FILED

2/12/2018 4:33 PM
Donna Kay McKinney
Bexar County District Clerk
Accepted By: Krystal Gonzalez

2018CI02586
CAUSE NO. _________________

RAYMOND FORD, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT

Plaintiff §
§
§
V. § BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS
§
MICHELLE BARRIENTES VELA, §
BEXAR COUNTY CONSTABLE, §
PRECINCT 2, §
Defendant §
§
§
§
§
§
§ 225th
§ _____ JUDICIAL DISTRICT

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW Plaintiff, Raymond Ford, and files this Original Petition complaining of

Bexar County Constable Michelle Barrientes Vela, both personally and in her official capacity as

the Bexar County Constable, Precinct 2, would show the Honorable Court the following:

I. DISCOVERY LEVEL & CLAIM FOR RELIEF

1. Plaintiff intends that discovery be conducted under Discovery Level 3.

II. PARTIES AND SERVICE

2. Plaintiff is a resident of Bexar County.

3. Defendant Michelle Barrientes Vela is the Bexar County Constable of Precinct 2, and is

being sued both personally and in her official capacity. Defendant may be served at the

Precinct 2 Constable’s Office at, 7723 Guilbeau Rd., Suite 105, San Antonio, Texas 78250.
Plaintiff’s Original Petition, Ford Page 1 of 8
 Service of said Defendant as described above can be effected by personal delivery.

Defendant may also be served through her representative Ms. Kristin K. Bloodworth,

Assistant Criminal District Attorney, Civil Section at 101 W. Nueva St., 7th Floor, San

Antonio TX, 78205.

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. The damages sought in this case exceed the minimal jurisdictional limits of Bexar County

Judicial District Courts.

5. Venue is proper in Bexar County, Texas, because a suit for damages for libel or slander shall

be brought, and can only be maintained in the county in which the plaintiff resided at the

time of the accrual of the cause of action, or in the county in which the defendant resided at

the time of filing suit, or in the county of the residence of the defendant, or the domicile of

any corporate defendant, at the election of the plaintiff. TEX.CIV.PRAC.& REM.CODE

§15.017.

6. Venue is proper in Bexar County, Texas because the Defendant resides in Bexar County,

Texas. Venue is also proper because Plaintiff resides and did reside in Bexar County, Texas

at the time of the accrual of the cause of action, and one of the claims or causes of action is

governed by the mandatory venue provisions. TEX.CIV.PRAC.& REM.CODE § 15.004.

7. Pursuant to Rule 47 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff is seeking relief over

$200,000.00 but not more than $1,000,000.00.

IV. JURY DEMAND

8. Plaintiff demands a trial by jury.

V. FACTUAL SUMMARY

9. On February 13th, 2017, Deputy Constable Raymond Ford, Plaintiff, was served with a

Plaintiff’s Original Petition, Ford Page 2 of 8

 “Termination Letter” signed by Constable Michelle Barrientes Vela, Defendant, attached

hereto as Plaintiff’s Exhibit A, and incorporated by reference. Her letter failed to specify any

particular act or incident involving Plaintiff, but stated the following:

“Effective immediately as of February 10, 2017, you are terminated base (sic) on the
following concerns: No (sic) confidence, not trustworthy, dishonesty and conduct which
are (sic) detrimental to or have (sic) adverse effect for (sic) the Department (sic) and
place (sic) this department and myself (sic) in a liability situation. All county issued
items/property must be turned in immediately; (sic) including your credentials and all
work permits are now void.”

10. Defendant fired Plaintiff, using the allegations in the letter as her basis.

11. Defendant placed the Letter of Termination in Plaintiff’s permanent employment file.

12. The Letter of Termination was dated February 10th, 2017. Defendant served it on Plaintiff on

February 13th, 2017.

13. Defendant then submitted and signed an F-5 Separation of Licensee form to the Texas

Commission on Law Enforcement, attached hereto as Plaintiff’s Exhibit B, and incorporated

by reference.

14. In the F-5 Separation of Licensee form, Defendant listed Plaintiff’s discharge date of

separation as “February 12, 2017.”

15. In the F-5 Separation of Licensee form, Defendant states the reason for separation, as “while

in good standing and not because of pending or final disciplinary actions or a documented

performance problem.”

16. Defendant told other officers that she had fired Plaintiff for being “dishonest” and

“untrustworthy.”

17. Plaintiff appealed his termination to the Bexar County Civil Service Commission on or about

February 24th, 2017.

18. On or about March 20th, 2017, after consultation with the Bexar County District Attorney’s
Plaintiff’s Original Petition, Ford Page 3 of 8
 Office, Civil Section, Defendant served on Plaintiff a “Notice of Rescinded Termination”

letter, attached hereto as Plaintiff’s Exhibit C, and incorporated by reference.

19. While the letter rescinded termination, Defendant never removed or retracted the defamatory

statements she previously made and published.

20. Upon his return to service, Defendant routinely berated Plaintiff and said to him in front

of other officers, “I still do not trust you” and “Next time, I won’t make the same mistake,”

in reference to his improper termination.

21. On April 7th, 2017, Defendant made and published statements to news reporter, James Keith,

of Kens-5 News that characterized conduct by her officers as “stealing and unethical as an

officer.”

