Vietnam War: The Battles of Coral (S H I) and Balmoral (Đ NG Tràm) - May 1968: The Vietnamese Communist Accounts - Including Three Sketch Maps.

1
The Battles of Coral (Sở Hội) and

Balmoral (Đồng Tràm) –
May 1968
The Vietnamese Communist Accounts – including three sketch maps

(Ernie Chamberlain – 2018)
2
The author has also published the following on the Vietnam War:
Books:
The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story, 2011 (ISBN 978-0-9805623-4-7).
The Viet Cong D440 Battalion: Their Story (and the Battle of Binh Ba), 2013
(ISBN 978-0-9805623-5-4).
The 33rd Regiment – North Vietnamese Army: Their Story (and the Battle of Binh Ba),
2014 (ISBN 978-0-9750350-5-4).
The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story (and the Battle of Long Tan), 2016
(ISBN 978-09805623-4-7).
The 33rd Regiment (North Vietnamese Army): Their History (including the Battles of Binh
Ba - 1969 and Nui Le - 1971), 2016 (ISBN 978-0-9750350-61).
Research Notes:
Commander D445 Battalion: Bui Quang Chanh or Nguyen Van Kiem ? – Research Note
23/2010, 2 September 2010.
The Battle of Binh Ba - a baffling “Mystery” and SIGINT failure ?, January 2013 – in The
Bridges Review.
The Battle of Coral - 13 May 1968: Intelligence Aspects and Enemy Strengths. Research
Note 07/2014, 31 July 2014.
1 ATF’s Trainng and Liaison Unit (TALU), Research Note 9/2015, 6 September 2015.
Vietnam War: The Battle of Coral – Vietnamese Accounts (and a sketch map), Research
Note 01/2016, 5 January 2016.
The Battle of Long Tan: NVA/VC Documents, Weapons, Interrogation Reports,
Research Note 5/2016, 4 June 2016.
Vietnam War: Incoming - Shelling of Nui Dat, 17 August 1966 , Research Note 6A/2016,
29 June 2016.
Vietnam War: The Battle of Balmoral / Đồng Tràm: The NVA Assaults on the FSPB –
26 and 28 May 1968 – Involvement of the 141st NVA Regiment, Note 2/2017, 7 July 2017.
Vietnam War: The Battle of Long Tân: Việt Cộng Casualties – “New” Material,
Research Note 4/2017, 8 October 2017.
Vietnam War: The Battles of Coral (Sở Hội) and Balmoral (Đồng Tràm) – May 1968:
The Vietnamese Communist Accounts – including three sketch maps. Research Note
1/2018, 26 January 2018.
Presentations (Powerpoint) :
“Tougher than us – the NVA/VC”, Australian War Memorial Conference: “Vietnam:

International Perspectives on a Long War”, Canberra, 16 August 2013.
“A Tough Enemy – the NVA/VC”, Geelong Vietnam Veterans Association, Geelong. 13

November 2013.
“The Enemy and Intelligence in Phuoc Tuy – Successes and Failures”, National Vietnam
Veterans Museum – Phillip Island, 12 April 2014.
3
The Battles of Coral (Sở Hội) and Balmoral (Đồng Tràm) –

May 1968: The Vietnamese Communist Accounts
CONTENTS
Introduction and Overview. – pp.5-7.
Operation Toàn Thắng I (Complete Victory I). – p.8.
Australian Accounts – Assaults on FSPB Coral: 13 and 16 May 1968. – pp.9-10.
Vietnamese Accounts – Assaults on FSPB Coral: 13 and 16 May 1968. - pp.10-15.
The Second Attack at Coral/Sở Hội – 15/16 May 1968. – pp.15-16.
An Award for the 141st Regiment – and Commendations for Personnel. – p.17.
The Sở Hội Memorial. – pp.17-18.
Australian Accounts – Assaults on FSPB Balmoral: 26 and 28 May 1968. – pp.18-20.
Vietnamese Accounts: Assaults on Balmoral/Đồng Tràm – 26 and 28 May 1968. – pp.20-22.
A Detailed and Critical Vietnamese Account On-line. – pp.22-23.
US Reports. – pp.23-24.
The 141st NVA Regiment at Balmoral – a Summary. – pp.24-26.
Accuracy – p.26.
Attachments:
1. Map: Eastern III Corps Tactical Zone – 1968 (noting FSPBs Coral and Balmoral) –
p.29.
2. Map: Border Area: Phú Giao District (Bình Dương Province)/Tân Uyên District
(Biên Hòa Province) – and FSPBs Balmoral, Coral, and Coogee (Operation Toàn
Thắng - Phases 7 & 8, Scale 1: 50,000). – p.31.
3. Map: AO Newport/FSPB Balmoral, 1: 50,000. – p.33.
4. “Surprise Attack at Sở Hội” … (A Number of Battles in the Resistance War Against
the French and the Americans), Tập (Volume) I, 1991) – including sketch map, see
f.22 and pp.35-38.
5. 7th NVA Division History – Extract. – pp.39-40.
6. Conduct of the Surprise Attack on Sở Hội by the 141st Regiment/7th Division
on 13 May 1968 (141st Regiment History). Sketch Map. – p.41.
7. The Second Mobile Assault at Sở Hội - 16 May 1968 (141st Regiment History).
Sketch Map. – p.43.
8. “Balmoral 2”: A Detailed Vietnamese Account On-line – The 165th and 141st
Regiments at Balmoral 2 - from: Dựng Nước - Giữ Nước . – pp.45-48.
9. Vietnamese Casualties at the Battles of Coral and Balmoral and the Recovery of
Remains. – pp.49-54.
10. The Battles of Coral and Balmoral: Extracts from Captured Documents and
PW/Rallier Debriefings. – pp.55-59.
Bibliography - pp.61-63.
4
((This page is intentionally blank))

5
Brigadier E.P. (Ernie) Chamberlain, CSC (Retd) 1 Watermans Court

Point Lonsdale VIC 3225
Australia
Email: chamber@pipeline.com.au
Research Note 1A/2018
5 March 2018
Australian Army History Unit
For information:
Department of Veterans’ Affairs
Australian War Memorial
Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal
Museum of Australian Military Intelligence
Vietnam War: The Battles of Coral (Sở Hội) and Balmoral (Đồng Tràm) –
May 1968: The Vietnamese Communist Accounts – including three sketch maps.
References:
A. Hodges, I., The Battle of Fire Support Bases Coral/Balmoral – Vietnam 1968,
Department of Veterans’ Affairs, Canberra, 2008.
B. People’s Armed Forces (PAVN) On-Line, “Confirming the Names of 33
Martyrs in Two Mass Graves in Tân Uyên District (Bình Dương)”, 3 October
2010 (in Vietnamese).
C. Chamberlain, E.P., Vietnam War: The Battle of Coral - 13 May 1968:
Intelligence Aspects and Enemy Strengths – Research Note 07/2014, 31 July
2014.
D. Chamberlain, E.P., Vietnam War: The Battle of Coral – Vietnamese Accounts
(and a sketch map), Research Note 1/2016, 5 January 2016.
E. Chamberlain, E.P., Vietnam War: The Battle of Balmoral / Đồng Tràm: The
NVA Assaults on the FSPB – 26 and 28 May 1968 – Involvement of the 141st
NVA Regiment, Research Note 2/2017, 6 July 2017.
F. DVA Website: Australia and the Vietnam War, http://vietnam-
war.commemoration.gov.au/combat/coral-balmoral.php
Introduction and Overview
In recent years, several English-language media articles have reviewed the

Battles of Coral and Balmoral fought during the “Mini-Tet”1 in May 1968 in Tân
Uyên District of Biên Hòa Province (Coral) and (then) Phú Giao District of Bình
Dương Province (Balmoral). Several accounts have been principally associated with
Vietnam veteran Brian Cleaver’s on-the-ground search for Vietnamese remains. His
activities culminated in the 2015 documentary film - “The Crater”, produced by David
1
According to US intelligence staffs, the 1st Phase of the communists’ 1968 Tết Offensive concluded
on 6 April; the 2nd Phase - lasting 36 days, ended on 14 June; and the 3rd Phase lasted 33 days (18
August until early September 1968). - Sorley, L., Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes 1968-1972,
Vietnam Chronicles, Texas Tech University Press, Lubbock, 2004, p.173. US MACV and the Republic
of Vietnam were forewarned of the 2nd Phase of the Offensive by NVA Lieutenant Colonel Trần Văn
Đắc (aka Tám Hà) – Assistant Political Officer of Sub-Region 1, who defected on 19 April 1968.
Initially planned to begin on 27 April, the 2nd Phase Offensive was launched on 5 May 1968.
6
Bradbury. No doubt, as a result of Brian Cleaver’s activities - and liaison with the
Vietnamese authorities, knowledge and documentation on the Battles of Coral and
Balmoral in DVA, the AWM, and the AAHU has increased. With the Defence
Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal’s ongoing consideration of the battles of Coral
and Balmoral (that reportedly received over 150 submissions) – and as the 50th
Anniversary of those two Battles approaches, interest in the engagement can certainly
be expected to increase. I note the very active blog on the Internet, the 2017 U-Tube
video, and the 2017 on-line petition to Veterans’ Affairs Minister Tehan (8000+
signatures). With the 50th Anniversary of the Battles in May this year, more accounts
will undoubtedly be published, and there is a probability that Dr Ian Hodges’ book
(Reference A) might be republished.
In earlier quite esoteric Research Notes (as listed in “References”), I have
reviewed Australian assessments of the NVA forces at the Battles of Coral and
Balmoral - and, based on recently available Vietnamese material, confirmed the
involvement of the 141st NVA Regiment 2 at the Battle of Coral - and also the Battle
of Balmoral (which is not referenced in Australian reporting of that Battle). 3
This Note reviews Vietnamese-language material – including histories sourced
in late 2017 - eg the histories of the 141st NVA Regiment 4, the 165th NVA Regiment
5
, and a brief work by Major General (Retd) Đào Văn Lợi 6 who fought at the Battle
of Coral as a 141st Regiment cadre. Australian accounts of the Battles are also briefly
recounted in the following paragraphs.
In summary, Vietnamese accounts of the Battle of Coral and the Battle of
Balmoral include several inaccuracies in the conduct and outcomes of those
engagements - and in the detail of participants and the events. For example, the
reviewed Vietnamese accounts relate that the Australian 4RAR [sic]7 was attacked
2
Cover designators for the 141st NVA Regiment included: Q41 (from March 1966), 14 th Regiment
(Q14), K41, and V17 (from October 1967). On 26 July 1968, NVA Senior Lieutenant Phạm Lục rallied
in Bình Dương Province. A political officer, he had been assigned to the 141 st NVA Regiment from 20
April 1968 to evaluate its medical staff and convalescent system. During his debriefing, Phạm Lục
related that - prior to the May 1968 Offensive, both V17 (141st NVA Regiment) and V15 (165th
Regiment) had “full TOE” strengths of 1600-1800. During that May 1968 Offensive, the 141st
Regiment had reportedly suffered “600-700 casualties”. “Approx two-thirds of the casualties were
suffered on the various battlefields of the Offensive from small arms, air strikes, and artillery”. The
165th Regiment (V15) had “suffered approx 800 – 900 casualties during the May Offensive.” His
account of the 141st Regiment’s attack on FSB Coral (which he called “Sở Hội”) on 16 May is not
accurate in parts – VCAT Item No. F034604240408, see also footnote 37 and Attachment 10.
3
Chamberlain, E.P., Vietnam War: The Battle of Balmoral / Đồng Tràm: The NVA Assaults on the
FSPB – 26 and 28 May 1968 – Involvement of the 141st NVA Regiment, Research Note 2/2017, 6 July
2017. The Note also relates on-line criticism in recent years by Vietnamese communist historians of the
NVA attacks on Balmoral as máy móc (ie: mechanistic/robotic/inflexible/repetitive) – see the following
footnotes 59, 62 and Attachment 8 in this Research Note.
4
Colonel Trần Xuân Ban, Trung Đoàn 141 (Sư Đoàn 7, Quân Đoàn 4), People’s Armed Forces
Publishing House, Hà Nội, 1997.
5
Colonel Nguyễn Xuân Quý, Trung Đoàn Bộ Binh 165 (Sư Đoàn 7, Quân Đoàn 4) 1946-2001,
People’s Armed Forces Publishing House, Hà Nội, 2003.
6
Major General (Retd) Đào Văn Lợi, Trận mạc và giảng đường (Close Combat and University Halls),
People’s Armed Forces Publishing House, Hà Nội, 2010, pp.64-65.
7
4RAR did not arrive in Vietnam unit June 1968 – several weeks after the Battles of Coral and
Balmoral. The mistaken reference to “4RAR” at Coral in Vietnamese accounts is probably because
4RAR - after its initial Operations Redwing and Kosciusko, deployed into the Đồng Nai River/Tân
Uyên area on Operation Toàn Thắng II on 23 June 1968 – ie into AO Birdsville, to protect the north-
eastern approach to Long Bình. Rather, as detailed correctly in Australian accounts, 1RAR was the
1ATF unit that was attacked at FSPB Coral in the early hours of 13 May 1968. Vietnamese accounts –
including sketch maps, do not note the presence of HQ 3RAR and 161 Battery RNZAA within the
7
and defeated at FSPB Coral on 13 May 1968 – and the Australian troops fled
“helter-skelter” south down Route 16 to Tân Uyên District Town, and were replaced
at FSPB Coral by US units of the 1st US Infantry Division. Vietnamese texts also
contend US units alone defended FSPB Balmoral. According to an official
Vietnamese history, an Australian soldier was purportedly captured at FSPB
Coral. Of interest, three sketch maps from Vietnamese histories of the attacks on
FSPB Coral are reproduced in the following pages of this Note. In recent years – on
an official Vietnamese military website, Vietnamese historians have queried NVA
tactics in the attacks on Coral and Balmoral – ie citing such as inappropriately
“mechanistic, inflexible, and repetitive”.
From the foregoing Vietnamese documents, the outline NVA/VC order-of-
battle at the engagements appears to have been: Coral 1 – 141st NVA Regiment (2nd
8
Battalion, 3rd Battalion); Coral 2 – 141st NVA Regiment, C.302 Tân Uyên District
Company; Balmoral 1 9 - 141st NVA Regiment (and possibly elements of 165th
Regiment); Balmoral 2 – 165th NVA Regiment (two battalions); 1st Battalion/141st
NVA Regiment.
7th NVA Division Organisation – as at 7 May 1968 10
perimeter of FSPB Coral - nor the infantry companies of 1RAR and 3RAR in positions outside the
FSPB, on 12-13 May. Also, Vietnamese accounts do not relate the arrival at FSPB Coral on 13 May of
Headquarters 1ATF, the Task Force Maintenance Area (TFMA), and other support elements.
8
If a NVA soldier was KIA or became a PW - and had an infiltration pass on him or in his pack, such
did not necessarily indicate that his whole Infiltration Group had been recently fighting as a Group on
the battlefield where he was killed or captured. More likely, the pass was an “historical”/administrative
document that he carried with him for quite some time after his arrival – ie when serving with the unit
to which he was allocated from his Infiltration Group. See footnotes 12 and 14; and Attachment 10.
9
The 7th NVA Division history, the 141st NVA Regiment history – and the Vietnamese military history
website/forum “Dựng Nước - Giữ Nước”, cite the 141st Regiment at Balmoral 1. The Australian
Official History however implies that the attack on FSPB Balmoral early on 26 May 1968 was by
elements of the 165th Regiment alone. The 165th Regiment History (2003) does not relate the
Regiment’s involvement in the Balmoral 1 attack – only the Balmoral 2 attack. However, Bùi Dúc
Tuấn and Trần Văn Tuc of the 165th NVA Regiment were reportedly captured at Balmoral on 27 May
1968 – ie before the Balmoral 2 attack on 28 May 1968.
10
US and RVNAF intelligence on NVA/VC organisation, plans and activities in May 1968 benefited
from the defection and debriefing of NVA Lieutenant Colonel Phan Mậu (ie: Lieutenant Colonel Phan
8
Operation Toàn Thắng I (Complete Victory I)
During Operation Toàn Thắng I, on 25 April 1968, a Forward Headquarters of

the 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) deployed from Núi Đất to the major Bearcat
base to command two of its battalions operating in Biên Hòa Province in,
successively, the Murray Bridge, Columbus, and Surfers areas-of-operation (AOs).
The 1 ATF After Action Report for this Operation relates: “It was anticipated that the
AO Surfers area ((see the maps at Attachments 1-3)) would be in a position to
interdict ((enemy)) exfiltration routes from Saigon. … on 12 [sic] May 68 1 ATF was
ordered by ((US)) II FFV to occupy blocking positions within AO SURFERS to
interdict enemy withdrawal routes from the South and South West [sic – ie NVA/VC
moving to the north and north-east]” … “to interdict enemy withdrawal/infiltration
routes beween Saigon/Southern Catchers Mitt/War Zone D areas.”
1 ATF’s FSPB Coral was established at XT 9329 on 12 May 1968 11 with the
helicopter-deployment of 1RAR, 3RAR, 12 Field Battery RAA, and 161 Field Battery
RNZAA. HQ 1 ATF, the Task Force Maintenance Area (TFMA), and other elements
remaining at the Bearcat base were scheduled to move to FSPB Coral on 13 May.
Subsequently, FSPB Balmoral was established at XT 933339 by 3RAR on 24 May -
about four kilometres north of FSPB Coral.
The 1 ATF post-operation Intelligence Review of Operation Toàn Thắng
noted that: “The presence of 1 ATF in AO Surfers I and II was hurting the enemy
particularly in that we were threatening his traditional rear supply area near Binh My,
((see the attached maps)) and in that we were astride a major infiltration/exfiltration
route to and from Saigon.”12
Việt Dũng aka Phan Mậu, Ba Mậu – b. Saigon, 1930). He had been the operations and training officer
of the 7th NVA Division from July 1966, then 2ic of 165 Regiment and later CO from – reportedly from
October 1967. On 7 May 1968, Phan Mậu defected to the Saigon Government. Phan Việt Dũng/Phan
Mậu related that on 5 May his Regiment’s “main activity was in Lái Thiêu ((XT 8605 - eight
kilometres north of Saigon; 20 kilometres west-southwest of Tân Uyên District Town)) in Bình Dương
Province with the 5th ((ARVN)) Division as its main target, and then to be ready to proceed to Saigon
should the situation become favourable.” – Transcript of Press Conference, Saigon, 31 May 1968.
VCAT Item No. 2121107027; biography: VCAT Item No. UA1795119136620B0; photo: 2390321002.
During his debriefing, Phan Mậu provided detailed information on the organization, personnel,
equipment, and activities of the 7th NVA Division and the 165th NVA Regiment – including noting that
the 165th NVA Regiment (aka Q12, 12th Regiment, V15) suffered 300 KIA during the first phase of Tết
1968 (until his defection on 7 May 1968) - see VCAT Item No. F034603571270 and Attachment 10.
Some of the foregoing is also noted in: Trần Xuân Ban, The History of the 7th NVA Division 1966-
2006, People’s Armed Forces Publishing House, Hanoi, 2006.
11
1 ATF, Combat Operations After Action Report (to CG II FFV), Operation Toan Thang I: 21 April –
7 June 1968, July 1968, p.13 (AWM95, 1/4/111). The deployments and engagements during Operation
Toàn Thắng I (Total/Complete Victory I) were to counter the Second Phase (5 May – 14 June) of the
communists’ 1968 Tết Offensive – the “Mini-Tết”. The 1 ATF “QUARTEREVAL” Report explained
the aim of “Operation Toan Thang (Phase 5)” was “to interdict enemy withdrawal routes from the
South and South-West and enemy entry routes to Saigon from the North and North-East.” “Toan
Thang (Phase 6) was initiated on 24 May and completed on 6 June 1968”. 1 ATF, Quarterly Evaluation
Report (QUARTEREVAL), 1 Apr 68 – 30 Jun 68, Nui Dat, 5 July 1968.
12
1 ATF, Intelligence Review Op Toan Thang, Nui Dat, 21 June 1968, p.3. A 3RAR post-operation
report also described the “Significance of the AO to the Enemy” in its Intelligence Summary: “The area
to the east of Route 16 borders on to War Zone ‘D’ and the Catchers Mitt. It is into these bastions of
the enemy that supplies of arms, material and infiltration groups flow from North Vietnam prior to
being distributed throughout the III Corps Tactical Zone. To threaten the security of these areas is to
threaten the viable presence of the enemy in III Corps. The large population along Route 16 in this
area, and in particular the population of the village of Binh My XT 9034 are controlled by the enemy
and are utilized to provide food, labour, intelligence, and recruits … highly sympathetic to the enemy
9
Australian Accounts – Assaults on FSPB Coral: 13 and 16 May 1968 13
The Official Australian History notes that the assault on FSPB Coral -
beginning at 0145hrs on 13 May 1968, was conducted by “one battalion of 141 NVA
Regiment ((7th NVA Division)), augmented by 275 and 269 Infiltration Groups.” 14
The 1 ATF After Action Report related that fire “by RPG and mortars into the FSPB
… was followed by a ground attack by an estimated battalion.”15 The 1 ATF
Intelligence Review of 21 June 1968 also noted the attacking force as the 141st NVA
cause.” - 3RAR, Operation Toan Thang – Operational Analysis: 21 Apr – 5 Jun 68, Nui Dat, 17 June
1968 (AWM95, 7/3/62) – Battle for Balmoral No 1 – 26 May 68 (Appendix 1 to Annex B).
13
For intelligence aspects of the Battle of Coral (ie that communist accounts refer to as “The Attack at
Sở Hội”) – including the pre-deployment intelligence on NVA formations briefed to the 1 ATF Orders
Group and annexed to the 1 ATF OPS35 FRAG O 6 to OpO 19/68 of 10 May 1968 issued at Bearcat,
see Reference C – ie Annex A to that OpO “Enemy Situation in AO Surfers” identified “the following
enemy regiments have already been contacted in or near AO Surfers: 141 NVA Regt (Str now 975),
165 NVA Regt (Str now 694), 274 VC Regt (Str now 720), 275 VC Regt (Str ?), Dong Nai Regt (Str
now 8-900); in addition the following LF or district elements are also operating in or near AO Surfers
…”. For detail on the NVA attack against FSPB Coral – including a Vietnamese sketch diagram of the
assault published in 1991, see Reference D and the sketch map inserted at page 11 and Attachment 4 of
this Note. On seeming Australian “complacency”, author Lex McAulay cites 2LT L. J. Studley
(3RAR): “we took little notice of Intsums and Intreps, as they always over-estimated enemy strengths.
To believe them would have led to ulcers.” McAulay, L., The Battle of Coral and Balmoral: Vietnam
Fire Support Bases Coral and Balmoral – May 1968, Arrow, Milsons Point, 1989, p.33.
14
McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive: The Australian Army in the Vietnam War – January 1967
- June 1968, Allen&Unwin – in association with the Australian War Memorial, Crows Nest, 2003,
p.364. In Research Note 07/2014 on intelligence aspects of Coral (Reference C), I noted my research
on the Infiltration Groups - including: 32 IG, 165 IG, 233 IG, 269 IG, 275 IG, D 280 IG, 745 IG, NAM
HA IG. The 275th Infiltration Group – 400 strong, infiltrated from December 1967 to April 1968 and
was allocated to the 141st NVA Regiment. The 200-strong 233rd Infiltration Group – comprising troops
from the 3rd Regiment of the 338th NVA Division, arrived in the Bình Mỹ area in May 1968. In an
email (12 July 2014) to the AAHU, I related that Infiltration Groups did not fight as entities – rather,
they were split-up on arrival and allocated to formations and units. I also provided detail on the dates of
departure from the North, arrival dates in the South, and the strengths of the groups noted above.
Importantly, I also noted to the AAHU that “if a NVA soldier was KIA or became a PW - and had an
infiltration pass on him or in his pack, such did not necessarily indicate that his whole Infiltration
Group had been recently fighting as a Group on the battlefield where he was killed or captured. More
likely, the pass was an ‘historical’/administrative document that he carried with him for quite some
time after his arrival – ie when serving with the unit to which he was allocated from his Infiltration
Group.” For example, a 141st NVA Regiment soldier killed on 13 May 1968 at Coral was carrying his
D259 Infiltration Group pass issued in late November 1960, and another was carrying his D304
Infiltration Group pass issued in January 1960. In early 1968, Infiltration Groups – with an average
strength of 200-400 men, moved south mainly on foot (ie from the Vinh area in North Vietnam) and
averaged 10-12 kilometres per day for about 120 days to cover over 1,300 kilometres to reach the
COSVN area. For a detailed description of infiltration, see the account of Tạ Hồng Cu (Infiltration
Group 307C) who joined the 165th NVA Regiment in the South (captured on 17 May 1968 by US
forces) - VCAT Item No. F034604272343. The serial numbers for Infiltration Groups departing the
North changed from three digits to four digits in February 1968. Some of the Infiltration Groups noted
above might perhaps have been “vanguard” personnel of the 7th Division’s 209th Regiment that reached
the South in mid-late 1968. In the “War Against the French”, from 1951 the 312 th Division’s infantry
regiments were the 141st (cover designator: Ba Vì), 165th (cover designators: Thành Đồng Biên
Giới/Border Bulwark, Lao Hà Yên) and the 209th (cover designator: Sông Lô). In the “American War”,
the 209th Regiment initially fought as a 312th NVA Division element in the Central Highlands and did
not reach the “Southern Battlefield” to join its “fraternal” French-resistance era infantry regiments – the
141st and the 165th, as part of the 7th NVA Division until mid-late 1968.
15
1 ATF, Combat Operations After Action Report (to CG II FFV), Operation Toan Thang I, op.cit.,
July 1968, p.18 (AWM95, 1/4/111). The 1RAR Combat Operations After Action Report 2/68 - dated
30 June 1968, also refers to a “bn size attack”, see paragraph 22 (AWM95, 7/1/79).
10
Regiment’s K2 and K3 Battalions, and the 269 and 275 Infiltration Groups – and
records “55 NVA KIA (BC), 1 NVA PW (2 Bn/141 NVA Regt)”.16
The “second attack” on FSPB Coral - beginning at 0230hrs on 16 May 1968,
is described in the Official Australian History as “a regimental-sized attack” 17 on
FSPB Coral. The 1 ATF After Action Report had similarly related “an attack from an
estimated regiment”.18 The 1 ATF Intelligence Review also noted the attacking NVA
force as the 141st NVA Regiment (K2 and K3 Battalions, C17 RCL Company, C18
AA Company), and the 269 and 275 Infiltration Groups – the NVA casualties were
recorded as “37 NVA KIA (BC), 10 Poss KIA, 1 NVA PW”.19
Regrettably, few Australian signals intelligence (SIGINT) records of the Coral
and Balmoral engagements are yet available.20
Vietnamese Accounts – Assaults on FSPB Coral: 13 and 16 May 1968
The NVA attacks on FSPBs Coral and Balmoral are included in several
official Vietnamese histories. The major multi-volume work on the American War –
“The History of the Resistance War for National Salvation …” 21 relates:
“In the middle week of May ((1968)), the 14th Regiment ((ie the 141st NVA
Regiment)) of the 7th Division – supported by COSVN artillery, attacked the base at
Sở Hội ((ie FSPB Coral)) driving an infantry battalion from the battlefield and
destroying two combined artillery emplacements. The Tân Uyên District troops
((C.302)) – reinforced by the Bình Mỹ village guerillas, set up many defensive lines
16
1 ATF, Intelligence Review Op Toan Thang, Nui Dat, 21 June 1968, p.2. NVA/VC unit and
formation titles were annotated in manuscript on the Review by (then) Major G.C. Cameron (GSO2 Int
1 ATF) – email to Chamberlain from Lieutenant Colonel G.C. Cameron (Retd), 23 July 2014. These
elements are also cited as the attacking force on 13 May in McAulay, L., The Battle of Coral and
Balmoral, op.cit., 1989, p.344. At p.353, Lex McAulay acknowledged Lieutenant Colonel G.C.
Cameron (Retd) as the information source for NVA units at the Battles. However, McAulay also cites a
“85 Regiment” not cited by Cameron – but see comments at footnote 72.
17
McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, p.375. The 1 ATF QUARTEREVAL Report
noted that “Operation Toan Thang introduced the Task Force into operations where for the first time
the enemy was met in regimental strength …”. 1 ATF, Quarterly Evaluation Report
(QUARTEREVAL), 1 Apr 68 – 30 Jun 68, 5 July 1968, p.13. However, 1 ATF elements had earlier
engaged the 275th VC Main Force Regiment and D445 Local Force Battalion at the Battle of Long Tân
on 18 August 1966.
18
July 1968, p.18 (AWM95, 1/4/111).
19
1 ATF, Intelligence Review Op Toan Thang, Nui Dat, 21 June 1968, p.2. These elements are also
cited as the attacking force on 16 May in McAulay, L., The Battle of Coral and Balmoral, op.cit., 1989,
p.344 – as sourced from 1 ATF intelligence reports, see footnote 16.
20
Following the first attack on FSPB Coral, NVA signals operating instructions (SOIs) were found
among the recovered documents. On 18 May, a three-man intercept team from 1 ATF’s 547 Signals
Troop (initially: Sergeant Jim Brill, Sergeant Fred Hawkes, and Corporal Tom Williams) was deployed
to FSPB Coral – 547 Sig Tp Progress Report, 1-31 May 1968. While successful in intercepting some
NVA VHF Low-Level Voice (LLV) transmissions, the messages were not readable as the unfamiliar
phonetic/voice codes could not be deciphered. However, 547 Signals Troop weekly summaries (ie only
recently available) – with annotated maps, do not include information on 7th NVA Division formations
or units – but are focused on the 5th VC Division and its elements. Discussions between: Ernie
Chamberlain, Tom Williams, and Major (Retd) R.W. Hartley, AM - December 2015; and Hartley,
R.W., AM & Hampstead, B.V., The Story of 547 Signal Troop in South Vietnam 1966-1972, Googong,
2016 – Australian War Memorial – MSS2216/ AWM2016.294.2, pp.270-274.
21
Nguyễn Văn Minh - Colonel, Lịch sử Kháng chiến chống Mỹ cứu nước 1954-1975 (The History of
the Resistance War for National Salvation against the Americans, Tập (Vol) 5, NXBCTQG, Hà Nội,
2001. http://www.vnmilitaryhistory.net/index.php?topic=15458.50 .
11
to defeat the sweeping operations of an American [sic] battalion at Đồng Tràm lake
((FSPB Balmoral)), killing and wounding almost one hundred of the enemy.”
A broad-ranging Vietnamese military history – “A Number of Battles …”22,
published in 1991, also includes a passage on the Battle of Coral – titled: “The
Surprise Attack at Sở Hội” (ie Coral) – see the translation of that passage at
Attachment 4 to this Note. That work describes the 12/13 May attack on FSPB Coral
in greater detail than other Vietnamese accounts sighted to date. It identifies several
senior cadre of both the 7th NVA Division and the 141st NVA Regiment who were
involved in the attack on FSPB Coral.
That 1991 “A Number of Battles” account relates that: “at exactly 0300hrs on
13 May, the Regimental Commander gave the order for the mortars and RCLs to open
fire. … The 12th Company discovered a number of enemy fleeing on Route 16 to Tân
Uyên – so the deputy company commander led a pursuit force, but was stopped by
enemy artillery fire.” The account concludes with the “Results of the Battle” ie:
“After an hour of fighting, we had seized one heavy machine gun, two medium
machine guns, one 81mm mortar, one 61mm [sic] mortar, and two AR-15s. We had
destroyed three 105mm mobile artillery pieces, three 106.7mm mortars, one 81mm
mortar, and set fire to two tanks and one helicopter. We suffered 35 wounded and 42
comrades were killed in action.”
Perhaps of most interest in “A Number Battles” is the sketch map (ie Diển
Biển …23) - previously examined in Reference D, and included below:
Conduct of the Surprise Attack on Sở Hội by the 141st Regiment/7th Division

(13 May 1968) – see also an A-4 sized copy within Attachment 4.
22
Trung tá (Lieutenant Colonel) Phạm Vĩnh Phúc, Một số trận đánh trong Kháng chiến chống Pháp,
Kháng chiến chống Mỹ (A Number of Battles in the Resistance War Against the French and the
Americans), Tập (Volume) I, 1991.
23
The title of the sketch map: “Diển Biển Trận Tập Kích Sở Hội của eBB141/fBB7 (Ngày 13 tháng 5
năm 1968)” translates as: The Conduct of the Surprise Attack at Sở Hội by the 141st Infantry
Regiment/7th Infantry Division (13 May 1968). The Australian positions as marked on the “Diển Biển”
map are not accurate, and several units are not included. As with many Vietnamese military sketch
maps, this “Diển Biển” map lacks a scale – and, for clarity, an approximate scale has been added by
Chamberlain. An “equivalent” Australian marked-map is at p.362 in McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the
Offensive: op.cit., 2003 as Map 12.3 at p.362 . That map shows the Australian positions about one
kilometre farther to the north-west of those indicated on the “Diển Biển” map.
12
Throughout the War, the NVA/VC used “Warsaw Pact-style” map-marking

symbols – with some Vietnamese variations. In the preceding monochrome “Diển
Biển sketch map and within Attachment 4, the enemy (ie Australian) elements are
hatched/shaded – including infantry positions, artillery pieces, mortars, and medium
tanks.24 Battalion-sized elements are shown as triangular flags – with the “fly” to the
a rubber (Cao Su) plantation – ie the Sở Bà Đầm rubber processing facility. The Bàu
Sông Rắn Lake is also shown in the north-eastern portion of the sketch map. In the
eastern area of the sketch, open grass fields are indicated as “Trảng tranh”. Route 16
is shown running diagonally across the sketch map. The Cây Me Junction (Ngã tư
Cây Me) is shown - with 141st Regiment forces purportedly pursuing Australian
elements (a black dashed-line with an arrow) “fleeing” south-east down Route 16 “to
Tân Uyên” (“Đi Tân Uyên”). For “inaccuracies” in this Vietnamese depiction –
including the omission of HQ 1RAR and 161 Battery RNZAA within the perimeter of
FSPB Coral – infantry companies of 1RAR and 3RAR outside the perimeter, see
footnote 7. For clarity, I have added a “Scale” to the Vietnamese sketch map.
The 7th NVA Division History (2006) 25 related that on 12 May, the NVA
force discovered: “the Australian 4th [sic] Battalion … at the Sở Hội Plantation
located four kilometres north-west of Tân Uyên. Nguyễn Thế Bôn ((Commander, 7th
NVA Division)) directed: ‘we must strike immediately before the enemy is firmly
established … on the night of the 12th”; the 141st “Regimental Commander Doãn
Khiệt and the battalion commanders 26 did a reconnaissance, and the orders for the
attack were given. … The enemy was in panic, unable to resist, and were completely
wiped out. … The battle was truly successful and the unit was awarded the Liberation
Military Exploits Medal 3rd Class (Huân chương Quân công hạng 3) announced by
the Divisional Commander on the afternoon of 13 May).27 With the Australians
defeated, they were immediately replaced by US troops.”28 A longer translation of
24
Australian medium tanks – Centurions (C Squadron/1st Armoured Regiment), did not arrive at FSPB
Coral from Núi Đất (via the US 11th Armoured Cavalry Regiment’s Blackhorse base) until 1430hrs on
23 May 1968. On 25 May, 2 Tp/C Sqn moved from FSB Coral to FSB Balmoral to join 3RAR.
25
Trần Xuân Ban – Colonel (Retd), The History of the 7th Infantry Division 1966-2006, People’s
Armed Forces Publishing House, Hà Nội, 2006. Colonel Ban has also written a discrete history of the
141st NVA Regiment – see footnote 4 (1997 edition) and an edition in 2010.
26
In May 1968, the 141st Regiment’s political officer was Nguyễn Văn Nhật, the chief-of-staff was Hà
Xuân Trường, the 1st Battalion was commanded by Trần Văn Nhạn, and the 3rd Battalion by Phạm Văn
Xuyến.
27
In 2010, I translated Vietnamese passages for Bruce Davies from the 2006 7th NVA Infantry
Division History on the attack on the Coral FSPB by the 141 st NVA Regiment for his 2012 work - see:
“NVA 141 Regiment’s combat achievement medal”, in Davies, B. with McKay G., Vietnam – The
Complete Story of the Australian War, Allen&Unwin, Crows Nest, 2012, p.384.
28
The 2006 7th Division History notes that although April 1968 was intended as a “rest, consolidation,
and preparatory period” for the 7th Division’s “upcoming operations”, it was heavily engaged by
elements of the US 1st Infantry Division, the US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (11 ACR), and the
18th ARVN Division. The 1st US Infantry Division also engaged 7th NVA Division elements in early
May 1968. The 141st and 165th Regiments had moved to the Bình Mỹ area (vicinity XT 9034) to
“regroup”. See Operational Report – Lessons Learned, Headquarters 1st Infantry Division, Period
ending 31 July 1968, 25 November 1968, pp.16-17. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/394109.pdf .
See also footnote 24 of Reference C for warnings to the Australian forces on 12 May 1968 by the
13
that section of the 7th NVA Division’s 2006 history – with footnoted comments, is
attached to this Note as Attachment 5.
The “Australian 4th Battalion” - ie 4RAR, is noted as the defending enemy
unit in both the 1991 “Number of Battles” and the 7th NVA Division History
accounts. However, 4RAR did not arrive in Vietnam until June 1968 – several weeks
after the Battles of Coral and Balmoral. The mistaken reference to “4RAR” at Coral in
Vietnamese accounts is probably because 4RAR - after its initial Operations Redwing
and Kosciusko, deployed into the Đồng Nai River/Tân Uyên area on Operation Toàn
Thắng II on 23 June 1968 – ie into AO Birdsville to protect the north-eastern
approach to Long Bình. Rather, as detailed correctly in Australian accounts, 1RAR
(commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Phillip Bennett) and 102 Field Battery were the 1
ATF elements attacked at FSPB Coral in the early hours of 13 May 1968.29
The 141st Regiment History (1997) 30 relates: “On 12 May, we discovered a
battalion of Royal Australian troops had deployed to South Sở Hội (six kilometres
north of Tân Uyên), and the Regiment was ordered to launch a night attack. The night
was dark, and the regimental commander – Doãn Khiết, together with the battalion
commanders and the reconnaissance element went to study the battlefield. On the
way, they encountered commandos and interdicting artillery fire that blocked their
approaches to the target. Political Officer Nguyễn Văn Nhật and Chief of Staff Hà
Xuân Trường guided the troops to occupy the battlefield. At 0300 a.m., the 1st
Battalion and the 16th 82mm Mortar Company were still far away and had not reached
the battlefield in time, but the Regiment was determined to commence firing. At 4.30
a.m., the order was given to open fire, and all types of our firepower continuously
fired upon the targets at an intense rate. The enemy - having just arrived and with their
defences not yet complete, came under our heavy shelling. They abandoned our
objective and fled helter-skelter. Immediately seizing the opportunity, our infantry
sections – with overwhelming bravery, assaulted and wiped out the enemy. After 30
minutes of combat, we were completely in charge of the battlefield – and then swiftly
withdrew our forces so that the enemy’s aircraft and artillery could not react in time.
The battle concluded quickly. We wiped out an Australian battalion, captured a
prisoner, seized eight weapons (including two heavy machine guns), a 60mm mortar,
and an 81mm mortar. … The battle was truly deserving of the award of the Liberation
Military Exploits Medal 3rd Class (Huân Chương Quân công Giải phóng hạng 3).”
The 141st Regiment History (1997) also included a sketch map of the first
Battle of Coral/Sở Hội on 12/13 May 1968 – the title of the defending Australian
battalion – ie 1RAR, is not indicated in the sketch. The sketch also omits HQ 3RAR
and 161 Battery RNZAA within the FSPB Coral perimeter, and 1RAR and 3RAR
companies outside the perimeter. HQ 3RAR and its D Company were located about
“300 metres” west of HQ 1RAR and were “not subjected to any ground attack”.
Barbed wire is indicated around the northern, eastern and southern perimeter of FSPB
Coral on 13 May 1968. However, the Australian Army official history relates that on
Deputy Commander of the 1st US Infantry Division on NVA activities in the Bình Mỹ area: “You
won’t need to go looking for them. They’ll come looking for you.”
29
McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive: The Australian Army in the Vietnam War – January 1967
- June 1968, Allen&Unwin – in association with the Australian War Memorial, Crows Nest, 2003,
pp.354-381.
30
Trần Xuân Ban, Trung Đoàn 141 (Sư Đoàn 7, Quân Đoàn 4) ie 141st Regiment/7th Division/4 Corps,
People’s Armed Forces Publishing House, Hà Nội, 1997. A 300-page edition was also published in
2010 – but “for internal distribution only”. Trần Xuân Ban was the operations officer of the 141st NVA
Regiment in May 1968 and met with Australian veterans of Coral/Balmoral in Tân Uyên District in
November 2007 - see his media article: Trần Xuân Ban, “Poppies and Flowing White Rubber" (“Hoa
anh túc (+) và những dòng cao su trắng”), Viêt Báo, 18 November 2007.
14
12/13 May: “No claymore mines or barbed wire had been laid for the defence of the
fire support base; there had been no time and, in any case, the wire had not arrived.” 31
Battle of Coral/Sở Hội - 12/13 May 1968 (141st Regiment History - 1997)
– see also Attachment 6. Map-marking symbols are explained earlier at p.12.
In his 2010 book, Major General (Retd) Đào Văn Lợi very briefly described
the Battle of Coral/Sở Hội on 12/13 May - noting his 3rd Battalion (commanded by
Phạm Văn Xuyến) of the 141st Regiment was initially allocated a reserve role in the
attack.32
The Bình Dương Province Party History relates that in May 1968, the armed
forces of Tân Uyên and Châu Thành ((Districts)) coordinated with the 14th ((ie 141st))
Regiment of the 7th Division to launch operations west [sic] of Route 16 and wiped
out an Austalian company and two American companies – and destroyed five artillery
pieces at Bình Cơ ((a hamlet of Binh My village – about three kilometres west of
FSPB Balmoral)), Sở Hội ((FSPB Coral)) … .” 33
Liberation Press Agency Report – 3 June 1968. “On 13 and 15 May, the
revolutionary armed forces in the same area repeatedly attacked the U.S. and
Australian base camps in the So Hoi area, knocking out two infantry battalions and
three artillery batteries: 12 105-mm howitzers and 106.7mm mortars were
destroyed.”34
31
McNeill, I., and Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, p.363.
32
In his 2010 book – Close Combat and University Halls, General Lợi mentions meeting an Australian
veteran of the Battle of Coral during an official vist to Australia in 2003 – ie a “government minister”.
p.65. This was presumably The Hon. Tim Fischer – who was a Second Lieutenant with the 1st
Battalion (1RAR) and was wounded at the Battle of Coral on 13 May 1968.
33
Lịch sử Đảng bộ tỉnh Bình Dương, phần 3 (Part 3): 1954 – 1968, 2003 and 2011.
34
On 2 June 1968, Hanoi’s international service in English made the same announcement ie: “On 13
and 15 May, the revolutionary armed forces in the same area repeatedly attacked the U.S. and
Australian base camps in the So Hoi area, knocking out two infantry battalions and three artillery
15
People’s Army of Vietnam on-line media - 31 January 2014. At 2 a.m. on

the morning of 13 May, the Regiment opened fire, attacked, and wiped out an
Australian battalion (mercenaries) at Sở Hội Town [sic] in Tân Uyên District. The
attack occurred quickly and was extremely violent. The enemy fired both short-
barrelled weapons and long-barrelled weapons – together with all types of artillery
shells (including bomblets, flechette rounds, and delay-fuzed shells) fired from Biên
Hòa and surrounding posts. The fire rained down continuously. From the sky, enemy
aircraft swooped down and fired 37mm cannon, rockets, bombs, and grenades. … But
after only one hour, we had completely wiped out an Australian mercenary battalion
and had taken control of the battle field.” 35
The Second Attack at Coral/Sở Hội – 15/16 May 1968.
The 7th Division History (2006) notes that “with the Australians defeated” at
the First Battle of Sở Hội ((FSPB Coral)) and “replaced immediately” by US forces36 ,
the 141st Regiment was “reinforced by the Tân Uyên District Company and H12s ((ie:
Type 63 107mm rockets - 12 tubes)), and on the night of 15/16 May the 141st
Regiment inflicted heavy casualties on an American infantry battalion, two artillery
batteries, and an armoured troop.”
The 141st Regiment History (1997) relates: “In exploiting our earlier victory,
the cadre and soldiers of the Regiment gave immediate attention to consolidating and
reinforcing our forces and our weapons – and, only three days later, the Regiment
attacked Sở Hội ((FSPB Coral)) for the second time. This time it was occupied by an
American battalion with tanks and reinforced artillery. The base had barbed wire
defences and prefabricated concrete blockhouses. These defences were 500 metres
from the former position – and, immediately after the enemy arrived, their forces burst
out to block our approach routes. Regiment Commander Doãn Khiết had to organise
completely new routes to approach and study the layout and structure of the enemy’s
defences. With higher headquarters allocating a regional company (Tân Uyên) as a
reinforcement and H12s ((ie: Type 63, 107mm rocket launchers – 12 tubes)), on the
night of the 15/16 May the units launched the attack and inflicted heavy casualties on
an infantry company, two artillery batteries, and a troop of American tanks ((see
footnote 36)). Thus we concluded the 1st High Point of the Second Phase of the
General Offensive with a resounding victory.”
batteries; 12 105mm howitzers and 106.7mm mortars were destroyed.” On 4 June, NLF Radio
announced: “… brilliant encirclement battles … and Eastern Nam Bo had Soi Hoi …”.
35
“Đêm 31/1/1968: Xuân Mậu Thân rực lửa”, VĂN CHU (Quân đội nhân dân), People’s Army of
Vietnam on-line media, 31 January 2014 – infonet.vn/dem-3111968.
36
After the first attack on FSPB Coral early on 13 May, elements of HQ 1 ATF (Forward) were heli-
lifted to Coral, followed by – as planned, two road convoys from Bearcat – including HQ 1 ATF
(Forward) and TFMA elements. Australian APCs under Major J.D. Keldie – OC A/3rd Cavalry
Regiment, also escorted a US artillery unit into the FSPB ie: A Battery 2/35 th Artillery Regiment
equipped with M109 155mm self-propelled guns (and two dual 40mm anti-aircraft guns from 5/2nd
Artillery US – ie tracked “Dusters” with powerful searchlights, for use in a ground role). A battery of
US 175mm guns firing from Long Bình also provided fire support for FSPB Coral during the
subsequent NVA attack on the FSPB on 15-16 May 1968.
16
Depiction: The Second Mobile Assault at Sở Hội (16 May 1968)

- see also Attachment 7. Map-marking symbols are explained earlier at p.12.
In late July 1968, NVA Senior Lieutenant Phạm Lục (see footnote 2) rallied
and related aspects of the 141st Regiment’s attack on FSB Coral on 15-16 May– eg:
“At 2000hrs on 15 May [sic], V17 ((141st Regiment)) soldiers were ordered to prepare
their weapons and supplies for an attack that night. However, they were not told the
objective of the attack. Reconnaissance of the ((enemy)) base camp had taken place
two to three days earlier ((a possible reference to the attack on 13 May ?)) … . At
0100hrs on 16 May, elements of V17 began mortaring the Sở Hội ((ie Coral)) base
camp. The mortar attack lasted about 20 minutes. Approx 200 rounds were fired into
the camp. The ground attack followed immediately. During the ground assault, the
fighting lasted for about four hours, all 680 Americans [sic] in the base camp were
killed ((see footnote 36 for US forces at FSPB Coral)). The base camp was occupied
until dawn on 16 May. Our force then withdrew to rear areas about two hours walk
away. During the attack, the V17 Regiment suffered 60 KIA and approx 100
WIA.” Phạm Lục also claimed that on “26 May 1968, a B-52 strike at the forward
base camp of the 141st NVA Regiment - vicinity XT 832343 ((10 kilometres west of
FSPB Balmoral)), caused approximately 100 casualties”.37
37
During a subsequent debriefing on a possible 3rd Phase Tết Offensive, the US MACV debriefing
officer noted that Phạm Lục was “a political officer in the position of an assistant, and he furnished
little information on military matters.” See footnote 2 and VCAT Item No. F034604502192 and
Attachment 10.
17
An Award for the 141st Regiment – and Commendations for Personnel
The 141st Regiment History (1997) also related that: “The battle evidenced
the results of our resolute courage, accurate appraisals, and the work-styles and the
versatility of the leadership – and represented a step forward in our new maturity in
coordinated operations by our troops in striking the enemy in open terrain. The battle
was truly deserving of the award of the Liberation Military Exploits Medal 3rd Class.”
– illustrated below.38
On 19 May - a few days after the battle, a group of probable 141st (ie K.41)
Regiment personnel (four soldiers, four section commanders, and one platoon
commander) were formally cited in a certificate for their “combat achievements in the
attack on 15 May 1968”.39
The Sở Hội Memorial
A small memorial – a stela (see overpage), was erected post-War by the

Vietnamese authorities at the site of the Sở Hội/Coral engagements. The inscriptions
on the monument read: “Forever Remember and Give Thanks to the Heroic Martyrs”
and “Memorial – At this place on 15 [sic] May 1968, in an attack on the Big Red
((One)) American [sic] Division, 67 soldiers of the C.302 Tân Uyên District Unit and
the 14th Regiment [sic – “Q14”, ie a cover name for the 141st Regiment] of the 7th
Worksite [sic – ie “7th Division”] bravely sacrificed themselves.” There is also a quite
small red-and-yellow, tiled-roof memorial nearby (ie a “Bia Tưởng Niệm”) for
prayers and offerings.
For a discussion of Vietnamese casualties and the recovery of remains, see
Attachment 9. A small memorial at the site of the following Battle of Balmoral is
described at footnote 53.
38
Liberation Military Exploits Medal 3rd Class - ie Huân chương Quân công Giải phóng hạng 3 – also
noted in the 7th NVA Division History (2006), see footnote 27.
39
Those cited appear to have also been associated with the C-61 local unit in the Bến Cát area about 20
kilometres west of FSPB Coral ie: Nguyễn Quang Thành (section commander), Nguyễn Đình Cấp
(platoon commander), Lê Văn Thịnh (soldier), Đào Xuân Kính (soldier), Lê Văn Thành (section
commander), Vũ Lưu Hữu (soldier), Đình Quang Lợi (section commander), Phạm Ngọc Sỹ (soldier),
and Bùi Đức Thắng (section commander). A manuscript amendment on the certificate indicates that
“Battalion” disapproved of the award being granted to Nguyễn Văn Mịch (soldier). The document, was
recovered by a unit of the 1st US Infantry Division on 29 May 1968 at XT 891101.
18
Australian Accounts – Assaults on FSPB Balmoral: 26 and 28 May 1968
Later on 13 May 1968, 3RAR and 161 Field Battery RNZAA departed FSPB
Coral and established FSPB Coogee four kilometres to the west of Coral. A revised 1
ATF (Fwd) enemy assessment – the “Enemy Situation AO’s Surfers/Newport – As At
211200H May 68” – disseminated on 22 May 1968, identified the main-force enemy
units in the AOs as: “HQ 7 NVA Div, 141 NVA Regt, 165 NVA Regt40 , 275 NVA
Infiltration Group, 269 NVA Infiltration Group, Dong Nai Regiment (NVA/VC), Phu
Loi II Indep Bn (NVA), 81 and 83 Rear Services Groups, and elements of 69 VC
Artillery Command”. 41 On 24 May, 3RAR redeployed and occupied FSPB Balmoral
about four and half kilometres north of Coral. On 25 May, 2 Troop/C Squadron/1
Armoured Regiment – four Centurion tanks, moved from FSB Coral to FSB Balmoral
to join 3RAR.
The 1 ATF Intelligence Review42 noted that the “company-strength assault”
on FSPB Balmoral at 0345hrs on 26 May 1968 was made by the 165th Regiment –
40
As noted earlier, cover designators for the 165th NVA Regiment included: Q21 (from March 1966),
12th Regiment/Q12, K21, and V15 (from October 1967). Following the defection of NVA Lieutenant
Colonel Phan Mậu (Phan Việt Dũng - see footnote 10) on 7 May 1968, the 165th NVA Regiment was
commanded by Major Lê Tuyến/Tuyên - the political officer was Hiếu.
41
Annex A to 1 ATF FRAG O No 7 to OPO No 19/68 dated 22 May 68. 1 ATF’s GSO2 Int had direct
access to the II FFV J2 Intelligence staff – including some SIGINT material hand-delivered by the II
FFV J2 staff. Intelligence on the enemy was also provided to 1 ATF staff by the Headquarters of the
48th Regiment of the 5th ARVN Division located in Tân Uyên District Town (XT 965230) –
discussions, February 2014: Chamberlain – Lieutenant Colonel G.C. Cameron (Retd) – GSO2 Int 1
ATF 1968-1969.
42
1 ATF, Intelligence Review Op Toan Thang, Nui Dat, 21 June 1968, p.2. At Balmoral, the assault
was preceded by “150 and 200 rounds of 82mm mortar, 60mm mortar, RPG-2 and 7 fire. … FSPB
Coral received about 60 rounds of 82mm mortar and 20 rounds of 75mm RCL but no ground assault –
the aim apparently being to stop Coral giving fire support to Balmoral.” 1 ATF INTSUM No. 148/68 of
28 May 1968 notes “2nd and 3rd Battalions of 165 Regt” attacked FSPB Balmoral. A sketch map of
FSPB Balmoral showing the Australian deployments on 25/26 May - and depicting the NVA “Main
attack” from the northeast and the “diversionary attack” from the southeast, is in McNeill, I. & Ekins,
A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, ie Map 13.1 at p.385. See also footnote 58.
19
with “9 NVA KIA (BC)” in the “badly coordinated attack”. The 1 ATF After Action
Report “estimated a battalion group was present, with the actual attack being carried
out by a company.” The report on that “Balmoral No. 1” attack in the 3RAR
“Operational Analysis”43 does not identify enemy units by title. The Australian
Official History (2003) implies that the attack on FSPB Balmoral early on 26 May
1968 was by elements of the 165th Regiment alone.44 The official booklet - published
by the Department of Veterans’ Affairs in 2008 (Reference A), related that “NVA
from 165 Regiment” attacked Balmoral on 26 May.
For the subsequent ground attack launched on FSPB Balmoral at 0230hrs on
28 May 1968 (“Balmoral No. 2”), the 1 ATF After Action Report “estimated that two
battalions participated in the attack”.45 Subsequently, the 1 ATF Intelligence Review
recorded that the ground attack was “by an estimated two battalions” and “bodies and
PWs identified the 2nd and the 3rd Battalions of 165 NVA Regiment/7th NVA
Division (ie K2 and K3 Battalions – and possibly K5 Battalion) and also four new
infiltration groups ((233, 745, D280, and Nam Ha)) which had been in South Vietnam
for periods from 2 to 15 days [sic] … .”46 The report of the “Balmoral No. 2” attack in
the 3RAR “Operational Analysis”47 does not identify enemy units by title. Only the 1
ATF Intelligence Review details the participating NVA elements – including
infiltration groups.48 The Australian Official History (2003) stated that the assault
“was carried out by an estimated regiment (of two battalions) of North Vietnamese
Army troops” – but no regiment is identified and cited in that publication.49 No
43
3RAR, Operation Toan Thang – Operational Analysis: 21 Apr – 5 Jun 68, Nui Dat, 17 June 1968
(AWM95, 7/3/62) – Battle for Balmoral No 1 – 26 May 68 (Appendix 1 to Annex B).
44
McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, p.384. “… 165 NVA Regiment was ordered
to ‘emulate the victory achieved by 141 Regiment’ as claimed by Radio Hanoi.” The “165 NVA
Regiment” is cited as the sole attacking element on 26 May in McAulay, L., The Battle of Coral and
Balmoral, op.cit., 1989, p.344.
45
July 1968, p.22 (AWM95, 1/4/111).
46
1 ATF, Intelligence Review Op Toan Thang, Nui Dat, 21 June 1968, p.3. That Review summarised:
“Combined results ((at FSPBs Coral and Balmoral on 28 May)): 51 NVA KIA (BC) ((ie 47 at
Balmoral, four in the Coral area)), 7 NVA PW (one died).” A manuscript note on the Intelligence
Review records “seven infiltration groups identified: 269, 275, 745, Nam Ha, 233, D280, 165” – see
footnote 14. HQ AFV records list the following PWs captured at the Battle of Balmoral on 27-28 May
1968: three from 165th NVA Regiment, one from the 233rd Infiltration Group, one from the D280th
Infiltration Group, one from the Assault Youth Group, one without a unit noted, and two who died of
wounds – see footnote 50 below. As noted at footnote 44, according to a 1 ATF report: “A PW from
165 Regt claimed that his Regt had been ordered to ‘emulate the victory achieved by 141 Regt’ and had
been committed against FSPB Balmoral for this reason.” – 1 ATF (Fwd), Enemy Situation AO Surfers
II as at 291200 May 1968. See also: 1 ATF, INTSUM No. 148-68, 28 May 1968.
47
3RAR, Operation Toan Thang – Operational Analysis: 21 Apr – 5 Jun 68, Nui Dat, 17 June 1968
(AWM95 7/3/62) – Battle for Balmoral No 2 – 28 May 68 (Appendix 2 to Annex B). The 3RAR Log
entry of 1140hrs 28 May 1968 recorded “47 enemy KIA, seven PWs” – weapons recovered 18 AKs,
two SKS, three RPDs, two RPGs, seven Bangalore torpedoes, 48 stick grenades.
48
The “new” infiltration groups cited in the 1 ATF Intelligence Review are “233, 745, D280, and Nam
Ha” – with “165, 269, and 275” making a total of seven, and “the seven groups appeared to have been
allocated to, or employed by, 7 NVA Div.” 1 ATF, Intelligence Review Op Toan Thang, Nui Dat, 21
June 1968, p.3. Further information on those infiltration groups was included in 1 ATF (Fwd), Enemy
Situation AO Surfers II as at 291200 May 68 (with “arrival” dates and strengths, and indicating that
Infiltration Groups 269 and 275 were involved in the 12/13 and 15/16 May attacks on FSPB Carol –
and that elements of 165, 233, D280, and Nam Ha took part in attacks “against FSPB Balmoral on
27/28 May as part of K2, K3, and possibly K5 Battalions of 165 th NVA Regiment.” These elements are
also cited in McAulay, L., The Battle of Coral and Balmoral, op.cit., 1989, p.344 – sourced from 1
ATF intelligence reports. On citing “Infiltration Groups” – based on recovered NVA documents, see
footnotes 8 and 14.
49
McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, p.389.
20
Australian records or accounts appear to note the 141st NVA Regiment as

participating in the assaults against FSPB Balmoral.50 Detailed after action reports
were completed by the Australian tank troop commander for the attacks on both 26
and 28 May – and several sketch maps from those reports are included within
Attachment 9.51
Vietnamese Accounts: Assaults on Balmoral/Đồng Tràm – 26 and 28 May 1968 52
7th NVA Division (2006): This history only has brief references to the
engagements at Balmoral in late May 1968 – at a location the Vietnamese accounts
term “Đồng Tràm” 53 - as follows:
“On the night of 25 May, the 141st [sic] Regiment 54 again [sic] attacked Đồng
Tràm (three kilometres south-west [sic]55 of Bình Mỹ). The 165th Regiment had
deployed its 6th Battalion to operate independently at Lái Thiêu ((XT 8605)), and its
remaining forces were reinforced with the 1st Battalion of the 141st Regiment in
preparation for the second [sic] attack on Đồng Tràm ((FSPB Balmoral)). On 26 May,
the enemy poured in infantry, a combined artillery battalion, and a tank squadron to
regain [sic] Đồng Tràm. On the night of 27/28 May, the commander of the 165th
Regiment - Lê Tuyên, led the 165th Regiment in the attack. The battle was decisive,
but we met many difficulties – after nearly two hours of fighting we were only able to
50
As noted above at footnote 46, Australian PW records managed by HQ AFV – which are incomplete,
noted the identified units of PWs captured at Balmoral as: C6/K5/165 Regiment, C4/K3/165 Regiment,
233 Infiltration Group, Assault Youth Corps, C2/1Bn/D280 Infiltration Group [sic], and C17/K3/165
Regiment. Nine captured documents from the Coral engagement are currently available for scrutiny on-
line, but only one document recovered at Balmoral appears to be available (18 May 1968 - recovered
by B/3RAR at XT 898285, citing the “Đồng Nai 2” unit and finance and resupply aspects). “Đồng Nai
2” was a cover designator for the 7th NVA Division. For a review of captured documents, see
Attachment 10.
51
Butler, M.J. Second Lieutenant, After Action Reports: M1, M2 (26 May), M4 (28 May) – including a
total of six diagrams/sketches – AWM95, 2/3/9. Second Lieutenant Butler’s reports noted that during
the attack the assaulting NVA troops “successfully used craters made by B-52 strikes for cover from
our fire”; the attack on 28 May was “more determined”; on 28 May, “the enemy had advanced across
open ground, using the craters”; “it is surprising to find he attacked again from the same direction the
second time”; and “the enemy expended a major part of his effort on the open approaches which he
knew to be covered by tanks.” For Second Lieutenant Butler’s sketches, see Attachment 9.
52
While the 1991 “Number of Battles” history describes the Battle of Coral/Sở Hội – and includes a
sketch map, that work does not mention Balmoral/Đồng Tràm. Trung tá (Lieutenant Colonel) Phạm
Vĩnh Phúc, Một số trận đánh trong Kháng chiến chống Pháp, Kháng chiến chống Mỹ (A Number of
Battles in the Resistance War Against the French and the Americans), Tập I (Volume I), 1991.
53
There is a small lake – Bàu (Lake) Đồng Tràm, at XT 940340. There were several large ponds and
small lakes in the vicinity of FSPB Balmoral, with Bàu Hàm/Hàng immediately north of the FSPB.
Near the former FSPB Balmoral site, a small Vietnamese memorial stone now commemorates
“Anonymous Remains” that were recovered at “Bào Tràm, Bàu Hàng” on 22 April 2009. A posting to
an official Vietnamese military blogsite in 2010 related: “Our side calls this the Battle of Đồng Tràm.
The first attack was by our 141st Regiment (the 141st was also the unit that attacked Coral twice – that
we call the Battle of Sở Hội), the second attack was by the 165 th Regiment.” – Chiangshan, Dựng Nước
- Giữ Nước (Build the Nation – Defend the Nation) Website/Forum, http://www.vnmilitaryhistory.net/ ,
replying to Altus, 31 August 2010.
54
The 141st NVA Regiment was commanded by Doãn Khiết - having replaced Lê Nam Phong (Lê
Hoàng Thống) in December 1967. Doãn Khiết had commanded the mid-May attack on FSPB Coral by
the 141st Regiment – see: Trần Xuân Ban - Colonel (ed), The History of the 7th Infantry Division 1966-
2006, op.cit., 2006; and : Chamberlain, E.P., Vietnam War: The Battle of Coral – Vietnamese Accounts
(and a sketch map) – Research Note 1/2016, op.cit., 5 January 2016 (Reference D).
55
FSPB Balmoral at XT 933339 was not “south-west” of Bình Mỹ village (located “XT 9036 to 9132”
in 1968). Rather, Bình Mỹ (a “linear” village astride Route 16) was about three kilometres west of
FSPB Balmoral. – see the map at Attachment 2.
21
inflict heavy casualties on the enemy force. As a result, in the three days (22 [sic] to
28 May), the Division had conducted two attacking operations at regimental level on
the one position, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy’s personnel and their war-
making means.”
165th Regiment History (2003): The Regiment suffered heavy casualties in

the fighting in the Lò Chén and Lái Thiêu areas in early May 1968. “On 16 May 1968,
the Regiment was ordered to withdraw and locate to Bình Mỹ. After nearly ten days
of consolidation, the Regiment was tasked to send its 6th Battalion to operate
independently in Lái Thiêu while the remainder of the Regiment was reinforced by
the 1st Battalion of the 141st Regiment in preparation for the second attack at Đồng
Tràm ((Balmoral)). On the night of 27/28 May, after quite careful preparation, our
Regimental Commander Trần Quốc Tuyên led the units in the second attack on the
enemy’s base at Đồng Tràm. The battle was fought decisively. We faced many
difficulties and were not able to take complete control of the battlefield. However, our
units inflicted heavy casulaties on an American [sic] battalion ((see footnote 36)), two
artillery batteries, and a platoon of tanks and armoured vehicles.56
165th NVA Regiment Organisation (7 May 1968) 57
56
165th NVA Regiment PW Bùi Dúc Tuấn related that his unit departed the Bình Mỹ area at 1500hrs
on 27 May, comprising four companies with a total strength of 324 men. After the engagement, he was
captured near the FSPB Balmoral perimeter wire by Australian forces at 0700hrs on 28 May 1968.
57
During his debrief, the rallier NVA Lieutenant Colonel Phan Mậu (see footnotes 10 and 40) stated
that the organisation of the 12th ((165th)) Regiment was the same as that of the 14th ((141st Regiment)).
The battalion commanders of the 165th Regiment were reportedly: 4th – Bôn, 5th – Thiễn, and the 6th –
Bau. For a basic organogram of the 141st Regiment (ie as V17) – but with less detail than the
organogram of the 165th Regiment, see the debriefing report of rallier Senior Lieutenant Phạm Lục
(footnote 2), see VCAT Item F034604240100.
22
141st Regiment History (1997): “After more than a week of taking the opportunity to
consolidate, the units of the Regiment moved into a new High Point phase.
To begin the Second High Point, on the night of 25 May 1968, the Regiment
concentrated its forces to attack the enemy concentration at Đồng Tràm (three
kilometres north of Bình Mỹ). The Regiment inflicted heavy casualties on an infantry
company and a combined American [sic] artillery battery ((see footnote 36)).
After their defeat on 25 May, the enemy concentrated their forces in the
commanding position at Đồng Tràm. Apart from an American [sic] battalion, they
were reinforced with a combined battalion and a squadron of tanks – with defensive
works, quite strong obstacles, and many additional minefields on the approaches that
they foresaw we would use.
The 1st Battalion of the 141st Regiment was order to reinforce the 165th
Battalion (minus) in the second attack on the Đồng Tràm position.
On the night of 27/28 May, our units attacked the enemy’s entrenched camp
and inflicted heavy casualties on an American battalion two artillery batteries, and an
enemy tank squadron.” 58
A Detailed and Critical Vietnamese Account On-line
In late August and early September 2010, two Hanoi-based Vietnamese

military historians – “Altus” and “Chiangshan”, discussed the topic: “Were our
operational methods/tactics too rigid ?” on the official Vietnamese military
website/forum: Dựng Nước - Giữ Nước.59 Reviewing Australian accounts of the
Battles of Coral and Balmoral in some detail (with maps 60), one historian
commented that: “In the opinion of our opponent ((ie Australians)), an example of the
máy móc ((ie: mechanistic/robotic/inflexible/repetitive)) tactics by our forces were
the attacks against the two Australian fire support bases Coral and Balmoral from 13
to 28 May 1968.” The Vietnamese historians sought opinions from Vietnamese
colleagues on why NVA forces attacked FSPB Balmoral twice “over open ground”
and at the same hour (0230hrs) with the same tactics – noting that on 28 May the
Australian defenders “couldn’t believe their own eyes as the North Vietnamese
attacked over an open field.” 61 Altus also noted that Australian records showed that
the 165th Regiment was the principal NVA formation that assaulted FSPB Balmoral
on both 26 and 28 May 1968 – and sought comments.
A Vietnamese colleague responded to Altus that: “According to the
Australians ((derogatory pronoun added)), the top-notch unit that attacked Balmoral
58
The only forces defending the FSPB Balmoral base were the Australian 3RAR infantry battalion,
Australian tanks and M113 APCs – see McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, Map
13.1 at p.385. The 1997 141st Regiment History does not include sketch maps of the Battle of Đồng
Tràm/Balmoral – but did included two maps of the attack on FSPB Coral (see Attachments 6 and 7).
59
“Quân ta tác chiến có cứng nhắc?” (“Were our operational methods/tactics too rigid ?”), Dựng Nước
- Giữ Nước (Build the Nation – Defend the Nation) – Website/Forum:
http://www.vnmilitaryhistory.net/, postings from 29 March 2008 to 28 August 2011.
60
Principally from: McAulay, L., The Battle of Coral and Balmoral, op.cit., 1989.
61
An Australian publication also noted that on 28 May: “After that slaughter ((the attack on 26 May))
the Australians were surprised when they came that way again ((across “a wide expanse of grass over
which the enemy had attacked two nights earlier.”)), rather than through the bush on either flank.”
Hodges, I., The Battle of Fire Support Bases Coral/Balmoral – Vietnam 1968, Department of Veterans’
Affairs, Canberra, 2008 (Reference A). That aspect is also addressed in the detailed accounts in
McAulay, L., The Battle of Coral and Balmoral, op.cit., p.286: The enemy was “predictable. They
showed a lack of imagination and flexibility. They didn’t do a close enough recce.” See also footnote
51 for the After Action Reports of Second Lieutenant M.J. Butler RAAC noting “the enemy had
advanced across open ground …”.
23
on 26 and 28/05/1968 was the 165th Regiment (all three battalions). Our side calls this
the Battle of Đồng Tràm. The first attack on Balmoral was by the 141st Regiment (the
141st was also the formation that attacked Coral twice – which we call the Battle of Sở
Hội), the second attack on Balmoral was by the 165th Regiment. In summary, in that
second attack, we suffered 41 killed and missing in action, 29 wounded, and lost 29
weapons.” The colleague also provided several pages from a yet-to-be-identified
Vietnamese after-action report (see Attachment 8) 62 describing some detail of the
Battle of Balmoral on 28 May that included, in outline:
- The assaulting elements comprised: the 4th and 5th Battalions of the 165th
NVA Regiment; and the 1st Battalion of a second regiment ((ie the 141st
NVA Regiment)).
- The ((7th)) Division agreed to the withdrawal of the 165th/141st Regiment
Group at 0330hrs - but each battalion was to leave a platoon behind (with a
fire support team) to prevent the enemy from discovering the withdrawal.
The remaining elements of the Regiment were to organise the evacuation
of their wounded and dead before withdrawing.
- The work claimed that more than 15 Australian tanks had been destroyed -
along with three “fire support vehicles”.63
US Reports
The USMACV monthly review of significant activities for May 1968

summarised: “Northeast of Saigon, the 1st Australian Task Force (ATF) established a
base in War Zone D, where elements of the NVA/VC 7th Division made unsuccessful
attacks in an attempt to eject the Australians from that traditional VC jungle
sanctuary.” 64 The II FFV Operational Report noted that: “At the end of July, the 7th
62
The source of the Vietnamese “Balmoral 2” “after-action report” is unclear. The publication is
possibly – as for several Vietnamese military histories, for “internal distribution only” (“lưu hành nội
bộ”). The extract specifically identifies that the 1st Battalion of the 141st Regiment supported the 165th
Regiment in the “Balmoral 2” attack on 28 February 1968. A translation of the extract is at Attachment
8.
63
At FSPB Balmoral, 2 Troop/C Squadron/1 Armoured Regiment – commanded by Second Lieutenant
Michael Butler, only comprised four Centurion tanks – his after-action reports are on file AWM95,
2/3/9. 2 Troop/ A Squadon/3 Cavalry Regiment – commanded by Captain Bruce Richards comprised
11 M113-A1 APCs (a diagram showing the location of Australian armoured vehicles at FSPB Balmoral
is at p.385 in McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003). Querying the large number of
Australian tanks claimed to have been destroyed, the Vietnamese historian “Altus” noted that there
were only four Australian tanks at the FSPB. Historian “Chiangshan” responded: “Well, no doubt the
enemy’s reports are different to ours.”
64
HQ MACV, Monthly Summary, Part 1, May 1968. VCAT Item 168300010767. That MACV
Summary’s daily chronology reported the Battles of Coral and Balmoral: “13 May (Monday) – Toan
Thang (Binh Duong Prov): 0145 fire spt base 25 miles NNE of Saigon occupied by elements 1st and 3rd
RARs atkd by en force employing SA & RPG fire. Arty, hel gunships & tac air sptd frd unit in contact.
Contact lost 0630. 54 EK ((enemy killed)). Australian cas rept lt.”; and “Tue 28 May: Toan Thang
(Binh Duong Prov): Elms 3rd Bn, RAR, fire spt base Calmoral [sic] 13 mi E of Ben Cat recd mort fire
& hvy grd atk from south & northeast. En beaten off and withdrew. He1 gunships, Arty & AC-47
gunship sptd. 44 EK, 6 DET & 20 IW and 12 CS capt. Aus cas very lt.” As noted earlier, the II FFV
Operational Report for the Period Ending 31 July 1968 - covering the “Mini-Tet”, included brief
passages on FSPB Coral at p.18, p.23, p.28-32, and p.35 (see DTIC AD393858). However, the NVA
attacks on FSPB Balmoral were not specifically mentioned. While the Battle of Balmoral in late May
1968 is not mentioned in that II FFV Operational Report, the Australian Official History notes that “the
task force nevertheless figured prominently in American reports”. One noted: ‘In less than four weeks
of operations in the Catcher’s Mitt area, the Australian forces had killed 219 enemy and captured 13
prisoners’ … .” - McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003, p.396. At p.396, that
Australian Official History also relates that: “Operation Toan Thang concluded officially on 31 May.
24
NVA Division withdrew north to the Tri-Border Base Area (Base Area 350) where it
probably assumed control of the newly infiltrated 32nd NVA Regiment which arrived
from II Corps Tactical Zone earlier in the month.”65 According to a post-War US
Military history: “The enemy 7th Division, after several engagements with the 1st
Australian Task Force in Binh My – and after withdrawing one of its elements from
north of Saigon in Phase II, had retreated into the Hac Dich base.”66
The 141st NVA Regiment at Balmoral – a Summary
As noted, the Official Australian History states that the attack on FSPB
Balmoral early on 26 May was by the 165th Regiment.67 The 1 ATF “Intelligence
Review”68 noted that the “company-strength” ground attack on FSPB Balmoral at
0345hrs on 26 May 1968 involved the 165th Regiment. That 1 ATF Intelligence
Review recorded that the subsequent ground attack at 0230hrs on 28 May 1968 was
“by an estimated two battalions” and “bodies and PWs identified the 2nd and the 3rd
Battalion of 165 NVA Regiment/7th NVA Division and also four new infiltration
groups69 which had been in South Vietnam for periods from 2 to 15 days.”70
According to the Australian Official History, the attack on FSPB Balmoral on 28 May
Two hundred and thirty-eight NVA soldiers and 38 Viet Cong had died fighting the Australians. A
further 69 enemy were recorded as likely or possibly killed. … The Australian force suffered 25 killed
and 109 wounded (including five New Zealanders and five American soldiers serving with the task
force).” That History’s “Summary of Operations” records that 1 ATF elements participated in
Operation Toan Thang I from 21 April to 7 June – resulting in 276 NVA/VC KIA and 11 PW while
suffering 25 KIA and 99 WIA – p.452. A recent US publication incorrectly states that “on the night of
27-28 May the greater part of the 165th Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 141st Regiment, attacked
Firebase Coral [sic] for the third time that month.” – Villard, E.B., Combat Operations – Staying the
Course, Center of Military History – United States Army, Washington D.C., 2017.
65
II FFV, Operational Report for the Period Ending 31 July 1968. Base Area 350 (XU 7417 – XU
8824) “was formerly the base area of the 9th VC Division which moved south into Binh Duong
Province during Phase One of the General Offensive … still probably used as a border crossing area.”
US MACV/CICV, VC/NVA Base Area Study, ST-68-011, 15 April 1968.
66
Hoàng Ngọc Lung – Colonel ((ex-ARVN)), The General Offensives of 1968-1969, US Center for
Military History, Washington D.C., 1981. VCAT Item No. 21311208069. The Hắc Dịch/Hắt Dịch area
was defined by USMACV as the area bounded by coordinates YS 1790 – YS 4690 – YS 2572 and YS
4572, containing the jungle area south of the Bình Sơn Rubber Plantation and east of Route 15 to Route
2, with the Núi Thị Vải Mountains on the south. However, the 7th Division History (2006) relates
further attacks by its formations and units beginning in early-mid June - eg on the post at Cây Dầu, at
Phú Hòa and Cầu Dinh, and in the Lái Thiêu and Route 15 and 16 areas. The 7th Division did not
withdraw to its bases near the Cambodian border in northern Bình Long Province until 20 July 1968 -
XU 790190, where it was joined by its new formation - the V19 (32nd) Regiment from the Kontum area
in the Central Highlands.
67
68
1 ATF, Intelligence Review Op Toan Thang, Nui Dat, 21 June 1968, p.2.
69
Earlier in footnote 14 - referencing Research Note 07/2014 (Reference C), I noted that I had
“researched the Infiltration Groups - including: 32 IG, 165 IG, 233 IG, 269 IG, 275 IG, D 280 IG, 745
IG, NAM HA IG, and provided AAHU with their strengths and their arrival dates in the South.
70
1 ATF, INTSUM No. 148-68, 28 May 1968. See also: 1 ATF, Intelligence Review Op Toan Thang,
Nui Dat, 21 June 1968. That Review summarised: “Combined results ((Coral and Balmoral on 28
May)): 51 NVA KIA (BC) ((ie 47 Balmoral, four Coral area)), 7 NVA PW (one died).” HQ AFV
records list the following PWs captured at the Battle of Balmoral on 27 May 1968: three from 165 th
NVA Regiment, one from the 233rd Infiltration Group, one from the D280th Infiltration Group, one
from the Assault Youth Group, and one without a unit noted. As noted at footnotes 44 and 46: “A PW
from 165 Regt claimed that his Regt had been ordered to ‘emulate the victory achieved by 141 Regt’
and had been committed against FSPB Balmoral for this reason.” – 1 ATF (Fwd), Enemy Situation AO
Surfers II as at 291200 May 1968.
25
“was carried out by an estimated regiment (of two battalions) of North Vietnamese
Army troops” – but no regiment is identified.71
As related earlier in this Note, more recent Vietnamese accounts of
engagements at Balmoral include:
- the 7th Division History (2006) which - despite its brief coverage of the
Battle of Balmoral, identifies the 141st Regiment attacking Đồng Tràm
(near Bình Mỹ) on “25 May” (the “Balmoral 1” attack); and the 165th
Regiment attacking Đồng Tràm on “27/28 May” (the “Balmoral 2”
attack) – strengthened by the 1st Battalion of the 141st Regiment.72
- The 141st Division History (1997) which relates: “The 1st Battalion of the
141st Regiment was order to reinforce the 165th Battalion (minus) in the
second attack on the Đồng Tràm position. On the night of 27/28 May, our
units attacked the enemy’s entrenched camp and inflicted heavy casualties
on an American [sic] battalion, two artillery batteries, and an enemy tank
squadron.”
- An article on the official Dựng Nước - Giữ Nước (Build the Nation –
Defend the Nation) Website/Forum (see footnotes 53 and 59) states that at
“the Battle of Đồng Tràm ((Balmoral)): The first attack was by our 141st
Regiment … the second attack was by the 165th Regiment. In summary, in
this second attack we had 41 killed or missing, 29 wounded, and lost 29
weapons.” And, on 28 May, the assaulting elements comprised: the 4th and
5th Battalions of the 165th NVA Regiment; and the 1st Battalion of a second
regiment ((ie of the 141st Regiment)).
- In his 2010 book Major General (Retd) Đào Văn Lợi very briefly
described the Battle of Coral/Sở Hội on 12/13 May - noting his 3rd
Battalion of the 141st Regiment was initially allocated a reserve role in the
attack. However, General Lợi does not mention any late May 1968
engagements at Balmoral/Đồng Tràm 73
Further, acknowledging some “correlation” difficulties, the PAVN 2010 “33

