SECTION I, ARTICLE III CASE DIGESTS

Right to Life and Property

1. Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, Feb. 18, 2014
FACTS: The case arises out of consolidated petitions to the Supreme Court of the
Philippines on the constitutionality of several provisions of the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012, Act No. 10175. The Petitioners argued that even though
the Act is the government’s platform in combating illegal cyberspace activities, 21
separate sections of the Act violate their constitutional rights, particularly the right
to freedom of expression and access to information.

In February 2013, the Supreme Court extended the duration of a temporary

restraining order against the government to halt enforcement of the Act until the
adjudication of the issues.

ISSUE: Is Sec. 13 of the Cybercrime Law, which requires the service provider to
preserve the integrity of the traffic date and subscriber information for 6 months, a
deprivation of the right to property?
RULING: NO. No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the
internet belong to their authors or recipients and are to be considered private
communications. But it is not clear that a service provider has an obligation to
indefinitely keep a copy of the same as they pass its system for the benefit of users.
The user ought to have kept a copy of that data when it crossed his computer if he
was so minded. The service provider has never assumed responsibility for their
loss or deletion while in its keep.
At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data that service
providers preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made
inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such orders. The process of
preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of the same.

2. Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

FACTS: Concerned citizens and the Catholic Church had petitioned for the
constitutionality of the Reproductive Health Bill.
ISSUE: Does the RH Law violate the constitutional right to life of the unborn?
RULING: Yes. Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section
3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of
the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the
insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval
of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe
mechanism.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when
they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term “primarily”.
Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or
the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec.
3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives
that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization.
This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason,
the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses
the term “primarily”, must be struck down.
 Police Power
3. Cruz vs. Pandacan Hikers’ Club, G.R. No. 188213, Jan. 11, 2016
FACTS:

ISSUE: Was the act of the Punong Barangay in removing the basketball ring an
abatement of nuisance and a valid exercise of police power?
RULING: No. Both petitioner Cruz, as Punong Barangay, and petitioner Dela
Cruz, as Barangay Tanod, claim to have acted in their official capacities in the
exercise of their powers under the general welfare clause of the Local Government
Code. However, petitioners could cite no barangay nor city ordinance that would
have justified their summary abatement through the exercise of police powers
found in the said clause. No barangay nor city ordinance was violated; neither was
there one which specifically declared the said basketball ring as a nuisance per se
that may be summarily abated. Though it has been held that a nuisance per se may
be abated via an ordinance, without judicial proceedings, the Court added that, in
the case at bar, petitioners were required to justify their abatement via such an
ordinance because the power they claim to have exercised – the police power under
the general welfare clause – is a power exercised by the government mainly
through its legislative, and not the executive, branch. The prevailing jurisprudence
is that local government units such as the provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.

4. Mosqueda vs. Filipino Banana Exporters, GR 189185, August 16,

2016
FACTS: After several committee hearings and consultations with various
stakeholders, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No.
0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural
practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City.
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two
of its members, namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and
Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to
challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance.
They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police
power; violated the equal protection clause; amounted to the confiscation of
property without due process of law; and lacked publication pursuant] to Section
511 of Republic Act No. 7160.
On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring
Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid and constitutional
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power under
the General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code; that the ordinance,
being based on a valid classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause; that aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of pesticides
application because it exposed the residents to a higher degree of health risk caused
by aerial drift; and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality,
and could be invalidated only upon a clear showing that it had violated the
Constitution.
On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the
judgment of the RTC. It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and
unconstitutional for being unreasonable and oppressive;
The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of protecting the
public and the environment against the harmful effects of aerial spraying, on one
hand, and the imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of all forms of
substances, on the other.
Issue: Is Davao City Ordinance No. 0309-07 unconstitutional for being
unreasonable, oppressive and an invalid exercise of police power?
Ruling: YES. The impossibility of carrying out a shift to another mode of
pesticide application within three months can readily be appreciated given the vast
area of the affected plantations and the corresponding resources required therefor.
To recall, even the RTC recognized the impracticality of attaining a full-shift to
other modes of spraying within three months in view of the costly financial and
civil works required for the conversion.
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone
will consume considerable time and financial resources given the topography and
geographical features of the plantations. As such, the conversion could not be
completed within the short timeframe of three months. Requiring the respondents
and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences of the ban within
the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even
cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute
abuse of police power.
A valid ordinance •must not• only be enacted within the corporate powers of the
local government and passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. In
order to declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply with the
following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be
partial or discriminatory; ( 4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; ( 5) it
must be general and consistent with public policy; and ( 6) it must not be
unreasonable.

