Saul Kripke

Saul Aaron Kripke (/sɔːl ˈkrɪpki/; born November 13, 1940) is an American philosopher and logician. He is
a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York and
emeritus professor at Princeton University. Since the 1960s Kripke has been a central figure in a number
of fields related to mathematical logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, metaphysics,
epistemology, and set theory. Much of his work remains unpublished or exists only as tape recordings
and privately circulated manuscripts. Kripke was the recipient of the 2001 Schock Prize in Logic and
Philosophy.

Saul Kripke

Born

November 13, 1940 (age 77)

Bay Shore, New York

Alma mater

Harvard University (BA, 1962)

Awards

Rolf Schock Prizes in Logic and Philosophy (2001)

Era

Contemporary philosophy

Region

Western philosophy

School

Analytic

Institutions

Princeton University

City University of New York

Main interests
Logic (particularly modal)

Philosophy of language

Metaphysics

Set theory

Epistemology

Philosophy of mind

History of analytic philosophy

Notable ideas

Kripke–Platek set theory

Work on theory of reference (causal theory of reference, causal-historical theory of reference,[1] direct
reference theory)

Admissible ordinal

Kripke structure

Rigid vs. flaccid designator

A posteriori necessity

The possibility of analytic a posteriori judgments[2][3]

Contingent a priori[4]

Kripke semantics

Disquotational principle

Accessibility relation

Rule-following paradox (Kripkenstein)

Influences

Marcus · Frege · Curry · Lewis · Russell · Tarski · Wittgenstein · Dummett · Quine · Turing

Influenced

Burgess · Boghossian · Burge · Chalmers · Devitt · Evans · Field · Kaplan · Putnam · Salmon · Shoemaker ·
Soames · Weinstein · Yablo
Kripke has made influential and original contributions to logic, especially modal logic. His work has
profoundly influenced analytic philosophy, with his principal contribution being a semantics for modal
logic, involving possible worlds as described in a system now called Kripke semantics.[5] Another of his
most important contributions is his argument that necessity is a 'metaphysical' notion, which should be
separated from the epistemic notion of a priori, and that there are necessary truths which are a
posteriori truths, such as "Water is H2O." He has also contributed an original reading of Wittgenstein,
referred to as "Kripkenstein." His most famous work is Naming and Necessity (1980).

WORKS --Z-----------Z7

Kripke's contributions to philosophy include:

Kripke semantics for modal and related logics, published in several essays beginning while he was still in
his teens.

His 1970 Princeton lectures Naming and Necessity (published in 1972 and 1980), that significantly
restructured philosophy of language.

His interpretation of Wittgenstein.

His theory of truth.

He has also contributed to set-theory (see admissible ordinal and Kripke–Platek set theory)

Modal logic Edit

Two of Kripke's earlier works, A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic and Semantical Considerations
on Modal Logic, the former written while he was still a teenager, were on the subject of modal logic. The
most familiar logics in the modal family are constructed from a weak logic called K, named after Kripke
for his contributions to modal logic. Kripke introduced the now-standard Kripke semantics (also known as
relational semantics or frame semantics) for modal logics. Kripke semantics is a formal semantics for
non-classical logic systems. It was first made for modal logics, and later adapted to intuitionistic logic and
other non-classical systems. The discovery of Kripke semantics was a breakthrough in the making of non-
classical logics, because the model theory of such logics was absent prior to Kripke.

A Kripke frame or modal frame is a pair {\displaystyle \langle W,R\rangle } \langle W,R\rangle , where W
is a non-empty set, and R is a binary relation on W. Elements of W are called nodes or worlds, and R is
known as the accessibility relation. Depending on the properties of the accessibility relation (transitivity,
reflexivity, etc.), the corresponding frame is described, by extension, as being transitive, reflexive, etc.