Martyrs’ List” (Reference B and Attachment 9) detailed the personal data of 33 of the
48 “martyrs” declared as KIA in the period 25-27 May 1968. Of those 33: 22 were
from the 141st NVA Regiment (14 KIA on 25 and 26 May, and eight KIA on 27
May); and nine were from the 165th NVA Regiment (two KIA on 26 May, seven
KIA on 27 May). Such figures in that Martyrs’ List – if accurate, confirms that the
141st NVA Regiment was also involved in the Battle of Balmoral/Đồng Tràm
engagements in late May 1968 - ie while, as noted above, Australian accounts cite two
71
72
A wounded NVA soldier captured by D/3RAR at XT 943348 on 2 June 1968 (Private Trần Binh
Trương) declared that he was part of a 400-strong “32 Infiltration Group” that had departed North
Vietnam on 3 March 1968 and arrived in the Coral/Balmoral area on 22 May 1968. He was then
allocated to C8 Company/D27 Battalion/85 Regiment (1,200-strong comprising 27, 29, 32 and 35
Battalions). According to the PW, two companies of D27 had participated in the attack on FSPB
Balmoral on 27/28 May. 1 ATF, Enemy Situation AO Surfers II – as at 031200H June 68, 3 June 1968.
See also 1 ATF, INTSUM No.153-68, 3 June 1968. However, it was subsequently reported that the PW
Private Trần Binh Trương (of “A2/B2/C8/D27/85 Regt”) “was unsure of his unit in SVN due to his
arriving only a few days before his capture”. 1 ATF, Troops Information Sheet, No. 95, 26 May – 1
[sic] June 1968. During the War, an “85 Regiment” was never included in USMACV assessments or
orders-of-battle of the NVA or VC formations in the South.
73
Major General (Retd) Đào Văn Lợi, Trận mạc và giảng đường (Close Combat and University Halls),
People’s Armed Forces Publishing House, Hà Nội, 2010, pp.64-65.
26
battalions of the 165th NVA Regiment as the principal attacking force at those
Balmoral engagements.
Accuracy
As reviewed in this Note, the currently available published Vietnamese works

relating the Coral and Balmoral engagements in May 1968 are inaccurate in parts and
routinely “hyperbolic” in overstating NVA/VC achievements. Nevertheless, any
objective and complete study of those Battles is obliged to examine and assess the
Vietnamese accounts.
(E. P. Chamberlain)
27
Attachments:
1. Map: Eastern III Corps Tactical Zone – 1968 (noting FSPBs Coral and
Balmoral). - p.29.
2. Map: Border Area: Phú Giao District (Bình Dương Province)/Tân Uyên
District (Biên Hòa Province) – and FSPBs Balmoral, Coral, and Coogee
(Operation Toàn Thắng - Phases 7 & 8, Scale 1: 50,000). – p.31
3. Map: AO Newport/FSPB Balmoral, 1: 50,000. – p.33.
4. “Surprise Attack at Sở Hội” … (A Number of Battles in the Resistance War

Against the French and the Americans), Tập (Volume) I, 1991) – including
sketch map, see also f.22. – pp.35-38.
5. 7th NVA Division History – extract. – pp.39-40.
6. Conduct of the Surprise Attack on Sở Hội by the 141st Regiment/7th Division

on 13 May 1968 (141st Regiment History). Sketch Map. - p.41.
7. The Second Mobile Assault at Sở Hội - 16 May 1968 (141st Regiment

History). Sketch Map. – p.43.
8. “Balmoral 2”: A Detailed Vietnamese Account On-line – The 165th and 141st
Regiments at Balmoral 2 - from: Dựng Nước - Giữ Nước (see footnotes 53
and 59). pp.45-48.
9. Vietnamese Casualties at the Battles of Coral and Balmoral and the Recovery
of Remains. – pp.49-54.
10. The Battles of Coral and Balmoral: Extracts from Captured Documents and
PW/Rallier Debriefings. – pp. 55-59.
28

29
Attachment 1
Eastern III Corps Tactical Zone - 1968

(noting FSPBs Coral and Balmoral)
Source: Hodges, I., The Battle of Fire Support Bases Coral/Balmoral –

Vietnam 1968, Department of Veterans’ Affairs, Canberra, 2008.
30

31
Attachment 2
Border Area: Phú Giao District (Bình Dương Province)/Tân Uyên District
(Biên Hòa Province) – FSPBs Balmoral, Coral, and Coogee, 1:50,000 74
74
Note that Route 16 (1968) is now Provincial Route (Đường tỉnh - ĐT) 747; and Route 349 now runs
north-east from Provincial Route 747 from Route 349’s T-junction with Provincial Route 747 at XT
924288.
32

33
Attachment 3
AO Newport/FSPB Balmoral, 1: 50,000

34

35
Attachment 4
THE SURPRISE ATTACK AT SỞ HỘI 75

By the 141st Infantry Regiment (7th Division) – 13 May 1968
The Developing Battle
Deployment and battle procedure

According to plan, at 2300hrs on 12 May the units began to deploy – led by
reconnaissance elements. At 0130hrs on 13 May, the 3rd Battalion and its 82mm
mortars reached the battlefield and had occupied their positions. The 2nd Battalion and
its companies had not completed their deployment – and the 1st Company of the 1st
Battalion and the Regiment’s 16th Mortar Company had yet to arrive. The Regimental
Commander – Comrade Doãn Khiết recalculated the timings – if he waited until
0200hrs then the 1st Company and the Regiment’s mortars would still not have arrived
in time. Accordingly, he decided to open fire one hour later (ie at 0300hrs) and
advised the Divisional Commander – Comrade Nguyễn Thế Bôn, who agreed. By
0250hrs, the commanders of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Battalion, the 82mm mortars, and
the 75mm RCLs reported that they had completed taking up their positions 150 metres
from the enemy and were awaiting the orders to open fire. However, the 1st Company
and the 16th Company still had yet to arrive. The Regimental Commander discussed
the situation with the Political Commissar – Nguyễn Văn Nhật, and reconfirmed the
decision. If the Regiment’s 16th 82mm Mortar Company could not arrive in time, then
they would still open fire despite the lack of firepower (ie having three less tubes than
originally planned), but would exploit the use of their 60mm mortars. The Regimental
Commander reported this to the Divisional Commander who approved (the total
number of artillery pieces for the preparatory fire comprised two 75mm RCLs, two
82mm mortars, and five 60mm mortars). At 0255hrs, the Regimental Commander
made a final inspection – with the battalion headquarters having been established
about 1,000 metres from the enemy, and the telephone lines from the battalions to the
regiment and from the regiment to the division fully operational. The infantry units
and the supporting firepower elements had fully occupied their positions and were
ready to open fire.
Opening Fire and the Assault

At exactly 0300hrs on 13 May, the Regimental Commander gave the order for
the mortars and RCLs to open fire. From the very first minutes, the artillery
concentrated on hitting the enemy’s headquarters and their artillery positions. After
two minutes of rapid artillery fire, our assault formations – as planned, simultaneously
attacked the enemy positions.76 The battalion commanders reported to the Regimental
Headquarters that the enemy’s resistance was weak, and the Regimental Commander
75
Trung tá (Lieutenant Colonel) Phạm Vĩnh Phúc, Một số trận đánh trong Kháng chiến chống Pháp,
Kháng chiến chống Mỹ (A Number of Battles in the Resistance War Against the French and the
Americans), Tập I (Volume I), 1991. Translator’s Note: Sở Hội is located about four kilometres north
of the district town of Tân Uyên in Biên Hòa Province. A sketch map – see the following pages,
indicates that the attack by the 141st NVA Regiment on 13 May 1968 was against the Australian “4 th
[sic] Battalion” – ie the Battle of Coral (vicinity of XT 9329).
76
Translator’s Note: The attack on FSPB Coral on 13 May 1968 was described by 1ATF as “by an
estimated battalion, directed mainly at 102 Fd Bty and ((the)) 1 RAR mortar position both of which
were held by the enemy for a short period.” - 1 ATF Combat Operation After Action Report (to CG II
FFV), Operation Toan Thang I : 21 April – 7 June 1968, July 1968, p.18 (AWM95, 1/4/111).
36
ordered the assaulting waves to move swiftly into the depth of the enemy positions,
seek out the enemy, and not allow them to escape. At 0310hrs, the exact situation was
as follows:
The 3rd Battalion’s sector:

The 12th Company had formed two assaulting elements and attacked the
enemy’s right flank, but had been blocked by two heavy machine guns. The
commander had led a group deeper into the posts and ordered two B40 teams to crawl
forward and wipe out the two enemy firing positions. He then led an assault team
directly into the enemy artillery emplacements – and the enemy fled in panic. Our
troops used sub-machine guns and medium machine guns to fire on and sweep away
the enemy – and the company commander bravely crawled forward and used a hand-
grenade to destroy a 106.7mm77 mortar. Our second attacking element – led by the
assistant political officer, assaulted the enemy’s left flank but was held up by an
enemy heavy machine gun. He ordered a B40 to destroy the heavy machine gun post
and advanced into the enemy’s artillery emplacement where he joined with our deep-
penetrating group led by the company commander. They then moved to the right and
attacked the enemy battalion headquarters.
The 13th Company – led by the deputy company commander, advanced on the
left but was also blocked by lines of enemy infantry and many firing posts.
Consequently, their progress was difficult. The deputy company commander ordered
B40s and B41s to wipe out two firing posts to their front, and then advanced deeply
into the enemy’s headquarters area, joining up with the 6th Company of the 2nd
Infantry Battalion.
The 2nd Battalion’s sector:

At 0315hrs, the 6th Company attacked into the enemy positions but was
blocked by an enemy heavy machine gun and a tank78. The company commander
quickly split the company into two elements – one to attack on the left, the other to
attack on the right. Comrade Yên’s team crawled forward and used a B40 to set fire to
an enemy tank. At the same time, the second assaulting element also crawled forward
and used grenades to wipe out the enemy’s heavy machine gun. Next, the two
elements moved forward simultaneously but were stopped by enemy fire from their
in-depth positions. Our teams quickly applied pressure with their sub-machine guns
and medium machine guns to suppress the enemy – with a number of the enemy
fleeing for their lives. Our teams then moved deeper into the enemy positions to a
106.7mm mortar emplacement, and the enemy fled in panic. The two attacking
elements then moved forward to the right and struck the enemy headquarters area,
meeting up with the 3rd Battalion.
Coordinating with the 6th Company, the 7th Company advanced into the enemy
positions but was engaged by an enemy heavy machine gun from a flank. They used a
B40 to wipe out the heavy machine gun post and continued to advance – but met a
tank firing from deeper in the enemy positions. Comrade Lịch’s team circled to the
right and fired a B41 that set the vehicle afire. At the same time, Comrade Trực’s
team attacked the enemy’s 105mm artillery emplacement and destroyed three artillery
77
Translator’s Note: Australian medium tanks – Centurions (C Squadron/1st Armoured Regiment), did
not arrive at FSPB Coral from Núi Đất (via the US 11th Armoured Cavalry Regiment’s Blackhorse
base) until 1430hrs on 23 May 1968.
78
Translator’s Note: The Australian force at FSPB Coral did not have 106.7mm mortars – ie the US
4.2” M-30 mortar.
37
pieces79 and continued to advance deeper - setting fire to two tents and seizing a
heavy machine gun.
The 8th Company – the Battalion’s reserve force, deployed one element to
directly attack the enemy’s electricity generators, but was engaged by enemy flanking
fire from the left. Our teams swiftly overcame this with hand-grenades and then
circled to the rear wiping out each of the fleeing enemy groups. The deputy company
commander led an assault directly into the enemy’s 81mm mortar positions –
destroying one mortar. They intended to dismantle another mortar and take it away,
but - unable to dismantle it, our soldiers threw away the mortar tube and its base-plate.
It was now 0337hrs, and the 2nd Battalion had joined up with the 3rd Battalion at the
enemy’s headquarters and artillery support areas. Our assaulting elements then
advanced deeper – searching for the defeated enemy remnants as they scattered and
fled.
The 11th Company – the reserve force of the 3rd Battalion, acted in accord with
the plan and its assigned tasks. When it lost contact with the Battalion, it
automatically advanced behind the 12th Company. However, because they had circled
too far to the west, they only turned back when they heard the sound of gunfire on the
battlefield. As the 12th and 13th Companies had resolved the battlefield situation, they
((ie the 11th Company)) only wiped out a few of the enemy.
Concluding the Battle

At 0255hrs [sic], our assaulting elements continued to scour deep into the
rubber plantation and the enemy positions, but found only dead bodies. The 12th
Company discovered a number of enemy fleeing on Route 16 to Tân Uyên – so the
deputy company commander led a pursuit force, but was stopped by enemy artillery
fire. As enemy aircraft were very active - firing intensely onto the battlefield, our
companies quickly evacuated their wounded and fallen from the area by 0405hrs -
together with battlefield booty. After ten minutes, the enemy aircraft began firing
around Sở Hội, and our soldiers manning the 12.8mm anti-aircraft machine guns shot
one helicopter down in flames.
Results of the Battle

After an hour of fighting, we had seized one heavy machine gun, two medium
machine guns, one 81mm mortar, one 61mm [sic] mortar, and two AR-15 rifles. We
had destroyed three 105mm mobile artillery pieces, three 106.7mm mortars, one
81mm mortar, and set fire to two tanks and one helicopter. We suffered 35 wounded
and 42 comrades were killed in action.80
79
Translator’s Note: In the attack on 13 May 1968, one Australian 105mm howitzer and two 81mm
mortars were damaged. See: 1 ATF Combat Operation After Action Report (to CG II FFV), Operation
Toan Thang I, op.cit., July 1968, p.18 (AWM95, 1/4/111).
80
Translator’s Note: According to Australian records, casualties at the Battle of Coral (XT 9329) on 13
May 1968 (0145hrs-0800hrs) were: Australian/New Zealand forces - nine killed and 28 wounded;
NVA/VC 52 killed (body count), and one NVA PW. Later on 13 May, five NVA were engaged and
killed by elements of 1RAR and 3RAR. See: 1 ATF Combat Operation After Action Report (to CG II
FFV), Operation Toan Thang I: op.cit., July 1968, p.13, p.18 (AWM95, 1/4/111). For detail on artillery
aspects of the Battle of Coral, see: Ahearn, I.F., Colonel (Retd), “South Vietnam First Battle of Coral
12-13th May 1968 – The Real Story”, Cannonball, Journal of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical
Company, No. 84, September 2012, pp.5-23.
38
THE SURPRISE ATTACK AT SỞ HỘI - By the 141st Infantry Regiment

th
(7 Division) – 13 May 1968. Map-marking symbols are explained earlier at p.12.
Translator’s Note: 1RAR was the 1ATF unit attacked at FSPB Coral in the early hours of 13 May
1968. “4RAR” did not arrive in Vietnam until June 1968. Vietnamese accounts – including sketch
maps, do not note the presence of HQ 3RAR and 161 Battery RNZAA within the FSPB Coral
perimeter - nor the infantry companies of 1RAR and 3RAR in positions outside the FSPB, on 12-13
May. HQ 3RAR and its D Company were located about “300 metres” west of HQ 1RAR and were “not
subjected to any ground attack”. 3RAR, Operation Toan Thang – Operational Analysis: 21 Apr – 5 Jun
68, Nui Dat, 17 June 1968, sub-para 3.e. (AWM95 7/3/62).
39
Attachment 5
Extract from the 7th NVA Infantry Division History (2006)
ie: Trần Xuân Ban - Colonel (ed), The History of the 7th Infantry Division 1966-
2006, People’s Armed Forces Publishing House, Hanoi, 2006 81
“On 12 May, the reconnaissance element of the 141st Regiment discovered an