ISSUE#2: Did the ordinance violate the Equal Protection Clause?

RULING: Yes. The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty equal
protection secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional
and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute
or by its improper execution through the State's duly constituted authorities. The
concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State governs impartially,
and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to the legitimate governmental objective.
 5. Knights of Rizal vs. DMCI Homes Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 25,
2017 amiel

On 1 September 2011, DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI-PDI) acquired a

7,716.60-square meter lot in the City of Manila, located near Taft Avenue, Ermita,
beside the former Manila Jai-Alai Building and Adamson University. The lot was
earmarked for the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila condominium
project. On 2 April 2012, DMCI-PDI secured its Barangay Clearance to start the
construction of its project. It then obtained a Zoning Permit from the City of
Manila's City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) on 19 June 2012. Then,
on 5 July 2012, the City of Manila's Office of the Building Official granted DMCI-
PDI a Building Permit, allowing it to build a "Forty Nine (49) Storey w/ Basement
& 2 penthouse Level Res'l./Condominium" on the property. On 24 July 2012, the
City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of the
Building Official to temporarily suspend the Building Permit of DMCI-PDI, citing
among others, that "the Torre de Manila Condominium, based on their
development plans, upon completion, will rise up high above the back of the
national monument, to clearly dwarf the statue of our hero, and with such towering
heights, would certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal
Roxas Boulevard vantage point[.]

§ Is there a law or ordinance prohibiting the construction of Torre de Manila?

In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila project is
“contrary to morals, customs, and public order” or that it brings harm, danger or
hazard to the community. On the contrary, the City of Manila has determined that
DMCI-PDI complied with the standards set under the pertinent laws and local
ordinances to construct its Torre de Manila project. There is one fact that is crystal
clear in this case, There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de
Manila due to its effect on the background “view, vista, sightline, or setting” of the
Rizal Monument. It is clear that the standards laid down in Section 47 of
Ordinance No 8119 only serve as guides, as it expressly states that “the following
shall guide the development of historic sites and facilities.” A guide simply sets a
direction or gives an instruction to be followed by property owners and developers
in order to conserve and enhance a property’s heritage values.

§ Is Torre de Manila a nuisance per se that deserves to be summarily abated even

without judicial proceedings?
It can easily be gleaned that the Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se. The Tobe
de Manila project cannot be considered as a "direct menace to public health or
safety." Not only is a condominium project commonplace in the City of Manila,
DMCI-PDI has, according to the proper government agencies, complied with
health and safety standards set by law. DMCI-PDI has been granted the following
permits and clearances prior to starting the project: (1) Height Clearance Permit
from the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines; (2) Development Permit from
the HLURB; (3) Zoning Certification from the HLURB; (4) Certificate of
Environmental Compliance Commitment from the Environment Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources;(5) Barangay
Clearance; ( 6) Zoning Permit; (7) Building Permit; (8) and Electrical and
Mechanical Permit.

6. Maula vs. Ximex Express, G.R. No. 207838, Jan. 25, 2017 reyna

FACTS:
Petitioner was hired as Operation Staff. Petitioner's employment was uneventful
until the HRD required him and some other employees to sign a form sub-titled
"Personal Data for New Hires." When he inquired about it he was told it was
nothing but merely for the twenty peso increase. He could not help but entertain
doubts as they were hurriedly made to sign the same. It also [appeared] from the
form that the designated salary/wage [was] daily instead of on a monthly basis. Feb
2009, he, together with some other concerned employees[,] requested for a meeting
with their manager together with the manager of the HRD. They questioned the
document and aired their side voicing their apprehensions since they were long
time regular employees earning monthly salary/wages and not daily wage earners.
Petitioner filed a complaint before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board

ISSUE:
§ Was Maula denied of substantive due process and/or procedural due process?