A Kripke model is a triple {\displaystyle \langle W,R,\Vdash \rangle } \langle W,R,\Vdash \rangle , where
{\displaystyle \langle W,R\rangle } \langle W,R\rangle is a Kripke frame, and {\displaystyle \Vdash }
\Vdash is a relation between nodes of W and modal formulas, such that:

{\displaystyle w\Vdash \neg A} w\Vdash \neg A if and only if {\displaystyle w\nVdash A} w\nVdash A,

{\displaystyle w\Vdash A\to B} w\Vdash A\to B if and only if {\displaystyle w\nVdash A} w\nVdash A or
{\displaystyle w\Vdash B} w\Vdash B,

{\displaystyle w\Vdash \Box A} w\Vdash \Box A if and only if {\displaystyle \forall u\,(w\;R\;u} \forall u\,
(w\;R\;u implies {\displaystyle u\Vdash A)} u\Vdash A).

We read {\displaystyle w\Vdash A} w\Vdash A as "w satisfies A", "A is satisfied in w", or "w forces A". The
relation {\displaystyle \Vdash } \Vdash is called the satisfaction relation, evaluation, or forcing relation.
The satisfaction relation is uniquely determined by its value on propositional variables.

A formula A is valid in:

a model {\displaystyle \langle W,R,\Vdash \rangle } \langle W,R,\Vdash \rangle , if {\displaystyle w\Vdash
A} w\Vdash A for all w ∈ W,

a frame {\displaystyle \langle W,R\rangle } \langle W,R\rangle , if it is valid in {\displaystyle \langle

W,R,\Vdash \rangle } \langle W,R,\Vdash \rangle for all possible choices of {\displaystyle \Vdash }
\Vdash ,

a class C of frames or models, if it is valid in every member of C.

We define Thm(C) to be the set of all formulas that are valid in C. Conversely, if X is a set of formulas, let
Mod(X) be the class of all frames which validate every formula from X.

A modal logic (i.e., a set of formulas) L is sound with respect to a class of frames C, if L ⊆ Thm(C). L is
complete with respect to C if L ⊇ Thm(C).
Semantics is useful for investigating a logic (i.e., a derivation system) only if the semantical entailment
relation reflects its syntactical counterpart, the consequence relation (derivability). It is vital to know
which modal logics are sound and complete with respect to a class of Kripke frames, and for them, to
determine which class it is.

For any class C of Kripke frames, Thm(C) is a normal modal logic (in particular, theorems of the minimal
normal modal logic, K, are valid in every Kripke model). However, the converse does not hold generally.
There are Kripke incomplete normal modal logics, which is unproblematic, because most of the modal
systems studied are complete of classes of frames described by simple conditions.

A normal modal logic L corresponds to a class of frames C, if C = Mod(L). In other words, C is the largest
class of frames such that L is sound wrt C. It follows that L is Kripke complete if and only if it is complete
of its corresponding class.

Consider the schema T : {\displaystyle \Box A\to A} \Box A\to A. T is valid in any reflexive frame
{\displaystyle \langle W,R\rangle } \langle W,R\rangle : if {\displaystyle w\Vdash \Box A} w\Vdash \Box A,
then {\displaystyle w\Vdash A} w\Vdash A since w R w. On the other hand, a frame which validates T has
to be reflexive: fix w ∈ W, and define satisfaction of a propositional variable p as follows: {\displaystyle
u\Vdash p} u\Vdash p if and only if w R u. Then {\displaystyle w\Vdash \Box p} w\Vdash \Box p, thus
{\displaystyle w\Vdash p} w\Vdash p by T, which means w R w using the definition of {\displaystyle
\Vdash } \Vdash . T corresponds to the class of reflexive Kripke frames.

It is often much easier to characterize the corresponding class of L than to prove its completeness, thus
correspondence serves as a guide to completeness proofs. Correspondence is also used to show
incompleteness of modal logics: suppose L1 ⊆ L2 are normal modal logics that correspond to the same
class of frames, but L1 does not prove all theorems of L2. Then L1 is Kripke incomplete. For example, the
schema {\displaystyle \Box (A\equiv \Box A)\to \Box A} \Box(A\equiv\Box A)\to\Box A generates an
incomplete logic, as it corresponds to the same class of frames as GL (viz. transitive and converse well-
founded frames), but does not prove the GL-tautology {\displaystyle \Box A\to \Box \Box A} \Box A\to
\Box \Box A.

