Recognition in Fichte and Schelling = 39 tends to regard community as sornething restrictive and oegative.” The decen- tering of the subject by the other has a predominantly negative connotation; Fichte conceives the other primarily as a restriction on freedom. In his early ‘writings, Hegel believes that Fichte’s concept of community is negative, bet- eronomous, and potentially tyrannical. Later Hegel achieved a little-noticed, rapprochement with Fichte. The Philosophy of Right ts in part a commentary and continuation of the “recognition strand” of Fichte’s thought ia opposition to its “coercion strand,” Hegel thinks through the concept of recognition and develops its positive implications for social ontology and philosophy. But he also had some belp from Schelling Schelling In hisearly career Schelling was influenced by Fichte. However. he was also. ‘titical of Fichte's position as one-sided, tending te privilege subjectivity at the expense of nature, A genuinely objective idealism would be ontological in the sense that it mst regard both nature aad ego as expressions of the absolute, In ‘Schelling’s language, nature is also connected tothe absolute, This means both ego and nature depend on the absolute and that the ego therefore has a teal sther. These convictions find expression in his treatment of recognition in the System of Transcendental Idealte.™ ‘The question of the other is taken up by Schelling in his discussion of the distinction between nature and freedom and the parallel correlative distine- tion between the realm of nature and the realm of history and society as con- scious constructions of freedom. The other plays a pivotal rote in the transition fram necessity to freedom. Schetling beytins with Fichte's problem of the self- consciousness of freedom: Since the imelligence contains nothing save what it produces and since it eannot produce its own self-objectification, the self's ‘consciousness of its freedom sccens to be impossible, In other words, the ideal- ist principle that everything in the subject exists dhrowgh tbe subject is insut- ficient to account for the self"s consciousness of its freedom. Hence Fichile's question, how does the self became conscious of its own freedom? Schelling sscutely explains that the act whereby the self becomes canscious of its free- dom must be both explicable and inexplicable by the subject. To the extent that the act is explicable by the subject, a quasi-transcendeatal accoant of some 29, This ean jn Fit’ thoughts further expe eo in Sapte 12. wil eek so tate stan of Fixit’ though in GN, “reais argue foe cmstuniy sma” and the "Goro aument fo commen stun” kn my sew Hegel develop he frmer ba ects he oppressive aspect f the aie 30, F. WJ Schelling, Sue sey Transcendent firaliouss (Hamburg, Meiner Verag, 1962); gli ealaion: Seiten of Tromscendestat hilo (800, ans. Peer Heath (Cha Jomestile Unnerty Press of Virginia 1978) Heweaftr ced as STi withthe Engh raion ‘ant andthe Geman references second (G}-40 Preiminaries sort can be given. But to the extent that the act is inexplicable by the subject, this points beyond the subject un an independent acher as its condition. This strange, explicable and yet inexplicable action constitutes the paradox of imter- subjectivity, and points to an even stranger divided or dual ground of freedom, Schelling qualifics the latent solipsism of transcendental idealism when be maintains that the ground of free: self-determination must lie partly “within” the subject and partly “outside” of the subject. Schelling’s point in affirming that the ground of freedom is divided is that freedom is social and imersubjec~ tive. Hence the ground of freedom cannot he identified with eubjectivity alone; the grounds of freedom must be both “in” the subject and yet transcend the subject. Freedom and the consciousness of freedom must obviously be the subs Ject’s own doing, yet the subject is incapable of making itself and its freedom into an object and so it cannot be sutanomously self-conscious in the crucial sense, Something irreducibly other is required to make the subject available to itself and to arouse the subject wo freedom and responsibility. For this reason self-consetousness and freedom requize reciprocal interaction between wel and other. Neither self nor other is, by itself, sufficient; consequently, the ground of freedom must be twofold, and yet correlative. This account of a “divided” ground and intersubjective realization of freedom is at the same time a “de- duction of the other.” Denial of such a “twofold ground” of self-determination means acceptance of sofipsism and incoherence (circularity), for the self would have to precede its own freedom, or will prior to wilting. The reference to the other obviates this circularity. ‘Yet the correlation of the internal and external grounds of freedom, or sclf and other, is not simply a positive empirical one. Schelling shares Fichte's ten- dency to conceive the other in terms of negation. The other is not, and I am not-other. Both the other and the self mutually condition each other, but suck conditioning is negative. There is no direct presence of the other to the self, or viee versa, Thus “the most importamt question