[G.R. No. 43195. August 23, 1935.

FELIPE GONZALES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. FLORENTINO C. VIOLA and VALENTIN

MANIQUIS, Respondents-Appellees.

Juan S. Rustia for Appellant.

Payawal, Osorio & Mendoza for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. HABEAS CORPUS; GROUNDS FOR RELIEF; RESTRAINT. — In passing upon a petition

for a writ of habeas corpus a court or judge must first inquire whether the petitioner is restrained
of his liberty. Only where such restraint obtains is the court required to inquire into the cause of
the detention, and if the alleged cause is found to be unlawful then the writ should be granted and
the petitioner discharged.

2. ID.; ID.; NATURE OF RESTRAINT. — The restraint of liberty which would justify the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus must be more than a mere moral restraint; it must be actual
or physical confinement.

3. ID.; ID.; RELEASE ON BAIL. — It is well settled that a person out on bail is not so
restrained of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.

DECISION

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, denying the petition for
a writ of habeas corpus filed by the appellant. The order of denial was entered by the court
below after due hearing, on the ground that the appellant was legally detained. .

The facts which gave rise to this case are fully set forth in the order appealed from. In deciding
this appeal, it is sufficient to observe that the record shows that on January 18, 1935, at about
11:30 a. m., appellant was placed under arrest by order of the appellees and detained in the
municipal jail of San Miguel, Province of Bulacan; that a few hours later a criminal complaint
was filed by the appellee Maniquis against the appellant in the justice of the peace court of the
aforesaid municipality; and that on the same day, at about 8 p. m., he was released on bail. When
the hearing on the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was had in the court below the appellant
was already out on bail.

In passing upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire whether
the petitioner is restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Only where such
restraint obtains is the court required to inquire into the cause of the detention, and if the alleged
cause is found to be unlawful then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged.
(Code of Civil Procedure, sections 525, 541; Wales v. Whitney, 114 U. S., 564; 29 Law. ed.,
277.) .

The law is well settled that a person out on bail is not so restrained of his liberty as to be entitled
to a writ of habeas corpus. The restraint of liberty which would justify the issuance of the writ
must be more than a mere moral restraint; it must be actual or physical. "There is no very
satisfactory definition to be found in the adjudged cases, of the character of the restraint or
imprisonment suffered by a party applying for the writ of habeas corpus, which is necessary to
sustain the writ. This can hardly be expected from the variety of restraints for which it is used to
give relief. Confinement under civil and criminal process may be so relieved. Wives restrained
by husbands, children withheld from the proper parent or guardian, persons held under arbitrary
custody by private individuals, as in a mad-house, as well as those under military control, may
all become proper subjects of relief by the writ of habeas corpus. Obviously, the extent and
character of the restraint which justifies the writ must vary according to the nature of the control
which is asserted over the party in whose behalf the writ is prayed. . . . Something more than
moral restraint is necessary to make a case for habeas corpus. There must be actual confinement
or the present means of enforcing it." (Wales v. Whitney, supra.)

Under the circumstances of the present case, the court below would have been justified in
refusing the writ solely on the ground that the appellant was not, within the meaning of section
525 of the Code of Civil Procedure, deprived or restrained of his liberty; and upon that very
ground the order appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Hull, Vickers, Diaz and Recto, JJ., concur.

 G.R. No. 158802 November 17, 2004

IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at

the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City)
JUNE DE VILLA, petitioner-relator,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, respondent.

FACTS:

This is a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner Reynaldo de Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-relator June de Villa, seeks a
two-fold relief: First, that respondent Director of Prisons justify the basis for the imprisonment of
petitioner Reynaldo de Villa; and second, that petitioner be granted a new trial. These reliefs are
sought on the basis of purportedly exculpatory evidence, gathered after performing
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing on samples allegedly collected from the petitioner and a
child born to the victim of the rape.

By final judgment, petitioner de Villa, the trial court found petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen
Mendoza when she was 12 years old, his niece by affinity and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusión perpetua; and ordered him to pay the offended party civil indemnity, moral
damages, costs of the suit, and support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative child born of
the rape. Petitioner is currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.
Petitioner’s defense, at the time of the alleged rape, he was already 67 years old. Old age and
sickness had rendered him incapable of having an erection. On automatic review, the court found
that the date of birth of Aileen’s child was medically consistent with the time of the rape.

Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, there was a question of Reynaldo de Villa’s
guilt or innocence. Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He
alleges that during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could
determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the victim’s child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-
relator was only informed during the pendency of the automatic review of petitioner’s case that
DNA testing could resolve the issue of paternity. This information was apparently furnished by
the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti-Death Penalty Task Force, which took over as
counsel for petitioner. Thus, petitioner’s brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct of a blood
type test and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of the child allegedly conceived as a
result of the rape and the relief was implicitly denied. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the Decision, wherein he once more prayed that DNA tests be conducted and
it was denied with finality in a Resolution. Petitioner-relator was undaunted by these challenges,
for having been informed that DNA tests required a sample that could be extracted from saliva,
petitioner-relator asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate of
Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup and used as a sample. Petitioner-
relator then gathered samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa. Petitioner-relator
requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those
given by the grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself.
The identities of the donors of the samples, save for the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa, were
not made known to the DNA Analysis Laboratory.

After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report and showed that Reynaldo de
Villa could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a
match between the pertinent genetic markers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DNA result is a valid basis for habeas corpus and new trial?

HELD:

No. The most criterion for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, is that the individual
seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form
of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrained via some the legal process, the writ of
habeas corpus is unavailing. In the recent case of Feria v. CA, it was held that review of
judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only
in a very specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there
has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court
had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such
sentence is void as to such excess. This court stated the general rule that the writ of habeas
corpus is not a writ of error, and should not be thus used.

A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following
requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could
not have been discovered and produced at the trail even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that
the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment.

Petitioner-relator’s claim that he was “unaware” of the existence of DNA testing until the trial
was concluded carries no weight with this court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA
testing speaks of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or on the part of petitioner’s
counsel. In either instance, however, this negligence is binding upon petitioner.
Angeles v Director of New Bilibid Prison; G.R. No. 101302; 25 Jan 1995; 240 SCRA 490

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with and convicted of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. He was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. He filed a petition for habeas corpus after
the enactment of Republic Act No. 7659 which has reduced the penalties prescribed under the
original provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, and the recent ruling of the Supreme Court
which has confirmed the retroactive application of the above-numbered amendatory law.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not only the Supreme Court may entertain petitions for habeas corpus involving
persons convicted of drug-related offenses prior to the effectivity of RA 7659.

RULING:
NO. All courts of competent jurisdiction may entertain petitions for habeas corpus to consider
the release of prisoners convicted of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act who have served the
maximum of the applicable penalties newly prescribed by RA 7659. The formalities required for
petitions for habeas corpus shall be construed liberally, and such petitions, although deficient in
form, may be entertained so long as they are sufficient in substance.

Petition is DISMISSED for being premature.