Canonical models Edit

For any normal modal logic L, a Kripke model (called the canonical model) can be constructed, which
validates precisely the theorems of L, by an adaptation of the standard technique of using maximal
consistent sets as models. Canonical Kripke models play a role similar to the Lindenbaum–Tarski algebra
construction in algebraic semantics.

A set of formulas is L-consistent if no contradiction can be derived from them using the axioms of L, and
modus ponens. A maximal L-consistent set (an L-MCS for short) is an L-consistent set which has no
proper L-consistent superset.

The canonical model of L is a Kripke model {\displaystyle \langle W,R,\Vdash \rangle } \langle W,R,\Vdash
\rangle , where W is the set of all L-MCS, and the relations R and {\displaystyle \Vdash } \Vdash are as
follows:

{\displaystyle X\;R\;Y} X\;R\;Y if and only if for every formula {\displaystyle A} A, if {\displaystyle \Box
A\in X} \Box A\in X then {\displaystyle A\in Y} A\in Y,

{\displaystyle X\Vdash A} X\Vdash A if and only if {\displaystyle A\in X} A\in X.

The canonical model is a model of L, as every L-MCS contains all theorems of L. By Zorn's lemma, each L-
consistent set is contained in an L-MCS, in particular every formula unprovable in L has a counterexample
in the canonical model.

The main application of canonical models are completeness proofs. Properties of the canonical model of
K immediately imply completeness of K with respect to the class of all Kripke frames. This argument does
not work for arbitrary L, because there is no guarantee that the underlying frame of the canonical model
satisfies the frame conditions of L.

We say that a formula or a set X of formulas is canonical with respect to a property P of Kripke frames, if

X is valid in every frame which satisfies P,

for any normal modal logic L which contains X, the underlying frame of the canonical model of L satisfies
P.

A union of canonical sets of formulas is itself canonical. It follows from the preceding discussion that any
logic axiomatized by a canonical set of formulas is Kripke complete, and compact.
The axioms T, 4, D, B, 5, H, G (and thus any combination of them) are canonical. GL and Grz are not
canonical, because they are not compact. The axiom M by itself is not canonical (Goldblatt, 1991), but
the combined logic S4.1 (in fact, even K4.1) is canonical.

In general, it is undecidable whether a given axiom is canonical. We know a nice sufficient condition: H.
Sahlqvist identified a broad class of formulas (now called Sahlqvist formulas) such that:

a Sahlqvist formula is canonical,

the class of frames corresponding to a Sahlqvist formula is first-order definable,

there is an algorithm which computes the corresponding frame condition to a given Sahlqvist formula.

This is a powerful criterion: for example, all axioms listed above as canonical are (equivalent to) Sahlqvist
formulas. A logic has the finite model property (FMP) if it is complete with respect to a class of finite
frames. An application of this notion is the decidability question: it follows from Post's theorem that a
recursively axiomatized modal logic L which has FMP is decidable, provided it is decidable whether a
given finite frame is a model of L. In particular, every finitely axiomatizable logic with FMP is decidable.

There are various methods for establishing FMP for a given logic. Refinements and extensions of the
canonical model construction often work, using tools such as filtration or unravelling. As another
possibility, completeness proofs based on cut-free sequent calculi usually produce finite models directly.

Most of the modal systems used in practice (including all listed above) have FMP.

In some cases, we can use FMP to prove Kripke completeness of a logic: every normal modal logic is
complete wrt a class of modal algebras, and a finite modal algebra can be transformed into a Kripke
frame. As an example, Robert Bull proved using this method that every normal extension of S4.3 has
FMP, and is Kripke complete.

