Silverio v Republic

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. He’s a biological male who feels trapped
in a male body. Being that, he sought gender re-assignment in Bangkok, Thailand. The procedure
was successful – he (she) now has a female body. Thereafter, in 2002, he filed a petition for the
change of his first name (from Rommel to Mely) and his sex (male to female) in his birth
certificate. He filed the petition before the Manila RTC. He wanted to make these changes,
among others, so that he can marry his American fiancé.

The RTC granted Silverio’s petition. The RTC ruled that it should be granted based on equity;
that Silverio’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be
in any way taken against him; that there was no opposition to his petition (even the OSG did not
make any basis for opposition at this point); that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would
bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of Silverio and [her] fiancé and the realization of
their dreams.

Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA. The CA reversed the decision
of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth certificate may be
changed on the ground of gender re-assignment.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries finds no support in existing
legislation.

Issue on the change of first name

In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR
NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER) was
passed. This law provides that it should be the local civil registrar that has jurisdiction in
petitions for the change of first names and not the regular courts. Hence, the petition of Silverio
insofar as his first name is concerned is procedurally infirm. Even assuming that the petition filed
properly, it cannot be granted still because the ground upon which it is based(gender re-
assignment) is not one of those provided for by the law. Under the law, a change of name may
only be grounded on the following:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner
and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he merely alleged gender re-assignment
as the basis.

Issue on the change of sex

This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the regular courts or a petition for the
local civil registry. Not with the courts because there is no law to support it. And not with the
civil registry because there is no clerical error involved. Silverio was born a male hence it was
just but right that the entry written in his birth certificate is that he is a male. The sex of a person
is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not
attended by error, is immutable.

But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?

No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial legislation. To grant the changes sought by
Silverio will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations.
It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-
to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to
women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies
under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in
relation to women which could be substantially affected if Silverio’s petition were to be granted.

But the SC emphasized: “If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has
to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that
privilege.”
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna
a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan
to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is
sufferingfrom Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted
persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with
secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the
medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which
certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan
genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not
develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower court decided in her
favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that
the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did
not implead the local civil registrar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the case, the
Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme Court made
use of the availale evidence presented in court including the fact that private respondent thinks of
himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s body produces
high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male.”

The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how
an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the
respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult
for the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences that will
follow.
Facts: In 1998, respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote (guardian ad litem) filed a petition for change
of name of her ward from Giovanni Nadores Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. The petition
alleged that: Giovanni is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado
Gallamaso; he was born on July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code; his
mother made him use the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between
them; from the time Giovanni was born and up to the present, his father failed to take up his
responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual
concerns; Giovanni is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to have his
surname changed to that of his mother’s surname; Giovanni’s mother might eventually petition
him to join her in the United States and his continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname
of his natural father, may complicate his status as natural child; and the change of name will be
for the benefit of the minor.

Having found respondent’s petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave due
course to the petition. Publication of the petition was ordered and the local civil registrar and the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was notified. Since there was no opposition to the petition,
respondent moved for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed
commissioner. The OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the
lower court granted the motion. After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a
decision ordering the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment
of error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding. Ruling that the
proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision ordering the change of name.

Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the CA erred in affirming the trial
court’s decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of
indispensable parties. The purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected
by the child’s change of name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding
adversarial.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the petition for change of name should be granted.

2. Is a proceeding for change of name adversarial?

3. Did Capote comply with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding?

4. When is a proceeding considered adversarial?

Held:
1. Yes. The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the
proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and
complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the
appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition
sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his
name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as
her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father.
It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her
in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.

2. The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an
adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical errors in
entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for change of name
under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this
petition does not fall under Rule 108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers
from clerical or typographical errors. The relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous
entries in the civil registry, although by granting the petition, the result is the same in that a
corresponding change in the entry is also required to reflect the change in name.

3. Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a

newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The lower court also
furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the
petition including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of
its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The
lower court is still expected to exercise its judgment to determine whether the petition is
meritorious or not and not merely accept as true the arguments propounded. Considering that the
OSG neither opposed the petition nor the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the
opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were not
adversarial enough.

4. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other
party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Respondent gave notice of the petition
through publication as required by the rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed
notified and the whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial
court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the
requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties,
including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the
petition (Republic of the Philippines vs Trinidad R. A. Capote, G.R. No. 157043, February 2,
2007).
CO VS CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA
FACTS: HUBERT TAN CO was born March 23, 1974. His sister, ARLENE TAN CO, was born
May 19, 1975. In their respective certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents CO BOON
PENG AND LOURDES VIHONG K. TAN are CHINESE CITIZENS. CO BOON PENG filed
an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with the Special Committee on
Naturalization under LETTER OF INSTRUCTION no. 270. His application was granted and he
was conferred Philippine citizenship under PD 1055. He was issued a certificate of
naturalization and consequently took an oath as Philippine citizen on February 15, 1977.
On August 27, 1998, they filed with the RTC Manila a petition under Rules of Court for
correction of entries in the certificate of birth which was denied on the ff. grounds:
a) Although CA 473 and LOI 270 are statutes relating to the same subject matter, they do not
provide the same beneficial effects with respect to the minor children of the applicant;
**Sec. 15: effects of naturalization on the wife and the children
b) LOI 270: refers to qualified individuals only;
c) Section 15 CA no. 473 should not be deemed and incorporated in and applied to LOI 270;
d) Application of “pari material” rule of construction is misplaced.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arlene and Hubert are Filipino citizens on account of the naturalization
of their Father Co Boon Peng.
HELD: It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of naturalization of
their father, to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They are likewise mandated to prove the ff.
material allegations in their petition:
1) That they are legitimate children of Co Boon Peng;
2) They were born in the Philippines;
3) That they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen.
CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS Case Digest

GERBERT CORPUZ VS. DAISYLYN STO. TOMAS

G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

FACTS: Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on Nov. 2000. On, Jan. 18 2005, he married a Filipina
named Daisylyn Sto. Tomas. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert
left for Canada soon after their wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in
April 2005 to surprise her wife but was shocked to discover that Daisylyn was having an
affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert went back to Canada and filed
a petition for divorce and was granted.

Two years after, Gerbert fell in love with another Filipina. In his desire to marry his new
Filipina fiancée, Gerbert went to Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the
Canadian divorce decree on their marriage certificate. Despite its registration, an NSO
official informed Gerbert that their marriage still exists under Philippine Law; and to be
enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must be judicially recognized by a Philippine
court.

Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved, with the RTC. Daisylyn offered no opposition and requested for
the same prayer.

RTC denied Gerbert’s petition contending that Art. 26 (2) applies only to Filipinos and
not to aliens. Gerbert appealed by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether the registration of the foreign divorce decree was properly made.

HELD: Supreme Court held in the negative. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that
“no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order.” The
Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially
cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional
and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing
the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry.