[Digest] People vs.

Fajardo (1958)
PEOPLE V. FAJARDO (1958)

Reyes, J.B.L.

Facts
Aug. 15, 1950 - Juan Fajardo was the mayor of Baoo, Camarines Sur. During his term the municipal council passed
Ordinance No. 7 which prohibited the construction or repair of any building without a written permit from
the mayor prior to construction or repairing.

1954 - Fajardo and Babillonia (Fajardo’s son-in-law) applied for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their
gas station, still on Fajardo’s private land, separated from public plaza by a creek.
Jan. 16, 1954 – request denied because it would destroy the view of the public plaza.
o Applicants appealed but were turned down again on Jan. 18, 1954.

Fajardo and Babillonia proceeded to construct even without a permit because they claimed that they needed a
residence badly due to a typhoon destroying their previous place of residence
Feb. 26, 1954 – Fajardo et at., were charged and convicted by peace court of Baoo for violating Ordinance no. 7
o CFI – Affirmed
o CA forwarded the case to the SC because “the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.”

Issue/Held: W/N Ordinance No. 7 is a valid exercise police power in its regulation of property.
NO. Ordinance No. 7 went beyond the authority that the municipality could enact and is therefore null and
void. Fajardo et al., acquitted.

Ratio:
• The ordinance is not merely lacking in providing standards to guide and/or control the discretion vested by
the ordinance. STANDARDS ARE ENTIRELY LACKING IN THIS CASE.
o Ordinance grants mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant/deny construction/repair permits
• Legislation may validly regulate property in the interest of general welfare
 Prohibition of offensive structures. HOWEVER, ‘the state may not under the guise of police power
permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to
preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.’
o IN THIS CASE: Structures regardless of their own beauty and regardless of the fact that they are built on
private land are condemned by the ordinance  appellants constrained would be constrained to leave their
land to idle without receiving just compensation for the virtual confiscation of their private land
• Municipal government justified the ordinance under Revised Administrative Code – Sec. 2243 – C – that
municipal council shall have authority to exercise discretionary powers regarding establishing fire limits in
populous centers  empowers municipal government to require construction/repair permits, to charge fees
for such permits

o IN THIS CASE: there were no fire limits or safety regulations that the municipal council promulgated in order
to set a standard in the type of building that can be safely constructed in the public plaza.

People v Fajardo G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958

J. B. L . Reyes

Facts:
Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camrines Sur when the municipal council passed the ordinance that
prohibits the construction of a building that blocks the view of the town plaza. Moreover, it redirects
the grant of permission to the mayor.
After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside the gasoline station near
the town plaza. His request was repeatedly denied. He continued with the construction under the
rationale that he needed a house to stay in because the old one was destroyed by a typhoon.
He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building due to its obstructing view.
He appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the petition due to the question of the ordinance’s
constitutionality.

Issue: Is the ordinance constitutional?

Held: No, petition granted.

Ratio:
The ordinance doesn’t state any standard that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is
an arbitrary and unlimited conferment.
Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which may
be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should
have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the authorities
cited above sustain this conclusion.
The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants
of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts
to a taking of appellants property without just compensation.
While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the state may eliminate
structures offensive to the sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of
their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance
of the community.
Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for urban purposes. To do
this legally, there must be just compensation and they must be given an opportunity to be heard.
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the
property.
The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states:
SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. — The municipal council shall have
authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may
be constructed or repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging
a fee which shall be determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two pesos
for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees collected under the
provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund.
Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established
fire limits within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to
be constructed or repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said
ordinance was not conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243 (c)
G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Higinio V. Catalan for appellee.
Prila, Pardalis and Pejo for appellants.

REYES, J. B. L., J.:

Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur convicting defendants-
appellants Juan F. Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia of a violation of Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of
the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, for having constructed without a permit from the municipal
mayor a building that destroys the view of the public plaza.

It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo
as mayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in
question providing as follows:

SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before
constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor.

SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00
for each repair permit issued.

SEC. 3. PENALTY — Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall make
the violation liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of
not less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court. If said
building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be
removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house.

SEC. 4. EFFECTIVITY — This ordinance shall take effect on its approval. (Orig. Recs., P. 3)

Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son in-law,
appellant Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to
construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's
name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek (Exh. D).
On January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed
building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza (Exh. E). On January 18, 1954,
defendants reiterated their request for a building permit (Exh. 3), but again the request was turned
down by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a
permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been
destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property.