RULING:
Yes. Dismissal from employment have two facets: first, the legality of the act of
dismissal, which constitutes substantive due process; and, second, the legality of
the manner of dismissal, which constitutes procedural due process. In this case, the
respondent failed on both. Respondent manifestly failed to prove that petitioner's
alleged act constitutes serious misconduct and the procedural due process
requirement was not complied with.
7. MPSTA vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 192708, Oct. 2, 2017 babe

FACTS:
On 14 November 1936, a government service insurance system was created by
virtue of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 186 in order to promote the efficiency
and welfare of the employees of the government of the Philippines. On 31 May
1977, then President Marcos approved Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146
amending, expanding, increasing, and integrating the social security and insurance
benefits of government employees and facilitating the payment thereof under C.A.
No. 186. More than 20 years later, P.D. 1146 was amended, and Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8291, or the "The GSIS Act of 1997," took effect.

In the meantime, GSIS issued the assailed Resolutions, to wit:

1. Resolution No. 238 - In 2002, the GSIS Board introduced Claims and Loans
Interdependency Policy (CLIP)
2. Resolution No. 90 15 - In 2003, the GSIS Board adopted the Premium-Based
Policy (PBP)
3. Resolution No. 17919 - In 2007, the GSIS Board approved the Automatic Policy
Loan and Policy Lapse (APL)

These Resolutions were not published in a newspaper of general circulation and

were enforced before they were even filed with the Office of the National
Administrative Register.

ISSUE: § Considering that the parties participated in the public consultation of

GSIS’ policy resolutions on PBP, APL and CLIP was it non-publication validly
dispensed with?

RULING:
No. In Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp., this Court held that the
requirements of publication and filing must be strictly complied with...even in
cases where the parties participated in the public consultation and submitted their
respective comments, strict compliance with the requirement of publication cannot
be dispensed with.
Moreover, according to the Court in Veterans Federation of the Philippines v.
Reyes, interpretative regulations that do not add anything to the law or affect
substantial rights of any person do not entail publication. This is because "they
give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed."
However, "when xxx an administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the
means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law
but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the
agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and
thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and
effect of law."

While GSIS filed copies of the subject resolutions with the Office of the National
Administrative Register (ONAR), it only did so after the claims of the retirees and
beneficiaries had already been lodged. The resolutions were not published in either
the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation in the country.

Furthermore, the resolutions additionally obligate member-employees to ensure

that their employer-agency includes the Government Share (GS) in the budget,
deducts the Personal Share (PS), as well as loan amortizations, and timely remits
them; and that the GSIS receives, processes, and posts the payments. These
processes are beyond the control of the employees; yet they are being made to bear
the consequences of any misstep or delay by either their agency or GSIS.

8. Subido vs. CA, G.R. No. 216914, December 6, 2016 monique

FACTS: In 2015, reports abounded on the supposed disproportionate wealth of
then Vice President Jejomar Binay and the rest of his family, some of whom were
likewise elected public officers. The Office of the Ombudsman and the Senate
conducted investigations and inquiries thereon.
CA ordered probe of Binay 's assets reporting that the appellate court had issued a
Resolution granting the ex-parte application of the AMLC to examine the bank
accounts of petitioner Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza & Binay Law Firm
(SPCMB).
SPCMB filed petition for certiorari and prohibition on the grounds that the Anti-
Money Laundering Act is unconstitutional insofar as it allows the examination of a
bank account without any notice to the affected party: (1) It violates the person's
right to due process; and (2) It violates the person's right to privacy.
ISSUE: Is Section 11 of R.A. No. 9160 which provides for ex-parte application
and inquiry by the AMLC into certain bank deposits and investments violative of
substantive due process?
RULING: No. The Court does not subscribe to SPCMB’s position. Succinctly,
Section 11 of the AMLA providing for ex-parte application and inquiry by the
AMLC into certain bank deposits and investments does not violate substantive due
process, there being no physical seizure of property involved at that stage.It is the
preliminary and actual seizure of the bank deposits or investments in question
which brings these within reach of the judicial process, specifically a determination
that the seizure violated due process

Procedural Due Process

9. Jardeleza vs. CJ Sereno, G.R. Nos. 213181, Aug. 19, 2014
FACTS: Following Justice Abad’s compulsory retirement, the JBC announced the
application or recommendations for the position left by the Associate
Justice. Jardeleza, the incumbent Sol-Gen at the time, was included in the list of
candidates. However, he was informed through telephone call from some Justices
that the Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno, will be invoking Sec 2, Rule 10 of JBC-
009 or the so-called “unanimity rule” against him. Generally, the rule is that an
applicant is included in the shortlist when s/he obtains affirmative vote of at least a
majority of all the members of the JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009,
however, is invoked because an applicant’s integrity is challenged, a unanimous
vote is required. Jardeleza was then directed to make himself available on June 30,
2014 before the JBC during which he would be informed of the objections to his
integrity.
Jardeleza wrote a letter-petition asking the SC to exercise its supervisory power
and direct the JBC to, among others, give Jardeleza a written notice and sworn
written statements of his oppositors or any documents in the JBC hearings, and to
disallow CJ Sereno from participating in the voting process for nominees on June
30, 2014.
During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, Justice Carpio appeared and
disclosed a confidential information which, to CJ Sereno, characterized Jardeleza’s
integrity as dubious. Jardeleza demanded that CJ Sereno execute a sworn
statement specifying her objections and that he be afforded the right to cross-
examine her in a public hearing. He also requested deferment of the JBC
proceedings, as the SC en banc has yet to decide in his letter-petition.
However, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the
nominees to be included in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC released the shortlist
of 4 nominees. It was revealed later that there were actually 5 nominees who made
it to the JBC shortlist, but 1 nominee could not be included because of the
invocation of the “unanimity rule”..
Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus via Rule 65 with prayer for TRO to
compel the JBC to include him in the list of nominees on the grounds that the JBC
and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite
having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.
ISSUE: Is the constitutional right to due process available in JBC proceedings?
RULING: YES. While the facets of criminal and administrative due process are
not strictly applicable to JBC proceedings, their peculiarity is insufficient to justify
the conclusion that due process is not demandable.
The fact that a proceeding is sui generis and is impressed with discretion, however,
does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process. It is
well-established in jurisprudence that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are
sui generis, in that they are neither purely civil nor purely criminal; they involve
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers, not the trial of an
action or a suit.
The Court subscribes to the view that in cases where an objection to an applicant’s
qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor renders
illusory the fulfillment of the duty of JBC to recommend. This holding is not an
encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence
to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion.
When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded
the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the
situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and
capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to
strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an
applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with
the dictates of fairness for the only test that an exercise of discretion must
surmount is that of soundness.
10. Sen. Jinggoy Estrada vs. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, Jan. 21,
2015
FACTS: Sen. Estrada claimed that under the circumstances, he has “no appeal or
any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, except
through this Petition” and asked for a judgment declaring that (a) he has been
denied due process of law, and as a consequence thereof, (b) the Order dated 27
March 2014, as well as the proceedings in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-
0397 subsequent to and affected by the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order, are
void.
ISSUE: Is Sen. Estrada entitled to the essential and fundamental requirements of
due process in administrative proceedings, as laid down in Ang Tibay?
RULING: No. The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang
Tibay are not applicable to preliminary investigations which are creations of
statutory law giving rise to mere statutory rights. A law can abolish preliminary
investigations without running afoul with the constitutional requirements of due
process as prescribed in Ang Tibay. The present procedures for preliminary
investigations do not comply, and were never intended to comply, with Ang Tibay.
Preliminary investigations do not adjudicate with finality rights and obligations of
parties, while administrative investigations governed by Ang Tibay so adjudicate.
Ang Tibay requires substantial evidence for a decision against the respondent in
the administrative case. In preliminary investigations, only likelihood or
probability of guilt is required. To apply Ang Tibay to preliminary investigations
will change the quantum of evidence required to establish probable cause. The
respondent in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay has the right to an
actual hearing and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. In preliminary
investigations, the respondent has no such rights.

11. Ang-Se vs. OP, G.R. No. 207355, Feb. 3, 2016 juan

FACTS :
Petitioners are Assistant Special Prosecutors III of the Office of the
Ombudsman, who have been assigned to prosecute cases against Lt. Gen.
(Ret.) Leopoldo S. Acot (Acot), Bgen. (Ret.) Ildelfonso N. Dulinayan
(Dulinayan) and several others before the Sandiganbayan for alleged ghost
deliveries of assorted supplies and materials to the Philippine Air Force
amounting to about Eighty Nine Million Pesos (P89,000,000.00).

Sometime in early 1995, the Judge Advocate General's Office of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against
Acot, Dulinayan and several others which was eventually docketed as OMB-
AFP-CRIM-94-0218. In a Resolution dated 12 April 1996,[5] Ombudsman
Investigators Rainier C. Almazan (Almazan) and Rudifer G. Falcis II (Falcis)
recommended the filing of Informations against Acot, Dulinayan, and several
others for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(Republic Act No. 3019 [RA No. 3019]) and/or for Malversation through
Falsification. Casimiro was then the Director of the Criminal and
Administrative Investigation Division of the Office of the Ombudsman and
the immediate supervisor of Almazan and Falcis. Casimiro concurred with
and signed the 12 April 1996 Resolution and indorsed the same to Bgen.
(Ret.) Manuel B. Casaclang, then Casimiro's immediate superior.