22. Citing the Termination Letter and her published statements to Kens-5 News, on or about

April 19th 2017, Plaintiff submitted to Defendant a “Request for Correction, Clarification or

Retraction, In Accordance with Rule 73.055 Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and

Notice of Suit,” attached hereto as Plaintiff’s Exhibit D, and incorporated by reference.

23. On May 1st, 2017, Defendant’s representative with the Bexar County District Attorney’s

Office Civil section, responded to Plaintiff’s Request in writing, attached hereto as Plaintiff’s

Exhibit E, and incorporated by reference.

24. To date, Defendant has made no correction, clarification or retraction of her defamatory

statements against Plaintiff in accordance with Rule 73.055 Texas Civil Practice and

Remedies Code.

25. Defendant had absolutely no basis to make and publish the statements in the Termination

letter against Plaintiff.

26. Defendant had absolutely no basis to continually accuse Plaintiff of dishonesty and
Plaintiff’s Original Petition, Ford Page 4 of 8
 untrustworthiness in the presence of other officers after he returned to service in March of

2017.

27. Defendant had absolutely no basis to make and publish the statements to Kens-5 News,

which by implication, accused Plaintiff of “stealing” and “unethical” conduct.

28. When Defendant made the above-referenced claims, she knew she lacked any evidence or

basis in support.

VI. CAUSES OF ACTION

LIBEL AND SLANDER

29. All previous allegations are incorporated herein by reference.

30. Mr. Ford is a private individual and is neither a public official nor a public figure for any

purpose.

31. Defendant is a non-media defendant.

32. The foregoing statements, made and published by Defendant were statements of fact that

were false, both in their particular details and in their main point, essence, or gist in the

context in which they were made.

33. The foregoing statements made and published by Defendant directly and/or indirectly

referred to Mr. Ford.

34. The foregoing statements made and published by Defendant were libelous per se because

they injured Mr. Ford’s reputation and have exposed Mr. Ford to public hatred, contempt or

ridicule and/or financial injury.

35. The foregoing statements made and published by Defendant were libelous per se because

they impeach Mr. Ford’s honesty, integrity, virtue, and/or reputation.

36. The foregoing statements made and published by Defendant were libelous per se and
Plaintiff’s Original Petition, Ford Page 5 of 8
 slanderous per se because they injured Mr. Ford in his office, profession, and/or occupation.

37. The foregoing statements made and published by Defendant were libelous per se and

slanderous per se to the extent they falsely charged Mr. Ford with the commission of a crime

or failure to report a crime.

38. In the alternative, the foregoing statements made and published by Defendant were libelous

and/or slanderous through innuendo and/or implication.

39. Defendant is strictly liable for damages caused by libel and/or slander.

40. Alternatively, Defendant knew the foregoing defamatory statements were false or was

reckless with regard to whether the statements of fact were false.

41. Alternatively, Defendant knew or should have known the defamatory statements were false.

42. Mr. Ford is entitled to recover nominal damages, special damages, and/or exemplary

damages.

RETRACTION

43. All previous allegations are incorporated herein by reference.

44. Pursuant to the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Mr. Ford requests that Defendant

correct, clarify or retract the statements detailed above. The statements were defamatory by:

(1) injuring Mr. Ford’s reputation and have exposed Mr. Ford to public hatred, contempt or

ridicule and/or financial injury; (2) by impeaching Mr. Ford’s honesty, integrity, virtue,

and/or reputation; (3) by injuring Mr. Ford in his office, profession, and/or occupation; and

(4) by falsely charging Mr. Ford with the commission of a crime or failing to report a crime.

VII. DAMAGES

45. All previous allegations are incorporated herein by reference

Plaintiff’s Original Petition, Ford Page 6 of 8

46. Mr. Ford is entitled to nominal damages, general damages, and actual damages for

Defendant’s libel and slander, including compensation for injury to his reputation.

47. Mr. Ford is entitled to exemplary damages pursuant to Chapter 41 of the Texas Civil Practice

and Remedies Code because Defendant acted with malice.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff herein respectfully requests that

the Court issue citation for the Defendant to appear and answer, and that the Plaintiff be awarded

a judgment for the following:

a. Nominal damages;

b. General damages;

c. Actual damages;

d. Special damages;

e. Exemplary damages;

f. Pre and post judgment interest;

g. Costs of court; and

h. Such further relief, both general and special, at law or in equity, to which Plaintiff

may show himself to be justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

SAREEN & BOZZA, PLLC

214 Dwyer Suite 305
San Antonio, TX 78204
Tel. (210) 449-4994
Fax. (210) 569-5134

Plaintiff’s Original Petition, Ford Page 7 of 8

 By: /s/ Mac Bozza
Mac Bozza
Texas Bar No. 24079784
Email: mac@sareenbozza.com

/s/Ishan Sareen ________________________

Ishan “Shawn” Sareen
Texas Bar No. 24079724
Email: shawn@sareenbozza.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been served via

electronic filing service provider, e-mail, Certified Mail Return Receipt Requested, and/or

facsimile to all parties on this the ___th day of February 2018.

/s/ Mac Bozza

Mac Bozza


Plaintiff’s Original Petition, Ford Page 8 of 8