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1980
The views expressed herein are those of the author and are not to be construed as BY
representing the opinions of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense,
or any other governmental agency.

Published under the auspices of the Airpower Research Institute, Air War College,
Maxwell Air Force Base, Aillbama, 1980
Maj Gen Haywood S. Hansell, Jr.
0905 USAF, Retired

U.S. GOl'ernment Printing O.IBce

For sale h.\· thl" ::illl)prtlitelldent of Documents,
Wuhlolltton, D.C. 2<K02
 GENERAL OF THE ARMY

HENRY H. "HAP" ARNOLD

The General H. H. "Hap" Arnold
B-29 Assigned to the 58th Wing
Air Member United States Joint Chiefs of Staff XXIst Bomber Command
Commanding General US Army Air Forces Twentieth Air Force
Commanding General Twentieth Air Force Tinian, Mariana Islands

"Fully recognizing the indispensable contribution of other arms, I

feel that air power's part may fairly be called decisive. The collapse
of Japan has vindicated tbe whole strategic concept of the offensive
phase of the Pacific war.-No invasion was necessary."

General Arnold's report to the Secretary

of War, 12 November 1945

ii

IN MEMORY OF
KENNETH N. WALKER
Brig Gen US Army Air Forces
Bombardment Instructor The Air Corps Tactical School
Maxwell Field, Alabama
Commanding General Vth Bomber Command
Fifth Air Force
Lost in combat while l�ding a formation of
B-17 bombers""er Rabaul
6 January 1943
Congressional Medal of Honor
"A well organized, well planned and well executed bomber attack I
once launched, can not be stopped."
iv
Foreword
IN HIS PREFACE, Hansell admits that prejudice and a natural tendency toward self-defense
may have crept into this book. In my judgment, there is less prejudice apparent in his work
than in most of the personal diaries written by leaders and participants in World War II. In fact,
he has been unusually generous toward fellow participants in the historical review of the
incidents he relates.
I believe Hansell's opportunity to review the Strategic Air War Against Japan was unique.
Few leaders in any conflict have had the opportunity to participate in the plan for a campaign,
in its execution in combat, and in a review of the success or failure of the plans and operations.
"Possum" Hansell not only had this rare opportunity, but fortunately for US Air Force history,
he had the analytical ability, the writing capability, and the all-important industry to
accomplish this significant task in superlative fashion.
As a student at the Air Corps Thctical School in 1935, I first became acquainted with
Hansell when he was an instructor there. I formed a high opinion of the quality and originality
of his work at that time, as I did of the talent of Capt Harold George and Lts Larry Kuter and
Kenneth Walker and other members of the faculty. I was also well acquainted with their
superior work as planners who produced AWPD-I and AWPD-42, which proved remarkably
accurate forecasts of the air resources needed to defeat Hilier and the Japanese warlords.
When General H. H. Arnold sent Hansell and Kuter to the United Kingdom to get them
operational experience, he said to General Spaatz and me that he could only leave them for a
limited period as he would undoubtedly need their services in Washington on the Air Staff or in
some other theater within the year.
Hansell had a vast and varied experience which uniquely qualifies him for t)lis task. He was,
successively, a wing and air division commander in the Eighth Air Force in the United
Kingdom and a bomber commander in the Pacific. He helped to prepare the air plan for each
theater. He also is the author of previous books and lectures on the results of the air campaigns
of World War II, the most significant of which is titled, The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler. His
book analyzing the US Strategic Bombing Survey is an authoritative text widely used in all war
colleges today. He has had a distinguished career as air planner, as air combat leader, and now
as air historian. We have had many great leaders in each of these areas, but I cannot name one
so respected in all.
The student or historian who studies this book will probably be impressed, as I was, by the
logical organization of the material in three parts: Part I, Prelude to Strategic Air War
1918-1943; Part II, Strategic War Against Japan; and Part III, Observations in Retrospect.
Part II, Strategic War Against Japan was of greatest value to me since all my operational
experience was in Europe with the US Eighth.Air Force out of the United Kingdom and with
the Mediterranean Allied Air Force as commander with headquarters in Caserta, Italy. Of
 these observations where we had an equal opportunity to observe the air war unfold, his
memory and analyses coincide in general with my own.

It is in Pan III, Observations in Retrospect where our experiences and conclusions di�er in
.
some respects. For example, General Hansell queries why we advoca«:d daylight bombmg of
point targets, such as aircraft factories, generally fon;wearing populatlOn cent"'".'
10
Euro�,
whereas we attacked area targets and civilian populations in Japan. I have no dIfficulty WIth
this differing air strategy between Germany and Japan.

In Germany, factories and workmen were housed in brick buildings that were not easily Acknowledgements
burnable and that required great accuracy to locate and destroy. On the other hand, in Japan,
much of the wartime industry and war supportive labor were in paper buildings, ideal for
incendiary attack.

There was also different treatment of our prisoners in the two situations. The Germans
treated our prisoners humanely as the signed international agreements required. They also
permitted the International Red Cross to inspect and report on prisoner conditions. Japan, on
the other hand, treated prisonen;;nhumanely, permitted no inspections, nor made or permitted
any reports.
Those acquainted with the death march from Bataan had little concern about killing
Japanese, military or civilians. The main consideration was to end the war as soon as possible in
order to stop casualties on both sides. Reliable intelligence sources indicated that the morale of
the Japanese people was greatly affected by the burning of their cities and the loss of their
industries.
Hansell also says in this book that General Arnold questioned dropping the atomic bombs.
With this I disagree. Both he and General Spaatz said it would not be necessary to drop the
atom bomb to secure Japanese capitulation without Army invasion of the home island. But
each said that it might aid the Emperor in overcoming the warlords' opposition to surrender.
Also, they thought there might be other considerations. And each said to me, postwar, that they
considered it fortuitous that we did drop them and prove their awesome destructive power, thus
serving as a factor in preserving peace and freedom from nonnuclear war, post-World War II.
It was also General Spaatz, at that time the Strategic Air Commander in the Pacific, who was
charged by President Truman with dropping the atomic bombs.
General Hansell and I often appear together at Air War College forums on World War II. In
general, we agree in our observations and operational analyses. He does advocate a higher
priority for electric power than I do. While fully agreeing on energy production and
transmission as vital to weapons making, I do not believe bomber forces, as then constituted,
trained, and employed, made power plants, transition lines and transformers profitable targets
at highest priority. Of course, all that has changed tith postwar weapons technology.
SINCE this is a personal memoir, I acknowledge my indebtedness on two scores: to those who
shaped the pen;pective through which I viewed the events described in this book; and to those
who helped in the preparation of the book itself.
My perspective and outlook were deeply influenced by my fIrSt commanding officer, Ml\i
Hugh Knerr of the Second Bombardment Group at Langley Field. He impressed me as a
dynamic and charismatic leader who imbued his outfit with his own integrity, devotion, and
patriotic loyalty to the Air Corps. lowe. debt of admiration to Capt Kenneth Walker for his
enthusiasm and his faith in bombardment; to Lt Col Harold George for his perceptive inquiry
into the basic purpose and nature of strategic air warfare, which colored my outlook for the rest
of my military career; to Maj Don Wilson for his method of logical research into fundamental
target systems; to Lt Col Muir Fairchild for his thoughtful approach to and appraisal of military
philosophy, panicularly as it pertains to strategic air warfare; to Lt Col Ira C. Eaker for his
dedication to performance as Executive to General Henry H. Arnold, and as Commanding
General, Eighth Air Force for his courage and steadfastness of character in the harrowing first
yean; of the great trial of the Eighth Air Force in combat. His dedication to the Air Force
knows no equal. My outlook upon strategic planning and the conduct of air warfare was
influenced by my service under Lt Gen Carl "Tooey" Spaatz and my admiration for his
example of calm, courageous common sense and good judgment. And, I pay tribute to two great
commanders for whom I worked and whose achievements-through signally different
methods-I came to admire: General of the Army, George C. Marshall, the epitome of integrity
and cool dedication; and General of the Army, Henry H. Arnold, whose dynamism drove men
to accomplish the impossible in the creation of the United States Air Force.
All of these people influenced my military pen;pective and formed my military outlook.

The creation of the book itself benefited from many who helped, offered criticism, or edited
It is my view that our target planners did an excellent job of target selection and by the time
and corrected. My gratitude to Maj Gen Cecil E. Combs knows no bounds. He offered
we, the operational people, got our target lists and priorities from the Combined Chiefs of Staff,
intelligent and constructive criticism coupled with encouragement. His observations and
they had undergone such thorough review that they were optimum, both against Germany and
contributions were well founded; he was an active panicipant in most of the events recorded in
Japan.
this memoir.
On the whole, I believe these memoin; of General Hansell are significant in the study of our
military history and will be of especial value to those who plan and conduct our vital air
And I offer my thanks and acknowledgements to Lt Gen Raymond B. Furlong, Air
campaigns of the future.
Univen;ity Commander, and Col Thomas A. Fabyanic, Chief, Military Studies Division, Air
War College, without whose enthusiastic support this memoir would probably not have been
.
published. I especially appreciate a very special scholar, Dr R. F. ·Futrell, a gifted professIOnal
historian who panicipated in the air war in the Pacific. His acknowledged scholarshIp and
Ira C. Eaker
willingness to edit and review this manuscript have eliminated lingering fean; of some gross
Lt Gen, USAF (Retired)
error on my pan.
vi
vii
 I also aeknowledgemy indebtedness to Mr Robert T. Finney and Mrs Irene P. Barnett, of the
Air University, for final editing and rearranging. Mrs Barnett gave of her talents so thoroughly
that I feel she is better acquainted with this memoir than its author.

Finally, I expr..s my gratitude to the editors of Air University Review for permission to use
extracts from my artiel.. whieh it has published.

Haywood S. Hansell
Thble of Contents

Pages
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

Part I Prelude to Strategic Air War 1918.1943

Chapter
I DEVELOPMENT OF US S TRATEGIC AIR DOCTRINES AND
STRATEGY BEFORE PEARL HARBOR........................... .

Air Pioneers . . . .. ............ ...................................... I

War Department Doctrine.. ...... .. ... ...... .... ... .... .... ..... .. .... 2
The Issu... . . . .... . . . . .... . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Air Doctrin.. and Strategic Principl... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3
The GHQ Air Force. .... ..... ..... ..... ........ .. .. ...... .. .... .. .... 4
War in Europe.. .... ...... .. ...... .. ..... .. ... .. ... ....... ..... .. ... 5
The First Strategic Air Plan (AWPD-I) ........................ , .. ... .... 5

2 STRATEGIC PURPOSES, PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE AIR

OFFENSIVE AGAINST JAPAN.................................... 9
•
Tidal Wave from Pearl Harbor. . ... ... ...... ....... .. .. ... .... .... ..... 9
The Joint Strategic Committee . .. ........ .. .. .. .. .... .. ... ....... .... .. 10
AWPD-42.......................................................... 15

Part II Strategic War Against Japan

PACIFIC STRATEGY. ....... ... .. ....... .. .... .. ... .. .. ..... .. .. ... 17

QUADRANT Conference ... .. ... ... .......... ....... .. ..... .... ..... 17
SEXTANT Conference........ .... .... ..... ...... ...... ... .. ... ...... 17
MATTERHORN. ........ ........ ... .... .... .. ..... .. ............ ... 19
Conferenceo in the Pacific Theaters .. . . ...... .. . . .. .. ..... .. .. ..... ..... 21
Pacific Strategy........ .. .... .... .. ... .... .. .. .... ...... ...... .. .. . .. 22

4 STRATEGIC AIR FORCE-PACIFIC .. . .. . .. ..... .. ... .. ...... .... ... 25

Organization, Command, Control, and

Deployment of the Strategic Air
Forceo............................................................ 25
viii
ix
 The Twentieth Air Force. ..... .............. ...... .... .... ........ .... 26 Requirements for 90 Percent Probability
Inception........................................................ , 27 of Destruction of Substations ..................................... 89
Organization and Deployment ....................................... 27 Requirements for 90 Percent Probability
Command and Control ........... . ................................ 28 of Steam Power Plants ............................................ 89
Was the Strategy of Selective Target
5 EARLY DEPLOYMENT AND INITIAL OPERATIONS .......... .... ... 30 Bombing a Feasible Alternative? .................................... 89
Alternative Grand Strategy in the Pacific................................. 90
The XXth Bomber Command.......................................... 30
Conclusions ........................................................ 9 1
The XXlst Bomber Command ......................................... 3 1
Criteria for Force Employment....................................... 9 1
6 FIRST STRIKES........................ ............... ... .... .... .. 36 The Atomic Bomb ................................................. 92
War Aims ........................................................ 92
SAN ANTONIO I and II.............................................. 36 Grand Strategy Revised in Retrospect ................................. 92
Improving Successive Missions......................................... 40
Early Operations .................................................... 40 APPENDIX A Organizational Charts . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
The Aerial Mining Campaign .......................................... 42 APPENDIX B The B-29 Test Specifications ............................ 98
Technical Problems .................................................. 43
Tactical Problems. . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
APPENDIX C Extracts from USSBS .................................. 100
Weather Forecasting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 APPENDIX 0 Twentieth Air Force Staff Meeting Minutes ............... 106

7 COMMAND CHANGES.............................................. 45 APPENDIX E Report by Joint Staff Planners ........................... 109

Command Relationships and Bomber APPENDIX F Details of Campaign Against Japan....................... 116
Commanders...................................................... 45 APPENDIX G Grapbs Showing Probable Hits..........................125
Fim Change of Organization and
Command, XXlst Bomber Command ................................. 46 APPENDIX H Correspondence ...................................... 128

APPENDIX I Mapsof the Pacific .................................... 145

OPERATIONS...................................................... 5 0

Operations: Initial Phase.............................. ................ 50

Pacific Strategy...................................................... 5 I
A Tactical Achievement............................................... 52
Later Operations ..........................................,. ........ 60
Effects of the Air Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

9 AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC ................... 68

Second Cbange of Command .......................................... 69

The Finale.......................................................... 7 1

Part III Obsen'atiODS in Retrosped

10 CRITIQUE AND CONCLUSIONS .................................... 7 4

Fundamental lssues .................................................. 7 4

Speculation on Alternative Air Strategies ................................ 75
intelligence....................................................... 76
Transportation .................................................... 76
Iron and Steel..................................................... 78
Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Chemicals ........................................................ 78
Electric Power .................................................... 78
Effects of Bomb Strikes on Japanese
Electric Powerinstallations ......................................... 8 1
Feasibility o f Selective Bombing of
Japanese Electric Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8S
Capacity of Forces Available. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8S

x xi
 Preface

THESE OBSERVATIONS constitute a memoir, with all the shortcomings of faulty memory,
bias, personal viewpoint, personal experience, and inadequate research that are implied in the
term. They lead to speculation under specified circumstances, and that speculation is likewise
suspect because it reflects personal judgment. But the compendium may lead others to evolve
lessons and conclusions which fit into a broader mosaic.
This work does not, of course, aspire to the dignity of "history." Participants are notoriously
poor historical observers. Participation induces bias. But there should be some limited value to
the viewpoint of participants-if that expression is properly screened for elimination of
prejudice. After all, there is some virtue in the observation of Archibald MacLeish:

"The experts sit in serried rows

And fill the Plaza Toros full.
But only one there is who knows
And he's the one who fights the bull."

These memoirs certainly will not earn an ear. But the perspective is that of an aged matador.

"The choice of enemy targets . . . is the most delicate operation of air warfare. . . . It is
precisely in this field that the commanders of future Air Forces will be able to give proof of
their ability."

General Giulio Douhet

1921
,

On what primary basis should those "enemy targets" be selected? The answer is "The First
PrinCiple of War":

"The Objective"

"What is the 'end purpose' sought; what is the 'end effect' desired at the conclusion of the
war? If it is stated by higher authority, well and good. If it is not clearly stated, then it must be
deduced from authoritative expressions of National Policy.
"The clear definition of the 'end purpose' desired, as distinct from operations and actions to
be performed, is the most vital requirement of all war planning and operations. It looks easy; it
is perhaps the most difficult task of all. Everything else depends upon it and should be related
to it. Yet it is·the most difficult to determine and define. Often' it must simply be deduced.
"In time of peace, this rule should govern the creation of military doctrine, the development
and procurement of weapons, the training of organizations, the establishment of bases, and the
provision of logistic systems; in time of war, it should govern the selection of strategic military
objectives and targets, the modification of military doctrine, and the application of military
forces."

1st Lt Haywood S. Hansell, Jr.

The Air Corps Tactical School
1936
Instructor, Air Force Section

xiii
 II
i
"I I
Development of US Strategic Air Doctrines
and Strategy before Pearl Harbor
WORLD WAR II witnessed the first full application
PART I of strategic air power in war. At this writing, in fact,
World War II has provided the only such full-scale
application. Because that great effort was unique, it
should be worth analytical examination, not only in
PRELUDE TO STRATEGIC AIR WAR terms of actions and effects, but more particularly in
terms of objective, strategic plans, and the result of
1918-1943 operations designed to achieve these ends. . The day may not be far off when aerial
A brief review of the development of American
strategic air doctrines and their nature at the outbreak
of World War II should serve as a useful prelude to
discussion of the strategic air war itself.'
Air Pioneen
Airplanes were used, of course, in World War I,
though on a very limited scale. But even with the
limited use and, for the most part, inconclusive results
of air operations, proponents of air power began to
appear. One of the most notable of these early
expressions of the potential of the virtually untried air
weapon came in a report from a commission (headed
by Field Marshal Jan Christian Smuts) which had been
established by the British Cabinet to investigate the
dual problems of air organization and home defense.
(The commission came into being largely as a result of
popular dissatisfaction with the ability of the air
defenses to deal with Zeppelin and Gotha attacks
against London.) The report, submitted to the British
Prime Minister on 17 August 1917 , stated: "It is
important for the winning of the war that we should
not only secure air predominance, but secure it on a
very large scale; and having secured it in this war, we
•For " ftIOZ'e detaikd KCCUnt at the oriJin and de¥clopment of US aratqi<: air
doctrine, _ my 11w Air Pftlll TItM DqIaItd Hftl� (AlluUfo, Oa.: HigiDi.
MeArthur.lLoqinQ.t.Porter, Inc., 1972).
CHAPTER 1
should make every effort and sacrifice to maintain it
for the future. Air supremacy may in the long run
become as important a factor in the defense of the
Empire as sea supremacy." Smuts himself said in
submitting the report of his commission:
operations, with their devastation of enemy landl
and destruction of industrial and populOlll
centers on a vast scale, may become the principal
operations of war, to which the older forms of
military and naval operations may become
secondary and subordinate.
These were strong words regarding the potential of
the new air weapon, coming as early as 1917. They
were even more significant, however, beeause they
were spoken by a highly respected ground IOldier,
described by Marshal of the RAF Sir John Sleuor _
"one of the greatest men of our time-of all times,'" a
ground soldier speaking not as one wedded to an
historic art, but as a farsighted Itatelman.
Significantly, the report of tbe Smuts' committee led to
the establishment of the Air Ministry in December
19 1 7 and the Royal Air Force in April 19 18. Then, of
course, there was Maj Gen H. M. Trenchard (later
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Viscount Trenchard),
who fended off attacks on the fledgling RAF by the
other services and postulated advanced notions
concerning the possibilities of the air arm.
Support for what we call today "stratellic
bombardment" came from other directions as well.
For example, as early as 1916, the Italian aircraft
'Sir John SlCla'll', 71w CmnvI Biw (New Yon:: Frederidl A. PI'IICpf. ItS?), P. 634.
 manufacturer Count Caproni di Taliedo proposed to
destroy German and Austrian naval vessels by bomber
attack against fleet bases. In January 1917, he argued
that his large triplane bombers, if built in sufficient
numbers, could destroy Austria's factories, thus
ending the war with Italy's main opponent. In October
1917, Caproni, in collaboration with his friend Lt Col
Giulio Douhet of the Italian army, prepared a
"Memorandum on the Air War for the U.S. Air
Service," in which he suggested that mass attacks made
at night by long· range Allied bombers against
industrial targets deep within Germany and Austria
could definitely overwhelm the enemy by SUbstantially
reducing his war production at the same time that
Allied production was increasing.
More must be said about Douhet. Actually, he had
begun to write about military aviation as early as 1909.
During World War I, he was imprisoned for a year
(1916-1917) for criticizing Italy'S wartime military
policy. But Douhet, like Billy Mitchell of the US Air
Service, whose career he closely paralleled, became
more influential in the post.World War I period. His
wartime court·martial was expunged in InO, and he
was promoted to general officer rank in 1921. He
completed his first serious treatise on military
aviation-Il Dominio del Aria, or Ccmmand of the
Air- in October Inl. In this essay, he proved to be a
strong proponent of strategic air warfare. In essence,
he advocated the creation of an independent air force,
made up of a fleet of bombers and "combat planes"­
the latter to be a bomber.type plane that would be
equipped with many guns and used to convoy bombers
and fight off hostile pursuit planes. Following
establishment of command of the air, which was to be
achieved by destroying enemy air forces at their bases
and aircraft industries, the independent air force
would be able to destroy an enemy nation by attacking
transportation lines and population centers.
Then in the post·World War I period, the most
outspoken proponent of air power in our own country
was, of course, Gen William "Billy" Mitchell. The
story of Billy Mitchell's advocacy of an independent
i:
air force and his insight into the potential of the air
weapon has been told and retold" and does not need
repeating here. During the war, he had been exposed
to ideas of other air pioneers, notably Lord Trenchard,
Douhet, and Caproni, and he came out of the war
convinced, among other ideas, that to be effective air
power should be concentrated in the hands of airmen
and that an air force had a separate, independent
mission from the other services. The extent to which
Smuts, Trenchard, Caproni, and Douhet influenced
him is speculative, but in the post·World War I period
h,s espousal of a principal role-a war.winning role­
for air power is indisputable.
2
Mitchell's ideas concerning air power came
cascading in a stream of publications and public
statements. So wide·ranging were his views, it is
difficult to pin down his views in one brief quotation.
Perhaps, however, the principal thrust of his
arguments was summed up in his statement before the
House Committee on Military Affairs in 1926, when
he declared:
There has never been anything that has come
which has changed war the way the advent of air
power has. The method of prosecuting a war in
the old days was to get at the vital centers of the
country in order to paralyze the resistance. This
meant the centers of production, the centers of
population, the agricultural districts, the animal
industry, communications-anything that
tended to keep up war. Now in order to keep the
enemy out of that, armies were spread in front of
those places and protected them by their flesh
and blood. You had men killing there sometimes
for years before these vital centers were reached.
It led to the theory that the hostile army in the
field was the main objective, which it was. Once
having been conquered, the vital centers could
be gotten at. . . . So that, in the future, we will
strike, in case of armed conflict, when all other
means of settling disputes have failed, to go
straight to the vital centers, the industrial
centers, through the use of an air force and hit
them. That is the modern theory of making war.
This is the general thesis of his last book, Skyways.
War Department Doctrine
While Mitchell advanced ideas on the potential of
air power far in excess of the capabilities of the air
weapon of his day, the War Department General Staff
continued to be nourished on the time·honored
concepts of warfare, which proclaimed that the
infantry was the "Queen of the Battle." Within the War
Department, the two decades after World War I was a
period of conflict, basically between the traditional·
minded Army members of the General Staff and a new
breed within the Army, the upstart airmen, concerning
both the place within the Army for the new air arm
and, more particularly, the role of air power. Gen
John J. Pershing, recently returned from Europe as
head of the victorious American Expeditionary Force
and now Chief of Staff, US Army, threw the weight of
his considerable personal prestige against air power. In
fact, airmen might have been squelched into oblivion
if the American public had not shown an interest in
aviation. Public clamor was at least partially
responsible for forcing the Government to convene a
series of military and congress ional boards and
commissions to inquire into the role and organization
of aviation. The reports of these various investigative
agencies played no small role in keeping the question
of military aviation alive.
With one exception, the report of the Lampert
Committee, which in many respects endorsed
Mitchell's ideas, the reports reflected a general
consensus that the air arm could serve a useful purpose
as an adjunct to the Army and Navy but that there was
no place for a separate air force in the militar y
establishment l\I1d there certamly was no separate air
mission. The prevailing view was summed up in the
July 1934 report of the Baker Board, perhaps the best
known of the various boards. The Baker Board
contended: "Our national defense policy contemplates
aggression against no nation; it is based entirely upon
the defense of our homeland and our overseas
possessions, including protection of our sea and
airborne commerce." The purpose of the Army was
"to hold an invader while the citizen forces are being
mobilized. . . . The idea that aviation can replace
any of the other elements of our armed forces is found,
on analysis, to be erroneous. Since ground forces
alone are capable of occupying territory, the Army
with its own air forces remains the ultimate decisive
factor in war."
Jimmy Doolittle, a member of the Baker Board and
an experienced Army aviator, filed a minority dissent.
He said, "I believe that the future security of our
Nation is d....ndent upon an adequate air force. This
is true at the,.,resent time and will become increasingly
important as the science of aviation advances and the
airplane lends itself more and more to the art of
warfare." He advocated separation for development
and employment.
The Issues
The issues between the advocates of air power and
the older services were clearly drawn. The Army and
Navy would only acknowledge the airplane as a useful
auxiliary. Smuts, Caproni, Douhet, and Mitchell
advanced ideas and concepts that embraced a war­
winning potential for air power and advocated air
attack against "the vital centers, the industrial centers,
the centers or population of the enemy nation."
But these visionary concepts lacked specif-s. How
does one go about destroying or paralyzing these vital
centers? Are cities really the best targets? What are
other targets, if any? How should air power be
controlled and employed? What effect is intended and
expected? In short, what doctrines were needed to
accomplish the ends?
To my knowledge, the Army Air Corps had no
official body of doctrines in the early 1930s. It was a
part of the Army. What little guidance the Air Corps
received for the conduct of its operations was
contained in Training Regulations (fRs), issued by
the War Department. But the brief instruction issued
to the Air Corps through the TRs could scarcely be
called doctrines for the employment of air power.
Moreover, unlike the other branches of the Army,
which had boards-the Infantry Board, the Cavalry
Board, the Artillery Board, etC.-the Air Corps had
no board at that time. In the absence of similar Air
Corps agencies, the Chief of the Air Corps relied upon
the Air Corps Tactical School as a center for
producing concepts of air power employment. So in
reality, the teachings of the Air Corps Tactical School,
as far as airmen were concerned, were the accepted
doctrines of the Air Corps and served as guidance for
forming strategic air plans. These American air
doctrines and concepts of air strategy were evolved at
the Tactical School in the 1930s.
Air Doctrines and Strategic Principles
The Air Corps' tactical school was established at
Langley Field, Virginia, in 1920. Beginning as a Field
Officers' School, it did not expand its scope of
instruction and place emphasis on air power
employment until the end of the decade. The school
was blessed with a group of gifted leaders. But the one
who was primarily responsible for its achievements
was Col John F. Curry, the commandant when the
school moved to Maxwell Field, Alabama, in 1931. He
stood as a shield between his faculty and the harshly
·critical superiors in Washington. He gave freedom of
thought and expression to such leaders as Ken Walker,
Harold George, Don Wilson, Muir "Santy" Fairchild,
and Claire Chennault.
The following expresses the American air doctrines
and strategic principles in effect at the outbreak of
World War II. They owe an obvious debt of gratitude
to Field Marshal Smuts.
The basic elements of the doctrines and principles
of strategic air warfare were to the effect that air forces
could reach and destroy vital targets deep in enemy
territory. The selection and destruction of such targets
could bring defeat to a highly industrialized enemy
nation by:
I. destroying industrial and civic systems which
support the enemy state; or by
2. destroying industrial systems which support the
enemy armed forces; and by these means
3. undermining the nation's will and capability to
resist, which is the ultimate objective of war
operations. In seeking these ends, offensive strategic
air forces could be used as (I) the primary war·
winning force, supported or paralleled by land and sea
forces, as suggested by Air Marshal Smuts, or (2) a
collateral force, coequal with land or sea forces
operating against separate but related objectives. In
any event, the strategic air forces would have to have
strategic air intelligence peculiar to its own needs. Air
power, in pursuit of these two air strategies, required
concentration of effort and unified command and
 control at the top echelon of command if it were to be
effective.
But the very flexibility of air forces made possible
the diversion of the strategic element to (3) operations
in a supporting role. There were situations in which
the lack of vital enemy industrial targets, the existence
of an immediate national emergency, or the overriding
authority of superior command, could result in
application of the strategic air forces to the suppon of
land or sea force objectives. Air forces organized
primarily for performance of strategies I and 2 above
could be shifted to 3; the reverse was not true.
The Air Corps Tactical School considered direct air
attack of urban populations to undermine morale and
to break the civilian "will and capability to continue
the war," but rejected this strategy in favor of selected
target destruction, except as a last reson. Selection of
targets and strategic objectives and methods would
depend upon the national purposes for which the war
was undenaken and the nature of the strategic
situation. Development, organization, and equipping
of strategic air forces would be strongly influenced by
the national objective and the role they were to play.
In addition to specific doctrines of air employment,
the Air Corps Tactical School accepted and adapted
the War Department PrinCiples of War. The most
imponant were:
The Objective: Determine clearly what you want to
accomplish and stick to it.
The Offensive: Only offensive action against the
enemy will produce victory.
Mass: Concentrate the maximum possible
effon toward attainment of the
principal objective. 00 not permit
effon to be divened from the
principal purpose.
Economy of The converse of the Principle of
Force: Mass . In all other operations use as
little force as possible in order to
concentrate mass on the principal
effon.
Security: Unless the base of power is
defended and secure, it will be very
difficult to sustain the strategic
offensive and to continue to
prosecute the war.
The schooI devised a form for determin
ing the
optimum application of strategic air power.
It was
called "the air estimate of the situation for strategic
air
�arfare." The rationale behind this form was fairly
Simple, but the most imponant consider
ations were:
(1) define clearly the purpose, the goal-wh
at do you
Want to accomplish; (2) consider the
obstacles and
opponunities in the broad situation;
(3) list the actions
(tasks) which if successfully accomp
: lished, will attain
the purpose, 10 order of desired
priority; (4) consider
the force needed to accomplish
each task; (5) consider
4 5
the capacity of your own forces and determine which
of the tasks COme within your capability; (6) consider
the risks and losses for each task; (7) select the tasks
which will accomplish most effectively your purpose
without unacceptable risk and loss, and which come
within your capability; and ( 8) prepare a plan to carry
out the selected tasks.
We used this form in preparing all the strategic air
war plans. Purpose was the keynote. Select targets
which contribute most to purpose. It emphasized
another principle-the principle of the capacity of the
force. "00 not attempt tasks which are beyond your
capability. Keep your operations within the capability
of the forces available. It is far better to destroy a few
vital targets completely than to attack many targets
inconclusively."
Although airmen at the Tactical School were slowly
evolving a Concrete body of doctrine for the
employment of strategic air forces, the Army Air
Corps had neither the organization nor the air weapon
necessary to implement it. The closest the Air Corps
came to achieving either in the 1930s was the
establishment of the General Headquarters (GHQ) Air
Force, and the appearance of the B-17 bomber.
The GHQ Air Force
In 1935 the Baker Board, while rejecting the
concept of independent strategic air warfare, did
recommend the creation of a GHQ Air Force. GHQ
would be the General Headquarters of the Army
command in the field, and the GHQ Air Force would
be directly subject to this Army commander. In
keeping with the Baker Board recommendations, the
GHQ Air Force was activated in March 1935.
There were three views as to the purpose of the
GHQ Air Force. One view saw it as GHQ Aviation
Reserve. This was a role advocated for Army aviation
after World War I. Parts of the GHQAir Force would
be apportioned out and attached to field armies and
corps as the situation demanded. A second view saw
the GHQ Air Force as a cohesive air-striking force to
be employed as a unit in furtherance of the Army
mission. Still a third view-one which was held by
airmen-was that it was a unified striking force
available for use beyond the sphere of activity of the
Army as well as in suppon of the Army. In other
words, airmen viewed the GHQ Air Force as an air
force with missions of its own.
The Commanding General of the GHQ Air Force
Maj Gen Frank M. Andrews, felt no doubt about th�
issue and left no doubt in the minds of his associates.
To General Andrews, the GHQ Air Force was an
instrument of air power.
Actually, however, as the War Department
underwent a series of reorganizations in the face of the
growing possibilities of US involvement in war after
1939, the concept of a GHQ went out the window and
with it the GHQ Air Force. The GHQ Air Force was
too short· lived to leave any outstanding legacy of air
doctrine. But it demonstrated in several dramatic
flights that the bomber had superb flexibility and
could quickly be deployed to remote bases.
Significantly, ho\Wever, despite the fight of airmen for
acceptance of air power theories, as late as 1939 the
War Department was still saying, "The mission of the
air component of the Army is to perform effectively
the air operations devolving upon the Army in its
assigned functions in the national defense. Air
operation beyond the sphere of action of the surface
forces are undenaken in furtherance of the strategical
plan of the commander of the field force."
War in Europe
With the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, the
development of air power theory shifted from the Air
Corps Tactical School to other centers of development
and application, and the instructors shifted also. Ken
Walker and Harold George, who had served as
Director of Air Tactics and Strategy at the Air Corps
Tactical School, were in the GHQ Air Force; Oon
Wilson, who had succeeded George as Director of Air
Tactics and Strategy, was in War Plans Division of the
General Staff; "Santy" Fairchild, who, in tum,
succeeded Oon Wilson, was in the pt'fice, Chief of Air
Corps; Larry Kuter, who had "'-n instructor in
Bombardment, was in G·3 of the General Staff; and I,
formerly instructor in Bombardment and Air Force,
was in the Information Division of the Office, Chief of
Air Corps. With the eruption of World War II in
Europe, the doctrines of air power were thrust into the
furnace of war.
The course of the war in Europe was a cause of
growing concern. On 9 July 1941, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt sent a letter to the Secret.".ies of War and
the Navy asking them to prepare "an estimate of
overall production requirements required to defeat our
potential enemies."
The First Strategic Air Plan (AWPD·l)
The Joint Army-Navy Board met in response to the
President's inquiry but was unable to agree on joint
strategy. Each Department proceeded to estimate its
OW� requirements.
The preparation of the Army requirements fell
upon the War Plans Division (WPD) of the General
Staff. WPD requested assignment of some Air Corps
officers to assist in preparing the Air Annex. Col
Harold George, who had just been made chief of the
new Air War Plans Division of the equally new Air
Staff, Army Air Forces, protested, asserting that the
task of preparing the air requirements should fall upon
his division. Lt Gen Henry H. Arnold' agreed and
"GcncBl Arnold.,... Commandina Omeral, US Army Air Corp..
arranged for this transfer of responsibility. Colonel
George got the job on 4 August, just seven days before
. the estimates had to be submitted.
Four of us, all former instructors at Maxwell, took
on the task-Harold George, Chief of the Division;
Ken Walker, Chief of the War Plans Group; Larry
Kuter, borrowed from G-3 of the General Staff; and
myself, Chief of the European Section of the War
Plans Group.' The result was a straightforward
product of air doctrine produced at Maxwell.
Two major problems faced Colonel George and his
planning team: selecting an overall strategic concept
and air objective, and preparing an air plan to achieve
that objective. Army and Air Corps doctrines were in
open conflict in the resolution of both aspects of the
strategic air problem.
After a period of discussion, we agreed to adopt a
strategic air objective aimed at winning the war by air
power, in accordance with Tactical School doctrine.
But we also recognized the possibility that capitulation
of Germany and Italy might not result from the air
offensive alone, and we appended a provision for
support of an invasion if necessary. The critical
weakening of Germany and Italy through destruction
of vital interior structures would, of course, contribute
t"ward the final operations of the ground forces on the
continent if that should prove necessary. Hence, we
reasoned, such an air strategy should not be
unacceptable to the Army planners. In the initial
phase, the air forces would go all out to make the
weakening of the enemy interior structure so drastic as
to be decisive in itself.
In the Far East, we would initially assume the
strategic defensive, whether or not Japan declared war
on the United States. Since there was no suggestion
that permanent acquisition of territory was a goal of
our national policy, the only purpose of invasion
would be to apply "compellance.". Air power could,
ve thought, apply this "compellance" at far less cost in
American lives.
In p r o d u c i n g our p l a n , w e w e r e a i d e d
immeasurably b y two guidelines the War Department
gave us-ABC-I Agreement and Rainbow War Plan
No. 5. In the face of the growing threat of the Axis
Powers to the democracies, British and American
military staff conferences opened in January 1941
with the purpose of establishing principles of
cooperation "should the United States be compelled to
resort to war." In March, the military experts formally
approved a document subsequently cited as American­
British Conversations-I, or in abbreviated form,
ABC-I. For air planners. the most significant features
of ABC-I were (I) the European Theater would be
°It II of �nl intcreallD nok that the Air War Plam Divilion had eeveraI "cbieft"
but no "Indi-." There was no JIIIff in the War Pianl Group.
01 coined the word "CQlJlpeUance" which il construed to mean eoerc:ion for an
hononble and acceptable JIlIlPI*'. Coen:lOrI aIoIle i, rK'! an acceptable ta:m bocauae it "­
an WlattrlICtive connotation oIthc application of II(IIRUI\lC force-tM aetllxuor thrallS of
1 bully.

considered the primary, decisive theater and (2) the
stipulation that "Offensive measures in the European
area will include a sustained air offensive against
German military power, supplemented by air offensive
against other regions und�r enemy control which
contributed to that power. " In short, offensively,
American a i r resources would be used i n
collaboration with the Royal Air Force against
German military power. The provisions of ABC- I
were incorporated into the war plan under
development by the War and Navy Departments, and,
10 May 1 94 1 , the Joint Army-Navy Board approved
the war plan known as RAINBOW No. 5. It was
subsequently approved by the Secretaries of War and
Navy and President Roosevelt. Although the ABC- I
Agreements and RAINBOW No. 5 underwent some
agonizing reappraisals on the part of the War
Department and some differences in interpretation of
the ABC- I Agreements arose, RAINB(JW No. 5
provided the basic guideline for planning US
participation in World War II. And our small
planning staff provided the Army Air Force input to
the final plan.
In planning for the strategic air war against
Germany, we listed the vital industrial systems of
Germany and arranged them in desired priority;
selected key targets; determined the size bombs
required and estimated the number of hits required on
each target to cause destruction; determined the
number of bombs that should be dropped to give a 90
percent chance of getting at least that number of hits
on each target; computed the number of successful
sorties required for initial destruction and to sustain
that destruction; estimated the number of missions that
could be launched per month; estimated losses and
aborts; estimated the capacity of the American aircraft
industry to produce specified types of combat and
training aircraft (information provided by the Material
Division of the Air Staff); examined the target list in
the light of the expected capacity of the force and
selected the Primary and Intermediate Target Systems
.1 to be attacked; and concluded that it would take six
Ii months of operations after the force had reached full
size to accomplish the results desired.
The intermediate and primary objectives and target
systems, selected after consideration of the capacity of
the force, were: Intermediate objective (with overriding
priority), adequate neutralization of the German
fighter force; Primary objectives. disruption of the
German electric power system, transportation system
(railroads, canals), and the oil and petroleum system
(includi"i! the refineries at Polesti, Romania). As a last
resort, if necessary in order to topple the German state,
we would undermine morale by attack of cities. The
offensive strategic air forces would be based in
England, Ireland, and the vicinity of Cairo, Egypt.
Defensive strategic air forces were deployed to defend
the Western Hemisphere and initially our Pacific
IOterests and possessions. Strategic offense against
6 7
doctrinal thought and a blueprint for the air war of application) of AWPD-I in the strategic air war
Japan would follow the defeat of Hitler and apply a
which followed.' against the European Axis in an earlier work.' This
similar strategy. (For Total Force Requirements see
study directs attention to the strategic air war against
Table I - I .)
I have described the application (including the lack Japan.
The final plan was called AWPD- I -Air War Plans
Division Plan No. I . It was submitted at the last
possible moment and became "Annex 2 Air
Requirement" of the War Department report. Gen
George C. Marshall and Secretary Henry L. Stimson "FIItrdl. Idaa, Concqt.r, �, p.59.
accept� the air plan in detail. But the Joint Board, in
submittlOg the full report, took little notice of the air
plan. The Board stated:
Air Forces and naval forces can render valuable
assistance, but it can be accepted as an almost
invariable rule that only armies can win wars.
Total Force Requirements, AWPD- I
Heavy bombers B - 1 7, B -24 47 groups
Very heavy bombers B-29, B-32 24 groups
Very long-range bombers B-36 44 groups
Fighters 54 groups
Others (primarily for support 82 groups
of ground forces)
Total groups 25 1
Total Combat Aircraft
Production 6 1 799AIC
Trainers 37051
Total Aircraft Production 98850
The B-36s were required in case Britain should
collapse.
Thble 1 - 1 . Total Force Requirements
Dr Robert F. Futrell has pinpointed the achievement
as follows:
. . . The War Plans Division had asked only to
know the maximum number of air squadrons
which the Army Air Forces might ultimately
require to garrison a great number of geographic
sites and to hold as "reserves of opportunity. " But
[Col] George and his associates (most of whom
had been faculty members at the Air Corps
Tactical School) undertook to prepare a
comprehensive air plan for the defeat of the
Axis. Beginning on 4 August, teams of two or
three officers worked up separate subjects and
supporting tabs, and AWPD- I , "Munitions
y
Requirements of the Arm Air Forces" was
completed on 1 2 August 1 94 1 . The completion
of the first major strategic air war plan by the
newly-formed Army Air Forces staff in only
nine days was a notable achievement which
marked both the apex of prewar air force

