1
A cause of action is the delict or wrongful act or omission
G.R. No. 191825, October 05, 2016
DEE JAY'S INN AND CAFE AND/OR MELINDA
FERRARIS, Petitioners, v. MA. LORINA
RAÑESES, Respondent.
Petitioners argue that the present case is governed by the
2005 NLRC Rules of Procedure, which had already supplanted
the 2002 NLRC Rules of Procedure. Under the 2005 NLRC
Rules of Procedure, only the causes of action that were
pleaded in a complaint would be entertained. Petitioners, in
addition, assert that respondent was not dismissed from
employment; instead, respondent did not report for work
anymore after petitioner Ferraris scolded respondent and
Moonyeen on February 4, 2005 regarding the P400.00
shortage in the earnings of petitioner DJIC for the day.
Petitioners insist that they never used "abandonment" as a
defense in the termination of respondent's employment; and
they merely alleged that respondent never returned to work
anymore after the scolding incident.
The Court first addresses the procedural issue raised by
petitioners.
The record shows that respondent filed her complaint
sometime in January 2005 and position paper on September 8,
2005. During said period, the 2002 NLRC Rules of Procedure,
as amended by NLRC Resolution No. 01-02, was still in effect.
The 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC only took
effect on January 7, 2006.22chanrobleslaw
Section 4, Rule V of the 2002 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as
amended, provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 4. Submission of Position Papers/Memoranda. -
Without prejudice to the provisions of the last paragraph,
Section 2, of this Rule, the Labor Arbiter shall direct both
parties to submit simultaneously their position papers with
supporting documents and affidavits within an inextendible
period of ten (10) days from notice of termination of the
mandatory conference.
These verified position papers to be submitted shall cover
only those claims and causes of action raised in the complaint
excluding those that may have been amicably settled, and shall
be accompanied by all supporting documents including the
affidavits of their respective witnesses which shall take the
place of the latter's direct testimony. The parties shall
thereafter not be allowed to allege facts, or present
evidence to prove facts, not referred to and any cause or
causes of action not included in the complaint or position
papers, affidavits and other documents. (Emphases
supplied.)
Stated differently, the parties could allege and present
evidence to prove any cause or causes of action included, not
only in the complaint, but in the position papers as well. As
the Court explained in Tegimenta Chemical Phils. v.
Buensalida23:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[T]he complaint is not the only document from which the
complainant's cause of action is determined in a labor case.
Any aause of action that may not have been included in the
complaint or position paper, can no longer be alleged after the
position paper is submitted by the parties. In other words, the
filing of the position paper is the operative act which
forecloses the raising of other matters constitutive of the
cause of action. This necessarily implies that the cause of
action is finally ascertained only after both the complaint
and position paper are properly evaluated.
committed by the defendant in violation of the primary right of
the plaintiff. A complaint before the NLRC does not contain
specific allegations of these wrongful acts or omissions which
constitute the cause of action. All that it contains is the term by
which such acts or omissions complained of are generally
known. It cannot therefore be considered as the final
determinant of the cause of action. (Citation omitted.)
In the more recent Our Haus Realty Development Corporation
v. Parian,24 which cited Samar-Med Distribution v. National
Labor Relations Commission,25cralawred the Court further
expounded:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A claim not raised in the pro forma complaint may still be
raised in the position paper.
Our Haus questions the respondents' entitlement to SIL pay by
pointing out that this claim was not included in the pro
forma complaint filed with the NLRC. However, we agree with
the CA that such omission does not bar the labor tribunals from
touching upon this cause of action since this was raised and
discussed in the respondents' position paper. In Samar-Med
Distribution v. National Labor Relations Commission, we
held:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Firstly, petitioner's contention that the validity of Gutang's
dismissal should not be determined because it had not been
included in his complaint before the NLRC is bereft of merit.
The complaint of Gutang was a mere checklist of possible
causes of action that he might have against Roleda. Such
manner of preparing the complaint was obviously designed to
facilitate the filing of complaints by employees and laborers
who are thereby enabled to expediently set forth their
grievances in a general manner. But the non-inclusion in the
complaint of the issue on the dismissal did not necessarily
mean that the validity of the dismissal could not be an
issue. The rules of the NLRC require the submission of verified
position papers by the parties should they fail to agree upon an
amicable settlement, and bar the inclusion of any cause of
action not mentioned in the complaint or position paper from
the time of their submission by the parties. In view of this,
Gutang's cause of action should be ascertained not from a
reading of his complaint alone but also from
a consideration and evaluation of both his complaint and
position paper. (Citations omitted.)
The Court observes herein that respondent could not have
included the charge of illegal dismis al in her complaint
because she filed said complaint (which were for various
money claims against petitioners) in January 2005, and
petitioners purportedly dismissed her from employment only
on February 5, 2005. However, since respondent
subsequently alleged and argued the matter of her illegal
dismissal in her position paper filed on September 8, 2005,
then the Labor Arbiter could still take cognizance of the same.
Nevertheless, on the substantive issue of whether or not
respondent was illegally dismissed, the Court answers in the
negative.
The Court of Appeals was correct in its observation that the
Labor Arbiter's quote on the shifting of the burden of proof in
dismissal cases, supposedly from De Paul, could not actually
be found in said case. Yet, it does not necessarily mean that
the Labor Arbiter's ruling on the matter was fallacious or
entirely baseless.
In Exodus International Construction Corporation v.
Biscocho,26 the Court pronounced that "[i]n illegal dismissal
cases, it is incumbent upon the employees to first establish the
fact of their dismiss before the burden is shifted to the

employer to prove that the dismissal was legal." The Court
then explained that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"[T]his Court is not unmindful of the rule that in cases of illegal
dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proof to prove that
the termination was for a valid or authorized cause." But
"[b]efore the [petitioners] must bear the burden of proving that
the dismissal was legal, [the respondents] must first establish
by substantial evidence" that indeed they were dismissed. "[I]f
there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to the
legality or illegality thereof."27 (Citations omitted.)
The Court, in Cañedo v. Kampilan Security and Detective
Agency, Inc.,28 expressly recognized the rule
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In illegal dismissal cases, "[w]hile the employer bears the
burden x x x to prove that the termination was for a valid or
authorized cause, the employee must first establish by
substantial evidence the fact of dismissal from service." The
burden of proving the allegations rests upon the party alleging
and the proof must be clear, positive and convincing. Thus, in
this case, it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove his claim of
dismissal. (Citations omitted.)
The Court reiterated in Brown Madonna Press, Inc. v.
Casas,29 that "[i]n illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the
burden of proving that the employee's dismissal was legal.
However, to discharge this burden, the employee must first
prove, by substantial evidence, that he had been dismissed
from employment."
It bears to point out that in the case at bar, the Labor Arbiter,
the NLRC, and even the Court of Appeals, all consistently
found that respondent was not able to present substantial
evidence of her dismissal. They all rejected the joint affidavit of
Mercy and Mea, submitted by respondent, for being partial and
biased. It appears that Mercy and Mea executed said affidavits
to return a favor as respondent testified for them in their own
cases against petitioners. The Court of Appeals only deviated
from the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC by also
disregarding Eva's affidavit, submitted by petitioners to
corroborate their allegations, for being insufficient to prove
abandonment. The appellate court then applied the equipoise
doctrine: with all things considered equal, all doubts must be
resolved in favor of labor, that is, respondent.
Given the jurisprudence cited in the preceding paragraphs, the
application by the Court of Appeals of the equipoise doctrine
and the rule that all doubts should be resolved in favor of labor
was misplaced. Without the joint affidavit of Mercy and Mea,
there only remained the bare allegation of respondent that she
was dismissed by petitioners on February 5, 2005, which
hardly constitute substantial evidence of her dismissal. As both
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC held, since respondent was
unable to establish with substantial evidence her dismissal
from employment, the burden of proof did not shift to
petitioners to prove that her dismissal was for just or authorized
cause.
As pointed out by petitioners, they never raised abandonment
as a defense as there was no dismissal in the first place.
Petitioners did not argue that respondent abandoned her work
which justified her dismissal from employment. Petitioners
merely alleged the fact that respondent, after being scolded on
February 4, 2005, no longer returned to work beginning
February 5, 2005, which was corroborated by one of
petitioners' employees, Eva, in her affidavit.
Similar to this case is the factual background in Nightowl
Watchman & Security Agency, Inc. v. Lumahan,30 in which
Lumahan, the employee, asserted, but failed to prove, that he
was constructively dismissed; while Nightowl, the employer,
2
alleged that Lumahan did not report for work anymore by a
certain date but did not raise abandonment as a defense.
Quoted extensively below are the relevant portions from the
ruling of the Court in Nightowl:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion in the
NLRC's factual conclusion that Lumahan was not
dismissed from work.
In every employee dismissal case, the employer bears the
burden of proving the validity of the employee's
dismissal, i.e., the existence of just or authorized cause for
the dismissal and the observance of the due process
requirements. The employer's burden of proof, however;
presupposes that the employee had in fact been
dismissed, with the burden to prove the fact of dismissal
resting on the employee. Without any dismissal action on
the part of the employer, valid or otherwise, no burden to
prove just or authorized cause arises.
We find that the CA erred in disregarding the NLRC's
conclusion that there had been no dismissal, and in
immediately proceeding to tackle Nightowl's defense that
Lumahan abandoned his work.
The CA should have first considered whether there had been a
dismissal in the first place. To our mind, the CA missed this
crucial point as it presumed that Lumahan had actually been
dismissed. The CA's failure to properly appreciate this point -
which led to its erroneous conclusion - constitutes reversible
error that justifies the Court's exercise of its factual review
power.
We support the NLRC's approach of first evaluating whether
the employee had been dismissed, and find that it committed
no grave abuse of discretion in factually concluding that
Lumahan had not been dismissed from work.
It should be remembered that in cases before
administrative and quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC,
the degree of evidence required to be met is substantial
evidence, or such amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. In a situation where the word of another party
is taken against the other, as in this case, we must rely on
substantial evidence because a party alleging a critical
fact must duly substantiate and support its allegation.
We agree with the NLRC that Lumahan stopped reporting for
work on April 22, 1999, and never returned, as Nightowl
sufficiently supported this position with documentary evidence.
In contrast, Lumahan failed to refute, with supporting evidence,
Nightowl's contention that he did not report for work on April
22, 1999, and failed as well to prove that he continued working
from such date to May 15, 1999. What we can only gather from
his claim was that he did not work from May 16, 1999 to June
8, 1999; but this was after the substantially proven fact that he
had already stopped working on April 22, 1999.
In addition, we find that Lumahan failed to substantiate his
claim that he was constructively dismissed when Nightowl
allegedly refused to accept him back when he allegedly
reported for work from April 22, 1999 to June 9, 1999. In short,
Lumahan did not present any evidence to prove that he had, in
fact, reported back to work.
x x x x
In the case before us, the CA clearly ignored certain
compelling facts and misread the evidence on record by relying
on LA Demaisip's erroneous appreciation of facts. Under the

circumstances, the NLRC acted well within its jurisdiction in
finding that Lumahan had not been dismissed. Otherwise
stated, by reversing the ruling that there was no dismissal to
speak of, the CA committed a reversible error in finding grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or the
exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility; or in a manner so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to
act at all in contemplation of law. It is not sufficient that a
tribunal, or a quasi-judicial agency of the government, in the
exercise of its power, abused its discretion; such abuse must
be grave.
All told, we cannot agree with the CA in finding that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in evaluating the facts
based on the records and in concluding therefrom that
Lumahan had not been dismissed.
The CA erred when it considered "abandonment of work"
generally understood in employee dismissal situations
despite the fact that Nightowl never raised it as a defense.
As no dismissal was carried out in this case, any
consideration of abandonment - as a defense raised by an
employer in dismissal situations - was clearly misplaced.
To our mind, the CA again committed a reversible error in
considering that Nightowl raised abandonment as a
defense.
Abandonment, as understood under our labor laws, refers
to the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to
resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of duty that
constitutes just cause for the employer to dismiss the
employee.
Under this construct, abandonment is a defense available
against the employee who alleges a dismissal. Thus, for the
employer "to successfully invoke abandonment, whether as a
ground for dismissing an employee or as a defense, the
employer bears the burden of proving the employee's
unjustified refusal to resume his employment." This burden, of
course, proceeds from the general rule that places the burden
on the employer to prove the validity of the dismissal.
The CA, agreeing with LA Demaisip, concluded that Lumahan
was illegally dismissed because Nightowl failed to prove the
existence of an overt act showing Lumahan's intention to sever
his employment. To the CA, the fact that Nightowl failed to
send Lumahan notices for him to report back to work all the
more showed no abandonment took place.
The critical point the CA missed, however, was the fact
that Nightowl never raised abandonment as a defense.
What Nightowl persistently argued was that Lumahan
stopped reporting for work beginning April 22, 1999; and
that it had been waiting for Lumahan to show up so that it could
impose on him the necessary disciplinary action for
abandoning his post at Steelwork, only to learn that Lumahan
had filed an illegal dismissal complaint. Nightowl did not at all
argue that Lumahan had abandoned his work, thereby
warranting the termination of his employment.
Significantly, the CA construed these arguments as
abandonment of work under the labor law construct. We
find it clear, however, that Nightowl did not dismiss
Lumahan; hence, it never raised the defense of
3
abandonment.
Besides, Nightowl did not say that Lumahan "abandoned his
work"; rather, Nightowl stated that Lumahan "abandoned his
post" at Steelwork. When read together with its arguments,
what this phrase simply means is that Lumahan abandoned his
assignment at Steelwork; nonetheless, Nightowl still
considered him as its employee whose return they had been
waiting for.
Finally, failure to send notices to Lumahan to report back to
work should not be taken against Nightowl despite the fact that
it would have been prudent, given the circumstance, had it
done so. Report to work notices are required, as an aspect of
procedural due process, only in situations involving the
dismissal, or the possibility of dismissal, of the employee.
Verily, report-to-work notices could not be required when
dismissal, or the possibility of dismissal, of the employee does
not exist. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)
In a case where the employee was neither found to have been
dismissed nor to have abandoned his/her work, the general
course of action is for the Court to dismiss the complaint, direct
the employee to return to work, and order the employer to
accept the employee.31 However, the Court recognized
in Nightowlthat when a considerable length of time had already
passed rendering it impossible for the employee to return to
work, the award of separation pay is proper. Considering that
more than ten (10) years had passed since respondent
stopped reporting for work on February 5, 2005, up to the date
of this judgment, it is no longer possible and reasonable for the
Court to direct respondent to return to work and order
petitioners to accept her. Under the circumstances, it is just
and equitable for the Court instead to award respondent
separation pay in an amount equivalent to one (1) month salary
for every year of service, computed up to the time she stopped
working, or until February 4, 2005.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 29, 2009 and
Resolution dated February 8, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 01877-MIN is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE.
The Resolution dated August 30, 2006 of the National Labor
Relations Commission in NLRC CA No. M-009173-06,
affirming en toto the Decision dated February 21, 2006 of the
Labor Arbiter in RAB 12-01-00026-05,
is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION that petitioners Dee
Jay's Inn and Cafe and Melinda Ferraris, for just and equitable
reasons extant in this case, are additionally ORDERED to
jointly and severally pay respondent Ma. Lorina P. Rañeses
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every
year of service, computed up to the time she stopped working,
or until February 4, 2005.
_____________________________________________
G.R. No. 217455, October 05, 2016
OYSTER PLAZA HOTEL, ROLITO GO, AND JENNIFER
AMPEL, Petitioners, v. ERROL O. MELIVO, Respondent.
The petitioners argue, first, that the service of summons was
defective leaving the proceedings before the LA and the NLRC,
and the decisions they rendered, void; that neither Miraña nor
Ampel was authorized to receive the summons for Oyster
Plaza/MDC because they were not its president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent, director, corporate secretary, or in-
house counsel; that Ampel did not receive any summons; that
Go never received any summons in the New Bilibid Prisons in

Muntinlupa City, where he was serving his sentence; that
Oyster Plaza, being a mere name and business style, could not
be sued because it had no legal personality; and that the
summons and notices addressed to Oyster Plaza could not
bind MDC.
Second, on the assumption that the summons was validly
served, the petitioners argue that Melivo was not illegally
dismissed because he was not a regular employee but merely
a fixed-term employee. Lastly, assuming that Oyster Plaza was
liable, Go could not be made solidarity liable because he was
no longer connected with the hotel Neither could Ampel be
held solidarity liable as there was no proof that she acted in
bad faith.
In his Comment,24 dated October 23, 2015, Melivo refuted the
petitioners' arguments. He countered that in quasi-judicial
proceedings before the NLRC and its arbitration branch,
procedural rules governing service of summons were not
strictly construed; that the service of summons and notices
substantially complied with the requirements of the 2005
Revised NLRC Rules of Procedure; that the non-inclusion of
the corporate name of MDC was a mere procedural error which
did not affect the jurisdiction of the labor tribunals; that Go and
Ampel were responsible officers of Oyster Plaza; and that
Melivo's dismissal was done in bad faith because he was
verbally and arbitrarily dismissed.
In their Reply,25 dated March 23, 2016, the petitioners merely
reiterated the arguments they raised in their petition.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
Petitioners were Not Deprived of their
Right to Due Process
In quasi-judicial proceedings before the NLRC and its
arbitration branch, procedural rules governing service of
summons are not strictly construed. Substantial compliance
thereof is sufficient. The constitutional requirement of due
process with respect to service of summons only exacts that
the service of summons be such as may reasonably be
expected to give the notice desired. Once the service provided
by the rules reasonably accomplishes that end, the
requirement of justice is answered, the traditional notion of fair
play is satisfied, and due process is served. 26
In Scenarios, Inc. vs. Vinluan,27 the Court considered as
substantial compliance the service of summons by registered
mail at the respondent's place of business. The Court
explained therein that technical rules of procedure were not
strictly applied in quasi-judicial proceedings and only
substantial compliance was required; and that the notation in
the registry receipt that "a registered article must not be
delivered to anyone but the addressee, or upon the
addressee's written order" creates the presumption that the
persons who received the summons and notice were
presumably able to present a written authorization to receive
them and, therefore, the notices were presumed to be duly
received in the ordinary course of events.
Similarly, in this case, the summons and notices were served
by registered mail at the petitioners' place of business. Thus,
the person who received the same was presumed authorized
to do so. Consequently, the summons and notices were
presumed to be duly served. The burden of proving the
irregularity in the service of summons and notices, if any, is on
4
the part of the petitioners. In this case, the petitioners clearly
failed to discharge that burden.
The Court concurs with the CA that the failure to implead MDC
in the proceedings before the LA and the NLRC was merely a
procedural error which did not divest the labor tribunals of their
jurisdiction. In Pison-Arceo Agricultural Development Corp. vs.
NLRC (Pison-Arceo),28 which involved the resolution of
substantially the same issue, the Court held
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
X x x. There is no dispute that Hacienda Lanutan, which was
owned SOLELY by petitioner, was impleaded and was heard. If
at all, the non-inclusion of the corporate name of
petitioner in the case before the executive labor arbiter was a
mere procedural error which did not at all affect the jurisdiction
of the labor tribunals.29 [Emphasis supplied]
chanrobleslaw
By the petitioners' own admission, Oyster Plaza was owned
and operated by MDC. This was further underscored in the
petitioners' Verification/Certification,30 dated December 8,
2011, attached to their petition before the CA. It was stated
therein that "Elsa Go is the authorized representative of
petitioner Oyster Plaza Hotel/Martyniuk Development
Corporation." Applying the pronouncement in Pison-Arceo, the
failure to include MDC's corporate name in the complaint did
not necessarily result in the loss of the labor tribunals'
jurisdiction over the former. The said failure was but a
procedural blunder which did not render the labor proceedings
void, so long as the dictates of justice were substantially
complied with.
Further, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to
be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is the
absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard; hence, a
party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been
afforded the opportunity to present his side. 31
The Court notes that even though the petitioners failed to
participate in the proceedings before the LA, they were able to
argue their case before the NLRC. The petitioners, through
their pleadings, were able to argue their position and submit
evidence in support of their position that they did not receive
the summons and notices from the LA; and that Melivo was not
illegally dismissed.
Evidently, the petitioners' contention that they were denied due
process is devoid of any merit.
Melivo was Illegally Dismissed
Anent the issue of illegal dismissal, the CA correctly affirmed
the ruling of the NLRC.
Probation is the period during which the employer may
determine if the employee is qualified for possible inclusion in
the regular force.32 The employer has the right or is at liberty to
choose who will be hired and who will be denied employment.
In that sense, it is within the exercise of the right to select his
employees that the employer may set or fix a probationary
period within which the latter may test and observe the conduct
of the former before hiring him permanently. 33 An employee
allowed to work beyond the probationary period is deemed a
regular employee.34
In Holiday Inn Manila vs. NLRC (Holiday Inn),35 the Court
considered therein complainant's 3-week on-the-job
training (OJT) period as her probationary employment period.