Kripke semantics has a straightforward generalization to logics with more than one modality. A Kripke
frame for a language with {\displaystyle \{\Box _{i}\mid \,i\in I\}} \{\Box _{i}\mid \,i\in I\} as the set of its
necessity operators consists of a non-empty set W equipped with binary relations Ri for each i ∈ I. The
definition of a satisfaction relation is modified as follows:
{\displaystyle w\Vdash \Box _{i}A} w\Vdash \Box _{i}A if and only if {\displaystyle \forall u\,
(w\;R_{i}\;u\Rightarrow u\Vdash A).} \forall u\,(w\;R_{i}\;u\Rightarrow u\Vdash A).

Carlson models Edit

A simplified semantics, discovered by Tim Carlson, is often used for polymodal provability logics. A
Carlson model is a structure {\displaystyle \langle W,R,\{D_{i}\}_{i\in I},\Vdash \rangle } \langle W,R,\
{D_{i}\}_{i\in I},\Vdash \rangle with a single accessibility relation R, and subsets Di ⊆ W for each
modality. Satisfaction is defined as:

{\displaystyle w\Vdash \Box _{i}A} w\Vdash \Box _{i}A if and only if {\displaystyle \forall u\in D_{i}\,
(w\;R\;u\Rightarrow u\Vdash A).} \forall u\in D_{i}\,(w\;R\;u\Rightarrow u\Vdash A).

Carlson models are easier to visualize and to work with than usual polymodal Kripke models; there are,
however, Kripke complete polymodal logics which are Carlson incomplete.

In "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic", published in 1963, Kripke responded to a difficulty with
classical quantification theory. The motivation for the world-relative approach was to represent the
possibility that objects in one world may fail to exist in another. If standard quantifier rules are used,
however, every term must refer to something that exists in all the possible worlds. This seems
incompatible with our ordinary practice of using terms to refer to things that exist contingently.

Kripke's response to this difficulty was to eliminate terms. He gave an example of a system that uses the
world-relative interpretation and preserves the classical rules. However, the costs are severe. First, his
language is artificially impoverished, and second, the rules for the propositional modal logic must be
weakened.

Kripke's possible worlds theory has been used by narratologists (beginning with Pavel and Dolezel) to
understand "reader's manipulation of alternative plot developments, or the characters' planned or
fantasized alternative action series." This application has become especially useful in the analysis of
hyperfiction.[13]

Intuitionistic logic Edit

Kripke semantics for the intuitionistic logic follows the same principles as the semantics of modal logic,
but uses a different definition of satisfaction.

An intuitionistic Kripke model is a triple {\displaystyle \langle W,\leq ,\Vdash \rangle } \langle W,\leq
,\Vdash \rangle , where {\displaystyle \langle W,\leq \rangle } \langle W,\leq \rangle is a partially
ordered Kripke frame, and {\displaystyle \Vdash } \Vdash satisfies the following conditions:

if p is a propositional variable, {\displaystyle w\leq u} w\leq u, and {\displaystyle w\Vdash p} w\Vdash p,

then {\displaystyle u\Vdash p} u\Vdash p (persistency condition),

{\displaystyle w\Vdash A\land B} w\Vdash A\land B if and only if {\displaystyle w\Vdash A} w\Vdash A
and {\displaystyle w\Vdash B} w\Vdash B,

{\displaystyle w\Vdash A\lor B} w\Vdash A\lor B if and only if {\displaystyle w\Vdash A} w\Vdash A or
{\displaystyle w\Vdash B} w\Vdash B,

{\displaystyle w\Vdash A\to B} w\Vdash A\to B if and only if for all {\displaystyle u\geq w} u\geq w,
{\displaystyle u\Vdash A} u\Vdash A implies {\displaystyle u\Vdash B} u\Vdash B,

not {\displaystyle w\Vdash \bot } w\Vdash \bot .

Intuitionistic logic is sound and complete with respect to its Kripke semantics, and it has the Finite Model
Property.

Intuitionistic first-order logic

Let L be a first-order language. A Kripke model of L is a triple {\displaystyle \langle W,\leq ,\

{M_{w}\}_{w\in W}\rangle } \langle W,\leq ,\{M_{w}\}_{w\in W}\rangle , where {\displaystyle \langle
W,\leq \rangle } \langle W,\leq \rangle is an intuitionistic Kripke frame, Mw is a (classical) L-structure for
each node w ∈ W, and the following compatibility conditions hold whenever u ≤ v:

the domain of Mu is included in the domain of Mv,

realizations of function symbols in Mu and Mv agree on elements of Mu,

for each n-ary predicate P and elements a1,...,an ∈ Mu: if P(a1,...,an) holds in Mu, then it holds in Mv.
Given an evaluation e of variables by elements of Mw, we define the satisfaction relation {\displaystyle
w\Vdash A[e]} w\Vdash A[e]:

{\displaystyle w\Vdash P(t_{1},\dots ,t_{n})[e]} w\Vdash P(t_{1},\dots ,t_{n})[e] if and only if

{\displaystyle P(t_{1}[e],\dots ,t_{n}[e])} P(t_{1}[e],\dots ,t_{n}[e]) holds in Mw,

{\displaystyle w\Vdash (A\land B)[e]} w\Vdash (A\land B)[e] if and only if {\displaystyle w\Vdash A[e]}
w\Vdash A[e] and {\displaystyle w\Vdash B[e]} w\Vdash B[e],

{\displaystyle w\Vdash (A\lor B)[e]} w\Vdash (A\lor B)[e] if and only if {\displaystyle w\Vdash A[e]}
w\Vdash A[e] or {\displaystyle w\Vdash B[e]} w\Vdash B[e],

{\displaystyle w\Vdash (A\to B)[e]} w\Vdash (A\to B)[e] if and only if for all {\displaystyle u\geq w} u\geq
w, {\displaystyle u\Vdash A[e]} u\Vdash A[e] implies {\displaystyle u\Vdash B[e]} u\Vdash B[e],

not {\displaystyle w\Vdash \bot [e]} w\Vdash \bot [e],

{\displaystyle w\Vdash (\exists x\,A)[e]} w\Vdash (\exists x\,A)[e] if and only if there exists an
{\displaystyle a\in M_{w}} a\in M_{w} such that {\displaystyle w\Vdash A[e(x\to a)]} w\Vdash A[e(x\to
a)],

{\displaystyle w\Vdash (\forall x\,A)[e]} w\Vdash (\forall x\,A)[e] if and only if for every {\displaystyle
u\geq w} u\geq w and every {\displaystyle a\in M_{u}} a\in M_{u}, {\displaystyle u\Vdash A[e(x\to a)]}
u\Vdash A[e(x\to a)].

Here e(x→a) is the evaluation which gives x the value a, and otherwise agrees with e.

Naming and Necessity Edit

Main article: Naming and Necessity

Cover of Naming and Necessity

The three lectures that form Naming and Necessity constitute an attack on descriptivist theory of names.
Kripke attributes variants of descriptivist theories to Frege, Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle,
among others. According to descriptivist theories, proper names either are synonymous with
descriptions, or have their reference determined by virtue of the name's being associated with a
description or cluster of descriptions that an object uniquely satisfies. Kripke rejects both these kinds of
descriptivism. He gives several examples purporting to render descriptivism implausible as a theory of
how names get their references determined (e.g., surely Aristotle could have died at age two and so not
satisfied any of the descriptions we associate with his name, and yet it would seem wrong to deny that
he was Aristotle).

As an alternative, Kripke outlined a causal theory of reference, according to which a name refers to an
object by virtue of a causal connection with the object as mediated through communities of speakers.
He points out that proper names, in contrast to most descriptions, are rigid designators. That is, a proper
name refers to the named object in every possible world in which the object exists, while most
descriptions designate different objects in different possible worlds. For example, 'Nixon' refers to the
same person in every possible world in which Nixon exists, while 'the person who won the United States
presidential election of 1968' could refer to Nixon, Humphrey, or others in different possible worlds.