Strategic Purposes, Plans and PreparatlQl1s
for the Air Offensive Against Japan
Tidal Wave from Pearl Harbor
The Japanese aircraft that destroyed the US Navy's
battle line at Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7
December 1 9 4 1 produced reverberations that
extended far beyond the Pacific. The attack rouaed an
apathetic America into a fury of resentment and
produced a tidal wave of emotion that swept over the
carefully reasoned plans which had been prepared to
meet a war emergency. The wave of emotion affected
civilians and military alike. America had watched the
progress of the war in Europe and the Far East with
bemused and pacific apprehension. Suddenly, after
Pearl Harbor, there was a call for action, and the call
focused attention on the Pacific and Far East - upon
the Japanese - not upon Hitler and his Nazis.
US military planners had not been idle after the
outbreak of war in Europe. Despite the pacifists
prevailing in the country, the possibility of the United
States being drawn into the conflict was very real. The
plans which had been prepared in a calmer and more
logical atmosphere called for the initial effort to be
launched apinst Axis Europe, while the war against
Japan would be restricted to the strategic defensive
pending the defeat of Hitler. Then, and only then,
America would transfer her might to the Pacific and
defeat the Japanese. Ouring the defensive phase in the
Pacific, the US fleet would seek out and defeat the
Japanese fleet if opportunity occurred, but the primary
effort and the priority of resources would be devoted
to the defeat of Hitler. In other words, the maximum
possible effort would be concentrated upon the main
objective, the defeat of Hitler; the minimum effective
force and effort would be devoted to the restraint of
Hirohito.
With the loss of the battleships at Pearl Harbor, the
opportunity to meet the Japanese fleet on the high seas
9
CHAPTER 2
would have to be postponed. But emotions were
running high and reversal of the "Europe first"
strategy and assumption of the offensive against Japan
at the earliest possible time seemed likely. The order of
priority in building and deploying our forces was
likely to veer in that direction.
Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the
Germans damaged their cause by promptly declaring
war against the United States. This act within itself,
however, did not stem the tide of opinion, which
demanded immediate retaliation in the Pacific. It was
not the Germans who had attacked us; it was the
Japanese. The US Navy understandably welcomed this
public surge toward reprisal against the Japanese. For
over a generation, the Navy had looked toward the day
when it would sweep the Pacific oceans of the
Japanese. Now the Navy was seriously depleted in
terms of capital ships and the trained and patriotic
men who manned them. The Navy had also suffered an
affront to the pride of the organization that had
produced the world's greatest fighting machine at sea.
The logic of a "Europe first" strategy seemed likely to
be quenched in the sea of emotion.
Almost immediately after Pearl Harbor, Prime
Minister Winston Churchill announced his intention
to come to America to join President Franklin D.
Roosevelt for consultations between the new allies on
combined grand strategy. He may have sensed the
American impulse to tum west against Japan rather
than east against Axis Europe in the new situation. He
announced that he would bring his military staff, the
Chiefs of Staff Committee, consisting of the Chief of
the Imperial General Staff, Sir Alan Brooke; the First
Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound; and the Chief of Staff of
the Royal Air Force, ,Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles
Portal. They would be supported by the members of
the British Joint Plans Committee and Joint
intelligence Committee.
 We viewed this approaching visit with alarm and
some misgiving. The British interservice staff
organization was competent and experienced. On the
other hand, we, as yet, had no similar committee
organizations that were prepared to confer with the
British. Moreover, our plans and desires were in
complete disarray as a result of Pearl Harbor.
The President met this emergency by appointing the
US Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. On the initiative
i po
of General Marshall, the President accepted the
I. Commanding General of the Army Air Forces,
General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold in the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Committee, in order to meet Mr Churchill's
suggestion that there should be an American "opposite
member" to the Chief of the Air Staff of the Royal Air
Force. But he issued no formal directive defining
General Arnold's position.
Adm William D. Leahy, who had been US
Ambassador to France, had recently' returned to
become the President's personal Chief of Staff.
Initially he attended the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff for the purpose of keeping the President
informed of the proceedings and discussions of the
Committee, in much the same role as that of Sir
Hastings Ismay, Mr Churchill's military assistant, who
attended the meetings of the British Chiefs of Staff
Committee.
The new "Joint Chiefs of Staff' set up supporting
committees, including, as the principal ones, the Joint
I Plans Committee, the Joint Strategic Committee, the
Joint Intelligence Committee, and the Joint Logistics
'I Committee.
I to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that I must divest
The Joint Strategic Committee
The Joint Strategic Committee and the Joint
Intelligence Committee supported the Joint Chiefs of
Staff through the Joint Plans Committee. The Joint
Plans Committee initially consisted of Rear Adm R.K.
Turner, US Navy (chairman); Col Thomas T. Handy,
US Army; and Col Harold L. George, US Army Air
Corps. After Colonel George assumed command of
the Air Transport Command in March 1 942, Maj Gen
Carl Spaatz became the Air member, with Col Howard
Craig serving as his deputy.
The functions of the Joint Strategic Committee
were described in these terms.
The mission of the Joint US Strategic
Committee is to prepare such strategical
estimates, studies, and plans as may be directed
by the Joint Staff Planners, and to initiate such
studies as the Committee may deem appropriate.
The estimates and studies produced by the
Joint US Intelligence Committee and the Joint
US Strategic Committee should present the
considered, composite convictions of each
committee. In their studies and deliberations
10
preliminary t o committee conclusions, i t is
intended that the members of these committees
should present their individual views regarding
the matter under consideration. When higher
authority has reached a decision or has issued a
directive, the committee concerned will be
guided accordingly.
The original membership of the Joint Strategic
Committee included the following:
Capt O. M. Read, Col R. T. Maddocks,
USN USA
Capt B. J. Rodgers, Lt Col J. C. Balmer,
USN USA
Capt Forrest Sherman, Lt Col A. C. Wedemeyer,
USN USA
Maj H. L. Litzenberg, Maj H. S. Hansell,
USMC USA Air Corps
On a Friday morning, I received orders transferring
me immediately from the Army Air Corps where I Was
Chief of. the European Section of the Air War Plans
Division to the War Department General Staff Corps.
I was ordered to report to the Joint Strategic
Committee at its new offices on Monday morning. As
a member of this committee, I found myself in the
midst of the massive machinery which was trying to
deal with problems of worldwide proportions. I Was
told that my loyalties in my newjob were to be devoted
myself of service loyalties and all pr'<iudices that
related to one branch of the military service.
There were only four offices for the eight members
of the Committee. Each office had a large double desk
at which two officers, of different services, sat. Each
desk had one "in" basket, one "out" basket, and one
"hold" basket. Every effort was made to force us into
concerted action and to divorce us from separatism
and service loyalties.
We were a group of strangers, four from the War
Departtnent and four from the Navy Department. The
senior officer was Captain Read" of the Navy. He
acted as chairman initially but alternated with Colonel
Maddocks at Army insistence.
The military beliefs of the various members of the
Joint Strategic Committee were as different as the
members themselves and reflected the divergent
backgrounds of the individuals and their training. But,
of the eight committee members, I was, unfortunately,
the only graduate of the Air Corps Tactical School,
though the school had graduated many Army, Navy,
and Marine Corps officers. I, for one, was familiar
°Capcaia Read wu aoon repI&«Id by Navy Capt H. E. RodrlCld. Thil; Navy
dlaint1&l1Mip followed an intcratilll pattern. Later in the war,1 count �Ied that more
than 75 �t oC the ICS Committeet were chaired by NIVY offi cc....
with Air Corps doctrine which taught that wars, once
entered upon, should be won in the sense that victory
should make possible the attainment of national war
aims and that victory involved overcoming the enemy's
"will to resist" while preserving one's own. That end
could be sought by adopting one or more of the
following options:
I . Providing security for one's own sources of
r statement of policy to serve as guidance. We did agree,
�� befeating the enemy's forces in battle;
3. Destroying (or cutting off) the war-supporting
industrial structure which supplied the instruments
with which the enemy fought;
4. Destroying or debilitating the industrial systems
which supported both the war-supporting and the
civil-social life-supporting vitality of the enemy State;
5. As a last resort, destroying great numbers of the
enemy people themselves, particularly the masses
dwelling in the cities.
Of these options, air power might be employed to
achieve I , 3 , 4 and 5, or to assist the Army and Navy in
achieving 2.
This Air Corps doctrine obviously was not
unanimously adopted by the committee. In fact, there
was no unanimity - no common ground - on whIch
the members of the Joint Strategic Committee might
move in unison toward recommending a joint overall
strategy for the conduct of the war.
With the exception of Lt _ Col Wedemeyer, the
members of the Joint Strategic Committee were
unaware of the Air Corps' views on air power and
certainly were unprepared to accept them. The Army
members considered that victory could come only
through invasion and defeat of the enemy army. The
Navy was prepared to go along with this view, with the
clear understanding that invasion could not possibly
be considered until the Navy had defeated the enemy
navy and secured the lines of communication.
Thereafter, the Navy was prepared to support the
amphibious assault and protect the hnes of
communication, and leave the rest up to the Army.
supported by the air forces. As the Air Corps member,
I contended that the enemy could best be defeated by
strategic air power. The Joint Strategic Committee was
treading on troubled waters. The potential capability
of strategic air power to be the decisive element in
achieving victory continued to be disputed till the end
of the war.
We were just getting acquainted when we received
our first directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the
meeting was called to order, a burly captain of
Marines entered, bearing a locked and sealed
briefcase. He wore side arms and an armed guard
accompanied him. With much ceremony, he removed
a message from his briefcase and received a signed
receipt. The directive was from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff by way of the Joint Plans Committee. It was a
masterpiece of directness and simplicity. The directive
said, in effect, "What should be the strategic concept
II
for the conduct of the warT' Making no reference to
previous plans or policies and making no effort to
influence our views, it left the field wide open.
Unfortunately, the directive furnished no statement
of national purpose or national objective of the war to
serve as guidance for our formidable task. Equally
unfortunately, we, as the Joint Strategic Committee,
did not seek to interpret national attitude and
however, at our first meeting upon a sensible first
step-calling upon the Joint Intelligence Committee
for a presentation of the world intelligence situation.
The Joint Intelligence presentation was gloomy
indeed. All of Western Europe had become a German
citadel, and Hitler's armies were at the gates of
Moscow. The Germans had suffered a rebuff, but thts
was considered to be as much the result of winter
weather as of Russian counterattack. The Joint
Intelligence Committee estimated that Russian
resistance would collapse within three months after
resumption of fighting in the spring. That would be in
about six months. The Japanese were pressing
relentlessly onward with no sign of weakening.
Corregidor might hold out for a whi Ie but would
simply be bypassed. The Intelligence Committee
estimated that the Germans and Japanese might join
hands in the vicinity of Karachi, India, within the year.
Taking note of these facts, opinions, and predictions,
we sought to evaluate them. In our deliberations, the
great question marks were the Russian army and the
capability of Britain to hold out.
The Russian army offered no reason for optimism.
Little was known of it, but that little was hardly
encouraging. The Communist Party had killed off
great numbers of the professional military in the
purges of the I 930s. Thereafter, the Government
instituted the Commissar System. ThIS RUSSIan army
had not fared well against the very small adversary of
Finland in 1939 and 1 940. Rumor indicated that the
communists abandoned the commissar system
thereafter. Later, however, we learned that this was not
true. The Soviets were extremely secretive and treated
their allies as potential enemies.
The great Russian army had permitted itself to
suffer the disastrous effects of surprise the previous
summer when Hitler had unleashed 1 63 divisions
against them on 22 June 1 94 1 . How the Germans
could amass armies totaling 1 6 3 divisions on the
Russian border without alerting the Russians to their
danger remains a mystery. Actually Stalin had been
warned, both by the British and by his own agents.
The summer campaign of the Germans had
produced one of the wonders of military history. Using
the bold tactics of wide envelopment and of deep
penetration by Guderian's armoured forces closely
supported by the Luftwaffe to cut out huge chunks of
Russians, and a follow-up with foot soldiers at an
amazing pace, the Germans simply ingested over a
million Russian prisoners at a rate which surely taxed
the prisoner-of-war facilities to the utmost.
In the winter of 1 942, the hope of continued
Russian resistance on any major scale seemed dim
indeed. If Russia capitulated, or if Russian military
resistance faded away, what then? The Germans would
be released for redeployment against the British. The
British had shown a capability to preserve their
security through the Battle of Britain. But it was
problematical whether Britain could be successful a
second time. With the European industry available for
producing new armaments, the deficiencies which led
to the defeat of the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain
could be corrected. Longer-range bombers and escort
fighters might accomplish what the He 1 1 I and the Me
109 and 1 10 failed to do. The submarine campaign
might be extended until it did, indeed, starve Britain
into submission or accommodation. Thea all would be
lost. and America would face either the extension of
German power into South America, or the prospect of
an uneasy peace in which the vast resources and
markets of Europe were subject to German
exploitation.
But what could be done about it? More specifically,
what could the United States do about it?
The "Victory Program," just completed, had shown
that it would take two years to raise the armies and
build ships to transport them to Europe for massive
combined invasion to "Fortress Europe" even if the
British were able to survive and persist. Two years
seemed quite hopeless.
We had been spared the agony of deciding whether
to go to war. The Japanese had made that decision for
us. But the Joint Strategic Committee would have been
well advised to preface its deliberations with a
determination of national purpose and national
military objectives. The first was, unfortunately,
ignored. The latter was commonly agreed to be
"victory over our enemies," victory so convincing as to
permit our statesmen and political leaders to lay out
whatever course was best for America and for the
world.
The Committee faced the following two options in
terms of national grand strategy: (a) strategic offensive
in Europe and strategic defensive against Japan; (b)
strategic defensive of the Western Hemisphere and
strategic offensive against Japan. The Committee also
faced several options in terms of military force
application. The options considered were:
1 . Primary emphasis on invasion.
2. Primary emphasis on sea blockade.
3. Primary emphasis on strategic air attack.
4. Combinations of these primary options.
To be sure, earlier the President and the Prime
Minister had clearly favored a joint offensive in
Europe as a first priority. But this was before the
catastrophe of Pearl Harbor and the proximate defeat
of Soviet Russia. At this point, the Joint Strategic
Committee felt free to make a new military appraisal.
12
I n fact, the Committee looked upon this a s a
requirement in view of the directive from the Joint
Chiefs.
It soon became evident the direction most of the
members of the Committee would favor. If the
salvation of Europe was hopeless, then it would be
stupid to waste resources on a doomed venture and
leave the Japanese undi sturbed while they
consolidated their expanding areas of conquest. In
short, insofar as grand strategy was concerned, the
majority of the Committee tended toward option b,
strategic defensive of the Western Hemisphere and
strategic offensive against Japan. As to military force
application, the Navy, understandably enough, favored
primary emphasis on blockade and upon gaining
domination of the Pacific. gaining sea superiority in
the critical areas vital to Japan, and, finally, of
supporting invasion. Army members stoutly
contended that invasion, both in Europe and Japan,
was the decisive maneuver for victory.
I, of course, was the proponent of air power as the
primary instrument of victory. Although my interests
included air defense and air support, they centered on
strategic air warfare. And I was not prepared to write
off Europe as already lost. There were a number of
primary modes for the application of air power. We do
not need to go into them here as they pertained to the
air war against Germany.· The significant point was,
however, that authorities at the very highest levels had
already approved AWPD- l . In defense of my position,
therefore, I briefed the committee in detail on this
approved plan, which proposed first priority on a
sustained and unremitting air bombardment of
Germany.
The purpose of the air offensive was "to debilitate
the German war machine through destruction of war
industries and topple the German state if possible, and
to prepare for support of an invasion if that should be
necessary." More specifically, AWPD- l called for the
operation of 4,800 medium, heavy, and very heavy
bombers for six months against:
German Air Force - 30
German Electric
Power System - 50
German Petroleum
System - 27
German Transpor­
tation System � selected targets
15 4 selected targets
The primary air objectives were described in - some
detail with regard to Axis Europe; they were less
definitive with regard to Japan.
Days and nights of bitter but earnest argument
within the Committee ensued. The weight of the
• For deuill of the variOlA moda of appIiwion nail.tlle. see my 11... Air PIfm T11U1
Dtt/Nt«i Hirlrr.
Committee sentiment and conVIctIOn gravitated
steadily to the Pacific. Committee members had spent
their professional lives studying military history, and
the majority were inclined to accept a strict
interpretation of the Joint Army-Navy Board's precept
expressed in the Victory Program: "Naval and air
power may prevent wars from being lost and, by
weakening enemy strength, may greatly contribute to
victory. By themselves, however, naval and air forces
seldom, if ever, win important wars. It should be
recognized as an almost invariable rule that only land
armies can finally win wars." And invasion by land
armies before the collapse of Russia seemed a very
remote possibility.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff grew impatient. They sent
a message demanding an answer to their question.
Colonel Wedemeyer and I favored a grand strategy of
Axis Europe first, even though the prospects of victory
in Europe looked very grim indeed. A head count
showed that the great majority of our committee
members, three-fourths in fact, favored defense of the
Western Hemisphere and offense against Japan. They
were ready to acknowledge the loss of Europe and
Britain as a hopeless cause and assume the offensive
against Japan at the earliest possible time, culminating
in the invasion and conquest of the Japanese home
islands.
I was motivated, by a number of convictions, to turn
our maximum effort to the defeat of Hitler. A year's
study as head of the strategic intelligence section of
A-2 led me to a firm belief that Germany was
susceptible to defeat from the air. I estimated and
evaluated the force requirements to achieve this aim. I
knew that the air offensive would not have to be
delayed two years; it could begin in the near future and
reach massive proportions in a little over one year if it
was accorded top priority. I knew that base areas could
be provided in Britain. And a tour in England as an
observer of the war convinced me that Britain would
fight and continue to fight so long as there was one ray
of hope. We could supply that ray.
I felt that victory over Hitler was essential to
selected targets
America's future well-being. Failure to preserve
Europe could produce a situation in which a Nazi­
selected targets
dominated Europe could become too strong for our
economic competition or our military security. This
selected targets
was not so in regard to the Far East. Failure to thwart
Hirohito would lead to discomfort, but not to disaster.
Colonel Wedemeyer also believed that we should do
everything in our power to defeat Hitler and save
Europe. He, too, felt that a Europe dominated and
exploited by Hitler could prove to be a disaster for the
future of America.
Together we persuaded our associates. The
recommended grand strategy which was submitted to
the Joint Chiefs through the Joint Plans Committee
provided for strategic offensive operations against
Axis Europe as the maximum national effort until
Nazi Germany was decisively defeated, and
13
concurrent strategic defensive operations i n the
Pacific with minimum diversion of available forces
from the effort against Hitler. Maximum effort
strategic offensive operations would be launched
against Japan immediately after the defeat of Hitler.
The initial mode of offensive operations against Axis
Europe would be through a combined strategic air
offensive by the Royal Air Force and the US Army Air
Forces from bases in England. The offensive would be
directed against the German air force and the war­
making and civic-sustaining resources of the German
state. Preparation for an invasion of the Continent and
sustained and combined air and surface warfare would
be provided. The proponents of strategic air warfare
hoped that an invasion would not be necessary, but
Allied grand strategy could not be pinned to that hope
alone.
This grand strategy was accepted by the US Joint
Chiefs of Staff and was formally accepted by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff on 3 1 Dec 1 94 1 . The
agreement contained the following paragraph:
The essential features of the American-British
Strategy as adopted by the Combined Chiefs of
Staff on December 3 1 , 1 94 1 , based on the
principle that only the minimum of force
necessary for the safe-guarding of vital interests
in other theaters should be diverted from
operations against Germany, were:
<a) The realization of the victory programs of
armaments, which first and foremost requires the
security of the main areas of war industry.
( b ) T h e m a i n te n a n c e o f e s s e n t i a l
communications.
(c) Closing and tightening the ring around
Germany.
(d) Wearing down and undermining German
resistance by air bombardment, blockade and
subversive activities and propaganda.
(e) The continuous development of offensive
action against Germany.
(f) Maintaining only such positions in the
Eastern theater as will safeguard vital interests
and deny to Japan access to raw materials vital to
her continuous war effort while we are
concentrating on the defeat of Germany.
It is interesting to note that the Combined Chiefs of
Staff recognized that defensive security ofthe sources of
power, the main areas of population and war industry,
must be ensured before any offensive operations could be
sustained.
One would expect that this would settle the
dichotomy over early offense against Japan, but this
was not so. The US Navy was not content with a
defensive role and demanded the acceptance of a
"limited active defense" against Japan, with forces
assigned for this purpose. Specifically Navy officials
wanted a US Army strategic air force assigned to
support naval forces in the South Pacific. The matter
was referred to the Joint Strategic Committee.
The crux of the disagreement focused on
communications between Hawaii and Australia. I
demurred against provision of a strategic air force in
the Pacific which would compete with requirements
for Europe, but the other committee members agreed
with the Navy's contention that the line of
communications to Australia through New Zealand
was vital to the war effort and that "there must be
provided a mobile air force of long-range aircraft to
operate with the mobile naval surface forces." The
idea was appealing and had merit-if we Iwd forces to
support it.
I agreed that the area was important but could not
agree that a long-range air force should be provided
for operations in that area. Actually, we had no long­
range air forces at all. The Eighth Air Force was to be
organized for deployment to England .at the earliest
possible moment. But it was not even in existence. We
were short of long-range bombers and trained crews,
and we were straining to provide such an air force for
the air offensive against Axis Europe. To set up
another long-range air force for operations in the
South Pacific would dilute our sparce resources
beyond recognition. This was the first of the many
efforts-some of them all too successful-to divert
long-range bombers from their agreed first priority
job, the attack of Germany.
I su ? mitted a dissenting minority report,
contendmg that no long-range bombers other than the
ones planned for the purpose in AWPD-I should be
diverted from the main air offensive against Germany.
This was, I suspect, the first "split-paper" submitted to
the Joint Chiefs.
The Joint Chiefs were not pleased. They delivered
an official reprimand to our Committee and directed
us to reconvene and come up with an agreed
recommendation. General Arnold called me in and
gave me a "personal admonition," to go on my record.
I believe other members received similar treatment
from their respective chiefs.
We reconvened in continuous session. Colonel
Wedemeyer, who had always inclined to a "Europe
first" strategy, recognized the danger in setting up a
competing demand for a strategic air force in the
South Pacific. He joined me, and we worked as a team.
Little by little the others came around-the Navy
members most reluctantly. Finally, we came to
agreement on the need for concentration of forces for
the main effort against Axis Europe with a minimum
of diversion elsewhere. We submitted our unanimous
findings, which were accepted. I rather thought
General Arnold would remove the record of my
personal admonition, since I had won my point, and I
am sure he would have if he had thought of it. But
apparently it did not occur to him.
I do not think it wise to make too much of these
incidents. I doubt that the Joint Chiefs would have
endorsed the recommendation first favored by the
majority of our Committee-abandoning Europe as
14
irrevocably lost and turning our energies to defeat of
Japan. But it is possible that they might have. The
President and Mr Churchill would certainly have
overridden any recommendation to that effect. But if
Germany had not declared war on the United States so
promptly, the President would have had to face alone
the wave of anger against Japan. I think it quite
possible that, under those circumstances, our main
effort might have been in the Pacific. The incidents
have, I think, two points of significance.
First, if Germany's declaration of war against the
United States had been omitted entirely or had been
delayed, Mr Churchill would have found it difficult to
arrange for immediate conversations on British­
American grand strategy, on a worldwide basis. And
it would have been difficult for him to bring the British
Chiefs of Staff Committee and their supporting
committees with him. Since there would have been no
immediate need for a US air member to balance the
Chief of Staff of the Royal Air Force, it is quite likely
that the initial composition of the US Joint Chiefs of
Staff (if such a committee were appointed at all) would
have elllbraced only the Chief of Staff of the Army and
the Qhief of Naval Operations, together with the
Presldent's personal Chief of Staff. Without air
membership, the US Joint Chiefs in their deliberations
on grand strategy would have clinched the argument
that Britain could not be saved by surface warfare and
would have endorsed the decision to abandon support
of Britain as infeasible and to make defeat of Japan the
primary offensive military objective.
Second, the Navy never abandoned, really, its
adherence to the concept that equal priority should go
to the war in the Pacific-to the defeat of Japan. When
the final plans for invasion of the Japanese home
islands were approved in 1945, the Navy had
completed an enormous armada in the Pacific,
including 10 new battleships and 13 rebuilt old ones
and 109 aircraft carriers of assorted sizes. Nearly all of
these ships had been committed or laid down in 1942
and 1943, and they had enjoyed equal priority with the
needs and demands of the Army for new armaments,
though these Navy resources were destined for the
secondary, defensive effort in the Pacific, not to the
primary offensive effort against Axis Europe.
The enormous carrier force was equipped with
multiple aircraft complements and combat crews for
each carrier. These, too, enjoyed equal priority in
resources with the Army Air Forces, which were
committed to the top priority strategic effort against
Axis Europe.
No one will deny the magnificent performance of
these forces in the Pacific. But their production
schedule was not in consonance with the agreed joint
strategy, and it competed with and jeopardized the
buildup of forces for the main effort.
My tenure with the Joint Strategic Committee was
not long. In May, General Eisenhower asked for me to
head up an air plans office in his European Theater of
Operations. and, in June, I went to England, where he
promoted me to brigadier general. My replacement on
the Joint Strategic Committee was Col E. E. "Pat"
Partridge. I went from that job to wing and air division
commands in the Eighth Air Force.
AWPD.42
In August 1942, I was called back from England on
a temporary basis to direct preparation of a plan (in
response to the President's request) for the
requirements to reach air supremacy. AWPD- I had
been a "contingency plan," in case we should go to
war; but this later plan, AWPD-42, found us at war
with all three Axis Powers. We had just begun initial
air operations from English air bases. AWPD-42 was
essentially a "requirements" plan-a plan which
specified the munitions and base requirements to carry
out a strategy-since we still lacked the essential
military forces with which to conduct important air
operations. AWPD-42 retained the basic structure of
AWPD- l . The defeat of Germany was still in first
priority, and the air offensive against Japan was still
deferred.
The primary strategic purpose was still that of
undermining and destroying the capability and will of
Germany to wage war by destroying the war­
supporting industries and the systems upon which the
war industries and the urban economy of Germany
depended.
The air operations contemplated for 1 943 and
1 944 were:
I . An air offensive against Axis Europe to
a. defeat the German air force
b. destroy the sources of German submarine
construction
c. undermine the German war-making capacity
2. Air support of a land offensive in Northwest
Africa
3. Air support of United Nations' land operations
to retain the Middle East
4. Air support of surface operations in the
Japanese Theater to regain base areas for a final
offensive against Jap;1O proper, including:
a. land operations from India through China,
reopening the Burma Road;
b. amphibious operations from the South and
Southwest Pacific toward the Philippine Islands
5. Hemisphere defense, including antisubmarine
patrol
The air objectives were described as:
I Intermediate objective, with overriding priority:
(German) Fighter aircraft assembly plants
Bomber aircraft assembly
plants
Aero engine assembly plants
Primary objectives:
(German) Submarine yards
Transportation targets
Electric power system
Oil plants
15
Aluminum plants
Synthetic rubber plants
The purpose of the strategic air offensive against
Japan, when it could be inaugurated, would be similar
to that against Germany: to undermine and destroy the
capability and will of the Japanese people to wage war
by destroying the war-supporting industries and the
systems upon which the war industries and the civilian
economy of Japan depended.
In comparison with operations and priorities called
for in AWPD- I , by 1942 worldwide operations
revealed some weakening of resolve to keep the
maximum possible air strength directed toward the
primary strategic air offensive: the destruction of the
vital elements of Germany. Northwest Africa was
drawing off air forces for support of land operations
there. Land operations in the Middle East were
diverting air elements in support there as well. And
surface operations to regain base areas in the Far East,
as distinct from operations for strictly defensive
purpose, were absorbing air effort too. All these must,
of necessity, detract from the air offensive against
Germany. Yet the latter had not even started in any
meaningful sense and the delay would be still further
extended as diversions continued to grow.
As for the air offensive against Japan, it was still too
early to give anything more than general guidance in
terms of objectives and targets. Nevertheless,
AWPD-42 took cognizance of the strategic air
offensive against Japan, after the defeat of Germany,
by proposing the following targets in Japan:
Aircraft engine plants
Submarine yards
Naval and commercial bases
Alumina and aluminum plants
Iron and steel
Oil
Chemical plants
Rubber factories
There are two striking omissions from this list: the
electric power system; and the transportation system,
including shipping, harbor and repair facilities, inland
seas routes and waterways, and railroads. The
omission of the electric power system stemmed from
the general belief, resulting from cursory analysis by
A-2, that electric power was produced in a multiplicity
of small hydroelectric generating plants which would
render the system as a whole practically invulnerable
to attack. The analysis had not been made in depth and
no examination of the distribution system had been
undertaken. However, there was' ample time for
further examination of the system. Failure to proceed
with detailed analysis was a costly error.
My interests in the Pacific diminished as I became
heavily engaged in the European war, and they did not
surface again until I attended the QUADRANT
Conference at Quebec, Canada, as General Ira C.
Eaker's representative.

PART II
STRATEGIC WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Pacific Strategy
QUADRANT Conference
Grand strategy for the Pacific began to receive
formal reexamination at t he Q U A D R A N T
Conference o f the Combined Chiefs o f Staff, held at
Quebec in August of 1943. There was no specific
emphasis placed upon a sustained strategic bomber
offensive against Japan in the conclusions of the
Conference. The QUADRANT Conference reached
the following agreement regarding the overall strategic
concept for the prosecution of the war:
In cooperation with RUSSIA and other Allies
to bring about at the earliest possible date, the
unconditional surrender of the AXIS in
EUROPE.
Simultaneously, in cooperation with other
PACIFIC Powers concerned, to maintain and
extend unremitting pressure against JAPAN
with the purpose of continually reducing her
military power and attaining positions from
which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The
effect of any such extension on the overall
objective to be given consideration by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.
Upon the defeat of the AXIS in EUROPE, in
cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers and, if
possible, with RUSSIA, to direct the full
resources of the UNITED STATES and GREAT
BRITAIN to bring about at the earliest possible
date the unconditional surrender of JAPAN.
There were two specific agreements made at
QUADRANT that would affect the air operations in
the Far East.
We are agreed that the re-orientation of forces
from the European Theater to the Pacific and
17
CHAPTER 3
Far East should be started as soon as the German
situation, in our opinion, so allows.
General Stilwell will be Deputy Supreme
Allied Commander South East Asia Theater and
in that capacity will command the Chinese
troops operating into Burma and all US air and
ground forces committed to the South East Asia
Theater.'
The plan for defeat of Japan would be taken up at
the SEXTANT Conference.
SEXTANT Conference
The SEXTANT Conference at Cairo, Egypt, took
place in late November and early December of 1943.
President Roosevelt headed the US delegation.
With him were his personal military aide, General
"Pa" Watson; the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Admiral
Leahy; Maj Gen "Santy" Fairchild from the Joint
Strategic Survey Committee; Maj Gen Larry Kuter,
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army Air Forces; the
Joint Plans Committee; and the Joint Logistics
Committee, among others.
The Joint Staff Planners consisted of Brig Gen
Frank Roberts, US Army; Rear Adm B. H. Bieri, US
Navy, formerly of the Joint Strategic Committee; and
myself, Brig Gen H. S. Hansell, recently returned
from the Eighth Air Force. For this occasion Admiral
Bieri, the senior member and chairman, chose to
consider that there were only two legitimate members,
one representing the War Department and one
representing the Navy Depanment. He considered me,
if he noted my presence at all, as a son of junior
consultant to Frank Roberts on air matters.
'Combine:! Chiefs of swr 31915, 24 AUIIUC 1943.
 Because Admiral Bieri would not bring himself to
recognize my existence, he could not very well argue
against the items I supported. The principal objectives
that I supported were:
I . Consolidating our strategic air forces under
unified air command and control, both in Europe and
in the Pacific.
2. Recognizing strategic air warfare as a principal,
war-winning strategy, and its acceptance as such in the
war against Japan.
3. Obtaining air base sites from which strategic air
warfare could be waged against Japan.
General Roberts was cooperative, and I was able to get
the Joint Plans Committee to agree to all the important
things that affected the Air Forces.
Long before the proposed invasion of Normandy,
General Arnold sought to strengthen the strategic air
forces opposing the European Axis powers through
merger and establishment of a unified air command.
The Eighth Air Force in England and the Northwest
African Strategic Air Forces of the Mediterranean
should have been directed in a coordinated attack
against the selected targets of Germany. But they were
separated by command barriers. The strategic air
forces in the Mediterranean were under the theater
commander in that area, a British general. They were
being used to support theater objectives. General
Arnold sought to correct this fault by merging the
command of the US strategic air forces in both areas
under a single US strategic air commander, who would
have authority to direct the strategic air operations.
As the Air Planner, I was able to put the issue
through the Joint Plans Committee of the US Joint
Chiefs of Staff, with some difficulty. As the US Air
member of the Joint and Combined Plans Committee,
it was my job to put it through the Combined Plans
Committee at the Cairo Conference. It met stiff
opposition from the British members.
Our contention was that unity of command and
concerted cooperation in the target area were more
important than unity of command of logistics and
administration in the base areas. The British, who had
the overall command of all air forces in the
Mediterranean, were quick to oppose a change that
would rob their senior air' commander in the
Mediterranean of a large block of his air power. They
pointed out the complexities of logistic support and
the fact that the US strategic air forces in the
Mediterranean were completely dependent upon the
common logistics facilities. A separate operational
command would still be at the mercy of the logistics
allocations and capacity. Why not leave the command
chain as it was and direct the US strategic air
commander in the Mediterranean to cooperate and
coordinate with his opposite number in England? This
would, of course, leave the strategic air forces in the
Mediterranean under the command of the local theater
18
commander, who could use them as he deemed
necessary and leave the arguments to be settled later.
In the final confrontation, we prevailed, pointing
out that the RAF did, in fact, have unity of command
of its own air forces through the Air Ministry and
that this bridged the boundaries between theaters. Why
should not the American strategic air forces have
similar unity of command?
The argument and agreement that unity of
command-and-control over air operations to be
performed at the target areas was more important than
that covering the base areas later served us 10 good
stead when the Twentieth Air Force was created. The
outcome of the issue at the Cairo Conference was the
creation of the US Strategic Air Forces in Europe and
the organization of the Fifteenth (Strategic) Air Force
in the Mediterranean to take its place with the Eighth.
Even this consolidation proved unable to prevent a
diversion of strategic air forces away from their
primary mission and their employment in support of
local missions. Without this unified command,
however, the diversions would have been far worse.
Airmen became distrustful of the powers of surface
theater commanders. When the time for organization
and command of air forces in the war against Japan
carne up for consideration, the fight was renewed on a
broader scale. But command of strategic air forces in
Europe was not the only air issue at Cairo.
I had returned from England to become the US Air
member of the Joint Plans Committee only about four
weeks before departing for the SEXTANT
Conference. During my preparation for the
Conference, I was surprised by one paper I carne
across. It was the proposed Joint War Plan for the
conduct of the war in the Pacific. The opening
statement of basic strategy, which had been prepared
by the Far East War Plans Group and endorsed by the
Joint War Plans Review Board (whIch contamed an
Air Corps flag officer), stated, in effect:
. . . it has been clearly demonstrated in the war
in Europe that strategic air forces are incapable
of decisive action and hence the war against
Japan must rely upon victory through surface
forces, supported appropriately by air forces.
Final victory must come through invasion of the
Japanese home islands.
There was no dissenting voice from the air members
of these committees. The draft plan had been sent to
the various members of the Joint Plans Committee.
This was October of 1943. To be sure, the bombing
offensive against Germany had not yet demonstrated
decisive capability. It had not yet been launched 10
strength and would not reach full power for almost
another year. Nothing had been demonstrated eIther
for or against the potentials of that strategic air
offensive. With much difficulty, I succeeded 10
amending that statement of basic strategy and
establishing a proVISIon for an initial strategic air
offensive against the Japanese home islands. It was
agreed that preparations for invasion should proceed
concurrently, in case such an air offensive should not
be decisive. Strategic air power barely attained a
reprieve, and strategic air forces gained a temporary
stay against dismemberment and apportio�ment to
various theaters for support of surface operations. But
final reliance upon surface invasion of the Japanese
home islands was indelibly imprinted on Allied grand
strategy, at least so far as the US Army was concerned.
But we succeeded in making a very substantial
change in the original statement of grand strategy for
the Pacific. The Combined Chiefs of Staff accepted
and approved the "overall plan for the defeat of
Japan" as submitted by the Combined Staff Planners. 2
The new description of grand strategy stated:
1 . Our studies of the subject have taken account of:
a. The possibiJity that invasion of the
principal JWanese islands may not be
necessary and the defeat of Japan may be
accomplished by sea and air blockade and
i n t e n s i v e a i r b o m b a r d m e n t from
progressively advanced bases. The plan
must, however, be capable of expansion to
meet the contingency of invasion.
3. Overall Objective.
To obtain objectives from which we can
conduct intensive air bombardment and
establish a sea and air blockade against Japan
and from which to invade Japan proper if this
should prove necessary.
We also succeeded in inserting a sentence in the
"Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1 944,"
which was approVed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff
on 3 December 1943. The paragraph read:
Central, South, and Southwest Pacific. The
advance along the New Guinea-NEI-Philippines
axis will proceed concurrently with operations
for the capture of the Mandated Islands (by the
Central Pacific). A strategic bombingforce will be
established in Gumn, 1inian, and Saipan for
strategic bombing of Japan proper. Air
bombardment of targets in the NEI-Philippine
Area and the aerial neutralization of Rabaul will
be intensified.
The strategy underlying the bombing of Japan
proper was similar to that against Germany: to defeat
'Combined Chief, of SIaff 417, 2 December 1943.
19
the enemy air force and to so weaken the Japanese
capability and will to fight as to cause capitulation or
permit occupation against disorganized resistance;
failing this, to make invasion feasible at minimum
cost,-
The position of air strategists regarding the air
offensive against Japan was very weak in November
1943. B-29s were beginning to come off the line, but
essential bases for their operation had not yet been
provided. General Arnold and his air staff were
determined to employ the B-29s against the Japanese
homeland. We were extremely apprehensive lest they
be apportioned to theater commanders for local
operations. Once assigned to such control, it would be
difficult to extricate them and concert their efforts
against the prime targets in Japan.
MATfERHORN
An outline plan was prepared by the Air War Plans
Division of the Air Staff for use of the B-29s from
bases to be constructed by the forces of Chiang Kai­
shek in China. It was the only way we could find for
initially applying the B-29s, however ineffectively,
against Japan proper, prior to capture of the Marianas.
The idea was not entirely new. At the Casablanca
Conference in January 1943, President Roosevelt
discussed such a possibility with Mr Churchill.
General Marshall endorsed General Arnold's view
that Japanese industry was very vulnerable to
bombardment from the air. The President added that
periodic bombing of Japan would have a tremendous
morale effect upon the Chinese people. He suggested
sending 200 to 300 planes to China, including heavy
bombers [B-24s], and proposed that the bombers be
based in India and staged through advanced bases in
China.
The President had gone so far as to wire Chiang
Kai-shek that he was sending General Arnold to
Chunking to discuss US aid because he was
"determined to increase General Chennault's air
force> in order that you may carry the offensive to the
Japanese at once." However this reference was to the
Japanese in China, not to Japan proper. An outllOe
plan for the use of B-29. based in India and staged
through China for attack of the Japanese home islands
was initially presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
by General Arnold at Quebec, but the plan was tabled
there for consideration by the Joint Logistics
Committee and reconsideration at SEXTANT.
AWPD-42 had listed "iron and steel" as a primary
target system in the air offensive against the Japanese
• The ellpftMion "occuplion." .. distinct rl'QlTl "inYMion," _ dctibcraaeJy inlClted
by the alrmm in sexTANT dise..wn..
°Oencn.l Cbc:n.lWIll wu commUidina the newly ereMed FOIlI1«nth Air Fnrce,
..tiODed at variOUI aitfldds in (bIlla, and, conclirrerilly. air advilot 10 OUal'll Klii-ahck
and commander of the C'hi.- Air FOfCe.
home islands. The Committee of Operations Analysts coking plants. The vicinity of Chengtu, China, was the accelerate the destruction of selected systems of poor choice. Nevertheless, MATTERHORN
(COA) agreed that iron and steel were vital both to the preferred advanced base location. The location, critical Japanese industry, which would reduce the proceeded as planned and approved.
war-making capabilities of Japan and to the economic relative importance, and approximate distance of these Japanese war effort to impotency. Among the At the SEXTANT Conference, Allied leaders also
structure of the state. plants from Chengtu was as follows: intermediate objectives was the partial neutralization agreed upon two coordinated, but semi-independent,
Steel production was in short supply and was of the Japanese air force by combat and through the surface thrusts in the Pacific: one from the Southwest
running about 9,500,000 tons per year. The Anshan, destruction of aircraft factories, and the reduction of Pacific, under command of General Douglas
consumption was divided almost equally between near Mukden 34.5% of prod. 1 350 miles Japanese shipping and naval resources. This would MacArthur; one across the Central Pacific, under
military and naval usage and industrial and civilian Penhisu, contribute directly to the later major air offensive from command of Admiral of the Fleet Chester Nimitz.
usage. The following shows the extent to which steel near Mukden 1 1 .2% of prod. 1 300 miles the Marianas. The plan called for advance bases to be
was vital in both categories: Kenjiho, Korea 3.6% of prod. 1400 miles provided by the Chinese in the vicinity of Chengtu and
Conferences in the Pacific Theaters
Yawata, rear bases to be provided by the British in the vicinity
Kyushu, Japan ( 1 ) 16.2% of prod. 1 500 miles of Calcutta, India. Ten B-29 groups (28 aircraft per
Consumption Group Yawata, group) were to be available for deployment in China At the termination of the SEXTANT Conference at
Military and Naval Kyushu, Japan (2) 3.9% of prod. 1 500 miles by October 1944. Two thousand B-24 type aircraft, Cairo, I was chosen to go with General Marshall to
Aircri.ft 1 90,000 tons 2.0% Onuta, converted to transports, would be required to support meet with our principal commanders in the theaters in
Armored Fighting Kyushu, Japan 3.3% of prod. 1475 miles such operations from Calcutta supply bases. This the Pacific. Our flight plan took us to Karachi, India,
Vehicles 142,000 tons 1.5 number of aircraft, so converted, could be made then to Ceylon.
Ammunition 1 ,800,000 tons 19.0 available in the Calcutta area by October 1944. Lt Gen George Kenney, General MacArthur's air
Artillery & Chengtu is about 1 1 50 miles from Calcutta. The Combined Staff Planners concluded on 1 4 commander, met us at Darwin, Australia. We then
190,000 tons 2.0 General Arnold directed Brig Gen K. B. Wolfe, flew across the Arafura Sea to Port Moresby in New
Small Arms September 1943 that the plan was unfeasible from a
Misc. Field Equip. 998,000 tons 10.5 who was to command the first combat unit of B-29 logistic viewpoint. Despite this negative reaction to the Guinea. The following day, General Marshall met
Shipbuilding 950,000 tons 10.0 bombers, the XXth Bomber Command, to prepare an MATTERHORN proposal, just before he departed with General MacArthur at the latter's headquarters
Buildings & outline operational plan to carry out an attack on these on Goodenough Island. Only four persons were
for the SEXTANT conference, General Arnold
Works 430,000 tons 4.5 targets. General Wolfe's plan was expanded by the Air requested that the COA provide him with a list of present: General Marshall, General MacArthur,
W a r P l a n s D iv i s i o n a n d b e c a m e Project recommended targets for Japan to be considered for General Kenney, and myself.
Subtotal 4,700,000 tons 49.5%
MATTERHORN. the final air offensive which would include the General Kenney had been Assistant Chief of
Industrial and Civilian
The strategic purpose and concept of Project operations from other bases. Targets should be those Staff,operations on the staff of Gen Frank M.
Buildings & Works 430,000 tons 4.5%
M ATTERHORN were sound. The logistic which were suitable for air bombardment and "which Andrews in the early days of G HQ Air Force and had
Storage and
requirements were staggering and the logistic plan was would knock Japan out of the war." Iron and steel made a major contribution toward creation of air
Transport 380,000 tons 4.0
horrendous. The B- 29s would be based in India and were high on that list. power. He hit it off from the first with General
Mining and
would stage through advanced bases in China. Even if MacArthur-and little wonder. He did things with air
Quarrying 470,000 tons 6.0 The COA described 1 3 industries which did not
the Chinese could .be persuaded to build the air bases, forces that left airmen gasping. General MacArthur
Carbonization "now appear profitable aviation target systems," but
it would be necessary to support the operations from owed much of his brilliant success in the Southwest
Industry 1 90,000 tons 2.0 listed other preferred target systems:
the advance bases by air supply over the Himalayas. Pacific to General Kenney's imaginative performance.
Agricultural 1. Merchant shipping in harbors and at sea
1 .0
The B-29s themselves would have to ferry bombs and
2. Iron and steel production, to be reached through The meeting place was a shack which had been
Machinery 95,000 tons
gasoline over "the Hump," supplemented by a fleet of fitted up as a private war room for General
Machinery, Equip- coke ovens (in Manchuria, Korea and Kyushu, within
B-24s which were to be converted into tankers. The MacArthur. Maps and charts covered all the walls.
ment, Tools 475 ,000 tons 5.0 range of Chengtu)
effective rate of the operations would be very low General MacArthur described the situation and his
Railways 1 ,1 40,000 tons 1 2.0 3. Urban industrial areas, vulnerable to incendiary
2.0
indeed. Their primary virtue would lie in striking an
attacks plans. He stood at various maps, strode back and forth,
Motor Vehicles 190,000 tons
important blow against Japan proper and in and talked for about two hours without notes of any
Chemical & 4. Aircraft plants
preservation of the command and control structure sort. He had at his fingertips all the dispositions and
Electrical Ind. 380,000 tons 4.0 5 . Antifriction bearing industry, highly
pending the time when other Pacific bases could be recent actions of his troops. He seemed equally well
Miscellaneous 950,000 tons � captured and prepared.
concentrated in six main factories
acquainted with his enemy. He named Japanese
50.5% 6. Electronics industry, whose interruption would
Subtotal 4,800,000 tons Chiang Kai-shek, who was present at the Cairo organizations and their commanders everywhere and
have immediate military effects
Total 9,500,ooo tons 1 00.0% Conference, agreed to the base construction. He was as seemed well informed of their competence. He
7. The petroleum industry
good as his word. The bases were hand-constructed by described his plans, culminating in the recapture of the
hundreds of thousands of workers. The COA contended that the list was not in an order of Philippines and preparation for the next campaign,
The COA found that, in Japan, steel production was Actually, project MATTERHORN had a painful desired priority. whether it be Formosa or the coast of China, in minute
uniquely vulnerable because of the heavy birth and its life span was brief. The Air Plans In spite of all the criticism and opposition, Project detail, defining the force requirements (land, sea, and
concentration of coke ovens, upon which steel Division of the Air Staff, under General Kuter's MATTERHORN was approved at the SEXTANT air), the timing, the objectives, and the logistic flow.
production depends. Six coking plants, three in the supervision, planned MATTERHORN. General Conference. Chiang Kai-shek agreed to build the Throughout the presentation, he employed wit and
Japanese southern island of Kyushu, two near Mukden Arnold presented the final plan to the JCS and, after advance bases at Cbengtu. The British, who would charm with devastating persuasiveness. Although I had
in Manchuria, and one in Korea produced 73 percent some discussion, the JCS, at General Arnold's request, have to build the bases in the Calcutta area, went from the first been an advocate of "Europe fint," with
of Japanese coke. They stated that the destruction of referred it to the Joint Staff Planners. Both the Joint along. attendant delay against Japan, I simply melted under
these six coking plants would deprive Japan of 66 Staff Planners and the Joint Intelligence Committee But this did not end the argument. As late as 1 5 the persuasive logic and the delightful charm of the
percent of her total steel production. Coke ovens were raised serious questions as to the desirability and the February 1 944, the Joint War Plans Committee still great MacArthur. By the time he had finished, I
vulnerable to shock and their replacement would take feasibility of the concept. Nevertheless, it was sent to believed that the best use of the B-29s prior to wanted to give him everything he had asked for.
yean. the Combined Staff Planners for comment or deployment in the Marianas would be from Australian General Marshall was offar sterner stuff, though his
The Air War Plans Division proposed that B-29s be agreement. bases for use against shipping and oil. In that position left him reason for sensitivity or even
based in China, within range of some or all of these The overall objective of MATTERHORN was to Committee's opinion, Chengtu, in China, was a very embarrassment. In their earlier relationship, yean

20 21
before, General MacArthur had been Chief of Staff of constructed. His schedule called for capture of the
the 'US Army when General Marshall was still, I Marianas in mid-June, Ulithi-Yap by 1 September, <I.
and the Palaus by 1 November. It would then be 0 51
believe, a colonel, In World War I MacArthur had
been a general officer who had achieved an aura of possible to invade the Formosa-China Coast-Luzon 0: 0 �
fame from personal bravery on the battlefield, while area by early spring of 1945. He later amended the L&.I §
�
.
�
plan to provide for the capture of the Palaus before
General Marshall was an able but little-known officer
Ulithi-Yap. � t- '1
"
on General Pershing's staff. Now the tables were
completely turned. General MacArthur, for all his On the same day, Maj Gen Richard K. Sutherland,
3 c( � "

�
great prestige, was really a suppliant for approval, He General MacArthur's Chief of Staff, submitted a plan � L&.I >
"
; .
�
;
had to have General Marshall's approval for the plans which called for major support of an operation code­ � J: 1&1
which he proposed and espoused with such elan. named Operation RENO IV. This operation proposed
i �� t- I- 'ot
CC 'ot
Those plans would have required the assignment to a drive along the northern coast of New Guinea into
General MacArthur not only of the majority of the Mindanao, Philippine Islands. In a covering letter, he ., 0: en 1-
0: 0>
- : :� .
American forces arrayed against Japan, but also stated, "The line of action presented in RENO IV will c( () II) .c
u
sever sea communications between Japan and the vital ..
substantial diversions of forces destined for Europe. "' 0 ..
This was seven months before the launching of the Borneo-Netherlands East Indies-Malaya region and 0 � G: :IE ,.
Normandy Invasion. General Marshall had to tell him will place our forces in the Luzon-Formosa-China (j
� i·..:
.
that he could not have these forces and hence could Coast areas at the earliest possible date under
II CC
not carry out the program which he had described. conditions that can be foreseen at this time."3 ".
a. "
L&.
This General Marshall proceeded quietly to do. He Neither of these plans and presentations gave any
reminded General MacArthur that the basic grand importance to a strategic air offensive against Japan () ,...
strategy of defeating Hitler first, and concentrating proper. When these proponents of rival strategies had
reached the end of their presentations before the Joint
c( l �
maximum forces to that purpose, was agreed upon and d'
Q. Gt'
approved not only by the Combined Chiefs of Staff but Chiefs of Staff, General Arnold remarked that the � ! .2:
by the President himself and Mr Churchill. General Army Air Forces (AAF) would like to present its ...
."-
Marshall stated quite calmly his own devotion to that views on Pacific strategy at the next meeting. As he was
V
scheme, of which, in fact, he had been one of the leaving the room, he turned to me and told me to
i:i:
principal architects. prepare the presentation. I conferred with Generals
The meeting ended on the same level of punctilious Santy Fairchild and Larry Kuter and prepared an
outline.
courtesy. If General MacArthur was chagrined, as well
as disappointed, he did not show it. We left for home I went up to General Arnold's office to seek his .
..... . ..
.
approval or instructions and learned that he had gone
via Hawaii where General Marshall met with Admiral
to the West Coast and would not be back for the next
��
Nimitz and his staff. There was a presentation of a plan
0
for Central Pacific strategy which advocated, quite JCS meeting. Later I came to understand and ..
� c
naturally, the placing of primary reliance for regaining appreciate this tactic-which General Arnold used o .
� �
base areas upon the US Navy. General Marshall made several times. His position as a member of the JCS was .:1 0
no commitments that I know of, and we proceeded equivocal at best. The AAF was never accepted as an
home. equal partner by the Navy. The Navy Department did
not openly try to quash the upstart air membership, but
it worked quietly on the premise that there were by law �
Pacific Strategy only two recognized Departments-the War :;
Department and the Navy Department. General
After our return from the SEXTANT Conference Marshall was a tower of strength in supporting
at Cairo, the arguments about Pacific strategy General Arnold and the Army Air Forces, but
increased. The next major strategic objective was General Arnold was a subordinate Army officer, and
described by General Marshall as the "Formosa-China he could never afford to take open opposition to
Coast-Luzon" triangle to be approached by General General Marshall.
MacArthur from the Southwest Pacific and Admiral General Marshall was universally fair and
Nimitz from the Central Pacific. Proponents of the unbiased, but the Army people as a whole tended to
two thrusts made presentations before the Joint Chiefs support General MacArthur-just as the Navy people
of Staff, each proposing that the preponderance of tended to support Admiral Nimitz.
effort and of forces be assigned to his axis. General Arnold \cnew that we airmen would tend to
On 7 March, Admiral Nimitz, supported by his support the position of Admiral Nimitz and the Navy
Deputy, Rear Adm Forrest Sherman, appeared before if we could be assured of the capture of the Mariana
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and proposed bypassing the Islands and Guam as base areas for the 8-29
Japanese base at Truk and seizing the southern operations against Japan. If, in General Arnold's
Marianas, then proceeding to capture Ulithi Atoll
(about 360 miles southwest of Guam) for use as a fleet
base, together with nearby Yap, where airfields for
�. F. Craven and J. L. Cue, edI., 1M Amly Air F'omlJ ill World WdI' lI, Vol IV
support of Pacific naval operations could be (OJiCIF. illinois: The Uniwnity ofChiClfO rr.),p. S71.
23
22
absence from the next meeting, General Marshall
should take exception to this approach, General
Marianas -C e n t r a l
Pacific - 1 5 Jun CHAPTER 4
Arnold could, on his return, dismiss us in good grace Palaus -Central
on the ground that we had not been instructed to take Pacific - 1 5 Sep
this line and had exceeded our authority. The position Mindanao -Southwest
of the AAF and the support of General Marshall could Pacific - 1 5 Nov
be preserved. Formosa -Central
But in the actual event, General Marshall did not Pacific - 1 5 Feb 1945
take exception to our position as I presented it on
9 March 1943. The presentation was favorably The question of Pacific strategy had not been clearly
received. Subsequently the Joint Plans Committee and resolved and both the rival surface strategies were
the Joint Logistics Committee proposed the following endorsed, but capture of the Marianas as air bases and
schedule (see Pacific War Theater map): support for the B-29 operations in their air offensive
against the Japanese home iSlands were secured. This
Hollandia -Southwest precipitated the vital question of how the B-29s would Strategic Air Force- Pacific
Pacific - 1 5 Apr be organized, commanded, and controlled.

