 Group 5 compensation of respondent Pamintuan Development Companys

274.9037 hectare lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-

4972 and located at San Vicente, Makilala, Cotabato, at
FIRST DIVISION
P58,237,301.68. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:
G.R. No. 167886
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the just compensation of TCT
Petitioner,
No. T-4972 registered in the name of Pamintuan Development
Company (PAMDEVCO) containing an area of 274.9037 hectares
- versus -
located at San Vicente, Makilala, Cotabato is preliminary
determined at FIFTY EIGHT MILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN
PAMINTUAN DEVELOPMENT CO., represented by MARIANO
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED ONE AND 68/100 (P58,237,301.68)
PAMINTUAN, JR.,
PESOS.
Respondent.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Promulgated:October 25, 2005
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. The order
x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
denying the motion for reconsideration was received by petitioner
on June 11, 2004. At the proceedings before the trial court,
DECISION
petitioner was represented by Piczon, Beramo & Associates.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On June 4, 2004, Attys. Engilberto F. Montarde and Felix F. Mesa,
filed a Notice of Entry of Appearance[5] in behalf of petitioner.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the April 15, 2005
Within the period to appeal, or on June 15, 2004, said counsels also
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85843, which
filed a Notice of Appeal[6] via registered mail. The Certification[7]
dismissed Land Bank of the Philippines (LANDBANKs) petition and
attached to the Notice of Appeal was signed by Loreto B. Corotan,
sustained the August 2, 2004 Order[2] of the Department of
Head of petitioners Agrarian Operations Center.
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which denied due
course to the notice of appeal and notice of entry of appearance
Respondent filed an Opposition contending that the notice of
filed by LANDBANKs counsels.
appeal and notice of entry of appearance should be denied due
course because Attys. Montarde and Mesa failed to show that their
appearance was authorized by petitioner. Said new counsels, on the
The antecedent facts show that in DARAB Case No. 1204-0545-2003
other hand, asserted that they were duly authorized, attaching to
for Preliminary Determination of Just Compensation, DARAB
their Comment the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by
rendered a Decision[3] dated April 27, 2004, fixing the just
Gilda E. Pico, Executive Vice President of petitioner, authorizing
1
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6
Loreto B. Corotan to represent,[8] and designating[9] Attys.
Montarde and Mesa as counsels for LANDBANK.
On August 2, 2004, DARAB issued an order holding that Attys.
Montarde and Mesa are without authority to represent petitioner
because the latter failed to effect a valid substitution of their former
counsel of record. It added that the April 27, 2004 decision had
become final and executory because the notice of appeal filed by its
purported new counsels is a mere scrap of paper which did not toll
the running of the reglementary period to appeal. Thus
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the instant Notice of Entry of
Appearance and the Notice of Appeal are hereby not given DUE
COURSE for LACK OF LEGAL BASIS. The decision dated April 27, 2004
has become FINAL and EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration appending two
memoranda[11] signed by Atty. Danilo B. Beramo, petitioners
Department Manager and Head, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) Legal Services Department, confirming the
authority of Atty. Montarde to file a notice of appeal.
The DARAB, however, denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Hence, a petition for certiorari was filed by
petitioner with the Court of Appeals, but the latter dismissed the
petition. It sustained the DARABs finding that Attys. Montarde and
Mesa were not clothed with authority to file the notice of
appeal.[12]
Petitioner filed the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order.
In a resolution dated June 6, 2005, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the execution of the April 27, 2004
decision of the DARAB.
We find that the DARAB gravely abused its discretion in holding
that Attys. Montarde and Mesa lacked the authority to file a notice
of appeal in behalf of petitioner. Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. An attorney is presumed
to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he
appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize
him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on
motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being
shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a
case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and
to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the
person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as
justice requires. An attorney wilfully appearing in court for a person
without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be
punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has
misbehaved in his official transactions.
The presumption in favor of the counsels authority to appear in
behalf of a client is a strong one.[13] A lawyer is not even required
to present a written authorization from the client. In fact, the
absence of a formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate
the acts performed by the counsel in his clients name.[14] However,
the court, on its own initiative or on motion of the other party
require a lawyer to adduce authorization from the client.
2
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6
In the case at bar, the filing of a notice of entry of appearance by
Attys. Montarde and Mesa, gave rise to the presumption that they
have the authority to file the notice of appeal in behalf of
petitioner. When their authority was challenged, they presented the
SPA executed by Gilda E. Pico, Executive Vice President of
LANDBANK authorizing them to represent petitioner; and the two
memoranda of Atty. Danilo B. Beramo, Department Manager and
Head, CARP Legal Services Department, requesting Atty. Montarde
to file a notice of appeal. These documents are sufficient proof of
their authority to represent petitioners cause. The doubt
entertained by the DARAB as to when the SPA and memoranda
were executed is of no consequence in view of petitioners vigorous
assertion that it authorized said lawyers to file a notice of appeal.
Indeed, even an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be
ratified by the client either expressly[15] or impliedly.[16]
Ratification retroacts to the date of the lawyers first appearance
and validates the action taken by him.[17]
The DARABs assertion that Attys. Montarde and Mesa cannot validly
represent petitioner because there was no proper substitution of
counsels, lacks merit. Petitioner never intended to replace its
counsel of record, the law firm Piczon, Beramo & Associates.
Though not specified in the notice, Attys. Montarde and Mesa
entered their appearance as collaborating counsels.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals erroneously applied the doctrine laid
down in Sublay v. National Labor Relations Commission,[18] in
dismissing the petition. In Sublay, it was held that a substitution
cannot be presumed from the mere filing of a notice of appearance
of a new lawyer and that the representation of the first counsel of
record continuous until a formal notice to change counsel is filed
with the court.[19] Thus, absent a formal notice of substitution, all
lawyers who appeared before the court or filed pleadings in behalf
of the client are considered counsels of the latter. All acts
performed by them are deemed to be with the clients consent.
