A.C. No. 10207 RE: DECISION DATED 17 MARCH 2011 IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.

SB-28361
ENTITLED "PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSELITO C. BARROZO" FORMER
ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR JOSELITO C. BARROZO, Respondent.

FACTS:

This is a disbarment case against former Assistant Public Prosecutor Joselito C. Barrozo (respondent) is
taken up by this Court motu proprio by virtue of its power to discipline members of the bar under Section 1,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

Jennie Valeriano (Valeriano) was a respondent in several cases for estafa and violation of Batas Pambasa
Blg. 222 which were assigned to respondent as Assistant Public Prosecutor of Dagupan City, Pangasinan.

According to Valeriano, respondent told her that he would resolve the cases in her favor in exchange for
₱20,000.00. Hence, Valeriano went to the Office of Regional State Prosecutor to report the matter. The
Regional State Prosecutor introduced her to agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), who,
after being told of respondents’ demand, immediately planned an entrapment operation. During the
operation conducted of February 15, 2005, respondent was caught red-handed by the NBI agents receiving
the amount of ₱20,000.00 from Valeriano.

As a result, a case for direct bribery under paragraph 2, Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code was filed
against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City. The case, however, was later on
indorsed to the Sandiganbayan as respondent was occupying a position with a salary grade 27 or higher.

The Sandiganbayan found respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct bribery and sentence him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prison correctional
maximum, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prison mayor medium, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of ₱60,000.00. In addition, it imposed upon him the penalty of special
temporary disqualification.

Respondent file a 3 MR but the 2 MR’s were denied the 3 rd was ordered to be removed from the records.
Hence, respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court but was denied on the ground
that the Petition failed to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan committed any reversible error in its
challenged issuances as to warrant the exercise of the Court’s discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter from Wat & Co. of Hong Kong stating that its
client in Hong Kong received a letter from the Philippines signed by "Atty. Joselito C. Barrozo," asking for
long service payment from the employers of domestic helper Anita G. Calub who passed away on March 4,
2013. Upon checking online and discovering that said person was convicted of direct bribery, Wat & Co.
requested the OBC to inform it if respondent is still a lawyer qualified to practice law.

The OBC inquired from the Department of Justice (DOJ) whether respondent is still connected with them.

In reply, the DOJ informed OBC that respondent had already resigned from his position, The OBC write
Wat & Co. to conform that the respondent was indeed convicted of direct bribery by final judgment and
that the Philippine Court has yet to rule on his disbarment.

In view of the foregoing and considering that respondent’s conviction is a ground for disbarment from the
practice of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the Court through a Resolution required
respondent to comment on why he should not be suspended/disbarred from the practice of law.
In his Comment respondent, He argued that he did not engage in the practice of law, as his act of signing
the claim letter does not constitute such practice. He averred that he signed it not for any monetary
consideration, but out of his sincere desire to help the claimants. And since there is no payment involved,
no lawyer-client relationship was established between him and the claimants. This therefore negates
practice of the law on his part.

Upon Order of the Court, the OBC evaluated the case and came up with the recommendation of disbarment
of the respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Barrozo should be suspended or disbarred by reason of his conviction of the crime of
direct bribery.

RULING:

The court adopts the recommendation of the OBC. The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect
the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent,
honorable and reliable – lawyers in whom courts and [the public at large] may repose confidence. Thus,
whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, [the Court]
shall not hesitate to rid [the] profession of odious members.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Joselito C. Barrozo is herby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of the Decision be attached to his personal records and furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.

24. A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457 MELVYN G. GARCIA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. RAUL H.
SESBRENO, Respondent.

FACTS:

Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against Atty. Raul H.
Sesbrefio (Sesbrefio). The two cases, docketed as A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, were consolidated in
the Court's Resolution dated 30 September 2014.

Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the Office of the Bar Confidant. The case
was docketed as A.C. No. 7973.

Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth,
filed an action for support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time of the filing of
the case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was
dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreño and Garcia’s children learned about his
return, Sesbreño filed a Second Amended Complaint against him.

Garcia alleged that he learned that Sesbreño was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 18, for Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño is only on parole.
Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime against moral turpitude; and thus, Sesbreño should not be allowed
to continue his practice of law.