 [G.R. No. 125901. October 8, 2001]

TIJING et al. vs. CA et al.

SECOND DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated OCT 8 2001.

G.R. No. 125901(Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenida R. Tijing vs. Court of Appeals and Angelita
Diamante.)

On March 8, 2001, we rendered a decision in this case in favor of petitioners, granting their
petition for habeas corpus and ruling that the minor referred to as John Thomas Lopez, also
known as Edgardo Tijing, Jr., is petitioners' son. In the same decision, we stated that in the
future, DNA testing would be useful to all concerned in resolving parentage and identity issues.
Noteworthy, petitioners themselves have declared their willingness to undergo "blood test"
before the Court of Appeals (see Rollo, p. 36) to resolve the present controversy.

On May 21, 2001, private respondent filed with this Court a Motion for Reconsideration of our
decision. Petitioners commented on said motion on September 6, 2001, pursuant to our
resolution issued on July 18, 2001.

To conclusively settle the issue of the parentage of the minor child identified now as John
Thomas Lopez, a.k.a. Edgardo Tijing, Jr., this Court now deems it proper to order that DNA tests
be conducted, at the expense of the movant for reconsideration, on said minor as well as on
petitioner Bienvenida R. Tijing and private respondent Angelita Diamante, who are both
claiming to be the mother of said child. The results of the DNA tests should lay to rest all doubts
regarding the identity and the parentage of said child, and restore harmony to his family.

WHEREFORE, to resolve promptly the motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent
it is hereby ordered that DNA tests on the minor child John Thomas Lopez, a.k.a. Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., as well as petitioner Bienvenida R. Tijing and respondent Angelita Diamante, who
both claim as his true mother, be conducted at the University of the Philippines-Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory, within 15 days from notice of this
resolution. The UP-NSRI is directed to furnish this Court with the results thereof within five
days from their completion.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167193 April 19, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS ENGR. ASHRAF

KUNTING, Petitioner.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing Police Chief
Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan and General Robert Delfin,1 Philippine National Police (PNP)
Intelligence Chief, to bring petitioner Ashraf Kunting before this Court and show cause why he
is illegally detained.

The antecedents are as follows:

On October 19, 2001, petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian
Internal Security Act. On June 12, 2003, the Royal Malaysian Police in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for
his arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela City, Basilan, Branch 2, Ninth
Judicial Region. Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious
Illegal Detention with the RTC under separate Amended Informations, docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 3674-1187, 3537-1129, 3608-1164, and 3611-1165.

Petitioner was immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNP-IG at Camp Crame
for booking and custodial investigation.

In a letter dated July 3, 2003, Atty. Guillermo G. Danipog, Jr., Police Superintendent and Chief
of the Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, informed the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC that
Kunting was already in the custody of the PNP-IG. Atty. Danipog requested for Kunting’s
temporary detention at the PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City due to the high security risks
involved and prayed for the issuance of a corresponding commitment order.

In a letter dated July 9, 2003, Emilio F. Enriquez, Acting Clerk of Court of the RTC, replied to
the request of Atty. Danipog, thus:

xxx

The undersigned referred the matter to Hon. Danilo M. Bucoy, Presiding Judge of this Court,
who issued the Alias Warrant of Arrest in the herein mentioned case (Criminal Case No. 3674-
1187) and per his instruction, accused As[h]raf Kunting y Barreto [may be] temporarily detained
thereat by virtue of the Alias Warrant of Arrest issued in this case, however considering that the
accused is a high security risk, he should be brought to Isabela, Basilan as soon as the necessary
security escort can be provided for his transfer, where the proper commitment order can be
issued as the herein mentioned case is about to be submitted by the prosecution.
Thank you ever so much for your usual cooperation extended to the Court.2

On September 15, 2003, the RTC issued an Order directing the Police Superintendent and Chief,
Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to immediately turn over Kunting to the trial court since
Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation.

On November 5, 2003, PNP-IG Director Arturo C. Lomibao wrote a letter to Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño, Department of Justice (DOJ), requesting for representation and a
motion to be filed for the transfer of the venue of the trial from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig
City, for the following reasons: (1) Several intelligence reports have been received by the PNP-
IG stating that utmost effort will be exerted by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to recover the
custody of Kunting from the PNP considering his importance to the ASG; and (2) there is a big
possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG if he will be detained in Basilan due to
inadequate security facility in the municipal jail and its proximity to the area of operation of the
ASG.

On August 13, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision against petitioner’s co-accused in the
consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165, finding 17
of the accused, who were tried, guilty of the crime/s charged.

On February 11, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying Kunting’s Motion to Set Case for
Preliminary Investigation since the PNP-IG has not turned over Kunting. The trial court
reiterated its Order dated September 15, 2003, directing the Police Superintendent and Chief,
Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to turn over Kunting to the court.1avvphil.net

In a letter dated February 22, 2005, Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan reiterated the
request to Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño to facilitate the transfer of the venue of the
trial of Kunting’s case, citing the same grounds in the previous letter. He added that if Kunting
had been transferred to Isabela City, Basilan, he could have been one of the escapees in a jail
break that occurred on April 10, 2004 as suspected ASG members were able to go scot-free.

On March 15, 2005, Police Inspector Amado L. Barbasa, Jr., OIC, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-
IG, filed with the RTC a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Order dated February 11, 2005,
citing, among other grounds, the existence of a pending motion for the transfer of the venue of
the trial of Criminal Case No. 3537-1129 against Kunting, which was allegedly filed by the DOJ
before this Court. Police Inspector Barbasa prayed that the Order of the RTC dated February 11,
2005, directing the turnover of Kunting to the court, be suspended until the motion for the
transfer of venue is resolved.

On March 14, 2005, Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his liberty since June 12, 2003 by the PNP-
IG led by Police Chief Superintendent Ismael Rafanan and assisted by PNP Intelligence Chief,
General Robert Delfin. He alleged that he was never informed of the charges filed against him
until he requested his family to research in Zamboanga City. It was discovered in the RTC of
Isabela City, Basilan that his name appeared in the list of accused who allegedly participated in
the kidnapping incident which occurred on June 2, 2001 in Lamitan, Basilan.
Kunting asserted that he never participated in the kidnapping incident, so he promptly filed an
Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation on September 8, 2003. He was aware that the PNP-IG
requested Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño for representation to file a motion with this
Court for the transfer of venue of his case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. Having no
further information on the status of his case, he filed a Motion to Set Case for Preliminary
Investigation on January 26, 2005. He stated that since no action was taken by the trial court or
the DOJ, he filed this petition to put an end to his illegal detention classified in the records as
"for safekeeping purposes only."

The main issue is whether the petition for habeas corpus can prosper.

Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends to "all case
of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which
the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The remedy of
habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person,3 and if found
illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee.4 If, however, the detention is proven lawful,
then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.5

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.6

In this case, Kunting’s detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He was
arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC,
Branch 2, Isabela City, Basilan. His temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City,
was thus authorized by the trial court.1avvphil.net

Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal
Detention in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165. In
accordance with the last sentence of Section 4 above, the writ cannot be issued and Kunting
cannot be discharged since he has been charged with a criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of
Appeals7 holds that "once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer
question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."

Nevertheless, this Court notes that the RTC in its Order dated February 11, 2005 reiterated its
Order dated September 15, 2003, directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs
Division, PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, to turn over Kunting to the court. TThe trial court
has been waiting for two years for the PNP-IG to turn over the person of Kunting for the trial of
his case. The PNP-IG has delayed the turn over because it is waiting for the DOJ to request for
the transfer of venue of the trial of the case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. In the
absence of evidence that the DOJ has indeed filed a motion for the transfer of venue, In its
Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General stated that the PNP-IG is presently awaiting the
resolution of the Motion for Transfer of Venue it requested from the DOJ. In this regard, t the
Police Chief Superintendent is, therefore, directed to take positive steps towards action on said
motion.comply with the Order of the trial court, dated February 11, 2005, to turn over the body
of petitioner Kunting to the trial court..

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 118644 July 7, 1995

DIRECTOR EPIMACO A. VELASCO, as Director of the National Bureau of Investigation

(NBI), NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP
(SOG), SPECIAL INVESTIGATORS III FLOR L. RESURRECCION and ANTONIO M.
ERUM, JR., and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FELICITAS S. CUYAG, for and in behalf of LAWRENCE A.
LARKINS, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is lost in antiquity,1 was devised and
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as the best
and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.2 More specifically, its vital purposes are to
obtain immediate relief from illegal confinement, to liberate those who may be imprisoned
without sufficient cause, and to deliver them from unlawful custody. It is then essentially a writ
of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which a person is detained.3

Under our Constitution, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus cannot be suspended except in
cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.4 Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 102
of the Rules of Court, it extends, except as otherwise provided by law, to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. It is not available, however,
under the instances enumerated in Section 4 of the said Rule which reads:

Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of
any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted
of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.

In this petition for review, the petitioners want us to set aside and reverse the decision of 1
February 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36273,5 a petition for habeas corpus
and certiorari with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, ordering the herein petitioners to
immediately release Lawrence A. Larkins from their custody and declaring moot the alternative
relief of certiorari.
The antecedent facts of the case as culled from the challenged decision and the pleadings of the
parties are neither complicated nor disputed.

On 16 September 1993, a warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Manuel Padolina of Branch 162
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, against accused Lawrence Larkins in
Criminal Cases Nos. 101189-92 for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.

On 20 November 1994, a certain Desiree Alinea executed and filed before the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) a complaint-affidavit accusing Larkins of the crime of rape allegedly
committed against her on 19 November 1994 at 2:00 a.m. in Victoria Valley Subdivision, Valley
Golf, Antipolo, Rizal.6

Acting on the basis of the complaint of Alinea, petitioners Special Investigators Flor L.
Resurreccion and Antonio M. Erum, Jr. proceeded to the office of Larkins in Makati, Metro
Manila, on 21 November 1994 and arrested the latter, who was thereupon positively identified by
Alinea as her rapist. 7 Larkins was then detained at the Detention Cell of the NBI, Taft Avenue,
Manila.

On 22 November 1994, Larkins posted his bail of P4,000.00 in Criminal Cases Nos. 101189-92.
Judge Padolina forthwith issued an order recalling and setting aside the warrant of arrest issued
on 16 September 1993 and directing the Jail Warden of the NBI Detention Cell to release
Larkins from confinement "unless otherwise detained for some other cause."

Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum refused to release Larkins because he was still
detained for another cause, specifically for the crime of rape for which he would be held for
inquest.

On 23 November 1994, a complaint against Larkins for rape was executed by Alinea.8 It
contains a certification by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ma. Paz Reyes Yson that it is "filed
pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, the
accused not having opted to avail of his right to preliminary investigation and not having
executed a waiver pursuant to Article 125 of the RPC. . . ." The complaint was filed with the
RTC of Antipolo on 2 December 1994, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 94-11794, and
assigned to Branch 71 of the court, presided by Judge Felix S. Caballes.

On 2 December 1994, Larkins, through his counsel Mauricio C. Ulep, filed an Urgent Motion for
Bail9 wherein he alleged, inter alia, that the evidence of guilt against him for rape is not strong,
as he had no carnal knowledge of the complainant and the medical report indicates that her
hymen was neither lacerated nor ruptured; that he is entitled as a matter of right to bail; and that
he has no intention of going out of the country or hiding away from the law.

On 6 December 1994, Larkins, through his new counsel, Atty. Theodore O. Te, filed in Criminal
Case No. 94-11794 an Urgent Omnibus Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint and for
Immediate Release,10 principally based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest. This
motion met vigorous opposition from the private complainant.11
In the order of 5 January 1995,12 the trial court denied the aforesaid motions, thus:

After a careful appreciation of the arguments of the prosecution and the defense,
the Court finds no legal or valid grounds to dismiss the complaint or release the
accused, or to grant him bail. The filing of this case against the accused, which is
[a] very serious offense, justifies the grant of the motion of the prosecution for the
issuance of a hold departure order.

WHEREFORE, the motions of the accused are hereby denied for lack of merit,
and as prayed for by the prosecution the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
is hereby directed to include the name of the accused, Lawrence A. Larkins, in its
hold order departure list until further order from this Court.

Unable to accept the ruling, Larkins' common-law wife, Felicitas S. Cuyag, filed before the
Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus with certiorari. Impleaded as respondents were
the herein petitioners and Judge Felix S. Caballes.

Subsequently, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution13 ordering the respondents therein to
appear and produce Lawrence A. Larkins before the court on 31 January 1995 at 10:30 a.m. and
to show cause why Larkins' liberty is being restrained.

On the said date, Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum appeared and produced Larkins at
the hearing. Atty. Orlando Dizon of the NBI acted as their counsel. 14 The Office of the Solicitor
General representing the People of the Philippines made no appearance.15 Neither did Judge
Caballes, for he had not received a copy of the resolution. On the other hand, the petitioner
therein, Felicitas S. Cuyag, appeared with her counsel, who manifested that should the court
order the release of Larkins the alternative prayer for certiorari would be deemed abandoned. 16

After hearing the arguments of the parties, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged
decision, holding that:

From the arguments presented by the parties, we resolve to order the immediate
release of Larkins from his present confinement on the ground that the complaint
presented to the NBI by complainant Desiree Alinea on the basis of which
Larkins was detained without a warrant of arrest for rape did not meet the legal
requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

Furthermore, on the day the detention of Larkins commenced, i.e., immediately

after the NBI was served with the Order of the Pasig RTC for his release on bail
in connection with the BP 22 cases, no other criminal complaint or information
had been filed or pending in any court. It was only sometime between November
25, 1994 (when filing of the complaint was approved by the Rizal Provincial
Prosecutor) and November 29, 1994 (the date appearing on the Urgent Motion for
Bail filed by Larkins's former counsel, said Atty. Ulep) that the complaint for rape
was filed with the Antipolo RTC.
The petitioners insist that the respondent court erred in granting the petition for habeas corpus
because Larkins had already been charged with the crime of rape and the trial court had denied
his application for bail. They further claim that the warrantless arrest in this case is valid for it
was made under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