The case of Ong Ching v. Ramolete,[20] is on all fours with the
instant controversy. The trial court therein held that the period to
appeal had already lapsed rendering the assailed decision final and
executory because petitioners motion for reconsideration, though
presented within the reglementary period, is without legal effect
having been filed by a lawyer other than petitioners counsel of
record. It disregarded petitioners written authorization belatedly
filed by said new lawyer as the same was not appended to the
motion for reconsideration previously filed. In debunking the ruling
of the trial court, we stressed that the new counsel who filed the
motion for reconsideration in behalf of the client is presumed to be
authorized even if he filed no formal notice of entry of appearance.
Hence, said motion effectively tolled the running of the period to
appeal. As explained by the Court:
The present case, however, does not involve a substitution of
attorneys, but merely the employment by petitioner of an
additional counsel. True it is, as claimed by respondents, that the
motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Hermosisima gives no
indication that he was presenting his motion in collaboration with
Atty. Vasquez; but neither would it indicate that by his filing of the
pleading in the case, Atty. Hermosisima was replacing Atty. Vasquez
as counsel for petitioner. In law it is assumed prima facie that every
attorney who appears in court does so with sufficient authority. The
fact that a second attorney enters an appearance on behalf of a
litigant does not authorize a presumption that the authority of the
first attorney has been withdrawn. There is no question that a party
may have two or more lawyers working in collaboration as his
counsel in a given litigation. Thus in the case at bar the certificate
dated May 16, 1972, executed by Atty. Vasquez, is to the effect that
he, with the consent and authority of petitioner (who signified his
3
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6
conformity in writing) was authorizing Atty. Hermosisima to
collaborate with him in the case due to his ill health. While the said
certificate was not attached to the motion for reconsideration on
May 17, 1972, but was presented in court rather belatedly on June
16, 1972 as an annex to petitioners Rejoinder to Opposition to
Motion for Reconsideration, respondents have not shown that the
recitals of fact contained therein did not reflect the truth. At any
rate, this case is different from U.S. v. Borromeo, Fojas, et al. v.
Navarro, Ramos v. Potenciano, Baquiran v. Court of Appeals. Here
petitioner's counsel, Atty. Vasquez, not only affirmed his continued
connection with the case, but also explained Atty. Hermosisimas
appearance as collaborating counsel. While it may be desirable in
the interest of an orderly conduct of judicial proceedings, that a
counsel for a party should file with the court his formal written
appearance in the case, before filing a pleading therein, or mention
in said pleading that he is submitting the same in collaboration with
the counsel of record, the mere circumstance that such acts were
not done does not warrant the conclusion that the pleading filed by
such counsel has no legal effect whatsoever.
It is evident therefore that the DARAB gravely abused its discretion
in denying due course to the notice of appeal seasonably filed by
Attys. Montarde and Mesa, the duly authorized counsel of
petitioner. In the same vein, the affirmance by the Court of Appeals
of the assailed order of the DARAB is a clear disregard of the oft
repeated principle that courts should not resort to a rigid
application of the rules where the end result would frustrate the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the controversy.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the April 15, 2005
Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition in CA-G.R.
SP No. 85843, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board is DIRECTED to give due course
to petitioners Notice of Entry of Appearance and the Notice of
Appeal.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar
Section 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore
duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as
such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in
good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the
bar. — Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must
be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of
good moral character, and resident of the Philippines; and must
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.
Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the
United States of America. — Citizens of the United States of
America who, before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members of
the Philippine Bar, in active practice in the courts of the Philippines
and in good and regular standing as such may, upon satisfactory
proof of those facts before the Supreme Court, be allowed to
continue such practice after taking the following oath of office:
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to
continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear
4
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6
that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well
as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will
do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no
man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of may knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God.
Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other
jurisdictions. — Applicants for admission who, being Filipino
citizens, are enrolled attorneys in good standing in the Supreme
Court of the United States or in any circuit court of appeals or
district court therein, or in the highest court of any State or
Territory of the United States, and who can show by satisfactory
certificates that they have practiced at least five years in any of said
courts, that such practice began before July 4, 1946, and that they
have never been suspended or disbarred, may, in the discretion of
the Court, be admitted without examination.
Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a
justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose,
or with the aid an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-44388. January 30, 1985.]
VICTORIANO BULACAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FAUSTINO TORCINO
and FELIPA TORCINO, Defendants-Appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; IN MUNICIPAL COURTS,
LITIGANT MAY BE ASSISTED BY A FRIEND OR AGENT. — The Rules
(Section 34, rule 138 of the Rules of Court) are clear. In municipal
courts, the litigant may be assisted by a friend, agent, or an
attorney. However, in cases before the regional trial court, the
litigant must be aided by a duly authorized member of the bar. The
rule invoked by the Trocinos applies only to cases filed with the
regional trial court and not to cases before a municipal court. Court
procedures are often technical and may prove like snares to the
ignorant or the unwary. In the past, our law has allowed non-
lawyers to appear for party litigants in places where duly authorized
members of the bar are not available. (U.S. v. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539).
For relatively simple litigation before municipal courts, the Rules still
allow a more educated or capable person to appear in behalf of a
litigant who cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection of the
parties and in the interest of justice, the requirement for
appearances in regional trial courts and higher courts is more
stringent.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the case before us, the
complaint was verified by the party litigant himself. In the
verification, the plaintiff specifically stated that he had caused Mr.