The Court explained that the complainant was certainly under
observation during her 3-week OJT such that if her services
proved unsatisfactory, she could have been dropped anytime
during said period. On the other hand, when her services were
continued after her training, the employer in effect recognized
that she had passed probation and was qualified to be a
regular employee. Thus, the Court ruled that the complainant
therein attained regular employment status when she was
formally placed under probation after her OJT.
The present case involves substantially the same factual
considerations as that of Holiday Inn. In this case, Melivo was
first hired as a trainee in August 2008. His training lasted for
three (3) months. As a room boy, his performance was
certainly under observation. Thus, it can be reasonably
deduced that Melivo's probationary employment actually
started in August 2008, at the same time he started working as
a trainee. Therefore, when he was re-hired as room boy after
his training period sometime in November 2008 he attained
regular employment status.
Assuming arguendo that the 3-month training period could be
considered a probationary period, the conclusion would still be
the same. It should be remembered that Melivo was again
employed as a room boy in November 2008 under
probationary status for five (5) months or until March 2009.
Records would show that Melivo had completed his
probationary employment. Thus, when Oyster Plaza re-hired
him for the third time on April 7, 2009, he became its regular
employee thereof.
The petitioners' contention that Melivo was hired as a project
employee is untenable. Under Article 280 of the Labor Code,
as amended, a project employee is one whose employment
has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the
completion or termination of which has been determined at the
time of the engagement of the employee. Here, the contract of
employment failed to indicate the specific project or
undertaking for which Oyster Plaza sought Melivo's services.
Moreover, as correctly noted by the NLRC, the petitioners
failed to submit a report of Melivo's termination to the nearest
public employment office, as required under Section 2 of D.O.
No. 19.
As a regular employee, Melivo could only be dismissed for just
or authorized causes after affording him the procedural
requirement of notice and hearing. The petitioners failed to
adduce evidence that Melivo's dismissal was for a just or
authorized cause, or that he was sufficiently notified and given
opportunity to be heard why his employment should not be
terminated. Hence, Melivo's dismissal was illegal.
Go and Ampel cannot be held Solidarity
Liable with Oyster Plaza/MDC
A corporation, being a juridical entity, may act only through its
directors, officers and employees. Obligations incurred by
them, acting as such corporate agents, are not theirs but the
direct accountabilities of the corporation they
represent.36 Pursuant to this principle, a director, officer or
employee of a corporation is generally not held personally
liable for obligations incurred by the corporation; it is only in
exceptional circumstances that solidary liability will attach to
them.37 Thus, in labor cases, corporate directors and officers
are held solidarity liable with the corporation for the employee's
termination only when the same is done with malice or in bad
faith.38
In the present case, there is nothing substantial on record
5
which can justify Go and Ampel's solidary liability with Oyster
Plaza or MDC. As to Ampel, records reveal that her
participation in the illegal dismissal was her verbally informing
Melivo that his services were being terminated; and the said
act could hardly be considered malicious enough to make
Ampel solidarity liable with Oyster Plaza or MDC.
With regard to Go, aside from the assertion that he was the
owner of Oyster Plaza, no other act, relating to Melivo's illegal
dismissal, was ever averred against him. Besides, Go's relation
with Oyster Plaza or MDC was only based from the bare
allegations of Melivo who failed to provide substantial evidence
to prove them. It is of no moment that Go failed to produce
evidence to show that he was no longer connected with MDC
or Oyster Plaza. Melivo should have relied on the strength of
his evidence and not on the weakness of the defense offered
by the petitioners.39 Clearly, without any participation in the
illegal dismissal of Melivo, no malice or bad faith can be
attributed to Go to justify his solidary liability with Oyster Plaza.
In fine, the petition must be partially granted to the effect that
only Oyster Plaza/MDC should be adjudged liable to Melivo.
Finally, pursuant to Nacar v. Gallery Frames,40 this Court finds
that the award of the CA should be modified in that the total
monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per
annum from the date Melivo was terminated from work until
June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until their
full satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
April 30, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 122767 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that only
Oyster Plaza Hotel/Martyniuk Development Corporation
is ORDERED to reinstate Melivo to his former position without
loss of seniority rights; and to pay Melivo his backwages,
proportionate 13th month pay, and attorney's fees equivalent to
10% of the monetary awards.
The total monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of
12% per annum from the date that Melivo was illegally
terminated from work until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum
from July 1, 2013 until their full satisfaction.
_______________________________________________
G.R. No. 207156
TURKS SHAWARMA COMPANY/GEM
ZEÑAROSA, Petitioners,
vs.
FELICIANO Z. PAJARON and LARRY A.
CARBONILLA, Respondents.
Our Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
The Court has time and again held that "[t]he right to appeal is
neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is
a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of the
law."19 "The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply
with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to
appeal is lost."20
Article 223 of the Labor Code, which sets forth the rules on
appeal from the Labor Arbiter's monetary award, provides:

ART. 223. Appeal. --- Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor
Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such
appeal may be entertained only on any off the following
grounds:
(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the
part of the Labor Arbiter;
(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or
coercion, including graft and corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law; and
(d) If serious errors in the finding of facts are raised which
would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the
appellant.1âwphi1
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in
the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from.
x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Meanwhile, Sections 4 and 6 of Rule VI of the 2005 Revised
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, which were in effect when
petitioners filed their appeal, provide:
Section 4. Requisites for perfection of appeal. - (a) The Appeal
shall be: 1) filed within the reglementary period as provided in
Section 1 of this Rule; 2) verified by the appellant himself in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as
amended; 3) in the form of a memorandum of appeal which
shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in
support thereof: the relief prayed for, and with a statement of
the date the appellant received the appealed decision,
resolution or order; 4) in three (3) legibly typewritten or printed
copies; and 5) accompanied by i) proof of payment of the
required appeal fee; ii) posting of a cash or surety bond as
provided in Section 6 of this Rule; iii) a certificate of non-forum
shopping; and iv) proof of service upon the other parties.
b) A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other
requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the period
for perfecting an appeal.
xxxx
Section 6. Bond. - - - In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter
or the Regional Director involves a monetary award, an appeal
by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a
bond, which shall either be in the form of cash deposit or surety
bond equivalent in amount to the monetary award, exclusive of
damages and attorney's fees.
xxxx
No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on
meritorious grounds, and upon the posting of a bond in a
reasonable amount. The mere filing of a motion to reduce bond
6
without complying with the requisites in the preceding
paragraphs shall not stop the running of the period to perfect
an appeal.
"It is clear from both the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of
Procedure that there is legislative and administrative intent to
strictly apply the appeal bond requirement, and the Court
should give utmost regard to this intention."21 The posting of
cash or surety bond is therefore mandatory and jurisdictional;
failure to comply with this requirement renders the decision of
the Labor Arbiter final and executory.22 This indispensable
requisite for the perfection of an appeal ''is to assure the
workers that if they finally prevail in the case[,] the monetary
award will be given to them upon the dismissal of the
employer's appeal [and] is further meant to discourage
employers from using the appeal to delay or evade payment of
their obligations to the employees."23
However, the Court, in special and justified circumstances, has
relaxed the requirement of posting a supersedeas bond for the
perfection of an appeal on technical considerations to give way
to equity and justice.24 Thus, under Section 6 of Rule VI of the
2005 NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure, the reduction of the
appeal bond is allowed, subject to the following conditions: (1)
the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious
grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the
monetary award is posted by the appellant. Compliance with
these two conditions will stop the running of the period to
perfect an appeal.
In the case at bar, petitioners filed a Motion to Reduce Bond
together with their Notice of Appeal and posted a cash bond of
₱15,000.00 within the 10-day reglementary period to appeal.
The CA correctly found that the NLRC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reduce
bond as such motion was not predicated on meritorious and
reasonable grounds and the amount tendered is not
reasonable in relation to the award. The NLRC correctly held
that the supposed ground cited in the motion is not well-taken
for there was no evidence to prove Zeñarosa's claim that the
payment of the full amount of the award would greatly affect his
business due to financial setbacks. Besides, "the law does not
require outright payment of the total monetary award; [the
appellant has the option to post either a cash or surety bond. In
the latter case, appellant must pay only a] moderate and
reasonable sum for the premium to ensure that the award will
be eventually paid should the appeal fail."25 Moreover, the
absence of counsel is not a valid excuse for non-compliance
with the rules. As aptly observed by the CA, Zeñarosa cannot
feign ignorance of the law considering that he was able to post
a partial bond and ask for a reduction of the appeal bond. At
any rate, petitioners did not advance any reason for the alleged
absence of counsel except that they were simply abandoned.
Neither did petitioners explain why they failed to procure a new
counsel to properly assist them in filing the appeal. Moreover,
the partial bond posted was not reasonable. In the case
of McBurnie v. Ganzon, 26 the Court has set a provisional
percentage of 10% of the monetary award (exclusive of
damages and attorney's fees) as reasonable amount of bond
that an appellant should post pending resolution by the NLRC
of a motion for a bond's reduction. Only after the posting of this
required percentage shall an appellant's period to perfect an
appeal be suspended. Applying this parameter, the ₱15,000.00
partial bond posted by petitioners is not considered reasonable
in relation to the total monetary award of ₱197,936.27.
Petitioners, nevertheless, rely on a number of cases wherein
the Court allowed the relaxation of the stringent requirement of

the rule. In Nicol v. Footjoy Industrial Corporation, 27 the Court
reversed the NLRC's denial of the appellant's motion to reduce
bond upon finding adequate evidence to justify the reduction.
In Rada v. National Labor Relations
Commission28and Blancaflor v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 29 the NLRC allowed the late payment of the
bond because the appealed Decision of the Labor Arbiter did
not state the exact amount to be awarded, hence there could
be no basis for determining the amount of the bond to be filed.
It was only after the amount of superseades bond was
specified by the NLRC that the appellants filed the bond.
In YBL (Your Bus Line) v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 30 the Court was propelled to relax the
requirements relating to appeal bonds as there were valid
issues raised in the appeal. In Dr. Postigo v. Philippine
Tuberculosis Society, Inc., 31the respondent therein deferred
the posting of the bond and instead filed a motion to reduce
bond on the ground that the Labor Arbiter's computation of the
award is erroneous which circumstance justified the relaxation
of the appeal bond requirement. In all of these cases, though,
there were meritorious grounds that warranted the reduction of
the appeal bond, which, as discussed, is lacking in the case at
bench.
Petitioners, furthermore, claim that the NLRC's outright
dismissal of their appeal was harsh and oppressive since they
should still be given opportunity to complete the required bond
upon the filing of their motion for reconsideration. Thus, they
insist that their immediate posting of the deficiency when they
filed a motion for reconsideration constituted substantial
compliance with the Rules.
The contention is untenable.
The NLRC exercises full discretion in resolving a motion for the
reduction of bond32 in accordance with the standards of
meritorious grounds and reasonable amount. The "reduction of
the bond is not a matter of right on the part of the movant [but]
lies within the sound discretion of the NLRC x x x." 33
In order to give full effect to the provisions on motion to reduce
bond, the appellant must be allowed to wait for the ruling of the
NLRC on the motion even beyond the 10-day period to perfect
an appeal. If the NLRC grants the motion and rules that there
is indeed meritorious ground and that the amount of the bond
posted is reasonable, then the appeal is perfected. If the NLRC
denies the motion, the appellant may still file a motion for
reconsideration as provided under Section 15, Rule VII of the
Rules. If the NLRC grants the motion for reconsideration and
rules that there is indeed meritorious ground and that the
amount of the bond posted is reasonable, then the appeal is
perfected. If the NLRC denies the motion, then the decision of
the Labor Arbiter becomes final and executory.34
The rulings in Garcia v. KJ Commercial35and Mendoza v. HMS
Credit Corporation36cannot dissuade this Court from relaxing
the rules. In Garcia, the NLRC initially denied the appeal of
respondent therein due to the absence of meritorious grounds
in its motion to reduce bond and unreasonable amount of
partial bond posted. However, upon the posting of the full
amount of bond when respondent filed its motion for
reconsideration, the NLRC granted the motion for
reconsideration on the ground of substantial compliance with
the rules after considering the merits of the appeal. Likewise,
in Mendoza, the NLRC initially denied respondents' Motion to
Reduce Appeal Bond with a partial bond. Respondents
thereafter promptly complied with the NLRC's directive to post
7
the differential amount between the judgment award and the
sum previously tendered by them. The Court held that the
appeal was filed timely on account of respondents' substantial
compliance with the requirements on appeal bond. In
both Garcia and Mendoza, however, the NLRC took into
consideration the substantial merits of the appealed cases in
giving due course to the appeals. It, in fact, reversed the Labor
Arbiters' rulings in both cases. In contrast, petitioners in the
case at bench have no meritorious appeal as would convince
this Court to liberally apply the rule.
Stated otherwise, petitioners' case will still fail on its merits
even if we are to allow their appeal to be given due course.
After scrupulously examining the contrasting positions and
arguments of the parties, we find that the Labor Arbiter's
Decision declaring Pajaron and Carbonilla illegally dismissed
was supported by substantial evidence. While petitioners
vehemently argue that Pajaron and Carbonilla abandoned their
work, the records are devoid of evidence to show that there
was intent on their part to forego their employment. In fact,
petitioners adamantly admitted that they refused to rehire
Pajaron and Carbonilla despite persistent requests to admit
them to work. Hence, petitioners essentially admitted the fact
of dismissal. However, except for their empty and general
allegations that the dismissal was for just causes, petitioners
did not proffer any evidence to support their claim of
misconduct or misbehavior on the part of Pajaron and
Carbonilla. "In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on
the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just
cause."37 For lack of any clear, valid, and just cause in
terminating Pajaron and Carbonilla's employment, petitioners
are indubitably guilty of illegal dismissal.
All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in ruling that the
NLRC did not gravely abused its discretion in dismissing
petitioners' appeal for non-perfection due to non-compliance
with the requisites of filing a motion to reduce bond.
[T]he merit of [petitioners'] case does not warrant the liberal
application of the x x x rules x x x. While it is true that litigation
is not a game of technicalities and that rules of procedure shall
not be strictly enforced at the cost of substantial justice, it must
be emphasized that procedural rules should not likewise he
belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance
might result in prejudice to a party's substantial rights. Like all
rules, they are required to be followed, except only for the most
persuasive of reasons.38
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 8, 2013
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 121956
is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 221897, November 07, 2016
ISIDRO QUEBRAL, ALBERTO ESQUILLO, RENANTE
SALINSAN, JEROME MACANDOG, EDGARDO
GAYORGOR, JIM ROBERT PERFECTO, NOEL PERFECTO,
DENNIS PAGAYON, AND HERCULANO
MACANDOG Petitioners, v. ANGBUS CONSTRUCTION, INC.
AND ANGELO BUSTAMANTE, Respondents.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether the CA
erred in (a) holding that petitioners' appeal before the NLRC
was filed out of time and (b) declaring petitioners as project
employees of Angbus and consequently, holding their
dismissal to be valid.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Preliminarily, the Court stresses the distinct approach in
reviewing a CA's ruling in a labor case. In a Rule 45 review, the
Court examines the correctness of the CA's Decision in
contrast with the review of jurisdictional errors under Rule 65.
Furthermore, Rule 45 limits the review to questions of law. In
ruling for legal correctness, the Court views the CA Decision in
the same context that the petition for certiorariwas presented to
the CA. Hence, the Court has to examine the CA's Decision
from the prism of whether the CA correctly determined the
presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC
decision.22
Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a
capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. To be considered "grave," discretion must be
exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of
law.23
In labor cases, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to
the NLRC when its findings and conclusions are not supported
by substantial evidence,24 which refers to that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.25 Thus, if the NLRC's ruling
has basis in the evidence and the applicable law and
jurisprudence, then no grave abuse of discretion exists and the
CA should so declare and, accordingly, dismiss the petition. 26
Viewed from these lenses, the Court finds that the NLRC's
Decision in this case was supported by substantial evidence
and is consistent with law and jurisprudence as to the issues
raised in the petition. Hence, the CA incorrectly held that the
NLRC gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to
petitioners' appeal filed before it and in declaring that the
petitioners were regular employees of Angbus. Accordingly, the
NLRC's ruling must be reinstated.
On the procedural aspect, the Court notes that the issue of the
timeliness of the filing of the appeal is a factual issue that
requires a review of the evidence presented on when the
appeal was actually filed.27Thus, it is generally not covered by
a Rule 45 review. In this case, however, the conflicting findings
of the CA and the NLRC on this matter pave the way for the
Court to review this factual issue even in a Rule 45 review. 28
In this case, the CA held that the NLRC should not have given
due course to petitioners' appeal for being filed out of time.
Although both the registry receipt and the date stamped on the
envelope showed that the date of posting was May 20, 2013 or
the last day of the reglementary period, the CA was not
convinced that the appeal was actually mailed on that date at
the POEA Post Office. The CA held that petitioners should
have submitted, together with the registry receipt, an
authenticating affidavit of the person who mailed the
memorandum of appeal. It also refused to give credence to
Laureta's certification on the ground that it was issued without
authority, having been issued only on February 17, 2014 when
Laureta was no longer assigned at the POEA Post Office. It
therefore concluded that the NLRC erred in considering the
registry receipt as conclusive proof that May 20, 2013 is the
date of filing the appeal.
After reviewing the evidence on record, the Court disagrees
8
with the CA that the appeal was not timely filed.
Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that where
pleadings are filed by registered mail, the date of mailing as
shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry
receipt shall be considered as the date of filing. Based on this
provision, the date of filing is determinable from two sources:
(1) from the post office stamp on the envelope or (2) from the
registry receipt, either of which may suffice to prove the
timeliness of the filing of the pleadings.29
The Court previously ruled that if the date stamped on one is
earlier than the other, the former may be accepted as the date
of filing.30 This presupposes, however, that the envelope or
registry receipt and the dates appearing thereon are duly
authenticated before the tribunal where they are
presented.31 When the photocopy of a registry receipt bears an
earlier date but is not authenticated, the Court held that the
later date stamped on the envelope shall be considered as the
date of filing.32
In the present case, the petitioners submitted these pieces of
evidence to show the timeliness of their appeal: (a) the registry
receipt; (b) a copy of the envelope that contained the
memorandum of appeal and appeal fee; and (c) Laureta's
certification. As the CA noted, all three documents indicate
May 20, 2013 as the date of mailing at the POEA Post Office in
Mandaluyong City. Considering that there is no variance in the
dates stated on these documents, there is no reason for the
Court to mark another date as the date of mailing.
Laureta's certification corroborates the date of filing specified in
the registry receipt and on the envelope. The Court recognizes
that, ideally, the incumbent postmaster in the POEA Post
Office should be the one to certify the date of mailing based on
the post office records, considering that he or she is the person
duly authorized to do so. Nevertheless, the Court finds that
Laureta's certification as the postmaster at the time of mailing,
together with the pieces of evidence earlier mentioned,
constitutes substantial compliance with the authentication
requirement.
On the substantive aspect, Article 29533 of the Labor
Code,34 as amended, distinguishes a project employee from a
regular employee, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 295 [280]. Regular and casual employment. - The
provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding
and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the
employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of
the employer, except where the employment has been fixed
for a specific projector undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of
the engagement of the employee or where the work or
services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A project-based employee is assigned to a project which
begins and ends at determined or determinable times.35 Unlike
regular employees who may only be dismissed for just and/or
authorized causes under the Labor Code, the services of
employees who are hired as project-based employees may be
lawfully terminated at the completion of the project. 36
To safeguard the rights of workers against the arbitrary use of
the word "project" to preclude them from attaining regular
status, jurisprudence provides that employers claiming that