On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace
court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of the ordinance in question. Defendants appealed to the
Court of First Instance, which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced appellants to pay a fine of P35
each and the costs, as well as to demolish the building in question because it destroys the view of
the public plaza of Baao, in that "it hinders the view of travelers from the National Highway to the
said public plaza." From this decision, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter
forwarded the records to us because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in
question.

We find that the appealed conviction can not stand.

A first objection to the validity of the ordinance in question is that under it the mayor has absolute
discretion to issue or deny a permit. The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard
to guide or limit the mayor's action. No purpose to be attained by requiring the permit is expressed;
no conditions for its grant or refusal are enumerated. It is not merely a case of deficient standards;
standards are entirely lacking. The ordinance thus confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted
power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, and it is a settled rule that such an
undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity, per se lawful, is invalid
(People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil., 71; Schloss Poster Adv. Co. vs. Rock
Hill, 2 SE (2d) 392)

The ordinance in question in no way controls or guides the discretion vested thereby in the
respondents. It prescribes no uniform rule upon which the special permission of the city is to
be granted. Thus the city is clothed with the uncontrolled power to capriciously grant the
privilege to some and deny it others; to refuse the application of one landowner or lessee
and to grant that of another, when for all material purposes, the two applying for precisely the
same privileges under the same circumstances. The danger of such an ordinance is that it
makes possible arbitrary discriminations and abuses in its execution, depending upon no
conditions or qualifications whatever, other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city
authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested. Fundamental rights under
our government do not depend for their existence upon such a slender and uncertain thread.
Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and
which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The
ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be
secured. All of the authorities cited above sustain this conclusion.

As was said in City of Richmond vs. Dudley, 129 Ind. 112,28 N. E. 312, 314 13 L. R. A. 587,
28 Am. St. Rep. 180: "It seems from the foregoing authorities to be well established that
municipal ordinances placing restrictions upon lawful conduct or the lawful use of property
must, in order to be valid, specify the rules and conditions to be observed in such conduct or
business; and must admit of the exercise of the privilege of all citizens alike who will comply
with such rules and conditions; and must not admit of the exercise, or of an opportunity for
the exercise, of any arbitrary discrimination by the municipal authorities between citizens
who will so comply. (Schloss Poster Adv. Co., Inc. vs. City of Rock Hill, et al., 2 SE (2d), pp.
394-395).

It is contended, on the other hand, that the mayor can refuse a permit solely in case that the
proposed building "destroys the view of the public plaza or occupies any public property" (as stated
in its section 3); and in fact, the refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to the
appellant was predicated on the ground that the proposed building would "destroy the view of the
public plaza" by preventing its being seen from the public highway. Even thus interpreted, the
ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of
the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a
taking of appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern
tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness
of residents. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare, and in its
pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32
Phil. 580), the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the
aesthetic appearance of the community. As the case now stands, every structure that may be
erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in
question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The
appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious
purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the
municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.

An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for
any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a
taking of the property. The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and
actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of
taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden. (Arverne Bay Constr.
Co. vs. Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR. 1110, 1116).

A regulation which substantially deprives an owner of all beneficial use of his property is
confiscation and is a deprivation within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. (Sundlum vs.
Zoning Bd., 145 Atl. 451; also Eaton vs. Sweeny, 177 NE 412; Taylor vs. Jacksonville, 133
So. 114).

Zoning which admittedly limits property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it
cannot be said to set aside such property to a use but constitutes the taking of such property
without just compensation. Use of property is an element of ownership therein. Regardless of
the opinion of zealots that property may properly, by zoning, be utterly destroyed without
compensation, such principle finds no support in the genius of our government nor in the
principles of justice as we known them. Such a doctrine shocks the sense of justice. If it be of
public benefit that property remain open and unused, then certainly the public, and not the
private individuals, should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for such property under
the rules of law governing the condemnation of private property for public use. (Tews vs.
Woolhiser (1933) 352 I11. 212, 185 N.E. 827) (Emphasis supplied.)

The validity of the ordinance in question was justified by the court below under section 2243, par. (c),
of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended. This section provides:

SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. — The municipal council
shall have authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be
constructed or repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof,
charging a fee which shall be determined by the municipal council and which shall not be
less than two pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The
fees collected under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school
fund.

Under the provisions of the section above quoted, however, the power of the municipal council to
require the issuance of building permits rests upon its first establishing fire limits in populous parts of
the town and prescribing the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them. As
there is absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established fire limits
within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed or
repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was
not conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243 (c) aforequoted.

We rule that the regulation in question, Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the
Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, was beyond the authority of said municipality to enact, and is
therefore null and void. Hence, the conviction of herein appellants is reversed, and said accused are
acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Endencia and
Felix, JJ.,concur.