Kripke also raised the prospect of a posteriori necessities — facts that are necessarily true, though they
can be known only through empirical investigation. Examples include "Hesperus is Phosphorus", "Cicero
is Tully", "Water is H2O" and other identity claims where two names refer to the same object.

Finally, Kripke gave an argument against identity materialism in the philosophy of mind, the view that
every mental particular is identical with some physical particular. Kripke argued that the only way to
defend this identity is as an a posteriori necessary identity, but that such an identity — e.g., pain is C-
fibers firing — could not be necessary, given the (clearly conceivable) possibility that pain be separate
from the firing of C-fibers, or the firing of C-fibers be separate from pain (See: Philosophical zombie).
Similar arguments have been proposed by David Chalmers.[14] In any event, the psychophysical identity
theorist, according to Kripke, incurs a dialectical obligation to explain the apparent logical possibility of
these circumstances, for in the opinion of such theorists they should be impossible.

Kripke delivered the John Locke lectures in philosophy at Oxford in 1973. Titled Reference and Existence,
they are in many respects a continuation of Naming and Necessity, and deal with the subjects of fictional
names and perceptual error. They have recently been published by Oxford University Press.

In a 1995 paper, philosopher Quentin Smith argued that key concepts in Kripke's new theory of reference
had originated from the work of Ruth Barcan Marcus more than a decade earlier.[15] Smith identified six
significant ideas to the New Theory that he claimed Marcus had developed: (1) The idea that proper
names are direct references, which don't consist of contained definitions. (2) While one can single out a
single thing by a description, this description is not equivalent with a proper name of this thing. (3) The
modal argument that proper names are directly referential, and not disguised descriptions. (4) A formal
modal logic proof of the necessity of identity. (5) The concept of a rigid designator, though the actual
name of the concept was coined by Kripke.(6) The idea of a posteriori identity. Smith proceeded to argue
that Kripke failed to understand Marcus' theory at the time, yet later adopted many of its key conceptual
themes in his New Theory of Reference.

Other scholars have subsequently offered detailed responses arguing that no plagiarism occurred.[16]
[17]

"A Puzzle about Belief" Edit

Kripke's main propositions in Naming and Necessity concerning proper names are that the meaning of a
name simply is the object it refers to and that a name's referent is determined by a causal link between
some sort of "baptism" and the utterance of the name. Nevertheless, he acknowledges the possibility
that propositions containing names may have some additional semantic properties,[18] properties that
could explain why two names referring to the same person may give different truth values in
propositions about beliefs. For example, Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly, although she does not
believe that Clark Kent can fly. This can be accounted for if the names "Superman" and "Clark Kent",
though referring to the same person, have distinct semantic properties.

In the article "A Puzzle about Belief" Kripke seems to oppose even this possibility. His argument can be
reconstructed in the following way: The idea that two names referring to the same object may have
different semantic properties is supposed to explain that coreferring names behave differently in
propositions about beliefs (as in Lois Lane's case). But the same phenomenon occurs even with
coreferring names that obviously have the same semantic properties:

Kripke invites us to imagine a French, monolingual boy, Pierre, who believes the following: "Londres est
joli." ("London is beautiful.") Pierre moves to London without realizing that London = Londres. He then
learns English the same way a child would learn the language, that is, not by translating words from
French to English. Pierre learns the name "London" from the unattractive part of the city in which he
lives, so he comes to believe that London is not beautiful. If Kripke's account is correct, Pierre now
believes both that "Londres" is "joli" and that "London" is not beautiful. This cannot be explained by
coreferring names having different semantic properties. According to Kripke, this demonstrates that
attributing additional semantic properties to names does not explain what it is intended to.

Wittgenstein Edit
First published in 1982, Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language contends that the central
argument of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations centers on a devastating rule-following paradox
that undermines the possibility of our ever following rules in our use of language. Kripke writes that this
paradox is "the most radical and original skeptical problem that philosophy has seen to date." (p. 60)
Kripke argues that Wittgenstein does not reject the argument that leads to the rule-following paradox,
but accepts it and offers a 'skeptical solution' to ameliorate the paradox's destructive effects.

