In case of Macariola vs.

Asuncion, the court says ; Upon the transfer

of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the
United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this
Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated
because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of
the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the
new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are
expressly re- enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.

Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges

from engaging in commerce is, as heretofore stated, deemed
abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain
to America, because it is political in nature.

In case of Mutuc vs COMELEC;

Issue : Whether the taped jingles fall under the phrase “and the like.”

Held: Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general

words following any enumeration are applicable only to things of the
same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It is quite
apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution
of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain
a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution. The
Constitutional Convention Act contemplated the prohibition on the
distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible
for its distribution (distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets,
mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights,
athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats,
matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words
“and the like.”). Taped jingles therefore were not prohibited.

NOTE:E jus de m-Ge ne ris - Latin: of the same kind. A rule of statutory
construction, generally accepted by both state and federal courts,
"that where general words follow enumerations of particular classes
or persons or things, the general words shall be construed as
applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or
kind as those enumerated

IN CUSTODIA LEGIS. In the custody of the law.In

general, when things are in custodia legis, they cannot be

distrained, nor otherwise interfered with by custodia legis,
they cannot be distrained, nor otherwise interfered with by a
private person.

In case of Alih vs Castro; The Supreme Court declared those seized in

custodia legis and declared that the operation conducted by Maj. Gen.
Castro was ILLEGAL. The respondents have all the time to obtain a
search warrant granted that they have about 10 trial courts. The SC
also held the protection of the petitioner's human rights as stated in
Art IV Sec 3 and 4 of the 1973 Constitution regarding illegal search
and seizure. The presumption of innocence of the petitioners should
be observed and that they cannot be subjected to self-incriminating
instances like paraffin tests, photographing and finger printing.

In this case, "The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally
in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all
classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances. No doctrine,
involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the
wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during
any of the great exigencies of government."

In case of Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS; In its plain and

ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.
When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it
refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as
the Constitution could have very well used the term natural
resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It
also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and
letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a
landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it
was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in
1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become
the venue of various significant events which have shaped
Philippine history. In the granting of economic rights,
privileges, and concessions, especially on matters involving
national patrimony, when a choice has to be made between
a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter
shall be chosen over the former.

A provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without

the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself,
so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of
its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional
provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the
operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the
rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable
safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the
violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render
such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The
omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was
not intended to be self- executing. The rule is that a self-executing
provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative
power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it
more available.

II. AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be
proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths
of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.

Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly

proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification
of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of

this right.

Section 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its

Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all
its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a
convention.
Amendment vs. Revision
Amendment is a change or alteration for the better; an amendment or
change within the lines of the original instrument which will bring
about improvement
Revision is the rewriting or overhauling of the entire instrument.

Proposal – is the motion of initiating suggestions or proposals on

amendment or revision, which may either be by;
(a) Congress, upon vote of ¾ of all its members;
(b) Constitutional Convention
(c) The people thru initiative

In case of Santiago vs COMELEC; R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the

system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Under the
said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose,
enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution"
through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to
"laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed
laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.

Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and
Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is
provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main
thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local
laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it
could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the
order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and
local laws.

While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing

initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally
did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.

In case of Lambino vs COMELEC;

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the

people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire
proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means
two essential elements must be present.

First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No
agent or representative can sign on their behalf.

Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal

must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of

the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who
express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a
petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be
either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If
so attached, the petition must state the fact of such
attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the
several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the
full text of the proposed amendments before – not after –
signing.

Moreover, “an initiative signer must be informed at the time

of signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed”
and failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which
renders the initiative void.

In the case of the Lambino Group’s petition, there’s not

a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the
proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does
the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed
changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely

asks a question whether the people approve a shift

from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system of government. The signature
sheet does not show to the people the draft of the
proposed changes before they are asked to sign the
signature sheet. This omission is fatal.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without

first showing to the people the full text of the proposed
amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as
a gigantic fraud on the people. That’s why the Constitution
requires that an initiative must be “directly proposed by the
people x x x in a petition” – meaning that the people must
sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation’s
fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed
amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a
general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless,
and unelected individuals.

C. Submission-

In case of Tolentino vs COMELEC; The Supreme Court held that in

Section 1 of Article 15, there should be only one “election” or
plebiscite for the ratification of all amendments the Convention may
propose.