Organization, Command, Control, and
Deployment oftbe Strategic Air Forces
The command of strategic air forces was even more
difficult a problem than the technical problems posed
by the bomber airplane. Unity of command was a
cherished military concept in both the Army and the
Na�. T!' e Army achieved this unity of command by
. Chiang Kai -shek did not recognize any commander in
desIgnating single commanders to exercise command
over all units within s�ific geographical boundaries.
The Navy achieved it by retaining control of major
combat naval forces under ultimate command of the
top naval echelon of the nation. Fleet units were rarely
assign � to territorial command areas, and when they
were, It was always WIth the proviso that they could be
withdrawn at any moment for employment elsewhere
if the naval situation should so require.
� trategic air forces did not fit either concept, but
their command characteristics more closely resembled
those of the Navy than those of the Army. Often the
long-range air force straddled several land commands.
Its bombers might be based in many areas, each of
. Stilwell gave General Stratemeyer administrative
whIch was under separate Army or Navy jurisdiction.
But bombers of the strategic air forees had to have
unity a� th� ta�et area, and they had to have continuity
�
o �phcatlOn If they were to accomplish their strategic
mIssIon. The very flexibility which constituted the
cardinal virtue of strategic bombers also constituted
their greatest vulnerability. There was a constant
temptation to
. � ive� them from their long-range
strategIC war objectIVes to targets that were critical
only to local area commanders.
The problem of unity of command became more
acute as primary attention turned to Japan and the
B-29 force began to emerge. In order to apply this very
heavy bo�ber (VH8) force against Japan proper,
wh,ch was Its real role, plans were made to establish a
number of bases within action radius of Japan. Those
bases were to be in China, the Marianas, Alaska, the
Philippines, and Formosa or Okinawa.
24
Project MAlTERHORN called for bases in India
and China. US forces there were under command of
General Joseph Stilwell, US Army. He, in tum, was a
part of the Allied Southeast Asia Command headed by
Adm Lord Louis Mountbatten, Royal Navy.
Admiral Mountbatten was Supreme Al lied
Commander, Southeast Asia, a command which had
been created at the recent Quebec Conference. But
China above himself. General Stilwell commanded all
US fo�ces in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater,
including the B-29 forces. Maj Gen Claire Chennault
commanded the Fourteenth US Army Air Force in
China and was at the same time Chiang Kai-shek's
Chief of Staff for Air. Admiral Mountbatten had a
Commander in Chief, Eastern Air Command, Air
Marshal Richard Peirse. Lt Gen George Stratemeyer
was Commanding General, US Army Air Forces, in
India-Burma and Air Advisor to General Stilwell in
China. General Stratemeyer's command included the
Tenth Air Force, based in India. To confuse further an
already complicated command arrangement, General
command of the B-29 force, which had its main bases
in India, and issued orders to the Fourteenth Air Force
through him. General Stilwell proposed to exercise
direct operational control of the B-29s which he
planned to use extensively in combined operations in
China against Japanese ground forces. Admiral
Mountbatten endorsed the initial operations involved
in MAlTERHORN but planned to use the B-29s later
in support of Southeast Asia Command objectives.
(See Appendix A for organizational charts as of
January and August 1945.)
General Chennault, in his capacity as Chiang Kai­
shek's Chief of Staff for Air, made a direct appeal to
President Roosevelt requesting that all B-29s
operating out of China be placed under his control. He
made a similar request directly to General Arnold
asking that the B-29s operating from Chinese bases �
25
 placed under th� control of his Founeenth US Anny
Air Force.
The Joint Staff Planners proposed ultimately
placmg four groups of B-29s in the Philippines. Those
islands, when recaptured, would be under the
command of Gen Douglas MacArthur, whose chief
airman (Gen George Kenney) was already making
vigorous demands for B-29s to be used in the South­
west Pacific campaign. General Kenney wanted B-29s
stationed in Darwin, Australia, for use against targets
in the Netherlands East Indies. Plans were actively
being prepared for placing B-29s in the Central
Pacific and in Alaska. The Mariana Islands which
' Various schemes for centralizing control of the
were to be captured principally as the Central Pacific
base for the B-29s, would be under the command of
Adm Chester Nimitz, US Navy.
Each of these base areas was under a separate
theater command, and these field commanders were
powerful people. Each had strategic purposes to be
achieved. Each wanted to apply the B-29s to his own
strategic theater purposes, and each resented any
incursion into his area of control. Yet there was one
area in which unity of air command and continuity of
effort was imperative, and that was the target area
itself, Japan, which was under the control of none of
them.
In March 1 944, I presented to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff the Army Air Forces concept of Pacific strategy,
which called for a concerted bomber offensive against
the Japanese home islands from the Marianas to
undermine and destroy the warmaking oapabili of tY
Japan. The plan also called for the main B-29 force to
be established there. When the Philippines had been
retaken, a B-29 force was to be established tbere, also
on � within range of Japan. The B-29s in Chengtu,
Chma, were to be moved forward when better base
areas became available. A base was to be constructed
in the Aleutian Islands as well.
The first plan for the ultimate deployment of B-29s,
. under General Arnold, Commanding General of the
pnor to redeployment of the Eighth Air Force, and
escort fighters, when they became available, was as
follows:
Chengtu,
China 4 groups·
Mariana
Islands 1 6 groups, 3 squadrons each
Ryukyu
Islands 1 2 groups, 3 squadrons each
Philippine
Islands 1 2 groups, 3 squadrons each
A leutian
Islands 4 groups, (questionable)
Iwo Jima
Island
3 groups, support fighters
Ie Shima
Island 2 groups, support fighters
26
Kikai
Island 2 groups, support fighters
Okinawa I Sq. Suat. Recon.
The main thesis of the plan was a unified and
concerted air bombardment, concentrated against a
single list of targets in the Japanese home islands and
coordinated through a unified air command.
The Twentieth Air Force
B-29s under the JCS had been discussed ever since
SEXTANT. Actually it was the similarity of this air
problem to the traditional naval problem which fmally
was persuasive. At least, it was this similarity which
persuaded Adm Ernest J. King to accept the idea of a
strategic air force that would be assigned to none of the
surface commands but would report directly to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The manner in which this important agreement was
reached seems almost trivial. I secured General
Arnold's permission to discuss the subject with
Admiral King. I found Admiral King and General
Arnold walking together down a corridor leading to
tbe JCS conference room. I asked Admiral King if I
might have a word with him. I described briefly the
problem of concerted command and control of the
long-range bombers which would be attacking
common targets in Japan but would be operating from
bases under the command of several separate theater
commanders. I suggested a similari ty wi th the
problems attendant on control of the US Fleet, whose
command was centralized under him as Commander
in Chief, US Fleet, as well as Navy member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Would it not be sensible to concentrate
the very long-range bombers in a strategic air force
Army Air Forces? Under this arrangement, the B-29s
would actually fall under the control of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, with General Arnold serving not only
as Commanding General, but also as executive agent
for the Joint Chiefs. The Joint Chiefs would provide
unified strategic air objectives. Like fleet units of the
Navy, logistic support could be provided through
d i rectives to appropriate area and theater
commanders. Admiral King reflected for a moment
and then said, "I could find such an arrangement
acceptable. "
I prepared a brief memorandum to that effect,
discussed it with General Kuter and General
Fairchild, and then took it over to the War Department
Operations Division. The struggle was only half won
because General Marshall was dedicated to the
concept of theater unity of command. He had even
forced through the first Allied unified command the
ill-fated organization under British General Wa�1I
' with his typical breadth of vision, gave full support to
before the fall of the Netherlands East Indies.
I took the paper to General Tom Handy. He took
the paper, read it carefully, and looked at me. "I'll tell
you the truth, Hansell," he said, "I don't like any part
of this paper. It violates the principle of unity of
command in a Theater of War. It inserts operational
forces into a commander's area of responsibility but
gives him no control of those forces. At the same time,
the Theater Commander is expected to defend and
supply and support those forces in competition with
his own requirements. I don't like it." Then he grinned
and said, "But I don't have a better solution. I'll buy
it." I said, "Do you think General Marshall will buy
it?" He said, "General Marshall isn't here. But I know
how he'll react. If General Arnold and Admiral King
are agreed on it, he'll go along. As a matter of fact, I'll
approve it in his name."
The memorandum served as the basis of a paper
submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Joint Staff
Planners. The Twentieth Air Force was established as
a result.
Inception. And so the Twentieth Air Force was
born. It was called the Twentieth to distinguish it from
the other numbered air forces. There were no
Sixteenth or Seventeenth or Eighteenth or Nineteenth
air forces. On 1 2 April 1 944, the Joint Chiefs
approved the activation of the Twentieth Air Force,
with General Arnold as its first commander.
Some years later, an Air Force officer would
describe the wartime establishment of the Twentieth
Air Force as "one of the most important events in
United States Air Force history. If that had not
occurred," he thought, "we might still be parcelling
out our big punch in penny packets to numerous
theaters and lower commands. And there might have
been no United States Air Force."
The Joint Chiefs, in approving the creation of the
Twentieth Air Force, directed:
Commanders of the Theaters in which the
Twentieth Air Force's XXth and XXIst Bomber
Commands are based are directed to coordinate
B-29 operations with other air operations in
their Theaters. to construct and defend B-29
bases, and to provide logistical support and
common administrative control of the B-29
forces. Should strategic or tactical emergencies
arise requiring the use of the B-29 forces for
purposes other than the missions assigned to
them by the Joint Chiefs, Theater commanders
are authorized to use the B-29 forces,
immediately informing the Joint Chiefs of such.
action.
Admiral King's endorsement was vital because the
bUlk of the bombers would be in the Pacific Ocean
Area, which was a naval command. General Marshall,
the project.
27
The command arrangement for the B-29s was
referred to the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, since
combined plans called for participation of British
bombers in the final air offensive against Japan. Also,
the change in command relations would affect the
Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia. who
operated under the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the
British Chiefs of Staff Committee as executive agents.
The British Chiefs countered with the proposal that
the air offensive. including the Twentieth Air Force
and later a British bomber contingent, be placed under
the control of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, rather
than the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. This would parallel
the command relationship in the European Combined
Bomber Offensive in which Air Marshal Portal had
been the executive agent of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff. The JCS demurred. The Combined Bomber
Offensive in Europe was a joint British/American
venture. The air offensive against Japan would be
primarily an American venture. The British did not
press the issue.
Organization and Deployment. When General
Arnold became Commanding General and I became
the first Chief of Staff, Twentieth Air Force, it was
apparent that we would need a staff for the new
organization. But General Arnold already had a
staff-quite a large one-the Air Staff, or
Headquarters, Army Air Forces. He was reluctant to
increase the overhead by creating still another staff. I
suggested to General Arnold that he use the Air Staff
to meet his needs for the Twentieth Air Force. He
agreed, somewhat reluctantly. The Air Staff was the
parent headquarters for all the numbered air forces.
To single out the Twentieth as the special concern of
the Air Staff-as an operational headquarters for a
combat air command-would seem to slight all the
others. But General Arnold did not want another
headquarters staff in Washington. so he went along
with my suggestion. Each of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff
for the several Air Staff sections-Personnel,
Intelligence, Operations, Materiel, and Plans in the
Air Staff-was told to wear two hats-one for the
Headquarters, Army Air Forces, and one for the
Twentieth Air Force. Each of these Deputy Chiefs of
Staff selected one senior officer to represent him in
Twentieth Air Force matters. (See Table 4- 1 .) General
Order No I , Twentieth Air Force, assigned Col Cecil
E. Combs to the A-3 Division as Chief of Combat
Operations. I was designated a Deputy Chief of the Air
Staff as well as Chief of Staff of the Twentieth Air
Force. On the whole, I thought the scheme worked
reasonably well.
In many ways the Twentieth had unique features
and problems. It was necessary to establish and
approve tables of organization and equipment and to
establish tactical doctrine and standard operating
procedures. This was necessary for two reasons: to
permit the handling, control. and coordination of
large numbers of aircraft and units; and to provide a
basis for uniform training.
 communications-both command and control and used not only my meager name and authority to chum find anywhere. They will respond to a gesture of
HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
administrative. The JCS had approved our request to the brew, but he used General Arnold's big name and faith, if they understand the issues and if they are
set up our own separate communications system. This authority as well. I don't suppose we will ever find out treated fairly and equably. I suggest we have a
The Air Staff members who served as principal
staff members for the Twentieth Air Force while was a sizable order. We would have units and the true level of supplies that were ordered for the general meeting of all the professional aviation
I was Chief of Staff of the Twentieth and Deputy headquarters scattered over half the world. I briefed Twentieth. I think it likely that 'supplies were still writers, tell them the truth, put them on their
Chief of Staff of the Air Staff included: General Arnold on our communications requirements being shipped to the Marianas long after the war was honor not to divulge, and assure them that, when
and watched with amusement the application of his over and the troops had come home. Through his the news can be released they will all be told so at
famous technique for attacking the impossible. efforts I also acquired for a brief time my own personal exactly the same time so that there will be no
Brig Gen J. H. He called ih Brig Gen Harold McClelland, head of "Fleet," but that is another story. "scoops." Let them write their stories and file
McCormick A- I communications for the Army Air Forces. General During the period I served as Chief of Staff of the them with u s . We w i l l release them
Col W. M. Burgess A-2 Arnold said, with caustic emphasis, that he wanted the Twentieth Air Force, I had one particular experience simultaneously at the earliest time that will not
Col Cecil E. Combs A-3-Combat following: which I well remember. The B-29s were coming off jeopardize our mission.
Operations the P!oduction line and there was increasing interest
Col W. F. McKee A-3-Operations, A net that would include Washington, Hawaii, and speculation in the aviation press. We tried to keep
Commiunents, the Marianas (which had not yet been captured), a tight rein on security. The B-29s were destined for I was somewhat shaken by this bold suggestion. But
and Calcutta, India, and Chengtu, China with the major air assault on Japan . They would be I had a lot of faith in Rex Smith, and I realized that I
operating at high altitude, unescorted. If the Japanese knew practically nothing about the press and news
Requirements provision for extension to somewhere in the
Col L. O. Ryan i
A-3-Tra ning A l eutian c h a i n and somewhere in the learned this and also discovered the salient elements of media. I bought the idea and obtained General
A-3-Crew Training Philippines (when they were captured). He B-29 performance and defensive firepower, they Arnold's agreement.
LlCol J . W. Carpenter
Col S. R. Brentnall A-4-MM&D w a n t e d T O P S E C R E T S e c u r i ty w i t h would try by every means at their disposal to provide We had the meeting in a midwestern city. There
Col Sol Rosenblatt A-4-Supply instantaneous c o d i ng a n d read-out b y defenses against them. Security could be directly were several hundred people present. The security
Maj Gen L. S. Kuter A-5-Plans teleprinters. H e wanted the net in operation equated in terms of mission success or failure and in arrangements were carefully prepared and carried out.
Maj Gen D. W. Grant Surgeon twenty-four hours a day. terms of the lives of American crewmen. We were We "spi lied the beans" to a degree that ' left me
Brig Gen H. L. deeply worried about news leaks. Of course there was quaking. And it worked like a charm. Reponers and
McClelland Communications wartime censorship, but skilled aviation writers who writers filed their stories. When the first bombs were
Col Max Schneider Air Inspector Fantastic, I thought! It couldn't be done. indulged in speculation could and often did hit upon released over Tokyo and were still in the air, a message
Col Guido Perera Target General McClelland didn't bat an eye. He said the truth. was flashed back to Guam and was automatically
Intelligence "Yes, sir," saluted and departed. It left General We had an exceptionally fine Public Relations relayed to Washington. The President was the first
and represen­ Arnold a little flat and me completely deflated. Officer in the Twentieth Air Force Headquarters. His recipient. But almost simultaneously the stories and
tative of the General McClelland had the last chuckle. He nam� was Rex Smith, and he was a wartime colonel in reports which Rex Smith had been holding were
Committee of produced. Shortly after I had set up headquarters in the Air Corps. He was a veteran newsman and had at released to the press and the other news media.
Operations Guam, about six months later, the machinery was one time been editor of Newsweek magazine. He came
Analysts working. Within six weeks, I was sick of it The to me with a suggestion and recommendation. He said: Whether this approach would work again, I do not
machine worked 24 hours a day all right, without know. But it worked once to perfection and every
stopping. Most of the messages seemed to consist of I know my people and my associates. They are as attendee at the conference proved completely
questions that I couldn't answer. I began to understand loyal and patriotic as any Americans you can trustwonhy.
Table 4- 1 .
the meaning of the remark ascribed to Lord
Palmerston to the effect that the disintegration of the
Arrangements had to be made for deployment to British Empire had begun with the invention of the
overseas bases and for logistical support. Personnel telegraph.
had to be selected for key assignments. Top At one of our daily staff meetings of the
assignments had to be approved by General Arnold, of Headquarters Twentieth Air Force, I got rather upset
course, and he selected commanders at his own because supplies were not being provided for the
discretion. I watched anxiously the progress the Twentieth at a rate which I thought satisfactory. The
Materiel Command made in correcting a multitude of staff representative for materiel was a temporary
technical problems with the airplane and engines. wartime colonel named Sol Rosenblatt. I delivered
I spent as much time as I could shepherding myself of a somewhat intemperate diatribe. I
concepts and ideas through the Joint War Plans mentioned that the US Navy always got the best of
Committee, the Joint Plans Committee, and the JCS, everything, with plenty to spare, while good fighting
and discouraging dismemberment of the force. At my people in the Army-and the Army Air Forces in
request, the Committee of Operations Analysts was particular-made do on a song and a shoestring. The
made responsive to the Chief of Staff of the Twentieth Twentieth Air Force was on its way to becoming the
Air Force for matters pertaining to the Twentieth Air most powerful fighting force in the world, and it
Force. I had to be ready on a momenfs notice to deserved the best and we were going to provide it.
answer General Arnold's questions. He had to be I felt that I had expressed myself well and that the
informed in order to meet the questions of the other point was clearly understood-and I dismissed the
members of the JCS, who were showing a lively subject from my mind for awhile. But intemperance
interest in the new Twentieth Air Force. often breeds surprising results. It did so in this case. It
Command nnd Control. One of the first challenges was some time before I found out what a fire I had
fa c i n g t h e T w e n t i e t h A i r F o r c e w a s started. Colonel Rosenblatt took me seriously. He
29
28
CHAPTER S engineering achievement, but it was new and different
Early Dep loyment and Initial Operations
themselves. But others of us believed it could be done.
Original plans called for the Twentieth Air Force to
As a matter of fact, the XXIst did penetrate the
have, eventually, three or four bomber commands: the
defenses of Tokyo in raids from the Marianas later in
XX Bomber Command in China-India; the XXI in the
the year, with only one wing of B-29s-the same
Marianas; the XXII in the Philippines or Formosa or
strength available to the XXth.
Okinawa; and perhaps a XXIII in Alaska. Its total
General Wolfe vigorously denied that his B-29s
strength would be 1000 to 1 500 operational B-29s and
were capable of flying in formations in daylight to
such eScort fighters as could be developed or modified.
these targets and added the categorical statement that
Although the decision to concentrate the B-29s
they would be incapable of reaching their targets in
under Joint Chiefs of Staff control made po..ible the
daylight operations in formation from the Marianas
development of the concerted bomber offensive
also. This assessment was a real body blow to the
against Japan, it did not mark the close of the
operational plans of the XXIst. General Wolfe was the
argument from the theater field commanders. They
only air commander with actual experience with the
continued their efforts to gain control of the B-29
airplane, and he was the real expert and final authority
u n i t s in t h e i r areas. G e neral MacArthur's
on the B-29 itself.
headquarters was especially insistent and coupled its
I directed Col Cecil Combs, Chief of Combat
requests with personal letters from General Kenney to
Operations for the Twentieth, to carry out practice
General Arnold contending that B-29 operations out
tests to confirm or refute this contention that the B-29
of the Marianas against the Japanese home islands
had insufficient range to operate in formation as
were militarily and technically unfeasible.
required. He went to Eglin Field, Florida, and set up a
test run over the Gulf of Mexico simulating the flight
The XXth Bomber Command from the Marianas to Tokyo and back. Simulated
bombloads of 8,000 pounds were carried as well as
The initial operations of the XXth Bomber full loads of ammunition. He was able to muster only
Command in India and China did not go well. The three B-29s for the test, but it was carried out with
logistics problems had been expected, but the wartime combat tactics simulated as closely as
operational tactics were not producing results even possible, including the nature of the formation itself.
when the B-29s had enough gas and bombs to attack That is to say, the test involved initial assembly, loose
their targets. Brig Gen K. B. Wolfe was using night formation en route, climb to 30,000 feet for the bomb
operations exclusively. The coke oven targets which run, tight defensive formation in the areas of potential
were prescribed as first priority did not present good fighter interception, and retention of that formation
radar images and were not easily seen at night. As a until beyond the range of enemy fighters, then return
result, the bombs were not being placed on their to base in loose formation.
targets. As Chief of Staff of the Twentieth Air Force, I The aircraft all returned successfully to the original
prodded General Wolfe to improve bombing results. I base, Eglin Field, but the reserves of gasoline were
requested that daylight bombing attacks be conducted admittedly too low. The operation was feasible, but
against the coke ovens in the Mukden area in much remained to be learned about fuel consumption
Manchuria, where the Japanese fighter defenses were and daylight tactics if large formations were to be
not considered to be very effective. The available B-29 flown over those distances. General Wolfe received
force was considered by some to be too small to the report of the test, but he did not move from the
penetrate the air defenses of the Japanese Islands stand he had taken. The B-29 was a magn ificent
30
and it had new engines which we did not fully
understand.
The XXlst Bomber Command
The Twentieth Air Force was under extreme
pressure to perform. Olle major slip and the critics
would have had their way-the Twentieth Air Force
would have been dismembered and parceled out to the
various theaters. An understanding of this tension and
pressure is vital to an understanding of the early
struggle of the XXIst Bomber Command to meet its
commitments. We had given a pledge to launch an air
offensive against Japan in November 1 944. This
proposed offensive was tied into the carefully prepared
plans for the Pacific campaigns of Admiral Nimitz and
General MacArthur. The target date had to be met,
and the success of a highly controversial operation had
to be demonstrated, if strategic air power was to reach
fruition in the Pacific.
The XXIst Bomber Command was activated at
Smoky Hill Army Air Field, Salina, Kansas, on 1
March 1944. At that time, the XXth Bomber
Command was being established in the China-Burma­
India Theater. The 73rd Wing, which was originally
scheduled for the XXth Bomber Command, had been
transferred to the XXlst when the XXth was reduced
from two wings (eight groups) to one wing, the 58th.
The XXIst Bomber Command was trained and staffed
by the Second Air Force. The headquarters of the
XXlst Bomber Command was later moved from
Salina, Kansas, to Peterson Field, Colorado Springs,
Colorado. The XXIst Bomber Command was to
consist of 1 000 B-29s, and it had to be given the
necessary training.
In the late spring of 1944, General Arnold told me
that I was to have command of the XXlst Bomber
Command, destined for the Marianas. My replacement
as Chief of Staff of the Twentieth was Brig Gen Larry
Norstad. His arrival was delayed because he felt he
should "visit the troops" before becoming Chief of
Staff, and he insisted on going to the India-China
Theater. This took time so I could not get away to have
a look at training and organize the headquarters of the
XXlst Bomber Command until August. When I finally
took command of the XXIst Bomber Command on 28
August 1 944, the units of the 73rd Wing were training
for radar bombing at night, along the pattern of the
XXth Bomber Command in China, of which it was to
have been a part.
The XXth, because of its location, logistics
problems, and relationship to the main target areas,
had been assigned target priorities different from those
given the XXlst. The force was thought to be too small
to fight its way through the defenses of the Japanese
homeland in daylight. And it could reach only the
southern portion of the Japanese homeland from bases
In the area of Chengtu. The coke oven targets had
31
turned out to be unsuitable for night radar bombing.
Other targets had to be suitable for radar bombing or
they had to be located in lightly defended areas. Aside
from the coke ovens, this left little of vital importance
as· targets for the XXth Bomber Command.
The COA, whose advice was sought concerning the
strategic targets for the Twentieth Air Force
regardless of base areas, recommended that the B-29 �
be employed against merchant shipping, steel
producl1on (through coke ovens), urban industrial
areas, aircraft plants, and antifriction bearing industry,
the electronics industry and, belatedly, the petroleum
mdustry. The COA repeated its conviction that the
coke oven plants in Manchuria were highly vulnerable
to bombing and were vital to the production of steel in
Japan. The Committee also pointed out the extreme
vulnerability of Japanese urban areas to incendiary
attack.
The Air Staff, with the memory of the Luftwaffe
fighters still fresh in its mind, advocated the selection
of the Japanese air force as an overriding priority for
the XXIst Bomber Command. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff agreed. The aircraft factories and engine
factories assigned as targets to the XXIst Bomber
Command, based in the Marianas, were precision
targets. There were 1 3 aircraft and engine plants
known to exist in Japan. Eight of these were estimated
to produce 70 percent of its aircraft engines. Though
the towns in which the factories were located were
known, the actual plants had yet to be located
precisely-a major task for the reconnaissance
squadron of the XXlst.
We had some general knowledge of the Japanese
aircraft industry. The Japanese had canvassed
European and American aircraft and engine builders
immediately after World War I and had obtained
licenses for production. Three major Japanese
producers emerged at that time-Nakaj ima,
M itsubishi, and Kawasak i. They continued to
dominate the Japanese airframe, engine, and propellor
business. As the US Strategic Bombing Survey Report
on the Japanese Aircraft Industry later commented:
While waves of Japanese technicians wefe
studying American factories, America's top
engineering schools were training the men who,
on their return to Japan, were to design the Zero
fighter, Betty Bomber and other planes on which
the Japanese bid for Pacific domination was to
be based. By 1 930, the Japanese Army and Navy
had decided the industry should stand on its own
feet, and established a policy of self-sufficiency,
whereby only aircraft and engines of Japanese
designs were to be considered. No more foreign
engineers were to be hired. This was intended
mainly as a sop to Japanese nationalistic pride,
however, and did not prevent their technical
minions from continuing to buy the best foreign
models as starting points for Japanese designs. In
 1 935 Nakajima purchased licenses on the early
Corsair from Chance Vought Corporation, and
It acquired designs of the Whirlwind and
Cyclone engines from Wright Aeronautical
Corporation in 1937. Mitsubishi purchased a
French radial engine, which became the basis for
their famous Kinsei series, and secured plans for
a Curtiss fighter in 1937.
Sumitomo Metals bought rights to the
American Hamilton Standard and German
YOM propellors. Kawasaki secured rights on the
German Daimler Benz engine, from which came
the only Japanese liquid.cooled engine in the
war. . . . From 1937 onward the Japanese
aircraft industry, in general, and Mitsubishi in
partiCUlar, was shrouded in purposeful secrecy.
At a time when we were �anting visas to
Japanese technicians, the lid was �lamped on
tighter and tighter as the Japanese Government
moved toward closer control of the aircraft
industry.
We knew that Japan had launched upon a vast and
hurried expansion of her military aircraft industry. We
knew, for example, that the Japanese government had
directed a near doubling of the aircraft plants in 1 94 1 .
Japanese newspapers bragged to the world that a great
new airframe and assembly plant had been built at
Musashino, near Tokyo, and another near Nagoya,
I which was heralded as the second largest in the world.
Kawasaki set up immense modern plants near Akashi
I
and near Nagoya.
The exact location and description of these plants
was a mystery to us in the fall of 1 944. We recognized,
ho��ver, that these highly concentrated plants in the
VICInity of Tokyo, Nagoya, and Kobe would be
extremely vital precision targets-if and when we
discovered their precise locations and descriptions.
The aircraft targets could not be found, hit, and
destroyed with the radar bombing equipment and the
meager information we had available at the time. So
the units of the XXIst Bomber Command had to be
retrained on a crash basis to do high-altitude, daylight
precision bombing and to fly in formations which had
not yet been selected. We had to plan on
reconnaissance after we had established a base on
Saipan. The airplane and engine factory targets were at
the extreme limit of the B-29 radius of action as it was
then understood. Formation flying always reduces
available range, and it made completion of our
missions, marginal at best, even more of a problem. As
a matter of fact, it took several months of actual
operation to master the techniques of fuel control that
'would give the B-29 its design capability.
There was spirited dispute at the time over this
change in bombing tactics. The dispute persists, but
the r�asoni ?g is not hard to trace. OUf only real
expenence In massive bombing operations had taken
place over Europe. Had we not learned a painful
32
lesson in Europe? The whole concept of American air
power-the selection of vital targets on the ground and
their destruction through precision bombing-had
faced the possibility of disastrous failure there. The
ability of massive bomber formations to fight their way
through enemy defenses and reach remote targets,
without intolerable losses, came dangerously close to
being disproved. If the German fighter forces had been
left free to expand, the price might have been too high.
And if that price had been too high, the air offensive
would have failed and with it the hope of surface
invasion as well.
The bombers of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air
Forces were directed against the sources of German
fighter development and strength-the aircraft and
engine factories, the air bases, and the sources of
aviation fuel. These constituted the targets of the
"intermediate objective"-the enemy air force. At the
earliest possible time, the penetration capability of the
bomber formations were supplemented by escort
fighters.
This experience in Europe obviously weighed
heavily in establishing target systems in Japan. The
aircraft and engine factories, and to a more limited
extent, the oil resources of Japan were established as
the "intermediate objective" in the war against Japan
also, and were to receive first priority in point of time.
The other lesson of European air combat simply
could not be applied initially to the Twentieth Air
Force. The range of the B-29 was such that no escort
fighters could accompany the formations from the
Marianas, although efforts were made to provide a
very long-range escort fighter. Until Iwo Jima could be
captured and a fighter base established there, the
bombers would be entirely on their own. This was
really the most controversial point of all. Seasoned
experts on every hand assured us that the B-29s would
simply be shot out of the air. But it was a risk that had
to be taken_ if the strategic purposes were to be
achieved. And the B-29s had some factors working for
them, namely, greatly improved defensive firepower
and high-altitude performance.
I issued orders for conversion of the 73rd Wing to
daylight tactics early in September, and I established
tactical doctrine for daylight operations including a
standard formation. Opposition to this change was
severe, especially from the 73rd Wing. Training was
intensive. But training missions from Kansas to Cuba,
simulating the mission from Saipan to Japan, left
bombers down all over the Gulf States. Meanwhile the
pressure to commit the command to combat was
becoming intense.
Final practice missions were flown. Groups of the
73rd Wing participated in two long-range missions
which stressed takeoff, assembly, rendezvous,
formation flying, and simulated frontal weather
penetration. But it simply was impossible to train
bombardiers to achieve acceptable precision accuracy
in the time remaining. Training would have to be
completed in the Pacific.
Although the Marianas were captured on the
initiative and insistence of the Army Air Forces to
serve as a base for B-29 operations in the Pacific, the
decision was made before crews had enough flying
experience with the aircraft to know what the B-29
performance actually was. Initial experience in the
training area indicated that the round trip from the
Marianas to Tokyo was marginal for the B-29, even on
paper and without opposition. Depending on the
location of the base and the target, the distance could
be as much as 1 550 miles, one way. Obviously, there
would be no land-based escort fighters for the first part
of the campaign, before the capture of Iwo Jima. Not
only was the marginal range of the B-29 a factor. In
addition, the Marianas were separated from Tokyo by
nearly 1 5 00 miles of hostile environment-the Pacific
Ocean.
Six weeks later when the time came to move the first
units to Saipan, the crews had averaged less than 1 00
hours of total flying time in the B-29, and the average
high-altitude formation flying experience was less than
1 2 hours. The engines of the B-29 developed a mean
tendency to swallow valves and catch fire. The
magnesium crankcases burned with a fury that defied
all extinguishing efforts. In addition, gunsighting
blisters were either blowing out at high- altitude or
frosting up so badly that it was impossible to see
through them. But there was not time to fix them
properly.
The burning-out of exhaust valves was finally
solved by fitting a goosenecked pipe which sprayed
cool air directly on the valve housing and by putting
cuffs on the props which pumped more air through the
engine cowling. Oil flow through exhaust valve
housing was also improved. The other problem,
frosting of panes in the cockpit and of plastic bubbles
at gunners scanning stations, was solved by running
hot air hoses to the affected areas. With the cockpit
blanked out, it obviously would have been impossible
to keep formation. Also with scanning bubbles
clouded, the gunners could not see to shoot. These
problems were solved at literally the eleventh hour.
The XXIst Bomber Command requested that units
be flown to Saipan, under Air Transport Command
control, in squadron formation, in order to get needed
experience flying in formation for considerable
distances. This request was denied on the ground that
the airplane lacked sufficient range to fly in formation
from Sacramento to Hawaii, 2400 miles. The flight
would have been without a bombload, in the face of
no opposition, and with excellent communications,
weather reporting, and base facilities. These same
units, on arrival in Saipan, were faced with a round
trip of about 3000 miles, with bombloads, in the face
of expected enemy opposition, and with no weather
data or communications.
Two bases, each with two 8500-foot paved runways
33
and 80 hardstands, necessary shops, housing, fueling
facilities, and other essentials, were supposed to be
ready on Saipan. The bases were to have been built by
the Central Pacific Area Command, but stubborn
interference by the Japanese garrisons in the Pacific
and competition from US Navy construction work had
set the schedule back by several months.
I paid a departing visit to General Arnold and
General Marshall in Washington in mid-September.
In response to his inquiry, I assured General Marshall
that we would carry out our pledge to attack Japan in
November.
Departing on 5 October, 1 took the first B-29 to the
Marianas and started the flow which ultimately
became massive. I flew with the crew from the 73rd
Wing, commanded by a bright and capable young
major named Jack Catton.' Catton and I alternated in
the pilot position; I took it from Sacramento to
Hawaii; he took it to Kwajalein; and I flew the last lap
to Saipan. We took off from Mather Field near
Sacramento. The original design gross weight of the
B-29 was 1 20,000 lbs. Wright Field reluctantly
permitted an overload weight to 1 28 ,000 lbs. With our
spare engine in the bomb bay and the various kits we
carried, we weighed in at about 1 30,000 Ibs.
When we reached Hickam Field in Honolulu,
Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean
Area, greeted us, as did Lt Gen "Miff" Harmon, who
had been designated "Deputy Commanding General
Twentieth A i r Force for Administration and
Logistics." General Arnold retained direct control for
operations as Commanding General Twentieth Air
Force and Executive Agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
I asked Admiral Nimitz and General Harmon for
an opportunity to discuss my mission and my
requirements. I met with Admiral Nimitz the next
morning and explained my mission and its peculiar
command relationship-I would be completely
dependent upon Admiral Nimitz for construction of
bases in the Marianas, for movement and delivery of
all supplies by surface transportation, and for defense
of the bases. At the same time, I would be independent
of Admiral Nimitz's authority in operational matters,
except for serious emergencies.
This command relationship apparently had not
been clearly spelled out or explained to Admiral
Nimitz, because he expressed surprise on some counts.
J, for my part, was surprised too. General Kuter had
made a trip to Hawaii in late March or April for the
express purpose of describing these relationships. On
his return, a staff unit, headed by M aj Gen "Tony"
Frank, in a follow-up visit, had spent a week reaching
agreement on the principal details. Colonel Combs
represented Headquarters Twentieth Air Force on this
mission. The results of the mission were favorable
indeed.
Thinking that ttie JCS-approved command
'Catton relLred as a four·slar general in 1979

relationship had been explained, perhaps I was
undiplomatic in my presentation of my understanding
of that agreement. Fortunately I had the forethought to
bring with me a copy of the JCS agreement on the
subject, which I produced. Admiral Nimitz studied it
intently and said:
I must say to you that I am in strong
disagreement with these arrangements. If I had
been aware of their extent I would have
expressed this disagreement to Admiral King
and the Joint Chiefs. I command all of US forces
in the Pacific Ocean Area. This is an abrogation
i of the chain of command. However this is the
'I decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I say to
i The bases on nearby Tinian Island had hardly been
you again, I will give you all the help and
cooperation in my capability. You have my very
III
best wishes for success.
He was as good as his word. I had good reason to be
grateful for his continued support. But he ended on an
ominous note. He said, "You are probably in for a
rough time. You are going out to the Forward Area
where my commander, Vice Admiral John Hoover,
breaks my admirals and throws them overboard
without the slightest compunction. God knows what he
is going to do to you."
When [ got to know Admiral Nimitz better, I
recognized the vein of merry humor that flowed
beneath a sometimes stern visage. But at the time I was
somewhat shaken.
When I finally arrived at Saipan, [ called upon Vice
Adm John Hoover, Commander of the Forward
Area. He could not have been more cordial and
helpful. I kept him constantly advised of my problems
and progress, and I enjoyed his strong support. [ made
it a point to follow his advice and suggestions
whenever I felt that I could.
The movement to Saipan had been conducted in
supposed secrecy. When I left my wife in San Antonio
to return overseas, I did not even tell her which seas I
was going over-Atlantic or Pacific. The night of our
arrival in Saipan, "Tokyo Rose" broadcast a welcome
to Saipan for "General 'Possum' Hansell" over the
Japanese radio network.
This may have seemed am\lsing to many, but to one
it was almost tragic. Col Richard Carmichael,
commander of a B-29 group operating from Chengtu,
was shot down over Japan and captured . He was
hauled before a Japanese investigator who demanded
to know why I was called "Possum." When he
professed ignorance he was beaten unmercifully. This
went on for days, till the Japanese finally concluded
that he really didn't know-which was all too painfully
true. Years later, at a cocktail party, he asked my wife,
Dotta, why I was called "Possum." She said that she
had found an old prep-school annual bearing my
likeness at age 1 3 with the explanation, "He is called
'Possum' because he looks like one." I have been
34
II':•.' systems were Japanese industry, which was distributed force, and they d i d direct the capture o f the Marianas
steadfast �n a minority dissent on this report ever since, . throughout the great urban industrial areas, and third as a base of operations of the XXIst Bomber
to no avail.
priority, Japanese shipping. Command. It has been implied that the air strategists
A survey of conditions on Saipan caused dismay. Of
It must be remembered that the Twentieth Air who conducted the early operations of the XXIst had
the two bases under construction on Saipan, one could
Force had won its right to exist only by becoming a limited vision and were too much influenced by the
not be used at all by B-29s, and the other had one ! creature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Strategic air need to pave the way for invasion. This is not so.
runway 7,000 feet long (5,000 feet of it paved ), a
leaders believed that the war could be won by air The pattern of B-29 operations against targets in
taxiway at one end only, about 40 hardstands, and no
power, but the official war plans of the JCS Japan was not conditioned by the limited conception
other facilities whatever except for a bomb dump and a
contemplated invasion, and the Twentieth Air Force of the role of air power inherent in the basic idea of
vehicle park with gasoline truck trailers. It was hardly
could not divorce itself entirely from that ultimate defeating Japan by ground invasion. The initial target
ready to receive the 1 2 ,000 men and 1 80 aircraft of
concept. Certainly that was wise in the early stages. Air list had as its objective the defeat of the Japanese air
the 73rd Wing. Ground crews put up borrowed tents
power, applied by itself, had never before been force, but this, like the defeat of the German air force,
in what was certainly one of the most disorderly . .
sufficient to bring about capaulatlon of a major nation was an intermediate objective. It was considered a
military encampments of the war, but they worked day that was still in full control of its own military means. necessary preliminary in order to ensure and enhance
and night to meet the demands for the first strike.
What if the strategic air offensive should not be the effectiveness of strategic bombing operations. To
effective? The Joint Chiefs simply had to have a back­ be sure, the objective also contributed to successful
started. Those in Guam, where the main headquarters up plan. To be sure, there was some skepticism of air future ground and sea operations. But the initial
of the XXIst Bomber Command was to be located, had power , but even if there had not been, it would have primary air objectives were essentially the same as
not even been laid out. Communications were been unwise to fai l to provide for a backup. Actually those in Germany-the military, economic, industrial,
completely inadequate. The aircraft of the 73rd Wing the JCS did give the Twentieth Air Force priority and social structure, which supported the will and the
arrived rapidly on Saipan after mid-October and had second-to-none in the creation and launching of the ability of the Japanese nation to wage war.
to be double-parked on hardstands. In the meantime, a
shipload of supplies arrived at Guam, which was to
become a depot.
The ship had been carefully loaded so that the
supplies could be unloaded in reverse sequence and
stacked at the depot in "combat loaded" order. The
procedure was new and elaborate but one which would
give us an operating depot in a matter of weeks.
Actually, fighting was still going on in Guam when the
depot ship arrived, and confusion reigned supreme.
The harbor master said, ''I'll give you 24 hours to get
that goddamned ship out of here."
Before I learned what was happening, the supplies
were dumped in the jungle. They were never
recovered. It became necessary to provide aircraft
supplies for the B-29s, themselves new and unfamiliar,
by air all the way from Sacramento, Califomia-8,000
miles away! The in-commission rate of the B-29s was
astonishingly high-considering the circumstances.
As indicated earlier, the strategic concept was for
the defeat or neutralization of the Japanese air forces
as an "overriding intennediate objective." Thereafter.
the major strategic air offensive was to be launched
against the war-supporting and economic systems of
Japan. These systems were the "primary objectives."
The plan of operations against the primary objective
contemplated destruction of major selected industrial
facilities by selected target bombing.
The "overriding intermediate objective" and its
associated target system assigned to XX 1st Bomber
Command by agreement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
giving first place to Japanese aircraft and aircraft
engine factories, was not lightly conceived. It had been
learned in Europe that air superiority is necessary in
order to carry out effective surface operations and
invasions as well as major strategic air operations. The
Joint Chiefs had been persuaded to back the air
offensive, but they were looking over the shoulders of
the airmen at the invasion shore. Second priority target
35
CHAPTER 6 and there was deep concern in the command about the
First Strikes
Plans for the first bombing of Japan from the
Marianas called initially for a combined first strike
with the Navy, so that carrier-based aircraft would
divert some of the Japanese fighter defenses and
absorb some of their capability. For the rest, the B-29s
would have to depend upon high altitude and speed
(their principal advantage) and their own defensive
gunfire. The B-29 was designed as a high-altitude
bomber, the first to have pressurized crew
compartments. It had turbosupercharged engines, was
reasonably fast at high altitudes and was heavily
gunned. By operating in formation, it was expected to
fend for itself against enemy fighters which would be
operating at their ceiling and have little, if any. margin
of performance superiority.
The first airplanes and crews to arrive on Saipan
were given a small amount of training in the Pacific
area. Six short training missions were flown against
Truk and Iwo Jima. In spite of all the obstacles, the
XX 1st Bomber Command declared itself ready to meet
combat commitments exactly on time, by the middle of
November.
In the early morning of I November, an F- i 3A,
photo-reconnaissance version of the B-29, took off
from Saipan and became the first US plane over Tokyo
since April 1 942, the date of. the Doolittle raid. The
crew, led by Capt Ralph Steakley, insisted upon an
immediate mission, even though they had just arrived
from the United States. I advised a rest but they were
insistent. Thank God they were. They found clear
skies over Japan-a phenomenon. Called "Tokyo
Rose," the aircraft flew above the Japanese capital at
an altitude of 32,000 feet, photographing a complex of
aircraft and engine plants just west of Tokyo and
another on the outskirts of Nagoya. They shot over
7,000 excellent photographs. Before the first strike on
Tokyo on 24 November, 1 7 sorties had been flown
over Japan by F- 1 3s. Many of the missions were
36
hampered by bad weather, but enough information on
the location of aircraft factories was obtained for the
first bombing missions. Copies of the photographs
were sent to General Arnold for the JCS and to
Admirals Nimitz and William Halsey.
Mosaics were made, strips laid out, initial points
and target approaches selected. Every crew was
required to trace its photo map, mark landmarks and
target runs, an� then redraw them from memory-over
and over.
As the day for the combined operation against
Japan approached, the Navy found itself in serious
combat trouble in its movement into the Philippines
and announced that it was unable to participate in the
planned combined air operation against Japan.
SAN ANTONIO I and II
The planned strike was labeled SAN ANTONIO I.
I was to lead the first, and Brig Gen Emmett ("Rosey")
O'Donnell, Commander of the 73rd Wing, was to lead
the second. These plans were reported to Washington
in detail. To my surprise, I was ordered by General
Arnold not to lead the mission because of my extensive
knowledge of the Pacific campaign plans.
It was concern for just this possibility that had
prompted me to make a special request about a month
or so earlier. Just before leaving for the Pacific, I had
been summoned to Washington to be briefed on the
atomic bomb. I reported to Washington as directed. I
asked if the' knowledge I was about to receive would
keep .1Jle from flying combat missions. The answer was,
"Yes." I asked that I be excused from receiving the
information because I felt it imperative that I be free to
lead my command if the going got rough. This request
was honored and I proceeded without the briefing.
Now, it seemed to me, was the time when I should
lead the first mission. The going was likely to be rough
chances of successfully performing the mission. I
decided to ignore instructions, lead the mission, and
hope for the best. My hope was short lived. Two or
three days after advising Washington of our plans, I
was called upon by a Navy lieutenant and a petty
officer who had a copy of the message and demanded a
written acknowledgement of its receipt. The message
had been sent through Navy channels.
At the time I thought the decision was arbitrary and
ill-taken. Of course, I did have knowledge of the
strategic plans for the Pacific war, but plans are
constantly changing, and I had only a rudimentary
knowledge of the atomic bomb. But there was another
factor which I overlooked at the time and did not think
of until much later-I was privy to the existence of
supersecret intelligence and, what was much more
important, to the sensitive source of such information.
The story is out now after 30 years of secrecy. It is
told in fascinating detail in The Ultra Secret by the man
who was responsible for it, Group Captain F. W.
Winterbotham, RAF. It is the story of the breaking of
the most secret codes of the Germans and the
Japanese.
How I could have forgotten this item is incredible.
It was the source of daily agony as far as I was
concerned. For a period of several months before I
took over the XXIst Bomber Command, General
Arnold required Generals White and Kuter and me to
meet in his inner office every morning. We were
admitted at 7:30. At 7: 1 5, General Arnold received
the daily group of verbatim translations of high-level
secret German and Japanese messages. Before we
entered. we were each familiar with our own US secret
messages that had been exchanged during the night
and were prepared to present and discuss events
pertaining to our several interests and responsibilities.
But we did not receive "Ultra" messages direct.
General Arnold would reveal the information he had
just received and demand to know what we were doing
about it. We were not doing anything about it; we did
not know about it. But this did not save us from
withering comments about our competence.
Doubtless, General Arnold enjoyed this game, but it
was pretty rough business to be on the receiving end.
N ow that same supersecret intelligence was
returning to bite me again. There was an Allied
agreement, without deviation of any sort, to the effect
that recipients of "Ultra" information, and those who
had knowledge of its source, were not permitted to
expose themselves to capture. This may well have been
the clinching argument in my case.
The message from General Arnold could no longer
be ignored. I designated General O'Donnell,
Commanding General of the 73rd Wing, to lead SAN
ANTONIO I .
The Navy recommended postponement o f the B-29
attacks on the Japanese aircraft industry near Tokyo.
As Commanding General, XXIst Bomber Command,
37
I found myself in a serious predicament. Three nearly
simultaneous events combined to make my position
difficult.
First was the Navy recommendation that the
mission be cancelled or indefinitely postponed until
the Navy was ready to participate. This would clearly
indicate that the XXIst Bomber Command could not
operate independently but must operate only in close
concert with the Navy. If this were so, why have a
separate Twentieth Air Force chain of command?
Since coordination would be necessary, and it could
only be provided by the Commander in Chief of the
Pacific Ocean Area, Admiral Nimitz, why not place
the XXIst Bomber Command under the control of
Admiral Nimitz? The primary reason to reject such an
arrangement was that this would almost certainly
destroy the strategic air war against Japan as a war­
winning grand strategy-a grand strategy in which I
and my fellow airmen fervently believed. I hastened to
notify General Arnold that the XXIst Bomber
Command stood ready to carry out the mission without
Navy participation.
Second, I received a disturbing message from
General Arnold. Members of General Arnold's staff
and at least one top-level Air Corps field commander,
to whom my plan for SAN ANTONIO I had been
passed for comment, expressed grave doubts about our
capability to carry out our mission. General Arnold
forwarded these expressions of doubt and stated his
own inclination to agree with the skeptics. It was
contended that the airplanes lacked the necessary
range and it was further contended that the Japanese
would "shoot them out of the air." General Arnold did
not direct me to abandon or modify the mission.
Rather, he put me on record as having been warned.
He concluded with the statement that he had high
respect for the critics of the mission, but said that if I
were convinced of its feasibility and was determined to
carry on, then I was at liberty to do so. He left the
decision up to me and said that if I chose to go ahead,
then he wished me luck. The effect was chilling. The
warning was coming from the very area in which I had
expected firmest support.
Third, I received a handwritten letter from my
senior Wing Commander, General O'Donnell, stating
that he, too, doubted the capability of his unit to carry
out the mission. He recommended abandoning the
daylight attack and substituting a night attack against
some area target.
I pointed out to him that the operation he
recomrr:tended would not accomplish the mission with
which I was charged. I was determined to accomplish
that mission and I told him that if he was unwilling to
lead his wing in this operation, I would turn it over to
someone who was willing. (Roger Ramey, my deputy,
was anxious to head it.) He assured me that he was
willing but had felt constrained to express his doubts
and worries. I recognized his right and obligation to
give me in private his honest opinion. If the mission
failed and he had not warned me of his honest
convictions, I would have been justified in
reproaching hi m . O n the strength o f this, with his
agreement I destroyed his letter, with the explanation
that if the mission succeeded, the letter would be a
black mark on his record that would be hard to live
down, and that if it failed the onus would be entirely
on my head, since I had been warned from other
quarters.
I! was quite true that until the time for takeoff of
SAN ANTONIO I, the XXIst had never flown a
formation as large as a squadron a distance as far as
Tokyo and back, even without enemy opposition.
But the potential impact of the mission on Pacific
strategy and the future of the Air Force extended far
beyond the XXIst. The Army Air Forces, at the JCS
planning and command level, had been advocating
primary reliance upon the decisive effeC4iveness of the
air offensive, with provision for an invasion of the
Japanese mainland only if the air offensive proved
inconclusive. This viewpoint did not mesh with Army
and Navy planning. To admit at this late juncture that
the air offensive could not even attack its intermediate
objectives would have grave repercussions indeed. The
whole command structure of the Twentieth Air Force
as a worldwide command, reporting directly to the JCS
in a role parallel to that of the US naval fleet, was in
delicate balance. To subject it to reexamination
resulting from a major degradation of capability would
have had serious aftereffects. To those who believed
that the air offensive was not only the most effective
avenue to victory in the Pacific but also the cheapest in
terms of American lives, abandoning the planned
mission would be a disaster almost as great as the
tactical disaster of failure might have been. Still, there
was no denying that the decision to carry out the plan
was extremely risky.
I thought I understood why General Arnold had
sent me this message. Disaster on the first mission of
the XXIst Bomber Command would have changed
Pacific strategy and delayed recognition of coordinate
air power by many years. Since there seemed to be a
high probability that such disaster would actually
ensue, the ill effects would be less severe on the future
of the Air Forces if the responsibility were borne by a
subordinate field commander. He had warned me, and
I had chosen to go ahead in spite of the warning. I! was
not an unreasonable precaution to take under the
circumstances. I decided to go on with the mission and
notified General Arnold to that effect.
Rosey O'Donnell asked for a change in the
operational plan. I had set up two Initial Points, on
opposite sides of the target, and planned for two
converging bombing runs in order to confuse and
divide the enemy air defenses. I! called for a
complicated maneuver. Rosey asked that the plan be
simplified by using only one axis of attack, with
Fujiyama volcano, west of Tokyo, as the Initial Point. I
approved the change.
38
During preparation for the first strike, a delegation
of Congressmen visited my command. I Was extremely
busy. We seemed to be operating under "Murphy's
third law: if anything can go wrong, it will."
I quartered the visiting Congressmen in my own
pyramidal tent, perched on a promontory which jutted
out into the sea. I issued each of them a mess kit and
invited them to join me in the chow line and to wash
their own kits afterward as I was doing. I must admit
that the chow was simply awful, but we were living on
a shoestring and devoting all our energies to training
and preparation for the mission.
I devoted as much time to the visitors as I felt able
and told them of our general plans, problems, and
expectations. I did not go into the details of operations
and tactics. We kept those pretty close to the vest
because security leaks would endanger our success and
cost lives of our combat crews.
The group went back to Washington and wrote a
scathing denunciation of my administrative
arrangements. They also interviewed members of the
command who were from their home districts. Most of
the responses were understandably flavored with
apprehension about the forthcoming campaign. This
problem was a forerunner of the massive difficulties
which were to fall upon future American commanders
in the field in the Korean and Vietnamese wars.
The mission was laid on for 1 5 November. At the
final briefing before dawn, I made a short talk to the
crews.
Enroute to Tokyo Mission SAN ANTONIO 1-24 November 1 944
Stick together. Don't let fighter attacks break up Target Musashino Aircraft Factory-Tokyo
the formations. And put the bombs on the target. If
the bombs don't hit the target all our efforts and
risks and worries and work will be for nothing.
That's what we're here for. If we do our job, this was the Musashino aircraft plant of the Nakajima
traveled north toward Japan on our route to our
is the beginning of the end for Japan . Put the Aircraft Company on the outskirts of Tokyo, and the
targets. I! left the base a shambles and a sea of mud. If
bombs on the target. You can do it. the typhoon had arrived a few hours later, we would secondary targets and "last resort" areas were the
already have taken off-and found no place to land on docking facilities and urban area of Tokyo. A total of
return. 277.5 tons of bombs was delivered. Seventeen
Crews took stations in the early dawn. The long line The B-29s sat on their hardstands, two deep, fully bombers turned back because of fuel problems, and six
of 8-29s formed up on the single taxiway that led to loaded, for nine days. The orders had been distributed. missed bombing because of mechanicaJ troubles.
only one end of the runway. At the last moment, the The thought of a security leak was a nightmare. A daily Flying at 27,000·33 ,000 feet, the bombers picked up a
wind, which had consistently blown down the runway, weather flight followed the typhoon. To my great grief, 1 20·knot wind over Japan, giving them a ground speed
died down. We needed that wind badly to get off with one of them was lost and never heard from. of 445 miles per hour. This speed taxed the limits of
our heavy loads. Then the wind reversed direction and On 24 November, I I I B·29s of the 73rd Wing, the optical bombsights. Twenty·four planes bombed
freshened. I! Was impossible to taxi to the other end of XXIst Bomber Command, took off on the trip toward the Nakajima plant on the outskirts of Tokyo, and 64
the runway because the long taxi line could not be Japan, representing over 90 percent of the B·29s on unloaded on the dock areas. Only one B·29 was lost in
reversed and we could not use the runway itself to taxi Saipan. Some of the crews had arrived less than a week combat. US gunners claimed 7 enemy fighters
down and then take off by successive airplanes. The before, and their first takeoff was for Tokyo. Each destroyed and 1 8 probables. Final count for the XXIst
taxi time would have been excessive. causing long takeoff was an ordeal. As noted earlier, the B·29 was listed 2 B·29s destroyed, 8 damaged by enemy action,
delay in assembly and burning up too much of our I man killed, II missing, and 4 injured.
originally designed for a gross weight of 1 20,000
precious fuel. After the war, records indicated that 48 bombs had
pounds. By urging and pleading, we convinced Wright
There was no choice. I had to call off the mission. I hit in the factory area; I percent of the building and
Field to raise the allowable gross takeoff weight of the
hated to do so. We had built up to a psychological 2.4 percent of the machinery were damaged; and 57
8·29 to 1 32 ,000 pounds. In order to carry every
climax. Delay and then repeat would play on fears and persons were killed and 75 i njured.
gallon of gas that could be pumped aboard, they were
apprehension. I! was one of the hardest decisions I had The weather at the target had been far from
taking off at 1 40,000 pounds! A faltering engine
to make, but it was one of the luckiest. In a few hours, favorable, and the bombing left much to be desired.
would spell the end for any airplane.
a typhoon hit Saipan and lasted six days, then it However, the losses were small, and the operatIOn was
Primary target for the B·29s on SAN ANTONIO I
39

carried out in spite of the hazards and obstacles. Not
the least of the hazards was the return to base. The
mission lasted 1 2 to 14 hours, and the return was at
night. There were no runway lights, only smudge pots
along the single runway strip. The next nearest landing
strip was at Kwajalein. over a thousand miles away. If a
B-29 splattered itself on the runway, the rest of the
aircraft behind it were all through.
The decision to launch the offensive in the face of
such adverse conditions and recommendations seems
to reflect recklessness, and results stemmed more from
good luck than sound judgment. But this first great
gamble proved the feas i b i l ity of the assault.
Momentum, confidence, and improved efficiency
would come with experience and numbers. If the
decision had been to "stand down" SAN ANTONIO I
and substitute a night attack against some urban area,
the result would have been catastoophic, in my
opinion, particularly as regards confidence in and
continuation of the Twentieth Air Force.
SAN ANTONIO II was staged on 27 November,
· Ii
with the same target priorities. The crews of the 8 1
B-29s that flew the mission found Tokyo completely
,'I'
covered by clouds, so the bombs were dropped by
radar on the secondary targets. The Japanese were
,
I' provoked into trying to halt the bombing by making air
raids on Isley Field, our base on Saipan, destroying
some B-29s. The Japanese were realizing that their
home islands were indeed susceptible to sustained
attack and that their fighters could not turn back the
B-29s.
Improving Successive Missions
The accomplishment of these first two missions,
with very light losses, was an achievement in itself. The
fact that bombing results were only fair could be
overlooked in view of the proof that the force could,
indeed, reach its targets and return to base. But
succeeding missions made it clear that bombing
accuracy would have to be greatly improved. Two
methods were adopted to achieve that end-training in
visual bombing and the introduction of radar as an
assist and as a substitute for optical bombing in attacks
against selected precision targets.
A "lead-crew" school was set up, and one 8-29
� I
from each squadron was set aside for training. This
was rather a drastic move. We were desperately short
of B-29s, and withdrawing at least 12 8-29s for
training purposes out of a total of about a hundred
B w 29s in operational condition was a critical
weakening of the force. But there was no use sending
the force to Japan at all if it failed to destroy its targets.
The other method to improve bombing simply made
good sense. The AN/APQ- 1 3 radar bombing
equipment was interconnected with the Norden
optical sight. Initial points OPs) were chosen that
provided good radar returns. As each formation
approached the initial point, the turn to the bombing
40
run was made from observations by the radar�
bombardier. He then conducted a radar bombing run,
using the target if possible or an offset aiming point if
necessary, and the optical-bombardier coupled the
optical sight into the radar bombing run. In this
manner, it was possible to set into the optical sight the
drift angle and rate of ground speed and to have the
cross hairs of the optical sight aligned approximately
on the target. Then if the target became visible through
breaks in the clouds, it was necessary only to make
minor adjustments of the optical sight.
Although the bombs could be released on the radar
sight if the clouds obscured the target from visual
adjustment, the resulting accuracy was inferior to
visual sighting. To make the radar sighting acceptably
accurate, it would be necessary to prepare radar maps
of the targets and determine precise location of targets
with reference to good offset aiming points if the target
itself did not provide a good radar return .
Early Operations
Several events occurred in the first 10 days of
operations which had a sobering impact on me.
The first event occurred when Japanese fighters
began strafing attacks on the air base and parked
B- 29s. They had come down from Iwo Jima on a one­
way suicide mission and were completely undetected
by the Marine outfit that was supposed to provide air
defense for us.
I jumped in my jeep with Col John Montgomery,
my Chief of Staff, and headed for the field. As I came
up a rise to the flying field, I found myself looking
straight into a Japanese fighter which was strafing the
area. I brought the jeep to a halt and sought shelter
under it. Quick as my reaction had been, it still was not
quick enough. Colonel Montgomery was already
there.
Fortunately the Wing was out on a mission over
Japan and there were only a few B-29s on the ground.
But several B-29s had aborted the mission and were
fully loaded with bombs and gasoline.
The main warning radar, which the Marines should
have installed on a hill, was still in crates. There had
been ample time for installation, but the Marines
simply did not expect suicide attacks. General Arnold
was understandably outraged when he learned of this.
He had warned of this possibility but suitable action
was not taken to provide defenses.
Another incident had to do with Operation
"Memphis One" which was returning to Saipan when
an intense tropical storm hit the island. It was about
8:30 at night and the rain was so heavy that, standing
in the improvised tower, I could not see the dim
smudge pots which outlined the single runway.
Over 80 B-29s were approaching the field. The air
was full of calls saying, "No __ 8-29, I am
approaching Saipan. Visibility zero. I am out of
gasoline. Request instructions."
The tower operator was a noncommissioned officer
who earned my highest admiration. He was calm and
issued instructions without a hint of panic. The only
thIng we could do was hope the storm, which had
arrived suddenly, would depart with equal dispatch,
and that the fuel gauges which read zero didn't really
mean It. We were fortunate. The storm did clear. The
B-29s came in in rapid succession.
I realized that I really was quite helpless. The real
commander of the XXIst Bomber Command was a
noncommissioned officer who was functioning
superbly as tower operator. The best help I could give
him was to keep out of his way and avoid interfering
with him.
In another incident one evening, an air raid
warning sounded and all lights were doused. A
Japanese twin-engined bomber made a couple of
passes. Roger Ramey, my deputy commander, and I
were standing on the runway watChing the antiaircraft
bursts whe n the b o m b e r s u d d e n l y m a d e a
reappearance at very low altitude. A couple of B-29s
had been hit and were burning brightly. They lit up the
sky, and the oncoming Japanese aircraft was clearly
visible. I think we noted something about it at just the
same instant, because we took immediate and identical
action. It was making a low-level strafing attack down
the runway we were standing on. There was no place to
go. We hit the pavement with great force at just tbe
same time. Tracers from the ground defenses were
pouring into the Japanese bomber but it continued on
course. Then as it approached the end of the runway,
!
It swerved slIghtly and plowed into the ground. The
pilot evidently had been killed. The bomber hit with a
roar about a hundred yards from us and was engulfed
in flames. Just as we were rising to our feet, there was a
violent explosion. Evidently it still had bombs aboard.
That evening was replete with mental impressions as
well. As soon as the attack started, the base was
aswarm with thousands of men eager and determined
to see what was going on. They were completely
beyond control. Two B-29s were burning like torches,
and there were other B-29s nearby. Men pushed and
pulled to get the other 60-ton monsters away from the
fire. The B-29s were fully loaded with gasoline. Some
of them had bombs aboard in preparation for the
morrow's mission. No one seemed to know which of
them had bombs and which had not. Succor came
from an unbidden and unexpected source: the
engineers. They appeared on the scene with their
massive bulldoz�rs and earth-moving equipment. They
pushed the flamIng carcasses aside, piled dirt on them,
and rode over them till they had crushed out the fires.
It Was the most amazing sight I have ever seen. No
one
knew for sure that there were not bombs in those
flaming masses. Fifty-caliber ammunition was
going
off lIke firecrackers. The scene was an animated
Illustration out of Dante's Inferno. Engineers
were
ndIn� m bulldozers through flames reaching high
in
the alr� enormous monsters of steel were
burying other
41
monsters which threatened to lash back and blow up at
any moment.
I still don't know whose idea it was for the engineers
to take this action. It certainly was not mine. I really
.
thmk It was a spontaneous reaction from the engineer
operators themselves. I have always regretted that I did
not get them a unit combat citation. It certainly was
heroism far beyond the call of duty.
The next three months were frustrating, to say the
least. Schools worked hard to train the lead crews, in a
determined effort to improve bombing accuracy.
Enormous efforts were made to improve maintenance.
The depot had to start all over again, and in the
meantime, the air supply from Sacramento had to be
improved. More missions were run against aircraft and
engine factories. But the weather was a terrible
opponent, and there was no intelligence of its
movements. Japanese fighter opposition was desperate
but not very effective, at least in comparison with
German fighters. Air Kamikaze ramming tactics were
tried with some effect. Morale was a critical problem.
The airplane engines were still unreliable. Airplanes
that were disabled from combat or from other causes
were 1 500 miles from friendly territory, and crews had
the choice of drowning or bailing out over Japan, to be
executed by maddened Japanese. The US Navy made a
tremendous contribution to morale by stationing
rescue submarines at intervals along the route. Their
performance was superb. One submarine entered
Tokyo Bay in daylight and picked up a B-29 crew right
under the guns of the Japanese.
From November 1 944 to August 1945, 600
Twentieth Air Force flyers were saved in open-sea
rescues. The system involved Navy flying boats, B - 1 7s
(Dumbos) carrying droppable lifeboats, B-29. (Super
Dumbos), and submarines, all under the control of the
Navy. The system was largely the achievement of my
Navy Liaison Officer, Commander George McGhee.
On 1 3 December, 74 B-29s of the 73rd Wing
received credit for doing significant damage to
Japanese aircraft plants. Most of the bombers carried
500-pound general-purpose bombs, while others were
loaded with incendiary clusters. The primary target
was the Mitsubishi engine plant at Nagoya.
Photographs fai led to show the entire damage. Later
reports indicated that engine assembly shops and
auxiliary buildings were destroyed or damaged. A total
of 246 people were killed and 105 injured. Aircraft
engine production capacity was reduced from 1 600 to
1 200 per month. The Mitsubishi No. 4 Engine Works
no longer made parts. The Japanese also began the
transfer of plant equipment to underground facilities.
It was the most destructive mission to date for XXIst
Bomber Command.
The order for succeeding missions was for
maximum strikes against top-priority targets by high­
altitude precision bombing when weather was
acceptable. When this was not possible, secondary
targets were to be hit, and time was also given to single

