Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SANDIGANBAYAN
Quezon City
N,I,2S1
Promulgated
RESOLUTION
MUSNGI, J.:
Accused Yap prays. for the Court (a) to dismiss the charges Or quash the
Informations against him .based on inordinate delay in the conduct and
termination of the preliminary investigation of these cases; and (b) to defer
the issuance of warrants of arrest and suspend the conduct of further
proceedings in these cases pending resolution of the instant motion.
F. Fernandez assumed her position as Chairperson of the Sixth Division per Administrative Order No. 314-
2017, in view of J. Ponferrada's retirement on 13 September 2017. The incident was deemed submitted
for resolution after the filing of the prosecution's Comment/Opposition on 13 September 2017 (Record,
p. 553; Rule XII, Sec.3, Revised Internal Rules ofthe Sandiganbayan)
Designated as temporary member of the Sixth Division per Administrative Order No. 124-2017 dated 04
April 2017, in view of the vacancy therein.
* Designated as temporary member per Administrative Order No. 307-A-2017 dated 31 August 2017, in
view of the inhibition of J. Miranda.
** Designated as temporary members per Administrative Order No. 17-C-2017 dated 04December20!
'Sandiganbayan Records, Vol. 1, pp. 288-327.
Criminal Cases Nos. SB -1 7-CRM-1593 to 1596
People vs. Antonino, et al.
RESOLUTION
Page 2 of 9
X-- --- ------- - ----x
Citing the case of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 wherein the Supreme
Court considered as inordinate a delay of only three (3) years in the conclusion
of a preliminary investigation, he asserts that his constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases enshrined in Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution has been violated.
Accused Yap further asserts that his constitutional right to due process
has likewise been violated. He explains that the time limitation for the conduct
of preliminary investigation forms an important part of procedural due process
to which he is entitled.
issued the Resolution finding probable cause against the accused on 03 June
2016. Consequently, accused Yap flied his Motion for Reconsideration on 22
June 2016 which was denied in an Order dated 11 January 2017.
RULING
The Court grants the instant motion for violation of the accused's
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.
"Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies."
Date Indicent
15 June 2010 The Special Audits Office ("SÃO") of the Commission
on Audit ('COX) conducted .a performance audit of
the Priority Development Assistance Fund ("PDAF")
for 2007 to 2009, which included the transactions
subject of the present cases. 8
13 September 2012 The SAO terminated its performance audit of the PDAF
for 2007 to 2009.
4. 1
Criminal Cases Nos. SB -1 7-CRM-1593 to 1596
People vs. Antonino, et al.
RESOLUTION
Page sof9
x------------------------------ -----.-----x
14 August 2013 The SAO released the SAO Report No. 2012-03
containing its findings on the PDAF for 2007 to 2009. 10
18 June 2014 The Complaint-Affidavit dated 28 April 2014 was filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman.
29 October 2014 The Office of the Ombudsman ordered then
respondents, including accused Yap, to file their
Counter-Affidavits.
10 i
e--~Y '
Criminal Cases Nos. SB -1 7-CRM-1593 to 1596
People vs. Antonino, et al.
RESOLUTION
Page 6of9
x------------..---------- --------------x
It is worthy to note that the period spent on the preliminary
investigation upon receiving the Counter-Affidavit Of accused Yap on 03
December 2014 up to the issuance on 03 June 2016 of the Resolution finding
probable cause against, him already constituted a period of one year and six
(6) months delay.
Thereafter, the Office of the Ombudsman spent another one year and
two (2) months to file the Informations with the Sandiganbayan, reckoned
from accused Yap's filing of his Motionfor Reconsideration on 21 June 2016.
Reason for the Delay. The prosecution failed to allege and prove
factual circumstances that could have justified its delay in the conduct of the
reliminary investigation. Instead of offering any plausible reason to justify
why the Office of the Ombudsman spent more than three (3) years and two
(2) months in conducting its preliminary investigation, the prosecution merely
asserted the presumption of regularity in the performance by the Office of the
Ombudsman of its functions and the alleged failure of the accused to show
any sign of asserting his right to a speedy disposition of cases.
A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that
duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with
due process." (citation omitted).
Prejudice Caused by the Delay. Finally, the most serious interest of the
accused which is protected by the right to speedy disposition of cases is the
limitation on the possibility of impairing his/her defense. The inordinate delay
in the disposition of cases against the accused causes anxiety, hostility,,
additional expenses, and restriction on his person and well-being. The case of
Corpuz vs. Sandiganbayan,' 6 is instructive, thus:
14
407 U.S. 514 (1972).
'5 G.R.No. 191411,15 July 2013
16 0.R. No. 162214, 11 November 2004.
Criminal Cases Nos. SB -1 7-CRM-1593 to 1596
People vs. Antonino, et al.
RESOLUTION
Page 8 of 9
X_--------------------- ---------x
"In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right
to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must
be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the
defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.
Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant
that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent
oppressive pre-trial incarceration; 'to minimize anxiety and concerns of
the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be
impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of
a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the
entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable
to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is
not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on
his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often,
hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is
curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy." (emphasis supplied)
In sum, the prejudice and pernicious effect of the inordinate delay that
attended the investigation into these cases against the accused-movant
becomes manifest.
The hold departure order issued by the Court against the abovenamed
accused, if any, is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE, and the cash bond he
posted is ordered RELEASED, subject to the usual accounting and auditing
procedures. . .