D. Ratification: Article 17 Section 4, Paragraphs 1 and 2

Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this

Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later
than ninety days after the approval of such amendment
or revision.

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid

when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty
days nor later than ninety days after the certification by
the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the
petition.

E. The position of the Convention in our system of

government

There are three theories on the relative position of the Constitutional

Convention vis-à-vis the regular department of the government.

The first, as announced in Loomis v. Jackson, holds that the

constitutional constitution is supreme over the other departments of
the government because the powers it exercises are in the nature of
sovereign powers. This theory is thus called the Theory of
Conventional Sovereignty.

The second, as announced in Wood’s Appeal, considers the

constitutional convention inferior to the other departments of the
government since it is merely a creation of the legislature.

The third, as announced in Frantz vs Autry, declares that as long as it

exists and confines itself within the sphere of its jurisdiction, the
constitutional convention must be considered independent of and co-
equal with the other departments of the government.

The third of these theories, which is the most popular, has been
observed in our government since the case of Mabanag vs. Vito.

History and Background

A. The Philippine Revolution and the Malolos Constitution

On June 29,1898, Gen, Aguinaldo established the Revolutionary

Government replacing the Dictatorial Government with himself as the
President and a Congress whose function was advisory and
ministerial. The decree making such change stated

Minister is elected from among the members of the National Assembly

and serves as the head of government and commander-in-chief of the
Philippine Armed Forces. A President is elected from among the
members of the National Assembly and serves as the symbolic head
of state with a six-year term. The judicial power is vested in the
Supreme Court, composed of a Chief Justice and 14 Justices. The
National Assembly exercises the power to define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of the lower courts. All justices of the
Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts are appointed by the
Prime Minister. This Constitution retains the independence of the
Commission on Elections and establishes two independent
Constitution al bodies [Civil Service Commission and the Commission
on Audit] as well as the National Economic Development Authority
[NEDA]. On 24 August 1970, Congress enacted RA No. 6132,
otherwise known as the Constitution al Convention Act, for the
purpose of convening a Constitution al Convention. The 320 delegates
met from June 1971 until 30 November 1972, when they approved the
draft of the new Charter. While in the process of drafting a new
Constitution , President Ferdinand Marcos declared Martial Law on 21
September 1972. The draft Constitution was submitted to the
Citizen's Assemblies from January 10 to 17, 1973 for ratification. On
17 January 1973 , President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1102,
announcing the ratification of the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines. The above constitution was amended in 1976, 1980 and in
1981. There were minor amendments done in 1984.

In case of Sanidad vs COMELEC;

The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the
President the determination of the time when he shall
initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent
with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the
country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional
Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were
aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent
President was given the discretion as to when he could
convene the interim National Assembly. In sensu striciore,
when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the
proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not
in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when
engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a
peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter
itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article
XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National
Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for
the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the
business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by
virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the
Constitution is not legislative in character. In political
science a distinction is made between constitutional content
of an organic character and that of a legislative character.
The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such
being the case, approval of the President of any proposed
amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President
to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases
of legislation. The President has nothing to do with
proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

The 1986 Provisional Constitution

The 1986 Provisional Constitution, popularly known as the Freedom

Constitution, promulgated by President Corazon C. Aquino on March
25, 1986, was a provisional constitution after a successful People
Power Revolution. Under the Freedom Constitution, executive and
legislative powers are exercised by the President, and shall continue
to exercise legislative powers until a legislature is elected and
convened under a new Constitution. Furthermore, the President is
mandated to convene a Constitutional Commission tasked to draft a
new charter.

(1) Snap Election

In the Philippines, the term "snap election" usually refers to the 1986
presidential election, where President Ferdinand Marcos called
elections earlier than scheduled, in response to growing social
unrest. Marcos was declared official winner of the election but was
eventually ousted when it was alleged that he cheated in the
elections.

In the current constitution, a snap election will be held for the

positions of president and vice president on the condition that both
positions are vacant, and outside the 90-day range of the next
scheduled presidential election.

(2) The February 1986 Revolution

(3) Proclamation No.1 , Feb. 25, 1986

Pres. Aquino declared that she and her vice- president were “taking
power in the name and by the will of the Filipino People” on the basis
of the clear sovereign will of the people expressed in the election of
Feb. 7, 1986. In her oath, she swore to preserve and defend the
“fundamental law” (not the “Constitution”) and execute “just laws”
( instead of “its laws).