aircraft night operations, collecting weather data and
bombing by use of radar. But still bombing
effectiveness was hard to assess because of cloud cover.
Reports of effectiveness were deliberately played
down by the XXIst Bomber Command headquarters. I
wanted to build a reputation for credibility in XXIst
Bomber Command reports to counterbalance the
known tendency to exaggerate. Our whole energy was
devoted to efforts to improve effectiveness and
accuracy.
During November and December 1 944, 49 photo
missions were flown, and, by January 1 945, thousands
of photographs of Japanese targets had been taken.
These missions performed five functions for the XXIst
Bomber Command: photo reconnaissance for target
and strategic intelligence� weather reco,nnaissance;
radar scope photography; lead-crew training; and
nuisance raids.
The Aerial Mining Campaign
�
Preparation for aerial mining op�r�t ons agai!lst
shipping in Japanese waters was also mltlated dunng
this early period.
Dr Frederick M. Sallagar, while with the RAND
Corporation (but a member of my 4th Operations
Analysis Section in 1 944), completed a study entitled
Lessons From an Aerial Mining Campaign (Operation
"Starvation "). Dr Sallagar shows clearly that the aerial
mining of Japanese inland waters by B-29s of the
Twentieth Air Force's XXIst Bomber Command was a
tremendous success and contributed enormously to the
fall of Japan. He notes also a reluctance on the part of
senior Air Corps officers to enter into this operation
with the enthusiasm which it deserved. As
Commanding General of the XXIst Bomber
Command, I was one of those reluctant leaders. But
there were reasons for my reluctance.
Army A i r Force leaders ( i n c l u d i n g m e )
remembered what had happened in Germany.
AWPD- I committed the America.n bomber fleets to
the factories, industrial systems, and enemy air bases in
Germany. But the fleet was split apart and half was
assigned to the Allied forces invading North Africa in
Operation Torch. This provided a bitter lesson­
theater commanders, accustomed to seeking victory
through surface warfare, would demand and get
strategic air forces to support surface campaigns at the
expense of strategic air objectives. The Eighth Air
Force had hardly recovered from this nearly mortal
blow when the ordeal was again endured in
preparation for and support of the invasion of
Normandy. Strategic targets in Germany were
neglected far too long while the strategic air forces
were employed for support of surface campaigns. Thus
aerial mining in Japanese waters found a cool
reception in the first months of the XXIst Bomber
Command's operations. It might not have been so If we
had not been so apprehensive of dIverSIon of strategIc
air power by surface commanders.
The appeal for mining of Japanese waterways
looked like another diversion by a surface
commander. So the mining program, which turned out
to be one of the major contributions of the Twentieth
Air Force, met with some opposition to start with,
Mining of rivers and harbors in the Netherlands
East Indies by the B'29s of the XXth Bomber
Command had been one of the first operations carried
out by that command from bases in Ceylon. Admiral
Nimitz's staff proposed a much more extensive
campaign for XXIst Bomber Command in Japanese
home waters. In fact, the Navy's initial proposal would
have absorbed the total capacity of the XXIst Bomber
Command in the first three or four months of its
operations. I objected to this on the ground that it
constituted another major diversion from the prIncipal
purpose for which the command had been created and
deployed. The objection was directed, not primarily to
the idea of mining·, but to the magnitude of the
diversion at a time when utmost endeavor was needed
to develop our primary capability. The problem was
settled when General Arnold issued a directive calling
for a mining effort at a much reduced initial level and
postponed somewhat in time.
I was not, of course, in a position to change the
directive which had been issued by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. But when General Arnold sought my
recommendations on Admiral Nimitz's request, I
opposed the application of so large a proportion of the
XXIst Bomber Command to aerial mining at that
time. I recommended postponement until the force
had grown larger and proposed that one group be
charged with development of the techmque and
limited initial operations.
Even while the problem was being discussed at high
level, initial steps were undertaken to prepare for a
mining campaign of some intensity. I directed the by all the other aIrcraft m the Pacific
3 1 3th Wing, whose aircraft began to arrive in Tinian
in December, to undertake development of techmques
and tactics for this type of operation. One group of the
wing was designated to carry out this work. The XXIst
Bomber Command owes a debt of gratitude to the � erely damaged. Perhaps more
Navy personnel for their assistance in adapting Navy t e sUlVlvmg ship tonnage
mines to installation in B-29s and in helping develop harbors for prolonged periods
rmes
dropping techniques and tactics.
The later decision by General Curtis LeMay,' when
he became Commander of the XXIst, to launch a
vIe,,: of the later undeni
massive mining operation was a sound one. Adequate
force had been assembled. Tactics and techniques had
�� nlng campaign, it
been worked out (much of it by LeMay). Mining was
COmmanded the XXI
not dependent on weather, and, hence, it was possible
.General LeMay succeeded me lIS Commander of tbe XXISI: 011 20 January 1945 see
Chapter 7, p. 46.
42
to achieve continuity of operations. I think General
LeMay did not view mining operations at night as
abandonment of selective targeting. Moreover the
night mining operations, like the night urban bom ing b Our new equipment presented some technica
�
could be carried out regardless of cloud cover at th
target.
It is quite clear that I could have endorsed mining
as an aspect of strategIc bombardment against the
Japanese transportation system rather than as an
auxiliary aspect of sea blockade. I probably could have
pe;suaded General Arnold to stretch my target
.
pnonttes as prescnbed by the JCS to include aerial
mining when adequate force became available. I doubt
that I could have, or should have, devoted the major
effort of the Command to this purpose in the initial
phas� of strategic attack against Japan, when first
. from
pnonty was prescnbed as destruction of the Japanese
aircraft industry.
In retrospect, the actual evolution of events was
probably about right. The XXIst Bomber Command
did accoml'lish the "overriding intermediate objective
of undermmmg Japanese aircraft production'" it did
preserve its identity and command structur as a � complex. The SIght was swiveled by a left-hand
separate command eyen though operating in a Navy
�
comman area; and It did retam unity of effort even
when subject to constant pressure for subordination by
other commanders and staff agencies. These
achievements might have been jeopardized or at least
postponed, If the XXIst had initially devoted its
capacity to aerial mining, and the control of the XXIst
might have been compromised, perhaps, lost, as well.
The aerial mining campaign as later carried
out by
General LeMay was effective beyond
. anyone's
expectat Ion. Fleet Admiral Nimitz stated:
"The
plannmg, operattonal, and technical execution
of the
:'-
Twentieth If Force aircraft mining on a
scale never
before attamed had accomplished phenome
nal results
and IS a credIt to all concerned."
!
As Dr Sal ag� states in his study: "The campaign
w� ?utstandmg m many respects. More mines were
laId m five months (ov r 1 2,000) than
� were dropped
in more than two
years (9,000) .'"
. :
The ' phenomenal results" mentioned
by Admiral
NImItz mcluded at least 700,000
(and possibly as
much as 1 ,250,000) tons of Japanes
e shipping sunk or
important, much of
was bottled up in 'lIined
while waiting for the
to be cleared, which led to a virtual paralysi
s of
apan's essential maritime traffic
.
We have gotten somewh
. at ahead of the story but in
able success of the' aerial
is necessary to explain my
UCtance to initiate an
all-out campaign while I
st.
43
Technical Problems
l
.
problems whIch affected combat operations. I asked
for three fixes, which were attempted at Wright
Field
but dId not matenalize in time to be useful.
They
pertamed to gunnery, weather penetration, and rescue
at sea.
The gunnery equipment of the B-29 was new
f�rmidable, and complex. Experience in operatin
WIthout fighter escort in Europe had made defensive
g
gunfl �e Important. I had been instrume
ntal in
changl�g the t?P turret of the B-29 from a two-gun,
.50 cahbre, pair to a set of four such guns, in order
to
meet the most dangerous fighter attacks-those
the front. All the guns were remotely operated
from
SIghts placed m transparent sighting blisters. A
master
gunner operated from a master-gunner's position
in a
top blister from which all the guns except the two
tail
guns could be controlled and fired. The gun sights
and
controls were mgemous and sophisticated, but
highly
grip
control, both laterally and in height, and the range
.
the approachmg fighter was automatically fed into
of
the
SIght computer by a right-hand grip control by which
the gunner sought to keep an illuminated ring
in the
SIght adjusted to the wingspan of the approachi
ng
fight�r. Each hand had to work simultaneously with,
but mdependently of, the other. To complicat
e the
problem further, the messages fed into the computer
were accepted in terms of "rate." The "rate of turn"
of
the controls established the velocity and rate
of turn
and rate of approach of the target. If a gunner failed
to
mampulate his sight smoothly and moved with a
of Jerks, th';"" rapid jerks told the computer that
series
the
target velOCIty was accelerating or decelerating
wildly.
I asked that a device be designed which would
deter�l�e rang� and rate of approach by radar and
feed It dIrectly mto the sight computer. Such a device
was avaIlable for the tail guns which had a somewhat
.
hmtted field of fire. This would have relieved the
gunner of at least half his burden. Actually, it would
have proVIded far more relief than that. It certainly is
far easIer to do one thing at a time than to do two
separate things simultaneously.
Another fix that I desired had to do with "station­
keeping" by radar. I was worried about penetration of
heavy weather fronts in formation. It was necessary
that the formatIons be able to reassemble easily after
penetr�tlon of a weather front, to provide mutual
protectIOn. It was possible to use the APQ- 1 3 bombing
radar for thIS p�rpose to a limited degree, but I was not
content about It.
Finally, I asked for a floating transponder that
��
�o�ld be ssed into the sea just as a damaged airplane
dItched. ThIS would have permitted rescue aircraft
to home on the transponder and quickly locate the
poSItIon at which the airplane had gone down and,
hopefully, at which the crew could be rescued from
their rubber rafts.
Tactical Problems
We had tactical problems as well as technical ones.
In the early stages of operations, before we learned
how to get the most from our engines, we were
seriously constrained in terms of range. To save as
much fuel as possible the first thousand miles or so
were flown at low altitude and the climb to penetrating
altitude was begun after the airplane had become
lighter by the weight of the expended fuel.
General Arnold w,," understandably concerned
about the large number of losses due to "ditchings"
and failure to return for unknown reasons. Although I
felt that losses in a highly risky wartime operation that
gave promise of being decisive must,be expected, I
undertook extensive measures to reduce those losses as
much as possible. The actual combat losses were not
excessive considering the nature of the operations and
the desperate severity of the defenses. But losses due to
i n adequate m a i n te n a n c e and to equipment
malfunction were within our capability to reduce, and
we simply had to do everything within our power to
overcome our deficiencies.
One measure, in addition to improved maintenance
and inspection, was lightening of the airplane by
removing items which could be spared. A lighter
airplane had a much better chance of returning to base
after battle damage or equipment failure. We stripped
the airplane itself of 1900 pounds and removed one of
the bomb-bay gas tanks for another 4 1 00 pounds,
giving a total weight reduction of 6000 pounds.
But our operations were still confined to narrow
deviations from the direct route to Tokyo and Nagoya.
Mission after mission had to follow the same path. As
a result, our missions were reported as we passed Iwo
Jima (until its capture) and a few reporting ships which
provided warning in plenty of time for the Japanese
defenses to concentrate at Tokyo or Nagoya.
Weather Forecasting
The daily "command decision" whether to launch
a mission the next day and against what target was
44
dependent upon the weather forecast more than any
other factor. Our weather information depended
largely on a nightly B-29 flight to Japan. I had a CHAPTER 7
meteorological officer who did a magnificent job
under almost impossible conditions. His name was Col
James Seaver, whom I had known in England. He
knew perfectly well that my decision to "go" or to
"stand down" depended directly upon his forecast of
weather conditions. He also knew, and I knew, that his
estimate of weather conditions was going to be better
than mine, so he stated his forecast without
equivocation. He said what he thought would be the
case, without hedging it about with subjunctive
clauses. Sometimes he was wrong, but often he was
right. I relied upon him heavily and was careful never
to criticize when the weather forecast did not pan out.
Command Changes
The XXIst Bomber Command had no Special
Liaison Unit (SLU) to receive "Ultra" information,
and this was a grievous omission. I cannot understand
why. In his book, Group Captain Winterbotham drops
Command Relationships and Bomber materiel command with the primary misSion of
the casual statement:
Commanders expediting production and improvements of the B-29.
He was succeeded at XXth Bomber Command for a
In Brisbane (Australia) many of our main briefperiod by General Saunders. Then on 28 August,
signals now came from Delhi, but radio The first B-29 bomber commander was Brig Gen Maj Gen Curtis LeMay succeeded General Saunders.
blackouts were frequent. Sometimes signals K. B. Wolfe, who took the XXth Bomber Command The original plans had called for LeMay to take the
came via the Australia Post Office cable, or even to India and China and initiated operations against XXIst Bomber Command, and I was scheduled for the
by radio from Bletchley (England), and Japanese Japan with operation MATTERHORN. The XXth next. But recall of General Wolfe altered the plan and
weather reports came up from Melbourne by Bomber Command was formed at Marietta, Georgia, General Arnold sent LeMay to the XXth and gave me
teleprinter, so the SLU at Brisbane had a bit of a where the B-29s were being built. command of the XXIst, which was in training in the
job sorting out what was going on.' General Wolfe was designated Commander, XXth Midwest.
Bomber Command in November 1 943. He was a When I first entered the Pacific Ocean Area, I was
production genius and a first-class aeronautical apprehensive about my command relationship. It was a
What Colonel Seaver would have given for those
engineer; he literally mothered the initial phases of Navy domain, dominated by strong-minded Navy
Japanese weather reports! Weather over Japan was our
production and modification of the B-29. Some 2,000 commanders who could hardly be expected to
most implacable and inscrutable enemy. Weather
changes were made in the engine alone. welcome an intruder from the Army Air Forces who
reports received through "Ultra" were of great value in
The XXth Bomber Command Headquarters later was independent of their operational control. But I got
the strategic air war against Germany; they would have
moved to Salina, Kansas. The Second Air Force along well with the Navy commanders-due largely to
been priceless in the air war against Japan.
supervised its training. The 58th Wing, commanded by the broad-minded support of Fleet Admiral Chester
It seems simply incredible that no one "in the
Brig Gen LaVerne "Blondy" Saunders, was the first Nimitz and the personal attitude of Vice Admiral John
know" recognized our need, especially for Japanese
element to reach operational status, and the 73rd Hoover.
weather reports, and took steps to provide me, and
Wing, commanded by Brig Gen Emmett "Rosey" My trouble came from senior Air Corps generals
later General LeMay, with an SLU.
O'Donnell, was scheduled to follow. under Admiral Nimitz and, quite understandably, they
On arrival in India in preparation for operations did resent this break in the chain of command. Lt Gen
from Calcutta and advanced bases in Chengtu, China, Millard F. Harmon was the senior Air Corps general
the XXth Bomber Command came under the in the Pacific Ocean Area and, under Admiral Nimitz,
IF. W. Winterbotham, 11w U/trtl � (Harper & Row: New York, 197").
jurisdiction of Lt Gen Joseph Stilwell, who commanded all land-based aviation in the Theater­
commanded all US Army forces in the China-Burma­ Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. He naturally wanted
India (CBI) Theater, until activation of the Twentieth command of the XXIst Bomber Command too.
Air Force. First units of the XXth arrived in the General Arnold had sought to smooth over the
Theater in April 1 944. situation by appointing him Deputy Commander,
After the XXth Bomber Command was established Twentieth Air Force for A d m i n istration and
in the CBI Theater, the command conducted a "shake Logistics. But General Harmon wanted full command,
down" operation on 5 June 1944 against Bangkok including operational control-or at least inclusion in
from bases in India. On 14 June, the XXth launched a the chain of command from General Arnold to me. I
night attack against the Imperial Iron and Steel Works had resisted this arrangement in Washington, when I
at Yawata, Kyushu, Japan, from bases at Chengtu. was Chief of Staff of the Twentieth Air Force, and I
The B-29s continued to have mechanical and continued to resist it. If the Twentieth Air Force was
technical problems. In July 1 944 General Arnold to continue as a unified strategic air force under the
finally sent for the man in whom he had the most direct and unbroken command of General Arnold,
confidence, General Wolfe, who took over the and with a primary strategic mission, the chain of
45
Ilil
" II
'I ,
. ,1
operational command from the Joint Chiefs of Staff
through General Arnold to the XXIst Bomber
Command had to be kept direct and uncluttered.'
Under General Harmon was another senior Air
Corps officer, Maj Gen Willis Hale, who commanded
Army Air Corps forces in the Forward Area. Whereas
my relationship with General Harmon had been
agreeable, if somewhat formal, that with Willis Hale
deteriorated after a confrontation on Saipan. When
the second air base which had been prepared for the
73rd Wing of the XXIst Bomber Command on Saipan
proved technically unsuitable for B-29 operations, I
based the entire Wing on Isley Air Field. I agreed to
tum the other base over to General Hale's forces since
it was suitable for operations by other types of aircraft.
When I arrived on Saipan with the first B-29, I found
not only a half-completed base but also over a hundred
of General Hale's airplanes on Isley "ield. I made
several requests to General Hale that the field be
cleared for my impending operations, and he agreed to
do so but failed to move his airplanes. Finally, in
desperation, I had a showdown with General Hale.
The situation had become intolerable and threatened
to prevent our first strike. Admiral Hoover offered to
clear up the situation with a direct order to General
Hale. But I thought it would be better if two Air Corps
officers undertook to settie their problem between
them. General Hale moved his aircraft, but he then
went straight back to Washington to complain to
General Arnold about my "arrogant attitude. "
General Arnold backed m e up, but I suspect the
incident did me no good.
First Change of Organization and
Command, XXIst Bomber Command
About mid-January 1 94 5 a delegation from
General Arnold's office arrived at my headquarters at
Guam. Brig Gen Larry Norstad, Chief of Staff,
Twentieth Air Force, bore a message from General
Arnold. There was to be a major change in
organization and command. The combat elements of
the XXth Bomber Command were to be transferred to
bases in the Marianas at the earliest possible time.
Although I had been aware of plans to move the
XXth Bomber Command out of China, I was not
aware of the imminence of that move. The urgency was
partly due to insistence from the new Commanding
General of the China Theater, my oid friend General
Al Wedemeyer, who had replaced General Stilwell.
General Wedemeyer, strongly urged by General
Chennault, requested that the B-29s be moved out of
China as soon as possible. The supply tonnage being
absorbed by the XXth was urgently needed by the
Fourteenth Air Force and other forces in China. The
• General Harmon respected but O�r really approved thiS arrangement. He was on
�:c:�y back 10 W:WUllgtonto try \0 ha�c It changed when hiS airplane was lusl without a
46
repeated requests were directed to the loint Chiefs of
Staff, who gave them a sympathetic ear. General
Arnold agreed.
There were other reasons for expediting the change.
The XXth Bomber Command was operating under
tremendous disadvantages. TheXXth expended about
one-seventh of its flying hours in attacks against the
enemy and absorbed the other six-sevenths in Brig G e n Kenneth B . Wolfe
providing its own operation logistics-flying gasoline First Commanding General,
and bombs over "the hump" from India to the forward XXth Bomber Command
bases in China. Furthermore, the China-based B-29s Nov 1 943-Jul 1 944
could not reach the really vital targets in Japan.
On taking over the XXth Bomber Command,
General LeMay, quite independently, arrived at the
same decision which motivated me in retraining the
73rd Bomb Wing. He set about the transition from
area night bombing to daylight precision bombing
from defensive formations. He also set up a lead-crew
training school just as I had done in the Marianas. But
his logistic problems were so severe that it was almost
impossible to establish effective operations against
Japan itself. Radius of action limited strikes to the
southern island of Kyushu.
The XXth, while under the command of General
Brig Gen Haywood S. Hansell, Jr.
Wolfe, attacked the Imperial Iron and Steel Works at
First Chief of Staff,
Yawata on the island of Kyushu on 1 5 June 1 944.
Twentieth Air Force
Only 47 of the original 75 B-29s reached the target,
1 2 Apr 1 944-28 Aug 1 944
and damage was not extensive. Shortage of fuel at the
First Commanding General,
advanced bases prevented the launching of another
XXIst Bomber Command
full-scale strike for several weeks. On 7 July a force of
28 Aug 1 944-20 Jan 1 945
1 8 B- 29s launched a small raid against a number of
targets in Japan, including Suebo, Nagasaki, Omura,
and Yawata. On 9 July the XXth attacked the coke
facilities at Anshan in Manchuria. Twentieth Air
Force had directed a daylight precision attack with at
least 1 00 B-29s. In carrying out the operation, only 66
B-29s reached Manchuria, and the effects were not
satisfactory. The next operation was shifted to the oil
refinery at Palembang, in the Netherlands East Indies,
from advanced bases in Ceylon.
The attack, launched on 10 August, involved a
3800-mile round trip. Results, unfortunately, were
poor. The same day, the XXth sent a small force to
attack the N�kajima engine works on Kyushu. The
night attack was unsuccessful. B-29s again struck Maj Gen Curtis E. LeMay
Yawata in daylight on 20 August. The losses from Commanding General,
combat and operational causes were heavy- l 4 out of XXth Bomber Command
6 1 B-29s. Again, effects were disappointing. On 29 20 Aug 1 944-20 Jan 1 945
August, the XXth sent 1 09 B-29s against Anshan, Commanding General,
under General LeMay's command and with his XXIst Bomber Command
participation. This time there was considerable 20 Jan 1 945- 1 6 Jul 1 945
damage. The attack was repeated on 26 September in
daylight using 12 plane formations, but cloud cover
obscured the target. The logistics problems became so
severe that the XXth had to confine its operations
primarily to targets outside Japan itself. Targets
included: Okajama ai rcraft assembly plant on
Formosa, 1 4 and 1 6 October; Einansko Airdrome,
Formosa, 1 7 October; Omura aircraft factory, Kyushu,
47

25 October; Rangoon, Burma, marshalling yards, 3
November; Singapore Naval Base, 5 November;
Omura aircraft factory, I I November (Nanking was
actually attacked because of weather at the primary
target); and Omura on 21 November, in daylight. The
overall effectiveness was disappointing, caused by an
intolerable logistics problem, unfavorable weather,
and early training problems with a new and untried
airplane.
On 24 December the XXth conducted an operation
which was significant from several points of view.
Prompted by General Chennault, General Wedemeyer
directed the XXth to attack a Theater target, the port
facilities at Hankow. General LeMay objected, citing
his command relationship as a part of the Twentieth
Air Force. General Wedemeyer then appealed to the
JCS, citing the provision for emergency use of the
Twentieth Air Force by the Theater COij1mander as a
matter of urgency. The urgency existed all right. The
Japanese were launching a major-but unsuccessful­
drive toward the B-29 base areas. The Joint Chiefs
agreed, and General LeMay performed the mission,
dropping incendiaries at medium altitude. Eighty-four
B-29s dropped more than 500 tons of incendiaries on
Hankow, setting huge fires which burned for three
days. General Chennault, who urged the use of
incendiaries against the city, described the attack as
"the first mass fire-bomb raid" by the B-29s and
contended that it was the precursor to the massive
urban incendiary attacks against Japanese cities.
By year's end, neither the XXth Bomber Command
nor the XXIst had shown real effectiveness or
approached the power which was latent in the B-29.
But there was a vast difference between them in
considering the future. The XXth could never hope to
II
reach real effectiveness because of the logistic
problems.
The XXIst had enormous potential. Given time to
I!
perfect its tactical performance and the growing might
of the mounting accretions of new wings, it held
tremendous portent for the future. In my own opinion,
�i.· I'"i I
that portent, given time for training and collection of
bombing intelligence, could have been attained either
i through selective targeting or incendiary urban
destruction.
gh
Ni t incendiary attacks against Japanese urban
industrial areas in 1 945 were provisionally considered
in the original plans for the employment of the XXIst.
But such operations were to be undertaken only as a
last resort, and only if precision bombing of selected
targets proved infeasible or failed to bring about
satisfactory results. They were initially scheduled to
take place after the Japanese aircraft and engine
factories had been knocked out and the vital industrial
targets had been destroyed by selective bombing.
The difficulty of conducting selective bombing in
daylight caused by cloud cover was anticipated and a
greatly improved radar bombsight, the AN /APQ- 7,
was rushed to completion. With it, all-weather
48
enormously increased by an invasion. Was it worth it? Commander McGhee was my naval liaison officer.
bombing of selected targets-day or night-was hoped
Was time itself all that important? Or were the He was a Naval Reserve officer. The Navy made
for. The sights were not immediately available-their
casualties the more important consideration, once repeated offers to replace him with a senior, more
use would take time.
victory was assured? Some of the emphasi� on time experienced regular professional, but I resisted all
One wing of the XXIst, the 3 1 5th, had been
stemmed from military habit of thought; some of it offers. I knew I had an exceptional man. George was
equipped with this new radar bombsight, permitting
doubtless stemmed from restless impatience among the not only a competent Navy officer but had interests
more accurate bombing. All the XXIst units were
American people and a desire to get this thing over and knowledge that covered a very broad range. I
equipped and partially trained for radar bombing of
with and return to a more normal life. found his judgment invaluable in discussions of many
those area targets that rendered good radar return.
The overriding priority of targets assigned to the facets of our problem in the Pacific. His responses and
Time, however, was not available to the XXIst
XXIst Bomber Command called for destruction or observations were stimulating and perceptive. He was
Bomber Commander. General Arnold was demanding
neutralization of the Japanese aircraft engine and that priceless combination, a practical intellectual.
measurable results-now. His judgment was heavily
airframe factories. One of the ironies of war is that in After the war, George McGhee became a member of
influenced by bomb tonnage rather than target
the early months of its operations the XXIst actually the State Department Policy Planning Council and
destruction. Actually, many more tons of bombs could
did accomplish its mission in this regard, though these later Ambassador to West Germany.
be dropped at night, using radar bombing, than in
results were not then apparent. Its performance was There was another military associate for whose
daylight. In daylight the force had to fly in formation
and operate at high altitude in order to defend itself
surprisingly good-not understandably bad. But, y
friendship I am especiall grateful. When I took
unfortunately, we were not able to prove it, and the command of the XX 1st, I started looking about for an
against Japanese fighters. These restrictions reduced
proof was not apparent to anyone until after the war. I aide. I set forth my specifications to the Chief of
bombload. Furthermore, the rate of opportunity for
am sure that General Arnold did not understand what Personnel. I said I wanted a young first lieutenant or
daylight operations was heavily influenced by target
the XXIst had gone through or had accomplished. captain, who was intelligent, alert, hardworking, good­
weather, which was extremely hard to forecast-at
General Arnold wanted to change the command humored, tolerant, courteous, loyal, and trustworthy.
least good bombing weather was hard to forecast. Bad
and deployment setup at once. The proposed change In addition, he should be a top-notch four-engine
weather was the rule, and cloud obstruction was about
appealed to him both as a sensible move which would airplane pilot with enough guts to keep his hands off
the only weather feature which could be expected with
greatly enhance the performance of the XXth Bomber the controls when I was flying. Personnel produced
any degree of assurance. But the radar bombing at the
Command and as a relief from the pressure which w&s Ray M i l n e , who filled every one of those
start of the campaign , when target locations were hard
coming from General Wedemeyer. The China Theater specifications. He was a perfect aide so far as I was
to determine and radar maps had not yet been
Commander was vigorously bombarding the JCS concerned, and he became a cherished friend.
prepared, was not adequate to put the bombs on
because some of the ATC "Hump" tonnage was going I made my decision to resist remaining with the
selected industrial and economic targets.
to the XXth at a time when he and the Fourteenth Air XXIst as Vice Commander under the stress of surprise
In all fairness to General Arnold, he can not be
Force needed it all. and emotion. But I still think it was the proper
blamed for his impatience and his inclination to
General LeMay, who was senior to me, would take decision. I had every confidence in General LeMay as
measure strategic air attack in terms of tonnage and
over the command of the XXIst Bomber Command a commander. He had been the outstanding group
sorties. He was under constant pressure and criticism
within the month. I was offered the XXth Bomber commander when I commanded the 1 st Bombardment
from his associates on the JCS and from higher
Command for transfer to the Marianas; thereafter, I Wing in the early and crucial days of the Eighth Air
authority to explain what his Twentieth Air Force was
could become Vice Commander under LeMay. I did Force. When I returned from England to the United
accomplishing. It is exceedingly hard to measure and
not wish to accept. I knew and respected LeMay as an States to be the Air member of the Joint Plans
evaluate the effects of selective target bombing. We
able and competent bomber commander. I did not Committee of the JCS, LeMay stayed on, was
were unable to report on real effectiveness of such
think he needed another bomber commander as deputy. promoted, and became senior to me. I knew him well
operations until after the war. To be sure, it is possible
I was fortunate in having gifted and able associates enough to know that he needed no second string to his
to report the destruction of a factory, but it is hard to
in the Twentieth Air Force. Brig Gen Roger Ramey, bow. He did not need a second in command, and I
evaluate that destruction in terms of depletion of
my deputy, was not only a fine military associate, he would have been unhappy as a figurehead.
enemy industrial support for a specific set of economic
was also a fine friend. There were others who filled Furthermore, it is not a good thing to replace a
or military needs. There is always the possibility that
this dual role. Col Cecil Combs, Col J. B . commander and leave him in a subordinate position in
the enemy has found some substitute method of
Montgomery, and Commander George McGhee, his own outfit.
meeting those needs. It took the tremendous efforts of
the US Strategic Bombing Survey to evaluate those
USN, were among them. Such associations and The first three months for the B-29s in the Marianas
friendships are a priceless boon which help to helped lay the groundwork for the much larger
effects after the war, both in Europe and in the Pacific.
compensate the pains and disappointments of wartime bombing offensives against Japan during 1945. If it is
On the whole, these survey reports showed that
duty. Colonel Combs, who had been my Chief of conceded that initial periods are likely to be the most
selective targeting was far more effective than we
Combat Operations in Washington, became Deputy difficult ones, then the initial period of XXIst Bomber
thought it to be at the time of attack.
Commander of the 58th Wing on Tinian. On my Command was marked with reasonable success. It
On the other hand, statistics of tons of bombs
urgent recommendation, Colonel Montgomery, who cannot be denied, however, that such success as was
dropped and of sorties flown are easily compiled, seem
was my Chief of Staff of the XXIst Bomber Command, achieved, or at least was accompanied, by a full
factual and specific, and are impressive. Photographs
served General LeMay in a similar capacity. measure of good fortune. It might so easily have been a
of burned-out cities also speak for themselves. And
Colonel Montgomery was not only a fine planner period of disaster. If one of the initial operations, from
"time" had become an obsessive compUlsion-the
and manager, he was also an expert pilot and navigator uncompleted bases, had returned to find our single,
'"time for invasion of Japan.
and one of the best bombardiers in the Army Air partially completed runway blocked by a crippled
Washington placed great emphasis upon ending the
Forces. Monty and I made bomb runs against the B-29, the whole force would have been lost. All in all,
war as quickly as possible. "This carnage must not be
Japanese-occupied island of Rota. I was glad that it I think it was a good beginning. Its predominant
permitted to continue a single week longer than is
was I who made out Monty's efficiency report on pattern was woven on the theme of selective target
necessary to achieve victory." But there were obvious
bombing, not the other way around. destruction.
weaknesses in this thought. 'The carnage" would be
49
CHAPTER 8 interest became apparent. There was repeated industrial areas-Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kobe,
reference to and emphasis upon incendiary urban Kawasaki, and Osaka.
attack in the communications originating i n The Committee of Operations Analysts contended
Washington. I do not know whether this change was that the air offensive against Japanese urban areas
brought about by General Norstad or by General would reduce Japanese war production substantially
Arnold. by: ( 1 ) direct physical damage to major and feeder
Perhaps it was General Arnold. Unknown to me, plants, (2) destruction of finished items and materials
General Arnold harbored a lively interest in in process, (3) disruption of internal transportation
incendiary urban attack. On 5 April 1944, he wrote and services, and (4) reduction of labor efficiency.
General Spaatz about the proposed US Strategic Cities were listed as preferred targets, superseding
Bombing Survey (USSBS) and included these remarks: economic and industrial systems. This list indicated
"Of particular interest to me would be some idea as to some change from earlier strategy. The selected
the most effective mixture of high explosives and industrial "primary targets" still contained aircraft
Operations incendiaries against heavily built-up areas. . . . " At
any rate, the Committee of Operations Analysts (COA)
factories, but iron and steel (to be disrupted through
attack on coke ovens), and oil (the petroleum industry)
soon gave incendiary urban attacks a high priority. were all dropped to "secondary targets," below urban
The day after our first reasonably successful attack areas. Shipping, which presumably included aerial
on the aircraft facilities at Nagoya, on 1 8 December, I mining, was still a top priority as it had been in the first
received a directive to launch a full-scale incendiary recommendation prepared by the COA nearly a year
attack on Nagoya. This was a blow. I had been earlier. But antifriction bearings and the electronics
Operations: Initial Phase Strategic Objective: to force Japan to acknowledge sweating blood in my efforts to make the 73rd Wing a industry had been dropped, for reasons which I do not
defeat and to accept our terms of surrender. respectable precision bombing outfit, with very understand, and the electric power and rail
In November 1 944, Washington issued a new target Primary Air Strategy: to achieve the Strategic moderate success. We were just beginning to overcome transportation systems had not been revived from their
priority list which established target systems for the Objective by application of strategic air power. More the predilection for night area bombing, and we were initial rejection.
XX 1st Bomber Command in the following priority: ( 1 ) specifically: just beginning to show some improvement in bombing Since I had not yet accomplished my first priority
Japanese aircraft industry, ( 2 ) Japanese urban accuracy, both visual and radar. Now we were directed task, destruction of Japanese aircraft and engine
industrial areas, and (3) Japanese shipping. I . To destroy the effectiveness of the to reverse our painfully achieved progress in accuracy plants, I was not immediately affected by this change
Our schedule of operations-all against aircraft and Japanese Air Force to the degree where it should and turn to area bombing. It was no good trying to and I continued my emphasis on selective bombing.
engine factories except shakedown missions against be incapable of offering a serious threat to our achieve real accuracy with the incendiaries. Their
own bases and forces or of offering effective imprecise ballistic characteristics precluded any
Iwo Jima-was as follows: Pacific Strategy
hindrance to our strategic air offensive. To accuracy in delivery even if the sighting performance
Tokyo 24 November· approach this objective by destruction of should be perfect.
On 1 December 1 944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Iwo lima 7 December Japanese sources of air power using selective The directive had been in General Arnold's name issued a revised memorandum describing Pacific
Nagoya 13 & 18 December targeting and precision bombing. but had been signed by General Norstad. I protested strategy.
Iwo Jima 24 December 2. To destroy the war-making industrial directly to General Arnold. I pointed out that I had
Tokyo 27 December structure of Japan by destroying selected targets "with great difficulty implanted the principle that our The United States Chiefs of Staff have adopted
Nagoya 5 January and systems which were vital to the war effort mission is the destruction of primary targets by the following as a basis for planning in the war
Tokyo 9 January through precision bombing. sustained attacks using precision bombing methods against Japan. The concept of operations for the
Nagoya 14 January 3. To destroy and undermine the social and both visual and radar." I did not contend that we had main effort in the Pacific is:
Akashi 19 January economic structure of the Japanese state through achieved an acceptable measure of success in this A . Following the Okinawa operations to
selection and destruction of essential structures attempt, but I did contend that diversions from our seize additional positions to intensify the
• Three times more by 3 December; an initial which were vital to the organic functioning of the determined efforts would impede a progress that was blockade and air bombardment of Japan in
rate of four missions in 10 days. Japanese nation, again through precision beginning to be encouraging for the future. order to create a situation favorable to:
bombing of selected targets.
General Norstad replied for General Arnold that B. An assault on Kyushu (Island)-in order
Thirteen missions were flown in 56 days, Of an average 4. To prepare for, and, if necessary, to carry to establish a tactical situation favorable to:
the aircraft industry still had overriding priority and
of one every four and one-half days, counting Iwo out urban incendiary attacks as a last resort.
that the fire raid was "simply a special requirement C. The decisive invasion of the industrial
lima. resulting from the necessity of future planning." heart of Japan through the Tokyo Plain.
Seven of the ten primary targets prescribed by the Secondary Air Strategy: to support a surface
Joint Chiefs of Staff were specific aircraft and engine invasion of the Japanese home islands if the air Future planning? Was the switch to area urban
bombing already under way? The change to area urban General Marshall was generally acknowledged to be
factories. Then an urban area system was prescribed offensive failed to achieve its purpose.
incendiary attack, when it finally came, cannot be laid the author and proponent of this strategy.
followed by "shipping." Fallowing these three top I was in full agreement with this emphasis upon
directly at General LeMay's door. Its initial support Dr Sallagar offers the following perceptive
priorities were three secondary target systems: coke, selective targeting and precision bombing. I had been
came from Twentieth Air Force Headquarters. comment:
steel, and oil. It is surprising that these three vital one of the authors of this policy at the Air Corps
selective target systems should have been assigned a Tactical School. I had seen it work well in Europe and The selection of urban targets followed a revised
priority below "Japanese urban industrial areas." had prepared the plans for it in that theater. I believed report prepared and issued in October by the To the Army, the JCS endorsement of naval
After I left Washington as Chief of Staff of the in it. (I still do.) Committee of Operations Analysts on Economic blockade and strategic bombardment merely
Twentieth Air Force, a change in strategic policy set After I left Washington and became engaged in Objectives in the Far East. By that time I had departed meant that the Navy and the Air Force should be
in. The policy which I had espoused, and which I Headquarters Twentieth Air Force and was no longer allowed to apply their favorite methods of
preparing and directing the XXIst Bomber Command
believe was generally accepted, was in this vein: in position to influence strategic target selection. Six warfare, provided that these preliminary
to carry out this strategic concept, a change in strategic
cities were named in the report as vital Japanese urban operations were used to soften up the enemy in
50
51
 preparation for the invasion and did not radial o f 1 970 horsepower, the Ha-45 Model 2 1 , used
interfere with the major objective.l primarily in the army's "Frank" fighter, Ki-84-la,
considered by many to be the best Japanese fighter to
But my primary objective as Commanding General, be produced in quantity in World War II. Service
XXIst Bomber Command, had not been changed: the ceiling was given at 34,450 feet. It bore some
" intermediate objective of overriding priority" was resemblance to our P-47 but was smaller and much
still the Japanese aircraft industry. And the overall lighter.
statement of military strategy for the strategic air war The Akashi airframe plant produced "Nick," a
did not specifically countermand the initial statement twin-engined fighter with day and night versions. It
of the strategic air objective: to destroy Japan's was a two-seater and was used in defense against the
capability to support the war. B-29. Its service ceiling was given as 3 2,800 feet. The
plant also produced "Randy," a twin-engined single­
seat fighter which resembled "Nick" but had better
A Tactical Achievement performance. Kawasaki produced 8 ,269 airframes in
both its main plants between 1 94 1 and the end of the
In January we planned a variation from the steady war. From January 1 94 1 throup� August 1 945
stream of air attacks on factories in the Tokyo-Nagoya Kawasaki produced 1 0 ,274 engines in all its plants.
area. The Kawasaki Corporation, the third largest Kawasaki accounted for 1 2 percent of combat engines
aircraft production company in Japan, had a new manufactured in 1 944, the industry's peak year, and
engine and airframe complex at Akashi, about 1 2 1 7 percent of combat airframes. All in all, the Akashi
miles west of Kobe and about 1 00 miles west of complex represented a lucrative preCision target.
Nagoya. Akashi, the largest facility of the company,
The mission against the Akashi works contained a
(fJ
was also the headquarters of the Kawasaki engine
diversionary ruse and a tactical variation. The 73rd t-
division. There was another engine plant at nearby Z
Wing followed up the well-beaten path to Nagoya. But
Futami, about 8 miles west of Akashi, and one at
just as it approached the coast of Honshu, the force ct
Takatsuki, about halfway between Kyoto and Osaka, -I ....
split. Three airplanes of the lead squadron continued
about 20 miles from Akashi. Akashi was, however, the 1/1
toward Nagoya and bombed Hamomatsu, southeast of Il.. I)
key installation in the engine complex. There was c
Nagoya, at high altitude-3 5 ,000 feet. It dispensed
another Kawasaki airframe plant at Kagamigahara,
" rope" to obscure enemy radar screens and impart the
Z 1i
c
just north of Nagoya. The Akashi and Futami plants
were on the coast of Harimanada, an arm of the Inland
belief that the main force was continuing toward Q 101
Nagoya. But the remainder of the force, 56 B-29s, (fJ "CI
Sea, and adjacent to prominent landmarks which
turned sharply to the left and approached Akashi. The c :::>
showed up well on radar. The targets, the plants of the a: ftI
axis of attack was selected to optimize radar bombing
Akashi engine and airframe facility, were about two I.&J 1/1 :I:
of the target if it should be covered with cloud. Il.. I)
miles from the town of Akashi. The engine plant
occupied 1 ,287,700 square feet of productive floor
Bombing altitude was dropped to 25,000/27,400 feet,
(fJ E
about 5 ,000 feet below previous levels. This decision :! (/)
space and the adjacent airframe plant occupied ...
1 ,047,700 square feet, giving a total target of slightly
was made in order to improve bombing accuracy. It 0 .. Z
reduced the problems caused by very high winds and
over 3,300,000 square feet. Kawasaki was one of the
oldest and most experienced engine manufacturers in
extreme turbulence encountered above 30,000 feet, l: � <l 0
::J
�
and it reduced errors which tend to be proportional to w
Japan. It started under French license in 1 9 1 9 , (fJ If) 0
bombing altitude. The reduction in altitude involved a :I:
progressed through various German licenses for in­ ct �
calculated risk in terms of fighter opposition. I Z
line engines, and culminated in the Daimler-Benz
depended upon the ruse to deflect most of the fighter
� <l
design designated Ha-60-Model 22 of 1 1 5 0
opposition-which it did. And [ took the first step in a ct CL .,
Q
<l .,
horsepower, the Ha-40 o f 1 1 75 horsepower, and the C Q

or
planned schedule of altitude reductions by successive ..., 0 C
Ha-60-Model 33 of 1 350 horsepower, which was 0: 0
steps to improve bombing, based upon the discovery
purchased in 1 937. These were used in "Tony" -'
that the enemy fighter attacks, though bitter and z -
fighters, which resembled the German Me 109. The lIJ C :c
reckless, were not as effective against the B-29 as '" a 0:

Tony entered operational service in 1 943 and was at
one time the most potent of the Japanese army's
fighters. Its service ceiling was given at 3 2,800 feet.
Akashi engine works also produced two Nakajima­
designed air-cooled radial engines, the Ha-35 Model
22 and the Ha-35 Model 32 rated at 1 1 00 and 1 1 50
horsepower respectively. They were used in "Oscar"
fighters. They also produced a Mitsubishi-designed
'Sallagar, ussnns From lUI Aerial Bombing Campairrn. p
It
German fighter attacks had been against B- 1 7s and
B-24s. [ had planned to continue this step-by-step
reduction in altitude to improve bombing accuracy
until we found a level at which further reduction
�
incurred too many losses from enemy fighters.
KAWASAKI AIRCRAFT IND.
The mission of 1 9 January was a magnificent A K A S H I PLANT
success. The bombs were dropped between 2:50 and
3:24 in the afternoon in clear weather. A total of 6 1 0 0:
500-pound bombs were dropped on the primary
target; 275-45 percent-hit within the plant area,
23 which measured roughly 1 ,200 feet by 4,000 feet for 53

52
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55
54
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rl: - ' ��HJ1JjJl l l l l Hi I�I I ' I ll

r AK ASH I WORKS

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April 1940-
August 1945
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Engine and Airframe Production Akashi Plant-Kawasaki Co.

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AIR FRAME PRODUCTION
,. April 1941-July 1945
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Its.
1t4Z 1143 1...4 IHI

After the attack of 19 January 1945 both engine and airframe

production plummeted. Engine production had a brief resurgence from assembly of
finished and spare parts then dropped again to near zero.
the engine plant and 900 feet by 2,400 feet for the
airframe plant. Every important building in the engine
and airframe plants was hit. About two-thirds of the
bombs hit within the engine works. Production of both
plants was cut 90 percent. Production never
recovered.
o f the success o f selected strategic bombardment i n
regard t o the Japanese aircraft industry and war
production industries. Using the USSBS, I came to the
following conclusions: UJ
�
� ...
The Japanese aircraft industry did constitute a •
selected strategic target system. Initial operations :".....-"

�
!!!

lr
Eleven Japanese fighters made attacks. The against the Japanese aircraft and engine factories were
bombers claimed four fighters shot down. There were much more effective than I judged them to be at the

��
no bomber losses. The mission has been described as time. I was highly critical of our bombing accuracy. C

81
one of the most perfect examples of selective bombing But that bombing was, nevertheless, so destructive that
in the entire war. It was one of the best of which I have the Japanese concluded that their industry was

1iI�
1/
personal knOWledge. One important side effect of the doomed. They took the drastic countermeasure of
mission was to accelerate the dispersion of the aircraft dismantling their industry in order to disperse it and
industry-a drastic move from which the industry protect it underground. The combined result of our
never recovered.
The mission was, in my opinion. of great
destructive bombing and Japanese dispersal effectively
attained the purpose of the strategic air offensive
UJ
l? :!!!
�
?<
significance. Not only was the selected target virtually against the sources of production and supply of
&a. a:
destroyed, but, of much greater importl\jlce in the long
run, the bombing accuracy showed great improvement
Japanese aircraft. Japanese aircraft production never
recovered. As Dr Futrell records: C W
CD
and the pattern was well concentrated. The analysis of
bombing accuracy produced by the Intelligence
Actually the B-29 attacks against the Japanese
a:
0 :I -.., J
a: 0 :) 10
..�
aircraft factories proved to be more effective

�
Z "'It
C o
Section of the 73rd Wing showed 46 percent of the
than was realized at the time. The U.S. Strategic
- _ O)
0�
bombs which were actually released at the primary
target fell within 1 ,000 feet of the aiming point, giving
Bombing Survey would discover that the
&a. Z n &a. -
'�
�
damages caused by the B-29s were enough to
OQ� ZC b
a circular probable error (CEP) of 1 ,030 feet.
� O) C a: :I
I
convince the Japanese of a need to disperse their
However, this analysis, based upon bomb craters �
aircraft plants. The destruction inflicted, plus U) O - � O !!!
a: _
I�
identified in reconnaissance photographs, did not
:) :; l:
�0 Oo
the confusion resulting from frantic dispersal
account for all the bombs which were carried to the
efforts, reduced the pre-attack capacity of w "' Cl Ci 0)
"'lt
'\
target area. An analysis of the damage report prepared
-
by the USSBS showed a less favorable picture. Forty­
aircraft engine plants by 75 percent, of airframe
a: & W &a. -
� A. � �O c
plants by 60 percent, and of electronics and
five percent of the bombs fell in the primary target
area, which was greater than 1 ,000 feet in radius.
communications equipment plants by 7 0
>
G W .., •
As a broad approximation, the target area was
percent. 2
.J .( :1 ,�
roughly equivalent to that contained within a circle of
1 ,490 feet radius, and 45 percent hits within a circle of
Peak production of combat aircraft occurred in
1944, before the B-29 attacks which began in late
l:
� C
a:
&a.
'\)
that radius gives a CEP of about 1 ,600 feet. This was November. Production for the year was 2 1 ,058, an Z ;
not a demonstration of good bombing accuracy from increase from 3 , 1 80 in 1 94 1 . The increase had been 0 a:
26,000 feet by the 73rd Wing, but it was a very marked 560 percent of 1 94 1 production. There were nine :I :c )
'}
improvement when compared with earlier strikes, and producing companies. The production continued to be
lhe bombing pattern showed sufficiently close dominated by:
concentralion to destroy all elements of the target.

1
Nakajima 37. 1 %
Continuation of the training program later produced
1.
Mitsubishi 23.0 '
an average CEP of 1 ,250 feet, based on all bombers
Kawasaki 14.9

i:
which did not abort for mechanical reasons.
To be sure, the visibility was excellent and local
followed by:
;;
!!!