On the other hand, the private respondent contends that habeas corpus is rendered unavailing not
by the mere filing of an information, but by the issuance of a warrant of arrest or warrant of
commitment, which are the only two processes recognized by law to justify deprivation of
liberty, and the order of Judge Caballes of 5 January 1995 denying the petition for bail does not
qualify as such. She asserts that the petitioners have miscomprehended Paredes vs.
Sandiganbayan17 because that case did not rule that the writ is no longer available after an
information (or criminal complaint for rape as in this case) is filed against the person detained;
what it stated is that the writ of habeas corpus will not issue when the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which
has jurisdiction to do so. She submits that the controlling doctrine is that enunciated in Ilagan vs.
Ponce Enrile,18 adverted to in Sanchez vs. Demetriou,19 that "[t]he filing of charges, and the
issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained will cure the
defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of such defect."

We find for the petitioners.

But, before we take up the substantive merits of this petition, we shall first delve into the
propriety of the petition for habeas corpus and certiorari filed by private respondent Cuyag with
the Court of Appeals.

Concededly, the private respondent has the personality to institute on behalf of her common-law
spouse, Lawrence Larkins, the habeas corpus aspect of the petition, as she falls within the
purview of the term "some person" under Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, which
means any person who has a legally justified interest in the freedom of the person whose liberty
is restrained or who shows some authorization to make the application.20 She is not, however,
the real party in interest in the certiorari aspect of the petition. Only Larkins could institute a
petition for certiorari to set aside the order denying his motions for bail and for the dismissal of
the complaint against him.

It does not, however, follow that if certiorari is available to Larkins, an application for a writ of
habeas corpus will absolutely be barred. While ordinarily, the writ of habeas corpus will not be
granted when there is an adequate remedy by writ of error or appeal or by writ of certiorari, it
may, nevertheless, be available in exceptional cases, for the writ should not be considered
subservient to procedural limitations which glorify form over substance.21 It must be kept in
mind that although the question most often considered in both habeas corpus and certiorari
proceedings is whether an inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, the former involves a
collateral attack on the judgment and "reaches the body but not the record," while the latter
assails directly the judgment and "reaches the record but not the body."22

And now on the merits of the petition.

The Court of Appeals granted the writ of habeas corpus because it found that the warrantless
arrest of Larkins for the crime of rape "did not meet the legal requirements provided for in Rule
113 of the Rules of Court." It could have in mind Section 5 thereof on lawful warrantless arrest.

Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from
custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing
of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal,
it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of
Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Among such
supervening events is the issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained
person. Thus, in Sayo vs. Chief of Police of Manila,23 this Court held:

[W]e hold that petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their
release is hereby ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a process
issued by a competent court of justice. (emphasis supplied)

Another is the filing of a complaint or information for the offense for which the accused is
detained, as in the instant case. By then, the restraint of liberty is already by virtue of the
complaint or information and, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available. Section
4 of Rule 102 reads in part as follows: "Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with . . . an offense in the Philippines."

Thus, in Matsura vs. Director of Prisons,24 where petitioners Macario Herce and Celso
Almadovar claimed to have been illegally detained for more than one year without any complaint
or information filed against them, this Court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, for
at the time they filed the petition they had already been charged with the crime of treason and
confined by reason thereof. Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago25 reiterates Matsura.

In Cruz vs. Montoya,26 this Court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for having become
academic because the information for estafa against the party whose liberty was allegedly
illegally restrained had already been filed and a warrant for his arrest had been issued, and
whatever illegality might have originally infected his detention had been cured.

In Umil vs. Ramos27 this Court, applying the last sentence of Section 4 of Rule 102, held that the
writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been
charged before any court. Thus:

It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have
been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process or make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ
of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as
amended is quite explicit in providing that:
 Sec. 4. . . . Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person
suffering from imprisonment under lawful judgment.28 (emphasis supplied)

It may also be said that by filing his motion for bail, Larkins admitted that he was under the
custody of the court and voluntarily submitted his person to its jurisdiction. In De Asis vs.
Romero,29 this Court stated:

De Asis could have, right after his arrest, objected to the regularity of the issuance
of the warrant of arrest in question. Instead he not only filed a petition for bail
with the lower court, thereby accepting the court's jurisdiction over his person,
but he also pleaded, on arraignment, to the information filed against him.
(emphasis supplied)

The filing of a petition or motion for bail in cases where no bail is recommended has the same
legal import and effect as the posting of bail in cases where bail is recommended. It is settled that
the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the
jurisdiction of the court. In the case of Carrington vs. Peterson,30 this Court declared:

When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue

of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to
the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court's jurisdiction
over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the
complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the
court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51
Minn., 534)

In United States vs. Grant,31 this Court held:

Conceding again that the warrant issued in this case was void for the reason that
no probable cause was found by the court before issuing it, the defendant waived
all his rights to object to the same by appearing and giving bond.

While it may be true that on 6 December 1994, or four days after the filing of the Urgent Motion
for Bail, Larkins, thru a new counsel, filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for Dismissal of the
Complaint and for Immediate Release based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest, the
said motion was a mere afterthought which came too late in the day. By then, the trial court had
firmly acquired jurisdiction over his person.

Moreover, the trial court's order of 5 January 1995 denying the urgent motion for bail was an
unequivocal assertion of its authority to keep in custody the person of Larkins. This order comes
under the purview of the word order under the first sentence of Section 4 of Rule 102 reading:
"If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer .
..
by virtue of [an] order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to . . .
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed. . . ."
The foregoing renders untenable the private respondent's claim that it is the rule in Ilagan vs.
Enrile32 which must govern, that the writ may not be allowed only where the person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by the court or
judge, and that there are only two recognized processes which justify deprivation of liberty, viz.,
(1) commitment order and (2) warrant of arrest. The contention is not only a deliberate
misreading of Section 4 of Rule 102 limiting its application to the first part of the first sentence
and disregarding the rest, but is also an undue and unwarranted restriction of the term process. A
commitment order and a warrant of arrest are but species of judicial process.

In Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals,33 this Court stated:

Invariably a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other

formal writing issued by authority of law; also, the means of accomplishing an
end, including judicial proceedings, or all writs, warrants, summonses and orders
of courts of justice or judicial officers. It is likewise held to include a writ,
summons or order issued in a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a
person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce the judgment, or a writ,
warrant, mandate or other process issuing from a court of justice.

In Macondray & Co., Inc. vs. Bernabe,34 this Court quoted Corpus Juris' definition of the term
"process," to wit:

As a legal term, process is a generic word of very comprehensive signification

and many meanings. In its broadest sense, it is equivalent to, or synonymous with
"proceedings" or procedure and embraces all the steps and proceedings in a cause
from its commencement to its conclusion. Sometimes the term is also broadly
defined as the means whereby a court compels a compliance with its demands.
(50 C.J. 441)

We thus rule that the order of 5 January 1995 of the trial court also qualifies as a process within
the meaning of Section 4 of Rule 102.