of this enquiry” arises, namely, “How then, by pare negation, can anything positive he posited i such a way that [am obliged to intuit what is mot my activity, simply because it is not mine, as the activity of ai intelligence outside me?"” What is the relation or connection between the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ grousds and conditions of freedom’ The problem here is fundamental. It goes to the heart of the question concerning the other as a problem for first philosophy, which possibly “ex- plodes” the very concept of first philosophy. The heart of the problem is that once the grounds of freedom are divided into internal and external, how can they be correlated and connected” The difficulty is increased by the apparcnt facticity and contingency of the other, as well as the apparent facticity of the 31. STF, 2:6. 208, 32. 571, 166,.G,204Recognition in Fichte and Scheling = 41 summons of the other." How can freedom, as transcendental and transphe- nomenal, stand in correlation with an apparently contingent other? Or. if the ‘other is also transphenomenal freedom, then it is an absence, and access to it seems problematic or at best indirect, How then is any correlation possible with such an apparent absence” Schelling proposes three different approaches 10 this question, ‘The first is an appeal to preestablished harmony. This appeal is required by the following premises: the self can know only the prducts af its own activity, ‘and all that is ‘in! the self exists “through” the self. In short, each self is con- ceived as a windowless monad (Leibniz). No self can act directly on an other, ‘or apprebend the other as it conditions fneedior ‘as completely self-contained and setf-enclosed. The apparent coexistence of and correlation between the internal and the external grounds of freedom hap- pens “as if one were determined by the other.”"™ But since there is no interac~ tion or mutual determination between the two, “such a relationship is conceiv- able only through a pre-established harmony.” This metaphysical solution to the problem threatens to undermine the very freedom that it is supposed to ex- plain. If the harmony of the inner and outer conditions is preesiabtished, then there seems to be no room for contingency or freedom. Schelling rejects such an interpretation when be insists that his entire discussion—incloding. pre- ‘established harmony—is directed not 1o a denial of freedom but to uncovering its conditions, ‘The second way Schelling tackles the problem of relating the internal and ‘external grounds of freedom proceeds by appropriating and analyzing Fichte’s concept of the summons (Aufforderung) of the other, Schelling believes that the summons is a mediating concept that removes the contradiction of the di- ‘vided ground of freedom. But how does the summons resolve the contradiction? Tt must not be understood as a cause o stimulus to which the subject “auto- matically” responds. Schelling explains: “Only the condition for the possibil- ity of willing must be generated in the self without its concurrence. And thus. ‘we see forthwith a complete removal of the conmndiction, whereby the same act of intelligence had to be both explicable and inexplicable at once, The con cept which mediates the contradiction is that of the summons, since by means ‘of the summons the action is explained, if it takes place, without it having to 33 This strange enema of twancendence and ctesty isa cesta prubler w Sarre ac count of the other os the sabyees of she Look, For a discussion of the problem in Sarue, see Michael Theunisszn, The Ovher: Smuties inthe Social Ontology of Haaser, Headegger Sartre and ‘abe, ae Cenpes Macomn (Cambri, Mame: MIT Pre). MSM, 160; G, 207, 3 So Vie a, “Zr Lion von Fits Toe der neta” a [Fichies Lehre vom Rechtrverhlisa: Die Dechoaion der $§ 1A der Grundlage de Natarrectes ‘ad dire Stenger Rechisphlasophie (Praakéur am Main: Vitoria Kiowtermana, 1992),42 Preliminaries take place on that account.” The summons of the other does not create or ‘cause freedom (as if that were intelligible) but rather provides the possibility ‘of the self-consciousness of frecdom, The self calches sight of itself us a pos- sibility in the ‘mirror’ of an other. The summons creates conditions far a free response without, however, causing a “free” response or making it necessary, Schelling characterizes the summons as a mediating concept that connects the ‘internal’ and the ‘external” grounds of freedom, while preserving the contin- gency of both the other and the free response to it. ‘The summons is not a causal concept but an ethical one. Schelling contends that the summons is an obligation (Sollen). The summons does not create free- dom but presents freedom to itself as a possibility. As such it does not pre- determine or cause the realization of this possibility. The other summons the self. responsible freedom and provides a glimpse of such freedom as a possi- bility. The summons implies a self-recognition in an other, which in turn can be actualized only through reciprocal mutual recognition, However, a clarifi- ‘cation is in order: Schelling’s analysis is not af attempt to promote ethics. as first philosophy. He warns his reader that “what we seek te establish here is not 8 moral philosophy of any kind, but rather a transcendental deduction of the thinkability and explicahility of moral concepts in general.”