(4) Proclamation No. 3, March 25, 1986

That the provisional government established thereunder was

revolutionary in character having been installed by direct action of
the people or by “people power”, deriving its existence and authority
directly from the people themselves and not from the then operating
1973 Constitution.

G. The 1987 Philippine Constitution

(1) The Constitutional Commission of 1986

The 1987 Constitution was drafted by a Constitutional

Commission created under Article V of Proclamation No. 3 issued on
March 25, 1986 which promulgated the “Freedom Constitution”
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people.

(2) Proclamation No. 58 (Feb. 11, 1987)

(3) When Considered ratified?
Article 18 Section 27 (1987 Constitution)

This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its

ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous
Constitutions.
The foregoing proposed Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines was approved by the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 on October 12, 1986 and
accordingly signed on October 15, 1986 at the Plenary
Hall, National Government Center, Quezon City, by the
Commissioners whose signatures are hereunder
affixed/

IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW

A. Theory and Justification of Judicial Review
In case of Angara vs Electoral Commission, the Court
held that;

In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional

organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent thereof.

In case of Francisco vs House of Representatives, the

court ruled that;

The judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final

arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to
declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.

B. Requisites of Judicial Review

There must be an actual case or

controversy
 The question of constitutionality must be
raised by the proper party.
 The constitutional question must be raised
at the earliest possible opportunity.
 The decision of the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of
the case itself.
Article 8 Sec.5, paragraph (2)
(1)Actual Case or Controversy- involves a conflict of

legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of

judicial resolution. A “controversy” must be the one that is
appropriate for judicial determination. It must be definite and
concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests.

 Prematurity

In the case of PACU vs. Secretary of Education the petition contesting

the validity of a regulation issued by the Secretary of Education
requiring private schools to secure a permit to operate was dismissed
on the ground that all the petitioners have permits and are actually
operating under the same. The petitioners questioned the regulation
because of the possibility that the permit might be denied them in the
future. This Court held that there was no justiciable controversy
because the petitioners suffered no wrong by the implementation of
the questioned regulation and therefore, they are not entitled to relief.
A mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education will withdraw
the permit does not amount to a justiciable controversy. The
questioned regulation in the PACU case may be questioned by a
private school whose permit to operate has been revoked or one
whose application therefor has been denied.

NOTE: Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic

questions. Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law

upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its
operation.

In case of Mariano vs COMELEC held that the petition is premised on

the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will
run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-
elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the
same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these
contingencies may

or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue

which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners
who are residents of

Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this
abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

The decided case of Cutaran vs DENR the court defined the word
“justiciable controversy” Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners'
speculation that the DENR will approve the application of the heirs of
Carantes. There must be an actual governmental act which directly
causes or will imminently cause injury to the alleged right of the
petitioner to possess the land before the jurisdiction of this Court may
be invoked. There is no showing that the petitioners were being
evicted from the land by the heirs of Carantes under orders from the
DENR;

A justiciable controversy has been defined as, "a definite and

concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interest” which may be resolved by a court of law
through the application of a law.

Courts have no judicial power to review cases involving political

questions and as a rule, will desist from taking cognizance of
speculative or hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and in cases that
has become moot.

Subject to certain well-defined exceptions courts will not

touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless there

has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that has a

direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its
validity.

In the instant case of Montecarlos vs COMELEC, there is no actual

controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.
Petitioners' prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a
proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not present
an actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to
judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no
right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A
proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no constitutional right or
duty. The Court has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional
or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering
an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. The power of
judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo.22 The second
paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states –

"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of

justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there

has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the
constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power
of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.

 Mootness
In case of Gonzales vs Narvasa, that, with respect to the
PCCR, this case has become moot and academic.

An action is considered “moot” when it no longer presents a

justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become
academic or dead.

The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on

December 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same
day. It had likewise spent the funds allotted to it. Thus, the PCCR has
ceased to exist, having lost its raison d’etre. Subsequent events have
overtaken the petition and the Court has nothing left to resolve.

The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the

impossibility of granting the relief prayed for by petitioner. Basically,
petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR from acting as such.
Clearly, prohibition is an inappropriate remedy since the body sought
to be enjoined no longer exists. It is well established that prohibition
is a preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that is
already fait accompli. At this point, any ruling regarding the PCCR
would simply be in the nature of an advisory opinion, which is
definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial power.