Hence, even granting that Larkins was illegally arrested, still the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus will not prosper because his detention has become legal by virtue of the filing before the
trial court of the complaint against him and by the issuance of the 5 January 1995 order.

Even as we thus decide in favor of the petitioners, we are, nevertheless, disturbed by certain
incidents relative to the warrantless arrest of Larkins. Firstly, assuming that it was lawful, the
facts before us disclose that the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with (1) the last
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court requiring that the person lawfully arrested
without a warrant shall forthwith be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Section 7, Rule 112; and (2) Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, providing that he be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within
thirty-six hours, the crime with which Larkins was charged being punishable by an afflictive
penalty. Although the arrest was made in Makati where there is a police station and a municipal
(now city) jail, Larkins was brought to the NBI Detention Cell at Taft Avenue, Manila, and
though the complaint of the offended party was executed on 23 November 1994, it was not until
2 December 1994 that the said complaint was actually filed in court.

Unless satisfactorily explained, the non-compliance by the arresting officers with the said
provisions merits nothing but disapproval from the Court. In the performance of their duty and in
their commendable pursuit to stamp out crimes and bring criminals to the bar of justice, law
enforcement authorities should make no shortcuts, but must comply with all procedures to
safeguard the constitutional and statutory rights of accused persons. The rule of law must always
be upheld. What this Court said in Beltran vs. Garcia35 needs to be repeated:

It certainly does not speak well of officialdom, whether civilian or military, if a

person deprived of his liberty had to go to court before his rights are respected.
The good name of the administration is jeopardized, without any fault on its part,
by such inefficiency or inattention to duty. Every precaution should be taken
against its repetition. Otherwise, the parties responsible for this state of affairs
would justly lay themselves open to the accusation that the greatest danger to
constitutional rights comes from public officials, men of zeal, concededly well-
meaning, but without sufficient understanding of the implication of the rule of
law.

We also note that the trial court did not conduct a hearing of the urgent motion for bail, as
required under Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. The grant or denial of bail must be
based upon the court's determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. This
discretion may only be exercised after evidence is submitted at the hearing conducted for that
purpose.36 The court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence
for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong;
otherwise, the order would be defective and voidable. 37 In fact, even if the prosecutor refuses to
adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the
prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the State's evidence or judge the
adequacy of the amount of bail.38 It was thus incumbent upon the trial court to receive the
evidence for the prosecution on the urgent motion for bail. For this procedural shortcoming,
Larkins should also be partly blamed. He did not press for a hearing after the scheduled hearing
on 5 December 1994 was cancelled because, as he claimed, the presiding Judge was out of the
country.39

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals of 1
February 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 36273 is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.

No pronouncement as to costs.
 [G.R. NO. 163108 : February 23, 2005]

GLENN CABALLES y CHUA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. EMMANUEL

D. LAUREA, HON. BENJAMIN T. ANTONIO, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by the
petitioner for the nullification of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals1 which dismissed his
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for his release from detention despite the
pendency of People of the Philippines v. Glenn Caballes2 for rape, and its resolution denying his
motion for reconsideration thereof.

The antecedents are as follows:

On November 19, 2001, petitioner Glenn Chua Caballes was charged with rape of a minor in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
25756-MN and raffled to Branch 169, presided by Judge Emmanuel D. Laurea. Because the
petitioner was charged with a non-bailable offense, he was detained.

The petitioner was arraigned on February 7, 2002 and pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
The prosecution presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Venice Vera Pio, the private complainant,
and her mother. The petitioner, through counsel, commenced his cross-examination of Pio, but
failed to complete the same. In January 2003, the petitioner engaged the services of a new
counsel, Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, who entered his appearance as defense counsel.3

During the trial of February 26, 2003, the petitioner continued his cross-examination of Pio but
still failed to terminate the same. The trial was set on March 6, 2003 for the petitioner to
terminate his cross-examination of Pio. However, due to the illness of the private prosecutor, the
trial on the said date did not proceed. The trial was further reset to March 17, 2003 during which
the petitioner continued with his cross-examination of the private complainant. Thereafter, the
continuation of trial was set on April 3, 21, and 30, 2003. On April 3, 2003, the petitioner
concluded his cross-examination of Pio. The prosecution declared that its next witness would be
Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory, who had conducted a medico-legal examination of the private complainant,
but stated that he had not been subpoenad. The prosecution prayed for the cancellation of the
trial scheduled on April 21, 2003 to give the prosecution time to secure and cause the service of a
subpoena duces tecum on him. The petitioner conformed to the motion of the prosecution.

On April 28, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for bail.4

The trial of April 30, 2003 did not proceed because the petitioner's counsel filed a Manifestation5
that his presence was required in an execution sale in Cavite. The said counsel manifested that he
reserved his right to cross-examine any witness the prosecution would present in case trial would
proceed on that date; on the other hand, in the event that the trial court would cancel the trial, he
would be available in May 2003 and during the first half of June 2003.

The trial court reset the hearing of the case to 8:30 a.m. of June 19, 2003 and gave the
prosecution ten (10) days to file its opposition6 to the petitioner's petition for bail. It likewise
ordered the issuance of a subpoena to Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez to require him to attend the trial
on the said date.

On May 5, 2003, the petitioner filed a motion7 seeking an earlier trial date, invoking his right to
speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act of 1998. He also filed a motion for the urgent resolution
of his petition for bail.8

On May 12, 2003, the petitioner filed another motion9 praying that the hearing scheduled on June
19, 2003 be moved to an earlier date, preferably on May 26, 28 or 29, 2003. In the meantime, the
prosecution filed its comment/opposition10 to the petitioner's petition for bail.

On May 13, 2003, the court issued an Order11 declaring that the petition for bail was submitted
for its resolution and denying the petitioner's motion for an earlier trial date. On June 16, 2003,
the trial court issued its Order12 denying the petition for bail, on its finding that the evidence of
guilt against the petitioner was strong.

During the trial of June 19, 2003, Dr. Marquez failed to appear before the court because, in the
meantime, he had been assigned to the Eastern Police District and failed to receive the subpoena
issued to him by the court. The prosecution prayed for continuance, but the petitioner objected
and invoked his right to speedy trial. The court, nevertheless, granted the motion and reset the
trial to July 17, 2003.

