service.
On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative
OrderNo. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon and
ordering respondent's dismissal from government service. Respondent
subsequently questioned said administrative order before this Court through a
petition forcertiorari, mandamus, and prohibition 5 claiming that the Office of the
President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office.
He also insisted that respondents 6 in that petition violated the laws on security of
tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA
committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his authority to
resolve the administrative complaint against him (herein respondent).
In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition "for failure
on the part of petitioner to sufficiently show that public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned order." 7 Respondent
thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied with finality in our
Resolution of 15 November 1994. AcCTaD
ORDER
When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent
appeared.
The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have
the reception of evidence vis-à-vis this case be done in Marawi City,
Lanao del Sur before the president of the local IBP Chapter. Both parties
agreed. Accordingly, transmit the records of this case to the Director for
Bar Discipline for appropriate action. 12
On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving
Commissioner Fernandez's recommendation for the transfer of venue of this
administrative case and directed the Western Mindanao Region governor to
designate the local IBP chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report,
and recommendation. 13 The IBP Resolution states:
Resolution No. XII-96-153
Adm. Case No. 4018
Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong
RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor
C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and
direct the Western Mindanao Region Governor George C. Jabido to
designate the local IBP Chapter concerned to conduct the investigation,
report and recommendation.
Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar
Discipline, wrote a letter dated 23 October 1996 addressed to Governor George
C. Jabido, President of IBP Cotabato Chapter requesting the latter to receive the
evidence in this case and to submit his recommendation and recommendation as
directed by the IBP Board of Governors. 14
In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato
Chapter 15 informed the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) that the
investigating panel 16 had sent notices to both complainant and respondent for a
series of hearings but respondent consistently ignored said notices. The IBP
Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by recommending that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for five years. DTSIEc
On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for the
transmittal of the records of this case to the Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter
of the IBP pursuant to Resolution No. XII-96-153 as well as Commissioner
Fernandez's Order dated 23 February 1996.
Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP
Cotabato Chapter to comment on respondent's motion. 17 Complying with this
directive, the panel expressed no opposition to respondent's motion for the
transmittal of the records of this case to IBP Marawi City. 18 On 25 September
1998, Commissioner Fernandez ordered the referral of this case to IBP Marawi
City for the reception of respondent's evidence. 19 This order of referral, however,
was set aside by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIII-98-268
issued on 4 December 1998. Said resolution provides:
RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez
for the transmittal of the case records of the above-entitled case to
Marawi City, rather he is directed to re-evaluate the recommendation
submitted by Cotabato Chapter and report the same to the Board of
Governors. 20
Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08
October 1998 a motion praying that the recommendation of the IBP Cotabato
Chapter be stricken from the records. 21 Respondent insists that the investigating
panel constituted by said IBP chapter did not have the authority to conduct the
investigation of this case since IBP Resolution XII-96-153 and Commissioner
Fernandez's Order of 23 February 1996 clearly vested IBP Marawi City with the
power to investigate this case. Moreover, he claims that he was never notified of
any hearing by the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter thereby depriving
him of his right to due process.
Complainant opposed 22 this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of laches.
According to complainant, the report and recommendation submitted by IBP
Cotabato Chapter expressly states that respondent was duly notified of the
hearings conducted by the investigating panel yet despite these, respondent did
nothing to defend himself. He also claims that respondent did not even bother to
submit his position paper when he was directed to do so. Further, as respondent
is a member of IBP Marawi City Chapter, complainant maintains that the
presence of bias in favor of respondent is possible. Finally, complainant contends
that to refer the matter to IBP Marawi City would only entail a duplication of the
process which had already been completed by IBP Cotabato Chapter. iatdcjur
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p
DECISION
PER CURIAM : p
In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office of the
Bar Confidant, complainant Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bede
S. Tabalingcos (respondent) with unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of fees to complainant, and
gross immorality for marrying two other women while respondent's first marriage
was subsisting. 1
In a Resolution 2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court
required respondent to file a Comment, which he did on 21 March 2005. 3 The
Complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the
record. 4
On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission)
issued a Notice 5 setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on
05 July 2005. During the conference, complainant appeared, accompanied by his
counsel and respondent. They submitted for resolution three issues to be resolved
by the Commission as follows:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to complainant,
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation,
and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having
married thrice. 6 IcaEDC
The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position
Papers. Respondent filed his verified Position Paper, 7 on 15 July 2005 while
complainant submitted his on 01 August 2005. 8
Complainant's Accusations
Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as
a financial consultant to assist the latter on technical and financial matters in the
latter's numerous petitions for corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts.
Complainant claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be
entitled to P50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would
handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. He alleged
that, from February to December 2002, respondent was able to rake in millions of
pesos from the corporate rehabilitation cases they were working on together.
Complainant also claimed that he was entitled to the amount of P900,000 for the
18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as a result of his work with respondent, and a
total of P4,539,000 from the fees paid by their clients. 9 Complainant appended to
his Complaint several annexes supporting the computation of the fees he believes
are due him.
Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in
violation of Section 27 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly
respondent set up two financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management,
Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise his
legal services and solicit cases. Complainant supported his allegations by
attaching to his Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and
Jane, 10 letter-proposals to clients signed by respondent on various dates 11 and
proofs of payment made to the latter by their clients. 12
On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of
committing two counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his
first marriage was subsisting. He submitted a Certification dated 13 July 2005
issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General-National Statistics Office (NSO)
certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted marriage thrice:
first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in Dasmariñas, Cavite;
the second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Piñon in the City
of Manila; and the third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso
in Ermita, Manila. 13cHDEaC
Respondent's Defense
In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that
complainant was not an employee of his law firm — Tabalingcos and Associates
Law Office 14 — but of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., where the former is a
major stockholder. 15 Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional
and incompetent in performing his job as a financial consultant, resulting in the
latter's dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they presented in their court
cases. 16Respondent also alleged that there was no verbal agreement between
them regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by
his clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant had
been paid. 17
As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He
contended that his law firm had an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management,
Inc., whereby the firm would handle the legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation
case; and that the latter would attend to the financial aspect of the case' such as
the preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court. To support this
contention, respondent attached to his Position Paper a Joint Venture Agreement
dated 10 December 2005 entered into by Tabalingcos and Associates Law Offices
and Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.; 18 and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio
Balena, Vice-President for Operations of the said company. 19
On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by
William Genesis, a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as
havingno probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant
himself. 20 Respondent did not specifically address the allegations regarding his
alleged bigamous marriages with two other women.