their workers are project-based employees have the burden to
prove that these two requisites concur: (a) the employees were
assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking; and (b)
the duration and scope of which were specified at the time they
were engaged for such project.37
In this case, Angbus failed to discharge this burden. Notably,
Angbus did not state the specific project or undertaking
assigned to petitioners. As to the second requisite, not only
was Angbus unable to produce petitioners' employment
contracts, it also failed to present other evidence to show that it
informed petitioners of the duration and scope of their work.
The Court previously ruled that although the absence of a
written contract does not by itself grant regular status to the
employees, it is evidence that they were informed of the
duration and scope of their work and their status as project
employees at the start of their engagement.38 When no other
evidence is offered, the absence of employment contracts
raises a serious question of whether the employees were
sufficiently apprised at the start of their employment of their
status as project employees.39 Absent such proof, it is
presumed that they are regular employees, thus, can only be
dismissed for just or authorized causes upon compliance with
procedural due process.40
The Court agrees with the NLRC that the Brgy. Rosario
Certification cannot be given credence as it was issued by the
barangay captain in Rosario, Pasig City rather than in Quezon
City.
Section 11, Rule X, Book III of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code41 (Rules) requires the employer
to keep all employment records in the main or branch office
where the employees are assigned. It also prohibits the
keeping of employees' records elsewhere. In the present case,
Angbus has consistently declared in its pleadings, in its
General Information Sheet, and the DOLE Reports that its
main office is located at 16 Pratt Street, Filinvest 2, Batasan
Hills, Quezon City. As aptly ruled by the NLRC, the extension
office in the project site in Brgy. Rosario, Pasig City is not a
branch office contemplated by the Rules where employees'
records may be kept but merely a temporary office. Hence, the
Brgy. Rosario Certification, stating that petitioners' employment
records were destroyed by flood, does not justify the non-
presentation of the employment contracts. Besides, Angbus
could still have presented other evidence to prove project
employment but it did not do so, relying on the convenient
excuse that the documents were destroyed by flood. 42
The Court further observes that the CA placed unwarranted
emphasis on the DOLE Reports or termination reports
submitted by Angbus as basis to rule that petitioners were
project employees.
Section 2.2 of Department Order No. 19, Series of 1993,
entitled "Guidelines Governing the Employment of Workers in
the Construction industry," issued by the DOLE, provides
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2.2 Indicators of project employment. - Either one or more of
the following circumstances, among others, may be
considered as indicators that an employee is a project
employee.
(a) The duration of the specific/identified undertaking for which
the worker is engaged is reasonably determinable.
(b) Such duration, as well as the specific work/service to be
performed, is defined in an employment agreement and is
9
made clear to the employee at the time of hiring.
(c) The work/service performed by the employee is in
connection with the particular project/undertaking for which he
is engaged.
(d) The employee, while not employed and awaiting
engagement, is free to offer his services to any other employer.
(e) The termination of his employment in the particular
project/undertaking is reported to the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) Regional Office having jurisdiction over
the workplace within 30 days following the date of his
separation from work, using the prescribed form on employees'
terminations/dismissals/suspensions.
(f) An undertaking in the employment contract by the employer
to pay completion bonus to the project employee as practiced
by most construction companies. (Emphases supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the submission of the
termination report to the DOLE "may be considered" only as an
indicator of project employment. By the provision's tenor, the
submission of this report, by and of itself, is therefore not
conclusive to confirm the status of the terminated employees
as project employees, especially in this case where there is a
glaring absence of evidence to prove that petitioners were
assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, and that
they were informed of the duration and scope of their supposed
project engagement, which are, in fact, attendant to the first
two (2) indicators of project employment in the same DOLE
issuance above-cited.
All told, since Angbus failed to discharge its burden to prove
that petitioners were project employees, the NLRC correctly
ruled that they should be considered as regular employees.
Thus, the termination of petitioners' employment should have
been for a just or authorized cause, the lack of which, as in this
case, amounts to illegal dismissal.
As a final point, it may not be amiss to state that petitioners'
entitlement to their monetary claims, such as salary
differentials, thirteenth month pay, and holiday pay, 43 was not
contested further by the parties. Neither did they question the
NLRC's computation of the monetary awards due to
petitioners. Hence, the Court finds no reason to disturb it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
July 27, 2015 and the Resolution dated November 2, 2015 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 138885 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
December 26, 2013 and the Resolution dated December 29,
2014 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC
Case Nos. 07-10288-12, 07-10636-12, 07-10708-12 and 07-
10992-12 are REINSTATED.
__________________________
G.R. No. 196084
NUEVA ECIJA II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., AREA I,
Mr. REYNALDO VILLANUEVA, President, Board of
Directors, and Mrs. EULALIA CASTRO, General
Manager, Petitioners
vs.
ELMER B. MAPAGU, Respondent
The issues raised are:

1. Whether the petition for review on certiorari was, filed before
the CA within the reglementary period; and
2. Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition
for certiorari for non-compliance with the Rules.
II
We deny the petition.
The facts and material dates are undisputed. Petitioners
received the September 2, 2010 Resolution of the CA on
September 14, 2010. They filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and received the Resolution denying the same on March 17,
2011. Thereafter, they filed a Motion for Extension of Time to
File Petition for Review on Certiorari with Payment of Docket
Fees.42 They sought an extension of 20 days from April 1,
2011 or until April 21, 2011 within which to file the appeal.
On May 6, 2011, they filed this petition. They allege that they
have 60 days to file the appeal and in fact, they claim that they
are filing it 11 days ahead of the reglementary deadline.
Petitioners insist that following Republic v. Court of
Appeals43 and Bello v. National Labor Relations
Commission,44 petitions for review on certiorari can be filed
within 60 days from receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioners are gravely mistaken. The right to appeal is a mere
statutory privilege and must be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of the law. One who
seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with
the requirement of the rules. Failure to do so leads to the loss
of the right to appeal.45 The case before us calls for the
application of the requirements of appeal under Rule 45, to wit:
Sec. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring
to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth.
Sec. 2. Time for filing; extension. - The petition shall be filed
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final
order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in
due time after notice of the judgment. On motion duly filed
and served, with full payment of the docket and other
lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration
of the reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for
justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days
only within which to file the petition. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners failed to comply with the foregoing provisions. They
confuse petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with
petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. It is the latter which is
required to be filed within a period of not later than 60 days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. If a motion for
new trial or reconsideration is filed, the 60-day period shall be
counted from notice of the denial of the motion. Sections 1 and
4 of Rule 65 read:
Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
10
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board
or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of
the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
xxx
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be
filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution.1âwphi1 In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be
counted from notice of the denial of said motion.x x x
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners' reliance on Republic and Bello are misplaced. In
both cases, we are confronted with the issue of whether the
petitions for certiorari before the CA were filed out of time. No
other issue was raised in Republic and Bello. Further, it does
not escape our attention that petitioners initially filed a motion
for extension of time to file a petition for review where they
recognized that they only have until April 1, 2011 (or 15 days
from receipt of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration) to
file the petition. Clearly, petitioners were fully aware of the
correct period for filing an appeal under Rule 45. Yet, in their
actual petition, they maintain that they have 60 days to file the
appeal. We cannot countenance petitioners' obvious legal
maneuvering.
A party litigant wishing to file a petition for review
on certiorari must do so within 15 days from notice of the
judgment, final order or resolution sought to be appealed.
Here, petitioners received the Resolution of the CA denying
their Motion for Reconsideration on March 17, 2011. Under the
Rules, they have until April 1, 2011 to file the petition.
However; they filed the same only on May 6, 2011. This was
50 days beyond the 15-day period provided under Section 2,
Rule 45 and 30 days beyond the extension asked for. Even if
petitioners were given the maximum period of extension of 30
days, their petition before us still cannot stand. The Rules allow
only for a maximum period of 45 days within which an
aggrieved party may file a petition for review on certiorari. By
belatedly filing their petition with the CA, petitioners have
clearly lost their right to appeal.46
There are instances when we have relaxed the rules governing
the periods of appeal to serve substantial justice.47In Azores v.
Securities and Exchange Commission,48 we held:
The failure of a party to perfect his appeal in the manner and
within the period fixed by law renders the decision sought to be
appealed final, with the result that no court can exercise
appellate jurisdiction to review the decision. For it is more
important that a case be settled than that it be settled right. It is
only in exceptional cases when we have allowed a
relaxation of the rules governing the periods of

appeals. As stated in Bank of America, NT & SA v. Gerochi,
Jr., typical of these cases are the following:
In Ramos vs. Bagasao, 96 SCRA 395, we excused the delay of
four days in the filing of a notice of appeal because the
questioned decision of the trial court was served upon
appellant Ramos at a time when her counsel of record was
already dead. Her new counsel could only file the appeal four
days after the prescribed reglementary period was over. In
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 453, we allowed the
perfection of an appeal by the Republic despite the delay of six
days to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice since the
Republic stood to lose hundreds of hectares of land already
titled in its name and had since then been devoted for
educational purposes. In Olacao vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 177 SCRA 38, 41, we accepted a tardy appeal
considering that the subject matter in issue had
theretofore beenjudicially settled, with finality, in another
case. The dismissal of the appeal would have had the effect of
the appellant being ordered twice to make the same reparation
to the appellee.49 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted. Italics
in the original.)
None of the foregoing justifications are, however, present here.
Petitioners remain adamant that they properly observed the
Rules when clearly they failed to do so. They did not even
attempt to allude to any exceptional circumstance that would
move us to use our equity jurisdiction to allow a liberal
application of the Rules. Hence, we are constrained to declare
that for petitioners' failure to file an appeal by certiorari within
the reglementary period, the assailed Resolutions of the CA
had already become final and executory.
In the case of Gonzales v. Pe,50 we held that:
While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for
the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal
within the reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It
raises a jurisdictional problem, as it deprives the appellate
court of its jurisdiction over the appeal. After a decision is
declared final and executory, vested rights are acquired by the
winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal
within the prescribed period, the winning party has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision on the
case.51
All told, considering that we have lost jurisdiction to review the
case in view of the finality of the CA Decision, we see no
further reason to delve into the other issues raised by
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 2,
2010 and March 3, 2011 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 114690 are hereby AFFIRMED.
______________________________
G.R. No. 220978, July 05, 2016
CENTURY PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioner, v. EDWIN J.
BABIANO AND EMMA B. CONCEPCION, Respondents.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the
11
CA erred in denying CPI's petition for certiorari, thereby holding
it liable for the unpaid commissions of respondents.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
I.
Article 1370 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]f the terms of a
contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall
control."51 In Norton Resources and Development Corporation
v. All Asia Bank Corporation,52 the Court had the opportunity to
thoroughly discuss the said rule as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The rule is that where the language of a contract is plain
and unambiguous, its meaning should be determined
without reference to extrinsic facts or aids. The intention of
the parties must be gathered from that language, and from that
language alone. Stated differently, where the language of a
written contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract
must be taken to mean that which, on its face, it purports
to mean, unless some good reason can be assigned to
show that the words should be understood in a different
sense. Courts cannot make for the parties better or more
equitable agreements than they themselves have been
satisfied to make, or rewrite contracts because they operate
harshly or inequitably as to one of the parties, or alter them for
the benefit of one party and to the detriment of the other, or by
construction, relieve one of the parties from the terms which he
voluntarily consented to, or impose on him those which he did
not.53 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, in the interpretation of contracts, the Court must first
determine whether a provision or stipulation therein is
ambiguous. Absent any ambiguity, the provision on its face will
be read as it is written and treated as the binding law of the
parties to the contract.54chanrobleslaw
In the case at bar, CPI primarily invoked the "Confidentiality of
Documents and Non-Compete Clause" found in Babiano's
employment contract55 to justify the forfeiture of his
commissions, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Confidentiality of Documents and Non-Compete Clause
All records and documents of the company and all information
pertaining to its business or affairs or that of its affiliated
companies are confidential and no unauthorized disclosure or
reproduction or the same will be made by you any time during
or after your employment.
And in order to ensure strict compliance herewith, you
shall not work for whatsoever capacity, either as an
employee, agent or consultant with any person whose
business is in direct competition with the company while
you are employed and for a period of one year from date of
resignation or termination from the company.
In the event the undersigned breaches any term of this
contract, the undersigned agrees and acknowledges that
damages may not be an adequate remedy and that in addition
to any other remedies available to the Company at law or in
equity, the Company is entitled to enforce its rights hereunder
by way of injunction, restraining order or other relief to enjoin
any breach or default of this contract.
The undersigned agrees to pay all costs, expenses and
attorney's fees incurred by the Company in connection with the
enforcement of the obligations of the undersigned. The
undersigned also agrees to .pay the Company all profits,
revenues and income or benefits derived by or accruing to the

