CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES Compiled by ERNIE Y.

GULTIANO

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS

CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973

Facts: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass

demonstration in front of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of
the Pasig Police.

After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for
a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was
confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against
the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to
freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course
of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of
the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.

A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers
may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent
themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel
the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a
violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found
guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by
the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.

Issue: Whether the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA.

Ruling: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights
over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well
as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise
almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to
survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and
property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the
hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of expression and of assembly occupy a
preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions."

The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in
relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.”

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES Compiled by ERNIE Y. GULTIANO

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GSIS

G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

Facts: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program
of the government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51 % of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding, only two bidders
participated. Petitioner Manila Prince, a Filipino Corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
MHC at P41.58 per share and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian Firm, which bid for the same number
of shares at P44.00 per share. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder,
petitioner matches the bid price of P44.00 per share by Renong Berhad. Subsequently,
petitioner sent a manager's check as bid security to match the bid of Renong Berhad which
respondent GSIS refuse to accept. Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale may be consummated which Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a
petition before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional
provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void.

Ruling: A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of
a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which
it emanates. Since the constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

Article 12, Section 10, paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos." It means that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. When the
Constitution speaks of "national patrimony", it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

Manila Hotel has become a landmark- a living testimonial of Philippine Heritage. While it was
restrictively an American Hotel when it first opened, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony.

Respondents further argue that the Constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to
GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. In constitutional
jurisprudence, the acts of a person distinct from the government are considered "state action"
covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages is a public function; (2) when the
government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government
responsible for his action; and (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action.
Without doubt, the transaction entered into by the GSIS is in fact a transaction of the State and
therefore subject to the constitutional command. Therefore, the GSIS is directed to accept the
matching bid of petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES Compiled by ERNIE Y. GULTIANO

TAÑADA vs. ANGARA

G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

Facts: Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by
the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the international Agreement establishing
the World Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote
the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.” Further,
they contended that the “national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement
“place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of our Constitution, and render
meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”

Issue: Whether the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is
liberalized, deregulated and privatized.

Ruling: No, the 1987 Constitution does not prohibit our country from participating in worldwide
trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that
is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.

The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments
into the country, it does not prohibit them either.

The constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy” does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates
neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.”

There are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which
mandate the pursuit of a “trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity” and the promotion of
industries “which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby justifying its
acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of
legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the
policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.

What the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise,
beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between
the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide
march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should
determine in electing their policy makers.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES Compiled by ERNIE Y. GULTIANO

DOMINO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 134015. July 19, 1999

Facts: Juan Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the Lone Legislative
District of the Province of Sarangani in the May 1998 elections. However, private respondents
filed with the COMELEC a petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy.
They alleged that the petitioner is neither a resident nor a registered voter of the Province of
Sarangani where he seeks election.

The COMELEC Second Division disqualified the petitioner as candidate and ordered the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. The votes cast for Domino were counted and he got
the highest number of votes. So, he filed a motion for reconsideration but denied by the
COMELEC en banc.

Issues:

1. Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of
the petitioner.
2. Whether petitioner is a resident of Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately
preceding the May 1998 election.

Ruling:

1. Yes, the COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Section 78 Article IX of the Omnibus
Election Code over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. It
is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to determine whether false representations as
to the material facts were made in the certificate of candidacy including the residence
requirement.

2. No, the term residence as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and
for elective office, means the same thing as domicile which gives the intention to reside
in a fixed place and personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention. The petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon, Ilucos Sur but acquired
his domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City.

The petitioner contended that he already established his new domicile in Sarangani by
leasing a house and lot located therein. However, the Court is unsatisfied with it. The
lease contract may be indicative of Domino’s intention to reside in Sarangani, however,
it does not produce the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of his
original domicile.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES Compiled by ERNIE Y. GULTIANO

PAMATONG vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

Facts: Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent
COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a
registered political party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the
COMELEC violated his right to “equal access to opportunities for public service” under Section
26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to
those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties.
The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the
presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the
office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous
national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international
campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.

Issue: Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

Ruling: No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege
subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege
to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which
suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The “equal access” provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
“Declaration of Principles and State Policies.” The provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the “equal access” provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II,
the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not
give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations.
Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on “Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations
apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not
violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are
meant to be borne by anyone who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar,
there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they
create.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The
basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the
reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of
further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a
nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES Compiled by ERNIE Y. GULTIANO

YRASUEGUI vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.

G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008

Facts: Complainant was an international flight steward who was dismissed because of his failure
to adhere to the weight standards of the company. Petitioner claims that he was illegally
dismissed. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Was the dismissal valid?

Ruling: A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that
they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. The dismissal
of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that obesity is a
disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is
possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline.
Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that
“[t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes.
I can do it now.”

Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company
physician, per the advice of PAL.

In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight
attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his
dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As
the CA correctly puts it, “[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable
to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element
runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful
action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary
although it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).”

NOTES:
The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification
defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex,
religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is
an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because
it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid “provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably
necessary for satisfactory job performance.”

The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its
passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly
the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be
viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees.

The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight
safety.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES Compiled by ERNIE Y. GULTIANO

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012

Facts: In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as
two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the
JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives
from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this
petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of
Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives,
are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either
divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism,
as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective
powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one
representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.

Issue: Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2)
of whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling: Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.”