II
fighter opposition was minimal due to the successful Aichi 6.9
mse. Nevertheless, the XXIst Bomber Command had Tachikawa ...M... 1
\\
e,'ery reason to be elated. The intensive training Total 87.9%
program was paying off. It was clear to all, and most
especially to the combat crews, that the XXIst Bomber
Command was capable of destroying selected targets
Others 1 2. 1 %
1 00.0% /I o o

when weather conditions made visual bombing The primary and vital airframe and engine facilities
were concentrated in the central manufacturing areas
o
.. .g :;:
possible. It was an immense first step. The next would
be the achievement of acceptable accuracy in radar in the Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama area; the Nagoya
bombing of selected targets. That, too, was on the way area; and the Osaka-Kobe area.
and was attained later in the war. The drastic fall in actual aircraft production,
beginning in the third quarter of 1944, after the
It was the last mission that I laid on as Commanding
General, XXI_t Bomber Command. 59
Since that time I have assessed the situation in terms 'Futrell, ld«u. ConUpl5, Doctrirlr, p. 84

58

initiation of the air attacks on the Japanese aircraft
mdustry by the XXlst Bomber Command is shown in
Figure 8-1 prepared by the Aircraft Division Industry
Report of the US Strategic Bombing Survey.
Later Operations
After General LeMay took over command of the
XXIst Bomber Command, he "stood down" the
groups briefly. He continued the training program that
I had instituted and improved the Lead Crew School.
He concentrated upon the maintenance program and
kept on my A-4, Col Clarence Irvine, who had worked
wonders with a terribly difficult problem. After loss of
the depot at Guam, Colonel Irvine had to improvise a
mamten:mce system based on tbe depot at Sacramento,
8000 mIles away. He set up an air transport system of
his own, and I was careful not to ask where he got the
authority to use the transpons. He had also established
a streamlined maintenance system in the 73rd Wing by
consolidating the resources of the groups.
General LeMay kept most of the tactical methods
which I had established, including the airplane
.
formations. This is hardly surprising since we had
worked together in the Eighth Air Force.
The capture of Iwo Jima (an operation advocated
by,!, e Twentieth Air Force in May 1 944) by the
Martnes m February 1 945 provided an advanced air
base that was a boon to the Air Force. An air base
there was, of course, of enormous imponance from the
. s�dpomt of morale and the recovery of crippled
aIrcraft. It was also Imponant from the standpoint of
improved operations.. It served as an emergency
la�dmg. � .
�ound or crtppled B-29s returning from
raIds, and It proVIded a fighter base from whil'h escort
fighters could support the B-29s or could make
strafing and bombing attacks on their own. Finally the
cap�re of Iwo Jima removed the Japanese �Iy_
warmng station which had been giving two-to-three­
hour warning to Japanese defenders. From 4 March,
when the first crippled B-29 landed there, to the end of
the war, 2241 B-29s landed at Iwo Jima.' A large
number of these would have been lost if Iwo Jima had
not been awilable. It became the base of the VIIth
Fighter Command.
General LeMay continued the effort that I had
initiated for about six weeks-with· almost identical
results. It was apparent that our preferred strategy,
. economic systems except aircraft engine plants,
destruction of selected targets through precision
optical bombing, could not be conducted on a
sustained basis in the face of the weather conditions
over Japan-almost continuous cloud cover. And the
�PQ- 7 �:'" still in the offing. General Norstad paid
hIm a VISIt at the end of that time and brought the
60
expected news that General Arnold was far from
satisfied with performance. The factor of time was
taking on a new insistence. The invasion of the
Japanese home islands, whose necessity had become an
obsession with the Army planners, had been agreed
upon. If air power was to be successful its application
could not be delayed. A drastic reappraisal was in
order. LeMay made it.
The cities of Japan were vital to the continued war
effort, and they were immensely vulnerable to
incendiary attack. Although the first priority objective,
destruction of Japan's aircraft industry, had not been
fully attained, it had been approximated. Night attack
of Japanese cities using incendiaries and radar
bombing which come within the capabilities of the
APQ- 1 3 could be undertaken on a consistent
schedule, regardless of the weather. Japanese air
defensives against night or all'Weather attacks were
minimal or nonexistent. It would not be necessary to
operate in formation or at high altitude, both of which
would permit much greater bombloads (up to 20,000
Ibs.).
He decided to switch from primary reliance upon
daylight precision bombing of selected targets to night
incendiary attacks against Japanese cities.
The first incendiary attacks under General LeMay
against six of the greatest cities of Japan were very
effective and most impressive. The tonnage of bombs
delivered was very high; the losses were very low
indeed; the rate of operations was practically
independent of weather; the devastation of the urban
and industrial areas was startling. The new method of
operation represented a superb tactical and strategic
decision, and a most courageous and appropriate one.
It was, however, appropriate to the particular situation
and circumstances; it was not necessarily appropriate
to all requirements for the future. General LeMay
recognized this. He did not abandon selected targeting
but continued to use it when the weather and his
equipment permitted.
These operations produced two interesting
reactions. The Joint Target Group of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff seized upon the new tactic with enthusiasm.
ThI! Army Air Forces in World War /I states:
The Joint Thrget Group, after studying reports of
the blitz, concluded that there were no strategic
bottlenecks in the Japanese industrial and
but that the enemy's industry as a whole was
vulnerable through incendiary attack.'
The Joint Thrget Group, which was set up in the
Joint Chiefs of Staff organization to provide
recommendations on Twentieth Air Force targets,
began functioning in December 1 944. The judgment
on its part that "there were no strategic bottlenecks in
the Japanese industrial and economic systems except
aircraft engine plants" was completely unwarranted, as
intelligence studies had shown and the postwar
Bombing Survey was later to prove. The Joint Target
Group simply embraced a new · tactic that was both
easier to perform and to measure.
The Joint Target Group proceeded to list, in order
of priority, 22 most vital Japanese cities from the
standpoint of the important industries they contained.
On the basis of these recommendations, the Twentieth
Air Force on 3 April issued a new target directive. The
two principal aircraft engine manufacturers
Nakajima-Musashimo and the Mitsubishi engine plan
at Nagoya, were listed in top priority. Both were
selected targets. Then the directive listed six priority
urban areas-Tokyo,,,Kawasaki, Nagoya, and Osaka
Urban Area I , Urban Area 2, and Urban Area 3.
Again quoting The Army Air Forces in World War II;
ThI! Joint Target Group based its recommendations
on the asswnption that theprincipalfunction ofair
attack was to pave the way for an invasion of the
home islands. . . . But after studying the resultS
of the March fire raids, LeMay came to the
conclusion that with proper logistic support air
power alone could force the Japanese to
surrender-a view shared privately by some
members of Arnold's staff. 5
Thus one result of the first urban incendiary attacks
was an endorsement of this method to the near
exclusion of selected targeting. There was also another
reaction. There were obvious tactical advantages to
single-plane night operations at relatively low
altitudes. But did it follow that selective targeting
should be abandoned? Was it possible to apply these
same tactics to selective precision targets?
General LeMay was directed to find out, and he
applied himself to the question with his customary
zeal. Basically there is every reason to believe that
General LeMay would have welcomed an effective
tactic to destroy selected targets rather than urban
areas. But his equipment was limited and his crews
were untrained in this technique. He concluded that
the APQ- 1 3 radar bombing equipment was inadequate
for precision bombing. This was almost certainly true
in the absence of good quality radar maps and selected
offset aiming points that would provide good radar
returns. He chose to adopt and adapt the RAF night
bombing technique which, late in the European war,
had produced surprisingly accurate bombing results.
He ran four good�sized experimental missions.
'Ibid., P 625
24 Marcb-251 planes o f the 73rd, 3 1 3th, and
3 1 4th Wings were dispatched against the Mitsubishi­
Nagoya plant. RAF Pathfinder technique was
employed. Ten minutes before bombing time, 1 0
B-29s lighted the engine works area with M26 flares;
five minutes later another 1 0 B-29s dropped M I 7
incendiary clusters to start marker fires; then the main
force attacked with 500-lb. GP bombs-sighting
visually with the optical sight. Nagoya was obscured
with cloud. Results were negligible- I ,533 tons of
bombs were dropped.
30 Marcb-The 3 1 4th Wing sent a small force
against the same target, again wi th a Pathfinder force.
It missed entirely-again using visual sighting with the
; Norden optical sight.
i April-The 73rd Wing sent 1 2 1 planes against
this target. 1 ,0 1 9 tons of bombs were dropped with
only 4 hits.
3 April-'Three attacks were conducted consisting
of one wing each, with targets the Mitsubishi Shizuoka
engine plant, the Nakajima Kozumi assembly plant,
and Tachikawa engine plant. Results again were
negligible. .
The command just was not equipped for night
precision bombing. Specifically, it needed target
marker bombs, such as the 1 ,000 pounders used by the
RAF, and reflex optic bombsights. Lacking these,
General LeMay abandoned the experiment at that
time. However, with the arrival in May of the 3 1 5th
Wing equipped with the APQ-7 radar bombing
equipment, he tried again with satisfactory results
indeed, as described later.
Making use of aircraft from the 3 1 5th Wing as lead
aircraft, it might have been possible for the entire force
to bomb in daylight in squadron formations through
the undercast cloud cover, in addition to bombing at
night with individual aircraft with the' same
equipment. However the arrival of the 3 1 5th Wing had
been delayed and there was little opportunity to try this
tactic. This interest in continued application of
selective targeting may well have come from General
Kuter, who was General Arnold's Assistant Chief of
Staff-Plans.
General LeMay proceeded methodically to destroy
the urban industrial areas which had been prescribed
for him. But he did not lose interest in selective
targeting and attacked Japanese aircraft and engine
plants whenever weather appeared favorable. He
conducted such attacks on 7 April, 1 2 April, 24 April,
30 April; 5 May, I I May, 9 June, 10 June, 22 June,
and 26 June, for a total of 10 such missions in three
months. Then he attacked selected targets again on 24
july.
From 8 April to I I May, 75 percent of the effort of
XXlst Bomber Command was diverted to tactical
support of the invasion 'of Okinawa, Operation
ICEBERG, particularly to attacks on airfields in
Kyushu to suppress Kamikazi operations from there.
After release from ICEBERG, intensive incendiary
attacks were resumed at once.
61
 14 May-Daylight incendiary attack on Nagoya,
including the Mitsubishi plant area. 529 B·29s were
dispatched carrying 2 5 1 0 tons, 1 2,000 to 20,000 ft.
altitude: 3 . 1 5 square miles burned out.
16 May-Nagoya urban area at night. 522 B·29s
dispatched. 3609 tons of bombs. 3.82 square miles
burned out.
13 May-Night attack on urban Tokyo. 562 B·52s
dispatched. 3646 tons of bombs: 7800· 1 5 ,000
altitude: 17 B·29s were lost. 5 . 3 square miles burned
out.
lS May-Again the Tokyo urban area at night. 502
B·29s dispatched: 26 B·29s were lost to flak: 3262
tons of bombs. In all the six incendiary attacks Tokyo
was gutted. 56.3 square miles. 50.2 percent of city was
burned out.
29 May-Yokohama urban area in daylight-high
altitude. 5 1 7 B·29s were dispatched, escorted by 1 0 1
P·5 l s: 2570 tons of bombs. 6.9 square'miles burned
out.
1 June-Osaka urban area in daylight, by 5 2 1
B·29s. P·5 1 escort suffered heavily from violent
weather. 1 8 ,000 to 28,000 ft. altitude: 2788 tons of
bombs: 3 . 1 5 square miles burned out.
5 June-Kobe attacked in daylight. 473 B·29s
dispatched. 1 3,500. 1 8,000 ft.: I I B·29s lost: 4.35
square miles burned out.
7 June-Osaka attacked in daylight. 458 B·29s
dispatched with 138 P·5 1 s escort: bombing was by
radar: 1 8 ,000·23,000 ft. altitude: 2.21 square miles
burned out.
15 June-Osaka again, at night. 5 1 6 B·29s
dispatched: 1 .9 square miles burned out.
In this period there were 1 7 maximum effort attacks,
including 6,960 B·29 sorties. During the attacks,
4 1 ,592 tons of bombs were carried. Losses were 1 3 6
B·29s or 1 .9 percent of sorties. Thereafter, General
LeMay turned to the smaller cities on his list and
eventually to a total of 66.
The vast majority of the bombing effort of XXlst
Bomber Command was devoted to urban industrial
area incendiary attacks. In the entire period of its
operations, the Twentieth Air Force applied its
capacity in the following manner:
Tons of
Selected Target Attacks Sorties Bombs
aircraft and engine targets 2838 14,152
petroleum targets 1437 1 0 ,600
assorted industrial targets 1 459 8,093
5734 32,845
urban industrial area attacks 2 1 ,671 1 38,2 1 5
aerial mining 1 750
Total 29, 1 5 5 1 7 1 ,060
Thus only 19 percent of the total effort in terms of
both sorties and bomb tonnage was directed against
selected targets; 75 percent was devoted to urban
62
incendiary attacks, 6 percent to mining. The major
influence on the change to urban incendiary attacks
came from the Joint Target Group.
The somewhat precipitate decision of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to move the 58th Wing from the CBI
Theater to the Marianas had at least one ill effect. The
3 1 5th Wing, equipped with the new AN/APQ· 7 radar
bombing system, had been scheduled to arrive in the
Marianas in April. The decision to move the 58th
immediately resulted in postponing the deployment of
the 3 1 5th. As a result, the 3 1 5th did not arrive in the
Marianas until June 1945 and conducted less than two
months of operations before the end of the war. But
the delay was used to good effect in terms of training.
The training in radar bombing accuracy was
particularly intense. As a result, the performance of
the 3 1 5th with the AN/APQ· 7 bombing system was
spectacular. It clearly demonstrated the feasibility of
attacking selected targets at night and in periods when
the targets were obscured from visual bombing.
The first group of the 3 1 5th arrived at Northwest
Field, Guam, late in June. There was only one runway
available, though the other was nearing completion.
Many of the base facilities were not yet installed.
Construction of the field had been seriously delayed.
The decision of CINCPOA to move his advanced
headquarters to Guam had caused critical changes in
construction priorities there. Roads and naval
facilities were given a higher priority than construction
of B·29 bases. As a matter of fact, Northwest Field was
slipped to priority 95 on the Island of Guam. It took
all of General Harmon's great persuasive powers to get
the project moving again.
By the time the 3 1 5th actually arrived, General
Harmon had been replaced by Lt Gen Barney Giles
as Deputy Commander, Twentieth Air Force.
General Giles established his headquarters on
Guam. He endorsed and supported General LeMay's
decision to direct the operations of the 3 1 5th against a
set of selected targets comprising the Japanese oil
industry. These targets had been listed in AWPD·42
and more recently strongly recommended by the
USSBS. General Spaatz, when queried by Washington,
also strongly supported the decision. Because the
destruction of oil refining was not specified as a top
priority objective in the current assigned target list,
General LeMay described the initial attacks as
shakedown training operations. The selection of
strategic bombing objectives was being argued back
and forth in the Joint Target Group in Washington but
more and more selection of such objectives was' being
evaluated in terms of influence upon the proposed
invasion of Japan. But by April, the Strategic
Intelligence Section of the Air Staff in Washington
was arguing that the petroleum industry in Japan was
in such critical state that the destruction of facilities
and storage in Japan would have an immediate effect
upon the tactical situation. So Generals Giles and
LeMay had considerable support in their decision. It
was another fine decision on the part of General The first attack on this target, Mission No. 2, was
LeMay. It provided an opportunity to test again the only moderately successful and the target was again
feasibility of all·weather attack against selected targets attacked on Mission No. 7, flown on the night of
and at the same time to make a substantial 1 5/ 1 6 July, using 7 1 aircraft, of which 59 bombed the
contribution to the conduct of the war. primary. Again there were no losses. The cumulative
Fifteen missions were flown by the 3 1 5th Wing effects of both missions was very effective indeed.
against 10 oil refineries in Japan between 26 June and Mission No. 3 was against the MARUZEN
the end of the war on 1 4 August. These missions are
Refinery at the NIPPON Oil Company, located on the
listed below. coast south-southwest of OSAKA. The attack was
only partially successful and was repeated four nights
later.
DATE MISSION TARGET The first spectacular success was achieved with the
NUMBER fourth mission, on the night of 6/7 July. Results were
superb. The mission reports for Missions No. 3 and 4
contain the following description:
26/27 June I UTSUBE RIVER Oil Refinery
29/30 June 2 KUDAMATSU Oil Refinery
2/3 July 3 MARUZEN Oil Refinery Target: MARUZEN Refinery.
6{7 July 4 MARUZEN Oil Refinery
(Repeat) Located immediately norih of SHIMOTSU and
9/10 July UTSUBE RIVER Oil Refinery 7 mi South-Southwest of WAKEY AMA. The
(Repeat) plant produced aviation gasoline, lube oil,
1 2/1 3 July 6 KAWASAKI Petroleum Center ordinary gasoline and fuel oil. It had extensive
1 5/16 July 7 KUDAMATSU Oil Refinery storage facilities. Crude capacity was 5000
barrels per day.
(Repeat)
1 9/20 July 8 NIPPON Oil Co. KANSAI
22/23 July 9 UPE Oil Liquification Co. On Mission No. 3, 40 aircraft were airborne. 39
25/26 July 10 MITSUBICHI Oil Refinery dropped 297 tons of general purpose 500 lb.
28/29 July II SHIMOTSU Oil Refinery bombs on the primary target (95.7 percent of
1 /2 August 12 KAWASAKI Petroleum Center bombs which were airborne).
(Repeat)
5/6 August 13 UPE Oil Liquification Co.
(Repeat) On Mission No. 4, 60 aircraft were airborne. 59
9/10 August 14 NIPPON Oil Co. (Repeat) bombed the primary with 44 1 tons of 500 lb.
14/1 5 August 15 NIPPON Oil Co., Tsuchizaki general purpose bombs (98.2 percent of bombs
which were airborne).
The missions were conducted by streams of single
Damage from Mission No. 3 was only moderate but
aircraft at night, bombing from 1 5 ,000 ft. altitude.
The initial bombloads averaged 1 4,63 1 pounds per photographs from Mission No. 4 showed 95 percent of
the installation was damaged. Only five large tanks and
airplane but, with experience, this grew to 20,684
several small ones were left standing. (See map)
pounds. Only 4 planes were lost and 66 were damaged
in the entire campaign.
The 3 1 5th launched its first mission on the night of General LeMay, who never extended unearned
praise, sent the following message after photo·
26/27 June, under the command of Brig Gen Frank
Armstrong, who had been one of my wing reconnaissance and i nterpretation of pictures
. commanders in the I st Bombardment Division of the confirmed the mission report.
Eighth Air Force. The target was the UTSUBE SucceSsful strike is subject. I have just reviewed
RIVER Oil Refinery at YOKKAICHI, and two the post·strike photography of your strike on
groups conducted the attack. The target plant was target 1 764, the MARUZEN Oil Refinery at
producing aviation gasoline. The mission was only SHIMOTSU, the night of 6/7 July. With a half·
partly effective. Wing effort you achieved ninety-five percent
The second mission was flown against the destruction, definitely establishing the ability of
KUDAMATSU Oil Refinery on the night of 29/3� your crews with the APQ· 7 to hit and destroy
June. The target was on the coast west·southwest of precision targets, operating individually at night.
KURE. lhirty.six aircraft were airborne. Thirty-two This performance is the most successful radar
aircraft bombed the primary target. There were no b o m b i n g of t h e C o m m a n d to d a t e .
losses. Congratulations t o you and your men:
63
 On the night of 28/29 July another mISSion This means that 60 percent of the bombers dispatched
demonstrated the high degree of accuracy obtainable placed their salvo centers within 1 ,000 ft. of the
with the AN/APQ-7 "Eagle" radar bombing aiming point, giving an average CEP of about 850 feet
equipment. It was Mission No. I I and the target was for salvo centers. This is an 'astonishing degree of
th e Nippon Oil Company Refinery also at accuracy for bombing at night from 1 5 ,000 ft. through
stnMOTSU, south-southwest of OSAKA. Extracts an undercast. It is actually much better than the
from the mission repon are as follows: average CEP of bombing distribution of the XXIst
Bomber Command for visual daylight formation
An impon&nt refinery of crude petrolCU\Il bombing (1 250 ft), although this was conducted at
with large and modern facilities and good much higher altitude.
shipping and rail connections; the target also had Of course, one mission does not establish a CEP
a tank capacity of about 600,000 barrels. It was which can be taken as a reliable basis for forecasting
roughly the shape of an equilateral triangle about and planning. Unfonunately the other mission repono
2,500 feet along each side. The storage area of the 3 1 5th Wing do not contain bomb plots.
extended 1 ,000 feet beyond the nonhern top of The final mission of the 3 1 5th, flown on the night
the refinery area. of 14/15 August, was also remarkable. The mission
84 aircraft were airborne and 78 bombed the repon states:
primary target, dropping 658.3 tons of 500
pound GP bombs. Opposition was light and TARGET: NIPPON OIL COMPANY
there were no aircraft losses or crew member REFINERY AT TSUCHIZAKI NEAR AKITA
casualties.
> Photos showed it was unnecessary to return to This target was attacked on 1 5th and last
!:: the refinery for in this one mission the target was
almost completely destroyed. 927,000 barrels of
mission flown by the Wing, flown on the night of
14- 1 5 August, 1945 with bombs released only a
z
§
the 1 ,245,000 barrel storage capacity was few hours before the announcement by President
damaged while the 1 ,274,000 cubic foot Truman that the Japanese had accepted the
gasometer capacity was almost completely United States surrender terms.
> destroyed. 69 percent of the 2 10,254 square foot This mission was the longest nonstop combat
c group area was destroyed. The target was flight ever made, a distance of 3,740 statute miles
thoroughly saturated with bombs and obliterated from base at GUAM to the target on the nonhern
z beyond repair. coast of HONSHU island and return.
c( Postponed for several days by the peace
z The target photo and interpretation showed the negotiations, the mission took off, led by the
following distribution of bombing effon and impact of Wing Commander (Brig Gen Frank Armstrong)
c(
aircraft salvos: at 1637 hours on 1 4 August 143 aircraft were
a.
airborne and 1 34 dropped 953.9 tons of 100
c( No. A/C pound and 250 pound GP bombs on the
.,
Bombing Per""ntage of A/C primary.
Primary Dlsplltclled Bombing Results of photo-interpretation brought now
Group Target Primary Target familiar words: "Almost completely destroyed or
damaged. " Photographs disclosed that no
464th 20 95%
portion of the target was untouched. The three
33 1st 13 93%
refining units were a tangled mass of wreckage,
50 1st 16 1 00%
the main power plant still standing but seriously
502nd 15 91%
hit. More than 66 percent of the tank capacity
TOTAL 64 96% was destroyed. Lesser installation, including the
worker's barracks, were destroyed.
Centers of impact of 80 percent of salvos identified in Note: This mission was conducted by
the photographs. Of these: the Twentieth Air Force, after
78% were in the target circle of 1 ,000 ft. radius redesignation of the XXIst Bomber
7% were over the target circle of I ,000 ft. radius Command, under command of Lt
1 5% were shan of the target circle of 1 ,000 ft Gen Nathan F. Twining.
radius
Thus: (The figure for bomb size as given in the repon is
96% of aircraft dispatched bombed the primary probably in error and should have been 1 000
target pound rather than 100 pound as reponed.)
80% of the salvo centers were identified
78% of those identified were within 1 ,000 ft. of the The operations of the 3 1 5th Wing showed
aiming point conclusively that it was feasible to destroy selected
64
65
 I targets by radar bombing when the target location is
well known and the radar returns of the target itself
i:.'I
are clear or its location relative to a prominent radar
feature is well known. As indicated earlier, B-29s with
" AN/APQ-7 radar systems might have been used as
lead aircraft for daylight selective bombing by
r
formations of the other B-29s. This technique would
have permitted employment of the entire force for
daylight attack of selected targets even if those targets
were obscured by clouds.
� . ,
"I· I
I Effects of the Air Offensive
� I
!
"'. I
With the exception of the Japanese aircraft and
engine target system, the aerial mining campaign, and
, I attack against selected targets in the iron, steel, and
II i
petroleum industries, the USSBS was under some
I'
difficulty in reponing the effects of strategic bombing
j on Japanese war production indust.ies and upon
Japan's war economy because no related system of
[I
targets was set up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Twentieth Air Force as selected priority strategic
I
targets. Nevenheless, the Survey submitted repons on
a number of war production industries.
i
The Repon on Japanese War Production Industries
states that the objectives of our strategic air force were:
I . To bring about an overwhelming and immediate
drop in war production;
2. To shut off output of cenoin specific high
priority items of war production;
3. To accelerate the rate of the existing decline of
Qverall war production;
4. To force a substantial cut in production of those
military supplies of sucb high priority that they would
otherwise withstand the effects of the current
restrictive economic forces.
All four of these objectives were met to some
degree. Strategic bombing did succeed both in
hastening and in intensifying the decline in war
production and in preventing the Japanese from saving
the production of high-priority items from the general
decline.
The Repon does not say whence the objectives are
derived; probably they were deduced from various
statements. It chose to consider "war production" as
comprising six categories of production:
Japanese aircraft industry
Japanese army ordnance
Japanese naval ordnance
Japanese naval shipbuilding
Japanese merchant shipbuilding
Japanese motor vehicle industry
Of these, only the aircraft industry was subjected to
appreciable selective attack.
The effects of the strategic air offensive were
catastrophic in the aggregate. They were caused by a
series of interacting results of air bombardment: direct
damage from bombing; indirect effect of bombing
reflected in frantic effons to disperse industry; loss of
essential raw materials through blockade, including
66
aerial mmmg; and absenteeism of workers whose
homes had been destroyed and who had to forage for
food and the essentials of life for themselves and their
families.
The Repon gives the following analysis of the
effects of selective bombing on the aircraft industry:
No figures are available for loss of production
due to physical destruction of plant, machinery,
and equipment. Loss of production capacity
through unsuccessful attempts at dispersal
(which resulted from fear induced by the early
attack on airframe and engine plants) was as
follows:
Airframes 33%
Engines 57%
Propellors
42%
About 55 percent of the entire aircraft industry's
facilities were out of production as a result of dispersal
alone.
For the other categories of war production, overall
loss of production capacity through physical
destruction of plant, machinery, and equipment was as
follows:
Army ordnance 26%
Naval ordnance 28%
Merchant and naval ships 1 0- 1 5%
Motor vehicles negligible
Loss of production capacity through unsuccessful
attempts at dispersal, induced by the threat of
bombing:
Army ordnance
1 2%
Naval ordnance
1 2%
Merchant and naval ships
smaIl
Motor vehicles
sufficient to
bring about a
c o m p l et e
c o l l apse o f
production
The loss of production capacity through bombing
was brought about by a combination of heavy urban
area attacks and a relatively small amount of bombing
(24,000 tons or 1 7 percent of total bomb tonnage)
directed at selected targets.
Reduction in Japanese production was not the
result of strategic bombing alone. Loss of raw
materials as a result of shipping losses and blockade
had an impact as well. This was panicularly true of
steel. The Repon points out that:
The loss through ships sunk of I 7 percent of all
Army supplies shipped overseas (including food,
clothing, fuel, and construction materials as well
as ordnance) in 1 943; 30 percent in 1 944; and
50 percent in 1945 shows that incr�ed
production alone would not have been suffiCIent
to provide adequate supplies for the Japanese
Army overseas.
The Repon sums up its findings on the effect of
strategic bombing on Japanese War Industry
production in these terms:
There was a 53 percent decline in war
production between September 1 944 (just prior
to the launching of the air offensive) and July
1 945-the last full month of production before
the end of the war. The magnitude of the decline
in output of each of the major categories of war
production from peak levels to the July 1945
level is shown below:
Catqory Percentage drop from
peak production
Aircraft 57
Army ordnance 54
Naval ordnance 56
Merchant ships 82
Naval ships 53
Motor vehicles 96
There can be no doubt that the air offensive
crippled the Japanese war industries, even though only
.
one of them aircraft, was selected for dtrect attack.
.....
The urban ea incendiary attacks did have a crippling
effect upon other industry through indirect effect.
The Survey recognized another basic Air Force
. strategic objective-one that had been clearly defined
in AWPD- I and AWPD-42, though it had been
submerged by other considerations in later plans: the
intent to destroy not only the war-supponing structure
but also the economic structure on which the Japanese
state depended, and hence to bring about surrender
when it became apparent to the Japanese that they
could no longer supply the basic needs upon which the
population was dependent for its life and social
survival.
The Survey issued a repon on the effects of strategic
bombing on Japan's war economy. It concluded:
By July 1945 Japan's economic system had
been shattered. Production of civilian goods was
below the level of subsistance. Munitions output
had been cunailed to less than half the war time
peak, a level that could not support sustained
military operations against our o�mg forces.
The economic basis of Japanese resIstance had
been destroyed. This economic decay resulted
from the sea-air blockade of the Japanese home
islands and direct bombing attacks on industrial
67
and urban-area targets.
The urban-area incendiary raids had
profound repercussions on civili"." morale and
.
Japan's will to stay 10 the war. SIXty-SIX CitIes,
vinually all those of economic significance, were
subjected to bombing raids and suffered
destruction ranging from 25 to 90%. Almost 50
percent of the area of these cities was leveled.
The area raids interrupted the normal processes
of city life to an extent that interfered seriously
with such production as the shnnkmg raw
material base still permitted.
The bombing offensive was the major factor
which secured agreement to unconditional
surrender without an invasion of the home
islands-an invasion that would have cost
hundreds of thousands of American lives. The
demonstrated strength of the United States in the
B-29 attacks contrasted with Japan's lack of
adequate defense made clear to the Japanese
people and to the government the futility of
further resistance. This was remforced by the
evident deterioration of the Japanese economy
and the impact it was having on a large segment
of the popUlation. The atomIc bomb and
Russia's entry into the war speeded the process of
surrender already realized as the only possible
outcome.
The effectiveness of strategic air attack was
limited by the concepts of its mission Ha the
:
?
purpose of strategic air allB:ck been pnmarlly to
force an independent decISIon rather than to
suppon a ground-force invasion in No",:ember
1945, there would have been no occasIOn to
attack oil, tetraethyllead, arsenals, or, after
March, aircraft. Effort could have been
concentrated against food and fuel supply by
attack on internal transponation and against
.
urban areas, thus striking solely at the mam
elements upon which continued Japanese
resistance was based. Moreover, a pan of the
bombing effort merely duplicated results already
achieved by blockade. Attack on the raIl
tran_ponation system would have secured full
coordination with the blockade program. The
railroads were overburdened, defenseless, and
had only limited ability to replace rolling stock
or major installations. . . .
The testimony is overwhelming that the air
offensive against Japan-which was essentially an
anti-Japanese Air Force operation followed by an
urban-area strategy-was a magnificent success. The
conclusion that the bombing effon should have been
concentrated upon tran_ponation and urban areas
alone is, however, subject to funher evaluation.
I 9
CHAPTER
I General Arnold later divulged his reasons for
American G rand Strategy In the Pacific
AS the time for the Potsdam Conference drew near,
the President, Harry S. Truman, asked that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries meet with
him to discuss Pacific strategy before his meeting with
Mr Churchill and Marshal Stalin. The Joint Chiefs
immediately queried their theater commanders and
invited their views.
General MacArthur had previously advocated
invasion of Honshu at the plain of Tokyo. He had
stipulated that Russia must be induced to enter the war
in order to tie down the million-and-a-half Japanese
soldiers believed to be in Manchuria. Without this
provision, MacArthur advised against direct invasion
of the Japanese home islands. In a staff report dated 8
March 1 945, General MacArthur was quoted as
saying that he was in thorough agreement (with the
Army) that the only meanS of defeating Japan was by
the invasion of the industrial heart of Japan. (There is
a striking parallel here. General Dwight D.
Eisenhower had stated with regard to Germany that it
was essential to conquer the Rubr, the industrial heart
of Germany. Neither General Eisenhower nor General
MacArthur seemed to understand that the industrial
heart of a great nation can be stilled by strategic air
operations, as well as by occupation by troops.)
General MacArthur thought that Russia would
demand and get Manchuria, but thought that she
should pay for it by joining in' the fight against Japan.
He is quoted as saying that he understood that the
Navy still favored a plan whereby J"PaR would be
surrounded with air bases and naval bases and
eventually blockaded and bombed into submission.
General MacArthur contended that this would never
be effective.
On 20 April, General MacArthur analyzed the
strategic problem under three possibilities:
Course J. Encircle Japan by further expansion to
the westward, deploying maximum air
forces preparatory to attacks on Kyushu
68
and Honshu in succession or directly
against Honshu.
Course 2. Encircle Japan by further expansion to
the westward with a view to its complete
isolation, and endeavor to bomb Japan
into submission without effecting
landings in the homeland.
Course 3. Attack Kyushu and install air forces to
cover a decisive assault on Honshu.
He dismissed course I as time-consuming and
diversionary away from the decisive area-the plain of
Tokyo. He dismissed course 2 as time-consuming and
ineffective. He said that "it assumes success of air
power alone to conquer a people in spite of its
demonstrated failure in Europe, where Germany was
subjected to more intensive bombardment than can be
brought to bcar against Japan, and where all the
available resources in ground troops of the United
States, the United Kingdom and Russia had to be
committed in order to force a decision." He
recommended course 3.
In calling his conference with the Joint Chiefs for
1 8 June, the President stressed the cost of invasion in
terms of casualties. He wanted to know the time
required and the losses that would result from an effort
to defeat Japan by isolation, blockade, and
bombardment by sea and air forces.
At the conference the President asked General
Marshall if he would express his views. General
Marshall said that personally he viewed the operation
against Kyushu as the only course to pursue. He felt
that air power alone was not sufficient to put the
Japanese out of the war and stated that it was unable
alone to put the Germans out.
General Eaker was present, representing General
Arnold, who was in Guam at the Headquarters of the
XX1st Bomber Command. General Arnold had been
reached, and he stated his conviction that the bombing
effort could end the war. But he in&tructed General
Eaker to support the position taken by General
Marshall.
supporting the invasion of Kyushu. He believed, with
General LeMay, that Japan was already totterilli and
that air power would complete the collapse. But
capture of Kyushu would have certain benefits-it
would provide areas for the basilli of 40 groups in an
additional air force. These groups, primarily B- 1 7
bombers, would be i n close proximity to targets in
Honshu. The air units were actually available for
transfer to the Pacific. And the capture of Kyushu
would make the invasion of Honshu unnecessary. I n .
addition, this policy position would be a n expression
of loyalty to General Marshall, who had stood "in loco
parentis" behind the birth and growth of the Army Air
Forces and who had given evidence of supporting a
separate Air Force, coequal with the Army and Navy
after the war.
General Arnold knew, as did the other chiefs, that
Japan had already started negotiations for peace
through the Russians in Moscow, who deliberately
failed to forward the peace feelers.
Admiral King concurred with General Marshall.
Admiral Leahy sho�ed considerable concern over
:asualties and seemed to favor blockade and
bombardment.. He asked General Marshall what the
casualty rates had been in the other Pacific invasions
and how many troops would be needed for invasion of
Kyushu. General Marshall said that the plan for the
invasion of Kyushu called for 766,700 men. Admiral
Leahy said that the Okinawa casualties (34,000 Army,
7,000 Navy) constituted about 35 percent of the force.
If this were applied 10 Kyushu, the casualties would be
numerous indeed (268,000). Admiral King said he
thought the casualty rate would be somewhere between
that on Luzon and that on Okinawa. Admiral Leahy
went on to say that he questioned the advisability of
demanding unconditional surrender and said that
lesser terms would still permit our absolute control of
Japan. The President finally accepted General
Marshall's views and a target date for invasion of
Kyushu was set at J November.
On his trip to the Pacific, General Arnold had
viewed the scene firsthand from the Command
Headquarters in Guam. He was impressed with the
devastation already visited upon Japan and with the
immense power which was in place. He also saw the
mounting power of the Eighth Air Force, one wing of
which was established in Okinawa and the rest in
transit.
General Arnold received a preliminary report of
the findings of the USSBS on the effect of the strategic
air war against Germany. It was a staggering
testimonial of the effect of strategic air warfare on a
modern state at war. General Arnold is quoted as
having said, "If we could win the war by bombing, it
would be unnecessary for the ground troops to make a
69
landing on the shores of Japan. Personally I was
convinced it could be done. I did not believe Japan
could stand the punishment from the air that Germany
had taken.'"
General Arnold sent General LeMay back to
Washington to brief the Joint Chiefs and, if they
concurred, the Secretary and the President. General
LeMay arrived too late. The President had already
agreed to the policy of invasion and the machinery had
been set in motion, not only for invasion of Kyushu,
but also for the subsequent invasion of Honshu.
At the Potsdam Conference, President Truman
learned of the successful test of the "atomic device. "
He queried his advisors and top commanders about
use of the atomic bomb. They agreed to its use, with
one exception-General Arnold, the man whose
forces would deliver it. General Arnold, just back
from the Pacific, questioned the need to use the atomic
bomb to assure defeat of Japan without an invasion.
Japan had already been weakened by blockade and
beaten to her knees by air bombardment. However, if
it became a question of dropping the bomb or
launching an invasion, he favored the bomb. Other
considerations clinched his conviction that the bomb
should be dropped.
In anticipation of the President's decision to use the
atomic bomb, potential targets had been selected.
General Combs, on order from General Arnold, set
aside four cities which had not been bombed and
passed the word to LeMay that they were not to be
attacked. They included Hiroshima, Nagasaki,
Kokura and Niigata. '
Second Change of Command
With victory in Europe in May 1 945, the second
phase of global grand strategy was put in motion.
Forces rel�as.ed from combat in Europe were
transferre<! to the Pacific and preparations were made
for the firial offensive against Japan. On 1 6 July 1 945,
a major reorganIzation of the Twentieth Air Force
took place. General Arnold turned 10 the strategic air
team which had been so successful in the air war
against the Third Reich. General Carl Spaatz,
Commander in Chief, US Strategic Air Forces in
Europe, was chosen to command the strategic air
assault against Japan. His new designation was
Commander in Chief, US Army Strategic Air Forces,
Pacific, and his headquarters was located on Guam.
He reported directly to General Arnold, who would
continue to command the Strategic .A ir Forces from
Washington, as Executive Agent of the Joint Chi�fs of
Staff.
'Herman S. Walk, " "The 8-29, the A-Bomb, and the Japencae Surrender," Air Fr�
Masalin� (February 1975)•.p. S9.
'Pet'$)nal correspondence of the author with Gene...' Com�.
 General Carl Spaatz
Commanding General,
US Army Strategic Air Forces Pacific
July 1945

The Fifteenth Air Force, in the Mediterranean was
demobilized, but its Commanding General, Lt 'Gen
Nathan F. Twining, was ordered to the Pacific as a
member of Spaatz's winning team. The other wing of
that team, the veteran Eighth Air Force, under the
other member of the command team, Lt Gen Jimmie
Doolittle, would be returned to the United States, re­
equipped and trained with B-29s, and moved to
Okinawa. The old headquarters of the XXth Bomber
Command would be absorbed in the new headquarters
of the Eighth Air Force. The XXIst Bomber
Command would be reconstituted as the Twentieth
Air Force.
Again there was an awkward command problem.
General Arnold sent for General Twining and told
him there was going to be a reorganization of the entire
command structure in the Pacific. "I want Spaatz and
Doolittle and you to take over right away. Now get on
with it," said General Arnold.
General LeMay ·was relieved of command of the
XXIst Bomber Command and General Twining took
over as Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force.
(I'hrough oversight or neglect, General Arnold failed
to acquaint LeMay of the decision he had reached and
it remained for Twining to answer LeMay's query. on
his arrival, "What are you doing out here?" Perhaps
General Arnold had expected General Spaatz to notify
LeMay.)
General Twining's comment on taking command of
what had been the XXIst Bomber Command and was
now to be the Twentieth Air Force was typical-and
appropriate. He said, "Taking over the outfit from
Curt LeMay is about like taking over the Notre Dame
football team from Knute Rockne."
Fortunately General LeMay's broad experience and
demonstrated talents were saved for continued
application in the strategic air war. General Spaatz
made him his Chief of Staff-a role which would keep
him active in the final phase of the strategic air war
against Japan.
Lt Gen Nathan Twining
Commanding General,
Twentieth Air Force
July 1945
General Twining had barely taken over the duties of The Finale
his new command when he received orders to deliver
the atomic bombs. He had been so heavily engrossed in The war was soon over.
the performance of his functions as Commanding
General, Fifteenth Air Force, which was carrying out During the course of the war, the Twentieth Air
maximum effort combat missions in Europe. that he Force had flown 3 1,387 bomber sorties-3,058 of
had literally no knowledge of the atomic I)omb. A these were flown by the XXth Bomber Command,
supersecret briefing was arranged for him. He wasted 28,329 by the XXIst. The war had taken 414 B-298,
no time in questioning the judgment of his superiors. 80 from the XXth Bomber Command and 334 from
The orders were clear and concise. They came directly the XXIst. Losses on combat missions averaged 1 .3
from the Commander in Chief, the President of the percent of sorties airborne, and 147 bombers lost (.47
United States. The orders were carried out with percent per sortie) were the direct result of combat. Of
precision and dispatch. these combat losses:

70 71
 50% were caused by enemy fighters air attack, from all causes, was estimated at 900,000
36% were caused by enemy antiaircraft deaths and 1 ,300,000 injured. Following are a rew
1 3% were caused by a combination of both quotes on the effectiveness of American air power,
I% were self-inflicted by accident from Japanese sources:
Fighter losses were 80.
By the end of the war the Twentieth Air Force "If I were to give you one factor as the leading one
comprised: that led to your victory, I would give you the Air
Force. "
Bombers B-29 1 ,042 Admiral Asami Nayano
Fighters P-47 733 Imperial Japanese Navy
P-5 1 349 Chief of Naval Staff and Supreme
Night 18 Naval Advisor to the Emperor
Reconnaissance F-7 26
F- 1 3 52 "If I were to give you the decisive factors in the war
Staff and Transports 93 in the order of their importance, I would place first the
Air Force,"
2,3i3 Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukudome
Imperial Japanese Navy
The total inventory of B-29s on hand in tJ!e Army Air
Chief of Staff Combined Fleet
Force was about 3,700.
On the basis of photo coverage, A-2 estimated that
The determination to make peace was the
1 75 square miles of urban area in 66 cities were wiped
prolonged bombing by the B-29s."
out. ,
Total civilian casualties stemming directly from the
Prince Fumimaro Konoye PART III
Premier of Japan
urban attacks have been estimated at 330,000 killed,
476,000 injured, 9,200,000 rendered homeless.
2,21 0,000 houses were demolished or burned down Japan accepted defeat while still in possession of
and another 90,000 were partially damaged, This " de­ over two.-anq-a,-half milli,?" combat-equipped troops OBSERVATIONS IN RETROSPECT
housed" 50.3 percent of tile i 940 population of these arid nine· thousand Kamikaze-potential airplanes. No
cities. A total of 1 59,862 tons of bombs were dropped. enemy troops were on the soil of the Japanese home
Total Japanese casualties resulting from the strategic islands.