undersigned resulting from the undersigned's breach of the
obligations hereunder. This Agreement shall be binding upon
the undersigned, all employees, agents, officers, directors,
shareholders, partners and representatives of the undersigned
and all heirs, successors and assigns of the foregoing.
Finally, if undersigned breaches any terms of this
contract, forms of compensation including commissions
and incentives will be forfeited.56 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Verily, the foregoing clause is not only clear and unambiguous
in stating that Babiano is barred to "work for whatsoever
capacity x x x with any person whose business is in direct
competition with [CPI] while [he is] employed and for a period
of one year from date of [his] resignation or termination from
the company," it also expressly provided in no uncertain terms
that should Babiano "[breach] any term of [the employment
contract], forms of compensation including commissions and
incentives will be forfeited." Here, the contracting parties -
namely Babiano on one side, and CPI as represented by its
COO-Vertical, John Victor R. Antonio, and Director for
Planning and Controls, Jose Carlo R. Antonio, on the other -
indisputably wanted the said clause to be effective even during
the existence of the employer-employee relationship between
Babiano and CPI, thereby indicating their intention to be bound
by such clause by affixing their respective signatures to the
employment contract. More significantly, as CPFs Vice
President for Sales, Babiano held a highly sensitive and
confidential managerial position as he "was tasked, among
others, to guarantee the achievement of agreed sales targets
for a project and to ensure that his team has a qualified and
competent manpower resources by conducting recruitment
activities, training sessions, sales rallies, motivational activities,
and evaluation programs."57 Hence, to allow Babiano to freely
move to direct competitors during and soon after his
employment with CPI would make the latter's trade secrets
vulnerable to exposure, especially in a highly competitive
marketing environment. As such, it is only reasonable that CPI
and Babiano agree on such stipulation in the latter's
employment contract in order to afford a fair and reasonable
protection to CPI.58 Indubitably, obligations arising from
contracts, including employment contracts, have the force of
law between the contracting parties and should be complied
with in good faith.59 Corollary thereto, parties are bound by the
stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions they have agreed
to, provided that these stipulations, clauses, terms, and
conditions are not contrary to law, morals, public order or
public policy,60 as in this case.
Therefore, the CA erred in limiting the "Confidentiality of
Documents and Non-Compete Clause" only to acts done after
the cessation of the employer-employee relationship or to the
"post-employment" relations of the parties. As clearly
stipulated, the parties wanted to apply said clause during the
pendency of Babiano's employment, and CPI correctly invoked
the same before the labor tribunals to resist the former's claim
for unpaid commissions on account of his breach of the said
clause while the employer-employee relationship between
them still subsisted. Hence, there is now a need to determine
whether or not Babiano breached said clause while employed
by CPI, which would then resolve the issue of his entitlement to
his unpaid commissions.
A judicious review of the records reveals that in his resignation
letter61 dated February 25, 2009, Babiano categorically
admitted to CPI Chairman Jose Antonio that on February 12,
2009, he sought employment from First Global, and five (5)
days later, was admitted thereto as vice president. From the
foregoing, it is evidently clear that when he sought and
12
eventually accepted the said position with First Global, he was
still employed by CPI as he has not formally resigned at that
time. Irrefragably, this is a glaring violation of the
"Confidentiality of Documents and Non-Compete Clause" in his
employment contract with CPI, thus, justifying the forfeiture of
his unpaid commissions.
II.
Anent the nature of Concepcion's engagement, based on case
law, the presence of the following elements evince the
existence of an employer-employee relationship: (a) the power
to hire, i.e., the selection and engagement of the employee; (b)
the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the
employer's power to control the employee's conduct, or the so
called "control test." The control test is commonly regarded as
the most important indicator of the presence or absence of an
employer-employee relationship.62 Under this test, an
employer-employee relationship exists where the person for
whom the services are performed reserves the right to control
not only the end achieved, but also the manner and means to
be used in reaching that end.63chanrobleslaw
Guided by these parameters, the Court finds that Concepcion
was an employee of CPI considering that: (a) CPI continuously
hired and promoted Concepcion from October 2002 until her
resignation on February 23, 2009,64 thus, showing that CPI
exercised the power of selection and engagement over her
person and that she performed functions that were necessary
and desirable to the business of CPI; (b) the monthly "subsidy"
and cash incentives that Concepcion was receiving from CPI
are actually remuneration in the concept of wages as it was
regularly given to her on a monthly basis without any
qualification, save for the "complete submission of documents
on what is a sale policy";65 (c) CPI had the power to discipline
or even dismiss Concepcion as her engagement contract with
CPI expressly conferred upon the latter "the right to
discontinue [her] service anytime during the period of
engagement should [she] fail to meet the performance
standards,"66 among others, and that CPI actually exercised
such power to dismiss when it accepted and approved
Concepcion's resignation letter; and most importantly, (d) as
aptly pointed out by the CA, CPI possessed the power of
control over Concepcion because in the performance of her
duties as Project Director - particularly in the conduct of
recruitment activities, training sessions, and skills development
of Sales Directors - she did not exercise independent discretion
thereon, but was still subject to the direct supervision of CPI,
acting through Babiano.67chanrobleslaw
Besides, while the employment agreement of Concepcion was
denominated as a "Contract of Agency for Project Director," it
should be stressed that the existence of employer-employee
relations could not be negated by the mere expedient of
repudiating it in a contract. In the case of Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd. v. NLRC,68 it was ruled that one's
employment status is defined and prescribed by law, and not
by what the parties say it should
be, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is axiomatic that the existence of an employer-employee
relationship cannot be negated by expressly repudiating it in
the management contract and providing therein that the
"employee" is an independent contractor when the terms of the
agreement clearly show otherwise. For, the employment
status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and
not by what the parties say it should be. In determining the
status of the management contract, the "four-fold test" on
employment earlier mentioned has to be applied.69 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Therefore, the CA correctly ruled that since there exists an
employer-employee relationship between Concepcion and CPI,
the labor tribunals correctly assumed jurisdiction over her
money claims.
III.
Finally, CPI contends that Concepcion's failure to assail the
NLRC ruling awarding her the amount of P470,754.62
representing unpaid commissions rendered the same final and
binding upon her. As such, the CA erred in increasing her
monetary award to P591,953.05.70chanrobleslaw
The contention lacks merit.
As a general rule, a party who has not appealed cannot obtain
any affirmative relief other than the one granted in the
appealed decision. However, jurisprudence admits an
exception to the said rule, such as when strict adherence
thereto shall result in the impairment of the substantive rights
of the parties concerned. In Global Resource for Outsourced
Workers, Inc. v. Velasco:71
Indeed, a party who has failed to appeal from a judgment is
deemed to have acquiesced to it and can no longer obtain from
the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was
already granted under said judgment. However, when strict
adherence to such technical rule will impair a substantive
right, such as that of an illegally dismissed employee to
monetary compensation as provided by law, then equity
dictates that the Court set aside the rule to pave the way
for a full and just adjudication of the case.72 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In the present case, the CA aptly pointed out that the NLRC
failed to account for all the unpaid commissions due to
Concepcion for the period of August 9, 2008 to August 8,
2011.73 Indeed, Concepcion's right to her earned commissions
is a substantive right which cannot be impaired by an
erroneous computation of what she really is entitled to. Hence,
following the dictates of equity and in order to arrive at a
complete and just resolution of the case, and avoid a
piecemeal dispensation of justice over the same, the CA
correctly recomputed Concepcion's unpaid commissions,
notwithstanding her failure to seek a review of the NLRC's
computation of the same.
In sum, the Court thus holds that the commissions of Babiano
were properly forfeited for violating the "Confidentiality of
Documents and Non-Compete Clause." On.the other hand,
CPI remains liable for the unpaid commissions of Concepcion
in the sum of P591,953.05.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated April 8, 2015 and the Resolution dated October
12, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
132953 are hereby MODIFIED in that the commissions of
respondent Edwin J. Babiano are deemed FORFEITED. The
rest of the CA Decision stands.
_________________________
G.R. No. 220506, January 18, 2017
C.I.C.M. MISSION SEMINARIES (MARYHURST,
MARYHEIGHTS, MARYSHORE AND MARYHILL) SCHOOL
OF THEOLOGY, INC., FR. ROMEO NIMEZ,
CICM, Petitioners, v. MARIA VERONICA C.
PEREZ, Respondent.
13
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
To begin with, the petitioners failed to append the required
affidavit of service. The rule is, such affidavit is essential to due
process and the orderly administration of justice even if it is
used merely as proof that service has been made on the other
party.16 The utter disregard of this requirement as held in a
catena of cases cannot be justified by harking to substantial
justice and the policy of liberal construction of the Rules.
Indeed, technical rules of procedure are not meant to frustrate
the ends of justice. Rather, they serve to effect the proper and
orderly disposition of cases and, thus, effectively prevent the
clogging of court dockets.17 Thus, in Ferrer v. Villanueva,18 the
Court held that petitioner's failure to append the proof of
service to his petition for certiorari was a fatal defect.
Hence, the denial of this case is in order.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, however, the Court
opts to also delve into the merits of the case.
As a precept, the Court's duty in a Rule 45 petition, assailing
the decision of the CA in a labor case elevated to it through a
Rule 65 petition, is limited only to the determination of whether
the CA committed an error in judgment in declaring the
absence or existence, as the case may be, of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC.19
As a consequence, the Court shall examine only whether the
CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion when the
NLRC affirmed the LA's findings that the separation pay in lieu
of reinstatement as well as backwages due to respondent
should be recomputed until the finality of the Court's decision in
G.R. No. 200490, despite the fact that the delay in the
resolution of the said case was brought about by respondent
herself.
On this point, the Court rules in the negative.
Grave abuse of discretion, which has been defined as a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, 20 requires proof that
the CA committed errors such that its decision was not made in
contemplation of law. The burden of proof rests upon the party
who asserts.21
The petitioners, however, failed to carry out such burden.
The decision of the CA is based on long standing jurisprudence
that in the event the aspect of reinstatement is disputed,
backwages, including separation pay, shall be computed from
the time of dismissal until the finality of the decision ordering
the separation pay. In Gaco v. NLRC,22 it was ruled that with
respect to the payment of backwages and separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement of an illegally dismissed employee, the
period shall be reckoned from the time compensation was
withheld up to the finality of this Court's decision. This was
reiterated in Surima v. NLRC 23 and Session Delights Ice
Cream and Fast Foods v. CA.24
The reason for this was explained in Bani Rural Bank, Inc. v.
De Guzman.25 When there is an order of separation pay (in
lieu of reinstatement or when the reinstatement aspect is
waived or subsequently ordered in light of a supervening event
making the award of reinstatement no longer possible), the

employment relationship is terminated only upon the finality of
the decision ordering the separation pay. The finality of the
decision cuts-off the employment relationship and represents
the final settlement of the rights and obligations of the parties
against each other. Hence, backwages no longer accumulate
upon the finality of the decision ordering the payment of
separation pay because the employee is no longer entitled to
any compensation from the employer by reason of the
severance of his employment. One cannot, therefore, attribute
patent error on the part of the CA when it merely affirmed the
NLRC's conclusion, which was clearly based on jurisprudence.
Plainly, it does not matter if the delay caused by an appeal was
brought about by the employer or by the employee. The rule is,
if the LA's decision, which granted separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement, is appealed by any party, the employer-
employee relationship subsists and until such time when
decision becomes final and executory, the employee is entitled
to all the monetary awards awarded by the LA.
In this case, respondent remained an employee of the
petitioners pending her partial appeal. Her employment was
only severed when this Court, in G.R. No. 200490, affirmed
with finality the rulings of the CA and the labor tribunals
declaring her right to separation pay instead of actual
reinstatement. Accordingly, she is entitled to have her
backwages and separation pay computed until October 4,
2012, the date when the judgment of this Court became final
and executory, as certified by the Clerk of Court, per the Entry
of Judgment in G.R. No. 200490.
The Court would not have expected the CA and the NLRC to
rule contrary to the above pronouncements. If it were
otherwise, all employees who are similarly situated will be
forced to relinquish early on their fight for reinstatement, a
remedy, which the law prefers over severance of employment
relation. Furthermore, to favor the petitioners' position is
nothing short of a derogation of the State's policy to protect the
rights of workers and their welfare under Article II, Section 8 of
the 1987 Constitution.26
The petitioners, nonetheless, claim that it was not their fault
why the amounts due ballooned to the present level. They are
mistaken. Suffice it to state that had they not illegally dismissed
respondent, they will not be where they are today. They took
the risk and must suffer the consequences.
Finally, the Court disagrees with the petitioners' assertion that
a recomputation would violate the doctrine of immutability of
judgment. It has been settled that no essential change is made
by a recomputation as this step is a necessary consequence
that flows from the nature of the illegality of dismissal declared
in that decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the
reliefs continue to add on until full satisfaction thereof. The
recomputation of the awards stemming from an illegal
dismissal case does not constitute an alteration or amendment
of the final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal
ruling stands; only the computation of the monetary
consequences of the dismissal is affected and this is not a
violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments.27
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued by this Court on February 3, 2016 is
hereby LIFTED.
___________________________
G.R. No. 198967, March 07, 2016
14
JOSE EMMANUEL P. GUILLERMO, Petitioner, v. CRISANTO
P. USON, Respondent.
Guillermo asserts that he was impleaded in the case only more
than a year after its Decision had become final and executory,
an act which he claims to be unsupported in law and
jurisprudence.38 He contends that the decision had become
final, immutable and unalterable and that any amendment
thereto is null and void.39 Guillermo assails the so-called
"piercing the veil" of corporate fiction which allegedly
discriminated against him when he alone was belatedly
impleaded despite the existence of other directors and officers
in Royal Class Venture.40 He also claims that the Labor Arbiter
has no jurisdiction because the case is one of an intra-
corporate controversy, with the complainant Uson also claiming
to be a stockholder and director of Royal Class Venture.41
In his Comment,42 Uson did not introduce any new arguments
but merely cited verbatim the disquisitions of the Court of
Appeals to counter Guillermo's assertions in his petition.
To resolve the case, the Court must confront the issue of
whether an officer of a corporation may be included as
judgment obligor in a labor case for the first time only after the
decision of the Labor Arbiter had become final and executory,
and whether the twin doctrines of "piercing the veil of corporate
fiction" and personal liability of company officers in labor cases
apply.
The petition is denied.
In the earlier labor cases of Claparols v. Court of Industrial
Relations43 and A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU v.
NLRC,44 persons who were not originally impleaded in the
case were, even during execution, held to be solidarity liable
with the employer corporation for the latter's unpaid obligations
to complainant-employees. These included a newly-formed
corporation which was considered a mere conduit or alter ego
of the originally impleaded corporation, and/or the officers or
stockholders of the latter corporation.45 Liability attached,
especially to the responsible officers, even after final judgment
and during execution, when there was a failure to collect from
the employer corporation the judgment debt awarded to its
workers.46 In Naguiat v. NLRC,47 the president of the
corporation was found, for the first time on appeal, to be
solidarily liable to the dismissed employees. Then, in Reynoso
v. Court of Appeals,48 the veil of corporate fiction was pierced
at the stage of execution, against a corporation not previously
impleaded, when it was established that such corporation had
dominant control of the original party corporation, which was a
smaller company, in such a manner that the latter's closure
was done by the former in order to defraud its creditors,
including a former worker.
The rulings of this Court in A.C. Ransom, Naguiat,
and Reynoso, however, have since been tempered, at least in
the aspects of the lifting of the corporate veil and the
assignment of personal liability to directors, trustees and
officers in labor cases. The subsequent cases of McLeod v.
NLRC,49Spouses Santos v. NLRC50 and Carag v.
NLRC,51 have all established, save for certain exceptions, the
primacy of Section 3152 of the Corporation Code in the matter
of assigning such liability for a corporation's debts, including
judgment obligations in labor cases. According to these cases,
a corporation is still an artificial being invested by law with a
personality separate and distinct from that of its stockholders
and from that of other corporations to which it may be
connected.53 It is not in every instance of inability to collect

from a corporation that the veil of corporate fiction is pierced,
and the responsible officials are made liable. Personal liability
attaches only when, as enumerated by the said Section 31 of
the Corporation Code, there is a wilfull and knowing assent to
patently unlawful acts of the corporation, there is gross
negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the
corporation, or there is a conflict of interest resulting in
damages to the corporation.54 Further, in another labor
case, Pantranco Employees Association (PEA-PTGWO), et al.
v. NLRC, et al.,55 the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is
held to apply only in three (3) basic areas, namely: ( 1) defeat
of public convenience as when the corporate fiction is used as
a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation; (2) fraud
cases or when the corporate entity is used to justify a wrong,
protect fraud, or defend a crime; or (3) alter ego cases, where
a corporation is merely a farce since it is a mere alter ego or
business conduit of a person, or where the corporation is so
organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to
make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of
another corporation. In the absence of malice, bad faith, or a
specific provision of law making a corporate officer liable, such
corporate officer cannot be made personally liable for
corporate liabilities.56 Indeed, in Reahs Corporation v.
NLRC,57 the conferment of liability on officers for a
corporation's obligations to labor is held to be an exception to
the general doctrine of separate personality of a corporation.
It also bears emphasis that in cases where personal liability
attaches, not even all officers are made accountable. Rather,
only the "responsible officer," i.e., the person directly
responsible for and who "acted in bad faith" in committing the
illegal dismissal or any act violative of the Labor Code, is held
solidarily liable, in cases wherein the corporate veil is
pierced.58 In other instances, such as cases of so-called
corporate tort of a close corporation, it is the person "actively
engaged" in the management of the corporation who is held
liable.59 In the absence of a clearly identifiable officer(s) directly
responsible for the legal infraction, the Court considers the
president of the corporation as such officer. 60
The common thread running among the aforementioned cases,
however, is that the veil of corporate fiction can be pierced, and
responsible corporate directors and officers or even a separate
but related corporation, may be impleaded and held
answerable solidarily in a labor case, even after final judgment
and on execution, so long as it is established that such persons
have deliberately used the corporate vehicle to unjustly evade
the judgment obligation, or have resorted to fraud, bad faith or
malice in doing so. When the shield of a separate corporate
identity is used to commit wrongdoing and opprobriously elude
responsibility, the courts and the legal authorities in a labor
case have not hesitated to step in and shatter the said shield
and deny the usual protections to the offending party, even
after final judgment. The key element is the presence of fraud,
malice or bad faith. Bad faith, in this instance, does not
connote bad judgment or negligence but imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong;
it means breach of a known duty through some motive or
interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. 61
As the foregoing implies, there is no hard and fast rule on when
corporate fiction may be disregarded; instead, each case must
be evaluated according to its peculiar circumstances.62 For the
case at bar, applying the above criteria, a finding of personal
and solidary liability against a corporate officer like Guillermo
must be rooted on a satisfactory showing of fraud, bad
faith or malice, or the presence of any of the justifications for
disregarding the corporate fiction. As stated in McLeod,63 bad
15
faith is a question of fact and is evidentiary, so that the records
must first bear evidence of malice before a finding of such may
be made.
It is our finding that such evidence exists in the record. Like
the A. C. Ransom, and Naguiat cases, the case at bar involves
an apparent family corporation. As in those two cases, the
records of the present case bear allegations and evidence that
Guillermo, the officer being held liable, is the person
responsible in the actual running of the company and for the
malicious and illegal dismissal of the complainant; he, likewise,
was shown to have a role in dissolving the original obligor
company in an obvious "scheme to avoid liability" which
jurisprudence has always looked upon with a suspicious eye in
order to protect the rights of labor.64
Part of the evidence on record is the second page of the
verified Position Paper of complainant (herein respondent)
Crisanto P. Uson, where it was clearly alleged that Uson was
"illegally dismissed by the President/General Manager of
respondent corporation (herein petitioner) Jose Emmanuel P.
Guillermo when Uson exposed the practice of the said
President/General Manager of dictating and undervaluing the
shares of stock of the corporation."65 The statement is proof
that Guillermo was the responsible officer in charge of running
the company as well as the one who dismissed Uson from
employment. As this sworn allegation is uncontroverted - as
neither the company nor Guillermo appeared before the Labor
Arbiter despite the service of summons and notices - such
stands as a fact of the case, and now functions as clear
evidence of Guillermo's bad faith in his dismissal of Uson from
employment, with the motive apparently being anger at the
latter's reporting of unlawful activities.
Then, it is also clearly reflected in the records that it was
Guillermo himself, as President and General Manager of the
company, who received the summons to the case, and who
also subsequently and without justifiable cause refused to
receive all notices and orders of the Labor Arbiter that
followed.66This makes Guillermo responsible for his and his
company's failure to participate in the entire proceedings
before the said office. The fact is clearly narrated in the
Decision and Orders of the Labor Arbiter, Uson's Motions for
the Issuance of Alias Writs of Execution, as well as in the
Decision of the NLRC and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals,67 which Guillermo did not dispute in any of his belated
motions or pleadings, including in his petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and even in the
petition currently before this Court.68 Thus, again, the same
now stands as a finding of fact of the said lower tribunals which
binds this Court and which it has no power to alter or
revisit.69 Guillermo's knowledge of the case's filing and
existence and his unexplained refusal to participate in it as the
responsible official of his company, again is an indicia of his
bad faith and malicious intent to evade the judgment of the
labor tribunals.
Finally, the records likewise bear that Guillermo dissolved
Royal Class Venture and helped incorporate a new firm,
located in the same address as the former, wherein he is again
a stockl1older. This is borne by the Sherif11s Return which
reported: that at Royal Class Venture's business address at
Minien East, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, there is a new
establishment named "Joel and Sons Corporation," a family
corporation owned by the Guillermos in which Jose Emmanuel
F. Guillermo is again one of the stockholders; that Guillermo
received the writ of execution but used the nickname "Joey"
and denied being Jose Emmanuel F. Guillermo and, instead,
pretended to be Jose's brother; that the guard on duty

confirmed that Jose and Joey are one and the same person;
and that the respondent corporation Royal Class Venture had
been dissolved.70 Again, the facts contained in the Sheriffs
Return were not disputed nor controverted by Guillermo, either
in the hearings of Uson's Motions for Issuance of Alias Writs of
Execution, in subsequent motions or pleadings, or even in the
petition before this Court. Essentially, then, the facts form part
of the records and now stand as further proof of Guillermo's
bad faith and malicious intent to evade the judgment obligation.
The foregoing clearly indicate a pattern or scheme to avoid the
obligations to Uson and frustrate the execution of the judgment
award, which this Court, in the interest of justice, will not
countenance.
As for Guillermo's assertion that the case is an intra-corporate
controversy, the Court sustains the finding of the appellate
court that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a
tribunal are determined by the allegations of the complaint at
the time of its filing, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein.71 Although Uson is also a stockholder and director of
Royal Class Venture, it is settled in jurisprudence that not all
conflicts between a stockholder and the corporation are intra-
corporate; an examination of the complaint must be made on
whether the complainant is involved in his capacity as a
stockholder or director, or as an employee.72 If the latter is
found and the dispute does not meet the test of what qualities
as an intra-corporate controversy, then the case is a labor case
cognizable by the NLRC and is not within the jurisdiction of any
other tribunal.73In the case at bar, Uson's allegation was that
he was maliciously and illegally dismissed as an Accounting
Supervisor by Guillermo, the Company President and General
Manager, an allegation that was not even disputed by the latter
nor by Royal Class Venture. It raised no intra-corporate
relationship issues between him and the corporation or
Guillermo; neither did it raise any issue regarding the
regulation of the corporation. As correctly found by the
appellate court, Uson's complaint and redress sought were
centered alone on his dismissal as an employee, and not upon
any other relationship he had with the company or with
Guillermo. Thus, the matter is clearly a labor dispute
cognizable by the labor tribunals.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated June 8, 2011 and Resolution dated October 7,
2011 in CA G.R. SP No. 115485 are AFFIRMED.
____________________
G.R. No. 210032, April 25, 2017
DUTCH MOVERS, INC. CESAR LEE AND YOLANDA
LEE, Petitioners, v. EDILBERTO1 LEQUIN, CHRISTOPHER
R. SALVADOR, REYNALDO2 L. SINGSING, AND RAFFY B.
MASCARDO, Respondents.
Petitioners argue that the circumstances in Valderrama v.
National Labor Relations Commission29 differ with those of the
instant case. They explain that in Valderrama, the LA therein
granted a motion for clarification. In this case, however, the LA
made petitioners liable through a mere manifestation and
motion to implead filed by respondents. They further stated that
in Valderrama, the body of the decision pointed out the liability
of the individual respondents therein while here, there was no
mention in the November 23, 2007 NLRC Decision regarding
petitioners' liability. As such they posit that they cannot be held
liable under said NLRC Decision.
16
In addition, petitioners claim that there is no basis to pierce the
veil of corporate fiction because DMI had a separate and
distinct personality from the officers comprising it. They also
insist that there was no showing that the termination of
respondents was attended by bad faith.
In fine, petitioners argue that despite the allegation that they
operated and managed the affairs of DMI, they cannot be held
accountable for its liability in the absence of any showing of
bad faith on their part.
Respondents, on their end, counter that petitioners were
identified as the ones who owned and managed DMI and
therefore, they should be held liable to pay the judgment
awards. They also stress that petitioners were consistently
impleaded since the filing of the complaint and thus, they were
given the opportunity to be heard.
Issue
Whether petitioners are personally liable to pay the
judgment awards in favor of respondents
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
To begin with, the Court is not a trier of facts and only
questions of law may be raised in a petition under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. This rule, nevertheless, allows certain
exceptions, which include such instance where the factual
findings of the CA are contrary to those of the lower court or
tribunal. Considering the divergent factual findings of the CA
and the NLRC in this case, the Court deems it necessary to
examine, review and evaluate anew the evidence on record. 30
Moreover, after a thorough review of the records, the Court
finds that contrary to petitioners' claim, Valderrama v. National
Labor Relations Commission,31 and David v. Court of
Appeals32 are applicable here. In said cases, the Court held
that the principle of immutability of judgment, or the rule that
once a judgment has become final and executory, the same
can no longer be altered or modified and the court's duty is
only to order its execution, is not absolute. One of its
exceptions is when there is a supervening event occurring after
the judgment becomes final and executory, which renders the
decision unenforceable.33
To note, a supervening event refers to facts that transpired
after a judgment has become final and executory, or to new
situation that developed after the same attained finality.
Supervening events include matters that the parties were
unaware of before or during trial as they were not yet existing
during that time.34
In Valderrama, the supervening event was the closure of
Commodex, the company therein, after the decision became
final and executory, and without any showing that it filed any
proceeding for bankruptcy. The Court held that therein
petitioner, the owner of Commodex, was personally liable for
the judgment awards because she controlled the company.
Similarly, supervening events transpired in this case after the
NLRC Decision became final and executory, which rendered its
execution impossible and unjust. Like in Valderrama, during
the execution stage, DMI ceased its operation, and the same
did not file any formal notice regarding it. Added to this, in their
Opposition to the Motion to Implead, spouses Smith revealed
that they only lent their names to petitioners, and they were
included as incorporators just to assist the latter in forming