On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage
Contracts. 21 To the said Motion, he attached the certified true copies of the
Marriage Contracts referred to in the Certification issued by the NSO. 22 The
appended Marriage Contracts matched the dates, places and names of the
contracting parties indicated in the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the three
marriages entered into by respondent. The first marriage contract submitted was
a marriage that took place between respondent and Pilar M. Lozano in
Dasmariñas, Cavite, on 15 July 1980.23 The second marriage contract was
between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Piñon, and it took place at the
Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September 1987. 24 The third
Marriage Contract referred to a marriage between respondent and Mary Jane E.
Paraiso, and it took place on 7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second
and third Marriage Contracts, respondent was described as single under the entry
for civil status.
TcHEaI
On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for
Reconsideration and affirmed their Resolution dated 15 April 2008 recommending
respondent's disbarment. 44
The Court's Ruling
The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.
First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees
While we affirm the IBP's dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do
not concur with the rationale behind it.
The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the
former's share in the fees, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is
violative of Rule 9.02 45 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is
proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services
rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. Based on the allegations,
respondent had agreed to share with complainant the legal fees paid by clients
that complainant solicited for the respondent. Complainant, however, failed to
proffer convincing evidence to prove the existence of that agreement.
We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David 46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a
layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null
and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct.
Considering that complainant's allegations in this case had not been proven, the
IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.
Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients
Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising
legal services through various business entities. Complainant submitted
documentary evidence to prove that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel
Business Link, Inc. were owned and used as fronts by respondent to advertise the
latter's legal services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP established the
truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the
solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was
breached. aADSIc
A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities
mentioned in the report to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services,
purporting to be specialized in corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts
of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 47 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from
soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation.
Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted
in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer's duties as a member of the
bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself
to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used
as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer's behalf; or is of a nature that, if
handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law. 48
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi &
Jane Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was
indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure professional
employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases. Annex "C" 49 of the
Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which proposed an
agreement for the engagement of legal services. The letter clearly states that,
should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees, respondent would render
legal services related to the former's loan obligation with a bank. This
circumvention is considered objectionable and violates the Code, because the
letter is signed by respondent as President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and
not as partner or associate of a law firm.
Rule 15.08 50 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the
client whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is
a must in those occupations related to the practice of law. The reason is that certain
ethical considerations governing the attorney-client relationship may be operative
in one and not in the other. 51 In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not
clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence
of this practice by respondent, we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the
latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
Third Charge:
Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation.
To substantiate this allegation, complainant submitted NSO-certified copies of the
Marriage Contracts entered into by respondent with three (3) different women. The
latter objected to the introduction of these documents, claiming that they were
submitted after the administrative case had been submitted for resolution, thus
giving him no opportunity to controvert them. 52 We are not persuaded by his
argument. TEcCHD
We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the
qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the
procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v.
Garrido: 53
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as the
verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case,
prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the
complainant — do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's
qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in
the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission
to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and
is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. The
admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued
enjoyment of the privilege to practice law.Second, lack of qualifications or
the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is
a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this
Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For
the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must
be established by convincing and satisfactory proof. 54 In this case, complainant
submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent entered into two
marriages while the latter's first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent
denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague
assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did not dispute the authenticity
of the NSO documents, but denied that he contracted those two other marriages.
He submitted copies of the two Petitions he had filed separately with the RTC of
Laguna — one in Biñan and the other in Calamba — to declare the second and
the third Marriage Contracts null and void. 55
We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.
We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not
disputed the authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies
of the Marriage Contracts presented by complainant to prove the former's
marriages to two other women aside from his wife. For purposes of this disbarment
proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of respondent are
competent and convincing evidence proving that he committed bigamy, which
renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The documents were certified
by the NSO, which is the official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the
birth, marriage and death of a person. Having been issued by a government
agency, the NSO certification is accorded much evidentiary weight and carries with
it a presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has not presented any
competent evidence to rebut those documents. cTCaEA
According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third
marriages, he filed civil actions to annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the
attached Petitions for Annulment and found that his allegations therein treated the
second and the third marriage contracts as ordinary agreements, rather than as
special contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on marriage.
He did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its
amendment by the Family Code. Respondent's regard for marriage contracts as
ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of
marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to annul
a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into
marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-
Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we held thus:
[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we
found guilty of misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral
character required of them not only as a condition precedent for their
admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued membership
therein. Nodistinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was
committed in the lawyer's professional capacity or in his private life. This
is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney
at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent,
honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide
by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his
professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty
and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty
and dishonor in other relations. The administration of justice, in which the
lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court, demands a
high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the
courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him
as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. 57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted
grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court. 58
Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order
that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S.
Tabalingcos as follows:
1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement
and solicitation.
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in
bigamy, a grossly immoral conduct.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S.
Tabalingcos in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. aHTEIA
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from
the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Villatuya v. Tabalingcos, A.C. No. 6622, [July 10, 2012], 690 PHIL 381-399)
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J : p