72
CHAPTER 10
Critique and Conclusions
Fundamental Issues
I have already drawn attention to the basic
dichotomy between proponents of Europe as the first
and primary theater of war and those who favored
Japan in that role.
There were basic divisions of opinion within the
Pacific Theater itself. The most generally recognized
division pertained to which of the two principal
surface thrusts should predominate: the Central
Pacific axis or the Southwest Pacific axis. But there
was still another, more fundamental, division that has
received relatively little attention or pUblicity. Was
invasion of the Japanese home islands the best route to
victory and achievement of Allied war aims, or were
there alternative paths to victory? Were there better
paths? Was invasion really necessary at all? This issue,
which did not receive the attention that it deserved
until late in the war, had a profound impact upon air
strategy, which had its own basic dichotomy: defeat of
the enemy state through selective destruction of the
vital industrial, economic, and social structures and
system; or defeat of the enemy state by destroying the
principal cities through area bombing. The air issue
was strongly influenced by the invasion issue because
the proponents of invasion held the balance of power
and they favored urban bombing. They seemed to
believe that urban destruction would contribute more
directly to weakening of Japanese defenses and hence
would both hasten the date of invasion and weaken the
resistance on the beaches. Time became the dominant
feature in surface strategy. The two surface thrusts, led
by Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur, were
literally racing with each other to determine which
should be the paramount spearhead of invasion.
It is not clear why the surface strategists felt that
urban air attack would favor the invasion. Perhaps the
Joint Chiefs did not really weigh the issue in those
terms. Perhaps they and the President were influenced
74
more by measurable effects. The urban effects were
measurable in very dramatic terms; selective bombing
effects were much less apparent. There were elements
of the Army Air Forces who shared the preference for
area bombing.
The American decision to abandon the classic
American concept of strategic air warfare, which
called for selection and destruction of vital industrial
arid economic targets and target systems and to tum
instead to the British concept of urban area
destruction, will d.oubtless be debated by future
historians. The American concept had been assailed in
Europe by proponents of the British method and had
been vigorously defended by American strategic air
commanders. The American method worked well in
Europe. The abandonment of that method has
produced surprisingly little debate so far among
current military commentators and observers. Perhaps
this is because the very success of the urban area
attacks against Japan simply engulfed any serious
inquiries as to the wisdom of the decision, the manner
in which the decision was reached, or its application to
future air strategy.
Several important peculiarities of the Japanese
situation tended to support the decision for urban
bombing. Japanese weather made visual bombing
difficult and undependable. Radar precision bombing
was on the way. But its successful application would
take time and would not really come into its own until
the arrival of the APQ- 7, although experience,
training, radar maps, and superior maintenance would
greatly improve the performance of the APQ- 1 3.
Many of the Japanese precision targets were buried in
the sprawling cities and could not be ferreted out,
though they were vulnerable through systems which
supported them. And the cities themselves were more
vulnerable to incendiary attack than any other cities in
the world. If we made this singularly important
decision to abandon our own strategic concepts after a
careful consideration, not only of our brief early
operations, but more importantly of our growing
capabilities, then the decision can stand on its own.
. and engine plants at Akashi after only two months of
But if we failed to weigh the urban decimation in
terms of our national policies and purposes and in
terms of alternate strategies, and if we were hasty in
making a long-term decision in order to provide a
solution based upon expediency, then some inquiry
and discussion concerning both the decision and the
basis in which it was made are appropriate to our
own time, lest we draw conclusions which may lead us
astray in the near future.
The same pressures and arguments to abandon
selective bombing were advanced in the European
theater, and our determination to persevere in the
selected target method was later shown to be the wise
decision.
Perhaps time simply could not be granted in the
case of the Pacific war. When General Eaker
personally convinced Mr Churchill that the American
concept should be given a fair trial in Europe, the
proposed invasion of Normandy Was a year-and-a-half
away and had not even been agreed upon. But when
the issue became critical in regard to the war agalRst
Japan, the prospect of invading the Japanese home
islands had become a firm objective of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and the time for invasion was only seven or
eight months away. Massive forces were in motion.
Time to overcome initial obstacles in the air campaign
and to incorporate new equipment and develop new
tactics and techniques for the destruction of selected
targets by new, all-weather precision bombing would
not have been granted at the expense of delaying the
date of invasion.
There were strong arguments in support of
incendiary attack. The full force of the bombers could
be thrown into the urban incendiary attacks with little
interference from the weather. This could not be
achieved in the selective bombing method until
preCision bombing by radar had been perfected, and
even then the bombloads would be less than those
applied against the cities. But Washington r�ched the
.
decision to place pnmary rehance upon incendIary
attack against Japanese cities at a time when the XXIst
Bomber Command had had only three months of
combat experience. The force was small, it was ill­
trained, and it had much to learn and improve. With
the exception of the superb performance in destroying
the great airframe and engine plants at Akashi, the
accomplishments had been disappointing-though
they were more effective than we knew at the time. It
was not a good time to make so important a decision as
the abandonment of selective bombing in favor of area
bombing of cities. If a similar decision had had to be
made after three months of operations of the Eighth
Air Force-by mid-November of 1 942-and if the
decision had been based upon accomplishments to
75
date in terms of selected targets destroyed, then it is
quite likely that the American strategic air concept
would have been abandoned in Europe also, in spite of
the dedicated leadership of Generals Spaatz and
Eaker. Actually the total destruction of the airframe
combat experience by the XXIst Bomber Command
had no counterpart in the experience of the Eighth Air
Force until it had been in combat for nearly a year.
It is quite true that the cities of Japan were more
vulnerable to incendiary attack than those of
Germany. But it is also true that the industrial targets
and the industrial systems in particular were just as
vital to the continuation of the war by Japan as they
had been proven to be in Germany, and they were just
as vulnerable to bombs. Destruction of those targets
and systems had caused the collapse of Germany.
The discussion which follows is a contribution to
the beginning of debate on alternative strategies. There
is no doubt whatever that the decision to use
incendiaries to destroy the Japanese cities was an
effective, wartime decision in the light of the many
conflicting factors which were involved. There is no
doubt whatever that the chosen strategy was decisively
effective. The question is not whether the decision to
use incendiaries against the highly flammable cities of
Japan was a sound military decision, only whether
there was an attainable alternative, and, if so, whether
such an alternative could have produced satisfactory
results at less cost and with fewer undesirable side
effects. The question transcends the scope of World
War II. It pertains to the future as well. Is urban attack
of cities a method to be preferred to selective target
destruction in all cases, or even in most cases? For that
matter, was it the best strategy in the war against
Japan?
Speculation on Alternative Air Strategies
Is there any real usefulness in speculating about
other air strategies-particularly those based on
selective targeting rather than urban area targeting? I
suggest that there is some real usefulness. The massive
strategy of urban bombing brought results. But 66
cities?
Was there not some way to curb war production and
civilian economic subsistence without destroying 66
cities? Could vital "organic" systems upon which the
life of the nation depended have been selected for
attack? Once the vital organic systems of Japan had
been destroyed, bringing both helplessness and despair
and making it perfectly clear that further resistance
could not lead to victory or relief, but only to more
and more suffering culminating in defeat, could
surrender have been induced? After the destruction of
the vital organic systems, lesser means, involving
perhaps the destruction of one or two cities as
demonstration of what would follow, might then have
brought Japan to the peace table.
Two major selective target systems-organic
systems-suggest themselves for consideration in
addition to sea blockade. They are electric power and
internal transportation. Were they vulnerable? Could
they have been destroyed? Could Japanese industry,
Japanese economy, Japanese ...,.,iety and the Japanese
political state have SurvIVed WIthout them?
The basic question inviting speculation really is the
one propounded in the USSBS Report on the Effects
of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy,
quoted earlier. Was the adoption of the �rmy's grand
strategy, placing major rehance for VIctOry upon
invasion of the Japanese home islands, the better
alternative?
Or would the other grand strategy, proposed by the
Navy and the Army Air Forces, in which major
reliance for victory was to be sought through blockade
and air bombardment, have been more suit�ble? T�is
was the course 2 of MacArthur'S analYSls-:-whlch
he declared would be ineffective and . whIch he
discarded in favor of invasion.
Under the air bombardment/sea blockade grand
strategy at least two air strategies could have been
followed. One strategy, which actually was pursued,
involved selective targeting to defeat the Japanese au
forces and air mining of the sea aspects of the
transportation system, followed by urban· area mass
destruction through incendiary attack. A �nd
strategy might have been the one proposed 10 t e � b . The Air Objective Folder 90. 1 7 for Tokyo
AWPD. l and AWPD·42 and the USSBS Econo\�llc
Report. This strategy involved initial selectIve
targeting of the aircraft indUStry and, presumably, the
air mining of the sea aspects of the transport;>tlo�
system, coupled with selective la!'geting of the raIl
transportation system, of the electnc power system, of
the food system, and of the fuel system. This would be
followed by urban·area auack of the cities themselves
as a final blow, if necessary·
The intent of this latter strategy would have been to
destroy the Japanese capability to support �ot only
. concurred in.
their fighting forces but the state Itself. ThIS would
have involved selective targeting not only of systems
!
supporting war industry but a "? of the sophisticated
�
systems upon which Japanese CIVIC SOCIety relI for Its
very existence. This strategy would have mvol � determine whether it should have been recommended
holding back on urban·area incendIary attack, whIch
might finally be used as a last reso�-perhaps by
demonstration agaInst one m,aJor city-to cause
capitulation in a situation which obviously was totally
lost. In this latter strategy, defeat of the Japanese aIr
force through selective targeting would presumably
have held overriding first priority, at least to the pomt
where the Japanese could not interfere effectively with
the bombing offensive. This air strategy presumes
continuation of sea blockade.
The desirability and feasibility of this last air
�
strategy is worth con�i ering. It would �ave � freed
of the arbitrary restrIction Imposed by time, whIch �
a compelling feature brought on by the Army s
dedication to invasion in November 1945. It mIght
76
have started by consideration of the suggestions
offered in AWPD· l and AWPD-4 2, as a basIS of
departure.
Intelligence. Strategic intelligence upon whIch
. a part of the
selection of vital organic systems and �rgets would
rest was admittedly inadequate for thIS second alr
.
strategy at the time of initiation of the bombmg
offensive, November 1 944. It must be presumed that a
vigorous and perceptive intelligence campaIgn would
have been undertaken, a campaign that wo�ld have
. .
brought out the salient features of the �Ituatlo� as It
was later uncovered by the USSBS. ThIs mtelhgence
would have involved analysis in greater depth.
Although the paucity of target systems intelligence was
adequate reason for passing over many selected·target
potentials before the initial B·29 auacks on Japan, thIS
. approximately 2 3 8 ,000 tons in 1 94 1 to
condition should not have domInated later
recommendations. Photo reconnaissance of the
Japanese home islands by the XXIst Bomber
. dependent upon ocean shipping than Japan. Her
Command provided the basis for extensIve mdustrlal
and economic analysis. This is evident from study of
the USSBS reports. Time and again there are such
statements as that contained in the reports of the
Kawasaki Stearn Power Plant:
a. OSS report in general correctly identified and
evaluated this plant.
Area issued by the Office of Assist�t Chief of
Air Staff Intelligence, hsted thIS plant as
Target III, correctly located it on maps,
evaluated its importance, and gave a correct
plot plan and photographic info�ation .
. .
c. JTC (Joint Targeting CommIttee) mformatlon
. overland transportation was difficult and inadequat
was correct. Aerial photographIC cover was
excellent and location of buildings correct.
The size of the plant area was slightly in error
and weapon recommendation was not
Nearly all of Japan received such photo
intelligence. Yet there does not seem to have been any
reexamination of the electric power system to
as a Primary Target System.
Transportation. Other select�d.targ.et systems
might also have been reexamined 10 the lIght of new
intelligence. Transportation, which was treated as a
: of the inland sea and the Shimonoseki ferries was
single "organic syste�' in A � D.I and A � �D. 2 ,
w as not treated i n SImIlar fashIon when co�sldermg
Japan. Follow·up of the recommendations of
AWPD. 1 and AWPD-42 might have !�ulted 10
selection of transportation as a top priorIty target
sys
� aerial mining of harbors, straits and inland
!
seas was an extremely effective selective target�ng
operation, coupled with the war at sea .
. ShIps whIch
can not put to sea because harbor entrances h�ve been
mined might just as well have been sunk. ThIs was a
r vital part of one of the most attractive of all the target
systems, that is, transportation in all its aspects. It was
under extreme stress in the effort to counter the heavy
losses of merchant ships at sea
. In the actual event,
sea blockade which had a tremendous naval and commercial sea bases and construction
impact upon the Japanese capability to support the
yards were vital adjuncts to the war at seaagainst
war, considering her dependence upon import of raw Japanese shipping. That war was immensely effective.
materials. As the inland seas and harbors were
rendered useless by aerial mining, the railroads
To quote from the Summary Report of USSBS (pacific
War):
became even more important.
Actually these target systems were a part of the
The most important consumer of steel was the
overall organic system "transportation," which was shipbuilding industry. The increasingly critical
listed as a Primary Target System in AWPD·l and was
specifically recommended by the USSBS in response
nature of Japan's shipping situation caused her to
expand her naval and merchant shipbuilding
to General Arnold's inquiry. programs to a point where 35% of all steel
The importance of transportation-sea, coastal, and
consumed was being used in that industry alone.
rail-is further emphasized in the USSBS Report, Construction of merchant ships increased from
"The War Against Japanese Transportation."
1 ,600,000 tons of steel ships and 254,000 tons of
No major power in the world was more
wooden ships in 1 944.
entire economy in peace, and even more so in
But the increasing toll on shipbuilding materials
war, depended upon shipping to provide the
made it impossible to keep up with losses. Again the
basic materials for industry and to fill out the
survey reports: "Japan's merchant shipping fleet was
supply of staples required to feed and clothe the
not only a key link in the logistical support of her
population.
The munitions industries were largely founded
armed forces in the field, but also a vital link in her
economic structure."
upon the basic iron and steel, aluminum, and
Japan entered the war with some 6,000,000 tons of
chemical industries, all of which relied heavily
upon imported raw materials-iron ore, coking
merchant shipping of over 500 tons gross weight.
During the war an additional 4,100,000 tons were
coal, scrap and pig iron, alumina, phosphOrite,
constructed, captured or requisitioned. Some
etc.
8,91 0,000 tons of this shipping were sunk or so
Japanese waterborne transportation was vital and seriously damaged that it was out of action at the end
vulnerable in yet another mode-the distribution of 'of the war.
goods. The Japanese islands are mountainous, and
57.7% of this total was attributable to submarines
e. 16.3% to carrier·based planes
But the islands are linked by inland seas and the great
10.2% to Army land·based planes
production centers were all close to the water. Internal
4.3% to Navy and Marine land·based planes
transportation was carried by coastal shipping.
9.3% to mines (largely dropped by B·29s)
The USSBS Report continues:
1 .0% to surface gunfire and the remainder, about
1 .2% to marine accidents.
As her shipping was highly developed and her
principal heavy industry located to employ fuel
After April 1945, mines dropped by B·29s in Japanese
and raw materials received by water, the railroad
harbors and inland waterways accounted for 50
mileage was small and the rail system was
generally of limited capacity. Only two main
percent of all ships sunk or damaged.
Up to the end of 1 942, ship sinkings exceeded new
lines extended the length of Honshu, keeping for
acquisitions by a small margin. Thereafter, the
the most part close to the coastal margin. Only
the line from Tokyo southwest to the great ports
aggregate tonnage sunk increased far more rapidly
than could be matched by the expansion of the
developed for heavy traffic. . . .
Japanese shipbuilding program.
Could these vital target systems, so crucial to all
The highway system was primitive and no
phases of Japanese strength when coupled with the sea
important improved intercity h ighways
blockade, have been destroyed with the B·29 forces
existed. . . .
available? Was the Japanese rail system vulnerable to
Coastwise shipping and the two limited· capacity
auack?
main railroads were the life· lines of the basic
domestic movement, particularly of fuel and
The USSBS Report says:
food stuffs. These life· lines proved to be
exceedingly vulnerable.
Failure to attack the railroad system, as the force
was available, resulted in the loss of a major
opportunity. With her shipping so seriously
Japanese shipbuilding and repair services were put
reduced, Japan depended almost entirely upon
77
 her railroad system for transportation. The
dispoJition and supply of her forces to resist
invasion must rely upon the railroads; the
remaining industry must rely almost wholly upon
Japanese sources of fuel and raw materials which
could be transported only by rail; and the
distribution of food and elementary necessities
of life could not be accomplished without the
rails.
The Military Analysis Division of the USSBS made
an estimate of the air effort required to disrupt the
Japanese railroad system. It concluded that the
following air effort would suffice:
Force requirements for initial interdiction:
100 sorties of B-29s using Azon bombs, or
653 sorties of B·29s using GP bombs, or
1 740 sorties of carrier based aircraft. •
Force requirements per month to maintain
interdiction:
143 sorties of B·29s using Azon bombs, or
933 sorties of B·29s using GP bombs, or
2460 sorties of carrier based aircraft.
One highly successful air attack on rail
transportation facilities was carried out late in the war
by a naval carrier task force. The rail ferries at
Hakodate, linking Honshu with Hokkaido, by which
coal was moved to the power plants of the south, were
wrecked and sunk.
The USSBS reached the following conclusions:
The weakest point in Japan's economic structure
and the one which was already most near.ly
disposed of was her transportation. A
combination of accelerated and intensified
assault against shipping by the naval and air
arms, coupled with the type. of railroad attack
discussed above, should have been ample to
complete the destruction of the nation's war
making potential.
Iron and Steel. It was quite true that steel provided
the essential sinews of war production and economic
construction. But the raw materials for steel
manufacture and some of the ferrite ingredients which
were critical to aircraft engine construction had to be
imported by sea. It is also true that the coke ovens were
vital to Japanese steel production. If they had been
destroyed earlier, the blow would have been telling. By
the time the strategic air offensive really got under
way, the steel plants were already operating at partial
production capacity because of the lack of raw
materials. But the significance of the target system and
its vulnerability to air attack should not be forgotten.
011. Oil, like steel, 'ro. a critical element in the war
production and support system of Japan, and oil too
had to be imported in its entirety. Although Japan had
laid in large reserves of oil in preparation for the war
78
and although war plans initially worked to perfection
in opening up the vast petroleum resources of
Indonesia, by the time of the strategic air offensive, the
sea-lanes by which the oil was transported had been
interdicted. Oil storage and reserves would constitute a
useful selective target system, but refineries would
have lost some of their value as targets.
Chemicals. Chemicals are vital to the promotion of
war. They are needed for production of explosives and
for fertilizer to produce the food on which the
population is dependent. Japan's chemical industry
was inadequate to its task. Nevertheless, the USSBS
answers the question "Should the chemical industry
have been chosen as a specific target?" in the negative:
The bombs which fell on Japanese cities in the
spring and summer 1945 would not have been
more effective if they had been aimed directly at
chemical targets. By that time, the end was too
near to be hastel1ed by concentrated bombing of
chemical factories.
This opinion should, I think, be questioned. The
effect might have taken longer, but surely it would not
have been so deadly as the mass destruction of the
cities.
Electric Power. Analysis of the target systems
discussed above reveals a shocking gap in targets
seriously considered for recommendation. The
absence of this target was an oversight or else a
miscalculation. The target was Japanese electric
power. AWPD·\ listed German electric power second
only to the German aircraft industry in the air war
against Axis Europe. Later, after defeat of Germany,
AWPD·I contemplated the movement of strategic air
forces to the Pacific and launching of a similar air
offensive against Japan. The objective of such an air
offensive would be similar to that against Germany:
the application of air power for the breakdown of the
industrial and economic structure of Japan. Electric
power was no less vital to Japan than to Germany.
There seemed to be ample time in which to prepare the
intelligence and make the target selections for the air
offensive against Japanese electric power.
Unfortunately, electric power was later dropped
from recommended Japanese target lists. The decision
to drop electric power from the list of primary targets
was made because of inadequate and misleading
intelligence. Electric power sources as a selective
target system is worthy of reexamination in the light of
the USSBS reports. Destruction of the Japanese
electric power system would have rendered the great
cities of Japan useless as sources of Japanese stren&th.
We justified the destruction of the 66 largest cities
in Japan on the ground that they contained thousands
of small shops which could not be isolated and
destroyed. Yet every tool in every shop was completely
dependent upon public electric power. In addition,
such critical services as pumped water supply,
refrigeration of food, electric communications, parts
of the transportation system, and all the great
industries of the realm, were completely dependent
upon electric power. Even the thermal electric power
plants themselves depended upon electric power
service. All the war production industries, including
specifically the Japanese aircraft, engine, and
propeller industries, operated exclusively on electric
power. Food distribution and preservation relied
largely oli electric power. Even fuel distribution and
dispensing (gasoline and oil pumps) depended upon
electricity.
Was the Japanese electric power system a suitable?
selective target system? Was it an alternative to urban
destruction in terms of crippling Japan's war
supporting production? Was its disruption within the
capacity of the XXIst Bomber Command?
The initial conclusions of the Strategic Air
Intelligence Branch of A·2 in 1 94 1 were borne out by
the findings of the US Strategic Bombing Survey.
Electric power was, indeed, an extremely vital element
of Japanese war industry and of Japanese social
economy, and it was an exceedingly difficult system to
tackle. The USSBS agreed:
Electric power is one of Japan's basic industries.
It is utilized as the almost exclusive primary
motive 'power for manufacturers, in a large
proportion of the transportation system, in
virtually all commercial establishments, and for
lighting in an unusually high percentage of
dwellings.
Some indication of the pervading importance of
electric power to various prime elements of industry
and economy is given by the following, from the
Survey:
At peak production the Japanese iron and steel
industry formed the single largest consuming
group, absorbing 1 7 percent of energy delivered.
The users of electric energy in order of
importance, were:
Steel 1 7%
Aluminum 10%
Coal 7%
Railways 6%
Metal mining 5%
Ammonium sulphate 4%
Calcium carbide 4%
Aircraft industry 4%
All other industrial customers 24%
Electric light 8%
Small customers 1 \%
Total 1 00%
Japanese electric power was a vital and critical
target system, not in addition to urban incendiary
attack but as a substitute. In the actual case, the urban
incendiary attacks caused such widespread
79
devastation to Japan that the need for electricity
dropped rapidly. There was adequate electric power,
which had not been selected as a primary target system
and hence had suffered little direct damage, to meet
the requirements of the reduced remaining demand.
But if the cities had not been destroyed, the industries
would have suffered immediately from effective attack
of the electric generating and distribution system, with
attendant loss of production and widespread paralysis
of the social structure, which was almost wholly
dependent upon electricity.
If the targets selected did not completely disrupt the
electric power system, there was ample force capacity
to extend the destruction to additional substations.
This is a task to which the fighter·bombers based in
Iwo Jima and Okinawa could have contributed.
The US Strategic Bombing Survey states that the
total electrical capacity of the Japanese electrical
system was 10,1 20,000 kw. Eighty·seven percent of
this capacity, or 8,800,000 kw, was contained in the
public utility system. But this total was seldom actually
available. It was the sum of the hydroelectric capacity
and the steam-electric capacity. The hydroelectric
capacity was 5,830,000 kw and the steam·electric
capacity was 2,970,000 kw. The hydroelectric
generating capacity fluctuated with rainfall and stream
flow, and the available capacity was considerably less
than this peak on a year·round basis.
This was "the industrial heart of Japan"-the
central industrial organism on which the vitality of
Japanese power was wholly dependent. General
Marshall declared that the primary objective of
invasion would be the seizure of this vital area after a
crucial battle on "the plains of Tokyo." General
Eisenhower, too, had recognized a "vital industrial
area" as the crowning objective of invasion: the Ruhr,
which he called "the industrial heart of Germany."
Both these vital industrial complexes were totally
dependent upon electric power and transportation.
Electric power was the life·impulse which caused
those industrial hearts to beat The systems of
transportation constituted the arteries which brought
in the raw material., distributed parts and components,
and delivered the finished products to the military and
civilian consumers. Those industrial hearts and the
flow of their arteries could be stilled by destroying the
sources and availability of electric power and
disrupting transportation. In the war against Germany
and that against Japan the prizes were so great as to
invite our maximum air effort to destroy the electric
power system. Yet in each case, the task was dismissed
as "much too difficult" before all avenues had been
examined. But the importance of the "industrial heart"
as the real source of strength behind the enemy state
and the will and capacity of the enemy nation to
continue the war was recognized by soldiers and
airmen alike. Their objectives were similar; their
methods were different.
The A·2 analysis of 1 942 concluded that electric
power aeneratinll sources in Japan were so numeroUS
that they did not appear to constitute a vulnerable
tar&et system. Again the Survey:
. . . Some 1 350 hydroelectric generating
ltations ( 1 944 capacity 5,819,000 KW) make up
the public utility system, along with 80 steam­
electric stations of significant size (1 944
capacity 2,964,000 KW). There is also a
scattering of private generaung plants, both
hydro and steam, af!iliated with industri 1
. �
enterprises but usually ued to the utlhty system.
Hydroelectric generating stations in Japan would
not, indeed, have been profitable strategic bombing
targets becawe they were large in num�r, small 10
individual capacity, and widely dIspersed 10
mountainous terrain where conditions make accurate
bombing difficult. But the Survey clearly sh\lws that
. steam plants. Thrgets: 24 substations and 4 steam
our intelligence analysis made an error 10 stoppmg
Total peak demand (m 1943) was 5,500,000 kw.
short at this point. The analysts should have conunued
The wartime peak loads of the Important
in depth. The Survey says:
production centers in Japan totaled 3,229,000 kw, or
approximately 60 percent of total peak capaCIty.
The public utility system in Japan . proper,
which accounts for 87 percent of mstalled
capacity and 90 perc�t of energy generation in
the home islands, is hIghly mtegrated, and IS held
together by a nation·wide network o f
, The Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama
transmission lines. Some 60 percent of Japan s
electric power is generated at 60 cycles per
second the remainder at 50 cycles.
AI�ost four·fifths of the electric energy
consumed in the home islands is used in Honshil
and of the remaining one-fifth, the major
po rtion is consumed in Kyushu. Within Honshu
the two principal supply areas, centered around
Tokyo and Osaka, absorb pr�ctically half of the
energy delivered on the maIO Island. Nago:("
accounts for the lions share of the rest. Pre-raid
intelligence on the location and size of electric
power facilities was accurate in the great
majority of � . However, there was a notable
absmee ofanalysis of the relative imporlance and
jimcliotull relations of groups or systems or
jQcilitia, an absence which would have impeded
intelli,ent selection of installations suited to
coordinated attacks. From a map of the
transmission system, an impression is gained that
there is a network of lines and a multiplicity of
substations, providing infinite switching
flexibility. Closer analysis discloses, however,
that the cross-ties and apparent alternate routes
are made up of old, small capacity, lines which
arc of relatively little use if the main lines are out
of ICrvice.
The peak aenerating capacity was divided among
ttIc districtJ of the home islands as follows:
• USSBS J.- Electric Utilitia. p. 6.
80
Hokkaido hydroelectric power was seasonal. The steam-electric damage in the attack of adjacent targets. The US
Island 3. 5% generating plants had to carry about one-third of the Strategic Bombing Survey reported on one such steam
Northern load during the dry season, and by the end of the plant which was near two oil refineries, the Kawasaki
Tohoku Honshu 4.3% winter of 1945, the reservoirs were nearly empty when Steam Power Plant, near Tokyo. It received damage
Kanto (which included rains began to fall and snows began to melt. incidental to night radar bombing of the refineries.
Tokyo-Yokohama) As indicated above, the three principal The summary of this report is as follows:
manufacturing centers of Japan were centered around
Kansai (which included
Central Tokyo, Osaka-Kobe, and Nagoya. (See Generating The Kawasaki Steam Power Plant, located on
Kyoto-Osaka-
69.6% and Transmission System, Central Honshu, Tokyo Bay near Kawasaki, has 7 1 ,500 KW in
Kobe) Honshu
Highlighting Substations. and Steam Electric Plants.) name-plate generating capacity. Main buildings
Chubu (which included
these centers were surrounded and served by two are of concrete construction in two parts, the
Nagoya)
Western "rings" of high�tension transmission circuits - the larger part containing plant power, with coal
Chugoku (which included
Honshu 6.9% outer ring at 1 54 kilovolts and the inner at 66 storage and handling equipment on one side, and
Hiroshima-Kure)
kilovolts. the smaller part is the indoor transformer and
Shikoku The TOkyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama area had a high tension switching station. Its output
Island 3.6% demand of 1 ,000,000 kw and was served by 14
averaged in excess of 1 00 million KWH annually
Kyushu primary substations ( 1 54 kv) and 10 secondary during the first three years of the war. It was 29th
Island 1 3.0% substations (66 kv). One-third of demand was met by 4 in size in Japan and a very important standby
plant for supply of power to the Imperial
generating plants.
Japanese Government Railways, especially
The Osaka-Kobe area had a demand of 900,000
during the dry season when hydro power was
kw and was served by 9 primary substations (154 kv) down.
and 9 secondary substations (66 kv). There was
This plant was never a primary target but was
adequate steam generated capacity to carry the entire damaged in 3 (night) raids on adjacent targets by
The electric energy absorbed in th"';" principal load load in 7 stations. 1lugets: 1 8 substations and 7 steam
the Twentieth Air Force (3 1 5th Wing). On (the
centers was as follows: generating plants.
night of) 12/13 July 1 945, 452 tons were
The Nagoya area had a demand of 450,000 kw and dropped in the entire raid and 4 bombs fell
was served by 4 primary substations ( 1 54 kv) and 8
within the electric generating plant area. On (the
load center 1 ,000,000 kw secondary substations (66 kv). There were 2 steam night of) 25n.6 July 1945, 650 tons were
The Nagoya load center 450,000 kw plants. Targets: 1 2 substations and 2 steam generating
dropped in the entire raid, and 57 bombs fell
The Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto load plants.
979,000 kw within the generating plant area. On (the night
centeI The Survey concluded after careful analysis that
of) 1 n. August 1 945, 1 0 1 7 tons were dropped in
2,429,000 kw destruction of all these substations and steam the entire raid, and 32 bombs fell within the
The Hiroshima-Kure load center 100,000 kw generator plants would cripple these vital industrial generating plant area.
The Kyushu load center 700,000 kw areas. Total targets: 54 substations and 13 steam The principal physical damage was the
generating plants.' complete destruction of coal handling
3,229,000 kw Specifically the Survey stated:
equipment and collapse of the circulating water
Thus 75 percent of available electric power was intake tunnel which put the plant completely out
The destruction of 54 substations and 13 steam of commission. In addition, damage was done to
used in the Tokyo-Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka-Kobe power plants would have deprived Japan of the steam end of No. 3 turbogenerator unit, to
load centers, which should have been recommended
about 5 0 percent of electrical energy generator cables and control bay. Although the
for air attack to isolate them from theIr sources of requirements. This percentage does not,
electrical supply. The only other important load center plant was not in operation at the time of the
however, give the full importance or effect. This damage, the loss of production is equivalent to at
was the Kyushu area, which absorbed 22 perce�t of the curtailment would be in the three areas where the least 50% of one year's normal production of 57
electric load which supported major prodUCtion and largest proportion of heavy war production was million KWH. No attempt at recuperation has
civic centers. performed, and consequently, the economic been made. The vulnerability of steam power
If the destruction of the power substations and importance of such production loss is much plants is fully shown since the destruction of a
steam-power generating stations of central Hons�u greater than the figure of 50% would indicate.
should fail to cause the collapse of the mdUBtnal portion rendered the entire plant inoperative for
str\lCture of Japan and of the Japanese national fabric, a long period of time.
which depended upon those load centers, the Kyushu Effects of Bomb Strikes on Japanese The size, importance, and location had been
load center could also have been disrupted and Electric Power Installations correctly evaluated in intelligence data, but
isolated frorn its source of electric power bringing the damage had not been correctly stated in damage
total disruption of major electric-based industry to 97 Although no electric power facilities were assesm s ent reports.
percent. This additional disruption wo� ld have deliberately attacked by the Twentieth Air Force, a Of significance at this plant is the apparent
ease with which a steam power plant can be
required effective attack of six steam-electrIC plants, number of steam-generator plants received incidental
one hydroplant, and a few substations, in Kyushu. rendered inoperative by a small tonnage per
acre.
Although the hydroelectric system generated the
great majority of the electric power used. in J�P:u" the Unfortunately there does not appear to be any
reservoirs were limited and avaIlabIlIty of ·This tollll of 67 taqet1 � wilh66rOl dllnJptloo of lhc Oc:nn.n 1)'ltem
record of daylight attack of a substation. However
81
I Row of six 20,000 KVA transformers, all destroyed by one HE bomb which hit the end transformer and
I!I
II
Mie substation. Photo USSBS Japanese Electric Utility Repon, p. 1 39.
, Capacity of Forces Available. Would adverse
there is a repon of damage to the Mie Substation
Yolckaichi, near Nagoya, as a result of a night radar
attack on an adja<ent refinery by the 3 1 5th Wing on
the night of 9 July 1945. (See photographs)
The USSBS repons:
Thil. .,.tion was subjected to bombing with
H.E. Bombs on the night of 9 July 1945, at
approximately 2330. Records do not show that
this station was ever a primary target, so
evidently it was damaged during a raid on
Utsube Oil Refinery, which was the primary
target of attack on 9 July 1945. In this raid 61
alc of the Twentieth Air Force dropped 469 tons
of 5OO-lb. general purpose HE bombs. There
were 1 6 hits on this station. The principal
damage was destruction of the entire transformer
capacity, consisting of a total of 6 transformers,
which rendered the station completely
84
inoperative. No production loss was sustained
because of their ability to make substitution by
temporary means through another substation.
Recuperation would require about one year.
Vulnerability of such stations is demonstrated
conClusively by the large and lasting damage
caused by a very few bombs.
One direct hit near the end of the transformer
bank did the damage. This hit was directly beside
a 20,000 KVA transformer and damaged it
beyond repair. The oil was set on fire, and this
enveloped the complete transformer bank and
burned for 1 8 hours. All six transformers were
completely ruined. . . it is evident that the
bombing of a single substation produces no
desirable economic effect and that only by a
combination ofthe destruction of the majority of
substations, together with steam generating
produced fire which destroyed all the others.
Photo USSBS Japanese Electric Utility Repon, p. 1 39.
plants, within an area, can the electric power
supply be effectively destroyed.
Feasibility of Selectin Bombing of
Japanese Electric Power
weather conditions have permitted the necessary visual
bombing of the switching and transformer substations?
The general weather system notwithstanding,
opponunities to bomb the Tokyo side of Japan, where
the major industries were concentrated, did occur in
the spring and summer of 1945. As noted Wiler,
LeMay was able to dispatCh 10 visual bombing attacks
on precision targets in Honshu in the months of April,
May, June, and July. By this time, the Japanese air
force had been greatly weakened by combat, lack of
well-trained replacements, and lack of combat aircraft
resulting from factory destruction coupled with effons
to disperse the industry to save it from systematic
destruction by funher bombing. There remained
vinually no likelihood that Japanese fighters could
stop the air offensive or inflict unacceptable losses on
the XXIst Bomber Command. Hence the precision
daylight attacks could have been shifted from the
85
Japanese aircraft industry to other 1lIr8"ts, as the
USSBS points out, and bombing accuracy could bave
been improved by lowering the bombing a1tilUde­
which LeMay actually directed. Days of visual
bombing from medium altitude should have been
adequate to break the back of the electrical
distribution system.
Almost the entire month of April had been dnoted
to attacks on Kyushu in suppon of the assault on
Okinawa.
These calculations are, of course, not exact. But
even if they were in error by as much as 50 percent, it
still appears to have been feasible to accomplish this
task over a three months period of operations.
Actually, the available force in the XXIst Bomber
Command ill'Cl'NSed markedly in size after May of
1945. The arrival of the Eighth Air Force in Okinawa,
which began in the summer of that year, promised to
swell the B-29 force to formidable proponions indeed.
Although the war was ended with the atomic bombs
before the Eighth entered the fray, the effect of the
Eighth would have been pronounced if the war had
continued to the date planned for the invasion­
November of 1945. The following tables and chans
give an indication of the actual and proposed groWth·
of the B-29 force:
 [II IJIO.)STRlAL PLANTS
30,000 KW OR OVER

• 51[...... EI..ECTRI( PLANT S

lO,OOO KW OR OVER

• Ifl"OROELECTRIC PlANTS

30,000 K W OR OVtA
TAANSIoI/SSION LINES

TRANSMISSION LiNtS

UN()[R 100 1\....

POWER PLANT S UNDER

)0,000 K VI CAJW:ITY

00
'"

GENERATING AN,D
TRANSMISSION
SYSTEM
CENTRAL HONSHU
HIGHLIGHTING STEAM ELECTRIC PLANTS

L[G[NO

[II II'OJST"'AL PLANTS

30,000 K ¥if OR OVER

• .!in..... ELEC.TRIC PLANTS

lIIJ)OO K W OR OYER

• I1tOROEL[CTftIC PLANTS

30,.000 KW OR OYER

TR.\NSMlaSION I..IN[S
0VtA tOO K'II
TRANSMISSION U"[S

UNOf;A lOO K ...

POWER PLANT S UND£A

30,,000 KW CAPl\CITY

SUBSTATIONS

00
'"

GENERATING AND
TRANSM ISSION
SYSTEM
CENTRAL HONSHU
HIGHLIGHTING SUBSTATIONS
 B-Z9I OR H..... Etrec:tb'e Sorties
DaI.
20th A.F. 8th A.F. Total XXth D.C. XXIst D.C. 8th A.F. Total
(Actual) (planned)
April 1944 94 94
May 137 137
133 131 131 547
June 1 33
146 102 102 209
July 146
1 50 145 145 252
Aug. 150
199 199 521
Sept. 163 163
219 279 279 1 669
Oct. 219
262 339 175 5 14 2205
Nov. 262
345 295 492 787 3661
Dec. 34�
3410
447 433 454 887
Jan. 1 945 447
538 457 732 1 1 89 4020
Feb. 538
602 372 2520 2892 15283
Mar. 602
705 3246 3246 1 7492
April 705
730 4226 4226 24285
May 730
878 5243 5243 37542
June 878
979 6168 6 1 68 43091
July 979
3145 3145 21873
Aug, (l5t half) rooo 42 1 042

2752 26401 29153 1 76060

Total Actual 1 000 42 1042

Potential

3200 3200 22400

Aug. (2nd 1ull0 1000 42 1 042
6500 600 7 1 00 49700
Sept. 1000 200 1200
1400 6500 1600 8 1 00 56700
Oct. 1000 400
6500 3500 1 0000 70000
Nov. 1000 600 1 600

22700 5700 28400 1 98800

Total Potential 1000 600 1 600

57553 374800
Grand Total 1600

CuaMdIlll.. Total c..aIn IItl Total

Effectiye Sortiel Toaa of Bo_
Dale
To Date Dropped 10 Dat.
131 547
June 44
July 233 756
378 1008
Aug.
Sept. 577
856
1529
3 1 98
Oct.
Nov. 1370 5403
Dec. 2157 9064
Jan. 45 3044 1 2474
Feb. 4233 16494
Mar. 7125 3 1 777
Apr. 10371 49269
May 14597 73554
June 1 9840 1 1 1 096
July 26008 154187
Aug. (1st halO 29153 1 76059

Total Actual 29153 1 76059

Potential

Aug. (2nd halO 32353 197459

Sept. 39453 248959
Oct. 47553 3 1 0459
Nov.·Total 57553 390959

31.VO OJ. ]A1J.Y"1nWn!) - S3I,UlOS

87
86
 Was it within the capacity of the available strategic
� air power to destroy these targets and produce the
breakdown of Japanese industry, economy, and social
... ... ... t administration and support? The Military Analysis
............
... ... z Division of the USSBS was asked to answer this
S
oJ question. Their answer was, "Yes," and their analysis
. ... ......
:!!i
.. � was based on the following factors:
1
r;: ......... z Tonnage of bombs required "on target" for
� ... � substations: 1 /3 to 1 12 tons per acre for
......
... ... 2 unprotected substations (without roof covers
or blast-walls, as was the case); I to 1 '1. tons
......
... I per acre if the Japanese had decided to protect
their substations (which they did in only a
t very few cases); and I to 1 '1, tons per acre for
" steam generator plants.
...!i Bombing method-daylight visual bombing in
formations of I I aircraft, each bombing from
i 1 8 ,000121 ,000 feet against substations; units
of 33 aircraft against steam plants.
Bombers reaching target-8 8 % of force
! points in order to obtain satisfactory results.
i
dispatched (12% aborts and losses for various
reasons).
�
• Bombing accuracy-37% of bombs within a
:I 1000 foot radius circle from aiming point
... (CEP 1230 feet).
'"" Average B-29 bomb load-I 3,500 pounds.
Average force available for dispatch: 450 B-29s
c
..... during the period April-May-June, 1945 .
" The Military Analysis Division concluded that the
c! destroction of all these targets could be accomplished
in 1200 sorties for the substations and 900 sorties for
,. the steam plants, or a total of 2 1 00 B-29 sorties, which
l included provision for aborts. The Division also
concluded that the available force could accomplish
� the substation task in three operational days, and that
1
two more would be required for the steam plants. This
estimate was based on a 50 percent probability of
success.
I I, therefore, conclude that since visual bombing
weather was available only four days per month on the
b average at this period of the year, it would bave taken
::I
... the entire available force about five to six weeks to
" carry out the eritire task. Since this would have
c
involved only five operating days out of thirty-five to
...::I
� �
forty, there would have been ample opportunity to
carry out the aerial mining campaign at the same time
Ii! through night delivery.
Ii!
N
The principal criticism which might be leveled at
this estimate seems to me to be in the low probability
llYO 0.1 03ddOtiO S8111108 .:10 SNO.L - 'Y.LO.L 3AI.Ly,nlllln:> of success-50 percent. Other force requirements had
been based upon a 90 percent probability. To increase
the factor of probability from 50 to 90 percent would
have involved a multiplication of sortie requirements
by a factor between two and three. This would raise the
sortie requirement to about 6300, if, for the sake of
conservatism, the factor is taken as three. If the same
88
tactics were adopted, this would increase the timespan
to 1 5 to 1 8 weeks, using the entire force for all
available daylight bombing opportunities.
89
Since this timespan is considerable and part of the
available force might have to be employed for other
daylight bombing missions, it might have been
necessary to conduct a part of the task by radar
bombing at night or in had weather. This involves
further speculation and estimation.
Requirements for !HI Percent Probability of
Destrnction of Substations. The substations might be
attacked in daylight, since they would be more
difficult to identify and hence more appropriate for
visual bombing. At the 90 percent probability, this
would require 3600 (3 X 1200 sorties) sorties or 8
days of da�li3!lt operations spread over two months.�
ltequlrements for !HI Percent Probability of Steam
Po_ Plants. The steam power plants were generally
located near prominent bodies of water or on shore­
lines, where radar bombing of such targets was ideally
suited to APQ- 7 radar equipment. If APQ- 1 3
equipment was used , i t would be necessary t o prepare
radar maps and select aiming points or offset aiming
Daylight bombing accuracy (including radar
bombing) of the 58th and 73rd Wings averaged 36
percent hits within 1000 feet of the aiming point. This
is an average CEP of about 1250 feet. Specific
accuracy data for Twentieth Air Force radar bombing
against specific targets is not available in adequate
quantity, but the radar CEP from high altitude using
the APQ- 1 3 equipment was probably approximately
double that of the visual bombing, or about 2500 feet.
The AN/APQ-7 "Eagle" radar bombing equipment,
on the other hand, produced a very different picture.
The APQ-7 CEP was at least as accurate as visual
bombing. The CEP in the only available record for
APQ-7 bombing was 850 feet, through overcast at
night. The effect as a whole was at least as accurate as
visual bombing, considering the lower bombing
altitude (15000 ft.) for the APQ-7, at night.
The antenna was the key to the APQ-7 radar
bombing system. The antenna was a straight structural
beam 1 6 feet long, mounted on the lower part of the
fuselage. It mounted 250 dipoles and used electronic
scan rather than rotational scan. It produced a much
finer degree of resolution, but it surveyed only a 60
degree forward sector. It had a .4 degree width.
beam
Was tbe Strategy of Selective Target
Bombing a Feasible Alternative?
With good radar maps , well-established aiming
points and offset aiming points, and intensive
training, the CEP at 1 8,000 feet should be reduced to
perhaps 2,000 feet for the B-29 using the
AN/APQ.. 1 3 . The average accuracy showed a CEP of
about 1 250 feet using optical sighting and bombing in
formation salvos. This accuracy could be measurably
improved by further reducing the bombing altitude to
9,000 or 1 0,000 feet, as was the actual case in the
incendiary night urban attacks. Finally, there is an
\\
advantage in bombing effects derived from multiple, The destruction of the electric
individual aircraft sightings, rather than formation power system might have required
bombing on a single leader.' The combination of some 6,500 to 9,500 sorties. 9,500
these effects might have reduced the radar bombing The destruction and continued
error to the vicinity of 1 800 feet to take a conservative disruption of the rail transportation
flgU1'e. This would have established a requirement for system was calculated to require 933
about 3200 sorties for the stearn plants. sorties for initial destruction and
A CEP of 1 800 feet would provide 20 percent of 3,732 sorties to maintain disruption
bombs within a 1000 foot radius circle, as compared for four months, for a total of 4,385
with the experience of daylight visual bombing which sorties. 4,385
averaged 1 250 foot CEP and showed 37 percent of Aerial mining actually took 1 ,785
bombs within the 1 000 foot radius. To attain the same sorties. 1 ,785
expectancy by APQ- J 3 radar bombing as was Attacks on aircraft and engine
expected from visual bombing, or APQ-7 bombing, factories took 2,838 sorties. 2,838
the force would have to be increased by the ratio of Total number of sorties required
37120 or a factor of 1 .85 . This would set the force for these systems-about 1 8,500
requirement for 90 percent probability of destroying
the steam plants by radar bombing using APQ- 1 3 as An alternative air strategy of selective target attack
3200 x 1.85 or about 5900 sorties fOl' 90 percent appean to have been quite feasible, and it would have
probability of success. After the arrival of the 3 1 5th been far less costly in civilian livea. It might have taken
W'mg with the APQ-7 radar, the requirement would be a little longer since some parts of it might have had to
2700 sonies. await the arrival of the 3 1 5th Wing with its APQ-7
If half the available force (225 B-29s) were used on radar. But final results would not have been delayed
alternate nights, leaving the remainder for aerial more than a month or so.
mining and other tasJcs, it would take (59001225) x 2
or 52 days of operations with the APQ-J 3 , or 24 days Alternative Grand Strategy in the Padfic
after arrival of the APQ-7. This time, added to the
daylight visual operations against the substations, There was an intense concern with "time," caused
requiring 3600 sorties and 8 days, would give a total by the arbitrary selection of a November invasion date.
time of 60 days for the APQ-J 3 or 32 days for the But there really should have been no limitation on
APQ- 7. So it would appear that the entire operation strategic operations dictated by shortage of time. Time
was feasible over a period of two months before the was working to our advantage. The combination of sea
arrival of the 3 1 5th or one month thereafter. It would blockade, aerial mining, and strategic bombing was
have required about 9500 sorties (5,900 for the steam bringing Japan nearer to inevitable disaster with every
plants; 3,600 for the substations with 90 percent day that passed.
probability of success) prior to arrival of the 3 1 5th. General Arnold, General Spaatz, and General
The entire operation would have required 6300 sorties LeMay all opposed dropping the atom bombs if the
with use of the APQ-7, or about 40 percent of the in_ion of Japan was postponed or abandoned. They
sorties actually flown by the XXIst Bomber Command were convinced that the air attacks on Japan had
in May, June, and July. already literally destroyed the means by which Japan
The XXIst Bomber Command actually flew 26,400 could continue the war. They believed that time would
sonies. Obviously there was ample capacity to destroy bring surrender without an invasion. At Potsdam,
these selected target systems. It would have required General Arnold continued to oppose the use of the
only 70 percent of the actual sorties flown by the atomic bomb, even though the grand strategy still
XXIst Bomber Command through mid-August of affirmed the intention to invade and the date for the
1945, and only 32 percent of the total sorties assault was only about three months away. Presumably
potentially available through November 1945. There he hoped that the acceleration in the bombing assault
would have been ample force left over to destroy other caused by the advent of the B-29-equipped Eighth Air
Force would bring about coIlapse before November.
selected target systems, as well as the 66 cities, if it had
been necesaary to reson to urban attack to force The Strategic Bombing Survey, in evaluating the
war in the Pacific, found, "Even without the atomic
surrender-itself a very doubtful requirement.
To summarize the requirements for selective target bombing attaclc , air supremacy over Japan could have
destruction: exerted sufficient pressure to bring about
unconditional surrender and obviate the need for
invasion."
More specifically, in it's Final Report the US
• A ItUcIy of bexnbina requircmenll to dellroy . Iteam tenmltlna swian in Getman)'
by the Elabtb Air Foree lllin, fonnatioa aim bornblna u 1Xl/n)lfed 10 individual lilhtin, Strategic Bombing Survey stated:
-ad Ihdividual airplane saI_ indlcatel that IS·airplane form.tion a1_ rcqWrt; aboul
fivetilMl. IMaY airplane rel_ _ inclividual airpMnetilbtil\&l and al_toobu.in the
arne probability (9O':f,) of the .ame number of hil.l, lllina lbe arne CEP (H2O 1\). . . . it is the Survey's opinion that certainly
90
prior to 3 1 December 1 945, and in all
probability prior to I November 1945, Japan
would have surrendered even if the atomic
bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had
not entered the war, and even if no invasion had
been planned for or contemplated.
It seems to me, in retrospect, that not only were the
atomic bombs and invasion unnecesaary, but the urban
incendiary attacks, which were more devastating by far
than the two atomic attacks, could almost certainly
have been avoided or their quantity greatly reduced if
primary reliance upon selective bombing had been
pursued, even if the end of the war were slightly
postponed.
Although the atomic bombs need not have been
dropped at all, so far as Japanese coIlapse was
concerned, they served a crucial purpose that had not
been contemplated at the time: they authenticaied the
restraining influence of American air power in
holding back the Russian domination of Western
Europe after the war, when Russian surface forces
were immensely powerful and European and
American surface forces had melted away into
insignificance. If the two bombs had not been dropped
and their power demonstrated, Western European
nations today might bear a strong resemblance to the
satellite states of Eastern Europe.
Conclusions
This discussion is not intended to show that the
decision to switch to the urban incendiary attacks was
faulty. Quite the contrary. Under the pressure of time
there, the Air Force probably had no alternative. And
there may have been factors bearing on the decision of
which I am unaware. Given the circumstances as they
existed, including a dedication to grand strategy based
on invasion, the decision seems to have been quite
sound, and the effects were decisive.
But I do think that the grand strategy was at fault,
that the invasion should not have been considered the
sine qua non of victory. Japan was headed for
inevitable collapse, without any invasion. And I
believe that Japan could have been rendered helpless
without the extensive urban destruction.
The question whether grand strategy should have
been changed to reliance upon air power for victory is
academic and pointless. It certainly could not have
been changed by the Army Air Forces alone, though
they tried. But there is another point which is
important. Was American strategic air doctrine
sound? Which air method was beat?
The turn to incendiary area attack and the
devastating atomic bomb did not necessarily prove that
selective strategic bombing sbould be abandoned as a
method for conducting strategic air warfare. Selective
bombing was decisively effective against Germany. In
my judgment, it could have been decisively effective
91
against Japan. If, in the future, mutual fear should
inhibit the unrestricted use of nuclear weapona
selective destruction by nonnuclear weapons ma y
again be the arbiter that produces "fatal weakening';
and hastens the peace agreement
In retrospect, I wonder if it was really necessary to
capture Okinawa. Perhaps it was, but not necessarily
for the strategic purpose that dominated the
operation-as a jumping-off base for invasion of the
Japanese home islands. Probably it was worth the coot
as an added base for strategic air operation•.
The Eighth Air Force operating from Okinawa
would have more than equaled the striking power of
the Twentieth, since it was much closer to the vital
targets in Japan. But Okinawa was captured as a
jumping-off base for invasion. If the inVasion was not
absolutely essential to victory-and it does not appear
to have been-then there is some question as to the
necessity for the Okinawa campaign. It was Dot
essential to the prosecution of the sea blockade, the
aerial mining, or the strategic bombardment It can be
justified simply as insurance by providing bases for the
additional strategic air power.
Actually the invasion of Okinawa caused the
temporary diversion of nearly all the power of the
XXIst Bomber Command for the entire month of
April in preparation for and suppon of that operation.
This diversion came at a most inopportune time from
the standpoint of the strategic air offensive.
Criteria for Force Employment_ Ten years before
this climactic assault on Japan, at the Air Corps
Thctical School, I proposed three basic criteria under
which the employment of armed forces for suppon of
national purpose and national policy might be
analyzed:
Acquisition of enemy territory with intention to
control;
Forced acquiescence (better described as
"compeIlance") to make an enemy accept and
conform to our policies and aims;
Defense of the homeland and its sources of
power.
I think this approach still has merit as a basis of
evaluating military requirements and options in reprd
to national purpose.
Invasion of the Japanese home islands was not an
imperative requirement Going back to the principles
and precepts on which AWPD-I and AWPD42 were
based, it is apparent that, in the case of Japan, invasion
was simply a form of "compeIlance," not an end in
itself. We had no desire permanently to acquire
Japanese territory. If this had been our aim, then
invasion would have been a fundamental necessity.
But this was not our aim. We had no desire to
dismember the Japanese nation at home. What we
wanted to do was to impose acquiescence to our war
aims and remove the menace of Japanese aggression.
We needed to exert a compelling force to this end, and
such compellance could be imposed by sea blockade
and air bombardment as well as by invasion. To h."
sure occupation by ground forces on a temporary basIS
whil� civil order was being reestablished under
favorable terms would have been necessary, as indeed,
it transpired. But forceful invasion was just one of
several alternative methods of "compellance." Nor
was "unconditional surrender" essential to our war
aims. Assured control would have sufficed. Admiral
Leahy came closest to being right.
The destruction of these cities and the immense loss
of life of Japanese civilian population were in no sense
an end-objective of the US G�vernmen� or. of the
strategic air offensive. The ulttmate obJecttve was
enforced capitulation of the Jap",,:ese govern�ent. The
loss of life and the immense CapItal destructton were
means toward enforcing capitulation. Tltis aim was
achieved through the destruction of �e cities,. but the
. First Phase
wholesale destruction of those Clttes entaIled an
unwelcome burden of reconstruction after the war,
and the excessive loss of life could not be compensated
at all. If the capitulation could be eoforced at a I�
cost in life and property, then such an alternattve
approach would certainly have been preferable.
The Atomic Bomb. The question of using the
atomic bomb caused much soul-searching. As noted
earlier at Potsdam President Truman asked the
individual opinions of his principal advisors­
military, political, and scientific-whether they
favored dropping the bomb. One by one they
responded in the affirmative with the single, Important
exception of the man whose forces would have to do it,
namely, General Henry H. Arnold, Commanding
General Army Air Forces and Air Member of the
Joint chiefs of Staff. General Arnold questioned the
need on the ground that the Japanese had already
suffered defeat and would have to acknowledge it.
Japan was mortally wounded and bleeding to death.
Time would make the wounds more lethal and no
miracle would offer hope for her future. Only
capitulation would staunch the flow.
But the problem was more subtle than that. There
was the need not only of convincing the Japanese, but
the United States Army as well. The atomic bomb was
needed not only to convince the Japanese that further
resistance was futile, and thus to save great numbers of
Japanese lives through a cessation of hostilities; it was
needed also to convince the American Army that
invasion was not needed, and thus to save great
numbers of American lives that would be needlessly
lost on the beaches and battlefields of the Japanese
home islands. Nothing short of the atomic bombs
would divert the single-minded determination of the
US Army. If it was to be invasion or the bomb, he
preferred the bomb.
''The homb" ,may not have been needed to bring
defeat to Japan, but it was needed to save the Army
from its obsession with invasion, and its demonstrated
92
power would be needed after the war to deter Russian
domination of Europe. ..
War Aims. One of the fundamental flaws in our_
grand strategy was failure to grapPle with and define
. United States.
, our national purposes and obJecttves. � I noted �ly
in this memoir, the Joint StrategIc Committee
probably should have tackled that thorny challenge as
its first move. Grand strategy should be geared to
national purpose.
Grand Strategy Revised in Retr�specl •. The
strategic air offensive against Japan, carned out m the
. (3) Conduct of an effective strategic air war
context of the Allied grand strategy, w� a magmfi'7"t
and decisive accomplishment. But, lIke everythmg
else it could have been done better.
I� a different grand strategy it might have been
equally decisive and perhaps more efficIent. Such an
alternative overall grand strategy for the co�duct �f the
whole war might have had the followmg dImenSIOns.
I. Strategic offensive against Hitler's Germ.any to
bring about "fatal weakening" and collapse, WIth
. including supplementing the sea blockade by aerial
( 1 ) A sustained and unr��ltttng aIr offenSIve
against the sources of Germml: military' econ�mlci and
. and repair facilities and ports, and destroying Japanese
social strength through selecttve bombmg of.
. land transportation systems;
(a) The German aircraft engme mdustry
(b) The German electric power industry
(c) The German transportatio� �ems
. (e) Petroleum storage and refineries;
(d) The German oil and .ch�m�cal mdusu;'es
(e) The German antIfnctlOn beanng
industries-coupled with
(I) Air combat to defeat the German fighter
forces.
(2) Provision for invasion of the Conti�ent after
completion of the strategic air offensIve, If thIS should
prove necessary, and subsequent defeat of German
ground forces, or
. . , (d) invasion if all else failed.
(3) Occupation of Germany If the aIr offenSIve
caused collapse of military power or produced
surrender. .
II. Initial defensive operations in the P�clfic to
curb the expansion of the Japanese aggressIOn and
preserve base areas.
. Europe. The similarity is, of course, suspect. Both
III, Priority allocatton of resources to forces
engaged in the European war.
Second PIWM
As soon as victory in Europe could be assured,
development of forces for the w�r against JaF. and
initiation of such military operatIons for regammg or
securing essential base areas as could be undertaken
,
without impairing the success in Europe, co�pled WIth
intensive sea operations against Ja�ese shlppmg and
the Japanese navy.
Third PIWM
On defeat of Hitler, transfer of primary resources
and priorities to the Pacific for the defeat of Ja�
primarily by sea blockade and selectIve aIr
bombardment. More specifically to complete, such of
the following as had not been accomplished m phase
two:
( 1 ) Principal thrust across the Central Pacific to
defeat sea forces; to capture the Marianas, Okinawa,
and Iwo Jima as air bases for the strategic air offensive;
and capture of sea bases essential to effective
prosecution of a sea blockade and control of essential
sea areas. Japanese forces overseas to be cut off from
the home islands and left to die or give up for lack of
sustenance.
(2) Conduct of an effective sea blockade of the
Japanese home islands, including sinking or capture of
Japanese ships.
against Japan to produce "fatal weakening" and bring
about the collapse of effective Japanese resistance and
to undermine the civil and social structure of the state,
through selective air attack against:
, (a) The Japanese air force, through
destruction of the Japanese aircraft engine and
airframe industry;
(b) The Japanese electric power industry;
(c) The Japanese transportation systems,
mining of home waters and air attack of shipbuilding
(d) The Japanese steel industry, through
destruction of coke ovens;
(f) The Japanese food resources by
destruction of fertilizer chemicals,
(4) Preparation for
(a) incendiary attacks of Japanese urban
areas, if this should become necessary;
(b) atomic attack of Japanese urban areas, if
this should prove necessary;
(c) occupation, if Japan surrenders;
Secondary effort: operations in the Southwest
Pacific to isolate large bodies of Japanese troops, and
impose heavy casualties.
The proposed air strategy for Japan bears an
interesting resemblance to that of AWPD-I for
proposals stem from the same basic concepts
developed at the Air Corps Tactical School.
Any serious consideration of this speculation, and
any derivation of lessons must, of course, take into
account the circumstances in which the war was
fought. Those circumstances include:
I . Security of the American homeland. America
was in no danger at any time, There was no threat to
the American people and no extemal leverage against
93
the civil will to persist; only the leverage of domestic
impatience. The industrial machine was intact and
unhampered. There was no need for air defense of the
2. We had time in which to recover and react. Our
allies held the enemy at bay while we armed.
3. There was drain upon the German economy.
The Germans were fighting a major war on the Eastern
Front. The effectiveness of the American strategic air
offensive was conditioned by the strain imposed upon
German industry by the war with Russia, and later by
large-scale operations in Western Europe and the
Mediterranean, But presumably this would have
continued, even without the American invasion of
Normandy, and the decisive effectiveness of the air
offensive was not dependent upon the Normandy
invasion.
4, Isolated insufficiency of Japan. Japan was an
island empire with insufficient resources at home to
support the war and the social structure of the country.
This did condition the effectiveness of the strategic air
offensive.
Finally, in considering the effects of our incendiary
attacks as compared with selective bombing, we must
recognize a concurrent effect that is most unwelcome
but none the less real. Incendiary destruction of great
cities has had a powerful and redundant effect upon
the US Air Force. American civilians have forgotten
the compelling effectiveness of selective bombing
against Germany. They have forgotten, if they ever
knew, that Germany was brought to the brink of defeat
by selective air attack with very few civilian losses.
They remember only the slaughter of a million
civilians in Japanese cities. This has engendered a
reaction that is more powerful and debilitating against
the US Air Force than the accumulated efforts of the
German and Japanese air forces. That civilian
reaction may cripple the US Air Force by shackling
the strategic air offensive entirely-whether or not it is
dedicated to selective bombing-and it may deny the
United States its most effective means of exercising
"compellance" in just causes. Actually, if we are
denied the effective application of strategic air power
using selective bombing, we will have no means of
exerting strategic effect whatever, short of massive
nuclear exchange. If that crippiing effect is to be
avoided, the American public must be better informed
on the power and effectiveness of conventional
weapons, selective bombing, as a decisive means of
applying "compellance," as well as the deterrent
power of both nuclear and conventional air power and
the need for air and space defense.
 A P P E N D IX A

ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS

95
 US
CHAING - BRITISH
KA�SHEK CHEFS OF COMBINED JOINT CHIEFS

I
OF STAFF

I
STAFF COM CHEFS OF STAFF

I
WEDEMEYER
•
US FORCE
MOUNTBATTEN
•
SAC
SEA
I _
MacARTHUR

CINC
SOWESPAC
I
I
ARNOLD

CG
I
20th AF

HARMON
CINC
POA
1
NIMITZ
•

ri J�
PEARSE • •
DEP 20 , AAF
AF I POA CG Army

I
CG
fol Air FOrCes­
POA
. Log
G ��
�
C15
I CG Eastern --------....-
.., ----...
.
I
A ir Command •
� � L
CHENNAUL'" DAVIDSON· La MAY HANfELL HALE HOOVER
• • • • C�M
XXlst 7th AF
14th AF 10th AF XXth BC BC • FOR AR

I ; - - -�
,
1- - - I
....

I I H
Vllth
II
Vllth
I
MARINE
73 313 314 315 DEPOT
WINGS 58
FC BC AIR
O'DONNELL DAVIES POWER ARMSTRONG MOORE LANDON

COMMAND, CONTROL, AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

TWENTETH AIR FORCE
Januar, 1945
.Responalbla for AIr Defense of 8-29 bases
•• Support of B-29s-Marlanas
Responslble for Depot
•••R..po.... for Depot Support of B-29s-XXth Bomber Command

!IJ\\""" "

,
US
JOINT CHEFS OF STAFF
i

I
I� - , � -- - I
MacAtthur - Sp,at�
. . Nimitz
C.III C -SWPAC ..
USASTAF CINC-POA
Ken�ey
I
�
FAR EA T AI" �! Giles

�.
C/. .....

... ......mlth
. W�lte Wi!Iu:ead T....-·
Doolittle
13th 7th 5th •
'" AIR F AIR I" ' AIR I" 8th
....
AIR FORe£;
I I I I I -� - r � 1 I - - .,.---,
500th 3rd 58th
.�
I • • •
73rd 313th 314th 315th 7!/1 GUAM 8-29
C G · -- RS WING WING WING
316th 8-29 STRAT
WING WING FTR AIR WING WING WING FTR
COMO DEPOT
Tlnl,n GLI�m Tlnlen WING
Salpan Tlnlan Guam Guam IwoJlma Guam Okinawa

US ARMY AIR FORCES IN THE PACIFIC

US ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN THE
PACIF'lC
AS OF 15 August 1945

.509th Composite (Atomic) Group

 THE BOEING B-Z9 SUPERFORTRESS

Test Specifications

Power Plants: Four Wright R-3350 -23 1 8 cylinder air-cooled radial

engines rated at 2200 horsepower each.
Armament: Twelve .50 caliber machine guns in power turrets. One
20mm cannon in tail turret. Bomb loadings:
4-4000 Ib bombs, or
8-2000 Ib bombs, or
1 2- 1 000 Ib bombs, or
40- 500 Ib bombs, or
50- 300 Ib bombs, or
80- 100 Ib bombs.
Maximum speed 365 mph at 25000 ft.
Long Range Cruise 220 mph
Service ceiling 3 1 850 ft.
Range-Max. 5830 miles
Weight, empty 69,6 1 0 Ibs.
A P P E N D IX B Weight, loaded 132,000 Ibs.
Span 1 4 1 ft. 2 '/, in.
Length 99 ft.
THE B-29 TEST SPECIFlCATIONS
Radar APQ- 1 3 of
APQ-7
Crew Ten
Cost $639, 1 88
Production 3863
Stripped version with AN/APQ-7 Radar bombsight was designated B-29B (31 5th
Wing)

99
98
 Location of Japanese Airframe and Engine Factories

MillUbishi I plant (I) (airframe) near N"i0ya (2/3 of prod.)

I plant (2) (engines) near Nagoya (1/2 of prod.)
I plant (3) (airframe) near Napno
I plant (4) (airframe) near llIkaoka
I plant (S) (airframe) near Suzuka
I plant (6) (airframe) near Kapmijakara
I plant (7) (airframe) near Inami
I plant (8) (airframe) near Obu
I plant (9) (airframe) near Till
I plant (10) (airframe) near Okayama
I plant (1 1 ) (airframe) near- Yawata
I plant (12) (airframe) near Yokkaichi
I plant (13) (airframe) near Narugo
I plant (14) (airframe) near Musaahino
APPEN DIX C I plant (IS) (airframe) near Kumamoto
I plant (16) (engine) near Kyoto
I plant (17) (engine) near Shizuoka
E X T R A C T S F R O M U N I T E D S TA T E S I plant (18) (engine) near Napno
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY REPORTS I plant (19) (engine) near Hiroshima
I plant (20) (engine) near Ogaki
I plant (21) (engine) near Fukui
The Japanese Aircraft Industry I plant (22) (engine) near Koromo
I plant (23) (engine) near Nogata
The Japanese Electric Power Industry
MillUbiahi was the industry's most prominent engine producer (38% of combat engines)

Kawasaki I plant (74) (airframe & engine) Akashi

I plant (2S) (airframe & engine) near Kapmijakara
I plant (26) (airframe & engine) near Nagoya
I plant (27) (engines) near Osaka-Knhe
Nakl\jima 3 plants (28) (airframe) near Tokyo (80% fJgbter)
I plant (29) (airframe) near Nagoya
2 plants (30) (engines) near Tokyo
I plant (3 1 ) (en8lnes) near Nagoya

Nakajima produced 30% of all aircraft engines

These primary and vital airframe and engine facilities were concentrated in the central
manufacturing areas in the Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama area, and in the Nagoya-Kyoto-Tsu area.