DMI; after such undertaking, spouses Smith immediately
transferred their rights in DMI to petitioners, which proved that
petitioners were the ones in control of DMI, and used the same
in furthering their business interests.
In considering the foregoing events, the Court is not unmindful
of the basic tenet that a corporation has a separate and distinct
personality from its stockholders, and from other corporations it
may be connected with. However, such personality may be
disregarded, or the veil of corporate fiction may be pierced
attaching personal liability against responsible person if the
corporation's personality "is used to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, or is used as a
device to defeat the labor laws x x x." 35 By responsible person,
we refer to an individual or entity responsible for, and who
acted in bad faith in committing illegal dismissal or in violation
of the Labor Code; or one who actively participated in the
management of the corporation. Also, piercing the veil of
corporate fiction is allowed where a corporation is a mere alter
ego or a conduit of a person, or another corporation.36
Here, the veil of corporate fiction must be pierced and
accordingly, petitioners should be held personally liable for
judgment awards because the peculiarity of the situation shows
that they controlled DMI; they actively participated in its
operation such that DMI existed not as a separate entity but
only as business conduit of petitioners. As will be shown be
shown below, petitioners controlled DMI by making it appear to
have no mind of its own,37 and used DMI as shield in evading
legal liabilities, including payment of the judgment awards in
favor of respondents.38
First, petitioners and DMI jointly filed their Position
Paper,39 Reply,40 and Rejoinder41 in contesting respondents'
illegal dismissal. Perplexingly, petitioners argued that they
were not part of DMI and were not privy to its dealings; 42 yet,
petitioners, along with DMI, collectively raised arguments on
the illegal dismissal case against them.
Stated differently, petitioners denied having any participation in
the management and operation of DMI; however, they were
aware of and disclosed the circumstances surrounding
respondents' employment, and propounded arguments refuting
that respondents were illegally dismissed.
To note, petitioners revealed the annual compensation of
respondents and their length of service; they also set up the
defense that respondents were merely project employees, and
were not terminated but that DMI's contract with its client was
discontinued resulting in the absence of hauling projects for
respondents.
If only to prove that they were not part of DMI, petitioners could
have revealed who operated it, and from whom they derived
the information embodied in their pleadings. Such failure to
reveal thus gives the Court reasons to give credence to
respondents' firm stand that petitioners are no strangers to
DMI, and that they were the ones who managed and operated
it.
Second, the declarations made by spouses Smith further
bolster that petitioners and no other controlled DMI, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Complainants [herein respondents] in their own motion admit
that they never saw [spouses Smith] at the office of [DMI], and
do not know them at all. This is because [spouses Smith's]
services as lawyers had long been dispensed by the Spouses
Lee and had no hand whatsoever in the management of the
company. The Smiths, as counsel of the spouses at [that] time,
17
[lent] their names as incorporators to facilitate the
[incorporation of DMI.] Respondent Edgard Smith was then
counsel of Toyota Alabang and acts as its corporate secretary
and as favor to his former client and employer, Respondent
Cesar Lee, agreed to help incorporate [DMI] and even asked
his wife Respondent, Millicent Smith, to act as incorporator
also [to] complete the required 5 man incorporators. After the
incorporation they assigned and transferred all their purported
participation in the company to the Respondents Spouses
Cesar and Yolanda Lee, who acted as managers and are the
real owners of the corporation. Even at the time complainant[s
were] fired from [their] employment respondents Spouses
Smith had already given up their shares. The failure to an1end
the Articles of Incorporation of [DMI], and to apply for closure is
the fault of the new board, if any was constituted subsequently,
and not of Respondents Smiths. Whatever fraud committed
was not committed by the Respondents Smiths, hence they
could not be made solidarily liable with Respondent
Corporation or with the spouses Lee. If bad faith or fraud did
attend the termination of complainant[s], respondents Smiths
would know nothing of it because they had ceased any
connection with [DMI] even prior to such time. And they had at
the inception of the corporation never exercised management
prerogatives in the selection, hiring, and firing of employees of
[DMI].43
Spouses Smith categorically identified petitioners as the
owners and managers of DMI. In their Motion to Quash,
however, petitioners neither denied the allegation of spouses
Smith nor adduced evidence to establish that they were not the
owners and managers of DMI. They simply insisted that they
could not be held personally liable because of the immutability
of the final and executory NLRC Decision, and of the separate
and distinct personality of DMI.
Furthermore, the assailed CA Decision heavily relied on the
declarations of spouses Smith but still petitioners did not
address the matters raised by spouses Smith in the instant
Petition with the Court.
Indeed, despite sufficient opportunity to clarify matters and/or
to refute them, petitioners simply brushed aside the allegations
of spouses Smith that petitioners owned and managed DMI.
Petitioners just maintain that they did not act in bad faith; that
the NLRC Decision is final and executory; and that DMI has a
distinct and separate personality. Hence, for failure to address,
clarify, or deny the declarations of spouses Smith, the Court
finds respondents' position that petitioners owned, and
operated DMI with merit.
Third, piercing the veil of corporate fiction is allowed, and
responsible persons may be impleaded, and be held solidarily
liable even after final judgment and on execution, provided that
such persons deliberately used the corporate vehicle to
unjustly evade the judgment obligation, or resorted to fraud,
bad faith, or malice in evading their obligation.44
In this case, petitioners were impleaded from the inception of
this case. They had ample opportunity to debunk the claim that
they illegally dismissed respondents, and that they should be
held personally liable for having controlled DMI and actively
participated in its management, and for having used it to evade
legal obligations to respondents.
While it is true that one's control does not by itself result in the
disregard of corporate fiction; however, considering the
irregularity in the incorporation of DMI, then there is sufficient
basis to hold that such corporation was used for an illegal
purpose, including evasion of legal duties to its employees, and
as such, the piercing of the corporate veil is warranted. The act

of hiding behind the cloak of corporate fiction will not be
allowed in such situation where it is used to evade one's
obligations, which "equitable piercing doctrine was formulated
to address and prevent."45
Clearly, petitioners should be held liable for the judgment
awards as they resorted to such scheme to countermand labor
laws by causing the incorporation of DMI but without any
indication that they were part thereof. While such device to
defeat labor laws may be deemed ingenious and imaginative,
the Court will not hesitate to draw the line, and protect the right
of workers to security of tenure, including ensuring that they
will receive the benefits they deserve when they fall victims of
illegal dismissal.46
Finally, it appearing that respondents' reinstatement is no
longer feasible by reason of the closure of DMI, then
separation pay should be awarded to respondents instead. 47
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The July 1, 2013
Decision and November 13, 2013 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 113774 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that instead of reinstatement, Dutch Movers,
Inc. and spouses Cesar Lee and Yolanda Lee are solidarily
liable to pay respondents' separation pay for every year of
service.
____________________________
G.R. No. 181387, September 05, 2016
CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT,
INC., Petitioner, v. UE MONTHLY ASSOCIATES, UEAMI
WORKERS UNION NFL AND ALFREDO BASI, Respondent.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the assailed Decision and
Resolution on the following grounds: (a) the failure of the CA to
adhere to Jang Lim v. CA,39 in which this Court purportedly
applied the NLRC Sheriff's Manual on Execution, and not the
NLRC Rules of Procedure, in resolving a third-party claim; and
(b) the refusal of the CA to consider Metrobank's mortgage lien
as a specially preferred credit.
In a Resolution40 dated 16 April 2008, this Court required
respondents to comment on the Petition. However, the
repeated attempts to serve the Resolution on respondents
failed. Accordingly, We resolved to consider the Resolution to
have been served upon respondents, and the latter to have
waived their right to comment on the Petition.41chanrobleslaw
ISSUES
This case presents the following issues for resolution:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) Whether the CA erred in
applying the Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, which
does not require the LA to conduct a hearing before deciding
Metrobank's third-party claim
(2) Whether the CA erred in denying Metrobank's third-party
claim
OUR RULING
We DENY the Petition.
This Court agrees with the CA that a hearing is not required
before a third-party claim can be decided by the LA, albeit for a
18
different reason than the supposed repeal of Rule IV, Section 2
of the 1993 NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment (1993
Manual). Furthermore, the Court believes that Metrobank has
failed to present sufficient evidence of the third-party claim.
Third-party claims may be resolved even without a full-
blown hearing provided claimants are given an
opportunity to be heard.
Petitioner's main argument concerns the supposed failure of
the LA to conduct an evidentiary hearing before resolving the
third-party claim. Petitioner insists that its right to due process
was violated, because such a hearing is required under Rule
IV, Section 2 of the 1993 Manual.42 In support of its assertion,
it cites Jang Lim v. CA, in which this Court supposedly applied
the 1993 Manual, instead of the contradictory provisions of the
2002 NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure (2002 NLRC
Rules).43chanrobleslaw
The CA, however, disagreed with petitioner's stance. It refused
to apply the 1993 Manual because Section 9, Rule VIII of the
2002 NLRC Rules, had supposedly superseded the 1993
Manual's provisions on third-party claims.44chanrobleslaw
While this Court sustains the conclusion that the 1993 Manual
does not govern this dispute, it does not agree that the 1993
Manual was repealed by the 2002 NLRC Rules. Our view is
that Rule VI of the 1993 Manual was superseded by a new
version of the same manual enacted by the NLRC in July
2002.45Section 1, Rule VI of this 2002 Manual on Execution of
Judgment, provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 1. Proceedings. SHOULD A THIRD-PARTY CLAIM
BE FILED DURING EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT
AWARD, THE THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANT shall EXECUTE an
affidavit STATING his title TO PROPERTY or possession
thereof WITH SUPPORTING EVIDENCE and shall file the
same with the sheriff and copies thereof served upon the
Commission or Labor Arbiter who issued the writ and upon the
prevailing party. Upon receipt of the third-party claim, all
proceedings, with respect to the execution of the property
subject of the third-party claim, shall automatically be
suspended. The Commission or Labor Arbiter who issued the
writ MAY REQUIRE THE THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANT TO
ADDUCE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HIS
THIRD-PARTY CLAIM AND TO POST A CASH OR SURETY
BOND EQUIVALENT TO THE AMOUNT OF HIS CLAIM AS
PROVIDED FOR IN SECTION 6, RULE VI, OF THE NLRC
RULES OF PROCEDURE, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE
POSTING BY THE PREVAILING PARTY OF A
SUPERSEDEAS BOND IN AN AMOUNT EQUIVALENT TO
THAT POSTED BY THE THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANT. The
PROPRIETY of the THIRD-PARTY claim SHALL BE
RESOLVED within ten (10) working days from SUBMISSION
OF THE CLAIM FOR RESOLUTION. The decision OF the
Labor Arbiter is appealable to the Commission within ten (10)
working days from notice AND the Commission shall resolve
the appeal within the same period.
It is settled that revisions to procedural rules are applicable to
pending and unresolved disputes, so long as no injustice
results from the retroactive application.46 In this case, the third-
party claim was still pending before the LA at the time the 2002
Manual on Execution of Judgment took effect. Hence,
Metrobank was obliged to comply with the new requirement as
soon as it took effect. Notably, this fact distinguishes the
instant case from Jang Lim v. CA,47 which was cited by
petitioner to prove the applicability of Rule VI of the 1993
Manual to this case. We note, however, that the third-party
claim in Jang Lim was filed in 1999 and decided by the LA in
200048 before the amendment of the 1993 Manual; hence, the

revised rules were not applied to that case.
In the instant suit, Metrobank filed its third-party claim on 6
September 2002,49 or 10 days before 16 September 2002 -
when the 2002 Manual took effect.50 This sequence of events
explains why no supporting evidence was attached to the
bank's Affidavit of Third-Party Claim. We note, nevertheless,
that the 2002 Manual was already in effect when Metrobank
filed its Reply to Comment to Third-party Claim with Motion to
Set Hearing51 on 3 October 2002. By then, it should have
realized that it was already required to submit supporting
evidence of its claim under the revised rule, and that it no
longer needed to await the grant of its request for a hearing.
Furthermore, since the LA resolved the claim only on 5
December 2002, or three months after the 2002 Manual took
effect, Metrobank had more than enough time to submit the
required evidentiary support of its alleged right to the property.
It must be emphasized that the amended provision gave the LA
the discretion to determine whether additional evidence
needed to be presented before the third-party claim could be
resolved. Since the claimant was already required to submit
proof of his alleged title to the property, the LA was allowed to
decide the claim based only on the evidence submitted. Here,
the LA decided that no further hearing was necessary, given
the failure of Metrobank to submit proof of its claim to the
properties. As will be further discussed, the Court finds no
reason to overturn this conclusion.
We likewise find no merit in the assertion that petitioner was
denied due process. The decision of the LA not to conduct a
formal evidentiary hearing before resolving the case was
justified, as the conduct of those hearings is not mandatory in
all instances, particularly in administrative proceedings. 52 At its
core, due process simply means giving both parties a fair and
reasonable opportunity to be heard or to explain their side of
the controversy.53 Here, Metrobank was clearly granted this
opportunity through the written submissions it presented to the
LA. That these submissions supposedly failed to include all the
pieces of evidence it intended to present is entirely its fault.
In any case, Metrobank was given additional opportunities to
argue its case and present its evidence before the NLRC and
the CA. These subsequent proceedings were more than
enough to rectify any alleged procedural flaw and satisfy the
requirements of due process.54chanrobleslaw
Metrobank and petitioner failed to prove their right to the
properties.
At any rate, this Court sustains the conclusion of the CA with
regard to the failure of Metrobank to establish the latter's third-
party claim. Our examination of the records of this case reveals
that the bank failed to present a single piece of evidence in
support of a crucial point, i.e., that the properties subject of the
chattel mortgage in its favor were among those levied upon
and sold by the NLRC sheriff.
We cannot ignore the fact that Metrobank was repeatedly
made aware of its failure to present the required evidence and
given the opportunity to rectify the error. Throughout the
proceedings before the LA, the NLRC and the CA, its claim
was rejected because there was insufficient evidence that the
properties, subject of the levy, had indeed been mortgaged to
the bank. However, it never bothered to present proof of this
assertion in its various submissions before the agencies and
the CA. In fact, even when the bank identified and attached
copies of the documents it allegedly intended to present in
case an evidentiary hearing would be conducted, 55 its own
19
enumeration did not include any evidence of this particular
point. It merely submitted lists of the chattels supposedly
mortgaged to it without identifying which of these items were
actually levied upon and sold by the sheriff.
Petitioner also had an opportunity to prove the third-party claim
before this Court. It was aware that the CA had denied
Metrobank's Petition for Certiorari due to the absence of proof
that the properties allegedly mortgaged to the bank were
among those sold by the sheriff on execution. It would have
been a simple matter to identify the properties sold by the
sheriff, as well as to prove that these items were included in
the list of properties mortgaged to Metrobank. Petitioner,
however, still opted to attach only a machine copy of the Notice
of Levy/Sale on Execution of Personal Property, without
annexes,56 to its Petition for Review. For obvious reasons, this
machine copy will not suffice as evidence.
It must be pointed out that third-party claimants in execution
proceedings have the burden of proving their right or title to the
subject properties, if they want to defeat the judgment
lien.57 To do so, they must submit evidence not only of the
basis of their entitlement, but also of the fact that the properties
they are claiming were indeed the subject of the execution.
Failure to submit that evidence will justify the denial of the
third- party claim, as in this case.
In view of the foregoing, this Court no longer finds it necessary
to resolve the other issues raised by the parties. There was
sufficient justification for the LA to deny the third-party claim,
and for the NLRC and the CA to affirm that ruling.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 1 October 2007
and Resolution dated 21 January 2008 are hereby AFFIRMED.
_______________________
G.R. No. 209098
JUAN B. HERNANDEZ, Petitioner
vs.
CROSSWORLD MARINE SERVICES, INC., MYKONOS
SIDPPING CO., LTD., and ELEAZAR DIAZ, Respondents
Petitioner's Arguments
Praying that the assailed CA pronouncements be set aside and
that the NLRC judgment be reinstated instead, petitioner
contends in his Petition and Reply22 that contrary to the ruling
of the CA, the doctrine in Career Phils. Ship Management, Inc.
v. Madjus case applies to him as well, since he is likewise
prohibited from pursuing further claims under the documents
he was made to sign; that all these documents - Conditional
Satisfaction of Judgment, Receipt of Payment, and Affidavit -
in Career Phils. Ship Management and in this case are
identical and were prepared by one and the same counsel, the
del Rosario and del Rosario Law Offices; that in signing these
documents, he did so out of financial necessity and was left
with no other recourse; that nonetheless, even assuming that
the CA is correct in not applying Career Phils. Ship
Management, he is still entitled to disability benefits and other
claims awarded by the NLRC, as his illness is work-connected
and thus compensable; and that he has worked for
respondents since 2005 - which shows that his hypertension
and diabetes developed and/or were aggravated while working
for respondents and having to contend with the perils of the