In case of Defunis vs Odegaard; DeFunis did not cast his suit as a

class action, and the only remedy he requested was an injunction
commanding his admission to the Law School. He was not only
accorded that remedy, but he now has also been irrevocably admitted
to the final term of the final year of the Law School course. The
controversy

between the parties has thus clearly ceased to be "definite and

concrete" and no longer "touches the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests."

There is a line of decisions in this Court standing for the

proposition that the "voluntary cessation of allegedly

illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and
determine the case, i. e., does not make the case moot."These
decisions and the doctrine they reflect
would be quite relevant if the question of mootness here
had arisen by reason of a unilateral change in the

admissions procedures of the Law School. For it was the admissions

procedures that were the target of this litigation, and a voluntary
cessation of the admissions practices complained of could make this
case moot only if it could be said with assurance "that `there is no
reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.'" Otherwise,
"the defendant is free to return to his old ways," and this fact would
be enough to prevent mootness because of the "public interest in
having the legality of the practices settled." But mootness in the
present case depends not at all upon a "voluntary cessation" of the
admissions practices that were the subject of this litigation. It
depends, instead, upon the simple fact that DeFunis is now in the final
quarter of the final year of his course of study, and the settled and
unchallenged policy of the Law School to permit him to complete the
term for which he is now enrolled.

 Exceptions to Mootness

In case of Acop vs. Guingona, the court sayd that it’s necessary to
resolve the merits of the principal issue raised for a proper disposition
of prayer c) and for future guidance of both bench and bar as to the
application of Sections 3(d) and 4 of R.A. No. 6981. As we have ruled
in Alunan III vs. Mirasol, and Viola vs. Alunan III, "courts will decide a

question otherwise moot and academic if it is 'capable

of repetition, yet evading review.'"

In case of Sanlakas vs Executive Secretary; The Court agrees with

the Solicitor General that the issuance of Proclamation No. 435,
declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist, has rendered
the case moot. As a rule,

courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to

the determination of "actual controversies." Nevertheless, courts will
decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is "capable of repetition yet
evading review." The case at bar is one such case.

The same as in the case of Pimentel vs Ermita, the court held that as
a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done.
However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide
a question otherwise moot
if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.

In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its
resolution. The question of the constitutionality of the Presidents
appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while
Congress is in session will arise in every such appointment.

2. Proper Party
In case of Joya vs PCGG , THE COURT HELD THAT

ONE HAVING NO RIGHT OR INTEREST TO PROTECT CANNOT INVOKE

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AS PART-PLAINTIFF IN AN ACTION.
THIS IS PREMISED ON SEC. 2, RULE 3, OF THE RULES AND W/C
PROVIDES THAT EVERY ACTION MUST BE PROSECUTED AND
DEFENDED IN THE NAME OF THE REAL PARTY INTEREST AND THAT
ALL PERSONS HAVING INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT OF THE ACTION
AND IN OBTAINING RELIEF AND SHALL BE JOINED AS PLAINTIFFS.
THE COURT WILL EXERCISE ITS POWER OF JUDICAL REVIEW ONLY
IF THE CASE THAT A PARTY WHO HAS THE LEGAL STANDING TO
RAISE THE CONSTITUTIONAL OR LEGAL QUESTION.

ANY CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT IN THEIR ACQUISITION AND THEIR

SUBSEQUENT DISPOSITION MUST BE RAISED ONLY BY THE PROPER
PARTIES TRUE OWNERS THEREOF – WHOSE AUTHORITY TO
RECOVER EMANATES FROM THEIR PROPRIETY RIGHTS. HAVING
FAILED TO SHOW THAT THEY ARE THE LEGAL OWNERS OF THE
ARTWORK THAT THE VALUED PISCES HAVE BECOME PULICLY
OWNED, PETITIONERS DO NOT POSSESS ANY CLEAR LEGAL
RIGHT
TO
QUESTION
THEIR
ALLEGED
UNAUTHORIZED DISPOSITION.

In case of CHR Employees Assoc. vs CHR, the court held that; On

petitioner's personality to bring this suit, which held in a multitude of
cases that a proper party is one who has

sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an

injury as a result of the act complained of
 Citizen Standing

In Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns
a public right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real
parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a
citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need
not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the
action.

In Chavez vs PEA, the Court ruled that since the instant

petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of
constitutional rights - to information and to the equitable

diffusion of natural resources - matters of transcendental public

importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.

 Associational Standing
In KMU Labor Center vs Garcia, the court held that; In line
with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary
taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of
planters, and

non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute

actions before this court to question the constitutionality or validity
of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government
agencies or instrumentalities.