(See accompanying map)

101

1 00
 IlxmalT Z.-Hlec',,", ,eneration rC'01Irce'
LIST 01' POWER STATIONS OF 30,000 KW CAPACITY AND OVER-HYDRO ELECTRIC POWEn STATJONS-UTILITY

Order •
t.r.�g:-- Lo�;d"
.... ...
_ DO.
; ::
Na...e ot power
�:tc��r
�I �
.. map. OWDe1' alation LoaUOD

•
1 • • _ ; . NJ�D BaModeD . _ ShiDaDO&aw.- • • • • • • 186,000 NUpta·KtD Nakanoauma'lub Tomanl.ura - -3'·
-- 1i8-W
·
•
. I• • • • • . _do
. �• • • • • • • • • • KurolM-pwa #3._ • • • 81,000 Tor.ma.left 8bllDonUkawa-pD . Uebl'....· 10·00' 1:'17-30'
mura . . . . . . . . . : . . . . • . . • . . . • . . . . • . . . • .
· . a. . . . . . .� . . • .. f• • • • • • Saku : -• • • • • • . • • • • 12,700 01lll....
l ·1I:•• Seta-IuD Kltataebltt.na-lIIura • • .. .... 13'*
•• • • • • ' • • do . . . . . � . . . . . .. Komald . . . . . , • • , . . 12,000 To,.ma-hD Blcuhltonaml-pa. mcuhl,.- 30*3&' l3T*
maml-mur• • • • • . _ • . • _ . . • _ . • • . • • • • • • • • •
I. . . . . .. . do • • • • • • • • • • . • Kurobeca.ll #2_ . . . . 72,000 Toyama-lteD 8hlmODUkawa-ruD UeblJ'&ma· 88*"G' 137*40'
mura • . • • • • . • • • • :• . . • � ..• • • • • ; • • • • • • • •
e_ • • • • • • do • • •.. . _ _ • • • • • Olp.a • • • . _ _ . " -. $2.200 8hlsuoka·ken Halura,CUD Kamluwabe-liluf. . 35*0G' l3S* 08'
T • • • • _ . _ do • • • • • • • • • • • • Aklmoto ..•••••••• 82,000 FukullIlma-ke. Yama'lun A.suDia-mun. h• • , 3T*4O' 140*
•• • , • • _ .do • • • • • • • _ . • • • Ttuk.baru . • • • • • • • 80,000 lily.gllt-keD Nlahluaukl'&,UD Morotloka'Dlura 32*30' 131*18'
.. . . . . ... do . . . ..... .... Toyoml .· . . . . . . .. : . . . 68,.00 NIII'Ata·kea HlI...�lkambar.·PD TO)'OIDI· 37*fO' 131*30"
mur• . . • • . • • • • • . . . . . . • • • • • • . • . . • • . • • •
10. • • • • • .do • • • • • • • • • • • • Y••apwara . • : • • • . M,ooo Toy.ma·keD ShlmonUka..a·pn AlmolO·mura 36*-118' 137*36'
11. • . . . . .do
12 . • . . . . . 410
• • . • • . • • • . . • To)·ama . • • . • • • : • • ;
• . • • • • • • • • • • Ya.uoka . o·• • � • • • • • .
&',000 To,·lma·kf'D HI,..hltoDarul-,uD Talra-mura
&2,600 Xa,ano-ken Shlmolna-IUD Yuuoka-mar•. . • •
3.·3"
36*23'
13j-
137';00'
18 • • •.• . ),fIDllt..,. ot TraDI- SellJu. • • . � . • • ., • . • • · 152..000 NUlala-keD Nakauonuma-cun s.DJu:�aellj _ . 31*10' 13S*4&'
. portatlo• • • • • . •
1. . . • • • NlpPOD HalllOdea. � Kuo.. •. • . . • . • • • • • 151,800NUpla·ken HII••hlkllmbara·eua Ryok.DOte- 37*41' 138*28'
.
mura • . . . . . . . . : • . • . , • • , . . . . ... . . . . . . . .
;. .:
.
.
11. : .. . . . dO, . : . . � . . . . . .
'
. . . .. . . .; ..3*40'
;
Ur)'U 151,000Hokkat"o, KllmJk.",.·cun FureD·mura . � • • • • . 1·U*30"
1' • • . . . . 410 . . . . . . . . ;: • • Kanlder. . . . . . . :... . 50,000 Tonm.·keD N.J.-IUD BlHOlrt·mur•• . • . • • • • • . 38*21' 131*10'
IT . . . � � . . �
. . . . -. . . . . . . . lu••Ublro
.
#1 . :. : . 50,000 Fukushlm.-ken Kaw.numa-pD . . NJpp..bl- 31*33' 138* 58'
mara . . • . • • • . , • • . • • • • • • . . . . : . . • . . . • • •.
. . do 7 *26'
.
>- 1. . . . . . ......... ... 01. . . . ·. : . . . . . :..· • • • 48,000 Gltu·ken Ena-lUn Ulruk."a-mura . • • • , , ,' • • • 31l*30' . 13
I'. ; . . . . : dO •...••••.••• Obara • . : • • . .. • • . . . 4&.000 Tor_m.·keD HllUbltoDaml'lUn KamltaJr.- 3S* 2�'. 138*M'

t -20. . . . . . .410 . . . . . . . . . . . . . Yomlkakl 01?

mar• • • • , • • . . . • . . . • • . . • . . • . . . . • � . • • . .
�
.
. . . . . .; • • • 42,1 N.l!'ano·kea Ntsbteblkum.'C'UD Yomlkakl- 38" G' 137*33"
z . 21� • • , • •. do
. • . . • • • • • • • . KIUa,I • • • . • . • : • • : 40,600
marA . . . . . ._ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ . . . . , • . • . . •
Gltu-ken Kamo·,an Iljl·mura . . . . . . • . . . • . :. as*30' 127*20'

(j 22. • • • •
28 . • • • •
• •do
• • • • • '.' • . • • • Ka8Umluw• . . . . • . •
. . 410
. . • • • • . • • • • • Nakabup.a #1 . . • .
3.,000 N_pno·ken Mln.mJuuml-lun ..\.Zuml-mara. •
38.150 NlIc.t.·ken Nat_uonuma'lua Atlnan·mura . •
80*10'
30*00'
131*"0'
138*"0'
do
-
24. • • • • •
>
•• . . . . . . . . . . . . Sbln'o . . . . . . .. . . . . . 38,100 FukDlhlma·ken Ka..anum.·�a Shlnco·mura 31*40' 139*50"
•. • • . . . • do
. . . • • • • • . . . . Iloral . . . • • • • • • • • • • 38,600 lo""ukushlma-kf!D Date--�n Tatiukoram"-Dlur.
• 3j*.fO' 140*30'
18 . ; . . . NIPPOn Keh:lnllOtu FnJlca-"a #1 . . • • • . • 38,200 YaJllanashl-ken Nlablyat.euablro--llUI OkocbJ- 3&*3&' 130 * 10'
Q IT • • : • • Nlp�.D. Hut.Odea. . IUne7Ama
mura . . . . . . • • • . . . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • � • . •
3T,Hio 'GUu-ken Kamo,CUD Wa�bl-mur•• • • • • • • • . . •
Z
• •, . • . • . , "·W 137*05'
21• • • • � Sblmota.tl . ; . . . . . . . To('hill-ktrn Shlo),Il'JOn Jl'ujt••ra-mar• . h ' • •
:: :::: : :::. : : : �: : ::::.� : �::':a-:�� : :.: : : � : :
• . do . . . . . : . . . . .. . 88.500 3S*4O' 140*

..: . ..
. 3G,000
15.000
r.mall".hl·ken KJtnt.euru·,un I..ao·mura • • •
Nqano·lrea �Ishleblkuma-cun "-pm.bu-
3&*38'
38*46"
139*015'
13T*4O'
mac:ld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . .
z 11 . . . . . .� do ' ; ' ; � " ;'" ' ' J IY:....hl�·#2 .... . �.ooo Fu..knahlma-ke� K.1Io·aDluaa·pD Nlppuhl· 3T*33' . 139*0S'

tC U. . . . . . 1l
. . 110 • • • • • • • • '.' .-: 8 bI UI.... . . . . . . . .
mura • • • • . , ; , . • • • • . . . . • . . . . . . • ... • . . • •
32,000 Kyoto-'u KUH-pn If.killhlma-mura . . • . • • • • M*A2' 135*00'

CL 13 . � . . . . :dO . . . . . . . : . •.•. • UJl . . . . . . .: . . . ... . . . 32,000 K70to-tu KU.�lUa Ujl·ma�hI . . • • • , ; .. . . . . . . . :W *4,t 135*48"
14 . . . . . do 4
1 0* 40'
..:
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . Obonal • • : . . : . . . . . ·• 31,500 Aklta·ken Semboku·cun Obona!·mut'a . . • • . • • 39"-110'
as . . . " . . do . . • . . • • • • • • . Bllablm.eIIl • • • . • _ 31,300 GUll-keD yot.hlll:l·CUD lI'uDatsn·m.ebL . . • • • • • 38*30' 131*17'
-:t 38 • • • • . . . do • • • • . • • • • • • • [n.w••.blro #4. . • • • 30,&00 Fukushlma·ken Yllma-lUn Kom.,ala·mllr• . • 37*30' , ....
3T . . . . . "do . " . . . . . _ . . . )tnk",,·. . . . . . . . . . . 30.000 To)·anm·k",n X.minUkawa-cun Orama·mur•• • 30*35' 131*30'
88. . . •. . .do . '. ' ., . . • • . , . Kaw.be • . . . . • . . . . • 30,000 Gltu·ken Kamo-,an Kawabe-maeht . • • . • . . • • 3&*30' 131*03"
19 • • , . • • . do . . • . • • • • • • . • OrodOIIl... < #2 • . • . • 30,000 Mirasaki·ken BI,aa:hlmorolau·,uD Tak.olta· 31*56' 13t*15'
muhl ..... ..........................

8TBAM.ELEC!'RIC POWER 8TATION8-UTILITY-30,000 KW CAPACITY AND OVER

1 • • • • • �!ppon Bauodeu • • Am.....kl #1. . . . . . 318.000 R;yoco·kea Amqa1l8kl·shl Suehlro·�bo . . . • . . 34*40'" 135*20'
2 • . , • • . . 410 . , • • • • • • • . • , ARl&aaaakl #2 . • . . . . 300,000 flyoco-ken .\ma,aukl·1Ihl Sue-hlro-ebo . . . • . . 34*"0' 136*25"
8. • • . . . . do . • . . • • . , . . . . Thruml . . . • • • • • . . 178JWO K.n.,awll·lr:en K.weaakl..hI Okawa-ebo . . • . 3:1*36' 130*"0-
•. • • • • . .do
• . • . .' . . . . . . . Am.....ld·lDaft • • • 147,000 Hyorn·k�n Arna,..akl..hl HIJUhlh.ma-eho 3"*40' 135-26'
.
I . . . . . . do . • • • . . : . • • • • "\!elko . • . . . : • • • • • • 138.000 Alchl·ken N.py.-1Ihl Mln.to·ku Hltofune-cbo 35*]0' 130*151\'
e. . . . . . . do . . . . . . . . . . . . 1'0bIlU . . . , . . . . . . . . 133.000 FlIkuoka-ken Tobatll·shl N.k"baru . • . • , . • • . 33*&6' 130-50"
.
T . . . •• .
• .1:10 . . . . . :. . . . . X",OY• • • . . • • • • • • • 129.000 Aleht·ku N.COT.·.hl Mln.to-ku Qe·maehl . . . 30"*10' 130*55'
II • • • • • • • 410 • . • . . . • • • • • • llln.to • • • . . • • • • • • . 102,000 Fukuoka-ken OmutA·.hl ShIDml1Mto·m.ebl . • '33*10' 129*40-
. . . . . . . . do . .
. . . . . . . . .. . Knknr. ; . . . . . . . . . . 81,000 Fukuok.·kea Kokur..·.hl BI,••blmla.to- 33*W 133*DO'
machl . . • . . . • . • • • . � . . . • , . • • . • • . . , • • .
. .do TT.aOO
:
10. •. .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. SenJu . . • • . • • • • • . • • Tokro·to Ad.ebl·1ru Senju·Sakur.'I·ebo . . . • • 36*40' 139*50'
11 . • • • • . . do .••...•••• . K,ulul.de #2 • . . . . . . 86,000o..k...bl Konohana·tu Rlla-ajlk••••dorl. . • 34-40- 135*30'
1 2• • , . . . :410 • • • . • . • • • • • • Sblknmako • • • . . . • . 86.000Hyog-o·koa Shlk.m.·ebl Nakajllua . . • •• • . . , . • 3-11 *'6' 134*150'
13 • • • . • , . do • . _ • • • . • . . • • Alnoura . . . . . ... . . . 84,GOO ;s"qullkl·ken SaMlto·sbl H.Iltan.kAmen" • • • 33*10' 129*"0'
14 • • • . . • . do . . • • • • . . . . . • Milk" . . . . . . • • . • • . • 84,200 I-IJro.bIIhA·kt"n Akl'l\Iu Sak.·mura• . . . • • . , . 3-1*25' 13Z*30"
102 15. • • • • . .do • • • • • • • • • • • • (Ishlod" • • • • • • • • • • 64.000 K.nG,awe·ken K.wasakl·shl Sblralshl-eho . • 35*SO' 139*40'
.
18 . . . . . . dn . . . . . . _ . . . . . Klsuell"'a . . . . . . " . 83.000 Oaaka..bl SumJyoa:hl·ku ),(ul'llaakldanl·maebl a.. " 30' 135*30'

1 03
 STEA)f.ELECTUlC POWF..R 8TATIOXS-UTILITr--aO,OOO KW CArACITY AND OVElt-CunUIUlPd
()rd�r 0'
........
keJ' no.
on IUap. Owner
Name of power
atatlon �r�c;� LoeatiOD
lAtitude,
Nurth Lo'1!!��. Location

eo,ooo J.JebJ·ken Nlwa·gun Hagure·mura.

IT. • • • . Hippo. Haaoden . . Ube .0.000 Yamquchl·ken U...... Nubl·ln! · OId)"lUDa· ... 131-16'
120.000 Alchl·.ken Ntwa-Iun Iwakura·maebt.
u.etat.ehl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . • • . • . . • • • •

48,4GO Aicbl-ken Nakaahtma-gun Okoahl-machL

18 • • • • . )Jlnlatr;y ot Traaa- Kawuald • _ . . . • . " &&,300 Kua,awa.ken Ka"'...ti...hl Oli·machl . • • • • an-3D' ]�-43' 33,490 Alebl·ken Nacoya·ahi Nlshl·ku.
portatloll • • • • • • a,,-aGl 133-00' 52.000 Alehl·ken Na,oya·shl K1ta·ku.
1'. !'ilpfIOD Huaodea . . SAmban . • . • • . • • • . • 01,&00 Oka7ama.t�n lodo'CUD Samban·mura . . • • . . • 30,000 AJchl·ken A.lchl·,UD ldaka-mur-a.
:
. . do . . • • • • • . . • • r(asupde #1 • • • • • . • .. ... ......
• • ••

• 20. _ !. • • , Osaka.llbt KODOhua·1ta Rokken-c:bo . . • • . . . • 135-W 87,480 AJcbl-kea Nagoya-shl Mlnato-ta.

21. 8nmltome K;yodo NUbun. #2 • • • • , . . . "8,000 Ehlme-ua NlIbama..b1 • • • ·. • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • 33-58' 133-11i
. ·
• •.• •
07,000 AJchI·keo Nagoya·lhl Mlsuho·ku.
Dear)'Oku . . . . . • ""·20' 130·"" 40,000 Atcbt-ken Nagoya-Ibl Nakagawa·ku.

[ I
22 • • . • • Nlppoa Hauoden . • Sajlma . . . • . . . . "'• • " ,000 Fukuoka.keD ltaauya-CUD Tatara·mura . . • . • • 91,700 Alcbl-ken Nago'ya-shi Hlnato·ku.
23. . . • • . .do . . • . • • • . . • . . ElJetlu . . . . • . . . -. . . • 37.... ".k••ld. S.ppo...... _tau·....hl. , . " ,' ...... lU-3CY 100,000 Mle-ken Yokkalcbl-Ibl Tomari..
.....,.
o.:.:.-��� .���.�. �i_�:����':".�i�����
24 . • • • • . . do • • . • • • • . • • . • Jl'ukaaald . . . . . . • . . . 38,000 136-30" 45,000 00.
20• • • • • J . . do • . . . • • • •• . • . Salio . . . • • . . •• • • . • 32,000 Eblme-ken BaI,o·llIl Kitapwa • • - • . • . • • • . . • 33-53' 133-1D'
'60,000
50,000
Toyama·keD Nel·cun Nqaolll:a-mura.
Toyama-ken.Kamlnllkawa,pD Olawano-machl•
3G.000 Do.
•
.

62,200 Toyama-ken ShlmonU.ka1ll"a·gun.

STEAM.ELECTRIC POWER_STATION8-INDUSTRIAL-OVER 30.000 KW CAPACITY Michljlta·muta.
68,500 JllehJjlta·mura Takaok....bJ.
i. . . . ' NIPpon Seltetsu . . • XI.hlda . . • . • . . . �- 88,000 Fukuoka Yawata NlIb14a• 33"&2" 43,000 Do.
2"• • • • • liO,OOO Mlcbljlta·mura Imlsu-l\In Taukurlwicht-murL
• • . • . - • . . • . . • , . •

Ho "kkaldo Tanko Shlrulsusawa • . • • • - 48,500 Hotltaldo • • • • • • • . • • • • • • ...

.
• . • . . • • . • . • • . . •. •

KIMn • . . . . . . . . 30,000 Fukul-kn Yoshlda·gun Mauuoka-macbl.

I• • • • • Nippon S.ltetsu . . . Wanlsbl Chuo . . . . • . 48,000 Bokkaldo )Jurorau WalllebL . . • • . • • • . • • • • . "2-20' 141·01i 81 • • • • • • Nippon Hauodea. . .
30,000 Fukui-ken YOlhida·gun Nlshlfujllblma murL
ll'urukawabubl
"' . _ . � . . do . . . . . . . . . . ... "flirobAtll . . . . . . : • • • . 43,000 .. .
HyolO . . . . . . . . . - - • • • . •. . • • • • . . • • • • , • • ·. ...... 134-38'
• • • • • • 24-2,400 Oaata-fu Kltakawaebl-pD Kadoma·maebl.
0• • • • • Edamltsu . . • . • .. . •
•

. . do • . . . • • . . . • • • 40,000 'Fukuoka . . • . • . • • • . • • • • _ • . • - • . • • • • • • • r . . U-Ci2' 130·49' 330,000 Ouka-fu Minamllc ..wacbt·gun SbJkJ-murL

e,. • • • • NltdllUU Kapku Dal Icbl Karyoku • .' . 30,250 lfl1ua1l:1 • . • . • • , .• '. ' • • . • . . • • . . • • • • • • • • :. '. 32-36' 131-W 30,000 Olaka·tu Osaka-Ib} KODohana-ku TalcamJ-cho.
Kono • • . . . . • . • 46,500 Osaka·tu Sakal-,hi Naguone-c:ho.
30,000 Oaata_fu Kltakawacbl-pD Sango-machl.
Souaa : Elaetrlc po",·er'Dureau. 230.000' 'Osaka-fu TOyoDo·gun Ozone·mura.
81,500 Olata-fu Osaka..hl m,..blyodogawa-"ku
120,000 Olaka·to Osaka·sbi KODohana·ku.
.
.
37,000 Osata-fo 08aka·shl Joto-kn.
40,000 Olaka·tu Osata·lhI Tallho-ku.
lleferenH ..
'80,000 O Ita·to Fuse-lhL
No. Name ot compaD;Y LoeatiOD 30,000 Osaka-fu Oaaka-shl Sumlyoahl.ku.
42.000 Do.
1 • • • • • . Stppoa Haasoden• • • Sapporo " _ • • • • • • • • • 80.000 Boldtaldo Sapporo-CUD Sapporo-murL 60,000 O,-ka.tu Nakakawachl'CUn Tatsuml·mura.
Bokkaido Sorachi-cun BUDakawa·mach!. 45,000 Duka-fu Klshtwada·lbl.
:: : : : : : Oj��;�i:,: � : : : : : :': �:���:aJ " : : : : : : : :':
60.000
49,350 Bokkaido yllfutlu·pn Tomakomll1·macbt. 89,000 Kyoto-tu KyotO·lbl Fushlml-ku.
t . : . . . . !tlppon Ha.-odeD . . • 32.000 Kyoto-to Otokunt-gun Knee·mura.
.
ruwada . . . . • . . - • • • • 76,000 Fukulhlma-ken Auka·run Hlwada-maehl.
& • • • �. ; Toboku Halden. . . . · Kori7ama . _ . . • , ' .' • • • 42.000 FukUlhlma-ken Aaaka-I1lD Fukuyama-macbl. 90,000 Hyogo-ken ltaml-sbl Ikejlri.
8 . . . . . . . . do . . . � . . . . . . . _ . . XI1,,,� . . . ... . - . . . . . . 58.500 NUlatA-keD Nakntambara-cun Ilbiy"ama.mura. 2�2,000 H,..ogo-ken Muto-gun Yamada-mura.
T. _ . . • '. Nippon BassodeD. . . Ibarakl ••• . • • '.' • . . - . '. 30.000 lbarald·ken Naka-run Xanzakl-murL 94,&00 HYOlo·ken Kobe·shi Nada-)m.
8. . • • , • . . �o . ' '
• .. . . . • • . . . • • Ulnaml-Sblbuta". , . 45,000 GuJDJOa·kea Gumma"'l1ln Sblbuka"'a·nlAebl. 38,000 Hyogo-ken Kobe-abl Suma-h.
' Totyo-to �lnlllDltama·pn Tuna-mur"&. 37.000 Hyogo-ken Amaa:"ald-eb1.-
: : : : : : � ; ::: :.: : : : : : : : : : � : : ::::;; . : ; : :::;:::
a 30.000
Do.
·

1 ' 168,000 Tok;yo·to Adachl·1m Nlahl Kabel-clJo. 80,000

: : Kalneldo • • • • � . . . . . . 40,000 Do.
.

1 1 • • . • •. • . • do • • . . . . . . . . . . 108,000 Tbkr,o-to Jj:dola",a-kt:t" Blral-eho.

12. : . .. . . . .do • • .. . . • • • . . . . : ; Komatsupwa · . • • . • . . 64,000 Tok;yo-to Edopwa:-ku Higashitunaborl-eho. 30:000 B:rOlo-ken Nlahlnomlya-ahL
13 . • _ • • . . :40 : • . . • . • • • · · • . ; 'l'abata , 80.000 Tok;yo·to. Ar�kaw.-ku Oau-c:ho. 31.700 Nara·ken Kltatatsuragl'IUD Takata-macbl.
.: ""; Do.
. . • • . • . • • • • •

14. � • . • • . do . . . . . . . . - . . . . . Ogu . . . • • . � . . . . . . . - 30,000 39,000 Waleayama·ken Wakayama-lbJ

. .

11 . • • • • • _ .do • • • • • • . • • • • . • • Wadabon· . . • • . • • . • · • 100.000 Tokyo-to Su,lnaml-kU buml-cl\o. 48,500 Do.

1 8. . . . .. . Kanto JJalden . . . • . . Sbikahama • . • . • . . • · · 30,000 TokYO-to Adaehl·ku. 38.100 Okayama-ken Okayamll-ahl.
..
11 . . . . . . . do .• : : Yejlro 89,000 Tokyo-to Yodobubl-lru. 18,000 Hlre.,hlma·ken Fukuyama-ahl NaratRu-('bo.
18 • . • . . . • . do . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Yodobl.llhl • . • . • . • • • . 00,000 Do. 80,000 Blr-oehlma·ken . AkI-gun Fucbu·machl.
19 . . • . • • . . do . . • . . . . . • • . . . . Sensoku . • . . . . . • • . • • 7:i,OOO Tokyo-to Omorl·ku. '15,000 Hlroehlma-ken Kure·shl Hlro-maehl.
20 . . . . . . . . do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Roweo . . . . . . . . . . . . 89.800 Tokyo-to KamatA-ku. 30,000 Hlroshlma·ken Kure·ahi Matoba-dorl.
21 • . • • • . Nippon Has:soden. . . Raablmoto . • • . • • • . · · &1,000 Kanacawa-ken Kou.-lUn Sapm1hara-waebt. 33,000 Yamaguchl.ken T.okuyama..hl Fukudatera·maehl.
EaDalawa-kU YokohamA4hl )Un.a.t�klta·ku lllnam.I-Tnnublma-- 80,000 Yamaguchi-ken Kuma.P-CUD Hikari·macll1.
22. . .do . . • . • . • . • . . • • . Ttunublma . . . . •.• • . . .
132,000
cho.
• • . . •
38,000 Yamagucbl-ken UbwbJ OlUlhl.
23 . . . . . . . . do . . . . . . . . . . · . . · Kelnan . _ . ' . ... . . . . . . 64.000 Kanqawa·teD Yokohama..hi �ruml-ko EplAki·cbo.
laoura • • • . . • • • • • • • •
24 . . . . . , • . do . . � . . . . . . . . . . : Aaabl . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . 168,000 Kanaa:awa·teD Yokohama-.hl Tauruml-kQ Komaoka-c:bD. '
,18 • • • • • • Nippo. HUloden. . .
87,299 Eblme-ken NUhama-shl.

iE������ ��E���::�����:� �� �E�< :::::�::: :

Kojaku • . . . • • . • • • • • •
2t\i . . . . . . . . do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kawuak1 . . . . . . . . '.' 180,500 Kanqawa·ten Kawuaki-Ibi YaDIlI1·machl. 98 • • • • • • do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kabo . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
88,000 Fukuoka-kea Yawata'lhl Kaml-Kojalnl.
28 • • • • , • . . do • • • • • . • . • • . • • • Totluka ·• . • . • � • • • • • . 132.000 Kanqa".a-ken Yokohama·lhi Touuka·ku Totsuka-ebo.
• •
72.000 Jl"ukuoka-ken IIsuka·ahl Kawuhlma.
21 • Kanto Halden . . . . . . Koyalu • • • . • .:. • • • • • • 80,000 KanaKawa·ten Yokobama-abl Itanap.a-ku. 52.000 Fukuoka·keD Kokura-Ihl ltabltsu.
.
• • • • ,

28 . . . . . .. do . . . . . . . . . . . . . · nallbl . . . . - . . . . . . . . 80,000 KaDq"awa.ken KawaUItl-abJ. 80,000 Fulnlota·ken Misuma·gun Kisakl-1Dura.

28 . � . . . .. _do . . . . . ... . . . . . . · Tako . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30,000 Kanara1fa·lrea Odawan.·shl. 37,&00 Fukuot�·keD Omuta·ahl Sblamlnato-cbo.
30 . • • do . . • .• . . . • • . . • • Ta;Jima • • . • . . • . . • • • • to,OOO xanaaawa·1I:en Kawuakl-.bl. 80.000 Fukuoka-ken Omuta-ahl Oura-c:bo.

�• • • �·�• • �1
. Do.
• • • • •

31 . . . . , . . do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . HodOla1& . . . . . . . . . . 39,000 Kanalawa·ken Yokobama..bl Naka-ku. 30,000

32 • • • . . • • . do • . • . • • • • . . . . • : YOkqtlluka. • •. • • . . . . . . . 45.000 Kanacawa·kt'n yokolukll..hl. 80,000
30,000
lI'ukuota·keD Omuta-Ihl Sblnmlnat(H!'ho.
Fukuoka·ken TaR"awa-jrun Kaw"akl-macbl.
.a Sa1tama·ken Ka·","apchi·lhl )lltflu"\"l"a.
::: : : : : : ��:: . .�.���:: : ���:;� : : : : : : : : : : :
OD 188.000
. .. 182,000 Saltam.-Iura Kltaadaebl"'l1ln Soka·maehl. 84,330 Fukuoka-ken Yawata·shl.
86 • • • • • • do Shlmalawara . • . . • • • 90,000 salano·ken KIt.latu-CUD Kltamimakl-mura. 72,000 Sara-ken Klshlma-run Ta1l:eo-maebl.
30,000 Kumamoto-ken Hot.ko·KUD Takata·macbl.
. . . . • • • . . . • • • . • .

38 . . . . . . . . do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Shlojln . . . . . . . . . . . . 80.000 Nagano-ken Blp.hichlkuma·.cun Hlraoka·mura.

..
31 . . . . . Chubu Halden . . . . • . Hamamatllu • . •-.' • • • • • 48,480 Bblsnoka·kea Hamana·pn Nac_kaml-marL 97,000 Mlyuakl-ken N!sbluIUkl-CUD Morotsuka-mura.
as • • . • • . Sippon Kelklnzo)tu . . Kambara . • • • . . . • . . . 70.000 Sbisuoka-keD Ihara-p.D Kambara·machl. Nors-ApparentJ:r do.. not IDclude (I) railroad lubstatiOD
: (2) aubatatlonl auoclated .ltb leneratine pl�u.
n, . . . . . �Ippon HanodeD . . . Ni.-biD . . . • . • . • . . • . 150,000 AICbl-ken Alcbl-pn NIMbin·murL
8017aCll : ICledrlc Power Bureau.

104 105
 Twentieth Air Force Staff Meeting Action Assignments

Air Conference Room·0930·29 June 1 944

Attendance: General Hansell, presiding Lt Col Carpenter

Colonel Combs Lt Col Russell
Colonel Clinch Lt Col Wilson
Colonel Rosenblatt Lt Col Bohnaker, Second AF
Colonel Donohew Major McIntyre
Colonel Eubank Major Jackson
Colonel Nelson Major Lint
Lt CoI Hill Captain Cate
Lt Col Haddock Captain Slator
Lt Col Osborn Captain Spivak

ACTION TO BE TAKEN OFFICER TO WHOM ASSIGNED

Study on Feasibility of providing Eseort Fighters for B-29s on Col Rosenblatt

APPENDIX D
1.laDd of Iwo lima. General Hansell desires a study made Col Hill
immediately, this morning, on the feasibility of providing fighter Col Eubank
escort for the 8·29s. General Everest has prepared a paper on this Col Donohew
EXCERPTS FROM TYPICAL STAFF MEETINGS OF THE TWENTIETH AIR FORCE which Colonel Lindsay is now holding. Intelligence has prepared a
discussion for General Arnold on this subject. It is desired ( 1 ) To
have an analysis from the Engineering people as to whether or not we
can provide fighter escort at that distance, about a radius of 750
miles, within the next six months. Have we fighters that can go that
far? What airplanes are they, and when can we get them and in what
quantity? (Col Rosenblatt). (2) Where can we get people to man such
a fighter outfit if we can get the planes. Troop basis cannot stand in
the way. What kind of scheme can be worked out to get those fighter
groups from the Third and Sixth Air Forces for the Twentieth Air
Force? (Colonel Hill). The deadline on this study is 1 500 this
afternoon as General Hansell desires this information for the weekly
staff meeting. Plans is to monitor this study.

Effect of B-29 Formation on Speed. General Hansell desires a Col Carpenter

report on the formations as are now being flown at the Second Air Col Hill
Force. The AAF Board is to concern itself with the tests that are
being conducted at the Second Air Force.

Tactical Doctrine for the XXI Be. The Tactical Doctrine book of Col Carpenter
the 73rd Wing should be submitted to the XXI Bomber Command
with the idea of having a single Standard Tactical Doctrine for the
entire XXI Bomber Command, to be used for training of all XXI
Bomber Command elements.

Manning Shortage on Service and Depot Groups. Have a Col Clinch

presentation of this general problem ready for the weekly staff Col Hill
meeting this afternoon. OC&R is to have the letter establishing a
definite priority for manning the Service Units and the Minutes of the
meeting with General Arnold establishing those priorities should
also be available.

107

106
 Weekly Staff Meeting of Twentieth Air Force
Strategic Room
1 600· 29 June 1 944

Attendance: B�g Oen H. S. Hansell, Chief of Staff, presiding

Bng Oen J. N. McConnick, A.I
Col Cecil E. Combs, A·3, Combat Operations
Col W. F. McKee, A·3, OC&R
Col L. O. Ryan, A·3, Training APPEN DIX E
Lt Col J. W. Carpenter, A·3, Training
Col S. R. Brentoall, A·4, MM&D
Col Sol Rosenblatt, A·4, MM&D
Maj Gen L. S. Kuter, A·5, Plans WEiGIff OF STRATEGIC AIR EFFORT BY VERY HEAVY BOMBER (VHB)
Maj Oen D. N. W. Grant, Air Surgeon AIRCRAFT AND PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONS LEADING
Brig Gen H. L. McClelland" Communication TO THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DEFEAT OF JAPAN.
Col Max F. Schneider, Air Inspector

of Staff as
ACTION TO BE TAKEN Respoaolble OIIIce .
Report by the Joint Staff Planners approved by the Joint Chiefs
J.C.S. 1 1 65/1 22 March 1 945.
��nte_ce Dlm��.... SecoDd AIr Force. Inspectors' reports Col Ryan
mdlcate that the prmclpal trouble in maintenance at Oovi. i. the Col Carpenter This document was declassified from TOP SECRET, and ali security classifica·
supervision and organization. This matter is to be taken up with Oen Hansell tion was cancelled on 1 3 January 1 954.
General Hansell after the meeting.

B-19 SIaDdard Opentl... Procedure. The B·29 SOP will be issued
as a Tech Order and strict adherence thereto will be required. The
.
Air Inspector is to see that it is rigidly checked.
AdmlDiltratlve Polldes. The Administrative Policy Book should be
coordinated by all Staff Sections. It is a continuing and living
document and very necessary. Colonel Lorini, the Administrative
Inspector for the Twentieth Air Force, i. to keep it current.
Note: The planned deployment.as described in this Appendix Was affected by the end
Col Schneider ofthe war against Gennany. The bomber groups of the Eighth Air Force were reequip­
ped with B·29s and the Eighth Air Force was transferred from England to Okinawa.
The 3 1 6th Wing. originally scheduled for the XXIst Bomber Command in the
Col Lorini Marianas, was reassigned to the Eighth Air Force, so that the final planned
deployment was 5 Wings (20 Groups) in the Marianas and 3 Wings ( 1 2 Groups) in
Okinawa.

Dlredlve to General Wolfe. General Wolfe is to be advised that Col Combs

every effort possible will be made to get ATC tonnage for him
although this is not expected to be accomplished by I July:
Regardless, he is to comply with the Target Directives for July.

Requlre�Dt � Seize the � of "rollma. A Requirement placed Gen Hansell

on Twentieth Air Force stationery under the signature of the Chief of Oen Kuter
Staff for the Commanding General, Anny Air Forces, should be set
up showmg the need to seize the base of Iwo Jima. It should be
.
pointed out therein that the long distanCe escort fighters, the P.75a
and the P·82s will not be available for over a year and that escort
op«:�ons for the B·29s can be conducted with P·S Is from this base.
This IS to be given to General Kuter, who will prepare a paper for the
JCS on the problem of feasibility and necessity of using escort
fighters for the B·29. at Iwo Jima.

108

109
1CS 116511
22 March 1945
Pages 29-57, incl.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WEIGHT OF STRATEGIC AIR EFFORT BY VERY HEAVY BOMBER (VHB)
AIRCRAFT AND PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONS LEADING
TO THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DEFEAT OF JAPAN
References: a. J.C.S. 1 165
b. J.C.S. 1079
c. J.C.S. 71 3/20
d. J.C.S. 1 1 20
R eP.," by the Joint Staff Planners
THE PROBLEM
I . To revise J.C.S. 1 165, "Weight of Strategic Air Effort Required in Operations Leading to the
Earliest Possible Conclusive Defeat of Japan," in light of recent developments, as directed by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
2. This is part of the overall problem of determining the weight of air effort, both strategic and tacti­
cal, which will be so required. This paper, a revision of a previously approved study (J.C.S. 1 1 65, I I
November 1 944), is intended to serve as a basis for planning with regard to strategic (VHB) bombard­
ment requirements and potentialities, taking into consideration operational capabilities, availability of
bases and aircraft, weather, deployment, and intelligence as to Japanese war economy as now known. It
is appreciated that the rapid progress of events continually outdate this paper, but the effect on the total
weight of effort and employment thereof will be minimized by timely revision.
3. The tactical air effort required has been treated in a separate paper (J.C.S. 1 079), which has been
previously approved ( 1 4 October 1 944). This paper deals with the strategic air effort involved, the
results to be expected therefrom, and with requirements for fighter support of such effort, but does not
include the strategic use of aircraft from carriers. Strategic bombing by British Lancaster squadrons
(J.C.S. 1 1 20) has not been considered.
4. The strategic bombing objective is defined as "the destruction of selected industrial systems, pri­
marily in Japan proper, to undermine her war-making capacity to a point where it is fatally weakened."
5. The assumptions used are summarized in Attachment A.
6. The strategic concept of operations in the Pacific as set forth in J.C.S. 7 1 3/20 has been followed.
DISCUSSION
7. The report includes a possible and comparatively firm schedule of VHB operations. The schedule
is in consonance with the current estimates as to the number of sorties required to weaken primary mili-
1 10
tary industrial systems in the Japanese.war economy to the point where the cost of the invasion and
defeat of Japanese military forces in Japan proper can be made as small as possible so that some approx­
imation can be made of the time within which this result can be accomplished.
8. It is estimated that there will be sufficient force available under the schedule set up to reduce
whatever industrial systems emerge as primary targets prior to the time of invasion. '
9. The study is necessarily subject to repeated revisions.
10. For further discussion, see Attachment B.
CONCLUSIONS
II. In order to attack and neutralize effectively the Japanese aircraft industry, the most important
industrial urban areas, and the arsenals (estimated at present, I March 1945, to require approximately
33,000 sorties by I January 1946 from the Marianas, the Philippines, and the Ryukyus), the buildup of
VHB groups indicated in the following paragraphs is required.
1 2. During 1945, in the Marianas, 20 groups operational by August 1945; in the Ryukyus, 8 groups
by December 1945; and in the Philippines, 4 groups operational by December 1945.
1 3 . Mter December 1 9.45, a further buildup of units and augmentation of present unit equipment
may be required during the first four months of 1 946. For the present, a buildup to 48 groups in this
period should be kept in the planning program.
14. Primary target systems are the aircraft industry, arsenals, urban industrial areas, electronics
plants, and shipping lanes (mining) in homeland waters. The early destruction of the aircraft industry is
of particular importance.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1 5 . It is recommended that:
.i!,The loint Chiefs of Staff approve this revised study for planning purposes, in order that the
requirements visualized in this paper may be integrated with other requirements of equal importance in
connection with the accomplishment of the overall objective in the war against Japan.
.lh This paper be referred to the Joint Logistics Committee for examination of the logistic
implications and in connection with current studies on base development.
.£,. The loint Chiefs of Staff note the change in title of this paper.
III
 .; , '
ICS 1165/1 Attach_' A (2) Varyi.,, _1IIptio!u have beql lII8de . to pm:enlfle ofbombl carried � the t8IJe! that
will be dropped wilhin 2,000 feet of the aimi." puint.

I. The following assumptions have been imide: (3) Bomb ton... per IDI1ic wiea • to loc:adon of base from whic:h aircraft operate. For
:Mari ..
....based aircraft, an a-. ton... fi&ure of 3 is _ for planni.. duri." the period
JI. AS TO BASI'S AND DEPLOYMENT. February throuIh July, 11ft« which time the -. is 4. . ,

( 1 ) MARIANAS. VHB bases adequate to support 8 VHB groups will be operational in the
Marianas by FebrwuY' 1 945; bases for 1 6 VHB grollps will be operational by May 1945; bases for 20 (4) o.en:a.t and nilbt bombi." techniques, IoICther with the allowances rDade for aborti_
grOups Will be operational by July 1 945; and vIm groups will be so deployed in 'these numbeii IiiId by and weiaht of bomb on t8IJe!, will &lve IIIfcfi ient.leeway to allow for neceIIUY diwnlona and other
these months. Bases in the Marianas and intermediate islands will likewise be available" fur the unforaeea factors.
deployment of hea'V)' bombers (HB) and ta�ti�1. units to assure the security of the area, and for very long
range ftghter escort units. > "
(5) It is emphasized that weather is ' of viauaI
, a lftl\ior factor affecti." the bombi." precision
, t8IJe!S in Japan.
(2) PHIUPPlNI'S. VHB bases adequate to support 2 groups will be available in the
Philippines for operations in July 1945; bases for a total of 5 groups in August 1 945; for 8 groups in
September 1 945 and for 16 groups in December 1945. The availability of aircraft for HB groups to be
converted to VHB and VHB groups to be 'augmented precludes the possibility of permanently basing
VHB groups in the Philippines before November 1 945 when I group will be available and the buildup
thereafter will reach 4 group. in December. In the event the Ryulcyus bases cannot be made available by
August 1945, it is assumed that the 4 groups scheduled for deployment thereto during August and
September will be deployed to the Philippines.

(3) RYUKYUS. Two VHB groups will operate out of the Ryukyus beginning in August 1945.
In computing the weight of attack, sorties possible from the Ryukyus have been included on the basis of
8 VHB groups ultimately. See 'discussion in paragraph 1.11(2) above.

(4) CHINA. The 4 VHB groups which openited out of China until I February 1 945 will
resume operations in the Marianas during April 1945 .

.h. AS TO STRATEGY.

Operations were undertaken against the Bonins about 1 9 February 1 945 and will be
undertaken against the Ryukyus about I April 1945. Present approved plans contemplate operations
against the Japanese mainland in the winter of 1945.
lO. AS TO AIR FORCES AVAILABLE.

Air Forces available for deployment against Japan will be as currently set forth in firm
operational plans. Any tentative redeployment schedules are not considered. Conversion of HB to VHB
has lIeen assumed to commence at such time as to allow converted units to become operational. In the
event that HB groups scheduled for conversion to VHB groups are not available by August 1 945, the
strength of the VHB groups deployed at that time will be increased to be approximately equivalent to the
groups scheduled for conversion.
lI.. AS TO OPERATIONAL CAPABIUTIES.

( 1 ) Estimates will be based on daylight visual bombing operations against all primary objective
systems. It is considered that the primary target systems of Japan, except possibly for urban industrial
,
areas, are not susceptible to a successful attack by blind bombing. Secondary targets can and will be
attacked by blind bombing.

112

1 13
 ICS 1165/1 Attaehment B Since the aircraft system is first priority, and the aero-engine plants are considered to be more
important than aircraft assembly plants, the simultaneous attack of these targets in this system until a
SCHEDULE OF VHB OPERATIONS favorable damage percentage is attained, would be desirable.

I . Attachment A is a schedule of VHB operations on priority targets based on ITG Estimate No. I .
Due consideration has been given to deployment, operational capabilities, and air effort requirements
for priority targets as recommended by current ITG Priorities, 1 5 January 1 945 and ITG Priorities 1 5
February 1 945.
The large force of VHB required initially is not available under present operational factors and
methods. Appreciably increasing the bomb load carried from present bases is not probable (except for
low altitude night bombing) during the early part of 1 945, nor is there a possibility of obtaining bases
nearer the targets than the Marianas during this period when a greater force than that which now obtains
could reduce drastically the Japanese capability to continue the war.

11.. The schedule outlined is to be considered as a flexible plan of attack.

However, there is a possibility that a modification of bombing formations and tactics can be
developed in order to reduce the bomb wastage at the target. A study of this problem is under way by the
11, General conformance to the schcidule should produce the following results:
Joint Target Group.

3 1 Mar: 50% damage to three important aero-engine factories which represents loss of three
months engine production.

3 1 May: 25% of urban industrial areas subjected to the then current maximum effort.

30 June: Four major aero-engine factories 70% damaged.

3 1 July: One minor aero-engine factory 70% damaged. Initial attacks in force on arsenals.

3 1 Aug: Important aero-engine factories re-attacked. Attacks on arsenals continued.

30 Sept: Minor aero-engine factories re-attacked. Attacks on major arsenals completed

insofar as known requirements determine.

3 1 Oct: Urban industrial areas SUbjected to then current maximum effort.

2. Diversion from initial attack on priority targets in the aircraft engine industry must be he�d to a
.
minimum. Continuous attack thereon must not be interrupted except as dictated by the necessity for
using the force available to strike the urban industrial areas in April and May just prior to the season of
unfavorable weather.

3. VHB forces available initially are not sufficient to enable attack on aero-engine and ai�craft
assembly plants simultaneously; nor are they sufficient to complete attacks on each plant successively.

There is a possibility that appreciable damage to aero-engine factories will have been obtained prior
to mid-March as a result of the combination of VHB attacks and operations by Naval air against
Honshu. In this event, attacks on aSsembly plants could inflict some damage .to the pipeline, prior to, or
concurrent with, the attack on urban industrial areas.

4. While the number of lucrative targets on the Japanese mainland is considerable, 89% of aircraft
engine production is concentrated in only 4 factories and 70% of aircraft assembly production in 8
plants. Even this small number of priority targets requires a large attacking force with which to obtain
desired results immediately.

1 14

1 15
 l.C.S. 1 388{4
I I July 1945
Paaes 26 - 47, incl.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DETAILS OF TIIE:CAMPAIGN AGAINST JAPAN

APPIN DIX f
Reference: J.C.S. 1 388 Series

Report by the Joint Staff Plannen

DEiAILS OF CAMPAIGN AGAINST JAPAN JCS 1 388/4

approved by the J.C.S. on I I July 1945 I . The Enclosure is a revision of J.C.S. 1388 which includes:

A copy of the Report by the
Joint Staff Plannen
This document was declasaifted from TOP SECRET,
and all Clasaiflcation WIll cancelled. on 22 Jan 1971
The chanlles in phraseology recommended by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of
J!,
Naval Operations in J.C.S. 1 388/1 .
.!1:. The changes in phraseology recommended by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army in J.C.S. 1 388/2 as
modified by approval of J.C.S. 1388/3.
£. New paragraphs 7, 1 1 !..and..!!. on casualties, Chinese participation, and British participation.

2. The Joint Staff Planners recommend that the Enclosure be presented to the President.

DISTRIBUTION COpy NO. DISTRIBUTION copy NO.

Admiral Leahy 1 General Norstad II

General Manhall 2&5 Admiral Gardner 12
Admiral King 3&6 General Cabell 13
General Arnold 4 General Lincoln 14
General Handy 7 Captain Campbell 15
Admiral Edwards 8 Secy, JCS 16
Admiral Cooke 9 Secy, JPS 17
General Hull 10 Secy, JWPC 18

1 17

1 16
 E nclosure
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Subject: Campaign against Japan.
1. Strategy. Throughout the series of staff conferences with the British, we have agreed that the
overall concept for the prosecution of the war included provision "to bring about at the earliest possible
date the unconditional surrender of Japan." We believe that the only Sllre way, and certainly the
quickest way to force the surrender of Japan is to defeat her armed forces in the main Japanese islands.
Hence, 'at recent staff conferences we hav� proposed-and the British have agreed-that the overall
objective of the Japanese war is "to force the unconditional surrender of Japan by ( 1 ) lowering Japanese
ability and wi11 to resist by establishing sea and air blocka�es, conducting intens�ve air bom�ardment
and destroying Japanese air and naval strength; (2) mvadmg and selzmg obJectlves m the mdustrlal
heart of Japan."
It is by no means certain that a capitlliation by a Japanese government will be recognized by Japan",:e
armed forces everywhere. If, following such an acknowledgement, her forces do not surrender, their
position will be so seriously weakened as to facilitate their defeat in detail. However, the possibility must
be faced that the Japanese forces everywhere must be defeated.
2. Presently planned campaign. Our agreed concept of operations for the main effort in the Pacific
war �
"Following the Okinawa operation to seize additional positions to intensify the blockade and air
'
bombardment of Japan in order to create a situation favorable to:
"An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese capabilities by cont:uning and
destroying major enemy forces and further intensifying the blockade and air .bombardment m order to
establish a tactical condition favorable to the decisive invasion of the industnal heart of Japan through
the Tokyo Plain."
Our campaign plans have therefore been designed to seize positions progressively closer to the Tokyo
Plain-the political, industrial and communication center of Japan-with a view to isolatinll the
.
Japanese islands and providing sufficient bases from which, by sea and air bombardment, condltlons
will be created which wi11 make ultimate invasion of the Tokyo Plain acceptable and feasible. We have
also endeavored so to design the campaign that the Japanese cannot fail to see and feel the results of its
rapidly increasing tempo and magnitude, with the thought that at some stage of the campaign they will
admit defeat in order to avoid further destruction.
h
Thus far in t is campaign we have seized and developed air and naval bases in the Marianas, Iwo
Jima, the Philippines and Okinawa. No further operations in the Ryukyus after completion of the
Okinawa campaign are now contemplated; all available resources are being utilized to develop air and
naval bases in Okinawa to maximum capacity by November 1945. By then it is expected to have about
2700 land-based aircraft operating from this area and to have completed an advanced fleet base and
anchorage. Meanwhile every effort is also being made to transport to the Pacific from Europe the added
1 18
means required for a rapid and decisive campaign. In general the units needed to build the required
bases are being moved first, followed by the required additional combat units, air and ground.
Already we have eliminated practically all Japanese sea traffic between their main islands and points
to the southward of Shanghai, and severely restricted their traffic to Shanghai and Yellow Sea pons. By
November 1945, when air operations from Okinawa will be in full swing, there should remain to the
Japanese only those sea routes across Tsushima Strait to Korea and across the Sea of Japan. It should be
noted that our air and submarines are already operating in these areas on a limited scale. By November
1945, the Japanese situation is expected to be critical. Their fleet units in home waters have already
been so reduced as to no longer constitute a controlling strategic factor. Their air arm is already
committing training planes to combat and will probably continue to devote much of their remaining air
power to suicide tactics. Their ability to move ground forces to Japan from Asia or vice versa is already
reduced and is estimated by 1 November to be not more than one division a month.
In order to obtain bases still closer to the Tokyo Plain from which to augment sea and air
bombardment, complete the isolation of the main Japanese islands and to provide land based air cover
and support for the invasion of the Tokyo Plain, should that prove necessary, we have directed General
MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz to invade southern Kyushu about 1 November 1945.
We have not yet directed the execution of any operations after the invasion of southern Kyushu,
feeling that decision would better await further developments. However, plans and preparations are
being made to invade the Tokyo Plain-the political, industrial and communication center of Japan­
about 4 months after the southern Kyusbu operation, or about 1 March 1 946. We consider that this
operation should be decisive. By planning and preparing for a supreme operation of this magnitude, we
shall be in a position to undertake any lesser operation should developments warrant.
In the period prior to the planned invasion of the Tokyo Plain, every effort will be made to exploit
the blockade and bombardment of Japan. In this period, from bases presently and prospectively
available, more bombs will be dropped on Japan than were delivered against Germany during the entire
European war. If this blockade and bombardment achieve decisive results, these wi11, in all probability,
be brought about by this scale of effort prior to the planned date for the invasion of the Tokyo Plain.
However, in the event this invasion is not considered feasible and acceptable on the planned date, a
course of action to extend bombardment and blockade is open to us.
3. Bases on the Asiatic mainland other than in Korea are too distant to be of value in augmenting our
present capabilities for sea and air bombardment of Japan and in cutting the remaining Japanese sea
routes across Tsushima Strait and the Sea of Japan. Furthermore, the blockade of the Yellow Sea and
the sea areas to the southward is now virtually effective. There is also the likelihood that any operation
in North China, with its vast area and large numbers of Japanese ground forces, will develop into a
vacuum drawing ever more and more US forces into an indecisive and costly campaign. We therefore
discarded, as unnecessary and diversionary, operations to seize bases on the coast of North China. The
best areas from which to complete the isolation of Japan are obviously either in Korea or in the
southwestern part of the Japanese Archipelago. We considered three possibilities: Korea, the
northwestern part of Kyushu, and southern Kyushu.
We discarded Korea as a possible operation to follow Okinawa because of its longer sea approach,
the paucity of good beaches and exits therefrom, the rugged terrain back of the beaches, the few airfield
sites available for development after seizure, and the great reinforcement capabilities of the Japanese
from their fine and as yet untouched army in northern China. Furthermore, because of the distance
from Okinawa bases, we would have great difficulty in interfering by air action with the arrival of
Japanese reinforcements and in providing adequate air cover and support to the assault. The campaign
is estimated to require about the same commitment of forces as for the invasion of southern KyusiJu (14
divisions).
1 19
 II
I, 'I
Similarly we considered northwestern Kyushu unsuitable as an initial objecti",: area followi� 2 CB (Large Cruisers) 8 CL (AA) (Light Cruisers)
Okinawa because the sea approaches to the best landing area are restricted, well fortIfied and heaVIly (Antiaircraft)
22 CV (Aircraft Carriers) 364 DD (Destroyers)
mined, and because of Japanese capability to reinforce the area f�om two directions-from southern
. 2 CVB (Aircraft Carriers, Large) 326 DE (Destroyer Escort Vessels)
Kyushu and from Honshu. The forces required for such an operabon are estImated to be m excess of
9 CVL (Aircraft Carriers, Small) 1 89 SS (Submarines)
: those for southern Kyushu.
74 CVE (43 combat)
:1! The seizure of southern Kyushu has been directed because: (Aircraft Carriers, Escort) 799 LST (Thnk Landing Ships)
1 7 AGC (Operations and Command

I
..a. Its occupation is essential both for decisive assault on the Tokyo �Iain and �gulation of
Japan through bombardment and through isolation from Korea and the mamland of ASIa; Headq\l8rters Ships) 491 LSM (Medium Landing Ships)

l
223 APA (Attack Transport Ships) 108 AKA (Attack Cargo Ships)
.h. It is the most logical extension of our operations in the Ryukyus, since shore-based tactical air
suwc:.rt can be furnished from Okinawa and lines of communication are shorter than for any other
The above ftgUres make no allowance for attrition. Three months after the Kyushu operation it is
practicable objective;
estimated that approximately 10% will either have been lost or still undergoing repairs to d8llle ll8
Ii -" Airfields on which to base approximately 40 groups (over 25� air�raft) can be develoPe?, received in this operation. Of the operational ships in service, 75% will normally be available for any
!I .
from which we can practically sever Japan's last remaining communlcabon WIth � m�n
.
�
d of AsIa lingle operation. Others will be either undergoing operational repairs or be otherwise employed. It is
and from which the air bombardment of the remainder of Japan can be greatly mtenslfied, worthy of note that the amphibious resources listed above will permit simultaneous assault landings on a
scale never before thought possible.
lI.. It will contribute toward the defeat of Japanese armies in the Japanese homeland;
It is estimated that approximately 3,600 carrier-based aircraft will be available on I March 1 946_
� It may well be that Japanese capitulation will be forced by this operation.
As a general statement it may be said that the forces ofall arms which are required and which should
4. As to other areas, Admiral Mountbatten in the Southeast Asia Command plans to seize a position be employed for the operations we contemplate are all those which can be supported in the theater
in the Port Swettenham-Port Dixon area on the Malay Peninsula in the latter half of August 1945 and to within the means whiCh will be available to us and which can be effectively employed. We feel that the
follow this up with a campaign to recapture Singapore beginnipg probably in De\:ember-January. IIDremitting application of this maximum force is essential to defeating Japan at the least possible cost in
General Wedemeyer has advised that, in China, the Generaliasimo plans to launch an overland advance lives and resources.
with Chinese forces on the Canton-Hong Kong area beginning about I September 1 945 and to follow
up any Japanese withdrawals northward along the railroad route in Central China. 7. eu.Jtles. Our casualty experience in the Pacific war has been so diverse as to throw serious
do\lbt on the validity of any q\I8Dtitative estimate of casnalties for future operations. The following data
5. Plans for the period after the invasion of the Tokyo Plain cannot be made widt firmness at this indicate results of experience.
time. If the Japanese continue to resist, plans must provide for further operations in the main islands
and for operations by ourselves or our allies on the mainland of Asia against those Japanese forces Jap Casualties Ratio
which continue to resist. We are striving to keep US commitments on the mainland to a minimum US Casualties Killed and Prisoners US
through encouraging and supporting maximum effort by the Chinese and by the Ruasians if they sho\lld Campaign Killed, wounded, miasing (Not including wounded) to Jap
.
enter the war. Hence, plans provide for continued US aid to Chinese forces, the scale of which can
probably be materially increased later in the campaign. Sho\lld the Japanese unconditionally surrender Leyte 1 7,000 78,000 1 :4.6
Luzon 3 1 ,000 1 56,000 1 :5.0
or concede defeat during the campaign in Japan proper, there will still remain the sizable task of
Iwo Jima 20,000 25,000 1 : 1 .25
disarming their forces everywhere, assembling them at ports, and returning them to their home isl�ds.
Okinawa 39,000 (Ground) 1 19,000 1 :3
6. Forces required for presently plamtecI C8IIIp8ip. Estimates of the forces required to exec\lte the 7,700 (Navy) (not a complete count)
Normandy
invasion of southern Kyushu and of the Tokyo Plain are attached. The maps show the deployment of
(1 st 30 days) 42,000
land-based aircraft planned upon the completion of each of these two operations. It i. obvious from the
maps that this air power will cover Japan and the approaches thereto with a blanket of destruction.
The record of General MacArthur's operations from I March 1 944 through I May 1945 shows
1 3,742 US killed compared to 3 1 0,165 Japanese killed, or a ratio of 22 to I . During this same period
For the campaign as planned-through the invasion of the Tokyo Plain, it is expected there will be in
. the total US casualties, killed, wo'lnded. and miasing. were 63.s 10 or a ratio of approximately 5 to I .