enemy battalion at Sở Hội (four kilometres north of Tân Uyên). Following an
engagement, they realized it was the 4th Battalion [sic]82 of the Royal Australian
Regiment. The Divisional Commander, ((Nguyễn)) Thế Bôn, conferred with Political
Commissar Hiêp and ordered that the enemy be attacked immediately on the night of
12 May. Regimental Commander Doãn Khiết and the battalion commanders did a
reconnaissance, and the orders for the attack were given. Meanwhile Political
Commissar Nguyễn Văn Nhật and Chief of Staff Hà Xuân Trường organized the
troops moving forward. The enemy had not yet prepared defensive works, and could
not respond in time. They were attacked fiercely83 and surprised. The enemy
panicked, were unable to resist, and were completely wiped out.84 We seized 40
weapons (including two heavy machine guns, an 81mm mortar and two 60mm
mortars)85 and swiftly withdrew before the enemy could employ their artillery. The
battle was truly successful and the unit was awarded the Liberation Combat Exploits
Medal 3rd Class (announced by the Divisional Commander on the afternoon of 13
May). With the Australians defeated, they were immediately replaced by US troops.86
The Americans entered Sở Hội with artillery and tanks - and more armoured vehicles.
81
Translator’s Note: Trần Xuân Ban - reportedly the operations officer of the 141st NVA Regiment in
1968, served as its Chief of Staff in 1975. As a retired Colonel, Ban also wrote a discrete book on the
141st NVA Regiment ie: Trần Xuân Ban, Trung Đoàn 141 (Sư Đoàn 7, Quân Đoàn 4) ie 141st
Regiment/7th Division/4 Corps, People’s Armed Forces Publishing House, Hà Nội, 1997. Another
edition – “A Chronicle of Events”, was published in 2010. The attacks on Coral/Balmoral were also
mentioned in a Vietnamese article: Trần Xuân Ban, “Poppies and Flowing White Rubber" (“Hoa anh
túc (+) và những dòng cao su trắng”), Viêt Báo, 18 November 2007.
82
Translator’s Note: The Australian “4th Battalion” - ie 4RAR, is also noted as the force attacked by
the 141st NVA Regiment on 13 May 1968 at FSPB Coral - ie as indicated on a sketch map of the battle
(see Attachment 5) published in 1991- see Trung tá (Lieutenant Colonel) Phạm Vĩnh Phúc, Một số trận
đánh trong Kháng chiến chống Pháp, Kháng chiến chống Mỹ (A Number of Battles in the Resistance
War Against the French and the Americans), Tập 1 (Volume I), 1991.
83
Translator’s Note: The attack on FSPB Coral on 13 May 1968 was described by the 1st Australian
Task Force (1 ATF) as “by an estimated battalion, directed mainly at 102 Fd Bty and 1 RAR mortar
position both of which were held by the enemy for a short period.” - 1 ATF Combat Operation After
Action Report (to CG II FFV), Operation Toan Thang I : 21 April – 7 June 1968, July 1968, p.18
(AWM95, 1/4/111).
84
Translator’s Note: 1 ATF had been ordered by US II FFV to “occupy blocking positions within AO
SURFERS to interdict enemy withdrawal routes from the South and South West.” FSPB Coral was
established at XT 9329 on 12 May 1968. Casualties at the Battle of Coral on 13 May 1968 (0145hrs-
0800hrs) were: Australian/New Zealand forces - nine killed and 28 wounded; NVA/VC 52 killed
(body count), one NVA PW. Later on 13 May, five NVA were engaged and killed by elements of
1RAR and 3RAR. See: 1 ATF Combat Operation After Action Report (to CG II FFV), Operation Toan
Thang I, op.cit., July 1968, p.13, p.18.
85
Translator’s Note: No Australian/New Zealand heavy weapons were permanently seized by the
NVA/VC in the engagement. One 105mm howitzer was temporarily over-run, and two 81mm mortars
were damaged. See: 1 ATF Combat Operation After Action Report (to CG II FFV), Operation Toan
Thang I, op.cit., July 1968, p.18. For detail on artillery aspects, see: Ahearn, I.F., Colonel (Retd),
“South Vietnam First Battle of Coral 12-13th May 1968 – The Real Story”, Cannonball, Journal of the
Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company, No. 84, September 2012, pp.5-23.
86
Translator’s Note: The Australian force was not “replaced by US troops”.
40
... Regimental Commander Doãn Khiết did a reconnaissance, and the enemy was
attacked immediately. Reinforced by the Tân Uyên District Company and H12s
((Type 63, 107mm rockets, 12 tubes)), on the night of 15/16 May87, the 141st
Regiment inflicted heavy casualties on a US infantry battalion, two artillery batteries
and an armoured troop. On 25 May, the 141st Regiment again attacked Đồng Tràm
(three kilometres south-west of Bình Mỹ).88 The 165th Regiment detached its 6th
Battalion to operate independently at Lái Thiêu, and its remaining forces reinforced
the 1st Battalion (141st Regiment) preparing to attack Đồng Tràm for the second
time."
Translator’s Note: In the 7th NVA Infantry Division History, there is further
information on the 165th NVA Regiment - ie that some writers have implied was
involved in the 13 May 1968 attack on FSPB Coral (XT 9329) with 141st Regiment. A
summary of a passage follows:
“On 5 May 1968, the Commanding Officer of the 165th Regiment was changed
(replaced by the 7th Division’s operations officer, Phan Mậu). However, on 8 May –
while on route to lay some ambushes at Gò Chùa with his 5th and 6th Battalions/165th
Regiment, Phan Mậu ((ie Phan Việt Dũng)) surrendered” - ie rallied.
Such defections are rarely admitted in Vietnamese communist military histories.
According to the 2006 7th Infantry Division History, Phan Mậu disclosed the 165th
Regiment’s locations, and - over the next few days, the 165th Regiment was heavily
hit with artillery and air strikes in the Lò Chén - Lái Thiêu area – and they “lost a lot
of soldiers and cadre”. On 16 May, the 165th Regiment was ordered to move to Bình
Mỹ.
87
Translator’s Note: In the subsequent attack on FSPB Coral on 16 May 1968 (0240hrs-0645hrs), the
Australian/New Zealand forces suffered five killed and 19 wounded. 34 NVA bodies were recovered
and one PW was taken. – See: 1 ATF Combat Operation After Action Report (to CG II FFV),
Operation Toan Thang I, op.cit., p.19.
88
Translator’s Note: On 26 May 1968 (0345hrs-0500hrs), NVA forces attacked FSPB Balmoral (XT
9333) occupied by the Australian 3RAR. FSPB Balmoral – in Phú Giao District of Bình Dương
Province, was about four kilometres north of FSPB Coral. Australian casualties in the engagement at
FSPB Balmoral were three killed and 14 wounded; six NVA were reportedly killed (body count). See:
1 ATF Combat Operation After Action Report (to CG II FFV), Operation Toan Thang I, op.cit., July
1968, p.21.
41
Attachment 6
Battle of Coral/Sở Hội - 12/13 May 1968 (141st Regiment History - 1997)
Translator’s Note: Vietnamese accounts – including sketch maps, do not note the presence of HQ
3RAR and 161 Battery RNZAA within the FSPB Coral perimeter on 12-13 May - nor the infantry
companies of 1RAR and 3RAR in positions outside the FSPB. HQ 3RAR and its D Company were
located about “300 metres” west of HQ 1RAR and were “not subjected to any ground attack”. 3RAR,
Operation Toan Thang – Operational Analysis: 21 Apr – 5 Jun 68, Nui Dat, 17 June 1968, sub-para 3.e.
Barbed wire is indicated around the northern, eastern and southern perimeter of FSPB Coral on 13 May
1968. However, the Australian Army official history relates that on 12/13 May: “No claymore mines or
barbed wire had been laid for the defence of the fire support base; there had been no time and, in any
case, the wire had not arrived.” – see footnote 31 in the main text of this Research Note.
42

43
Attachment 7
The Second Mobile Assault at Sở Hội – 16 May 1968 (141st Regiment History -
1997)
Map-marking symbols are explained earlier at p.12 of the main text.
Translator’s Note: Vietnamese accounts do not relate or indicate the arrival at FSPB Coral on 13 May
of Headquarters 1ATF, the TFMA, and other support elements. Although tanks are depicted, Australian
medium tanks – Centurions (C Squadron/1st Armoured Regiment), did not arrive at FSPB Coral from
Núi Đất until 1430hrs on 23 May 1968. Australian APCs, US SP guns, and US “Duster” armoured
vehicles had arrived at Coral on 13 May after the first battle – see footnote 36.
44

45
Attachment 8
“Balmoral 2”: A Detailed Vietnamese Account On-line

(from Dựng Nước - Giữ Nước)
th st
The 165 and 141 Regiments at Balmoral 2 – see footnotes 53 and 59.
In late August and early September 2010, two Hanoi-based Vietnamese

military historians – “A” and “Ch”, discussed the topic: “Were our operational
methods/tactics too rigid ?” on the official Vietnamese military website: Dựng Nước -
Giữ Nước.89 Reviewing Australian accounts of the Battles of Balmoral in some detail
(with maps90), one historian commented that: “One example of a máy móc
((mechanical/robotic/inflexible/repetitive)) approach to tactics by our forces – in the
opinion of our opponent, were the attacks against the two Australian fire support
bases Coral and Balmoral from 13 to 28 May 1968.” He sought opinions from
Vietnamese colleagues on why NVA forces attacked the FSPB twice “over open
ground” and at the same hour – noting that on 28 May the Australian defenders
“couldn’t believe their own eyes as the North Vietnamese attacked over an open
field.”91 He also noted that Australian records showed that the 165th Regiment was the
principal NVA formation that assaulted FSPB Balmroal on both 26 and 28 May 1968
– and sought comments.
A Vietnamese colleague responded that: “The first attack on Balmoral was by
the 141st Regiment (the 141st was also the formation that attacked Coral twice – which
we call the Battle of Sở Hội), the second attack on Balmoral was by the 165th
Regiment. In summary, in that second attack, we suffered 41 killed and missing in
action, 29 wounded, and lost 29 weapons.” The colleague also provided several pages
from a Vietnamese after-action report92 describing the detail of the Battle of Balmoral
on 28 May that included:
- The assaulting elements comprised: the 4th and 5th Battalions of the 165th
NVA Regiment; and the 1st Battalion of a second regiment ((Translator’s
Note: presumably the 141st Regiment)).
- The ((7th)) Division agreed to the withdrawal of the 165th Regiment group
at 0330hrs - but each battalion was to leave a platoon behind (with a fire
support team) to prevent the enemy from discovering the withdrawal. The
remaining elements of the Regiment were to organise the evacuation of
their wounded and dead before withdrawing.
89
“Quân ta tác chiến có cứng nhắc ?” (“Were our operational methods/tactics too rigid ?”), Dựng Nước
- Giữ Nước (Build the Nation – Defend the Nation), postings from 29 March 2008 to 28 August 2011.
90
Principally from: McAulay, L., The Battle of Coral and Balmoral, op.cit., 1989.
91
An Australian publication notes that on 28 May: “After that slaughter ((the attack on 26 May)) the
Australians were surprised when they came that way again ((across “a wide expanse of grass over
which the enemy had attacked two nights earlier.”)), rather than through the bush on either flank.”
Hodges, I., The Battle of Fire Support Bases Coral/Balmoral – Vietnam 1968, Department of Veterans’
Affairs, Canberra, 2008. That aspect is also addressed in the detailed accounts in McAulay, L., The
Battle of Coral and Balmoral, op.cit., p.286: The enemy was “predictable. They showed a lack of
imagination and flexibility. They didn’t do a close enough recce.”
92
The source of the after-action report is as yet unclear. The passages are not in the 141st NVA
Regiment history by Colonel Trần Xuân Ban, People’s Armed Forces Publishing House, Hà Nội, 1997;
nor in the 165th NVA Regiment History by Colonel Nguyễn Xuân Quý, People’s Armed Forces
46
- The work claimed that 15 Australian tanks and three “fire support
vehicles” had been destroyed.93
A full translation of the extract posted to the Dựng Nước - Giữ Nước webite
on the attack on 28 May is below - (but it did not cite names of senior cadre to assist
in confirming units or formations).
“ – at 0130hrs, after having examined the situation of our units and sought a directive
from Division, the Regimental Commander ordered the 82mm mortars to open fire
(the signal to open fire was also the signal for the units to begin their coordinated
action). After the mortars and other firepower had shelled their targets for seven
minutes, the Regimental Commander ordered the mortars to cease fire and the units to
attack.
a. On the 4th Battalion’s sector: After the firepower had ceased, the Battalion was
ordered to assault with the company formations as follows:
- The 3rd Company exploited their opportunity as on the Company’s axis

there were no fences; the Company’s firepower team opened fire and
destroyed two enemy tanks, and created favourable conditions for its teams
to advance.
- The 2nd Company followed the direction of the 3rd Company’s advance but
were blocked by two positions occupied by tanks. These were destroyed
by its troops with RPG-2s, and the Company continued its advance. After
ten minutes of combat, the Company Commander was wounded in the rear
but did not advise the political officer or the Company 2ic. Although no
one replaced the Company Commander, the troops continued the attack
automatically.
- The 1st Company did not have a Company Commander, and the 2ic’s
control of the Company was not steady and the situation became confused.
The assault became jammed and, as the Company 2ic was unable to lead
the men, only one assault team followed behind the 2nd Company.
b. On the 5th Battalion’s sector: On hearing the mortars fire on the enemy
positions, as planned the Battalion ordered its units to open fire and attack.
The Company’s formation was:
- The 6th and 7th Companies crossed the clearing to about 150 metres from
the enemy’s outer defensive line (as the position was at an angle, the
clearing had to be crossed). Here, the enemy fired illumination rounds and
clearly lit up our assault lines. Engaged by the enemy tanks and ground-
fire, the assault was blocked. The 7th Company used RPG-7s to destroy
93
At Balmoral, 2 Tp/C Sqn/1 Armoured Regiment – commanded by 2LT Michael Butler, only
comprised four Centurion tanks. 2 Tp/A Sqn/3 Cavalry Regiment – commanded by Captain Bruce
Richards comprised 11 M113-A1 APCs (a diagram showing the location of Australian armoured
vehicles at FSPB Balmoral is at p.385 in McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003.
Querying the large number of Australian tanks claimed to have been destroyed, the Vietnamese
historian “A” noted that there were only four Australian tanks at the FSPB. Historian “Ch” replied:
“Well, no doubt the enemy’s reports are different to ours.”
47
two tanks in the forefront of the enemy defences and moved forward to the
barbed-wire fences. However, the team with the explosive charges became
lost so there were no explosives to destroy the fences. The Company
Commander had to lift the wire up to let the teams crawl through – with
only supporting fire from behind giving assistance. The 6th Company
reached close to the wire but was not able to advance further. The 8th
Company skirted the edge of the clearing to assault the enemy but also was
unable to advance.
c. On the 1st Battalion’s sector: At 0139hrs, the Battalion ordered the attack on
the enemy positions. The Battalion’s formation was as follows:
- The 2nd Company advanced and fought into the area without wire, so its
attack was successful in destroying three tanks and many of the enemy’s
infantry.
- The 1st Company reached the wire, but did not have explosive charges and
had to remain outside the wire and engaged the enemy’s firing positions.
- After 30 minutes of combat, the battalions had attacked their objectives,

but their advances were uneven. At this time, the enemy’s artillery was
firing aimlessly to the rear of the 4th and the 5th Battalion. The Regimental
Commander ordered the pace of their attacks be increased.
d. The attacks advanced into the enemy’s positions:
- On the 4th Infantry Battalion’s sector:
- At 0215hrs, the 3rd Company – having seized the outer defences, had four
teams that had penetrated the defences and destroyed four tanks, two
heavy machine guns, and a number of enemy troops. It then withdrew
automatically as it had no commander.
- The 2nd Company had two teams that had advanced into the defences,
destroyed two vehicles and two firing positions – then also automatically
withdrew.
- The 1st Company only had one team that had followed the route of the 2nd
Company into the defences, and then withdrew at dawn. The remainder of
its troops lay outside the wire and then automatically withdrew.
- On the 5th Battalion’s sector:
- The 7th Company was unable to break through the wire – so the Company
Commander lifted the wire for the troops to crawl through. 12 comrades
were able to fight inside the defences until dawn, but did not return. The
remainder of the Company were outside the wire and fought until it was
time to withdraw.
48
- The 6th Company advanced and three teams penetrated the defences – the
remainder fought from outside the wire and were able to destroy four
enemy vehicles.
- The 8th Company only had two teams that penetrated the enemy defences –
the remainder fired into the enemy positions from outside.
Summary: On the 5th Battalion’s sector, only 27 comrades penetrated the

enemy positions. This number attacked as far as the enemy’s artillery
positions. Despite the sound of the firing, the Battalion and the Regiment
were not able to follow the situation, and the company and battalion cadre
could not direct their assault groups. A number of troops advanced into the
enemy positions and fought to the end – and were not seen to return.
On the 1st Battalion’s sector:
- The 2nd Company – having destroyed a group of enemy infantry and tanks
to their front, quickly advanced to the enemy’s artillery positions. The
enemy’s resistance was weak, and the Company employed its AKs, RPG-
2s and grenades to wipe out the enemy’s artillery posts. They next
advanced to the enemy headquarters and joined up with a number of
soldiers from the 4th Battalion and turned around.
- The 1st Company lay outside the wire and fired on the enemy strong
points, but three/four tanks deep in the enemy positions returned fire
fiercely and prevented the Company’s advance.
- The 1st Battalion’s commander sent the 3rd Company into the fight to
follow the 1st Company, but it was hindered by the 1st Company’s
formation and was forced to wait until it could finally follow the 1st
Company.
e. The organisation of the withdrawal:
- At 0330hrs – from the battalions’ reports, the Regimental Commander was

able to understand the situation and contacted Division advising that: the
troops had advanced into the enemy’s base; the 5th Battalion had been able
to seize the artillery positions; there were still a number of enemy tank
fighting positions in the west that still continued to fire into our formations
- and proposed that the Division withdraw our forces.
- The Divisional Commander agreed for the Regiment to withdraw and

ordered the Regiment to leave behind a platoon from each battalion with a
fire support team to continue to fight the enemy – in order to prevent the
enemy discovering our withdrawal, lifting up their heads, and launching a
counter-attack. The remaining elements of the Regiment were to organise
looking after the wounded and the dead – and then withdraw. Focused that
the withdrawal route avoided … … ((extract ends)).
49
Attachment 9
Vietnamese Casualties at the Battles of Coral and Balmoral

and the Recovery of Remains 94
Information Provided to Vietnamese Authorities by the Australian Department

of Defence in 2005 on Engagements in Tân Uyên District in 1968
According to a September 2010 article in the Vietnamese Armed Forces
(PAVN) Magazine 95 :
“In 2005, the Australian Department of Defence – through that country’s
Embassy in Vietnam, passed to the Military Headquarters of Bình Dương Province
two sketch maps of the mass burial sites in the Tân Uyên ((XT 966228)) District area.
The first area with six sets of remains was in Bình Mỹ village, and the second burial
site was at Hội Nghĩa with 42 sets of martyrs’ remains. Additionally, the Australian
Department of Defence advised that these remains in mass burial sites are of
Vietnamese soldiers who died in battles in the period 25 to 28 May 1968 when
attacking the Royal Australian Artillery Regiment at Bình Mỹ and Hội Nghĩa in Tân
Uyên District. Although the Australian Department of Defence provided the sketch
maps and the exact grid references of the burial sites, in the past five years, searches
by many units, veterans, and the Bình Dương Province Military Headquarters have
not yet been able to find these two mass burial sites.”
Martyrs’ List (2010)

A subsequent PAVN media article in October 2010 96 also referred to the
Battle of Balmoral in late May 1968 and included the personal data 97 of “martyrs”
killed in the battle. The article potentially providesd some further insights – including
the involvement of the 141st NVA Regiment in the Battle of Balmoral. The opening
text of that October 2010 PAVN article states:
“The listing of ‘Information on Martyrs’ issued on 16 September ((2010))
included an item titled: ‘Seeking someone to decode the mass burial site sketches of
martyrs in Tân Uyên ((XT 966228)) District (Bình Dương)’. Information on these two
burial site sketches (the first with six sets of remains in Bình Mỹ village; the second in
Hội Nghĩa village with 42 sets of remains) in Tân Uyên District), were provided by
the Australian Department of Defence. Immediately after publishing, based on
information provided by the authorities in Bình Phước Province and the 7th
Division/IV Corps Veterans Association – and checked with documentation from unit
archives, it has been determined that: the remains of the 48 martyrs in the mass
graves noted above are those of cadre and soldiers of the IV Corps (principally of the
7th Division) who died in engagements that occurred in the period 25-28 May 1970
[sic] 98 during attacks on bases of the Royal Australian Artillery Regiment [sic] 99 at
Bình Mỹ and Hội Nghĩa villages in Tân Uyên District.
94
The content of this attachment was included in Research Note 2/2017 dated 6 July 2017.
95
Báo QĐND (On-Line), “Seeking someone to decode the mass burial site sketches of martyrs in Tân
Uyên District (Bình Dương)”, 17 September 2010.
96
People’s Armed Forces (PAVN) On-Line, “Confirming the Names of 33 Martyrs in Two Mass
Graves in Tân Uyên District (Bình Dương)”, 3 October 2010 (in Vietnamese).
97
The personal data of the 33 appears to have been collated from individual death certificates – ie
official “giấy báo tử”.
98
Undoubtedly a typing error – it should be “1968”.
50
Among those 48 martyrs, data on 33 has been confirmed: names, and places
of birth … ”
Muddled Vietnamese Records ?