sea, harsh climate and weather conditions, and emotional
strain of being away from his family.
Respondents' Arguments
In their joint Comment,23 respondents reiterate the CA
pronouncement, adding that in paying petitioner conditionally,
they simply acted in good faith, complied with the execution
proceedings, and wanted to prevent garnishment of their
accounts; that petitioner's illness was not contracted during his
employment with them; that diabetes is not a compensable
occupational disease; that petitioner's failure to submit to a
post-employment medical test by a company-designated
physician foreclosed his right to claim disability benefits; and
that for the foregoing reasons, petitioner is not entitled to his
other claims.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
Respondents profess that the Conditional Satisfaction of
Judgment, Receipt of Payment, and Affidavit which petitioner
was made to sign were prepared in good faith and simply to
comply with the execution proceedings below and prevent
garnishment of their accounts. However, this Court believes
otherwise. Hidden behind these documents appears to be a
convenient ploy to deprive petitioner of all his rights to claim
indemnity from respondents under all possible causes of action
and in all available fora, and effectively for nothing in return or
exchange - because in the event that the NLRC ruling is
reversed, then petitioner must return what he received, thus
leaving him with the proverbial empty bag. This is
fundamentally unfair, and goes against public policy.
As was held before, human life is not more expendable than
corporate capital.24 The survival of the petitioner and his family
depends on the former's ability to find and perform work for
wages they need to secure food, shelter, clothing, and the
education of his children. It may be that in this jurisdiction,
petitioner may ultimately be adjudged as not entitled to the
monetary claims he seeks, but in other fora - such as in
Panama, Japan, or any other country- he may be found to be
entitled thereto, and to other indemnities as well. Yet by affixing
his signature upon the Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment,
Receipt of Payment, and Affidavit, petitioner effectively
surrendered all his rights and waived all his claims and causes
of action in all jurisdictions, and in exchange for nothing.
Indeed, in the Affidavit, petitioner even went so far as to certify
and warrant that he will not file any other complaint or
prosecute any suit or action here or in any other country after
receiving the settlement amount.
6. That I have no further claims whatsoever in any theory of
law against the Owners of MV "NIKOMARIN" because of the
payment made to me. That I certify and warrant that I will not
file any complaint or prosecute any suit or action in the
Philippines, Panama, Japan or any other country against the
shipowners and/or the released parties herein after receiving
the payment of US$66,000.00or its peso equivalent x
xx."25 (Emphasis in the original)
This waiver by petitioner in exchange for nothing has in fact
become a reality, since the CA reversed the NLRC ruling,
which means that petitioner would now have to return what he
received from the respondents, and yet he is left with no
20
available recourse since he agreed that he will not
"prosecute any suit or action in the Philippines x xx against
the shipowners and/or the released parties herein after
receiving the payment of US$66,000.00 or its peso
equivalent."26 "Any suit or action" literally includes a petition
before this Court to review the CA reversal - or the instant
petition. It also covers a claim for interest that may justly
accrue in his favor during the pendency of the case.
In effect, while petitioner27 had the luxury of having other
remedies available to it such as its petition
for certiorari pending before the appellate court, and an
eventual appeal to this Court, respondent, 28 on the other hand,
could no longer pursue other claims, including for interests that
may accrue during the pendency of the case.29
That respondents did not invoke the prohibition in the Affidavit -
when the instant Petition was instituted - does not take away
the fact that petitioner has been unduly deprived of such
recourse through the documents he was made to sign.
In Career Philippines, believing that the execution of the LA
Decision was imminent after its petition for injunctive relief was
denied, the employer filed before the LA a pleading embodying
a conditional satisfaction of judgment before the CA and,
accordingly, paid the employee the monetary award in the LA
decision. In the said pleading, the employer stated that the
conditional satisfaction of the judgment award was without
prejudice to its pending appeal before the CA and that it was
being made only to prevent the imminent execution.
The CA later dismissed the employer's petition for being moot
and academic, noting that the decision of the LA had attained
finality with the satisfaction of the judgment award. This Court
affirmed the ruling of the CA, interpreting the 'conditional
settlement' to be tantamount to an amicable settlement of the
case resulting in the mootness of the petition
for certiorari, considering (i) that the employee could no longer
pursue other claims, and (ii) that the employer could not have
been compelled to immediately pay because it had filed an
appeal bond to ensure payment to the employee.
Stated differently, the Court ruled against the employer
because the conditional satisfaction of judgment signed
by the parties was highly prejudicial to the employee. The
agreement stated that the payment of the monetary award
was without prejudice to the right of the employer to me a
petition for certiorari and appeal, while the employee
agreed that she would no longer file any complaint or
prosecute any suit of [sic] action against the employer
after receiving the payment.30 (Emphasis supplied)
Within the context of the constitutional, legislative, and
jurisprudential guarantees afforded to labor, the position
petitioner has been led into is unjust, unfair, and arbitrary.
In More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC,31 the Court ruled
that:
The law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive
less compensation than what a worker is entitled to recover nor
prevent him from demanding benefits to which he is entitled.
Quitclaims executed by the employees are thus commonly
frowned upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar
claims for the full measure of the workers legal rights,
considering the economic disadvantage of the employee and
 21

the inevitable pressure upon him by financial necessity.
(Citation omitted)
Respondents could have simply paid the judgment award
without attaching conditions that have far-reaching
consequences other than those intended by a simple
compliance with what was required under the circumstances -
that is, the mandatory execution proceedings following a
favorable judgment allowed under the Labor Code. But they did
not; they had to find a way to tie petitioner's hands
permanently, dangling the check as bait, so to speak. To
borrow from a fairly recent ruling of the Court, ''[t]he execution
[of the documents] cannot be tolerated as it amounts to a
deceptive scheme to unconditionally absolve employers from
every liability.32
same documents with disfavor in the Career Phils. Ship
Management case and in subsequent dispositions of the
Court,36 insofar as these and similar documents contain terms
and conditions that are unfair to the employee.
Having disposed of the case in the foregoing manner, there is
no need to pass upon the other issues raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The November 29,
2012 Decision and September 3, 2013 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 124685 are REVISED and SET
ASIDE, and respondents’ Petition for Certiorari in said case is
considered MOOT and ACADEMIC in view of the full
settlement and complete satisfaction of petitioner’s claims.

x x x. As a rule, quitclaims and waivers or releases are looked G.R. No. 192369, November 09, 2016
upon with disfavor and frowned upon as contrary to public
policy.1âwphi1 They are thus ineffective to bar claims for the MARIA VICTORIA TOLENTINO-
full measure of a worker's legal rights, particularly when the PRIETO, Petitioner, v. ROBERT S. ELVAS, Respondent.
following conditions are applicable: 1) where there is clear
proof that the waiver was wangled from cm unsuspecting or G.R. No. 193685
gullible person, or (2) where the terms of settlement are
unconscionable on their face. To determine whether the ROBERT S. ELVAS, Petitioner, v. INNSBRUCK
Quitclaims signed by respondents are valid, one important INTERNATIONAL TRADING AND/OR MARIVIC TOLENTINO
factor that must be taken into account is the consideration (A.K.A. MARIA VICTORIA TOLENTINO-
accepted by respondents; the amount must constitute a PRIETO), Respondents.
reasonable settlement equivalent to the full measure of Our Ruling
their legal rights. In this case, the Quitclaims signed by the
respondents do not appear to have been made for valuable We deny the consolidated petitions.
consideration. x x x33 (Emphasis supplied)
Elvas' appeal was filed out of time.
For what they did, respondents are guilty of bad faith, and
should suffer the consequences of their actions.1âwphi1 One At the outset, we address the question of timeliness for both
is that their payment of petitioner's claim should properly be appeals. As borne by the records, Tolentino received a copy of
treated as a voluntary settlement of his claim in full satisfaction the Decision and Resolution of the CA on July 31, 2009 and
of the NLRC judgment - which thus rendered the Petition in May 28, 2010, respectively.51 Under Rule 45 of the Revised
CA-G.R. SP No. 124685 moot and academic. Rules of Court (the Rules), Tolentino had 15 days from receipt
of the resolution denying her motion for reconsideration or until
June 12, 2010 within which to file a petition for review.
For its part, the CA refused to apply the pronouncement Tolentino, however, asked tor additional period of 30 days or
in Career Phils. Shipmanagement, insinuating that the situation until July 12, 2010 to file her petition. We granted her request
of the parties in said case and in the present one are different in our Resolution dated July 2, 2010.52 On July 12, 2010,
in that, in the instant case, petitioner "still retains the right to Tolentino tiled her appeal. Clearly, her petition was tiled on
judicial recourse in the event"34 that the NLRC decision is time.
reversed, while in Career Phils. Shipmanagement, "the
Supreme Court opted to render the action therein moot and Elvas received a copy of the Resolution of the CA denying his
academic due to the fact that part of the condition is a partial motion for reconsideration on May 21, 2010. He had
prohibition on the part of the seafarer to pursue further until June 5, 2010 to tile a petition for review. He sought an
claims"35 as stated in the same Conditional Satisfaction of additional period of 30 days to file the same, which we granted
Judgment, Receipt of Payment, and Affidavit which he was in our Resolution53 dated July 21, 2010. However, on the
made to sign. The appellate court's position is flawed: 30thday, or on July 5, 2010, Elvas failed to file his petition.
petitioner's situation is no different from that of the seafarer in Instead, he filed it on July 6, 2010. Evidently, Elvas' petition
the Career Phils. Shipmanagement case. The CA's reasoning was filed out of time.
laid down in its pronouncement is a mere convenient play on
words. Just as in the Career Phils. Shipmanagement case, The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a
petitioner is equally prohibited from pursuing further claims; it is component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and
not simply that petitioner "still retains the right to judicial may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
recourse"; what is of significance is that he stands to gain the provisions of law.54 Elvas calls for our compassion to
nothing in the end, and yet is unduly prevented from pursuing overlook the one day delay in the filing of his petition; however,
further claims - all without the benefit of receiving, in return, we have ruled time and again that our kind consideration is not
valuable consideration or a reasonable settlement equivalent to for the undeserving. While it is within our power to relax the
the full measure of his legal rights. rule on timeliness of appeals, the circumstances obtaining in
this case do not warrant our liberality.
Respondents' counsel - the Del Rosario & Del Rosario Law
Offices - should have known better than to once more utilize Elvas attempted to justify the delay but we are not persuaded.
the Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment, Receipt of Payment, In his Reply in G.R. No. 193685, he claimed that he was able
and Affidavit, knowing that this Court looked upon these very to obtain funds for printing and photocopying of the petition and

its attachments only on the last day of filing the petition, or on
July 5, 2010. By then, he mused that it was too late to
complete the photocopying and the collation of documents for
submission on the same dayas in fact, he was able to
personally deliver the completed petition before us only on the
following day.55Interestingly, however, Elvas in his
Manifestation dated July 6, 2010 noted that he furnished
Tolentino and the CA, copies of his petition for review on July
5, 2010.56 We find this detail inconsistent with the alibi that
Elvas narrated in his Reply. Elvas claims that copies of the
petition became available only on July 6, 2010, yet he was able
to furnish Tolentino and the CA with copies of the same on July
5, 2010. The actuation of Elvas is suspect. It seems to us that
he intended to give his petition a semblance of being filed on
time when in fact it was not. It is calculated to prevent Tolentino
from questioning the timeliness of Elvas' petition, an utter sign
of bad faith which we cannot countenance and does not
deserve our compassion.
In addition, the fact that the delay in the filing of the petition
was only one day is not a legal justification for non-compliance
with the rule requiring that it be filed within the reglementary
period.57 Thus, in the recent case of Visayan Electric Company
Employees Union-ALU-TUCP v. Visayan Electric Cornpany,
Inc.,58 we affirmed the CA's denial of a petition
for certiorari filed 61 days instead of 60 days from notice of the
judgment or resolution, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[W]hen the law fixes thirty days x x x, we cannot take it to
mean also thirty-one days. If that deadline could be stretched
to thirty-one days in one case, what would prevent its being
further stretched to thirty-two days in another case, and so on,
step by step, until the original line is forgotten or buried in the
growing confusion resulting from the alterations? That is
intolerable. We cannot fix a period with the solemnity of a
statute and disregard it like a joke. If law is founded on reason,
whim and fancy should play no part in its application. 59
Consequently, we deny Elvas' petition for being filed beyond
the reglementary period. In any case, his petition is also
unmeritorious as we shall discuss shortly.
The NLRC and CA did not err in allowing respondents' appeal.
Article 229 of the Labor Code mandates that appeals from the
judgment of the LA which involve a monetary award may be
perfected only upon posting of a cash or surety bond issued by
a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the NLRC in
the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from. Consequently, Sections 1, 4, 5 and 6, Rule VI
of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure
state:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 1. Periods of Appeal. - Decisions, awards, or orders of the
Labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed to
the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar
days from receipt thereof; and in case of decisions or
resolutions of the Regional Director of the Department of Labor
and Employment pursuant to Article 129 of the Labor Code,
within five (5) calendar days from receipt thereof. If the 10th or
5th day, as the case may be, falls on a Saturday, Sunday or
holiday, the last day to perfect the appeal shall be the first
working day following such Saturday, Sunday or
holiday.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx
Sec. 4. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. - (a) The appeal
shall be:cralawlawlibrary
(1) filed within the reglementary period provided in
Section 1 of this Rule;
22
(2) verified by the appellant himself/herself in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court, as amended;
(3) in the form of a memorandum of appeal which shall
state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in
support thereof, the relief prayed for, and with a
statement of the date the appellant received the
appealed decision, award or order;
(4) in three (3) legibly typewritten or printed copies; and
(5) accompanied by:
i) proof of payment of the required appeal fee and
legal research fee;
ii) posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in
Section 6 of this Rule; and
iii) proof of service upon the other parties.
(b) A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other
requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the period
for perfecting an appeal.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx
Sec. 5. Appeal Fee. - The appellant shall pay the prevailing
appeal fee and legal research fee to the Regional Arbitration
Branch or Regional Office of origin, and the official receipt of
such payment shall form part of the records of the case.
Sec. 6. Bond. - In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the
Regional Director involves a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a bond,
which shall either be in the form of cash deposit or surety bond
equivalent in amount to the monetary award, exclusive of
damages and attorney's fees.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx
The appellant shall furnish the appellee with a certified true
copy of the said surety bond with all the abovementioned
supporting documents. The appellee shall verify the regularity
and genuineness thereof and immediately report any
irregularity to the Commission.
Upon verification by the Commission that the bond is irregular
or not genuine, the Commission shall cause the immediate
dismissal of the appeal, and censure the responsible parties
and their counsels, or subject them to reasonable fine or
penalty, and the bonding company may be
blacklisted.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx
These statutory and regulatory provisions explicitly provide that
an appeal from the LA to the NLRC must be perfected within
10 calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards or
orders of the LA. In a judgment involving a monetary award,
the appeal shall be perfected only upon (1) proof of payment of
the required appeal fee; (2) posting of a cash or surety bond
issued by a reputable bonding company; and (3) filing of a
memorandum of appeal.60
The second requisite is the crux of the present controversy.
Respondents seasonably filed a memorandum of appeal and
posted a surety bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary
award of the LA, but the bond turned out to be spurious upon
verification of Elvas. Respondents immediately put up a new

and genuine bond to replace the old one. The NLRC and the
CA allowed the appeal.
We find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the courts a
quo. While posting of an appeal bond is mandatory and
jurisdictional,61 we sanction the relaxation of the rule in certain
meritorious cases. These cases include instances in which (1)
there was substantial compliance with the Rules, (2)
surrounding facts and circumstances constitute meritorious
grounds to reduce the bond, (3) a liberal interpretation of the
requirement of an appeal bond would serve the desired
objective of resolving controversies on the merits, or (4) the
appellants, at the very least, exhibited their willingness and/or
good faith by posting a partial bond during the reglementary
period.62 The first and second instances are present in this
case.
As correctly found by the CA, respondents substantially
complied with the rules as shown by their lack of intention to
evade the requirement of appeal bond.63 Upon being informed
of the spuriousness of the bond, they dismissed their counsel
of record who was allegedly responsible for its submission and
hired another lawyer who submitted a genuine bond.64 Both the
NLRC and the CA found good faith on the part of respondents,
stating that the filing of the alleged fake bond was without their
knowledge and that they did not purposely post a spurious
bond. We adhere to a strict application of Article 229 of the
Labor Code when appellants do not post an appeal bond at
all;65 but here an appeal bond was actually filed. Strict
application of the rules is therefore uncalled for.
Further, Article 227 of the same Code authorizes the NLRC to
"use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively, without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure." In the case before us, the
NLRC opined that it is in the best interest of justice that the
appeal be allowed so that the case could be resolved on its
merits. In this regard, we cite Rada v. NLRC,66where we ruled
that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
entertained the employer's appeal despite the posting of the
surety bond beyond the reglementary period. We explained
that "[w]hile it is true that the payment of the supersedeas bond
is an essential requirement in the perfection of an appeal,
however, where the fee had been paid although payment was
delayed, the broader interests of justice and the desired
objective of resolving controversies on the merits demands that
the appeal be given due course."67
In Manaban v. Sarphil Corporation/Apokon Fruits, Inc.,68 we
affirmed the NLRC's decision to give due course to the appeal
of the landowner-employer, notwithstanding that the appeal
was perfected beyond the 10-day reglementary period and the
posting of the appeal bond was four months delayed on the
basis of fundamental consideration of substantial
justice. Manaban involves the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) which the
NLRC acknowledged to be more favorable to the landless
farmers or in this case to the laborers/workers of the land
subject of the CARP. In light of the government's policy to
equally protect and respect not only the laborers' interest but
also that of the employer, the NLRC allowed the landowner-
employer's appeal.
All told, the NLRC and the CA did not err when they admitted
respondents' appeal.
The CA may rule upon an unassigned error to arrive at a
complete and just resolution of the case.
23
Tolentino laments that she was denied due process when the
CA reviewed an unassigned error - the issue of Elvas' illegal
dismissal. She maintains that it is not closely related to, or
dependent on, the issue of perfection of appeal. To support her
argument, she harps on the applicability of Section 8, Rule 51
of the Rules, which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 8. Questions that may be decided. - No error which does
not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity
of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will
be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors. or
closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and
properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon
plain errors and clerical errors.
Rightfully so, as borne by the record and as admitted by Elvas,
the only error raised in the CA is whether the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to respondents'
appeal. Elvas did not ask the CA to review the finding of the
NLRC that he was not illegally dismissed. Yet, the CA reversed
that finding and declared that Elvas was illegally terminated
from service. Conscious of the fact that it was not raised as an
issue, the CA explained that ruling on the merits is necessary
for a complete and just resolution of the case.
We concur with the CA. Our rules recognize the broad
discretionary power of an appellate court to waive the lack of
proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not
assigned.69 The CA has ample authority to review errors not
raised in the following instances:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) When the question affects jurisdiction over the subject
matter;
(b) Matters that are evidently plain or clerical errors within
contemplation of law;
(c) Matters whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a
just decision and complete resolution of the case or in
serving the interests of justice or avoiding dispensing
piecemeal justice;
(d) Matters raised in the trial court and are of record having
some bearing on the issue submitted that the parties
failed to raise or that the lower court ignored;
(e) Matters closely related to an error assigned; and
(f) Matters upon which the determination of a question
properly assigned is dependent.70
Evidently, the exceptions obtain in this case. The CA effectively
avoided dispensing piecemeal justice when it did not confine
itself to the resolution only of the procedural aspect of the case
but ruled on the merits that is, the issue of illegal dismissal.
Since the LA and the NLRC had varying views of the merits, it
would best serve the interest of justice that the CA lays the
issue to a definitive rest. Additionally, it cannot be gainsaid that
an appeal throws the entire case open for review. 71
Finally, we reject Tolentino's contention that she was deprived
of due process by the CA because she was not able to address
the issue of illegal dismissal in her submissions. Suffice it to
state that no new issue of fact arose, and no new evidence
was presented before the CA in connection with the question of
illegal dismissal. Thus, it cannot be argued that Tolentino was
not given a chance to address them. The CA decided the
merits of the case based on the pleadings and evidence on
record. Tolentino cannot deny her active participation in the
proceedings before the courts a quo. Thus, her cry of violation
of due process is misplaced.