Nuñes to conduct the litigation and to sign the complaint in his
5
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6
behalf, indicating his awareness that Nuñes is not a registered
lawyer. There is, therefore, added justification for the pleading to
be admitted rather than dismissed. As the lower court has cited: "So
it has been held that, where a pleading is not signed by the attorney
as required, but is verified by the party, substantial rights have not
been affected and the defect may be disregarded as against a
motion to strike." (71 C.J.S. 954-955)
3. ID.; RULES OF PLEADINGS, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
LIBERALLY CONSTRUED. — Rules of pleading, practice, and
procedure must be liberally construed so as to protect the rights
and interests of the parties. As we stated in Paulino v. Court of
Appeals (80 SCRA 257): . . .." . . pleadings, as well as remedial laws,
should be construed liberally, in order that litigants may have ample
opportunity to prove their respective claims, and that a possible
denial of substantial justice, due to legal technicalities, may be
avoided . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. CIVIL LAW; ESTOPPEL; DOCTRINE OBSERVED IN CASE AT
BAR. — The Torcinos try to impugn the results of the relocation
survey. We agree with the appellee that the appellants are now
estopped on this issue because they themselves prayed in the
stipulation of facts that the findings of the geodetic engineer would
be bases for the decision of the court of first instance. We see no
error, much less any grave abuse of discretion, in the lower courts’
findings that the house of the Torcinos encroached on the lot of
Victoriano Bulacan.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The issue before us is whether or not a complaint for forcible entry
and detainer should be dismissed by a municipal court on the
ground that the plaintiff knowingly asked a non-member of the bar
to sign and file it for him.
A complaint for forcible entry and damages with preliminary
mandatory injunction was filed with the Municipal Court of Baybay,
Leyte by Victoriano Bulacan against Faustino Torcino and Felipa
Torcino. The complaint was signed by Nicolas Nuñes, Jr., "Friend
counsel for the Plaintiff" but was verified by the plaintiff-appellee
himself. The verification reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I, VICTORIANO BULACAN, of legal age, Filipino, married and a
resident of Baybay, Leyte after having been duly sworn to in
accordance with law thereby depose and say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled case; that I have
caused the above complaint to be prepared by Nicolas P. Nuñes, Jr.
and that I have voluntarily asked, sought and requested his aid to
file, claim, prosecute, and defend in court my civil case against the
defendants Faustino Torcino et al or others in connection with this
case at the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte; that I have read and
known the contents thereon and the allegations therein are true
and correct to my own knowledge.
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 4th day of
August, 1972 at Baybay, Leyte.
s/VlCTORIANO BULACAN
t/VlCTORIANO BULACAN
Plaintiff.
6
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6
"SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4th day of August,
1972 at Baybay, Leyte by Victoriano Bulacan with his Res. Cert. No.
A-930280 dated Aug. 4, 1972 issued at Baybay, Leyte.
s/NICOLAS P. NUÑES, JR
t/NICOLAS P. NUÑES, JR.
Notary Public
Due to the failure of the parties to settle their case amicably, the
court rendered a decision ordering the Torcinos to demolish and
remove the portion of their house which was illegally constructed
on the land of the plaintiff. The municipal court stated that there is
no doubt that Victoriano Bulacan is the owner and has been in
possession of Lot No. 5998 and that the lot of the defendants-
appellants is on the eastern portion of said lot. The court found that
the Torcinos constructed a residential house which unfortunately
encroached on the lot of the plaintiff.

Until December 31st, 1972. The Torcinos appealed the decision to the Court of First Instance of
Leyte.
"Doc. No. 344
On September 18, 1973, the appellants Torcinos filed a motion to
"Page No. 56 dismiss the complaint on the ground that the complaint was not
signed by the plaintiff or by an admitted attorney, and therefore
"Book No. VII must be considered as sham and false.

"Series of 1972"
When the defendants-appellants filed their answer, they did not
question the fact that the complaint was signed by Nicolas Nuñes,
Jr.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
On February 10, 1973, the municipal court issued the following
order:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The contending parties are given one week time to submit the
proposed compromise agreement in connection with his case.
"Failure to do so will constrain this court to render judgment on the
basis of the ocular inspection conducted sometime on December,
1972."cralaw virtua1aw library
Four days later, another motion to dismiss the complaint was filed
with the additional discussion that the fact that the complaint is
verified, does not in itself cure the defect obtaining in the
complaint.chanrobles law library
On September 24, 1973, appellee Bulacan opposed the motion and
alleged that the motion to dismiss was not filed on time and the
defenses therein were not pleaded in the answer in the municipal
court and therefore, are deemed waived and may not be raised for
the first time on appeal in the Court of First Instance. The
opposition also stated that the complaint substantially conforms to
the Rule.
7
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6
On September 24, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Leyte denied
the motion to dismiss. A motion for reconsideration was denied for
lack of merit.
On December 7, 1973, when the case was called for continuance,
the parties presented to the court a stipulation of facts which states
and which we quote verbatim:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"COME NOW, the plaintiff and the defendants duly assisted by their
respective counsel and unto this Honorable Court most respectfully
submits the following stipulation of facts, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That the plaintiff and the defendants hereby agree to
relocate the defendants’ land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
Number T-8133 which is hereto attached.
"2. That should the findings of the Geodetic Engineer be that
the present construction particularly the wallings is beyond the lot
of the said defendants as defined and described in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-8133 then the defendants will remove any
portion of the wallings that maybe inside the land of the plaintiff
and vacate from the premises encroached. However, should the
findings of the Geodetic Engineer be that the walling constructed by
the defendants does not encroach even an inch on the land of the
plaintiff then the plaintiff hereby agrees to the dismissal of the
present case.
"3. That should the Geodetic Engineer finds out that the
defendants has encroach the land of the plaintiff the defendants
will be the one who will pay for the services of the Geodetic
Engineer and should the findings be that no encroachment were
made by the defendants, then the plaintiff should shoulder the
expenses of the relocation survey.
"4. That parties hereby agree that Geodetic Engineer Jaime
Kudera be appointed by the Honorable Court to conduct and
execute the relocation survey.
"5. That plaintiff and defendants hereby agree to waive the
claims and counterclaims for damages.
"WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the Honorable
Court renders judgment on the basis of the above stipulation of
facts."cralaw virtua1aw library
The stipulation of facts was signed by plaintiff Victoriano Bulacan,
his new counsel Atty. Diego A. Cala, defendants Faustino and Felipa
Torcino, and their counsel Gerardo A. Pabello.
The court issued an order directing surveyor Jaime Kudera to
conduct the relocation work on the basis of the stipulation.
On December 17, 1983, Kudera submitted his report and on the
basis of his findings, the Court of First Instance of Leyte affirmed the
decision of the municipal court.
The defendants appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and
assigned two errors:chanrobles.com : virtual law library
I
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO
DISMISS FILED BY THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS AND IN NOT
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.