On June 27, 2003, the court issued a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum to Dr. Jose Arnel
Marquez requiring him to appear for the trial set on July 17, 2003.13

On July 4, 2003, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the court's Order dated June
16, 2003 denying his petition for bail. His motion was set for hearing, also on July 17, 2003.
However, the petitioner preempted the resolution of his motion for reconsideration and filed a
Motion to Dismiss14 the case on July 11, 2003 on the ground that his right to speedy trial had
been violated. He made the following allegations:

1. The hearings in the instant case have more often than not been scheduled more than one month
apart;

2. In the hearing on April 30, 2003, in particular, the day before undersigned counsel had filed a
Manifestation stating inter alia that his available dates for the next hearing may be "any Monday,
Wednesday or Thursday for the whole of May 2003 and the first half of June 2003, except on
May 14 and 21" - yet Atty. Manalaysay asked for the next hearing on June 19 which is already
outside or beyond the dates mentioned in the manifestation, and which was more than 1-1/2
months away, but which the Honorable Court nonetheless granted;
3. Atty. Manalaysay has never been able to present any "good cause" as to how come he was not
able to present Dr. Marquez on April 30, 2003, and then again on June 19, 2003; and as
aforesaid, his absence on March 6, 2003 has not been supported by any medical certificate;

4. The first hearing in the instant case was held on June 13, 2002, thus it has now been more than
one year, or close to 400 days ago since trial started; neither has there been any authorization
from the Supreme Court that the trial period may exceed 180 days;

5. There has been no statement by the Honorable Court in any of its orders granting continuance
that "the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and
the accused in a speedy trial;"

6. As above stated, it appears that the prosecution made a false statement before the Honorable
Court in claiming they had asked Dr. Marquez to testify in the June 19, 2003 hearing, when in
fact they had not.15

Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez had apparently still not received the subpoena issued by the trial court,
because of which the prosecution again failed to present him as a witness during the trial of July
17, 2003. The prosecution prayed for continuance, to which the petitioner vigorously objected.
The court, however, granted the motion and reset the trial to August 11, 2003.16

On July 24, 2003, Judge Laurea issued an Order17 inhibiting himself from hearing the case "to
avoid being misunderstood, to preserve his reputation for probity and objectivity and to live up to
the ideal impartial administration of justice." The case was re-raffled to Branch 170, presided by
Judge Benjamin T. Antonio, who calendared the case for trial on September 8, 2003.
Nevertheless, on August 11, 2003, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 of Judge
Laurea's Order dated July 24, 2003, which the latter denied, on the finding that no cogent reason
was presented to reconsider the same.19

During the hearing on September 8, 2003, Judge Antonio granted the private prosecutor's motion
to be given five (5) days within which to oppose the petitioner's motion to dismiss. Judge
Antonio also set the trial on September 18, 2003.20 On the latter date, the trial court issued an
Omnibus Order21 denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss. The trial court reasoned that there
was no violation of the petitioner's right to speedy trial, considering that the apparent delays
could not be attributed to the fault of the prosecution alone. The trial court noted that the
petitioner also sought Postponements of the trials.

Anent the motion for reconsideration of the court's Order dated June 16, 2003 which denied the
petition for bail, the trial court considered the same as having been abandoned by the petitioner
upon the filing of his motion to dismiss the case without waiting for the resolution of his motion
for reconsideration on his petition for bail.

The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a "Petition for Habeas Corpus and/or
Certiorari and Prohibition."22 On October 2, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution requiring the
petitioner to inform the court of his choice of remedy within five (5) days from notice thereof. In
compliance therewith, the petitioner filed a manifestation with the appellate court that he had
chosen his petition to be treated as a petition for habeas corpus without prejudice "to the
concomitant application of certiorari if the court considered the same necessary or appropriate to
give effect to the writ of habeas corpus."

The petitioner averred that (a) he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial and his constitutional
right to a speedy disposition of the case; (b) Judge Laurea erred in inhibiting himself from the
case; (c) the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion in denying his petition for bail;
and (d) Judge Antonio had prejudged the case against him.

On December 9, 2003, the CA issued its assailed Resolution dismissing the petition, viz:

WHEREFORE, for being the wrong or improper remedy, the PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.23

According to the appellate court, while the petitioner manifested his preference that his petition
be treated as a petition for habeas corpus, the same was not the proper remedy to review and
examine the proceedings before the trial court and as a relief from the petitioner's perceived
oppressive situation in the trial court. The CA further emphasized that a writ of habeas corpus is
not a writ of error; that it could not exercise its certiorari jurisdiction over the acts or omission of
the respondent judge as a concomitant remedy; and that the remedy for habeas corpus and
certiorari are different in nature, scope and purpose. The appellate court declared that the
petitioner failed to present any evidence to prove that there was any intentional or deliberate
delay caused to prejudice him; nor was there any malice in the failure of the prosecution to
promptly serve the subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum to its witnesses. The court also noted
that the resetting of petitioner's case may also be attributed to the voluminous work of the RTC
involved.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision contending that (a) the
congestion of the trial court's calendar is not a valid ground for continuance of the trial; (b) the
trial court failed to secure an extension of time of the trial period from the Supreme Court; (c) the
trial court should have given a precedence to the case, the charge therein being a heinous crime;
(d) his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was proper because his continued detention had
become illegal, following the prosecutor and the trial court's violation of his right to a speedy
trial, and the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the case and his petition for bail which
was tainted with grave abuse of discretion; and (e) a writ of habeas corpus may be issued with
the writ of certiorari for the purpose of review. However, the CA denied the petitioner's motion
for lack of merit.

The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
reiterating the grounds contained in his motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. The
petitioner averred that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in rendering its resolution, as well as the resolution denying his
motion for reconsideration thereof.
In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the trial court's order denying his
petition for bail, motion to dismiss the case, and Judge Laurea's order of inhibition. The OSG
posits that the petitioner was not deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his
case as well as under the Speedy Trial Act.

The issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether or not the decision of the CA is already
final and executory; (b) whether the proper remedy from the appellate court's denial of a
petitioner for a writ if habeas corpus is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court; and (c) if in the affirmative, whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the issuance of the
writ.

On the first issue, we find and so rule that the petitioner's recourse to this Court via a petition for
certiorari from the decision of the CA dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
inappropriate. Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that the period for appeal from
the judgment of any court in habeas corpus cases shall be forty-eight (48) hours from notice of
the judgment appealed from. While the said provision was not incorporated in the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, this Court approved Administrative Matter No. 01-1-03-SC amending Section
3, Rule 41of the said Rules, which took effect on July 15, 2001, thus:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal; appeal in habeas corpus cases. The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a
record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. However, an appeal in habeas
corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment or final
order appealed from.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

Following the rule, the petitioner should have appealed to this Court from the CA decision
denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as well as the denial of his motion for
reconsideration thereof; instead, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, as amended. The well-settled rule is that certiorari is not available where the
aggrieved party's remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the
reason being that certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The
existence and availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special
civil action for certiorari . These two remedies are mutually exclusive.24 An appeal in this case
would still have been a speedy and adequate remedy. Consequently, when the petitioner filed his
petition in this Court, the decision of the CA was already final and executory.

It bears stressing that a decision in a habeas corpus action stands in no different position than
with any other proceeding and if the appealed decision is to be reviewed by an appellate court,
the remedy is by writ of error because the error committed by the court is an error of judgment
and not an error of jurisdiction.25
Besides, as correctly held by the CA, a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail
the trial court's denial of the petitioner's motion to dismiss the case, the denial of the petition for
bail, as well as the voluntary inhibition of Judge Laurea.