It is apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is
used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or
the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word “Congress” in
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded because at the time the said
provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress. Then,
when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the
Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function
in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction
of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative
powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers
causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said
in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the
workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES Compiled by ERNIE Y. GULTIANO

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA

G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967

Facts: Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del
Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in
the city of Manila. They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City
Board to regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also
asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license
fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the
requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal information. There
was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses
would be open for inspection from city authorities. They claimed this to be violative of due
process for being vague. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being
arbitrary. It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours. The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the
license of the hotels that violated the ordinance. The lower court declared the ordinance
unconstitutional. Hence, this appeal by the City of Manila.

Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?

Ruling: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by
Congress (in this case the City Council) is valid. Without a showing or a strong foundation of
invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such
cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes
not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the
revenue of the LGU concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well.

The due process contention is likewise untenable. There is no controlling and precise definition
of due process. It has a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the
standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to
free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided. Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity for an
alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.

On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It
was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is
'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual
and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being.

The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and lifted the injunction on the Ordinance
in question.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES Compiled by ERNIE Y. GULTIANO

SMITH, BELL & COMPANY vs. JOAQUIN NATIVIDAD

G.R. No. 15574, September 17, 1919

Facts: Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippine Islands. A majority of its stockholders are British subjects. It is the owner of a motor
vessel known as the Bato built for it in the Philippine Islands in 1916, of more than fifteen tons
gross The Bato was brought to Cebu in the present year for the purpose of transporting
plaintiff's merchandise between ports in the Islands. Application was made at Cebu, the home
port of the vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a certificate of Philippine registry. The
Collector refused to issue the certificate, giving as his reason that all the stockholders of Smith,
Bell & Co., Ltd., were not citizens either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. The
instant action is the result.

Counsel argues that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal protection of the
laws because it, in effect, prohibits the corporation from owning vessels, and because
classification of corporations based on the citizenship of one or more of their stockholders is
capricious, and that Act No. 2761 deprives the corporation of its property without due process
of law because by the passage of the law company was automatically deprived of every
beneficial attribute of ownership in the Bato and left with the naked title to a boat it could not
use.

Issue: Whether the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the
registry of vessel in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders

Ruling: Yes. Act No. 2761 provides:

“Investigation into character of vessel. — No application for a certificate of Philippine register

shall be approved until the collector of customs is satisfied from an inspection of the vessel that
it is engaged or destined to be engaged in legitimate trade and that it is of domestic ownership
as such ownership is defined in section eleven hundred and seventy-two of this Code.”

“Certificate of Philippine register. — Upon registration of a vessel of domestic ownership, and of

more than fifteen tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall be issued for it. If the vessel
is of domestic ownership and of fifteen tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate of
Philippine register shall be optional with the owner.”

While Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation having alien stockholders, is entitled to the protection
afforded by the due-process of law and equal protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill
of Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations
such as Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade,
does not belong to that vicious species of class legislation which must always be condemned,
but does fall within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police power, and
so does not offend against the constitutional provision.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES Compiled by ERNIE Y. GULTIANO

VILLEGAS vs. HIU CHIONG

G.R. No. L-29646, November 10, 1978

Facts: The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on
February 22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any
person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be
engaged in any kind of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila without securing
an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes.

Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance.

Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Constitution.

Ruling: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable
aliens generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation.

While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from
the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or
disapproval of application is regulatory in character, the second part which requires the
payment of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure.

Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic
human right of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. While it is true
that the Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is
admitted he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the
means of livelihood. Also, it does not lay down any standard to guide the City Mayor in the
issuance or denial of an alien employment permit fee.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CASES Compiled by ERNIE Y. GULTIANO

NUÑEZ vs. AVERIA

G.R. No. L-38415 June 28, 1974

Facts: Petitioner is the protestant in Election Case No. TM-470 of respondent court contesting
the November 8, 1971 election results in certain precincts for the mayoralty of Tarnate, Cavite
on the ground of fraud, irregularities and corrupt practices. Original protestee was the
proclaimed mayor-elect Edgardo Morales, who was ambushed and killed on February 15, 1974
in a barrio of Tarnate2 and hence was succeeded by then vice-mayor Rodolfo de Leon who as
the incumbent mayor is now substituted in this action as party respondent.3

Respondent court had in its questioned order of January 31, 1974 granted protestee's motion
for dismissal of the election protest on the ground "that this court has lost its jurisdiction to
decide this case for the reason that the same has become moot and academic," citing the
President's authority under General Order No. 3 and Article XVII, section 9 of the 1973
Constitution to remove from office all incumbent government officials and employees, whether
elective or appointive.

Petitioner filed a timely appeal. Upon receipt of respondent's comment the Court resolved to
consider petitioner's petition for review on certiorari as a special civil action and the case
submitted for decision for prompt disposition thereof.

Ruling: The Court held that “the `right' of the private respondents to continue in office
indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of Art. XVII of the New Constitution but
principally from their having been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of
the November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to
their respective positions and consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their
functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to
enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them by said constitutional provision," and that "(I)t
is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Art. XVII of the New Constitution, the term of
office of the private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices
under a new term. We are of the opinion that they hold their respective offices still under the
term to which they have been elected, although the same is now indefinite."

The Court further stressed that "(T)he Constitutional Convention could not have intended, as in
fact it did not intend, to shield or protect those who had been unduly elected. To hold that the
right of the herein private respondents to the respective offices which they are now holding,
may no longer be subject to question would be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval to
what could have been an election victory characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote
buying, or other forms of irregularities prohibited by the Election Code to preserve inviolate the
sanctity of the ballot."

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