II
8
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE AGAINST THE
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS AND IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
THE MUNICIPAL COURT ON THE DECISION APPEALED FROM.
The Court of Appeals in a resolution dated August 7, 1976 certified
the appeal to us on the ground that no testimonial or oral evidence
was presented by the parties and, therefore, no factual matters are
in issue in the appeal.
We affirm the decision of the lower court.
The Torcinos allege that the complaint is irregular as it was signed
not by the plaintiff but by one who was not a member of the bar
and who designated himself merely as "Friend counsel for the
Plaintiff." The appellants argue that the municipal court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case. They invoke Section 5, Rule 7
which states:chanrobles law library : red
SEC. 5. Signature and address. — Every pleading of a party
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney
of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A
party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading
and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided
by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by
affidavit. The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support
it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed
or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be
stricken out as sham and false and the action may proceed as
though the pleading had not been served. For a willful violation of
this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary
action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter
is inserted. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the facts of this case, however, the applicable provision is
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a
municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the
aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with
the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the
bar." (Emphasis supplied)
The Rules are clear. In municipal courts, the litigant may be assisted
by a friend, agent, or an attorney. However, in cases before the
regional trial court, the litigant must be aided by a duly authorized
member of the bar. The rule invoked by the Torcinos applies only to
cases filed with the regional trial court and not to cases before a
municipal court.
In the case of Cantimbuhan v. Cruz, Jr. (126 SCRA 190) we decided a
similar issue and allowed the appearance of two senior law students
as friends of the complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan to prosecute
the case before the sala of Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the
Municipal Court of Parañaque.
Similarly, in the case of Laput v. Bernabe (55 Phil. 621) a law student
was allowed to represent the accused in a case pending before the
City Court of Manila.
Court procedures are often technical and may prove like snares to
the ignorant or the unwary. In the past, our law has allowed non-
9
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6
lawyers to appear for party litigants in places where duly authorized
members of the bar are not available. (U.S. v. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539).
For relatively simple litigation before municipal courts, the Rules still
allow a more educated or capable person to appear in behalf of a
litigant who cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection of the
parties and in the interest of justice, the requirement for
appearances in regional trial courts and higher courts is more
stringent.
In the case before us, the complaint was verified by the party
litigant himself. In the verification, the plaintiff specifically stated
that he had caused Mr. Nuñes to conduct the litigation and to sign
the complaint in his behalf, indicating his awareness that Nuñes is
not a registered lawyer. There is, therefore, added justification for
the pleading to be admitted rather than dismissed. As the lower
court has cited:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"So it has been held that, where a pleading is not signed by the
attorney as required, but is verified by the party, substantial rights
have not been affected and the defect may be disregarded as
against a motion to strike." (71 C.J.S. 954-955)
substantial justice, due to legal technicalities, may be avoided . .
."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Torcinos try to impugn the results of the relocation survey. We
agree with the appellee that the appellants are now estopped on
this issue because they themselves prayed in the stipulation of facts
that the findings of the geodetic engineer would be bases for the
decision of the court of first instance. We see no error, much less
any grave abuse of discretion, in the lower courts’ findings that the
house of the Torcinos encroached on the lot of Victoriano Bulacan.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Actg. C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and De la
Fuente, JJ., concur.

Rules of pleading, practice, and procedure must be liberally

construed so as to protect the rights and interests of the parties. As
we stated in Paulino v. Court of Appeals (80 SCRA 257):chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

x x x

". . . pleadings, as well as remedial laws, should be construed

liberally, in order that litigants may have ample opportunity to
prove their respective claims, and that a possible denial of

10
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6
G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, grounded on pure questions of law, with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002
promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay
City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction against the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and
the RTC’s Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by
this Court.
The antecedents:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before
the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father,
Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student,
justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the
Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer
may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a
party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance
was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written
authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the
prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied
permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the
ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice
in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student
Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court
laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of
trial.3
On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for
Reconsideration seeking to reverse the February 1, 2002 Order
alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not
have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the
authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which
is the Supreme Court alone.
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and
the public respondent MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public
respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding with Criminal Case No.
00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a
Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an
injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the
subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted
de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that
11
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6
therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally
tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for
Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law
provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last,
petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which
expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the
inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without
the supervision of a member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration
before the RTC, the petitioner filed a Second Motion for
Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking the
reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the
strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance
the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending
the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the
petitioner’s Second Motion for Reconsideration and his Motion to
Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already
denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the
instant Petition and assigns the following errors:
I.
the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it
resolved to deny the prayer for the writ of injunction of the herein
petitioner despite petitioner having established the necessity of
granting the writ;
II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION,
TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED
TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO
CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD
WITH THE LAW;
III.
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE
TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
IS YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI;
IV.
THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW
WHEN THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR
MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS
WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE
OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTC’S).4
12
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if
warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may take
cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.5
Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification,
and implementation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice
and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court in
Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may
appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as
encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the
petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf
of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without
the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has
successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme
Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer,
to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law
school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized
by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by
the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda
or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising
attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730,
the Court En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an
inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple.
In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity
without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of
the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid
of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent
or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the
bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No.
730 is subsequently changed to "In the court of a municipality" as it
now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:8
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a
municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the
aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with
the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
13
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
(Emphasis supplied)
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry
of Appearance with the MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real
distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court,
the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall
include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule
138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer,
as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while
the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an
agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule
138. The court a quo must have been confused by the fact that
petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of
appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a
quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against
petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for
the petitioner’s appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior
courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he
is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by
virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an
agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a
lawyer before inferior courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its
very nature, no civil liability may flow from the crime of Grave
Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private
prosecutor is not possible.
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been
intended by the RTC. In denying the issuance of the injunctive court,
the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil
liability by the private complainant for damages, and that the
records of the case do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and
that therefore, petitioner’s appearance as private prosecutor
appears to be legally untenable.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in instances
when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage,
violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against
popular representation.9 The basic rule applies in the instant case,
such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.10
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation,
waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No.