A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule
102 of the Rules of Court, as amended. In Ex Parte Billings,26 it was held that habeas corpus is
that of a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the
writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of
liberty, notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal
restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure
freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit and
prosecutes a case in that court.27

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial court's
function.28 It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used
to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the
merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the
proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void.29 The writ is not ordinarily
granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of
exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial.30
The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to
the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas
corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and
irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial,
subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved,
and not destroyed.31 It has also been held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors
and irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by habeas
corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.32

Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted for
the sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the
cause of his detention may be inquired into and his statements final.33 The writ of habeas corpus
does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is
alleged to be the unlawful authority.34 Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner
(prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved
is whether the custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty.35 The writ may be
denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.36

A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of liberty" is a prerogative writ

which does not issue as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It, is,
however, a writ of right on proper formalities being made by proof.37 Resort to the writ is to
inquire into the criminal act of which a complaint is made but unto the right of liberty,
notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint.38
The primary, if not the only object of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum is to determine
the legality of the restraint under which a person is held.39
Our review of the petitioner's material averments in his petition before the CA reveals that it was
a "petition for habeas corpus or, in the alternative, a petition for a writ of certiorari " The
petitioner assailed therein the orders of the trial court denying his petition for bail and his motion
to dismiss on the ground that he was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case
against him, and questioned Judge Laurea's order of inhibition. We agree with the CA that a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus cannot be joined with the special civil action for certiorari
because the two remedies are governed by a different set of rules. Rule 2, Section 5(b) of the
Rules of Court mandates that the joinder of causes of action shall not include special actions or
actions governed by special rules, thus proscribing the joinder of a special proceeding with a
special civil action.

We also agree with the ruling of the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a remedy
different from the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended. The writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on the processes, orders, or judgment
of the trial court, while certiorari is a direct attack of said processes, orders, or judgment on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches only jurisdictional errors. It has no other use, except to
bring before the court a record material to be considered in exercising jurisdiction. A writ of
certiorari reaches the record. On the other hand, a writ of habeas corpus reaches the body but
not the record; it also reaches jurisdictional matters but does not reach the record. However,
when jurisdiction is obtained by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, to bring the body of the
person whose liberty is involved into court, and if it is necessary, to provide the record upon
which the detention is based, that may be accomplished by using a writ of certiorari as an
ancillary proceeding, i.e., it is subordinate to or in aid of the primary action for the purpose of
impeaching the record. When a writ of certiorari is issued as the foundation of jurisdiction to
bring it and direct upon the validity of a judicial determination by any body or officer,
jurisdictional questions only are reached, and such questions pertaining to the detention made by
the officer or body particularly complained of.40

The petitioner manifested to the appellate court that his petition should be treated as a petition for
habeas corpus. Even then, the CA rightly dismissed the petition because the petitioner failed to
establish his right to the writ. The records show that the petitioner was charged with rape
punishable by reclusion perpetua and was detained based on the said charge; hence, if the
evidence of his guilt is strong, he shall not be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.41 There is no question that the trial court had jurisdiction over the offense
charged and over the person of the petitioner. The jail warden has the authority and, in fact, is
mandated to detain the petitioner until granted bail by the court, or the case against him
dismissed, or until he is acquitted after trial. The petitioner failed to establish that his
incarceration pendente lite was illegal, and likewise failed to establish exceptional circumstances
warranting the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by the appellate court. ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υΠ±l lÎ ±Ï‰ lÎ ¹brαrÿ

In Galvez v. Court of Appeals,42 the Court ruled that a petition for habeas corpus is not the
proper remedy to assail the denial thereof:

'The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course
was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a
right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy
was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and
even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also
available there.43

The remedy of the petitioner from the Order of the trial court denying his petition for bail was to
file a petition for certiorari in the CA if the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the said order.44 If the petitioner had done
so, his petition would have been granted because as gleaned from the assailed order of the trial
court, it failed to summarize the testimonies of the private complainant and that of her mother.
Hence, such order is invalid.45 The trial court would have had to issue another order containing
the summary of the testimonies of the private complainant and her mother, including its findings
and conclusions. However, the petitioner would still not be entitled to be released from detention
in the meantime.

It bears stressing that under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 13746 of the Rules of Court,
the voluntary inhibition of a Judge is addressed to his sound discretion for just or valid reasons,
the primary consideration being that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired.47
The petitioner should have thus filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition in the CA,
instead of a petition for habeas corpus.

In cases where the right of the accused to a speedy trial is violated by the prosecution, the
remedy lies in the procedure provided for under Republic Act No. 8493, as implemented by Rule
119 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 8 of the said Rule provides:

SEC. 8. Sanctions. - In any case in which private counsel for the accused, the public attorney, or
the prosecutor:

(a) Knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing that a necessary witness
would be unavailable for trial;

(b) Files a motion solely for delay which he knows is totally frivolous and without merit;

(c) Makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he knows to be false and
which is material to the granting of a continuance; or

(d) Willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions hereof,
the court may punish such counsel, attorney, or prosecutor, as follows:

(1) By imposing on a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense of an accused, a
fine not exceeding twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00);

(2) By imposing on any appointed counsel de oficio, public attorney, or prosecutor a fine not
exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); and cralawlibrary
(3) By denying any defense counsel or prosecutor the right to practice before the court trying the
case for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days. The punishment provided for by this section
shall be without prejudice to any appropriate criminal action or other sanction authorized under
these Rules.

If the trial court acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of lack of
jurisdiction in granting the prosecution's motion for the resetting of the trial over the petitioner's
objections, the more appropriate remedy would have been to file a petition for certiorari and/or a
petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to comply with the timeline provided for by the
said Rule for trial and termination of the case.

It was inappropriate for the petitioner to file a petition for habeas corpus assailing the trial
court's order denying his motion to dismiss the case for failure to comply with the timeline
provided for by the said Rules. Reading and evaluating the assailed Order of the trial court dated
September 18, 2000, it cannot be gainsaid that the court violated the right of the petitioner to
speedy trial. Thus:

The instant motion is anchored on the alleged violation of and/or to enforce the right of the
accused to speedy trial. In invoking such right, the accused contends that the failure of the
prosecution to present the medico-legal officer who examined the victim on two (2) occasions,
and the non-appearance of the private prosecutor on one occasion caused undue delay in the
proceedings of this case.

The prosecution vigorously opposed the Motion to Dismiss and claimed that since the
prosecution has not yet rested its case, the Court may not be able to appreciate the merits of the
instant motion in the light of the unfinished presentation of evidence for the prosecution and that
the grounds relied by the defense do not touch on the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but rather on the alleged delay and
failure to present Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez of the PNP Crime Laboratory.