Criminal Cases Nos. SB-i 7-CRM-1593 to 1596
People vs. Antonino, et al.
RESOLUTION
Page 9of9
x----------- --------
SO ORDERED.
MICHAEL MUSNGI
We concur:
I JvtuiY
ALTfL Q Y
--U
Associate
-
11? LJDINE FAITH A. EbONG
Associate Justice
We dissent:
iko D1 4
0 4ft
*
i II
14 %'
DISSENTING OPINION
The record shows that Complaint-Affidavit' was filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman on June 18, 2014. The Ombudsman approved the
Resolution4 finding probable cause to indict the accused on June 9, 2016 -
around one (1) year and eleven (11) months after the Complaint-Affidavit
was filed. Thereafter, accused Antonino, Yap and Javellana filed their
1
G.R. No. 162214, November 11, 2004
2
Reiterated in the more recent case of Remulla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 218040, April 17, 2017
'Dated April 28, 2014; Record, Vol. 1, pp. 74-98
4
Dated June 3, 2016; Record, Vol. 1, pp. 8-53
DISSENTING OPINION
People v. Antonino, et al.
SB-17-CRM-1593 to 1596
Page 2 of 5
x----------------------------------------x
xxx
Page 3 of 5
Supreme Court did not include the period for the Commission on Audit's
(COA) special audit in computing the length of delay. To wit:
While it may be argued that there was a distinction between the two
sets of investigations conducted in 1996 and 2006, such that they pertain
to distinct acts of different personalities, it cannot be denied that the basis
for both sets of investigations emanated from the same COA Special Audit
Report No. 92-128, which was issued as early as June 18, 1993. Thus,
the Ombudsman had more than enough time to review the same and
conduct the necessary investigation white the individuals implicated
therein, such as herein petitioner, were still in active service.
• Even assuming that the COA Special Audit Report No. 92-128 was
only turned over to the Ombudsman on December 11, 1996 upon the filing
of the Affidavit of the COA Auditors, still, it had been in the Ombudsman's
possession and had been the subject of their review and scrutiny for at
least eight (8) years before Tanodbayan Marcelo ordered the conduct of a
preliminary investigation, and at least sixteen (16) years before the
Ombudsman found probable cause on February 25, 2010.
The point of reckoning was either the date of the issuance of the
COA's Special Audit Report No. 92-128 or the time when such report was
turned over to the Ombudsman. Either way, it appears that the Supreme
Court, in computing the length of delay, only considered the time when the
Office of the Ombudsman had actual control over the case before it. To be
sure, the fact-finding investigation conducted prior to the preliminary
investigation should be included in the computation. But such fact-finding
investigation pertains to that conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman,
and not by other agencies.
Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman was created under the mantle
of the Constitution, mandated to be the "protector of the people" and as
such, required to "act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against officers and employees of the Government, or of any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, in order to promote efficient service."
This great responsibility cannot be simply brushed aside by ineptitude.
Precisely, the Office of the Ombudsman has the inherent duty not only to
carefully go through the particulars of case but also to resolve the same
within the proper length of time. Its dutiful performance should not only be
gauged by the quality of the assessment but also by the reasonable
promptness of its dispensation. Thus, barring any extraordinary
complication, such as the degree of difficulty of the questions involved in
the case or any event external thereto that effectively stymied its normal,,/
Page 4 of 5
work activity - any of which have not been adequately proven by the
prosecution in the case at bar - there appears to be no justifiable basis as
to why the Office of the Ombudsman could not have earlier resolved the
preliminary investigation proceedings against the petitioners.
Necessarily, the Office of the Ombudsman must have control over the
case before it could act on it. The Office of the Ombudsman can act on
matters before it only after such matters are brought before it, whether by
another person, government agency, or by the offices under its control.
Here, there is no indication of the exact date the matter was brought
to the Office of the Ombudsman, but it appears that the fact-finding
investigation commenced sometime in 2014.10 Both the Complaint-Affidavit
and the Ombudsman's Resolution mention COA Special Audits Office
(SAO) Report No. 2012-03. It appears that such report, which may have
served as one of the bases of said Complaint-Affidavit, was transmitted to
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) only on August 14,
2013 . 11 Thus, the Office of the Ombudsman may have received a copy of
the same only after such date. It cannot be said that, as held in the
majority's opinion, accused Yap was subjected to fact-finding investigation
and preliminary investigation within a combined period of seven (7) years,
two (2) months, and seven (7) days.
The total period of around three (3) years and two (2) months can be
broken down into the following:
4. The approval of said Order to the filing of the Informations with this
Court on August 22, 2017 (around 4 months).
It can be seen that although not all respondents filed their respective
counter-affidavits, all of them were given the opportunity to be heard , /
Page 5 of 5
The present cases are only part of several cases involving the PDAF.
Considering that the Office of the Ombudsman also handles other PDAF
cases, in addition to those cases not involving the PDAF, the undersigned
is of the opinion that the time it took to terminate the preliminary
investigation is not unreasonable. The delay not being unreasonable, it
cannot be said that such can be characterized as vexatious, capricious and
oppressive. There was no violation of accused Yap's right to speedy
disposition of cases.
J NE~ T. FE NNA EZ
Associate Justice
Chairperson
13
G.R. Nos. 146368-69, October 18, 2004
14
G.R. No. 126814, March 2, 2000