00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is
deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private
prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45,
Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor
under the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.
14
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
BAR MATTER NO. 730 June 13, 1997
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court
En Banc dated June 10, 1997.
IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT PRACTICING UNDER RULE 138-A
BE ACTUALLY SUPERVISED DURING TRIAL (BAR MATTER NO. 730).
The issue in this Consulta is whether a law student who appears
before the court under the Law Student Practice Rule (Rule 138-A)
should be accompanied by a member of the bar during the trial.
This issue was raised by retired Supreme Court Justice Antonio P.
Barredo, counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No. BCV-92-11
entitled Irene A. Caliwara v. Roger T. Catbagan filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.
The records show that the plaintiff in civil Case No. BCV-92-11 was
represented by Mr. Cornelio Carmona, Jr., an intern at the Office of
Legal Aid, UP-College of Law (UP-OLA). Mr. Carmona conducted
hearings and completed the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence-
in-chief without the presence of a supervising lawyer. Justice
Barredo questioned the appearance of Mr. Carmona during the
hearing because the latter was not accompanied by a duly
accredited lawyer. On December 15, 1994, Presiding Judge Edelwina
Pastoral issued an Order requiring Mr. Carmona to be accompanied
by a supervising lawyer on the next hearing. In compliance with said
Order, UP-OLA and the Secretary of Justice executed a
Memorandum of Agreement directing Atty. Catubao and Atty.
Legayada of the Public Attorney's Office to supervise Mr. Carmona
during the subsequent hearings.
Justice Barredo asserts that a law student appearing before the trial
court under Rule 138-A should be accompanied by a supervising
lawyer. 1 On the other hand, UP-OLA, through its Director, Atty.
Alfredo F. Tadiar, submits that "the matter of allowing a law intern
to appear unaccompanied by a duly accredited supervising lawyer
should be . . . left to the sound discretion of the court after having
made at least one supervised appearance." 2
For the guidance of the bench and bar, we hold that a law student
appearing before the Regional Trial Court under Rule 138-A should
at all times be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. Section 2 of
Rule 138-A provides.
Section 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student
authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and
control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs,
memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed the by
supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
The phrase "direct supervision and control" requires no less than
the physical presence of the supervising lawyer during the hearing.
This is in accordance with the threefold rationale behind the Law
Student Practice Rule, to wit: 3
1. to ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a
result of incompetence or inexperience of law students, who, not
having as yet passed the test of professional competence, are
presumably not fully equipped to act a counsels on their own;
15
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6

2. to provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school
clinic may be able to protect itself from any potential vicarious
liability arising from some culpable action by their law students; and
3. to ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that
no person is allowed to practice a particular profession without
possessing the qualifications, particularly a license, as required by
law.
The matter of allowing a law student to appear before the court
unaccompanied by a supervising lawyer cannot be left to the
discretion of the presiding judge. The rule clearly states that the
appearance of the law student shall be under the direct control and
supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
duly accredited by law schools. The rule must be strictly construed
because public policy demands that legal work should be entrusted
only to those who possess tested qualifications, are sworn to
observe the rules and ethics of the legal profession and subject to
judicial disciplinary control. 4 We said in Bulacan v. Torcino: 5
Court procedures are often technical and may prove like snares to
the ignorant or the unwary. In the past, our law has allowed non-
lawyers to appear for party litigants in places where duly authorized
members of the bar are not available (U.S. vs. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539).
For relatively simple litigation before municipal courts, the Rules still
allow a more educated or capable person in behalf of a litigant who
cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection of the parties and in the
interest of justice, the requirement for appearances in regional trial
courts and higher courts is more stringent.
The Law Student Practice Rule is only an exception to the rule.
Hence, the presiding judge should see to it that the law student
appearing before the court is properly guided and supervised by a
member of the bar.
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an
inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple.
In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity
without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34 Rule 138 provides;
Section 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a
justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party
may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent
or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that a law student appearing before
the Regional Trial Court under the authority of Rule 138-A must be
under the direct control and supervision of a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school
and that said law student must be accompanied by a supervising
lawyer in all his appearance.
Padilla and Francisco, J.J., on leave.
16
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459. October 14, 2003]
IMELDA Y. MADERADA, complainant, vs. Judge ERNESTO H.
MEDIODEA, 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Cabatuan and
Maasin, Iloilo, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Rules of Court, parties to a case in a first-level court may -
- without having to resign from their posts -- conduct their own
litigation in person as well as appear for and on their own behalf as
plaintiffs or defendants. However, appearing as counsel on behalf of
a co-plaintiff subjects the employee to administrative liability.
The Case and the Facts
A Complaint[1] dated January 3, 2002, was filed by Imelda Y.
Maderada against Judge Ernesto H. Mediodea of the 12th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo. In the
Complaint, the judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law
amounting to grave misconduct for failing to observe and apply the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in Civil Case No. 252.[2]
On September 7, 2001, complainant filed before the 12th MCTC of
Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo -- presided over by Judge Erlinda Tersol
-- an action for forcible entry with a prayer for preliminary
injunction, temporary restraining order (TRO) and damages[3]
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Because complainant
was the clerk of court in the aforesaid sala, Judge Tersol inhibited
herself from the case. Thus, Executive Judge Tito Gustilo designated
respondent judge to hear and decide the case.
In an Order[4] dated September 13, 2001, respondent required the
defendants in the civil case to show cause why the preliminary
injunction should not be granted. Respondent judge scheduled the
hearing on September 21, 2001, but defendants therein filed a
Manifestation[5] on September 17, 2001, praying that they be given
an additional period of ten days to file an answer. After the
September 21 hearing, respondent reset the hearing to September
28, 2001.[6] Meanwhile, the defendants filed their Opposition[7] to
complainants prayer for preliminary injunction and TRO. The
September 28 hearing was held in abeyance after the defendants
lawyer questioned the authority of complainant to appear on behalf
of and as counsel for her co-plaintiff.[8] Respondent gave the
defendants ten days[9] to file a motion to disqualify complainant
from appearing as counsel and thereafter to complainant to file her
opposition thereto.