Court is ready to brush aside this barren procedural infirmity and

recognize the legal standing of the petitioner in view of the
transcendental importance of the issues raised. And this act of
liberality is not without judicial precedent. As early as the Emergency
Powers Cases, this Court had exercised its discretion and waived the
requirement of proper party.

In John Hay vs Lim, The court says; The grant by the law on local
government units of the right of concurrence on the bases' conversion
is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on them, for it is in effect a
recognition of the real interests that communities nearby or
surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the
interest of petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the
legality of Proclamation 420, is personal and substantial such that
they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
government act being challenged." Theirs is a material interest, an
interest in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely an
interest in the question involved or an incidental interest," for what is
at stake in the enforcement of Proclamation 420 is the very economic
and social existence of the people of Baguio City.
In the case of Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. v. Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., et al.,ruled in the same lines and
enumerated some of the cases where the same policy was
adopted, viz:

. . . A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality

which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the
importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers

Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the

transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that
they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure." Insofar as taxpayers' suits are
concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not devoid of discretion
as to whether or not it should be entertained," or that it "enjoys an
open discretion to entertain the same or not.

 Taxpayers Standing
In ITF vs COMELEC, the court held that;The issues
central to the case are "of transcendental importance
and of national interest." As alleged, Comelec’s flawed

bidding and questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified

entity would impact directly on the success or the failure of the
electoral process. Any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the
expression of the will of the people would inevitably affect their faith
in the democratic system of government. Further, the award of any
contract for automation involves disbursement of public funds are in
gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest requires that the laws
governing the transaction must be followed strictly. Truly, our
nation’s political and economic future virtually hangs in the balance,
pending the outcome of the 2004 elections. Hence, there can be no
serious doubt thatthe

subject matter of the case is "a matter of public concern and imbued
with public interest"; in other words, it is of "paramount public
interest" and "transcendental importance." This fact alone would
justify relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the liberal policy
of the Court whenever a case involves "an issue of overarching
significance to our society."ITF,

et. al.’s legal standing should therefore be recognized and upheld.

Moreover, the Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when
there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of public funds," or if public
money is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; or when
petitioner(s) seek to restrain respondent(s) from "wasting public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law."

In Jumamil vs Café, The court defined the word locus

standi and interest;

Legal standing or locus standi is a party’s personal and substantial

interest in a case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged. It calls for
more than just a generalized grievance. The term “interest” means a
material interest, an

interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere

interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Unless
a person’s constitutional rights

are adversely affected by the statute or ordinance, he has

no legal standing.
 Voter’s Standing
In TOLENTINO VS COMELEC
Court Ruling:

"Legal standing" or locus standi refers to a personal and

substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the
challenged governmental act.

The requirement of standing, which necessarily "sharpens

the presentation of issues," relates to the constitutional
mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or
controversies

Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he

can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened
injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2)
the injury is fairly traceable

to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be

redressed by a favorable action.

In questioning, in their capacity as voters, the validity of the special

election on 14 May 2001, petitioners assert a harm classified as a
"generalized grievance." This generalized grievance is shared in
substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all the
voters, who voted in that election.
On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on standing and
exercised our discretion to give due course to voters' suits involving
the right of suffrage

We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant

case in their capacity as voters since they raise

important issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that the

issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again.

 Legislative Standing

In Ople vs Torres

RULING:

Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate.

As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite

standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance

of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As

taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of
the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS
funds to implement A.O. No. 308.

 The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at

bar is not affected by the fact that the

implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.

Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed
on its face.His

action is not premature for the rules yet to be

promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects.
 All signals from the respondents show their

unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for
the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In
this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on

standing is not a commendable stance as its

result would be to throttle an important
constitutional principle and a fundamental right.

 GOVERNMENTAL STANDING:
In People vs Vera;
HELD: The People of the Philippines, represented by the

Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party

in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without
saying that if Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of
the

Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a

substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal
wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an
invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can
challenge the validity of its own laws.

 Facial Challenge
In Estrada vs Sandiganbayan, the court defined the “face
challenge”;

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to

one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon
protected speech.The

theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no

readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for
rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent
value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is
deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his
own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity." The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility
that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of
overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes

have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence,
and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may
well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as
in the area of free speech.