After due consideration, the Court finds the instant motion untenable. ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrà ¿

The alleged delay and failure to present the medico-legal officer cannot be attributed to the fault
of the prosecution and/or the Court. The prosecution and the Court cannot encroach on the right
of the medico-legal officer to appear inasmuch as his schedule conflicted with the hearings set
for his appearance. Moreover, delays assailed by defense counsel that violated accused' right to
speedy trial are not all at the instance of the prosecution. In fact, the defense, contributed to the
delay since the former defense counsel and even the present defense counsel sought
postponements of the hearings.

Be that as it may, despite the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer, the Court (Branch
169) proceeded in resolving the Petition for Bail of the accused (albeit unfavorable to the cause
of the accused) on the basis of the sole testimony of the complainant, which is backed up by
several jurisprudence to this effect. The defense, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said
denial after he has filed a Motion to Dismiss. The filing of these pleadings adds to the delay until
the Presiding Judge who denied the Petition for Bail voluntarily inhibited himself from this case.
Then when the Motion to Dismiss was set for hearing, the Court, in an attempt to expedite the
proceedings, suggested for the parties to stipulate on the medical findings of the medico-legal
officer so as to dispense with his presentation. Defense counsel, however, would not want to
enter into such a stipulation. Hence, another delay.48

We agree with the petitioner that a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be
filed if one is deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case under Article IV, Section
16 of the 1987 Constitution and of his right to due process.49 However, the petitioner never
invoked in the trial court his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case against him.
What he invoked was his right to a speedy trial under Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. He invoked his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case against him, for
the first time, only in the Court of Appeals when he filed his petition for habeas corpus.

Even then, the petitioner failed to establish his claim that he was deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case. In Marilyn Corpuz, et al., v. Sandiganbayan,50 the Court had the occasion
to state'

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was
designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over
him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the
courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy
trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has
been denied such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy
disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and
not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is
supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances.
It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must
be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court
are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.

The Court emphasized in the same case that:

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels
the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for
the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice
should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed
to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and
concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the Possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of
these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his
case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are
unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned
prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of
anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is
curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.

Delay is a two-edged sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case
beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the
government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or
extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that
such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As
held in Williams v. United States, for the government to sustain its right to try the accused
despite a delay, it must show two things: (a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice
beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more
delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay.
Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State.
For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense
should be weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to
intentionally delay to gain some tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass or prejudice
him. On the other hand, the heavy case load of the prosecution or a missing witness should be
weighted less heavily against the State.

In this case, the petitioner was arraigned on February 7, 2002. In the meantime, he was able to
present only two witnesses. The petitioner failed to terminate the cross-examination of the
private complainant by the year 2002. The Court cannot determine the reason for the delay
because the records of the RTC are not before it. Neither of the parties made any explanation for
the delay; nor is there any showing that the counsel of the petitioner complained about the delay.
Aside from the petitioner's claim that the private prosecutor failed to give good cause for his
failure to present Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez during the trial dates April 30, 2003 and June 19,
2003, as well as to substantiate his absence during the trial of March 6, 2003 with a medical
certificate, the petitioner failed to support his claim in his pleadings before the CA and in this
Court. On the other hand, the counsel of the petitioner was absent during the trial on April 30,
2003 because he had to attend an execution sale in Cavite. The petitioner's counsel gave priority
to the execution sale and asked for a resetting despite the fact that his client, the petitioner, was
detained for a quasi - heinous crime. While it is true that the trial was reset to June 19, 2003, or
more than one month from April 30, 2003, the petitioner's counsel himself manifested that he
was available for trial during the first half of June 2003. There was a difference of only four (4)
days from the trial date set by the court and the available dates suggested by the petitioner's
counsel. It bears stressing that trial dates cannot be set solely at the convenience of the
petitioner's counsel. The trial dates available in the calendar of the court and of the prosecutor
must also be taken into account. ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lÎ ±Ï‰ lιbrαrÿ

Hence, it cannot be said that the petitioner was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of
the case simply because the private prosecutor failed to submit a medical certificate for his
absence during the trial of March 6, 2003. The petitioner could have asked the court to cite the
private prosecutor in contempt of court for his failure to submit the said certificate; he failed to
do so. Moreover, the petitioner failed to establish any serious prejudice by the delay of the trial,
and that the State deliberately delayed the trial to prejudice him.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Ilusorio vs Bildner Case Digest
Ilusorio vs. Bildner

G.R. No. 139789 May 12, 2000

Facts: Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a
period of thirty years. Out of their marriage, the spouses had six children. In 1972, they
separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived in Makati when he
was in Manila and in Ilusorio penthouse when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda
lived in Antipolo City.

When Potenciano arrived from United States and lived with Erlinda in Antipolo City for five
months. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that their mother overdosed their father with an
antidepressant drug which the latter’s health deteriorated. Erlinda filed with RTC of Antipolo City
a petition for guardianship over the person and property of her husband due to the latter’s
advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.

Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived in a condominium in Makati City
after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City. With these, Erlinda filed with CA a petition
for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband and also for the reason that respondent
refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and prohibiting Potenciano from
living with her in Antipolo City.

Issue: Whether or not Erlinda Ilusorio may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her
husband to live with her in conjugal bliss.

Ruling: The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To
justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not
merely nominal or moral.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife.
Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs
or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the
man and woman’s free choice. Therefore, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.
Feria vs CA
Facts: After discovering that his entire criminal records, including the copy of the judgment, was
lost or destroyed, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the
SC against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional
Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from
confinement on the ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and
violative of his constitutional right to due process. The RTC dismissed the case on the ground
that the mere loss of the records of the case does not invalidate the judgment or commitment nor
authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper remedy would be reconstitution of the
records of the case which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision. Petitioner
argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid judgment as required
by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, and that the evidence considered by the
trial court and Court of Appeals in the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish the contents
of such judgment. In a comment, OSG maintains that public respondents have more than
sufficiently shown the existence of a legal ground
for petitioner’s continued incarce
ration, viz., his conviction by final judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court, the discharge of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is not authorized.
Issue: WON there is legal basis to detain petitioner after the destruction or loss of his criminal
records. Held: Yes. The writ of habeas corpus, was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. Prior to this in 1981 the accused was charged of Robbery with homicide. that
after four years of trial the court found the accused guilty and given a life sentence in a
promulgation handed down in 198
5 petitioner’s declaration as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him under section 23 of rule 130 of the rules of court It secures to a prisoner the right to
have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have the
issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority. Consequently, the writ may
also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had
no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such
sentence is void as to such excess.
Petitioner’s claim is anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his
continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is
violative of his constitutional right to due process.Based on the records and the hearing
conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of
conviction of petitioner which serves as the legal basis for his detention. As a general rule, the
burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such
restraint. In other words, where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth
process which on its face shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on
petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such
process. If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the return is
considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the burden
of proof to show that the restraint is illegal. When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged
and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order, or decree is not subject to collateral
attack by habeas corpus.
Writ of Amparo