In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase “with the
inherent accessory penalties provided by law” was deleted. Sesbreño argued that even if the accessory
penalty was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreño further
alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that Garcia’s complaint was
motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate against him for representing Garcia’s
daughters in court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude. And Whether or not
Sesbreño should be disbarred

HELD:

YES to both. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime.
Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional
violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of
fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While generally but not always, crimes
mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained
whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum
prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are
crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude
is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial
inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.

We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and political
rights. the Order of Commutation did not state that the pardon was absolute and unconditional. There are
four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can grant reprieves,
commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. In this case, the
executive clemency merely “commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years
imprisonment” the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio. Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty.
Commutation only partially extinguished criminal liability. The penalty for Sesbrefio’ s crime was never
wiped out. He served the commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he was released from prison.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has
ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving
moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

25. A.C. No. 9872 NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO and HILDA S. PRESBITERO, Complainants, vs.
ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM, JR., Respondent.

FACTS:
This case originated from a complaint for disbarment, dated 26 May 2008, filed by Natividad P. Navarro
(Navarro) and Hilda S. Presbitero (Presbitero) against Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. (respondent) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
In April 2006, Hilda Presbitero engaged the services of Atty. Ivan Solidum, Jr. to help her in the quieting of
her title over a parcel of land. Presbitero paid Solidum P50,000.00 as acceptance fee.
In May 2006, Ma. Theresa Yulo, daughter of Presbitero also engaged the services of Solidum for the
registration of a parcel of land. Yulo however asked the help of her sister, Natividad Navarro, to finance the
case. Hence, Navarro gave Solidum Php200,000.00 for the registration expenses.
Meanwhile, Solidum in May and June 2006, obtained a total of Php2 million from Navarro. The loan was
covered by two Memorandum of Agreement (MOAs). The MOA was prepared by Solidum. The MOA
stated that the monthly interest shall be 10%.
Solidum also borrowed Php 1 million from Presbitero during the same period. He again drafted a MOA
containing the same terms and conditions as with Navarro. As additional security for the loan, Solidum
mortgaged his 263-hectare land for P1 million in favor of Presbitero.
Nothing happened in the quieting of title case field by Presbitero since Solidum did nothing after receiving
the acceptance fee.
In the land registration case of Yulo financed by Navarro, Navarro later found out that the land was already
registered to someone else. Navarro claims that she should not have financed the case if only Solidum
advised her of the status of the land.
Anent the loans, Solidum failed to pay them. Instead, he questioned the terms of the loans as he claimed
that the interest rate of said loans at 10% is unconscionable.
Navarro and Presbitero later filed an administrative case against Solidum.

The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for committing the following acts:

(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were from his own account;

(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;

(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter lot he mortgaged to her;

(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;

(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that it was exorbitant;
and

(6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the accounts were
already closed.

The IBP-CBD also found that respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he failed to properly account for the various funds he received from complainants.

In addition, the IBP-CBD found that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits borrowing money from a client unless the client’s interest is fully protected
or the client is given independent advice.
On the matter of practicing law while under suspension, the IBP-CBD found that the records were not clear
whether the notice of suspension respondent received on 29 May 2006 was the report and recommendation
of the IBP-CBD or the final decision of this Court. The IBP-CBD likewise found that there was insufficient
evidence to prove that respondent mishandled his cases.

The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be meted the penalty of disbarment.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ivan Solidum, Jr. should be disbarred.

HELD:
Yes. Although Solidum acted in his private capacity when he obtained a total of Php3 million from Navarro
and Presbitero, he may still be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his private capacity. The test
is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor,
or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. In this case, such act displayed by
Solidum merited his disbarment.
Solidum is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional capacity with
respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect to Navarro. Both Presbitero and
Navarro allowed Splidum to draft the terms of the loan agreements. Solidum drafted the MOAs knowing
that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the
same MOAs he prepared.
In the case of Navarro, who financed the Yulo case, Solidum also violated Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession. This is notwithstanding the fact that Navarro is not actually his
client in the Yulo case but was only the financier of the Yulo case.
In Presbitero’s case, since Presbitero is his client, Solidum also violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the
client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Even though
Solidum secured the loan with a mortgage and a MOA, Presbitero’s interest was not fully protected because
the property Solidum mortgaged was overvalued. He claimed that his 263-hectare land was worth P1
million but in fact Solidum sold it later for only P150,000.00. Clearly, Presbitero was disadvantaged by
Solidum’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. He took advantage of his
knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client.
Solidum was disbarred by the Supreme Court.