For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to

a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully,

since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances
exists under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness
doctrine, it is said

that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in

all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct
that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the
law as applied to the conduct of others."

3. Earliest Opportunity
4. Necessity of Deciding Constitutional Questions
In case of Arceta vs Mangrobang, the court held that;

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to

justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or
argumentative. The Court examined the contentions of

Arceta and Dy carefully; but they still have to persuade us that BP 22

by itself or in its implementation transgressed a provision of the
Constitution. Even the thesis of Dy that the present economic and
financial crisis should be a basis to declare the Bouncing Checks Law
constitutionally infirm deserves but scant consideration. As stressed
in Lozano, it is precisely during trying times that there exists a most
compelling reason to strengthen faith and confidence in the financial
system and any practice tending to destroy confidence in checks as
currency substitutes should be deterred, to prevent havoc in the
trading and financial communities. Further, while indeed the
metropolitan trial courts may be burdened immensely by bouncing
checks cases now, that fact is immaterial to the alleged invalidity of
the law being assailed. The solution to the clogging of dockets in
lower courts lies elsewhere.

 Mandatory Notice
In case of Mirasol vs. C.A, the court held that;

(Notice to Solicitor General) of the Rules of Court provides that "in

any action which involves the validity of a statute, or executive order
or regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party
attacking the statute, executive order, or regulation, and shall be
entitled to be heard upon such question." The purpose of the
mandatory notice in Rule 64,

Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not

his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is
necessary. To deny the Solicitor

General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him

of his day in court. The mandatory notice requirement is not

limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies.

The rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any action"
and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no
ambiguity in the words

used in the rule, there is no room for construction. In all actions

assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or
proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.

C. FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

In case of Salonga vs Cruz-Pano, the court enumerates
their functions for the judicial review;

The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of

State authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the
individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the
awesome powers of Government may not enter at will is not the
totality of the Court's functions. The Court also has the duty to
formulate guiding

and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules.

It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent
of protection given by constitutional guarantees.

The fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent the
Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one
of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports. Herein,
the prosecution

evidence miserably fails to establish a prima facie case against

Salonga, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to
overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of any subversive
organization. The respondents have taken the initiative of dropping
the charges against Salonga. The Court reiterates the rule, however,
that the Court will not validate the filing of an information based on
the kind of evidence against Salonga found in the records.
D. The Exercise of Judicial Review
In case of Ynot vs IAC, Under the provision granting the

SC jurisdiction to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal

or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide final judgments
of lower courts" in all cases involving the constitutionality of certain
measures, lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the
first instance.

E. Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality

New Civil Code, Article 7

Laws are repealed only by the subsequent ones, and

their violation or nonobservance shall not be excused
by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with

the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter
shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and

regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

In case of Serrano de Agbayani vs PNB,

The decision reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act,

for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise
suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights
or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its
repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in
its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the
new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the
latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws
of the Constitution. It is understandable why it should be so, the
Constitution being supreme and …the judiciary as the agency of the
State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending
suit or litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his
best interests. It may happen as it did in this case, that family
relations may press their respective claims. It would be

more in consonance not only with the natural order of things

but the tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred.
 DE JURE GOVERNMENT/ CRITERIA FOR LEGITIMACY
A de jure government has rightful title but no power or

control, either because this has been withdrawn from it or because it

has not yet actually entered into exercises thereof.

DE FACTO GOVERNMENT
A de facto government is a government of fact, that is, it
actually exercises power or control but without legal title.
KINDS of de facto government;

1. The government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by

force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and
maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as the government
of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliamentary and later
by Cromwell as Protector.

2. That established as an independent government by the inhabitants of

a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state, such as
the government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt against the
Union during the war of secession in the United States.

3.That which is established and maintained by military forces who

invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and
which is denominated as a government of paramount force, such as
the cases of Castine in Maine, which was reduced to a British
possession in the war of 1812, and of Tampico, Mexico, occupied
during the war with Mexico by the troops of the United States.

In case Co Kim Cham vs Valdez, the court define the kinds of de facto
governments;

There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or

government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that
gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of
the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself
against the will of the latter. The second is that which is established
and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory
of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a
government of paramount force. And the third is that established as
an independent government.

By contrast, the Supreme Court unanimously held in Lawyers League

for a better Philippines v Aquino that “the people have made the
judgment; they have accepted the government of Pres. Aquino which
is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a
de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government.
Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of
the present government.