Ii: I
I the Pacific theaters, India-B\lrma and China, by the spring of 1946 a total of 39 Army divisions and 1 27
Army air groups (8,500 land-based aircraft) or a grand total in Army forces of about 3,000 ,000 m� .
The nature of the objective area in Kyushu gives maneuver room for land and sea operations. For
General MacArthur has indicated that if operations are neceSsary after the invasi�n of the Tokyo Plam, th� and other reasons it is probable that ihe coSt in ground force casualties for the first 30 days of the
"

I I. I ;
plans should provide for the movement of additional divisions from the United States to the Pacific at a
Kyush\l operation will be on the order of that for Luzon. Naval casualties wiIl probably be at about the
rate of about 4 additional divisions per month, from II planned strateSic reserve of 17 divisions in the
same rate as for Okinawa.
United States.
A paraphrase of General MacArthur's comments on the Kyushu operation follows:
By I March 1946 the following major naval vessels are scheduled for deployment in the Pacific:

I
': BEGINS. The operation presents less hazards of excessive loss than any other that has been
1 10 BB (Battleships) 26 CA: (Heavy Cruisers) suggested. Its decisive effect will eventually save lives by eliminating wasteful operations of

II
1 3 OBB (Old Battleships) 33 CI:. (Light Cruisers) nondecisive character. The operation is the most economical in effort and lives thai is possible. It •

1 20 1 21 -
 must be remembered that the several months preceding the operation will involve practically no However, it should be noted

� � �
that a more desirable Ian
losses in ground troops and that sooner or later a decisive ground attack must be made. Additional Strait once it is under our wouId be to route the conv
control thus avoiding . oys through Tsushim
a
subsidiary attacks will simply build up our final total casualties. I most earnestly recommend no avoid by all possible means ;" e l e co d"lliO S °f the n
US co mitment to COStly pera . ? ?rthern straits. We shOUld
IOns 10 the Kunles-K
change in the operation for the invasion of southern Kyushu. ENDS. sole purpose. arafuto area for this

As regards invasion of the Tokyo Plain the number and extent of beaches suitable for amphibious
assault preclude concentration of defense. Furthermore, the terrain of the Tokyo Plain permits us to
In general, we believe that
any commitment, but mere
the best poli
�
is not to tress .
the RUSSians .
for further mfor
exploit our superiority in maneuver and in equipment. they may wish to make.
ly to declare our ead'mes
s 0 receI.Ve and fully consider any propo
mation or for
sals which

8. TI_. Under the campaign as planned, it is estimated that the defeat of the Japanese in the Tokyo I I. Participation by other natioDS.
Plain area and the seizure of ports on Tokyo Bay would be completed by mid-1946 Should it prove
.
necessary to execute other operations prior to invading the Tokyo Plain, the earliest date by which the .lI. China. The effectiven

::: : t
ess of the Chinese A "
latter operation could take place is estimated to be October 1 946, because of adverse weather and supply. By the fall of 1945 ' l. enli�
. ly dependent upon US

� 0J� �
, the Chinese National A training and
ground conditions and the necessity of further mobilizing resources. In either case, the war should be only about 545,000 (39 diVisi I'l conSist of a� t 2,5oo
ons) are bein train � ,ooo men. However,
over not later than the end of 1 946. reasonably effective for offen u der US superVJs on and
sive operation � can be considered
me f th alance of the Chmese Armi
defensive or occupation
On the other hand, we are unable to estimate the time required or the losses that will result in an are ineffective. Increase of ' �
operations while th Iarge
ren;'al�der, for logistical,
es are capable of
political and other reaso
. supply to the Chmese Armles ns,
effort to defeat Japan by isolation, blockade and bombardment without invasion, because of our major Chma ' IS dependent on the openi
ng 0 f a sea r utc to a

�
coast port and the impro . �
vement of internaI a" .
and ground hnes
inability to predict at what stage thereof the Japanese might concede defeat, and because of the

.,." t
Though we are planning of comm umcation.
to send several shi I°ad . G
possibility that invasion of the Tokyo area would ultimately be necessary. We feel that at best, such contingent upon his seizin of SUPPh to eneral Wedemeyer
g a harbor no su tantia . this summer,
dIverslOn 0 ships
strategy would lead to a longer and probably more costly war. made until the campaign
":
in Japan ill permit.
and men for this purpose
can be

9. In summary, our planned course of action is: It is estimated that Japan

about 900,000 men. It is
�:
ese strength ' Ch'ma ::: �
.
the all of 1 945 excluding
Manchuria, will be
.!: To proceed with an operation against southern Kyushu on I November 1945, as presently south of Manchuria shoul
considered that major are0 the task of defeating the
enemy in China
d fall to China.
directed.

.Q, British Empire (Com

.I!. To plan and prepare for an invasion of the Tokyo area with a target date of I March 1 946. monwealth) Forces •

�y:
.lU. To exploit to the utmost in the interim periods the possibilities of blockade and air
One Canadian divi
Australian Imperial
divisions are currentl
�.
sion has bee accepted "
.
for partiCipation in CORONET. Three
bombardment of Japan from positions in the Marianas, Iwo Jima, the Ryukyus and Kyushu. Y mg employed m .
command. The Briti Southwest Pacific Area
. . . sh Chiefs of Staff have rece under US
"
dIVISlons partiCipate . ntly proposed . .
that 3 - 5 BrIllsh

.:; � ��
.II. To base the decision as to operations following southern Kyushu developments. The views of the Aust
m the final phase of
the camp3Ign
G
. .
10 Japan, all to oper
Commonwealth
ate under US comman
ralian and New Zeal d
nd o e �
British Chiefs of Staff � �nts on this pr�posal have been requ
�
war.
�
, but not yet receiv ested by th
10. RussllUl participation in the In previous discussions and correspondence with the ' Th n s mtend deploym

� �;;.�
extent of 21 divisions . g Commonwealth forc
and 16 brigades (prO . es to the
bab y mc udmg the
Russians, they. have indicated that they would probably require about three months after VE-Day for East Indies Area. Under separate above divisions) in
the Southeast Asia­
consider f an offer to the United
concentration of troops and supplies on their eastern front. We have considered that Russia's entry at as to participate in oper States of I Australia
ations against Japan n division
early a date as possible consistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations is highly desirable to : .

�
provide maximum assistance to our Pacific operations and that the primary objective of Russia's
Air F orces: Negotiations are
in progress t make use

��r;;,� :i �
military effort should be to contain and destroy Japanese forces in Manchuria. Pacific, with a possible of 10 squadrons of Briti
ultimate emplo sh bombers in the

:
f o u ron . Iso a
squadrons have been
offered for suppo
3 5 I
� � �
force of approximately 1 5
tactical
We believe that we can defeat the Japanese in the main islands regardless of Russian entry, because of units found necessary for lons mdlcated above. The
operations in South�t A RAF will provide air
our own estimated ability to restrict movement of Japanese reinforcements from Asia. However, the .
defeat of the Japanese army in North China including Manchuria would be a valuable contribution to Naval Forces: Elements
of the British Fleet '
the early and economical termination of the war. assault for�, compriSi will su�P?rt operation .
ng amphibious lift for ' s In Southeast Asia;
about 3 dIVIsl ns, Will . 3 naval

As to basing US forces in Russian territory, this is no longer considered necessary, and we therefore
Southeast Asia Command
. .
BntISh PaCI'fiIC Fleet, conS
' should these elements
not be
� be conlinuously available
used m the maoIn o!'"r .
to the
isting of 4 batlleshiPS, alions against Japan. The
5 carriers' accompanym .
suggest that this subject be discussed only if necessary in connection with Russian discussion of opening

�
currently operating unde g hght naval forces and
r Admiral Nimitz I add' . train is
a sea route to their Pacific ports. ItlOn, eIements of the
support of the 3-5 divis
�
ions proposed a ve East Indies Fleet are offer
ed orf
Opening a sea route to Russian ports may well be a resultant requirement of Russian entry into the

��
Estimated Japanese stren
gth in Southeast A . and . .
war. We estimate that it might be satisfactorily accomplished by US convoy of cargo ships in small of 1945, is about 600,000 �alaYSI:'- ex�ludlng the Philippines, in the fall
men. The British Sho
groups without the necessity for our seizure of Japanese territory or of basing forces in Russian territory up the Japanese in SEA �ntlnue thelf primary
'
and the East Indles responsibility for mopp
ing­
other than an advanced anchorage at Petropavlovsk and minor base facilities at the Russian termini. proposed British Commonw excIUSlve of the PhITIPPln. es. Acceptanc
ealth contributio s to�the IimaI phase of the war
e of the latest
&g8Inst Japan should not
122
1 23
prejudice early accomplishment of this task provided the assault lift available to SACSEA is not
employed elsewhere. The British Pacific Fleet, elements ofthe Royal Air Force, one Canadian division,
and possibly the Commonwealth force proposed by the British will participate in the operation for
invasion of Japan. It is the intention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to turn over to British command certain
portions of the SWPAC area including Australia, the Solomons, New Guinea, New Britain, New
Ireland and the Netherlands East Indies.

.£, France. Certain French naval vessels are now under operational control of the Britis East
Indies Fleet. It does not appear practicable or desirable to employ French naval vessels or air forc in
Pacific operations. The French have offered a corps composed of two Colonial divisions for operatio
in the Pacific. The questions of where and when these divisions can be best employed is now being
examined. Arrangements for the French must include adequate provisions against any repetition in the
Pacific of the French refusals, which have occurred in Europe, to obey military orders. The Southeast
Asia Command includes minor French forces for clandestine operations in Indo-China.

Q. Portugal. If so desired by the Allies, Portugal stands ready to provide minor forces for
•
occupation of Portuguese Timor.

� The Netherlands. Dutch forces may fulfill a minor role in recapture of areas in the
Netherlands East Indies.
APPENDIX G

��
We believe that offers from any nation to contribute token or minor assistance in the Pacific war
PERCENT BOMBS
should be considered on their military merits. The acceptance of any forces should be on the basis that EXPECTED TO HI
IN 1 000 FT AND 200
they are to be trained and equipped to meet US standards of combat efficiency, can be effectively
THE AIMING POINT
FOR VARIOUS C 0 FT OF
ULAR PROBABLEE
employed in planned operations against Japan, are reasonably self-supporting, and will operate as AVERAGE RADIAL RRORS AND
ERRORS.
determined by the United States.

1 2. Control and Command in the Pacific War.

Based upon independ
ent trials.
Throughout previous staff discussions with the British, we have taken the position that control,
command and direction of the war in the Pacific lies with the United States. The British thus far have
committed their forces under this arrangement. We believe that we should continue to follow that policy
and that any efforts which may be made to bring the direction of the Pacific war under the laborious,
argumentative and time-consuming system of combined control should be vigorously opposed.

1 24
1 25

•
 100 r-----,

90
80

80 CHART I

CONVERSION CHART

70 % OF B O M B S I N C I R CL E

vs C E P &. M RE
�
�
i3 60
� CI
III !! i
III CI
� � :;;
g
Note:
50 :;; 20
� CEP=O.9394 MRE=1.177cr

... � MRE=t.065 CEP=t.253 cr

o CI
I­ 0 IN CIRCULAR ERROR ANALYSIS
0
Z

O�����g:�
lj 40 .:..
-I

:r:n d�
a: "
....
� ;
C 4000 5000 EET
III 600
30 J I I I ( I
1000 ! r ! I I [
, !
2000
3000 4000
! ! I I
AVERAGE RADIAL 5000 6000
ERROR

CONVERSION
CHART
Adapted from AFM 79
20

10

1 27
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
MRE: MEAN RADIAL ERROR, FEET

1 26
 22 September 1 944

Brigadier General H. S. Hansell

Commanding General
2 1 st Bomber Command
Peterson Field
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Dear Possum :

As you well know the original conception of the B-29 was an airplane that would carry tremendous
loads for tremendous distances. We have not to date fulfilled this promise. We have flown great
distances but we have not carried any sizeable bomb loads. In fact we have not carried any more bombs
and in most cases considerably less than the B-24s and B- I 7s carry. One of the greatest factors in the
defeat of Japan will be the air effort. Consequently every bomb that is added to each airplane that takes
off for Japan will directly affect the length of the war.

APPENDIX H
It is my desire that you do everything in your power to increase the bomb load to the maximum when

G units of your command begin operating against Japan. To this end your crews and commanders should
OLD COMMANDIN
GENERAL H H ARN
CORRESPONDENCE WITH
AND
·
TH LT G
wi
BARNEY GILES,EN be thoroughly imbued with the importance of the job they are expected to do with the B-29. They should
H AIR FOR CE, become accustomed to and proficient at flying the B-29 with gross weights up to 140,000 Ibs. or higher.
GENERAL, TWENTIET CES.
US ARMY AIR FOR
CillEF OF STAFF, Every pilot should be an expert on keeping gasoline consumption to a minimum. There is a tendency to
plan missions so that the weakest pilot will have a safe reserve on return to base. This cannot be
tolerated. Weak pilots must either be removed or given sufficient training so that the maximum is
are current
. included because they
These COpIes of letters are obtained from the airplane.
.nve a feel for the circumstances
with the events descn ·bed and '"
.
of 1 944 -45 .
fall and early wmter I know that you, in your position as commander of one of our great striking forces, will do your
and relationships in the
utmost to help accomplish the earliest possible defeat of Japan. This can only be done by making the
best possible use of the weapon at your disposal.
ry of Congress .
uscript Division, Libra
collections of the Man
Reproduced from the
Wishing you the best of luck with your new command.

Sincerely,

H. H. Arnold
General, U. S. Army
Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force

129
1 28

•
 (

Nov. 1 3 , 1 944
BOMBER COMMAN D
HEADQUARTERS XXI
ding General
Office of the Comman
Peterson Field

Brigadier General H. S. Hansell, Jr.

Colorado Springs, Colo. Commanding General, XXI Bomber Command
I October 1944 A.P .0. 234, c/o PosUOasler
San Francisco, California

Dear Possum:
General H. H. Arnold
Commanding General I have been getting reports of your photo reconnaissance missions and of your practice operations. It
United States Army Air Forces appears to me that you are working hard and well, and I am pleased with the progress that you have
and made with your Command.
Commanding General
Twentieth Air Force At the time that I write this letter, you have 77 B-29s with you and 17 more have departed the US,
Washington, D. C. with at least an equal number ready to jump off. I haven't been satisfied with the number of airplanes we
have delivered to you to date, but I believe that that has been corrected now. The weather the last few
Dear General Arnold: days has slowed us down a bit but they appear to be moving again now.
ed me.
. September 22 has just reach
rapidly that your letter 0f
I have been moving about so In order to give LeMay modified airplanes with the center section fuel tanks, we are taking a few of
. I will do my best to the end your reserve airplanes and sending them to him this month. This should have no effect on your
ls o? of CO? I ence and to assure you that
fid
I want to thank you for your expres of bomb s over Japan ese targets where they will operations since they are being replaced by the airplanes becoming available next month. You should
puts I!,
m�mum I ad
that the XXI Bomber Command
0
power t increas e the bomb load being carried. receive before December I , at least 1 50 B-29s plus replacements.
everythmg 10 our
do the most good. We will do
0

,000 pounds gross. You realize as well as anyone the important parr that you and the XXI Bomber Command will play
are taking off at 1 34 to 1 35
:1�1O
As you know our present tramm
. , . '
g mission" !� Ba�ta'
0 pounds. in the Twentieth Air Force program, and consequently, in the program of the entire Army Air Forces. I
our
.
I?IU al n again st Japan will take off at 136,00
Based on that experience I believe that .
ac ory, I feel confident that we can
do this without feel that these first few major missions of yours are ofparticular significance because ofthe fact that they
the runwa ys saU
If the surface and grading of will do much to establish the standards upon which future operations will be based. I know that you are
IS

difficulty. doing everything within your power to make them highly successful. I am confident that because of your

O u With the water injection

engines, and with the effort, they will be successful .

� Coo
that the load Sh \ Id
As we gain experience, I agree in the near future. Perhaps we
can reach that
am sure that we can reac I O ,
fuel injection engines, I In looking over the pictures which you sent in, I am impressed with the regularity of the dispersal
load with our present equip ment. area and the fact that a Jap strafer could easily line up 1 2 or 1 5 B-29s. No matter what we do about
by this means dispersal, we are going to end up having too many airplanes in a small area. I am afraid that cannot be
0f every flight engin eer after every mission, and hope
We are examining the flight records .
maxim um return from their aircraft. avoided, but I hope that you will seriously consider this matter and do everything possible to avoid
rs who are not getUn g the
to weed out those flight enginee furnishing a good target. Until such time as the Bonins may be cleared up, there wi.ll always exist a
. al doctrine material threat to the security of your bases. You will have to be constantly on guard to avoid any undue
. . . ation, and are issuing a tactic
noW on an eleven lIlrplane form
IncidentallY we are stablhzmg orma 0n , so as to provide maxim
um defense congestion and to eliminate any chances of a small Jap air attack accounting for a number of your
ive gunfir e from that � ti
for the control of maximum defens airplanes.
self inflicted damage.
and minimize the likelihood of
. . the 73rd Wing, I hope this reaches you before your first major undertaking because I would like to have you and your
p<lSSible u:aIDl�g. as a It f ur extension of time for
In order to gain the maximum a°m�io n (3 200 miles ), taking off at 134,000 Command know that you are starting out with the best wishes and the full confidence of all of us back
each unit !D . y o?e :?st
we have set up a requirement for , bombing at here. Please pass this on to Rosey and give him my best regards.
hour I �ng assembly Penetration of a front
to 1 35 ,000 pounds, ,,?d two seven �'�7 �: ;ormation. W� also intend to move by squad rons
gunn 3 ee
30,000 feet, and m3Xlmum . � �!.n ; em ts (except for bombing) en route. Sincerely,
to the theater, and to pra
cuce th ....u r en

Sincerely yours,

H. H. ARNOLD
General, U.S. Army
H. S. HANSELL, JR. Commanding
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
131
130
 HEADQUARTERS XXI BOMBER COMMAND guns and 2 I 6 fifty cal guns o
AA
'
f the artillery. I have requested the
Office of the Commanding General OUr own .50 cal AA guns into lSiand Commander
the scheme of defense under IS to incorporate
APO 234-c/o PM screen to cover the base . As soon as we can get started
h' control We are
. also .
prepartng a smoke
San Francisco, C�!ifomia ' .ons,
on our maJor operati
SOme aircraft up to Iwo Jima on we will continue

r;:;,
practice raids to discou to send
e the use of that place as
the capture of Iwo Jima will change a base. Of course,
the picture complet .

I �'t tell you how pleased I am to have Bill Irvine. I have

o!
. . .
With hiS assistance we can lick "":t confidence tn him and I am sure that
the maintenance problem
22 November 1 944 though , of course, we have not aircraft have stood up
remarkably well
�
participated in actual co bat.

�
! r ,;"
I distressed to report the loss of
a photo shi last night The l
gave him the CQurse to the field as 1 800-
e called the field
he aCk wledged 'A r tt e ater, about . � radio and We

=�
for another course and we gave I �lght O clock, he asked
him 1 8 70-which he did no ac �
General H. H. Arnold We had no reason to believe that l e. e SI als were not stro
he was in trouble and he was a Th !!" ng.
Commanding General We have a Navy search unit out t lime approxunateiy on
covering h'IS course now but the the course
U.S. Army Air Forces
and
was good at the field last night. chances are rather slim. The
visibiIi �
Commanding General I am making every effort to expedi

: ':t. 'pr? r
te completio f the Lo an tnstall
' .
Twentieth Air Force has not been finished, but when al1?n. The gr und insta lation
it is that will SOlv � l
Washington, D. C. e b em of returning naVi.
planes takeoff at daybreak which gation. Even if our
is 0500 the T0ky0 mission still
puts the
area two to three hours aft
er nightfall. . : .
airplanes back in the base
My dear General Arnold:
With the earnest hope that I will
be able to pass good news to you
Your letter of November 13 arrived yesterday afternoon. It was not only greatly appreciated but it long before this letter arrives,
I am
came at a most opportune time.

I have just made for the fifth time in a row the most difficult decision I have ever been called upon to Very Sincerely yours,
make-to postpone San Antonio I-our initial mission against Tokyo. We were all ready to go on the
1 7th with 83 of our 85 available airplanes scheduled to takeoff, when the storm which swept in that
morning lingered and steadily grew worse. After we have flown our first successful mission, I will write
you in detail the story of these last five days, but now they would sound like an excuse.
sl Possum

As for the airplanes which we are losing to LeMay, I fully understand that situation. To say that I H . S. HANSELL, JR.

willingly lose them to LeMay would call for a halo for my head which would not fit, but I do certainly Brigadier General, USA
appreciate his requirements and have every confidence that ours will be met also. Commanding.

I am enclosing some pictures which you may not have seen. I am sure that the boys in the "back
room" have been
studying pictures like these, but in the thought that you may not have seen them, and
knowing your personal interest, I am sending them along with Bill Irvine.

Your remark on the regularity of spacing of the hardstands on Isley #I was noted and I agree
completely, but honestly don't know what solution can be found. We are using nearly every foot of the
plateau on which Isley #I is situated, that is generally bounded by the perimeter road.

I feel quite sure that the Japs will come back again with the full moon the first part of next month. I
hope that they continue their present tactics. They dispatch high altitude and low-strafing planes
simultaneously. The high-altitude planes alert our defenses to meet both. We live in great apprehension
against the time when they will abandon this practice and send their strafers in at low altitude alone,
because our warning system is inadequate to meet that problem.

The Island Commander has cooperated to the greatest extent possible in the defense of the island.
Eighty percent of the automatic weapons available for this purpose are sighted around our air base, as
well as the majority of the heavy AA batteries. A total of 56 ninety mm guns are disposed about the base.
The Air Base is now quite well defended from the standpoint of small arms fire. There are 54 forty mm

132
133
 The first photos taken by the 3rd Photo Recon Squadron have Just come and I am delighted to say
BER COMMAND
HEADQUARTERS XXI BOM that the extent of damage was greater than I had anticipated from examination of the strike pbotos taken
General
Office of the Commanding by the Groups. If we can accomplish damage like this with less than 10% of our bombs in the target area,
APO 234-c/o PM then we can' really go to town once we bring our bombing proficiency up to its necessary level.
San Francisco , California
Dr. Bowles has been with us for several days and departed yesterday. Out of his visit came two things
of great importance to me. One ( 1 ) the conviction that we can do radar bombing against our primary
targets with improved training. Second (2) the conviction that we should have by all means a wing
9 equipped with stripped airplanes to do radar and night bombing, carrying approximately 20,000 Ibs. per
1 6 December 1 44
airplane. I feel that there is great utility for such a wing, but not at the expense of our present three
wings. It should be an additional wing and the sooner we can get it tbe better. I $till feel that our primary
effort should be by visual bombing, wben possible, because it is always inberently more accurate; but
with the improvement in radar bombing, I feel that our efforts can be directed against our primary target
every time and that it will not be necessary to waste our bombs on large city areas as a secondary effort.

General H. H. Arnold
In order to improve our bombing accuracy against primary targets, I bave issued a directive, a copy of
Commanding General
wbich is attached. Its purpose is to intensify training of lead crews both in the Wings and the Bomber
U.S. Anny Air Forces
and Command. To do this the Wings must have access to some airplanes for training. Under the system we
have been using, every airplane in the Wing is made ready for operation with the result none are
Commanding General
available for daily training. Sometimes we have to postpone an operation several days because of the
Twentieth Air Force
weather, and during that period the squadrons get no training at all. By setting aside one airplane per
Washington , D.C.
squadron we can intCflSify our training, especially of lead crews, and it can go on all the time. I am sure
that the result will be many more bombs on the target.
My dear General Arnold:

...
encumber you
.
that comes through yo ur office and I am hesitant to An interesting phenomenon in connection with Mempbis One was that we had literally no "overs"
I know the great volume of mall . ··-�-� · n the __ and
are keenIy mum:� :o I ·-000 -
. However, I also know that you and a great many " aborts." I think the bombardier just couldn't believe that they were bucking a wind of
with more readmg materiaI.
.
on the hIgh rghts
pass I of our latest experience.
so I shall attempt to ' 200 miles per hour. Another interesting fact is that they appeared to have got very few bits with our
, experience of this command,
M- 1 8 incendiaries. This, I believe, is due to the fact that an M · 1 8 cluster opening at 5,000 feet is subject

�� �
Factory,
against the Mitsubishi Aircraft
conduc� Memph'IS On. e to considerable drift from bigh winds. Most of our incendiaries hit sbort of the target. As a result, we
On the 1 3th, as you. know, we It b o� t to attention. However, I
is already m and I am sure shall go back to the M-76 500·lb. napon filled bomb.
Nagoya. The operational report
IS :� �
ymg p en yesterday the 1 5th,
be of interest. 1lle accomF _
::
have some later data which will 'derable has been
show the bombs which have
fallen in the �area. It nt
we are demonstrating at
ed With the state 0 IClency w
satisfi I realize that this has been a long letter but hope you will find it of sufficient interest to compensate
done. However, I am far from
present. for that fact. I'm in the process of moving my headquarters to Guam. All the personnel except the
•
Operations Section have already left Saipan. I expect to move with the Operations Section about
I thought we hit some high winds
some nm.: and pec,urlar experiences'
To be sure we are encountering . been bombing down wind up December 20.
ml'1es an ho r IS somet hmg new to aIl 0f us. We had
200 in an effort to improve our
-:;; �':"
in Europe but � .
is One operat ion. There we debberat�IY flew up wind I should like to extend very best wishes of the Command to you and Mrs. Arnold for a MERRY
ese to
anti�rcraft
until the Memph r redueed
d speed wasapan
200 mlles hou r
bombing accuracy. With the wind
approximately .� accuracy of J AA CHRISTMAS AND A HAPPY NEW YEAR.

:;:,����;:'re ndar
extremely vulner able to
about 130 which made our units ' . t ofview They are evidently
develop ment
at high altitudes is the most surprising by alone. On most
�ently are not e
using radar range finders but could not see, we have had no
AA, or Very Sincerely yours,

"
the ners
occasions when we have had a sobd ov ercast, so � m
gun eather, we had at least 3 1 of our airplanes
clear w
' On Memp his One which was
very inaccurate fiIre. to return it is a1moat
the four airplanes tiult failed
h'It by AA and damaged to greate . ' . Of
r or lesser extent
to develop our radar countenn
euures as
by AA • We shall have
certain that they had all been hit severe IY
counte raCt this AA ac curacy. H. S. HANSELL, JR.
rapidly as possible to
has been worrying us Brigadier General, USA
.
we encountered the other major danger that
On return from MemphIS One, . .
th lighten ing and the heaviest rain I have Commanding.

airc�W::���!
. A trOplca
! stonn WI
from the start: bad weather at the bases .
about 8 ' 30 at night Three airplanes
bad
r
ever seen hit our bases just as the fi st inutes �
which the'visibility was euctly 2 Incls'
a pen
landed ahead of It but then there was Inc! I . Photographs
.
. 9s came in as thick as flies. Needless to

�:: :i' :re

2
the stonn had passed' th B
zero and the rain torrential. �fter after hav!ng Incl 2 • Cy of directive
fr th short of gasoline, especially
say, we were extrem�ly worned, because eq and I think
fact that they lan saf y is a ibute to the Control System
tr
encountered heavy Winds. The
quite a high standard of ainnans hip.
135
134
 19 December 1944 work they have done in
preventing destruction of
connection with � utti�g out the �res as a result
of Japanese attacks and
other airplanes by elt ogged persIstence,
in the use of their bulldoz Ignoring their own personal safety
ers.

I am sending you this letter

by courier because I would
Iik e t0 have an answer to .
Brigadier General H. S. Hansell, Jr. It as soon as I can.
Commanding General, XXI Bomber Command
APO 234, clo Postmaster
San Francisco, California Sincerely,

Dear Hansell:
H. H. ARNOLD
General, U.S. Army
Your units out there have been doing a wonderful job. It is regretted that their strength is not such so
Commanding General , Army Air Forces
that we could have complete destruction o£ the plants rather than just partial destruction. I await with
great interest photographs of your latest operations, in which apparently you came nearer to securing
complete destruction than on any missions heretofore.

As you know, I was worried and am still somewhat concerned about the defenses of Saipan, Tinian
and Guam bases. Perhaps the antiaircraft defenses have been perfected to greater extent now than they
were when we first started operations. Certain phases I cannot understand. For one thing, I cannot
understand Jap planes coming over in the daytime and apparently making several passes at the field
during a period of 45 minutes with no mention whatsoever made of our own fighters even attempting to
prevent such strafing. A little later on, reports indicated that a few enemy airplanes were knocked down,
but no credit of any kind was given to our fighters for having made determined efforts to drive the Japs
away from the base. I would like to know the true story concerning this. Just what do our fighters do out
there, or don't we have any fighters?

Another phase of your operations that is not altogether clear to me is why we have so many planes
ditched on the return trip. I am fully aware of the fact that a certain number of the planes are ditched by
enemy aircraft or aircraft fire. I am also aware of the fact that some of these airplanes naturally must be
ditched, but it seems that on every raid there are about 3 or 4 airplanes that go down, well on the return
trip, with no definite cause being given. It would seem to me that as the losses from this cause are
constant and if added up, will present a very large number, we should find the causes and determine
what we can do to prevent them. Certainly there is no one in my office who can tell me the cause for
these airplanes going down. In my opinion, the B-29 cannot be treated in the same way that we treat a
fighter, a medium bomber, or even a flying fortress. We must consider the B-29 more in terms of a naval
vessel, and we do not lose naval vessels in 3s or 4s without a very thorough analysis of the causes and
what preventative measures may be taken to avoid loss in the future. This same reasoning must apply to
our B-290.

Have some of your people get busy on this phase of your operation at once and give me a full and
complete report of every mission since your arrival. I would also like for you to give me your
recommendations, first telling me what you believe the causes of these ditchings are, and second, what
we can do to eliminate them in the future. If we do not know, then certainly some of the restrictions on
the use of radio should be lifted so that we can have these fellows tell what the cause of their troubles are
before they leave the formation or before they land in the sea.

I wish you would convey to all of the members of your command, including all the Service Forces,
my appreciation of the splendid work they are doing under very difficult operating conditions. I wish
particularly that you would tell the engineers how much I appreciate their efforts and the marvelous

1 36
137
 30 December 1 944 I February 1 945

Brigadier General H. S. Hansell, Jr. Brigadier General H. S. Hansell, Jr.

Commanding General, XXI Bomber Command
A.P.0. 234, clo Postmaster
San Francisco, California
Dear Possum:
I read with a great deal of interest your letter of 2 December to Norstad on the subject of your first
�
operation. I realize that during the period that you were forced to delay attack rom day to day, much of
�.IS �
the pressure on you was the realization of the interest back here. I regret that h �
to be e case but I
cannot deny that we were watching you from day to day with the greatest anuclpauon. I think you did a
splendid job and you and your Command are'to be commended for initiating the Battle of Japan in such
good style.
To oversimplify our basic operating policy, it is our purpose to destroy our targets. For this reason we
have avoided announcing in advance what we propose to do and we have carefully screened our news
releases to avoid the public's becoming overoptimistic. We want to let the results speak for themselves.
However, we must accept the fact that we have a big obligation to meet. To fulfill this we must in fact
destroy our targets and then we must show the results so the public can judge for itself as to the
effectiveness of our operations. I have seen your PRU interpretation photos of the Musashino engine
factory attack and the strike pictures of the Musashino assembly plant, and I am willing to conclud� that
we have started the job. I hope that you will send back an increasing number of pictures of mcreaslngly
interesting subjects.
Commanding General, 38th Flying Training Wing
Williams Field, Arizona
Dear Possum:
I know that the change in command of the XXI Bomber Command was a great disappointment to
you and it is for that reason that I am greatly impressed with the fine spirit with which you have accepted
this situation. Your letter of the 8th of January indicates a degree of loyalty, judgment, and devotion to
duty which is a great credit to you as an officer.
I want to make it clear to you that I feel that you did a very fine job in organizing, training, and
committing the XXI Bomber Command to action. I am cognizant of the great problems involved in
pioneering a project of this type. You have my appreciation as well as my admiration for your excellent
work.
The decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deploy the 3 1 5th and 3 1 6th Wings in the Marianas puts
all our eggs in one basket. The XXI Bomber Command will, in fact, be the Twentieth Air Force for the
next 8 or 9 months at least. The job from now on is no longer planning and pioneering. It has become
one of operating. LeMay, because of his broad experience in handling large units of heavy bombers over
a long period of time plus his experience of over 4 months with the XX Bomber Command, should be
our best qualified operator. I know that you join me in wishing him well in this great undertaking.

You probably already know that the 3 1 5th and 3 1 6th Wings will ultimately be deployed to e �
Marianas. The 3 1 5th is a special strip-down instrument precision umt from which we are expectmg
great things. We expect it to be ready so that it can be deployed without delay in the present schedule
and that this will be in sufficient time to put it into effective operation during the period of the worst
I fully agree it is to the best interests of the service as well as best for you personally that you should
now enjoy a period of at least relative rest. I consequently directed Personnel to assign you to the
Training Command for duty of the general nature you requested. The change in your status was the
result of my decision based upon my best judgment. I sincerely appreciate your generous acceptance of

weather in Japan. this decision and I greatly regret the disappointment which I know It has caused you.

To me the best evidence of how you are getting along is the pictures of the destruction that you have
accomplished against your primary targets. However, I do like to hear from you so drop me a line when
you have time.
I want to assure you of my personal appreciation of what you have done and of my confidence that
your work in the future will be of the same high standard as you have always produced in the past.
I am leaving on a rather extended trip after having been in Washington only a few days. After my
return, I will look forward to seeing you either here in Washington or at your own Headquarters.

Sincerely,

Sincerely,

H. H. ARNOLD
General, U.S. Army
H. H. ARNOLD
Commanding Commanding General, Army Air Forces

1 38 139
 HEADQUARTERS
38th FLYING TRAINING WING Lt. General Barney M. Giles 27 March 1 945
Williams Field, Chandler, Arizona
played ball 100 percent witb General Harmon and never sent General Arnold any statement or letter
27 March 1 945 without telling General Harmon what I was doing. His staff was a little more difficult to get around,
because they wanted very much to control the XXI Bomber Command.However, I think we finally won
them over, too.
As for the second obstacle, the U.S. Navy, I have never received better support from anybody and
Lt. General Barney M. Giles have never been able to cooperate with anyone any better. When I arrived in the Marianas I had no
Chief of the Air Staff credentials, other than my own assumption of position and authority. Admiral Hoover was generally
Army Air Forces considered, by all the Army, and Navy as well, as the hardest-boiled and most intolerant Admiral in the
Pentagon Building Navy. We hit it off 1 00 percent again by the simple process of being completely honest and straight­
Washington, D.C. forward. Admiral Hoover responded beautifully to that approach. I left the Marianas with a firm friend
in Admiral Hoover, and he did everything he could to meet my requests. Incidentally, for air-sea rescue
Dear Barney: he provided an average of 6 submarines, 2 destroyers, and 10 to 1 2 flying boats. Although the air-sea
I had a very pleasant visit with
rescue was not especially successful, it was not through the lack of effort on the part of Admiral Hoover.
:� �
Hal G '
O· k Ltndsay , and Sa�ty Fairchild last weekend on the
West Coast. During the course of our CO �ti. � .I gathered that Wllhs As for the Depot, I had less success in that respect. Up to two weeks before I left Guam, I had
representations in Washington about our relatio ' Hale had made rather strong
nshIp tn the Pacific. received only three percent of my requisitions for supplies and absolutely no maintenance assistance
�
whatever. I didn't complain about this, because I felt the Depot was doing the best it could, but it
I realize that is now water over

:
the dam nd th n th·tng I do or say makes any real differe certainly left me in a spot. Looking back, I am amazed that we were still able to run 938 sorties against
�
score. However, since he expressed his versIDn, . . nce on that
give you mine. ' I In perhaps,just to complete the record, I had better Japan in the first 36 days, almost double our estimated capacity for that period. Of course, I might not
have done any better if the Depot had been under my control, but at least I would have had a firmer
hand in correcting the situation. My biggest maintenance problem was lack of a Deputy Chief of Staff
for Maintenance and Supply. At General Harmon's request Steve Thomas was relieved from that job
and assigned to General Harmon's staff, leaving me completely without any maintenance expert. I was
operating from a field that was less than half complete. My initial operations were from a single runway,
I . I had to redeem the confidence of G� ' staff, SInce
. 7000 feet long. We had to build our own shops and supply buildings, and they were not finished until
neraI Harm n and hIS he knew very well that I
had opposed his control of Twentieth Atr ' orce operatI�ons as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Twentieth long after the assault on Japan had been initiated. Bill Irvine, of course, saved the situation at the last
Air Force. minute, but I had an awfully tough time until he got there. My Headquarters was delayed on route and
p�fi� �� to establiS�a. friendly working relationship with the senior Navy Commanders did not arrive in the Marianas until the middle of December, so I had to run the 21st Bomber Command
out of pocket with about 1 0 staff officers and 1 5 or 20 enlisted men, operating from an improvised
overcome etr natural hostility to the introduction of in the hut-no complaint, but it was not easy.
another independent command.
3. I had to establish a working relationship with . I did succeed in establishing just exactly the relationship that I wanted with the Island Commander,
away from my jurisdiction. the A"tr Depot whIch, as you know, was taken
General Jarmon. We did it by the simple process of pitching in and working to the greatest possible

:� �� �:��� !':n
extent of our capacity, proving to him that we meant business, and expected no favors. He, too,
s administrative agreement with the Island Commander and responded to this kind of treatInent, and toward the latter part of my stay, was occasionally calling me
hi a y and completely by-passed hIm and went directly back to make it clear to up to see if tbere wasn't something more they could do for us. I could not hope for a finer relationship
: ":.� ..: �:��
for administraf d oG n General Harmon
old for operations, while at the same time I expected from there. As for the administrative relationship between General Jarmon and me, I wrote the ticket myself.
the logistic sU rt b him
I wrote a memorandum to him, explaining just how the Twentieth Air Force operated, and outlining

10;�: ;::�,I�
��:nt� :;ay of thinking the. 13rd Wing which, from its Commander to its
pe y o
precisely what functions I needed from him, and which we would take care of ourselves. He accepted it
without ever changing a comma, with the result that the Twentieth Air Force did get firmly established
to me and everyth Ing that I wanted to do. in the way that we wanted it.

:���::! : f:t��� ��=eyPlehadbelieved the job couldn't be done anyway, and even I nearly lost my mind about the 73rd Wing. As you know, they had sold themselves on radar bombing
FO ated . uneqUI.vocally that we could not conduct such
from �e Marianas th nk thIS was a fairly large
i Air at night. They were extremely bostile to my intention to bomb by daylight against precision targets. That
::ies and carefully so'ugh
operations on Ja � daylight was what I believed in, but whether or not I had believed in it I had a directive to that effect. I very
of all these diffi l I order. However, l was well aware seriously considered relieving the Wing Commander and all the group Commanders. However, to have
t to overcome them all.
done so would have wrecked the organization for a matter of months. We had told the Chiefs of Staff
As for General Harmon I rejoice t0 say th� tn . that we would attack Japan in daylight in the month of November, and I fully intended to see that it was
wrote me several very nice 'letters and · my opInion , was completely succesfu
I s l there. He done. I went to Rosie and we had a frank talk, as one man to another. He carne through very handsomely
express great confidence In what I was doing. Inciden
tally, I and supported my directives very loyally. Little by little, we swung the 73rd Wing around to where I
1 40 141
 Lt. General Barney M. Giles 27 March 1945
wanted it, but at one time I had to call them together and give them the strongest talk I have ever heard a
commanding officer deliver to a combat organization. They had to be shaken out oftheir smugness and
made to realize that bombs on the target were the only ones that counted. However, they did come
through, and I am very proud of their accomplishment.
There was, unfortunately, one other obstacle which I did not recognize until too late. I had not
realized that General Hale felt so strongly about his position in the Marianas. Here is the story of my
relationship with General Hale, as I see it:
I arrived on the I I th of October. I at once went to call upon General Hale and he was very cordial. I
must confess that I was somewhat dismayed on arrival at Saipan. Instead of two fields of two strips each,
8500 feet long, I found only one strip, 7000 feet long, and one strip nearing completion on a field which
was not usable. A slight hill rose about 140 feet above the level of the runway at a distance of about 500
feet. I tried a heavily loaded airplane off the other."trip and measured its altitude at the end of 6000 feet,
and finally had to admit that we couldn't make it. Therefore, I agreed to turn that field over to General
Hale and the 7th Air Force, despite the fact that it had been built on priorities establish� by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff for the Twentieth Air Force.
The other thing that dismayed me was this: There were already over 1 00 airplanes belonging to
General Hale's outfit, operating on the single strip of the B-29 field. Willis recognized this difficulty at
once and told me that he would have the field cleared by the l st of November, inasmuch as I had B-29s
coming in at the rate of five a day, and they had to get some practice before the initial operation, which
was scheduled for the 6th of November. This still left me somewhat dismayed, but I accepted it without
comment of any kind. When no airplanes were moved from the B-29 field to the other field, I reminded
Willis of the arrangement, and he said that he would have them off by the 6th of November. When my
operation was postP'?ned to the 1 1th of November, and finally the 1 6th of November, Willis agreed to
vacate the field, but made no move to do so.
Finally, I was directed to launch an operation, with maximum force, on the 1 6th of November, and
there were still over 100 airplanes, belonging to Willis' command and to the ATC, on the field. On the
1 2th of November, when no effort had been made to clear the field and I had over 100 B-29s there, I put
my request in writing. I had to address it through Admiral Hoover, and I asked for five things:
1 . Submarines for air-sea rescue.
2. Destroyers for air-sea rescue.
3 . Flying boats for air·sea rescue.
4. That all fields in the Marianas be cleared as crash landing strips for returned B-29s on the night
of the first operation.
5. That Isley field be cleared of airplanes not belonging to the XXI Bomber Command.
I took this, in person, to Admiral Hoover, who immediately agreed to all of them, and I asked him
not to take action on the last item, as that was a matter which I would adjust personally with General
Hale. I then went immediately to Willis' office and gave him a copy of the message which I had
delivered to Admiral Hoover. I also gave him at that time a detailed plan of my operation against Tokyo,
and we discussed it in a very friendly manner. It seemed perfectly clear to all of us that I could not
operate 1 20 B-29s from a single strip, 7000 feet long, and still have 100 miscellaneOus airplanes
operating from that same strip.
During the course of the conversation, Willis' A-3, a Colonel Eskridge, took me to task and asked me
to explain in what way the extra 1 00 airplanes were interfering with my operations, and why they would
have to be moved. This seemed so completely unreasonable to me, that I told him (not Willis Hale, but
Colonel Eskridge) that that was a malter which General Hale and I had agreed upon, and I did not
142
27 March 1 945
Lt. General Barney M. Giles
consider it necessary to explain to him why 100 miscellaneous airplanes on a single strip was an
excessive number, in addition to 120 B-29s.
Willis and I parted on, I thought, good terms, but it seems I had offended his pet assistant and the next
I knew of it General Jarmon called me up two days later and Willis was in his office, apparently
extremely irate. Willis said that he had made an official complaint against me, through Admiral Hoover,
and claimed that I had been arbitrary to him. I must confess that I was completely taken aback and had
to have the situation explained to me, because I did not understand that anything had been amiss. I then
told Willis that I was very much surprised at his action in sending his message, through the Navy, to
another commander, 4000 miles away, when all he had to do was pick up the telephone and I wo\,ld
have been glad to come to his office, which was only five miles from my own Headquarters. I also felt
that it was a very unhappy situation, when a ground commander had to take a part in clarifying a
discussion between two Air Corps officers. So I said to Willis, in General Jarmon's presence, that I felt
the air field would have to be cleared in order for me to launch my operation, as directed, but that I
would rely completely in General Hale's decision, and if he could not clear the field, I would find a way
to launch my operation anyway. I repeated my statement to General Jarmon: that I would leave the
matter entirely in General Hale's hands, to resolve, as best he could, and that I had every confidence in
General Hale's willingness to find a solution which would permit me to carry out my operation.
I must confess it was most distasteful to me to have to adopt this attitude when I felt I was so patently
in the right, but I felt very strongly that two Air Corps officers, so far from home, could not afford to
have their troubles resolved by someone else. I thought the malter had ended there and made no further
comment or report on it. I was busy carrying out operations.
To tell the truth, I think perhaps that General Hale's complaint may have been prompted partly by
concern over the failure of his command to provide defense for my bases, as directed by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and by the expectancy that I would complain about it As you know, the defense was completely
inadequate, and we took a pretty heavy beating. I did not complain about General Hale's failure to meet
this obligation, and perhaps I was wrong in not doing so.
in readjusting myself
There is the story as I see it. I fully realize it is past history, and I have succeeded
present circumstances. I h�ve
to my present circumstances. Incidentally, I have no complaint about my
group of people, and I should l�ke
an opportunity to do a great deal of flying; I am associated with a fine .
AAF Western Flymg Trammg
to say that this is the best organized unit I have ever been in-the
Command.
This is not offered as a complaint, nor do I expect anybody to do anything about it, but I will feel
better if someone there in Washington knows that there were two sides to the story.
Please drop me a line if you have an opportunity; I know that your duties are, as always, extremely
beavy.
Best regards to you and to Hollis.
Sincerely yours,
H. S. HANSELL
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Commanding
143
 April 9, 1 945

Brigadier General H. S. Hansell

Hq 38th Flying Training Wing
Williams Field
Chandler, Arizona

Dear Possum:

Your letter of March 27th arrived at an opportune time and has been read with very great interest.

'
For your private information, I am planning on leaving Washington within the next couple of weeks
to go to the Pacific to step into the big gap which has been left by Miff Harmon. For that reason, APPENDIX
particularly, I am glad to get the background information which you have sent to me.

I appreciate the mixed emotion with which you are undoubtedly viewing the splendid work being MAPS OF THE PACIFIC
done by your XXI Bomber Command.

For such satisfaction as it may be to you, I would like you to know that the current achievement of the
B-29s over the Marianas is accepted by this Headquarters as evidence that the XXI Bomber Command
was originally based and launched into operations soundly and well. For that achievement we know that
you deserve full credit.

With very best wishes to you.

Sincerely,

BARNEY M. GILES
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.
Deputy Commander, AAF

145
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147

146
 INDEX
INDEX

G L

A B-29, 6, 1 9, 30, 36, Appendix B General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force, 4 Lampert Committee, 3
British Joint Plans Committee, 9 George, Harold, 3, 5, 1 0 Leahy, William D.
Aerial Mining Campaign Brooke, Sir Alan, 9 as Chief of Staff to President, 1 0
Giles, Barney, 62
by XXIst Bomber Command, 42 correspondence of, Appendix H at SEXTANT, 1 7
under LeMay, 43 c Grand strategy, national on Pacific strategy, 69
Air command, unified, 26 definition of, 1 2 LeMay, Curtis
Air forces, strategic for Pacific, 1 7, I 9 on aerial mining, 42-43
Caproni, di Taliedo, 2 as commander XXIst Bomber Command, 46
supporting theater objectives, 1 8
Chennault, Claire as commander XXth Bomber Command, 46
merging under single commands, 1 8
command of, 25
as air pioneer, 3 H in urban incendiary attack, 6 1
14th US Army AF, 25 relieved of XXIst Bomber Command, 70
Air plan, strategic, 5
Chiang Kai-shek, 20, 25
See also AWPD-I Handy, Thomas T., 10, 27
China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater, 25, 45
Air Corps Tactical School, 3-6, 10, 9 1 , 93 Hansell, H. S.
Churchill, Winston, 9-10, 1 4
Air doctrine, 2-3 assigned to War Department, 1 0 M
Combs, Cecil, 30, 69
Air objective at SEXTANT, 1 7
Command of the Air, 2
intermediate, 6, 1 5 , 52 preparing Pacific strategy, 22
Committee of Operations Analysts (COA) Maddocks, K. T., 1 0
primary, 6, 1 5 , 35, 52 first Chief of Staff, 20th Air Force, 27
recommending targets, 20-2 1 , 3 1 Marshall, George C.
Air offensive, 1 2, 15 as commander XXIst Bomber Command, 3 1
on economic objectives, 5 1 on AWPD- I , 6
Allied grand strategy, 1 3 , 74, 90-91 on selective bombing, 5 1
Craig, Howard, 1 0 on air member to Joint Chiefs of Staff
American-British Conversations- I (ABC- I ), 5-6 Hale, Willis, 46
Curry, John F., 3 Committee, 1 0
AWPD- I , 5-7, 1 2, 1 4 - 1 5 , 76, 9 1 , 93 Harmon, Millard "Miff', 33, 45-46 meeting with MacArthur, 2 1
AWPD-42, 1 5 , 76, 9 1 Hoover, John, 34, 45 defending "Hitler first" strategy, 2 2
Army Air Corps, 3-4 D o n theater unity of command, 26
Arnold, Henry H.
on Pacific strategy, 5 1 , 68
as Commanding General, US Army Air Corps, 5 Douhet, Giulio, 2 I on objective of invasion, 79
as member of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee,lO, 1 4 Doolittle, Jimmy, 2, 7() Mariana Islands
o n use o f B-29, 1 9
Incendiary urban attack, 5 1 , 6 1 in Pacific strategy, 22
as commander 20th Air Force, 27
Ismay, Sir Hastings, 1 0 as base for XXth Bomber Command, 46
on radar bombing, 48 E
MATIERHORN, 1 9-21 , 25
on incendiary urban attack, 5 1
Mitchell, Billy, 2-3
on Pacific strategy, 69 Eaker, Ira C. J Montgomery, John, 40, 49
as Executive Agent to Joint Chiefs, 69 at QUADRANT, 1 5 Mountbatten, Lord Louis, 25
on use of atomic bomb, 92 on Pacific strategy, 68
correspondence of, Appendix H on European strategy, 75 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 1 - 1 2, 60, 68, 75
Atomic bomb Eighth Air Force, 14- 1 5 , 69-70 Joint Intelligence Committee, 9- 1 1 Me
test of, 69 Eisenhower Dwight D., 68, 79 Joint Plans Committee, 1 0- l l , 1 7 - 1 8
targets for, 69, 90-92 Electric power, 78-86 . Joint Strategic Committee, 1 0- 1 4
MacArthur, Douglas, 2 1 , 68
Joint Target Group, 60-61 on Pacific strategy, 68, 74
McClelland, H. L., 28
B F
McGhee, George, 4 1 , 49
K
Baker Board, 3-4 Fairchild, Muir S., 3, 5, 1 7, 25
Bombers Fifteenth Air Force Kawasaki Steam Power Plant, 76 N
B- 1 7, 4, 6 organized at SEXTANT, 1 8 Kenney, George, 2 1 , 30
B-24, 6 demobilized, 70 King, Ernest J., 26, 69 Nimitz, Chester
B-36, 6 Futrell, Robert F., 6, 5 8 Kuter, Larry, 5, 1 6 - 1 7 on aerial mining, 43

1 48 149
 INDEX INDEX

on Pacific strategy, 22, 26, 33, 74 s aspan of CBI Theater, 45 Military Analysis Division of, 78, 89
Norstad, Larry sorties flown by, 71 Repon on Japanese Electric
Chief of Staff 20th AF, 3 1 , 46 Twenty-first Bomber Command Utilities, 80-8 1 , 84
Saipan, 33
activation of, 3 1 rmal Repon, 90-91
Sallagar, Frederick M., 42, 5 1
high-altitude, daylight bombing, 32 See also Appendix C
o SAN ANTONIO I
mission planned, 36-40 on Saipan, 33
mission called off, 38 change of organization, 46
O'Donnell, Emmett C'Rosey"), 36-38, 45 priority targets, 49
mission flown, 39 v
SAN ANTONIO II, 40 sorties flown by, 71
Saunders, LaVerne ("Blondy"), 45 Twining, Nathan F.
Seaver, James, 44 moved to Pacific, 70-71
p "Victory Program", 12-13
SEXTANT Conference, 1 7- 1 8
Skyways, 2 u
Siessor, Sir John, I
Pacific Ocean Area, 45 Smith, Rex, 29 w
Pearl Harbor, 9-10, 1 2 Smuts, Jan Christian, I, 3 US Navy
Pershing, John J., 2 Spaatz, Carl T. on Pacific strategy, 1 2, 14
Policy, strategic, 50, 75 air member, Joint Strategic aiding aerial mining, 42
Portal, Sir Charles, 9 Committee, 1 0 US Strategic Bombing Survey Walker, Ken, 3, 5
Potsdam Conference, 68, 92 with Pacific forces, 69 Repon on Japanese Aircraft Industry, 3 1 War Department, 2, 4-6
Pound, Sir Dudley, 9 Stilwell, Joseph, 25, 45 Report on Japanese War Production War Plans Division (WPD), 5
Stimson, Henry L., 6 Industries, 66 Weather forecasting, 44
Sutherland, Richard K., 22 Repon on Japanese War Economy, 67 Wedemeyer, A. C., 1 0- 1 1 , 14, 46, 48
Repon on Effects of Strategic Wilson, Don, 3, 5
Q T Bombing, 76 Winterbotham, R. W., 37, 44
Economic Repon, 76 Wolfe, K. B., 20, 45
Repon on War Against Japanese World War I, 2-4
QUADRANT Conference, 15, 1 7 Transportation, 77 World War II, I , 3, 5-6, 75
Targets
Akashi Airframe Plant, 52
MARUZEN Oil Refinery, 63
NIPPON Oil Company, 65
R
Tenth Air Force, 25 NOTE: Military ranks have been omined because they varied widely in tM timespan ofthis book.
Theater Commanders, 19, 42
Tinian Island, 34
Radar Training Regulations, 3
APQ-7, 60, 63, 74, 89, 90 Truman, Harry S., 68
APQ- 1 3 , 60, 6 1 , 74, 89, 90 Trenchard, H. M., 1 -2
RAINBOW No. 5, 6 Turner, R. K., 1 0
Ramey, Roger, 40-4 1 , 49 Twentieth Air Force
Read, O. M., 1 0 inception of, 26-27
RENO IV, 22 organization and deployment of, 27-28
Roosevelt, Franklin D. command and control of, 28-29
queries production requirements, 5 sonies flown by, 71
consults with Allies, 9 staff meeting roles, Appendix D
at SEXTANT, 1 7 Twentieth Bomber Command
at Casablanca, 1 9 initial operations of, 30
Rosenblatt, Sol, 28 73rd Wing, 3 1-32
Royal Air Force, 5 formation of, 45
-A-u.s. Qo".,nment Prlntl.... 0"1_ t •• :.-.st.., •• 151 A U GAFS A L ( 8 1 0434 )260
1 50