In his Order[10] dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied the
defendants Motion[11] to disqualify complainant from appearing on
behalf of and as counsel for her co-plaintiff.
Complainant filed a total of three Motions[12] praying for judgment
to be rendered on the civil case. In an Order[13] dated October 19,
2001, respondent denied complainants Motions because of the
pending hearing for the issuance of a restraining order and an
injunction. He likewise denied the defendants Motion for extension
of time to file an answer.[14] Complainant did not ask for a
reconsideration of the denial of her Motion for Rendition of
Judgment.
In his Comment[15] on the Complaint, respondent contends that
complainant filed a Petition for his inhibition after filing two
administrative cases against him. He argues that the mere filing of
administrative charges against judges is not a ground for
disqualifying them from hearing cases. In the exercise of their
17
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6
discretion, however, they may voluntarily disqualify themselves. It is
worth noting that respondent later inhibited himself from Civil Case
No. 252. The case was then reassigned to Judge Loida Maputol of
the 14th MCTC, San Miguel-Alimodian-Leon, Iloilo.
Respondent avers that the delay in the resolution of the case cannot
be attributed to him, considering that he was mandated by law and
the rules of procedure to pass upon every motion presented before
him.[16] Besides, complainant allegedly failed to present evidence
necessary for the immediate resolution of her prayer for preliminary
injunction.[17] Moreover, she supposedly failed to exhaust the
remedies available to her to question the validity of his Orders.
Instead, she tried to compel him to render a decision on the
case.[18]
Respondent likewise refutes complainants assertion that she
appeared as counsel on her own behalf because she could not
afford the services of a lawyer. Such claim was allegedly without
basis, since her compensation and other benefits as clerk of court
were more than enough to pay for the services of counsel.[19] He
further alleges that she did not secure authority from this Court to
appear as counsel, and that she failed to file her leave of absence
every time she appeared in court.[20]
Evaluation and Recommendation of the
Court Administrator
The OCA agreed with respondent that the issuance of the
preliminary injunction prayed for in the Complaint should first be
resolved before judgment should be rendered in the principal
action. However, it opined that the prayer for preliminary injunction
should have been decided within 30 days from the filing thereof. It
noted that both the motion for preliminary injunction and the
principal action for forcible entry remained unresolved even after
four months had already lapsed since the filing of Civil Case No. 252.
Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent judge be fined
in the amount of P1,000 with a stern warning that a similar
infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely.[21]
It did not, however, find complainant completely faultless. It
therefore undertook another round of investigation, the subject of
which was complainants appearance in court as counsel for herself
and on behalf of her co-plaintiff without court authority.
According to the OCA, officials and employees of the judiciary must
devote their full time to government service to ensure the efficient
and speedy administration of justice. Although they are not
absolutely prohibited from engaging in a vocation or a profession,
they should do so only with prior approval of this Court. The OCA
added that [e]ngaging in any private business, vocation or
profession without prior approval of the Court is tantamount to
moonlighting, which amounts to malfeasance in office.[22]
Thus, it recommended that Complainant Maderada be fined in the
amount of P1,000 for appearing as counsel without authority from
this Court, with a stern warning that any similar infraction in the
future would be dealt with more severely. The OCA also
recommended that she be directed to file her application for leaves
of absence on the days she had appeared in court to litigate her
case.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and recommendations of the OCA, but
modify the penalty to conform to the rules.
18
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6
Administrative Liability
The Rules of Court clearly provide that actions for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, regardless of the amount of damages or unpaid
rentals sought to be recovered, shall be governed by the Rule on
Summary Procedure.[23] These actions are summary in nature,
because they involve the disturbance of the social order, which
should be restored as promptly as possible.[24] Designed as special
civil actions, they are governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure
to disencumber the courts from the usual formalities of ordinary
actions.[25] Accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure that
may cause unnecessary delays should be carefully avoided.[26] The
actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are designed to
provide expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the
right to possession of the property involved. Both are time
procedures designed to bring immediate relief.[27]
Moreover, as correctly observed by the OCA, in an action for
forcible entry, parties are entitled to the provisional remedy of
preliminary injunction.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of court
actions or proceedings prior to the judgment or final order,
requiring a party or a court, an agency or a person to refrain from
doing a particular act or acts.[28] It may also require the
performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it is known as
a preliminary mandatory injunction.[29] Since this remedy is
granted prior to the judgment or final order, we agree with both the
OCA and respondent that the prayer for preliminary injunction
should first be resolved before the main case of forcible entry is
decided.
However, respondent should have resolved the Motion for
Preliminary Injunction within 30 days from its filing. There can be no
mistaking the clear command of Section 15 of Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court, which reads:
Sec. 15. Preliminary injunction -- The court may grant preliminary
injunction, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to
prevent the defendant from committing further acts of
dispossession against the plaintiff.
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or
unlawful detainer may, within five (5) days from the filing of the
complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court
shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing
thereof. (Italics ours)
Judges have no other option but to obey. In fact, the provision uses
the word shall to evince its mandatory character. We cannot
subscribe to the belief of respondent that since there was a prayer
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the main case for
forcible entry would have to wait until after he shall have decided
the injunction plea, no matter how long it took. If that were so, then
the main case would lose its summary nature.
Respondent should have known that since a prayer for preliminary
injunction is merely a provisional remedy in an action for forcible
entry, it should lend itself to the summary nature of the main case.
This is the very reason why the Rules of Court mandate that a
preliminary injunction in a forcible entry case be decided within 30
days from its filing. Preliminary injunctions and TROs are
extraordinary remedies provided by law for the speedy adjudication
of an ejectment case in order to save the dispossessed party from
further damage during the pendency of the original action.
19
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6
Time and time again, this Court has impressed upon judges the
need to decide, promptly and judiciously, cases and other matters
pending before their courts.[30] To a large extent, the publics faith
and confidence in the judicial system is boosted by the judicious and
prompt disposition of cases and undermined by any delay
thereof.[31] Judges are thus enjoined to decide cases with dispatch.
Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanction on them. Rule 3.05 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct specifically obliges judges to dispose of the
courts business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods. Often have we ruled that their inability to decide a case
within the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency.[32] To avoid sanction, they should ask this Court for an
extension and give their reasons for the delay.
Although respondent is correct in asserting that he is mandated to
rule on every motion, he cannot use this excuse to evade the clear
command of the rule that cases should be decided within the
prescribed period. This Court notes with concern the plethora of
motions and pleadings filed in this case, which should have been
tried under the Rules of Summary Procedure. Yet, even after four
months had lapsed since the filing of the original Complaint for
forcible entry, the prayer for preliminary injunction and the main
case remained unresolved.
Respondent is reminded that in order to meet the deadlines set for
deciding cases, judges should at all times remain in full control of
the proceedings in their sala.[33] They should not be at the mercy of
the whims of lawyers and parties, for it is not the latters
convenience that should be the primordial consideration, but the
administration of justice.[34]
To reiterate, judges are bound to dispose of the courts business
promptly and to decide cases within the required period. They are
called upon to observe utmost diligence and dedication in the
performance of their judicial functions and duties. As held by this
Court in Gallego v. Acting Judge Doronila:[35]
We cannot countenance such undue delay by a judge especially at a
time when the clogging of court dockets is still the bane of the
judiciary whose present leadership has launched an all-out program
to minimize, if not totally eradicate, docket congestion and undue
delay in the disposition of cases. Judges are called upon to observe
utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of their judicial
functions and duties.[36]
The prompt disposition of cases becomes even more pronounced
when a municipal trial court is called upon to decide a case
governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure. As eloquently put by
Justice Jose C. Vitug, speaking for the Court in Cruz Jr. v. Judge
Joven:[37]
x x x. Being the paradigm of justice in the first instance, a municipal
trial court judge, more than any other colleague on the bench, is the
immediate embodiment of how that trust is carried out. In the
evolvement of the public perception on the judiciary, there can
likely be no greater empirical data that influences it than the
prompt and proper disposition of cases before the courts.[38]
We have often held that failure to decide cases and other matters
within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions against erring
judges. Given the facts of this case, a fine of P10,000 is appropriate
pursuant to current jurisprudence[39] and Rule 140.[40]
20
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6
As to Complainant Maderada, the OCA recommended that she be
fined in the amount of P1,000 for supposedly engaging in a private
vocation or profession without prior approval of the Court. The
Office of the Court Administrator held that her appearance as
counsel for herself and on behalf of her co-plaintiff was tantamount
to moonlighting, a species of malfeasance in office.
Since complainant was charged with engaging in a private vocation
or profession when she appeared on her own behalf in court, the
necessary implication was that she was in the practice of law. We
clarify. A partys right to conduct litigation personally is recognized
by law. Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of
the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid
of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do
everything during its progress -- from its commencement to its
termination.[41] When they, however, act as their own attorneys,
they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as
those qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be
unjustifiably rewarded.[42] Individuals have long been permitted to
manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do
so, they are not considered to be in the practice of law.[43] One
does not practice law by acting for himself any more than he
practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself.[44]
The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves
the exercise of a profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as
attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by
rendering legal advise to others.[45] Private practice has been
defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind.
In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for
judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of
the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice]
has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self
out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. x x x.[46] (Citations omitted)
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or
habitually holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was
she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be
said to be in the practice of law.
Blacks Law Dictionary defines profession in the collective sense as
referring to the members of such a vocation.[47] In turn, vocation is
defined as a persons regular calling or business; ones occupation or
profession.[48]
The law allows persons who are not lawyers by profession to litigate
their own case in court. The right of complainant to litigate her case
personally cannot be taken away from her. Her being an employee
of the judiciary does not remove from her the right to proceedings
in propria persona or to self-representation. To be sure, the lawful
exercise of a right cannot make one administratively liable. Thus, we
need not go into a discussion of the Courts ruling in Cayetano v.
Monsod[49] regarding the extent of the practice of law.
However, it was also clearly established that complainant had
appeared on behalf of her co-plaintiff in the case below, for which
21
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6
act the former cannot be completely exonerated. Representing
oneself is different from appearing on behalf of someone else.
The raison detre for allowing litigants to represent themselves in
court will not apply when a person is already appearing for another
party. Obviously, because she was already defending the rights of
another person when she appeared for her co-plaintiff, it cannot be
argued that complainant was merely protecting her rights. That
their rights may be interrelated will not give complainant authority
to appear in court. The undeniable fact remains that she and her co-
plaintiff are two distinct individuals. The former may be impairing
the efficiency of public service once she appears for the latter
without permission from this Court.
We cannot countenance any act that would undermine the peoples
faith and confidence in the judiciary, even if we consider that this
was the first time complainant appeared in court, that she appeared
for her own sister, and that there was no showing she did so for a
fee. Again we should be reminded that everyone connected with an
office that is charged with the dispensation of justice carries a heavy
burden of responsibility.[50] Given these circumstances, the penalty
of reprimand[51] is sufficient.
This Court reiterates its policy not to tolerate or condone any
conduct, act or omission that falls short of the exacting norms of
public office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve
the image of the judiciary. Thus, it will not shirk from its
responsibility of imposing discipline upon its employees in order not
to diminish the peoples faith in our justice system. But when the
charge has no basis, it will not hesitate to shield the innocent court
employee from any groundless accusation that trifles with judicial
processes,[52] and that serves only to disrupt rather than promote
the orderly administration of justice.[53]
WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Ernesto H. Mediodea is hereby
found GUILTY of gross inefficiency in failing to observe the
reglementary periods in deciding cases, and is FINED in the amount
of P10,000 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or of a
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. On the
other hand, Imelda Y. Maderada is hereby REPRIMANDED for
appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff without court
authority and is likewise warned that a future similar act shall be
sanctioned more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ.,
concur.
Corona, J., on leave.
CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST
IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the bar in good standing.