Whilst most commentators accept that the Philosophical Investigations contains the rule-following
paradox as Kripke presents it, few have concurred with Kripke when he attributes a skeptical solution to
Wittgenstein. It should be noted that Kripke himself expresses doubts in Wittgenstein on Rules and
Private Language as to whether Wittgenstein would endorse his interpretation of the Philosophical
Investigations. He says that the work should not be read as an attempt to give an accurate statement of
Wittgenstein's views, but rather as an account of Wittgenstein's argument "as it struck Kripke, as it
presented a problem for him" (p. 5).

The portmanteau "Kripkenstein" has been coined as a jesting nickname for Kripke's reading of the
Philosophical Investigations. The real significance of "Kripkenstein" was to put forward a clear statement
of a new kind of skepticism, dubbed "meaning skepticism", which is the idea that for an isolated
individual there is no fact in virtue of which he/she means one thing rather than another by the use of a
word. Kripke's "skeptical solution" to meaning skepticism is to ground meaning in the behavior of a
community.

Kripke's book generated a large secondary literature, divided between those who find his skeptical
problem interesting and perceptive, and others, such as Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker, who argue that
his meaning skepticism is a pseudo-problem that stems from a confused, selective reading of
Wittgenstein. Kripke's position has, however recently been defended against these and other attacks by
the Cambridge philosopher Martin Kusch (2006), and Wittgenstein scholar David G. Stern considers the
book to be "the most influential and widely discussed" work on Wittgenstein since the 1980s.[19]

Truth Edit

In his 1975 article "Outline of a Theory of Truth", Kripke showed that a language can consistently contain
its own truth predicate, which was deemed impossible by Alfred Tarski, a pioneer in the area of formal
theories of truth. The approach involves letting truth be a partially defined property over the set of
grammatically well-formed sentences in the language. Kripke showed how to do this recursively by
starting from the set of expressions in a language which do not contain the truth predicate, and defining
a truth predicate over just that segment: this action adds new sentences to the language, and truth is in
turn defined for all of them. Unlike Tarski's approach, however, Kripke's lets "truth" be the union of all of
these definition-stages; after a denumerable infinity of steps the language reaches a "fixed point" such
that using Kripke's method to expand the truth-predicate does not change the language any further.
Such a fixed point can then be taken as the basic form of a natural language containing its own truth
predicate. But this predicate is undefined for any sentences that do not, so to speak, "bottom out" in
simpler sentences not containing a truth predicate. That is, " 'Snow is white' is true" is well-defined, as is
" ' "Snow is white" is true' is true," and so forth, but neither "This sentence is true" nor "This sentence is
not true" receive truth-conditions; they are, in Kripke's terms, "ungrounded."

Saul Kripke gives a lecture about Gödel at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

Nevertheless, it has been shown by Gödel that self-reference cannot be avoided naively, since
propositions about seemingly unrelated objects (such as integers) can have an informal self-referential
meaning, and this idea – manifested by the diagonal lemma – is the basis for Tarski's theorem that truth
cannot be consistently defined. It has thus been claimed [20] that Kripke's suggestion does lead to
contradiction: while its truth predicate is only partial, it does give truth value (true/false) to propositions
such as the one built in Tarski's proof, and is therefore inconsistent. While there is still a debate on
whether Tarski's proof can be implemented to every variation of such a partial truth system, none have
been shown to be consistent by acceptable proving methods used in mathematical logic.

Kripke's proposal is also problematic in the sense that while the language contains a "truth" predicate of
itself (at least a partial one), some of its sentences – such as the liar sentence ("this sentence is false") –
have an undefined truth value, but the language does not contain its own "undefined" predicate. In fact,
it cannot, as this will create a new version of the liar paradox , called the strengthened liar paradox ("this
sentence is false or undefined"). Thus while the liar sentence is undefined in the language, the language
cannot express that it is undefined.[21]

Continueing

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saul_Kripke