® Although the analysis of the Auffordenung is transcendental, the thing itself is immanent in moral experience and reflection. Note that this analysis of the Aigfordenie seems to contradict the appeal to /eeestablished harmony. Foe the latter is invoked oa the presupposition that there is no direct interaction and no positive reciprocity between monadic selves. Self and other are conceived as self-enclosed and self-contained monads that relate to each other only negatively or as negations, But Aufforderung on the contrary requires a positive self-recognition in the other. Such positive seli- recognition in tum implies both interaction and reciprocity, However, such re- ciprocal interaction is indirect; Schelling denies any immediate or direct aware- ness of the other.” Schelling’s discussion vacillates between Aujforderung, which implies a positive relation to other and an affirmative self-knowledge in the other, and preestablished harmony, which presuppases windowless and re- lationless monads. The concept of the Auffordenung points to and requires a separation between selves that makes possible indirect interaction and reci- procity, Preestablished harmony is invoked, but it is only a negative, indirect sor.” It seems to amount to nothing more than a reiteration of the claim that as surcly as there exists a single intelligence, as surely there arc other intelli- ences with the same determinations and capacities. Individual and community 39.577, 62:6, 210, 2M. ST, 184; G, 200, 39. ST, 182-163, G, 210-211. 440,577, 161, 185; G, 210,215,Recognition in Fichte and Schelling 43 mutually require and condition each other, but this claim is known and verified only in the praxis of recognition *! A third set of considerations on the relation between the internal and external ‘ground of freedom runs as follows. Self-consciousness is not given but comes 10 be out of same prior or preconscious condition, Further, self-consciousness is determinate, whereas the prior canditian from which it emerges is indeter- minate. Thus the problem is, how to explain or account for the transition from indeterminacy to determinacy? As Schelling puts it: how, by pure negation, can anything positive (i.c., determinate) be posited? How to make the tran- sition from the fact that an action is nof mine to the other as the ground of the action’? Schelling invokes a social conception of reasoa, freedom, and intelli ‘pence that stands in correlation with a common objective world. ‘His analysis deepens Fichte’s conception of Auffordenung. Prior to Auifor- derung, the consciousness of freedom is indeterminate; the surnmons of the ‘other is the possibility of transition from indeterminacy to determinacy, the pos sibility of the consciousness of responsibility and freedom, But this determina- tion by summons is a limited one-*? As Fichte pointed out, the other's summons assumes freedom and intelligence in the one who is summoned, and this as sumption is the new possibility that the latter grasps and to, which she responds ‘Thus the determinacy constitutive of sclf-consciousness is possible only if there are others: “It is a condition of self-consciousness that I intuit in general ac- tions of intelligences outside me." ‘Schelling summarizes the point in the following way: ‘These restrictions (determinations) are possible only through intelligences out- ssid of me im ach fashion that, in tke operations of these imelligences upon mc, [discern nothing save the original bounds of my own individuality. and woold ‘have toinmait these: even if i fact there were no eer intelligences beyond myself. Although other intelligences are posited in me onty through negations, I never= theless mast scknowledge them as exiting independent of me. This will suprise ‘no one who refiets that this relationship is a.completely reciprocal ane, and that ‘no rational being can paave itself as such save by the recormnitaon sf others.** ‘Again it should be noted that in this text Schelling embraces both the concep tiom of selves ax self-contained windowless monads that relate to each other 28 441.977, 165:6, 218 42 Thins pose sre of Hops comcep of eterna epation erin Nepson, srhch in cningoad ro abi ope nein. Determine nation ted th tech peat end prscres wnt inepeod Dccrtnnac cpio ids expo a eget’ co ‘Sept ot Afb See Wissenschaft der Lg, ee 0A "83.571, 166:6,213-214. “4.571160, 6,218 have are the English rnsation44 Preliminaries negations, and the concept of reciprocal interaction between selves in mutual recognition. Acconding to the former, self and other are related via mutual ne- gution; according to the latter, there is mutual recogmition that yields positive self-knowledge mediated by an affirmative reciprocal relation to the other. This apparent paradox shows the dialectical structure of intersubjectivity and must be accepted: its acceptance is the basis on which Schelling builds his account of truth and the workd. ‘According to Schelling, the problem of truth is not reducible to the curre- spondence theory, which