In fine, the CA did not err in allowing respondents' appeal and
m ruling on the merits of the case.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED for lack
of merit. The July 21, 2009 Decision and May 17, 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107070
are hereby AFFIRMED.
_________________
G.R. No. 214301
RAMON MANUEL T. JAVINES, Petitioner
vs.
XLIBRIS a.k.a. AUTHOR SOLUTIONS, INC., JOSEPH
STEINBACH, and STELLA MARS OUANO,, Respondents
The Ruling of this Court
The petition lacks merit.
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC uniformly held that Javines'
employment was terminated for just cause under Article 297
(formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code.1âwphi1 It is
undisputed that from this unanimous finding, Javines failed to
move for reconsideration nor challenged said.ruling before the
CA. Consequently, the NLRC decision finding Javines to have
been dismissed for just cause. became final. For failure to file
the requisite petition before the CA, the NLRC decision had
attained finality and had been placed beyond the appellate
court's power of review. Although appeal is an essential part of
judicial process, the right thereto is not a natural right or a part
of due process but is merely a statutory privilege. Settled are
the rules that a decision becomes final as against a party who
does not appeal the same 22 and an appellee who has not
himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any
affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the
court below. 23 Hence, the finding that Javines was dismissed
for just cause must be upheld.
Javines' insistence that the petition for certiorari filed by Xlibris
throws open the entire case for review such that the issue of
whether or not he was dismissed for just cause ought to have
been addressed by the CA is entirely misplaced.
While it is true that the appellate court is given broad
discretionary power to waive the lack of proper assignment of
errors and to consider errors not assigned 24 , it has authority to
do so in the following instances: (a) when the question affects
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters that are
evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c)
matters whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
decision and complete resolution of the case, or in serving the
interests of justice or avoiding dispensing piecemeal justice; (d)
matters raised in the trial court and are of record having some
bearing on the issue submitted that the parties failed to raise or
that the lower court ignored; (e) matters closely related to an
error assigned; and (f) matters upon which the determination of
a question properly assigned is dependent. 25
None of the aforesaid instances exists in the instant case.
Thus, the CA. cannot be faulted for no longer discussing the
issue of whether indeed there exists just cause for his
dismissal.
24
Instead, in the petition for certiorari filed before the CA, Xlibris
only questioned the award of nominal damages for failure to
comply with procedural due process. Emphatically, neither
Xlibris nor Javines further questioned the CA' s award on this
point. As such, the issue as to whether the requirements of
procedural due process to constitute a valid dismissal were
complied with has been resolved with finality. In any event,
such involves a question of fact which the Court does not allow
in a petition filed under Rule 45. 26 It has been consistently held
that the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from
the CA via Rule 45 is generally limited to reviewing errors of
law and does not extend to a re-evaluation of the sufficiency of
evidence upon which the courts a quo had based its
determination. 27 What is more, findings of fact of labor
tribunals when affirmed by the CA bind this Court. We find no
compelling reason in this case to depart from the foregoing
settled rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
June 26, 2014 and Resolution dated August 28, 2014 of the
Court of Appeals finding petitioner Ramon Manuel T. Javines
to have been dismissed for just cause and awarding nominal
damages in the amount of PhPl,000 in his favor
are AFFIRMED in toto.
G.R. No. 190203, November 07, 2016
POWERHOUSE STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL,
INC., Petitioner, v. ROMELIA REY, LIZA CABAD,
EVANGELINE NICMIC, EVA LAMEYRA, ROSARIO
ABORDAJE, LILYBETH MAGALANG, VENIA BUYAG,
JAYNALYN NOLLEDO, IREN NICOLAS, AILEEN SAMALEA,
SUSAN YBAÑEZ; CHERYL ANN ORIA, MA. LIZA SERASPI,
KATHERINE ORACION, AND JEJ INTERNATIONAL
MANPOWER SERVICES CORPORATION, Respondents.
The Court's Ruling
Before going into the substantive merits of the case, we shall
first resolve the procedural issues raised by respondents in
their respective Comments.
In their Comment,33 respondent employees assert that
Powerhouse failed to show any justifiable reason why it should
be excused from the operation of the rules. 34 Moreover, the CA
actually resolved the petition on the merits but Powerhouse
showed nothing to earn a favorable ruling. 35
On the other hand, JEJ, in its Comment,36 avers that
Powerhouse failed to raise as an issue the dismissal of
Powerhouse's petition due to its gross and blatant violations of
the requirements of Rule 65. Instead, Powerhouse made
assignments of errors, or what it called "novel questions of
law," which is just a ploy to seek the review of the factual
findings of the CA and the NLRC.37
The petition in the CA was timely filed.
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended,38 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be
filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new
trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial
of said motion.

xxx
In this case, Powerhouse received on June 21, 2007, a copy of
the May 31, 2007 Order of the NLRC denying its motion for
reconsideration.39 Thus, it had 60 days, or until August 20,
2007, to file a petition for certiorari before the CA. However,
since August 20, 2007 was proclaimed by President Arroyo as
a special non-working day pursuant to Proclamation No. 1353,
series of 2007, Powerhouse had until the next working day,
August 21, 2007 to file its petition. The relevant portion of Rule
22, Section 1 provides: "x x x If the last day of the period, as
thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run
until the next working day." Thus, the petition filed on August
21, 2007 was timely filed.
Powerhouse substantially complied with the requirements
of verification and certification against forum shopping.
In previous cases, we held that the following officials or
employees of the company can sign the verification and
certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the
Chairperson of the Board of Directors; (2) the President of a
corporation; (3) the General Manager or Acting General
Manager; (4) Personnel Officer; and (5) an Employment
Specialist in a labor case.40 The rationale applied in these
cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or
representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or
certificate against forum shopping, being "in a position to verify
the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the
petition."41cralawred
In this case, the verification and certification42 attached to the
petition before the CA was signed by William C. Go, the
President and General Manager of Powerhouse, one of the
officers enumerated in the foregoing recognized exception.
While the petition was not accompanied by a Secretary's
Certificate, his authority was ratified by the Board in its
Resolution adopted on October 24, 2007.43 Thus, even if he
was not authorized to execute the Verification and Certification
at the time of the filing of the Petition, the ratification by the
board of directors retroactively confirms and affirms his
authority and gives us more reason to uphold that authority.44
Nevertheless, on the merits, the petition must fail.
It bears stressing that in a petition for review on certiorari, the
scope of the Supreme Court's judicial review of decisions of
the CA is generally confined only to errors of law. The
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and this doctrine applies
with greater force in labor cases. Factual questions are for the
labor tribunals to resolve.45
Respondents maintain that the petition, in the guise of raising
novel questions of law, is in reality seeking a review of the
factual findings of the CA and the NLRC.46
We agree with the respondents.
In this case, although the three issues raised in the petition
were stated in a manner in which they would appear to be
purely legal issues, they actually assume facts contrary to the
factual findings of the LA, the NLRC, and the CA and thus call
for a re-examination of the evidence, which this Court cannot
entertain.47Thus, the three issues presented by Powerhouse-
the liability of the transferee agency, the existence of illegal
dismissal and the basis for the monetary awards-are factual
issues which have all been ruled upon by the LA, the NLRC,
and the CA.
25
The well-entrenched rule, especially in labor cases, is that
findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, like the NLRC, are
accorded with respect, even finality, if supported by substantial
evidence. Particularly when passed upon and upheld by the
CA, they are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court
and will not normally be disturbed.49
The Court finds no reason in this case to depart from such
doctrine.
The evidence on record supports the findings of the CA and
the NLRC.
Respondent employees were illegally dismissed.
The onus of proving that an employee was not dismissed or, if
dismissed, his dismissal was not illegal, fully rests on the
employer, and the failure to discharge the onus would mean
that the dismissal was not justified and was illegal. The burden
of proving the allegations rests ufon the party alleging and the
proof must be clear, positive, and convincing.50
Here, there is no reason to overturn the factual findings of the
Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA, all of which have
unanimously declared that respondent employees were made
to resign against their will after the foreign principal, Catcher,
stopped providing them food for their subsistence as early as
March 2, 2001, when they were informed that they would be
repatriated, until they were repatriated on March 11, 2001.
The filing of complaints for illegal dismissal immediately after
repatriation belies the claim that respondent employees
voluntarily chose to be separated and repatriated. Voluntary
repatriation, much like resignation, is inconsistent with the filing
of the complaints.51
Respondent employees are entitled to the payment of
monetary claims.
We also agree that respondent employees are entitled to
money claims and full reimbursement of their respective
placement fees. However, the award of the three-month
equivalent of respondent employees' salaries should be
increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of
the employment contract in accordance with our rulings
in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.52 and Sameer
Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles.53
In Serrano, we declared unconstitutional the clause in Section
10 of R.A. No. 8042 limiting the wages that could be recovered
by an illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months. We
held that the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less" (subject clause) is both
a violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of
the Constitution.53 In 2010, upon promulgation of Republic Act
No. 10022,54 the subject clause was reinstated.55 Presented
with the unique situation that the law passed incorporated the
exact clause already declared unconstitutional, without any
perceived substantial change in the circumstances, in Sameer,
we, once again, declared the reinstated clause
unconstitutional, this time as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No.
10022.56
We likewise affirm the refund to the respondent employees of
the unauthorized monthly deductions in the amount of
NT$10,000.00. Contrary to Powerhouse's contention that the
claim for refund was based merely on allegations, respondent
employees were able to present proof before the NLRC in the
form of the two (2) passbooks given to each of them by their

foreign employer. According to respondent employees, the
"First Passbooks," where their salaries, including their overtime
pay were deposited, were in the custody of the employer, while
- the "Second Passbooks" where their allowances were
deposited, were in their custody. They were only able to make
withdrawals from their Second Passbooks, however, their
foreign employer made illegal deductions from their First
Passbooks.57 The pertinent pages of these First Passbooks
are pmt of the record of this case.58 Considering that
Powerhouse failed to dispute this claim, the same is deemed
admitted.59
It must be remembered that the burden of proving monetary
claims rests on the employer. The reason for this rule is that
the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and
other similar documents are not in the possession of the
worker but in the custody and absolute control of the
employer.60 Thus, in failing to present evidence to prove that
Catcher, with whom it shares joint and several liability with
under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, had paid all the monetary
claims of respondent employees, Powerhouse has, once
again, failed to discharge the onus probandi; thus, the LA and
the NLRC properly awarded these claims to respondent
employees.
Respondent employees are likewise entitled to the
payment of interest over their monetary claims.
In the matter of the applicable interest rates over the monetary
claims awarded to respondent employees, Section 10 of R.A.
No. 8042 provides that "[i]n case of termination of overseas
employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined
by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum." However, this provision does not
provide a specific interest rate for the award of salary for the
unexpired portion of the employment contract nor for the other
money claims the respondent employees are entitled to.
In Sameer, we held that Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular
No. 799 issued on June 21, 2013,61 which revised the interest
rate for loan or forbearance of money from twelve percent
(12%) to six percent (6%) in the absence of stipulation, is not
applicable when there is a law that states otherwise. Thus,
Circular No. 799 does not have the effect of changing the
interest on awards for reimbursement of placement fees from
twelve percent (12%), as provided in Section 10 of R.A. No.
8042, to six percent (6%). However, Circular No. 799 applies to
the award of salary for the unexpired portion of the
employment contract and the other money claims of the
employees since the law does not provide a specific interest
rate for these awards.62
Accordingly, the placement fees in the amount of P19,000.00
each which are to be reimbursed to respondents Magalang,
Nicolas, Ybañez and Oria, and the placement fees in the
amount of P17,000.00 each which are to be reimbursed to
respondents Rey, Cabad, Nicmic, Lameyra, Abordaje, Buyag,
Nolledo, Samalea, Seraspi and Oracion, shall earn interest at a
rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from finality of this
decision until full payment thereof.
On the other hand, the other monetary awards, specifically
respondent employees' salaries for the unexpired term of their
employment contract, the illegal deductions which are to be
refunded to them, and the award of attorney's fees in their
favor, shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from finality of this decision until full payment thereof.64
26
Powerhouse is liable for the monetary claims.
We likewise agree with the CA and the NLRC that JEJ could
not be held liable for the monetary claims of respondent
employees on account of the alleged transfer of accreditation
to it. Nothing in the two letters attached by Powerhouse in its
motion for reconsideration before the NLRC proved that the
alleged transfer pushed through with POEA's imprimatur. At
best, these show that Catcher intended to appoint JEJ as its
new agent and Powerhouse had no objection to such
transfer.65
Even the Affidavit of Assumption of Responsibility submitted to
the CA cannot absolve Powerhouse of its liability.
The terms of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 clearly states the
solidary liability of the principal and the recruitment agency to
the employees and this liability shall not be affected by any
substitution, amendment or modification for the entire duration
of the employment contract, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 10. Monetary Claims. - Notwithstanding any provision of
law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90)
calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims
arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of
any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and
other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under
this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall
be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and
shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The
performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement
agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all
monetary claims or damages that may be awarded to the
workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical
being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as
the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarity
liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid
claims and damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or
duration of the employment contract and shall not be
affected by any substitution, amendment or modification
made locally or in a foreign country of the said
contract. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx
In Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Maguad,65 we ruled that the
provisions of the POEA Rules and Regulations are clear
enough that the manning agreement extends up to and until
the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees
recruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment
agreement.66 In that case, we held that the Affidavits of
Assumption of Responsibility, though valid as between
petitioner Skippers United Pacific Inc. and the other two
manning agencies, were not enforceable against the
respondents (the employees) because the latter were not
parties to those agreements.67
In this case, even if there was transfer of accreditation by
Catcher from Powerhouse to JEJ, Powerhouse's liability to
respondent employees remained intact because respondent
employees are not privy to such contract, and in their overseas
employment contract approved by POEA, Powerhouse is the
recruitment agency of Catcher. To relieve Powerhouse from
liability arising from the approved overseas employment

contract is to change the contract without the consent from the
other contracting party, respondent employees in this case.
To rule otherwise and free Powerhouse of liability against
respondent employees would go against the rationale of R.A.
No. 8042 to protect and safeguard the rights and interests of
overseas Filipinos and overseas Filipino workers, in particular,
and run contrary to this law's intention to an additional layer of
protection to overseas workers.68 This ensures that overseas
workers have recourse in law despite the circumstances of
their employment. By providing that the liability of the foreign
employer may be "enforced to the full extent" against the local
agent, the overseas worker is assured of immediate and
sufficient payment of what is due them. Corollarily, the
provision on joint and several liability in R.A. No. 8042 shifts
the burden of going after the foreign employer from the
overseas worker to the local employment agency. However,
the local agency that is held to answer for the overseas
worker's money claims is not left without remedy. The law does
not preclude it from going after the foreign employer for
reimbursement of whatever payment it has made to the
employee to answer for the money claims against the foreign
employer.69
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
March 24, 2009 of the Court of Appeals DISMISSING the
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 100196 is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONthat each of the respondent employees
are AWARDED their salaries for the entire unexpired portion of
their respective employment contracts computed at the rate of
NT$15,840.00 per month at an interest of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of this decision until full payment
thereof.
Further, the award of placement fees in respondent employees'
favor shall earn interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum from finality of this decision until full payment thereof.
Furthermore, the illegally deducted amounts which were
ordered to be refunded to respondent employees, as well as
the attorney's fees awarded to respondent employees, shall
earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
finality of this decision until full payment thereof.
The temporary restraining order issued on March 3, 2010 is
hereby DISSOLVED.
_______________________
G.R. No. 159350, March 09, 2016
ALUMAMAY O. JAMIAS, JENNIFER C. MATUGUINAS AND
JENNIFER F. CRUZ,*Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION), HON.
COMMISSIONERS: RAUL T. AQUINO, VICTORIANO R.
CALAYCAY AND ANGELITA A. GACUTAN; HON. LABOR
ARBITER VICENTE R. LAYAWEN; INNODATA
PHILIPPINES, INC., INNODATA PROCESSING
CORPORATION, (INNODATA CORPORATION), AND TODD
SOLOMON, Respondents.
Ruling of the Court
We deny the petition for review on certiorari.
I x.38ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Stare decisis does not apply where the facts are
essentially different
27
Contrary to the petitioners' insistence, the doctrine of stare
decisis, by which the pronouncements
in Villanueva and Servidad would control the resolution of this
case, had no application herein.
The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents.33 When a court has laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same; but when the facts are essentially
different, stare decisis does not apply because a perfectly
sound principle as applied to one set of facts might be entirely
inappropriate when a factual variance is introduced.34
Servidad and Villanueva involved contracts that contained
stipulations not found in the contracts entered by the
petitioners. The cogent observations in this regard by the CA
are worth reiterating:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A cursory examination of the facts would reveal that while all
the cases abovementioned involved employment contracts with
a fixed term, the employment contract subject of contention in
the Servidad and Villanueva cases provided for double
probation, meaning, that the employees concerned, by virtue of
a clause incorporated in their contracts, were made to remain
as probationary employees even if they continue to work
beyond the six month probation period set by law. Indeed, such
stipulation militates against Constitutional policy of
guaranteeing the tenurial security of the workingman. To Our
mind, the provision alluded to is what prodded the Supreme
Court to disregard and nullify altogether the terms of the written
entente. Nonetheless, it does not appear to be the intendment
of the High Tribunal to sweepingly invalidate or declare as
unlawful all employment contracts with a fixed period. To
phrase it differently, the said agreements providing for a one
year term would have been declared valid and, consequently,
the separation from work of the employees concerned would
have been sustained had their contracts not included any
unlawful and circumventive condition.
It ought to be underscored that unlike in
the Servidad and Villanueva cases, the written contracts
governing the relations of the respondent company and the
petitioners herein do not embody such illicit
stipulation.35ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We also disagree with the petitioners' manifestation 36 that the
Court struck down in Innodata Philippines, Inc. v. Quejada-
Lopez37 a contract of employment that was similarly worded as
their contracts with Innodata. What the Court invalidated
in Innodata Philippines, Inc. v. Quejada-Lopez was the
purported fixed-term contract that provided for two periods - a
fixed term of one year under paragraph 1 of the contract, and a
three-month period under paragraph 7.4 of the contract - that in
reality placed the employees under probation. In contrast, the
petitioners' contracts did not contain similar stipulations, but
stipulations to the effect that their engagement was for the
fixed period of 12 months, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. The EMPLOYER shall employ the EMPLOYEE and the
EMPLOYEE shall serve the EMPLOYER in the EMPLOYER'S
business as a MANUAL EDITOR on a fixed term only and for a
fixed and definite period of twelve months, commencing on
August 7, 1995 and terminating on August 7, 1996, x x
In other words, the terms of the petitioners' contracts did not
subject them to a probationary period similar to that indicated
in the contracts struck down in Innodata,
Villanueva and Servidad.