Government distinguished from Administration

Government must be distinguished from administration, which is the

group of persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the
time being. The administration runs the government as a machinist
operates his machine.

Administration is transitional whereas the government is

permanent.

OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS OF GOVERNMENTS

a. Based on accountability to the people
b. Presidential vs Parliamentary
c. National. Local, federal

E. Sovereignty
Definition: is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent
in a State by which that State is governed.
Kinds:
1. Legal Sovereignty – is the authority which has the power to issue
final commands.

2. Political Sovereignty – is the power behind the legal sovereign or

the sum of the influences that operate upon it.

3. Internal Sovereignty – refers to the power of the State to control its

domestic affairs.

4. External Sovereignty – power of the State to direct its relations

with other States is also known as independence.

Sovereign is permanent, exclusive, comprehensive, absolute,

indivisible, inalienable, and imprescriptible.

Effects of Change of Sovereignty

In case of Macariola vs Asuncion, the court held that ; Upon the

transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on
from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of
the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated
because where there is a change of sovereignty , the political laws of
the former sovereign , whether compatible or not with those of the
new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are
expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.

Acts of State

In case of Harvey vs. Commissioner, the court held that; Every

sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its
territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-
preservation or public interest. The power to deport aliens is an act of
State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It
is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued
presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and
the domestic tranquility of the people. Particularly so in this case,
where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the tight of
children to assistance and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial
to their development (Article XV, Section 3[2]). Respondent
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, in instituting
deportation proceedings against petitioners, acted in the interests of
the State.

VI. CITIZENSHIP
Citizenship- is membership in a political community which is personal
and more or less permanent in character.
Nationality- is membership in any class or form of political
community. Thus, nationals may be citizens [if member of a
democratic community] or subjects [if members of a monarchial
community]. It does not necessarily include the right or
privilege of exercising political and civil rights.

Modes of Acquiring Citizenship

➢ Jus Soli – acquisition of citizenship on the
basis of place of birth.
➢ Jus sanguinis- acquisition of citizenship on
the basis of blood relationship.
➢ Naturalization- the legal act of adopting an
alien and clothing him with the privilege of
native-born citizen.
➢ Marriage
A. Who are Philippine Citizens;
➢ Conscious, voluntary and intelligent renunciation
➢ Express renunciation means a renunciation made
known distinctly and explicitly, and not left to
inference or implication.
➢ Mere registration of alien in BID and mere
possession of foreign passport do not constitute
effective renunciation.
➢ In Willie Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago, obtaining a

Portuguese passport and signing commercial documents as a

Portuguese were construed as renunciation of Philippine citizenship.

3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution

or laws of a foreign country upon attaining the age of 21; provided,
however, that a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine
citizenship in this manner while RP is at war with any country. –an
application of the principle of Indelible Allegiance.—by virtue of RA
9225

4. By rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed

forces of a foreign country EXCEPT:
➢ If RP has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the
said foreign country; and
➢ The said foreign country maintains armed forces in Philippine
territory with the consent of RP
5. By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization
6. By having been declared by competent authority a deserter of the
pardon or amnesty has been granted.

Reacquisition of citizenship:

1. Under RA 9225, by taking an oath of allegiance

2. By naturalization
3. By repatriation
4. By direct act of Congress

Repatriation
-mode for reacquisition for those who lost their citizenship
-governed by various statutes

-consists of taking of an oath of allegiance to the RP and registering

said oath in the LCR of the place where the person

concerned resides or last resided

Effect of repatriation:

It allows the person to recover or return to, his original status before
he lost his Philippine citizenship. Thus, the respondent, a former
natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship when
he enlisted in the US Marine Corps, was deemed to have recovered
his natural-born status when he reacquired Filipino citizenship
through repatriation.

The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are

the following:
a) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens; and
b) Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who
lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political
or economic necessity.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall
retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission, they
are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

Doctrine of INDELIBLE ALLEGIANCE: an individual may be compelled

to retain his original nationality even if he has already renounced or
forfeited it under the laws of the second State whose nationality he
has acquired.

Dual Citizenship – arises as a result of the concurrent application of

the different laws of 2 or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered as a national of said states – involuntary
Dual Allegiance
– refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to 2 or more states
– voluntary
Instances when a citizen of the Philippines may possess dual
citizenship:
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign
countries which follow the principle of jus soli;

2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if

by the laws of their father’s country such children are citizens of that
country;

3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the
former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they
are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.