Both the September and October 2010 PAVN articles above cite attacks
against Australian bases in the vicinity of both Bình Mỹ and Hội Nghĩa villages
during the Second Phase of the 1968 Tết Offensive 100 in the period “25-28 May”– for
locations, see the maps at Attachments 2 and 3. It is probable that the articles’
accounts of the attack “at Bình Mỹ” is a reference to the NVA attacks on the nearby
FSPB Balmoral on 26 and 28 May (Bình Mỹ village was about three kilometres west
of FSPB Balmoral)101 ; and the attack at “Hội Nghĩa” (about three kilometres south of
FSPB Coral) is a reference to the smaller NVA shelling attacks on FSPB Coral on 26
and 28 May 1968.102
However, the PAVN articles refer to only “six sets of remains” recovered at
Bình Mỹ; and “42 sets of remains” from Hội Nghĩa. Such KIA figures – and when
compared with Australian accounts summarised in footnotes 101 (Balmoral) and 102
(Coral), do not “correlate” with “Bình Mỹ” representing NVA KIA in the
engagements at FSPB Balmoral, and “Hội Nghĩa” representing their casualties at
99
The 2001 official Vietnamese history of the Anti-American Resistance War states that both FSPB
Coral (ie as: Sở Hội) and FSPB Balmoral (ie as: Đồng Tràm) were occupied by US troops. – Nguyễn
Văn Minh - Colonel, Lịch sử Kháng chiến chống Mỹ cứu nước 1954-1975 - Tập (Vol) 5, NXBCTQG,
Hanoi, 2001. The 2006 7th NVA Division History relates its 141st Regiment attacking and wiping out
the “unprepared” 4RAR [sic] at FSPB Coral (Sở Hội) on 12 May – which was then occupied by US
forces, including tanks. On 15/16 May, the 141 st Regiment again attacked FSPB Coral – inflicting
heavy casualties on an infantry battalion, two artillery batteries and a US armoured troop. As noted,
that account has the 141st Regiment attacking FSPB Balmoral on 25 May, and the 165 th Regiment –
reinforced by the 1st Battalion/141st Regiment, attacking Balmoral on 27/28 May 1968. - The History of
the 7th NVA Division 1966-2006, op.cit., 2006.
100
As noted earlier at footnotes 1 and 11, the engagements during Operation Toàn Thắng I
(Total/Complete Victory I) are regarded as having countered part of the Second Phase (5 May – 14
June) of the communists’ 1968 Tết Offensive – the “Mini-Tết”. The II FFV Operational Report for the
Period Ending 31 July 1968 - covering the “Mini-Tet”, includes brief passages on FSPB Coral at p.18,
p.23, pp.28-32, and p.35 (see DTIC AD393858). However, NVA attacks on FSPB Balmoral are not
specifically mentioned in that II FFV report.
101
Regarding engagements at FSPB Balmoral (XT 933339) in the period 25-28 May 1968, the 1 ATF
After Action Report notes the following enemy KIA: 25 May – two NVA killed (by B/1RAR and
armour in the vicintiy of XT 931311 while escorting APCs from FSPB Coral to Balmoral; 26 May - six
NVA killed by 3RAR during an NVA attack on FSB Balmoral (“Balmoral 1”); 27 May – two NVA
KIA by 3RAR (XT 949338); 28 May - 43 NVA killed (body count) – including one PW WIA who died
of wounds, 12 killed (possible), 6 PW - during an attack on FSB Balmoral (XT 933339). See: 1 ATF,
Combat Operations After Action Report (to CG II FFV), Operation Toan Thang I, July 1968, pp.21-22
(AWM95, 1/4/111), and 1 ATF SITREP, Nui Dat, 29 May 1968. Enemy casualties are also noted in the
3RAR Report ie: 26 May (Balmoral 1) – six KIA (BC); 28 May (Balmoral 2) - 42 KIA (BC), seven
PW. – 3RAR, Operation Toan Thang – Operational Analysis, 21 Apr – 5 Jun 68, Nui Dat, 17 June
1968, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 to Annex B (AWM95, 7/3/62). That 3RAR Report also notes that
Bình Mỹ village (“XT 9036 to 9132” in 1968) was regarded as “controlled by the enemy” and
“sympathetic to the enemy cause”.
102
In late May 1968, in the FSPB Coral area (XT 9329 – about five kilometres south of FSPB
Balmoral), the 1 ATF After Action Report notes the following engagements: on 26 May - 0415-
0430hrs NVA shelling of the FSPB by mortar, 75mm RCL, and RPG fire resulting in one Australian
killed and one wounded (this coincided with the attack on FSPB Balmoral – ie “Balmoral 1”); six
NVA killed by 1RAR in the afternoon (including three in a bunker complex at XT 930313 – or “seven
bodies were counted” as related in On the Offensive, 2003, p.389); 27 May - one NVA KIA by 1RAR
(XT 965299); 28 May - NVA mortar and rocket attack on FSPB Coral (0245-0300hrs – ie during
“Balmoral 2”) resulting in three US WIA. On 28 May, 1RAR recorded five enemy KIA (BC) at XT
951301 – 1 ATF SITREP, Nui Dat, 29 May 1968.
51
FSPB Coral in late May. If however - for those engagements of late May 1968, the 42
sets of remains had been stated in the PAVN articles as having been recovered at Bình
Mỹ (ie Balmoral) and the six sets at Hội Nghĩa (Coral) – then there would be a close
“match” with the Australian accounts.
Despites several requests, I have not yet sighted copies of the two burial site
sketch maps reportedly provided by the Australian Department of Defence in 2005.
However, I believe that the Australian-supplied information was probably passed to
our Defence Attaché in Hanoi to assist the Vietnamese authorities/Brian Cleaver in
their search for NVA remains in the Balmoral area. Those sketch maps may have
been copies of the sketch maps from an After Action Report by C Squadron, 1
Armoured Regiment held on an Australian War Memorial files.103 Perhaps the
information provided by the Australian Department of Defence also included
reference to NVA documents recovered by Australian elements on the Balmoral
battlefield and/or PW accounts – ie that assisted the Vietnamese authorities in
identifying 33 of the 48 killed in the Battle/Battles. A check of that 2005 Australian-
provided information would be helpful in resolving the probable “mis-match” by the
Vietnamese authorities discussed in the preceding paragraph.
Some Extrapolation and Analysis of the 2010 PAVN Martyrs Data

While the sub-unit/unit and personnel data in the October 2010 PAVN On-
Line article 104 is incomplete for many of the 33 listed martyrs of late May 1968, the
following can be extrapolated from the data provided on those 33:
Four were killed on 25 May; 14 were killed on 26 May; 15 were killed on 27
May. Of whom:
22 were from the 141st NVA Regiment of the 7th NVA Infantry Division
(four killed on 25 May, 10 on 26 May, and eight on 27 May).
Nine were from the 165th NVA Regiment of the 7th NVA Infantry Division.
(one killed on 26 May, eight on 27 May).
Two were from 2nd Company of the 22nd Battalion of the 210th Regiment.105
Those listed as killed included three platoon commanders of the 165th
Regiment and one platoon commander of the 210th Regiment (no ranks were
included for seven of the listed KIA).
103
Butler, M.J. Second Lieutenant, After Action Reports: M1, M2 (26 May), M4 (28 May) - total six
diagrams – Toan Thang. File: AWM95, 2/3/9. See also footnotes 51, 61, 63 and 93 in the main text of
this Research Note.
104
People’s Armed Forces (PAVN) On-Line, “Confirming the Names of 33 Martyrs in Two Mass
Graves in Tân Uyên District (Bình Dương)”, 3 October 2010 (in Vietnamese).
105
Both soldiers were killed on 26 May. According to a Vietnamese media report, the 210 th Artillery
Regiment of the 7th Division of IV Corps was formed in 1974 and fought principally in Military
Region 559 (ie “the Trail”) and Cambodia. - Quế Anh, “210th Regiment Reunion”, Bình Phước On-
Line, 15 August 2013. The 7th NVA Division History (2006) relates that in September 1966, the
Division’s supporting arms included the 22nd Field Artillery Battalion and the 18th AA Artillery
Company; and a 100th Sapper Company was included in May 1967. The 22nd Field Artillery Battalion
was noted supporting the Division in October 1967. On 18 August 1968, the 22 nd Field Artillery
Battalion shelled Lộc Ninh, and on 10 September 1968 shelled the Bình Long Sector HQ. Accordingly,
the two “martyrs of the 22nd Battalion/210th Regiment were probably serving in the 22 nd Field Artillery
Battalion at the Battle of Balmoral.
52
Sketch Map – Balmoral: a.m. 26 May (2LT M.J. Butler) – see footnote 51.
Northeast Corner
53
Sketch Maps – Balmoral: (2LT M.J. Butler) 28 May 1968– see footnote 51.
Northwest Corner
Northeast Corner
54
Sketch Map – Balmoral: A Sweep to Check En Battlefield (2LT M.J. Butler)

– see footnote 51.
55
Attachment 10
The Battles of Coral and Balmoral: Extracts from Captured Documents and
PW/Rallier Debriefings
This Attachment lists several captured documents and “rallier/PW”

debriefings of possible interest held in the Texas Tech University’s Vietnam Center
and Archive (VCAT). Brief notes are included on the content of each document/
debrief.106
VCAT Item F034603561370: 17 May 69: recovered by B/3RAR at XT 892264.
Shows 141st Regiment, Trần Văn Ty 107 (Recon Sect Comd, Recon 2nd Bn – Nov 67);
Party, Youth membership certificates, Giấy Chứng Nhận/Commendation. CDEC
Bulletin 12,741, Log 05-2547-68. Nguyễn Đức Bảo as “CO of V17” (141 Regiment)
November 1967.
VCAT Item F034603670386: 17 May 69: B/3RAR, XT 892264, 141st Regiment,
Recon Pl, Trần Văn Ty – platoon leader - plus 16 combatants (with names),
“Operations Booklet – Secret” has little data.
VCAT F034603611524: 13 May 69: 1RAR, XT 946303, 141st Regiment (V17).
Message log – between V (probably Regiment HQ) and K2 (2nd Battalion); first
message of 7 May 68 notes a FWMAF/ARVN Company with 15 tanks entered Bình
Mỹ and ordered companies from K1 and K2 - and C16 Company, to attack and
destroy the enemy that evening – signed by Khiết ((ie Doãn Khiết, CO 141st Regiment
– good copy for viewing)). Undated note regarding many helicopters having landed at
the site of two 105mm howitzers at “Nhà Trắng” ((?? Possibly FSPB Coral ??)).
VCAT Item F034603600722: 13 May – 1RAR, XT 9228. Documents of Phạm Trọng
Quỹ -C22 Recon Coy of V17 (141st Regiment). Youth Group membership card dated
15 Apr 68.
VCAT Item F034603611489: Documents recoved from a body in a bunker on 13 May
68 by an element of US 1st Inf Div at at XT 816038 including a Personal History
Statement (PHS) dated 3 May 68 of Phạm Trung Hiệu (1/1/141st Regiment); and a
PHS dated 30 Apr 68 of Đào Bá Tiệp (1/141st Regiment).
VCAT Items F034603662629 and F034603662621: 13 May – 1RAR, XT 9228.
Infiltration Group D259 – 20 Nov 1960 infil pass for Trần Văn Tiết of D259, and
D304 infil pass (dated 1 Jan 60). Personal records of Trịnh Duy Hưng of 141st
Regiment – including Military ID Booklet (Giấy Chứng Minh) dated 15 Apr 68 –
parts legible, signed by Vũ Chát (possibly CO 141st Regimentt) in Nov 65. Noted in
106
If a NVA soldier was KIA or became a PW - and had an infiltration pass on him or in his pack, such
did not necessarily indicate that his whole Infiltration Group had been recently fighting as a Group on
the battlefield where he was killed or captured. More likely, the pass was an “historical”/administrative
document that he carried with him for quite some time after his arrival – ie when serving with the unit
to which he was allocated from his Infiltration Group. See footnotes 8, 12 and 14 in the main body of
this Research Note.
107
Most Vietnamese, NVA/VC cadre, soldiers and infrastructure personnel usually had two-word
nicknames/aliases (aka)/pseudonyms (tự, bí danh). Invariably, these comprised a number (from 2 to 10)
– or occasionally “Út” (meaning “youngest”) as the first word, followed by their given name. This
reflected their “birth order” in their family (with the father consider number “One”). For example, the
nickname “Anh Hai” is “Brother Two” and “Tư Nghĩa” is “Four Nghĩa”. Party members often also had
a secure cover-name – ie an additional “full” Vietnamese name of three words eg: Phan Mậu (Phan
Viết Dũng, Ba Mậu/Three Ba Mậu) – CO 165 NVA Regiment. See the 1965-1966 Military Region 1
(later Military Region 7) staff list that shows NVA ranks, names, full cover-names, nicknames, “aka”s,
and Party status - CDEC Log 03-1341-66.
56
footnote 6 of my “Balmoral” Research Note 2/2017. Personal records of Trần Văn

Khôi – 141st Regiment, including an infiltration pass dated 1 Jan 60 (D.304) and a
Party membership card dated 15 Apr 68. Five Party/Youth membership certificates
for other personnel.
VCAT Item F034603600694: 13 May 68 – 1RAR, XT 9228. 141st Regiment - Party
and Youth Group membership cards including for Sắm Sỹ Phu, Nguyễn Công Khải,
Trần Phú Ngọt (signed by Nguyễn Văn Phòng), Nguyễn Văn Đãm (15 Apr 68),
Nguyễn Đức Toàn (15 Apr 68), Trịnh Quý Biền.
VCAT Item F034603732222: 17 May 68 – 1RAR, XT 937294. NVA Military ID
booklet (Giấy Chứng Minh) issued to an assistant platoon commander - name illegible
– (member of “154th Regiment” in Apr 65), name illegible,to 23 Mar 68.
VCAT Item F034603580745 : 18 May 68– B/3RAR, XT 898285. Letter dated 19 Mar
68 – from Nguyễn Thiết Kế of “Đồng Nai 2” (ie cover name for the 7th NVA Div)”,
regarding: food supplies, use of Cambodian riels (ie currency).
VCAT Item F034603922106: 13 May 68 – 1 RAR, XT 9228. Notes that Nguyễn Thái
Hưng – of 1/141st Regiment, was released from hospital on 10 Jan 68. Also notebook
with entries to 8 May 68 by unidentified soldier of 3/141st Regiment (?) – includes
notes of a 5 May 68 meeting on objectives during 2nd Phase of the Tet 68 Offensive.
Has personnel roster – single/given names of 62 personnel of an unspecified company
– an element of 7th NVA Div. No originals.
VCAT Item F034603840848: CDEC 07-1696- 68. B/ /18 Inf/ 2/1 U.S. Inf Div
captured document taken from bodies 29 May 1968 at XT 891101 included an award
for 141st Regiment (?) personnel for attack on 15 May 1968. Document signed by
Nguyễn Văn Nhat of K-41 (141st Regiment) on 9 Sep 1967. Order dated 19 May
1968, signed by Tư Thơ (OC B1 Platoon/61 Company) citing members of C2 for
combat achievements in the attack on 15 May 1968 for Nguyễn Quang Thành (section
commander), Nguyễn Đình Cấp (platoon commander), Lê Văn Thịnh (soldier), Đào
Xuân Kính (soldier), Lê Văn Thành (section commander), Vũ Lưu Hữu (soldier),
Đình Quang Lợi (section commander), Phạm Ngọc Sỹ (soldier), Bùi Đức Thắng
(section commander). A manuscript amendment indicates that “battalion” disapproved
of the award being granted to Nguyễn Văn Mịch (soldier). F034603950716 shows
those killed at the GR XT891101 on 29 May were 141 Regiment personnel.
F034603042777 notes that a rallier reported that Q.12 (165th Regiment) had the cover
designator K21 and Q.14 (141st Regiment) was K41. 7 Div was given the cover
designator “Group 15”.
VCAT Item F034603612144: 18 May 68, 3/RAR. Infiltration pass for Nguyễn Văn
Chu of D.304, dated 1 Jan 60. Travel order dated 23 Jun 67 for Nguyễn Văn Chu of
K41 – possibly battalion 2ic. (K41 as 141st Regiment).
VCAT Item F034604380779: Interrogation report of Nguyễn Văn Nhị (9th Division)
captured 7 May 68. Includes: joined 3/141st Regiment in Dec 65; 141st Regiment
infiltrated into the South in the period Feb-Aug 66 – then recuperated for four months.
In Dec 66, the Regiment was designated Q14 and joined the 7th NVA Div. Nhị was
transferred to 9th Div in Jan 67.
VCAT Item F34603752859: 2 May 68, XT 915297, US 1st Inf Div. 165th Regiment
aka 12 Regiment – notes recruits to K-5 and K-3 of V17 (141st Regiment). Includes
an organogram of the 7th NVA Division.
VCAT Item F034604272343: Tạ Hòng Cự, Soldier – 307C Infiltration Group 307C;
has a detailed description of infiltration Jul 67 – Jan 1968. Joined V15 (ie 165th
Regiment) in the South, captured with AK-47 by US forces on 17 May 1968 in Bình
Dương Province
57
VCAT Item F034603901444: captured 6 May 68 at XT 873132 by A/1/4 Cav/1st US

Division. Has records of awards to 21st Company/165th NVA Regiment – and a very
large number of other awards cited. Nguyễn Đức Song as CO V15 (165th Regiment)
on 8 Jan 68. Nguyễn Ngọc Chức signed as/for CO V15 on 30 March 1968. Cites V15
as subordinate to Đoàn Đồng Nai 2 (ie 7th NVA Division).
Lieutenant Colonel Phan Mậu - rallied 7 May 1968.

Phan Mậu – (Phan Viết Dũng, Ba Mậu): NVA Lieutenant Colonel, CO 165th NVA
Regiment until his defection on 7 May 1968.
See full debrief: VCAT Item F034603571270, and US debrief at F034603722548.
Also VCAT Item F034603622960 – for history and background eg: b. Sai Gon 1930,
educated Nha Trang, Oct 67 XO of 165th NVA Regiment (Q.12, V15); Mar 68 CO of
165 Regiment. Brought Q.12 to Bình Dương Province for attacks on 4 May 68.
Rallied to Bình Dương Province HQ on 7 May 68. VCAT Item F034603660613 -
Phan Mậu relates 29 Apr 68 meeting on 2nd Phase of Tet Offensive – including
presence of senior participants Hoàng Cầm, Tám/Tư Bôn, Tư Hiệp etc. 165th
Regiment assigned area of operations south of Phú Cường Town to Lái Thiêu –
against 5th ARVN Division. 141st Regiment (as Division reserve) – to intercept
ARVN and Free World Forces from Bình Mỹ to Bình Chuẩn (no representative
present) – then replace Q12 (165th Regiment) in Lái Thiêu if Q12 entered Saigon or
withdrew to Bình Mỹ.
VCAT Item F034603622927: ARVN debrief of LTCOL Phan Mậu – including the
formation of the 7th NVA Division in March 1965 - designated “Đồng Nai 2” in
December 1967 with subordinates Q12 (165th Regiment) and Q14 (141st Regiment).
All senior cadre/staff of 7th NVA Division named - including 165th Regiment and
141st Regiment – with detailed organisation charts of the 165th (Q12) Regiment.
VCAT Item 2121107027 - Transcript of Press Conference, Saigon, 31 May 1968.
VCAT Item UA1795119136620B0 – Biography.VCAT Item 2390321002 - Photo.
Senior Lieutenant Phạm Lục – rallied 26 July 1968.

Snr Lt Phạm Lục - VCAT Item F034604240408 (poor copy): b. Sep 1930, Thái Bình
Province, North Vietnam. Served with the Việt Minh from 1950. Political Officer,
infiltrated with Group 602 in period Jul-Dec 65. Seved with 9th VC Division –
wounded in an airstrike in Aug 66 – hospitalised at K-71A Hospital (see VCAT Item
F03460438080855 below). Recuperated, put on temporary assigned to 7th NVA
Division (as a political officer working with 141st/V17 Regiment medical staff and
convalescent soldiers – rallied 26 July 1968 to National Police in Bình Dương. From
20 Aprl to 26 Jul 68, he was with V17 (141st NVA Regiment). 7th Division base area
in Cambodia – at XU 768258 (V15 and V17 Base Areas at XU 792220 and XU
768210. V19 joined the 7th NVA Div in July 1968 – from Kontum. 98 percent of 7th
NVA Div were Northerners. Prior to the May 68 Mini-Tet Offensive, V15 (165th
NVA Regiment) had a full TOE strength of 1600 - 1800 men. Phạm Lục heard that
V15 had suffered 800-900 casualties during the May 68 Offensive (KIA, WIA, and
missing). Prior to the May 68 Offensive, 141st NVA Regiment (V17) also had a
strength of 1600-1800. During this Offensive, V17 had suffered 600-700 casualties.
Approx two-thirds of the casualties were suffered at the various battlefields of the
Offensive from small arms, air strikes, and artillery. On 26 May 68, a B-52 strike at
the forward base camp of the V17 Regiment (141st NVA Regiment) - vic XT 832343
((10km west of FSB Balmoral)), caused approx 100 casualties. Another B-52 strike
on the same camp on 24 Jun 68 caused an additional 90 casualties. 90 percent of 7th
NVA
Div armed with AK-47s – remaining 10 percent had CKCs. Basic ammunition
58
load – AK: 250, CKC: 150. Includes history of 7th NVA Division, and organogram,
V15 (165th NVA Regiment) led by MAJ Tuyen, V17 (141st NVA Regiment) led by
LTCOL Khiet. Other personnel are listed. In Mar 66, the 141st Regiment was
redesignated Q14 Regiment and 165th Regiment was redesignated Q12 Regiment. In
Oct 67, Q12 and 14 were respectively redesignated V15 and V17. In July 1968, 7th
NVA Div moved back to its base area at XU 790190 – and V19 arrived.
VCAT Item F034604502192 (poor copy): Snr Lt Phạm Lục: MACV: Subject -
“Enemy Engagement with US Forces”. “On 16 May the entire V17 Regiment ((141st
NVA Regiment)) comprising … troops was ordered to attack a battalion-sized base
camp of the US 1st Division consisting of approx 680 men in the So Hoi area. “At
2000hrs on 15 May (sic), V17 soldiers were ordered to prepare their weapons and
supplies for an attack that night. However, they were not told the objective of the
attack. Reconnaissance of the ((enemy)) base camp had taken place two to three days
earlier …. At 0100hrs on 16 May, elements of V17 ((141st NVA Regiment)) began
mortaring the So Hoi ((ie Coral)) base camp. The mortar attack lasted about 20
minutes. Approx 200 rounds were fired into the camp. The ground attack followed
immediately. During the ground assault, the fighting lasted for about four hours, all
680 Americans in the base camp were killed [sic]. The base camp was occupied
until dawn on 16 May. The force withdrew to rear areas about two hours walk away.
During the attack, the V17 Regiment suffered 60 KIA and approx 100 WIA.
VCAT Item F034604440610 : Snr Lt Phạm Lục: Moved to “Worksite 7” (7th NVA
Division) on 20 Apr 68 – ie V17 (141st NVA Regiment) to conduct medical
evaluation of medical and convalescent system – as Pham Van Kim. Includes
assessments of the performance of the Party Chapters of the 141st NVA Regiment. On
troops’ health, malaria was a “serious problem”. Casualties: “In many cases,
arrangements were made with the local civilian populace to care for and conceal the
wounded troops as was evidenced at So Hoi 1 ((Coral, 13 May 68 ?)) and An Loi. …
V17 had only two doctors and ten medical technicians. … V17 needed higher quality
preventative gas masks - as those being used by the Regiment “were ineffective and
deteriorating.”
VCAT Item F034604350688: Snr Lt Phạm Lục: questioned on his views of a future
3rd Offensive in 68.
VCAT Item F034604360233: Snr Lt Phạm Lục – queried on NVA/VC radio listening
habits by troops – gives times and frequencies for NLF and Hanoi broadcasts.
Soldiers had radios.
VCAT Item F034604240100 - Snr Lt Phạm Lục: illegible, apart from very basic
organogram of V17 (141st Regiment).
VCAT Item F034604151644: Snr Lt Phạm Lục – debriefed on “COSVN 7 Bulletin”
ie as studied by 7th NVA Division cadre on 26 Jul 68. Relates purported gains during
the communist offensive - ie cites “71,000 enemy killed including 45,000 US troops
KIA in first two Tet offensives”. In mid-Jul 68, reinforcements from North Vietnam
refurbished Q12 and Q14 to full strength - each battalion had a strength of 350-400
men. ORBAT and names of senior personnel - but much is illegible. Following the
two Tet offensives, troops were “rather gloomy” and discouraged. 7th NVA Div –
conducted re-education on 21 and 22 Jul 68. A US MACV debriefing officer noted
that Phạm Lục was “a political officer in the position of an assistant, and he furnished
little information on military matters.” …. .
VCAT Item F034604440591: biographical background far clearer. Debriefed on
Village Protection Forces in North Vietnam.
VCAT Item F034604350753 : biographical background clearer also. Arrival of V19
Regiment in Phước Long Province from Kontum on approx 15 Jul 68.
59
VCAT Item F03604402401 – Debrief on North Vietnam’s Military Regions.

VCAT F034604402168: 250A Regiment in the North, providing infiltration training.
Information on K71A Hospital.
VCAT Item F034604430823 : reasons for rallying/defectimg.
VCAT Item F034604272119 : questioned on possible 3rd Offensive in 1968, relates
7th Division meeting 21 Jul 66 and planning processes for attacks.
VCAT Item F034604151793 :Rear services supply processes. Groups 50 and 70 -
including movement by Cambodian vehicles from Mimot to Snuol. Use of pack
bicycles into Bình Long Province. Specialized hospitals 150 and 170 described.
VCAT Item F034604872085 : Organisation, functions and structure of COSVN
Political Department (Jul 68 – within Cambodia, about two kilometres from the Tây
Ninh Province border).
VCAT Item F0346004491066 : Organisation, roles and personalities of COSVN, the
Military Party Committee, and the NLF (Jul 68).
VCAT Item F034604502172: Cambodia, supplies to 7th NVA Division. Foodstuffs
purchased from Cambodian captain – the Mimot District Chief. Cambodian riels used
exclusively for purchases.
VCAT Item F034604380855 : Hospital K71A – XT 565935 including personnel,
treatment, equipment and drugs - in Cambodia in a thick forest. Capacity 3,000, but
usually 1300-1500 patients at a time. 75 small huts – each with 10-12 hammocks, plus
underground shelters. Principally for Tây Ninh and Bình Long provinces. No mention
of malaria. See also sketch maps of hospital and border areas.
VCAT Item F034604420555 : Detail on the 308th NVA Division in North Vietnam –
1960 to 1965 inclusive.
********
60

61
The Battles of Coral and Balmoral – A Bibliography
Books:
Đào Văn Lợi Major General, Trận mạc và giảng đường (Close Combat and University
Halls), People’s Armed Forces Publishing House, Hà Nội, 2010.
Davies, B. with McKay G., Vietnam – The Complete Story of the Australian War,
Allen&Unwin, Crows Nest, 2012.
Hoàng Ngọc Lung – Colonel ((ex-ARVN)), The General Offensives of 1968-1969,

US Center for Military History, Washington D.C., 1981. VCAT Item No.
21311208069.
Lịch sử Đảng bộ tỉnh Bình Dương (The History of the Bình Dương Province Party),
phần 3 (Part 3): 1954 – 1968, The Truth Publishing House, Hanoi, 2003 and 2011.
McAulay, L., The Battle of Coral and Balmoral: Vietnam Fire Support Bases Coral
and Balmoral – May 1968, Arrow, Milsons Point, 1989.
McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive: The Australian Army in the Vietnam War
– January 1967 - June 1968, Allen&Unwin – in association with the Australian War
Memorial, Crows Nest, 2003.
Nguyễn Văn Minh Colonel, Lịch sử Kháng chiến chống Mỹ cứu nước 1954-1975
(The History of the Resistance War for National Salvation against the Americans,
Tập (Vol) 5, NXBCTQG, Hà Nội, 2001.
http://www.vnmilitaryhistory.net/index.php?topic=15458.50 .
Nguyễn Xuân Quý Colonel, Trung Đoàn Bộ Binh 165 (Sư Đoàn 7, Quân Đoàn 4) (ie
The 165 Infantry Regiment, 7th Division, 4 Corps) 1946-2001, People’s Armed Forces
Phạm Vĩnh Phúc Trung tá (Lieutenant Colonel), Một số trận đánh trong Kháng chiến
chống Pháp, Kháng chiến chống Mỹ (A Number of Battles in the Resistance War
Against the French and the Americans), Tập (Volume) I, 1991.
Trần Xuân Ban, Trung Đoàn 141 (Sư Đoàn 7, Quân Đoàn 4) (ie 141st Regiment/7th
Division/4 Corps), People’s Armed Forces Publishing House, Hà Nội, 1997. (In 2010,
Colonel Trần Xuân Ban edited: Trung đoàn 141 biên niên sự kiện (A Chonicle of
Events) - 1966-2011, People’s Armed Forces Publishing House, Hanoi, 2010.
However, that work is classified “lưu hành nội bộ” (internal distribution only).
Trần Xuân Ban Colonel, Lịch sử Sư đoàn bộ binh 7 (1966 - 2006) (ie The History of
the 7th NVA Infantry Division 1966-2006, People’s Armed Forces Publishing House,
Hanoi, 2006.
Villard, E.B., Combat Operations – Staying the Course, Center of Military History –
United States Army, Washington D.C., 2017.
62
Monographs
Chamberlain, E.P., Vietnam War: The Battle of Coral - 13 May 1968: Intelligence
Aspects and Enemy Strengths – Research Note 07/2014, 31 July 2014.
Chamberlain, E.P., Vietnam War: The Battle of Coral – Vietnamese Accounts (and a
sketch map), Research Note 1/2016, 5 January 2016.
Chamberlain, E.P., Vietnam War: The Battle of Balmoral /Đồng Tràm: The NVA
Assaults on the FSPB – 26 and 28 May 1968 – Involvement of the 141st NVA
Regiment, Research Note 2/2017, 6 July 2017.
Hodges, I., The Battle of Fire Support Bases Coral/Balmoral – Vietnam 1968,
Department of Veterans’ Affairs, Canberra, 2008.
Hartley, R.W., AM & Hampstead, B.V., The Story of 547 Signal Troop in South
Vietnam 1966-1972, Googong, 2016 – Australian War Memorial – MSS2216/
AWM2016.294.2.
Jamieson, M., Our Guys Were Very Good …, University of Wollongong,

Wollongong, 2014.
Articles
Ahearn, I.F., Colonel (Retd), “South Vietnam First Battle of Coral 12-13th May 1968
– The Real Story”, Cannonball, Journal of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical
Company, No. 84, September 2012, pp.5-23.
Báo QĐND (On-Line), “Seeking someone to decode the mass burial site sketches of
martyrs in Tân Uyên District (Bình Dương)”, 17 September 2010.
Trần Xuân Ban, “Poppies and Flowing White Rubber" (“Hoa anh túc (+) và những
dòng cao su trắng”), Viêt Báo, 18 November 2007.
People’s Armed Forces (PAVN) On-Line, “Confirming the Names of 33 Martyrs in

Two Mass Graves in Tân Uyên District (Bình Dương)”, 3 October 2010 (in
Vietnamese).
VĂN CHU (Quân đội nhân dân), “Đêm 31/1/1968: Xuân Mậu Thân rực lửa”,
People’s Army of Vietnam on-line media, 31 January 2014 – infonet.vn/dem-
3111968.
Reports
1 ATF, Combat Operations After Action Report (to CG II FFV), Operation Toan
Thang I: 21 April – 7 June 1968, July 1968, p.13 (AWM95, 1/4/111).
1 ATF, Quarterly Evaluation Report (QUARTEREVAL), 1 Apr 68 – 30 Jun 68, Nui

Dat, 5 July 1968.
1 ATF, Intelligence Review Op Toan Thang, Nui Dat, 21 June 1968.

63
1 ATF, OPS35 FRAG O 6 to OpO 19/68, Bearcat, 10 May 1968.
1 ATF (Fwd), Enemy Situation AO Surfers II as at 291200 May 1968.
1 ATF (Forward), G (Ops) Log, May 1968 – AWM95, 1/4/97.
1 ATF, INTSUM No.153-68, 3 June 1968.
1 ATF, Enemy Situation AO Surfers II – as at 031200H June 68, 3 June 1968.
1 ATF, Troops Information Sheet, No. 95, 26 May – 1 [sic] June 1968.
1 RAR, Operations Log – AWM95, 7/1/78 Part 1.
1st US Infantry Division, Operational Report – Lessons Learned, Headquarters 1st

Infantry Division, Period ending 31 July 1968, 25 November 1968,
.http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/394109.pdf .
II FFV, Operational Report for the Period Ending 31 July 1968.
3RAR, Operation Toan Thang – Operational Analysis: 21 Apr – 5 Jun 68, Nui Dat, 17
June 1968 (AWM95, 7/3/62).
Butler, M.J. Second Lieutenant, After Action Reports: M1, M2 (26 May), M4 (28
May) - total six diagrams/sketches – AWM95, 2/3/9.
HQ AFV PW Record (file: AWM98, 493).
Transcript of a Press Conference – NVA Colonel Trần Văn Đắc (rallied 19 April
1968), 15 May 1968 – VCAT Item 2121107019.
US CICV, OB of the 7th VC [sic] Division aka WS 7, Saigon, 17 May 1968 (VCAT
Item No. F034603571270) – ie including biography of Lieutenant Colonel Phan Mậu
- rallied 7 May 1968. Phan Mậu – (Phan Viết Dũng, Ba Mậu).
US MACV, Subject - Enemy Engagement with US Forces (debrief of rallier NVA

Senior Lieutenant Phạm Lục), Saigon, VCAT Item No. F034604502192.
US MACV, Monthly Summary, Part 1, May 1968. VCAT Item No. 168300010767.
US MACV/CICV, VC/NVA Base Area Study, ST-68-011, 15 April 1968.
Note: See also Attachment 10: Extracts from Captured Documents and PW/Rallier
Debriefings.

Vietnam War: The Battles of Coral (S H I) and Balmoral (Đ NG Tràm) - May 1968: The Vietnamese Communist Accounts - Including Three Sketch Maps.

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Vietnam War: The Battles of Coral (S H I) and Balmoral (Đ NG Tràm) - May 1968: The Vietnamese Communist Accounts - Including Three Sketch Maps.

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

1

The Battles of Coral (Sở Hội) and

The Vietnamese Communist Accounts – including three sketch maps

“Tougher than us – the NVA/VC”, Australian War Memorial Conference: “Vietnam:

“A Tough Enemy – the NVA/VC”, Geelong Vietnam Veterans Association, Geelong. 13

The Battles of Coral (Sở Hội) and Balmoral (Đồng Tràm) –

Introduction and Overview. – pp.5-7.

Operation Toàn Thắng I (Complete Victory I). – p.8.

Australian Accounts – Assaults on FSPB Coral: 13 and 16 May 1968. – pp.9-10.

Vietnamese Accounts – Assaults on FSPB Coral: 13 and 16 May 1968. - pp.10-15.

The Second Attack at Coral/Sở Hội – 15/16 May 1968. – pp.15-16.

The Sở Hội Memorial. – pp.17-18.

Australian Accounts – Assaults on FSPB Balmoral: 26 and 28 May 1968. – pp.18-20.

Vietnamese Accounts: Assaults on Balmoral/Đồng Tràm – 26 and 28 May 1968. – pp.20-22.

A Detailed and Critical Vietnamese Account On-line. – pp.22-23.

The 141st NVA Regiment at Balmoral – a Summary. – pp.24-26.

((This page is intentionally blank))

Brigadier E.P. (Ernie) Chamberlain, CSC (Retd) 1 Watermans Court

Introduction and Overview

In recent years, several English-language media articles have reviewed the

7th NVA Division Organisation – as at 7 May 1968 10

Operation Toàn Thắng I (Complete Victory I)

During Operation Toàn Thắng I, on 25 April 1968, a Forward Headquarters of

Australian Accounts – Assaults on FSPB Coral: 13 and 16 May 1968 13

Vietnamese Accounts – Assaults on FSPB Coral: 13 and 16 May 1968

Conduct of the Surprise Attack on Sở Hội by the 141st Regiment/7th Division

Throughout the War, the NVA/VC used “Warsaw Pact-style” map-marking

People’s Army of Vietnam on-line media - 31 January 2014. At 2 a.m. on

The Second Attack at Coral/Sở Hội – 15/16 May 1968.

Depiction: The Second Mobile Assault at Sở Hội (16 May 1968)

An Award for the 141st Regiment – and Commendations for Personnel

The Sở Hội Memorial

A small memorial – a stela (see overpage), was erected post-War by the

Australian Accounts – Assaults on FSPB Balmoral: 26 and 28 May 1968

Australian records or accounts appear to note the 141st NVA Regiment as

Vietnamese Accounts: Assaults on Balmoral/Đồng Tràm – 26 and 28 May 1968 52

165th Regiment History (2003): The Regiment suffered heavy casualties in

165th NVA Regiment Organisation (7 May 1968) 57

A Detailed and Critical Vietnamese Account On-line

In late August and early September 2010, two Hanoi-based Vietnamese

The USMACV monthly review of significant activities for May 1968

The 141st NVA Regiment at Balmoral – a Summary

Further, acknowledging some “correlation” difficulties, the PAVN 2010 “33

As reviewed in this Note, the currently available published Vietnamese works

3. Map: AO Newport/FSPB Balmoral, 1: 50,000. – p.33.

4. “Surprise Attack at Sở Hội” … (A Number of Battles in the Resistance War

5. 7th NVA Division History – extract. – pp.39-40.

6. Conduct of the Surprise Attack on Sở Hội by the 141st Regiment/7th Division

7. The Second Mobile Assault at Sở Hội - 16 May 1968 (141st Regiment

((This page is intentionally blank))

Eastern III Corps Tactical Zone - 1968

Source: Hodges, I., The Battle of Fire Support Bases Coral/Balmoral –

((This page is intentionally blank))

((This page is intentionally blank))

AO Newport/FSPB Balmoral, 1: 50,000

((This page is intentionally blank))

THE SURPRISE ATTACK AT SỞ HỘI 75

Deployment and battle procedure

Opening Fire and the Assault

The 3rd Battalion’s sector:

The 2nd Battalion’s sector:

Concluding the Battle

Results of the Battle