22
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6
  Group 6 paying professional taxes for a lawyer to appear in court, would be
put to naught. " (p. 25, Rollo)
G.R. No. L-51813-14 November 29, 1983
Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan
filed separate criminal complaints against Patrolmen Danilo San
ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V.
Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries,
LUCILA, petitioners,
respectively, and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and
vs.
58550 in the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila.
HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court
of Parañaque, Metro Manila, and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN,
Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were
respondents.
senior law students of the U.P.assistance to the needy clients in the
Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, in August 1979, petitioners Malana
Froilan M. Bacungan and Alfredo F. Tadiar for petitioners.
and Lucila filed their separate appearances, as friends of
complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan. Herein respondent Fiscal
The Solicitor General for respondents.
Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the appearances of said petitioners,
and respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979, sustained
the respondent fiscal and disallowed the appearances of petitioners
RELOVA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases.
Likewise, on September 4, 1979, respondent Judge issued an order
Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the then Municipal Court of Parañaque,
Metro Manila, disallowing the appearances of petitioners Nelson B.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with
Malana and Robert V. Lucila as private prosecutors in Criminal Cases
prayers, among others, that the Orders of respondent judge, dated
Nos. 58549 and 58550, both for less serious physical injuries, filed
August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979, be set aside as they are in
against Pat. Danilo San Antonio and Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively,
plain violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and/or
as well as the Order, dated September 4, 1979, denying the motion
were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
for reconsideration holding, among others, that "the fiscal's claim
jurisdiction. Upon motion, the Court, on November 8, 1979, issued a
that appearances of friends of party-litigants should be allowed only
temporary restraining order "enjoining respondent judge and all
in places where there is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to be well
persons acting for and in his behalf from conducting any
founded. For, if we are to allow non-members of the bar to appear
proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 (People of the Philippines
in court and prosecute cases or defend litigants in the guise of being
vs. Danilo San Antonio) and 58559 (People of the Philippines vs.
friends of the litigants, then the requirement of membership in the
Rodolfo Diaz) of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the additional requirement of
on November 15, 1979 as scheduled or on any such dates as may be
fixed by said respondent judge.
23
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6

Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
which states: têñ.£îhqwâ£
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of
the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid
of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar — a party to an action is
authorized to appear in court and conduct his own case; and, in the
inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by
an attorney. However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional
Trial Courts, he can be aided only by an attorney.
On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that
pursuant to Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it is
the fiscal who is empowered to determine who shall be the private
prosecutor as was done by respondent fiscal when he objected to
the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila. Sections 4 and
15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provide: têñ.£îhqwâ£
SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions
either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. —
Unless the offended party has waived the civil action or expressly
reserved the right to institute it separately from the criminal action,
and subject to the provisions of section 4 hereof, he may intervene,
personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.
And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to
intervene is subject to the direction and control of the fiscal and
that his appearance, no less than his active conduct of the case later
on, requires the prior approval of the fiscal.
We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, clearly provides that in the municipal court a party may
conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed
by him for the purpose. Thus, in the case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55
Phil. 621, a law student was allowed to represent the accused in a
case pending before the then Municipal Court, the City Court of
Manila, who was charged for damages to property through reckless
imprudence. "It is accordingly our view that error was committed in
the municipal court in not allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an
agent or friend of Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting his
defense." The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to
enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In the first place, the
law does not impose this condition. What the fiscal can do, if he
wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the private
prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the
trial of the case. On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the active
participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the
court that the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the
prosecution of the case under his supervision and control. Further,
We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel or
as friend of the accused in a case before the municipal trial court,
with more reason should he be allowed to appear as private
prosecutor under the supervision and control of the trial fiscal.
In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of
Parañaque, petitioner Cantimbuhan, as the offended party, did not
24
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6
expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his right to institute it
separately and, therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly
instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said complainant Romulo
Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the success of the civil action
and, in the prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of his
right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge dated August
16, 1979 and September 4, 1979 which disallowed the appearances
of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as friends of
party-litigant petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan. are hereby SET ASIDE
and respondent judge is hereby ordered to ALLOW the appearance
and intervention of petitioners Malana and Lucila as friends of
Romulo Cantimbuhan. Accordingly, the temporary restraining order
issued on November 8, 1979 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos,
Plana, Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
Senior law students should study their lessons anti prepare for the
bar. They have no business appearing in court.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that
it is "a party" who may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid
of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose in the Court
of a Justice of the Peace. Romulo Cantimbuhan, as the complaining
witness in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 of the then
Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, is not a "party" within
the meaning of the said Rule. The parties in a criminal case are the
accused and the People. A complaining witness or an offended party
only intervene in a criminal action in respect of the civil liability. The
case of Laput and Salas vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, is authority only in
respect of the accused, as a "party", in a criminal case.
Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, being the more
specific provisions in respect of criminal cases, should take
precedence over Section 34, Rule 138 and should be controlling
(Bagatsing vs. Hon. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306 [1976]). Section 4
provides that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the Fiscal, while Section 15 specifically
provides that the offended party may intervene, personally or by
attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.
I vote, therefore, to uphold the Order of respondent Municipal
Judge, dated August 16, 1979, disallowing the appearances of
petitioners as private prosecutors in the abovementioned criminal
cases. Orders set aside.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos,
Plana, Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
25
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6
Rule 110, RoC
Section 4. Information defined. — An information is an
accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed
by the prosecutor and filed with the court. (4a)
Section 15. Place where action is to be instituted. —
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory
where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred.
(b) Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other
public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality
or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during
such its trip, including the place of its departure and arrival.
(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the
course of its voyage, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried
in the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or
territory where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the
generally accepted principles of international law.
(d) Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable
under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the
court where the criminal action is first filed. (15a)
Rule 7, RoC
Section 3. Signature and address. — Every pleading must be
signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either
case his address which should not be a post office box.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court
may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall
appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not
intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned
pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges
scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails promptly report to
the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate
disciplinary action. (5a)
26
PALE CASES FULLTEXT
Group 5 to Group6