focuses on the comespondence (or lack thereof) be- tween idea and its object. In addition to the correspondence between idea and abject, there is the question of the intersubjective agreement (Cbereinstim- ‘miurig) about such epistemological idea-object correspondences. Itis such imter~ subjective agreement between such individual subject-object correspondences that grounds objective truth. In short, the ether is not anly a condition of such ‘a consensus-coherence view of truth bat also a condition of the objective ‘world, For Schelling, then, the very objectivity of the world depends on others, “therefore follows self-evidently ... that a rational being in isolation coukd ot only not arrive at a consciousness of freedom, but would be equally unable to attain to consciousness of the objective world as such; and hence that imtel Tigences outside the individual, and a never-ceasing interaction with them, alone make complete the whole of consciousness with all its determinations. ‘There are in Fichte some hints that the interpersonal other is the foundation of the belief that there is a reality outside of and independent of the individual,*” ‘Thus the very concepts of “reality” and “world” are dependent on and mediated by others. Schelling supports this view when he writes, ‘The sole objectivity which the work can passess forthe indivicual isthe fact of its having been incited by intelligences ovtside the self... For the individual these other intelligences ate, as it were, the eternal bearers of the eniverse, and together they constine sa many indestructible mires of the objective world. ‘The world is independent from me, although it is posited only through tbe ego, bocause il resides objectively for me in the intuition of other intelligences, and thas social woeld is the archetype whose correspondence with my repreventations| alone constites the tra. ‘Schelling’s analysis remains rather formal and oetological. To he sure, he ‘contends that transcendental ontological analysis is not a moral of existential Philosophy bat a probing of the concetvability of moral ans interpcrsonal- 48.577, 164; 282. 46 S77, 174, G, 24238 47. CI his cooaments tha che other underlies the concept of the nonego (Vira of the Scholar, 13, Golehrar, 3), Sec abo Joschim Widen, Fichor [Sammlung Giechon] (Bern: ‘Walter de Gruyter, 1982), 77-78, 101. 48.977, 174, 224-228,Fiscognition in Fichte and Schelling 46 social concepts. Given this orientation, it comes.as no surprise that Schelling tends to downplay Auflorderuny as an act of an other, and treats it instead as an ontological Limit principle of finitude, When that is done, the facticity of the Aufforderung and the other seems to be given up, and the other tends to be re- duced to an ontological condition or structure.” Moreover, there is a tension hetween Schelling’s appeal to preestablished harmony that tends to reduce freedom to necessity and his acknowledgment, however minimal, of indirect free reciprocal interaction between selves. Any inconsistencies or other inadcquacics in Schelling's account pale into insignificance in comparison with his acute exposition of freedom as essen tially intersubjective and social, In making explicit Pichte's hints that Freedom is intersubjective and consequently has « double grounding, Schelling. implic- itly undermines the twin concepts of windowless monads and peeestablished harmony by exposing a fundamcatal dependence and relation between self and ‘other. This relation is fundamental in that it is a condition of any judgment about the objectivity of the world. It is also fundamental in that it precedes and is a condition of transcendental epistemological inquiry. The other is thus ‘opened up as an issue for first philosophy. Fos the self-other relation is by no means limited to amhropology; it appears on a variety of levels, from first phi- losophy 1o-the intersubjective grounding and mediation of reason and truth to the social-political-anthrapological, ‘Moreover, although Schelling warns his reader that he is not “doing ethics,” it is evident that the fundamental relation of self and other has ethical implica- tions. The other summons the self to responsible freedom, placing the self un- der obligation to respond in some way to: this summons. In short, although Schelling claims to be doing nothing more than setting forth a system of prac tical philosophy according to the principles of transcendental idealism, the Fundamental relation between self and other he uncovers in the course of his, exposition is also an important formulation of the so-called dialogical prin- ciple. The latter principle makes relation and reciprocity central concepts, and in such representative figures as Buber and Levinas, itis a central category in the most substantive cthical philosophy of the twentieth century, Although these figures are highly critical af German idealism, they nevertheless are in- debted to its leading figures and continue important, if hitherto concealed, as- ‘pects of its practical philasophy. 49. STI, 16. In Scheling's dofeme, transcendestal philosophy abstracts frm particularity and contingency. ‘50. Take the term “dialogical principle” from Buber: leneeen Man and Man, 209-224.