II
A fixed period in a contract of employment does not by
itself signify an intention to circumvent Article 280 of
the Labor Code
The petitioners argue that Innodata circumvented the security
of tenure protected under Article 280 of the Labor Code by
providing a fixed term; and that they were regular employees
because the work they performed were necessary and
desirable to the business of Innodata.
The arguments of the petitioners lack merit and substance.
Article 280 of the Labor Code provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. - The provisions of
written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and
regardless of the oral agreements of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the
employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of
the employer except where the employment has been fixed for
a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination
of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of
the employee or where the work or service to be performed is
seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of
the season.
An employment shall be deemed casual if it is not covered by
the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who
has rendered at least one year of service, whether such
service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular
employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed
and his employment shall continue while such actuallv exists.
The provision contemplates three kinds of employees, namely:
(a) regular employees; (b) project employees; and (c) casuals
who are neither regular nor project employees. The nature of
employment of a worker is determined by the factors provided
in Article 280 of the Labor Code, regardless of any stipulation
in the contract to the contrary.39 Thus, in Brent School, Inc. v.
Zamora,40 we explained that the clause referring to written
contracts should be construed to refer to agreements entered
into for the purpose of circumventing the security of tenure.
Obviously, Article 280 does not preclude an agreement
providing for a fixed term of employment knowingly and
voluntarily executed by the parties.41
A fixed term agreement, to be valid, must strictly conform with
the requirements and conditions provided in Article 280 of
the Labor Code. The test to determine whether a particular
employee is engaged as a project or regular employee is
whether or not the employee is assigned to carry out a specific
project or undertaking, the duration or scope of which was
specified at the time of his engagement. 42 There must be a
determination of, or a clear agreement on, the completion or
termination of the project at the time the employee is
engaged.43 Otherwise put, the fixed period of employment
must be knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties,
without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought
to bear upon the employee and absent any other
circumstances vitiating his consent, or it must satisfactorily
appear that the employer and employee dealt with each other
on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance
whatsoever being exercised by the former on the latter. 44
The contracts of the petitioners indicated the one-year duration
of their engagement as well as their respective project
assignments (i.e., Jamias being assigned to the CD-ROM
28
project; Cruz and Matuguinas to the TSET project). 45 There is
no indication that the petitioners were made to sign the
contracts against their will. Neither did they refute Innodata's
assertion that it did not employ force, intimidate or fraudulently
manipulate the petitioners into signing their contracts, and that
the terms thereof had been explained and made known to
them.46 Hence, the petitioners knowingly agreed to the terms of
and voluntarily signed their respective contracts.
That Innodata drafted the contracts with its business interest as
the overriding consideration did not necessarily warrant the
holding that the contracts were prejudicial against the
petitioners.47 The fixing by Innodata of the period specified in
the contracts of employment did not also indicate its ill-motive
to circumvent the petitioners' security of tenure. Indeed, the
petitioners could not presume that the fixing of the one-year
term was intended to evade or avoid the protection to tenure
under Article 280 of the Labor Code in the absence of other
evidence establishing such intention. This presumption must
ordinarily be based on some aspect of the agreement other
than the mere specification of the fixed term of the employment
agreement, or on evidence aliunde of the intent to evade. 48
Lastly, the petitioners posit that they should be accorded
regular status because their work as editors and proofreaders
were usually necessary to Innodata's business of data
processing.
We reject this position. For one, it would be unusual for a
company like Innodata to undertake a project that had no
relationship to its usual business.49 Also, the necessity and
desirability of the work performed by the employees are not the
determinants in term employment, but rather the "day certain"
voluntarily agreed upon by the parties.50 As the CA cogently
observed in this respect:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There is proof to establish that Innodata's operations indeed
rests upon job orders or undertakings coming from its foreign
clients. Apparently, its employees are assigned to projects -
one batch may be given a fixed period of one year, others, a
slightly shorter duration, depending on the estimated time of
completion of the particular job or undertaking farmed out by
the client to the company.51ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In fine, the employment of the petitioners who were engaged
as project employees for a fixed term legally ended upon the
expiration of their contract. Their complaint for illegal dismissal
was plainly lacking in merit.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review
on certiorari; AFFIRM the decision promulgated on July 31,
2002; and ORDER the petitioners to pay the costs of suit
_______________________________
G.R. No. 222424, September 21, 2016
FONTANA DEVELOPMENT CORP., DENNIS PAK AS
GENERAL MANAGER, PASTOR ISAAC AS DIRECTOR OF
HUMAN RESOURCES, CHRIS CHENG* AS DEPUTY
GROUP FINANCIAL CONTROLLER, JESUS CHUA,
REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL FELICIANO, ALMA
EREDIANO, LEILANI VALIENTE, MAN CHOI AS GROUP
FINANCIAL CONTROLLER, AND JAIME VILLAREAL AS
CHIEF ENGINEER, Petitioners, v. SASCHA
VUKASINOVIC, Respondent.
The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.
Respondent is guilty of forum shopping
There is forum shopping when a party repetitively avails of
several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances,
and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in
or already resolved adversely by some other court. Forum
shopping is an act of malpractice that is prohibited and
condemned because it trifles with the courts and abuses their
processes.13 It degrades the administration of justice and adds
to the already congested court dockets.14chanrobleslaw
In Gloria S. Dy v. Mandy Commodities Co., Inc.,15 this Court
had the occasion to explain the grave evil sought to be avoided
by forum shopping, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum
shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of two
separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party
litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals,
may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a
favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant confusion,
this Court adheres strictly to the rules against forum shopping,
and any violation of these rules results in the dismissal of a
case. To stamp out this abominable practice, which seriously
impairs the efficient administration of justice, this Court
promulgated Administrative Circulars No. 28-91 and No. 04-94,
which are now embodied as Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or
principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5)
days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be
curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading, but shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case
without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and
after hearing. The submission of a false certification of or non
compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute
indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of
the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be a ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt,
as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is
whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in
another or whether the following elements of litis pendentia are
present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as
representing the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
29
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration. Said requisites are
also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis
pendens.16chanrobleslaw
In the instant case, there is no doubt that all the elements
of litis pendentia have already been established, as this was
already settled with finality in CA-G.R. SP No. 126225. Yet, in
his Comment, respondent repeatedly claimed that there was
no forum shopping and petitioners are misleading this Court,
making it appear that forum shopping exists when there is
none at all.
Respondent's position is without basis.
It should be noted that in his Decision in NLRC Case No. RAB
III-09-18113-11, Labor Arbiter Abdon observed that there is an
identity of parties between NLRC Case No. RAB III-09-18113-
11 and NLRC Case No. RAB III-11-16967-10 which is the
complaint incipient in the present controversy. He pointed out
that both complaints show that petitioners Chris Cheng and
Man Choi are similarly impleaded in their capacities as officers
of petitioner FDC and that there is also an identity of causes of
action and reliefs prayed for by respondent. 17 To reiterate,
Labor Arbiter Abdon's Decision was affirmed by the NLRC and
the CA. In particular, in its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 126225
denying the petition for certiorari filed by respondent, the CA
observed, thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
What is truly important to consider in determining whether
Jorum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts
and parties litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or
administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes
and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the
process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered by the different for a upon the same issues.
In this case, it is undisputed that respondent filed two
labor complaints: first, NLRC Case No. RAB III-11-16967-
10-P entitled "Sascha Vukasinovic v. Fontana
Development Corporation, Dennis Pak, Pastor Isaac, Cllris
Clleng, Jesus Chua, Michael Feliciano, Alma Erediano,
Leilani Valiente, Man Clwi and Jaime Villareal'for illegal
dismissal, illegal suspension, regularization, non-payment
of salaries, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, as
well as actual, moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees, with prayer for reinstatement and full
back wages; and second, NLRC Case No. RAB III-09-
18113-11 entitled "Sascha Vukasinovic v. National Labor
Relations Commission, Labor Arbiter Reynaldo B. Abdon,
Jimei S. International, Ltd. (JSIL), Mr. Suk Man Choi in his
capacity as Group Financial Comptroller of JSIL, Chris
Cheng in his capacity as Deputy Group Financial
Comptroller of JSIL", for constructive (illegal) dismissal,
regularization, non-payment of salaries, premium pay for
holiday and rest days, service incentive leave pay,
13th month pay, as well as damages and attorney's fees
and other monetary claims including bonuses and travel
expenses (repatriation expenses). It is also undisputed
that the causes of action (illegal dismissal and
constructive dismissal) in the respective complaints in the
two (2) cases stemmed from the adverse decision in the
administrative case filed against respondent that resulted
to his dismissal from employment.

In Jesse Yap v. Court of Appeals, it was held:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x x
The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties,
or at.least such as representing the same interests in both
actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity
of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other.
All the elements of litis pendencia are present in this
case.18chanrobleslaw
(Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the existence of forum shopping has been duly proved
in this case. As a result, petitioners hinge this present appeal
on the error committed by the CA in not dismissing outright the
appeal filed by respondent.
When there is forum shopping, all pending
claims on the same claim must be dismissed
It is well-settled that once there is a finding of forum shopping,
the penalty is summary dismissal not only of the petition
pending before this Court, but also of the other case that is
pending in a lower court. This is so because twin dismissal is
the punitive measure to those who trifle with the orderly
administration of justice.19chanrobleslaw
The rule originated from the 1986 case of Buan v. Lopez,
Jr.20 In the said case, petitioners therein instituted before the
Court a special civil action for prohibition and, almost a month
earlier, another special civil action for prohibition with
preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Manila. Finding petitioners guilty of forum shopping since all
the elements of litis pendentia were duly proved, the Court
dismissed not only the action before it, but also the special civil
action still pending before the RTC, viz:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Indeed, the petitioners in both actions x x x have incurred not
only the sanction of dismissal of their case before this Court in
accordance with Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, but
also punitive measure of dismissal of both their actions,
that in this Court and that in Regional Trial Court as well.
The rule essentially penalizes the forum shopper by dismissing
all pending actions on the same claim filed in any court.
Because of the severity of the penalty of the rule, an
examination must first be made on the purpose of the
rule.21 The purpose of the rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits
and to prevent a party from instituting two or more actions or
proceeding involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition.22chanrobleslaw
What is critical is the vexation brought upon the courts and the
litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the
same or related causes and grant the same or substantially the
same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of
conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon
the same issues.23 Willful and deliberate violation of the rule
against forum shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of
the case; it may also constitute direct
30
contempt.24chanrobleslaw
Furthermore, Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court mandates
that a willful and deliberate forum shopping shall be a ground
for summary dismissal of a case with prejudice, thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. —The plaintiff
or principal party shall cetify under oath in the complaint or
other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a
sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5)
days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be
curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case
without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and
after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-
compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute
indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts
of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and
deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute
direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative
sanctions. (Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, the CA should have dismissed the case outright
without rendering a decision on the merits of the case.
Respondent should be penalized for willfully and deliberately
trifling with court processes. The purpose of the law will be
defeated if respondent will be granted the relief prayed for
despite his act of deliberately committing forum shopping.
Respondent, per Manifestation of his counsel, Atty. Erick Nolan
G. Mosuela (Mosuela), died on July 19, 2016. Atty. Mosuela
manifested that he has no information as to the heirs of
respondent, hence, his inability to substitute them, if any, in the
place of respondent.
The instant case involves an illegal dismissal which is an action
that does not survive the death of the accused. The Court ruled
in Bonilla v. Barcena,25cralawred to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends
on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the
causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of]
affects primarily and principally property and property rights,
the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the
causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of
is to the person, the property and rights of property affected
being incidental.
Since the property and property rights of the respondent is only
incidental to his complaint for illegal dismissal, the same does
not survive his death. Nonetheless, considering the foregoing
disposition dismissing respondent's petition before the CA and
ergo his complaint for illegal dismissal, the Court can proceed
with the resolution of the petition even without the need for

substitution of the heirs of respondent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 28, 2015 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 125945 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for certiorari
filed by respondent Sascha Vukasinovic with the CA is
ordered DISMISSED on the ground of deliberate forum
shopping.
___________________________
G.R. No. 198675, September 23, 2015
ILAW BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM) NESTLE
PHILIPPINES, INC. CHAPTER (ICE CREAM AND CHILLED
PRODUCTS DIVISION), ITS OFFICERS, MEMBERS,
BONIFACIO T. FLORENDO, EMILIANO B. PALANAS AND
GENEROSO P. LAXAMANA, Petitioners, v. NESTLE
PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
Reversible Error No. 1
The Court of Appeals erred in misappreciating the facts of the
case.
Reversible Error No. 2
The Court of Appeals erred in sustaining that the Petitioners'
demand to be paid has prescribed.5chanrobleslaw
Like petitioners' petition for certiorari filed with the CA, the main
issue raised in the present petition is whether petitioners' claim
is already barred by prescription.
Petitioners' basic contention is that respondent cannot invoke
the defense of prescription because it is guilty of deliberately
causing delay in paying petitioners' claims and that petitioners,
on the other hand, are entitled to protection under the law
because they had been vigilant in exercising their right as
provided for under the subject MOA.
The Court is not persuaded.
There is no dispute that the compromise agreement between
herein petitioner union, representing its officers and members,
and respondent company was executed on August 4, 1998 and
was subsequently approved via the NLRC Decision dated
October 12, 1998. However, considering petitioners' allegation
that the terms and conditions of the agreement have not been
complied with by respondent, petitioners should have moved
for the issuance of a writ of execution.
It is wrong for petitioners' counsel to argue that since the NLRC
Decision approving the parties' compromise agreement was
immediately executory, there was no need to file a motion for
execution. It is settled that when a compromise agreement is
given judicial approval, it becomes more than a contract
binding upon the parties.6 Having been sanctioned by the
court, it is entered as a determination of a controversy and has
the force and effect of a judgment.7 It is immediately executory
and not appealable, except for vices of consent or forgery. 8The
non-fulfillment of its terms and conditions justifies the
issuance of a writ of execution; in such an instance,
execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court. 9 Stated
differently, a decision on a compromise agreement is final and
executory.10 Such agreement has the force of law and is
conclusive between the parties.11 It transcends its identity as a
mere contract binding only upon the parties thereto, as it
31
becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in
accordance with the Rules.12
In this respect, the law and the rules provide the mode and the
periods within which a party may enforce his right.
The most relevant rule in the instant case is Section 8, Rule XI,
2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC which states
that:cralawlawlibrary
Section 8. Execution By Motion or By Independent Action. - A
decision or order may be executed on motion within five (5)
years from the date it becomes final and executory. After the
lapse of such period, the judgment shall become dormant, and
may only be enforced by an independent action within a period
of ten (10) years from date of its finality.
chanrobleslaw
In the same manner, pertinent portions of Sections 4 (a) and 6,
Rule III, of the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment,
provide as follows:cralawlawlibrary
Section 4. Issuance of a Writ: - Execution shall issue upon an
order, resolution or decision that finally disposes of the actions
or proceedings and after the counsel of record and the parties
have been duly furnished with the copies of the same in
accordance with the NLRC Rules of Procedure,
provided:cralawlawlibrary
a) The Commission or Labor Arbiter shall, motu proprio or
upon motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution
on a judgment only within five (5) years from the date it
becomes final and executory, x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. Execution by Independent Action. - A judgment after
the lapse of five (5) years from the date it becomes final and
executory and before it is barred by prescription, may only be
enforced by an independent action.chanrobleslaw
Similarly, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which can
be applied in a suppletory manner, provides:cralawlawlibrary
Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final
and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of
such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment
may also be enforced by motion within five years from the date
of its entry and, thereafter, by action before it is barred by the
statute of limitations.
chanrobleslaw
Article 1144 of the Civil Code may, likewise be applied, as it
provides that an action upon a written contract must be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action accrues.
It is clear from the above law and rules that a judgment may be
executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry
or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse
of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. If the
prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a mere
motion after the lapse of five years from the date of its entry (or
from the date it becomes final and executory), the said
judgment is reduced to a mere right of action in favor of the
person whom it favors and must be enforced, as are all
ordinary actions, by the institution of a complaint in a regular
form.13
In the present case, the five-and ten-year periods provided by
law and the rules are more than sufficient to enable petitioners
to enforce their right under the subject MOA. In this case, it is
clear that the judgment of the NLRC, having been based on a
 32

compromise embodied in a written contract, was immediately
executory upon its issuance on October 12, 1998. Thus, it
could have been executed by motion within five (5) years. It
was not. Nonetheless, it could have been enforced by an
independent action within the next five (5) years, or within ten
(10) years from the time the NLRC Decision was promulgated.
It was not. Therefore, petitioners' right to have the NLRC
judgment executed by mere motion as well as their right of
action to enforce the same judgment had prescribed by the
time they filed their Motion for Writ of Execution on January 25,
2010.
labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided
in favor of the workers.20 The law also recognizes that
management has rights which are also entitled to respect and
enforcement in the interest of fair play.21Stated otherwise,
while the Court fully recognizes the special protection which
the Constitution, labor laws, and social legislation accord the
workingman, the Court cannot, however, alter or amend the
law on prescription to relieve petitioners of the consequences
of their inaction. Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura
subveniunt - Laws come to the assistance of the vigilant, not of
the sleeping.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It is true that there are instances in which this Court allowed WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolutions
execution by motion even after the lapse of five years upon of the Court of Appeals, dated June 30, 2011 and September
meritorious grounds. However, in instances when this Court 28, 2011, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 118459,
allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years, are AFFIRMED.
there is, invariably, only one recognized exception, i.e., when
the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage. 14 In the
present case, there is no indication that the delay in the
execution of the MOA, as claimed by petitioners, was caused
by respondent nor was it incurred at its instance or for its
benefit or advantage.

It is settled that the purpose of the law (or rule) in prescribing

time limitations for enforcing judgments or actions is to prevent
obligors from sleeping on their rights.15 In this regard,
petitioners insist that they are vigilant in exercising their right to
pursue payment of the monetary awards in their favor.
However, a careful review of the records at hand would show
that petitioners failed to prove their allegation. The only
evidence presented to show that petitioners ever demanded
payment was a letter dated May 22, 2008, signed by one Atty.
Calderon, representing herein individual petitioners, addressed
to respondent company and seeking proof that the company
has indeed complied with the provisions of the subject
MOA.16 Considering that the NLRC Decision approving the
MOA was issued as early as October 12, 1998, the letter from
petitioners' counsel, which was dated almost ten years after
the issuance of the NLRC Decision, can hardly be considered
as evidence of vigilance on the part of petitioners. No proof
was ever presented showing that petitioners did not sleep on
their rights. Despite their claims to the contrary, the records at
hand are bereft of any evidence to establish that petitioners
exerted any effort to enforce their rights under the subject
MOA, either individually, through their union or their counsel. It
is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his
affirmative allegation, that mere allegation is not
evidence.17Indeed, as allegation is not evidence, the rule has
always been to the effect that a party alleging a critical fact
must support his allegation with substantial evidence which has
been construed to mean such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.18 Unfortunately, petitioners failed in this respect.

Even granting, for the sake of argument, that the records of the
case were lost, as alleged by petitioners, leading to the delay in
the enforcement of petitioners' rights, such loss of the records
cannot be regarded as having interrupted the prescriptive
periods for filing a motion or an action to enforce the NLRC
Decision because such alleged loss could not have prevented
petitioners from attempting to reconstitute the records and,
thereafter, filing the required motion or action on time. 19

As a final note, it bears to reiterate that while the scales of

justice usually tilt in favor of labor, the present circumstances
prevent this Court from applying the same in the instant
petition. Even if our laws endeavor to give life to the
constitutional policy on social justice and on the protection of