ISSUE:
§ Was petitioners’ right to administrative due process was violated when the
Office of the President did not allegedly consider the evidence they have
presented?

RULING

The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard - as applied to

administrative proceedings, it is an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In this
case, petitioners were given both opportunities - the opportunity to explain their
side by filing their pleadings which contained all their allegations and evidence in
support of their arguments, and the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
ruling complained of, as shown by their motions for reconsideration and appeals.
As long as parties are afforded these opportunities, the requirement of due process
in administrative proceedings is sufficiently met. As evidenced by the pleadings
filed during the administrative proceeding, and their subsequent appeal to the
Court of Appeals and now to this Court, they have been afforded the fullest
opportunity to establish their claims and to seek a reconsideration of the ruling
complained of.

Moreover, a reading of the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the OP shows
that the evidence petitioners presented had been duly considered. Indeed, aside
from their general allegation that the Court of Appeals did not consider their
evidence, petitioners failed to identify any conclusion arrived at by the Court of
Appeals or the OP that was not supported by the evidence on record. Moreover,
both the Court of Appeals and the OP addressed the issues raised by the parties,
and subsequently cited the proper evidence on record and quoted the applicable
laws and jurisprudence to support their findings. The bare allegation that they were
denied due process cannot overcome the clear fact that they were given every
opportunity to establish their claims.

12. ALFI vs. Garin, G.R. No. 217872, Aug. 24, 2016
FACTS: Petitioners opposed the unilateral act of the Food and Drugs
Administration (FDA) on re-certifying the contraceptive drugs named Implanon
and Implanon NXT; the basis of their opposition hinges on the fact that these drugs
are abortifacients. Thus, according to them, they should have been given notice of
the certification proceedings, and a chance to present evidence that indeed such
drugs are abortifacients.
Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioners are not entitled to notice
and hearing because the said proceedings are done in the exercise of its regulatory
power, not quasi-judicial power; also, they alleged that the Honorable Supreme
Court is incompetent to rule on the instant controversy due to the same reason.
ISSUE: Did FDA observe the basic tenets of due process when it certified,
procured and administered the contraceptive drugs and devices?
RULING: No. The court finds that the FDA certified, procured, and administered
such contraceptive drugs and devices without the observance of the basic tenets of
due process.
From the records, it appears that other than the notice inviting the stakeholders to
apply for certification/ re-certification of their reproductive health products, there
was no showing that the respondents notified the oppositors [sic] and conducted a
hearing on the applications and oppositions submitted.
13. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Conti, G.R. No. 221296. Feb. 22, 2017
chad
FACTS: This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) seeks to review and set
aside the May 19, 2015 Decision and the October 28, 2015 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 126698, entitled Nicasio A. Conti v. Office of
the Ombudsman. The CA issuances reversed the August 26, 2011 Decision and the
May 25, 2012 Order of the Ombudsman, finding respondent Nicasio A. Conti
(Conti) guilty of Dishonesty, Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service.

ISSUE: Was Conti denied of procedural due process?

RULING: Conti was deprived of his Constitutional Right to Due Process. An
administrative proceedings, due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the
charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend oneself. A
violation of that right occurs when a court or tribunal rules against a party without
giving the person the opportunity to be heard

14. ALFI vs. Garin, G.R. No. 217872, Apr. 26, 2017 normita
FACTS:
Same facts (refer to Case No. 12 )

ISSUE: Is there a need for FDA to conduct a trial-type hearing to comply with the
requirements of procedural due process?

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that petitioners were deprived of their Right to Due
Process. Perusal of the law and rules of procedure of the instant agency reveals the
need of an issuance of notice to all concerned MAHs and a posting of the
contraceptive products for public comments. These, respondents failed to do.To
conclude that product registration, recertification, procurement, and distribution of
the questioned contraceptive drugs and devices by the FDA in the exercise of its
regulatory power need not comply with the requirements of due process would
render the issuance of notices to concerned MAHs and the posting of a list of
contraceptives for public comment a meaningless exercise. Concerned MAHs and
the public in general will be deprived of any significant participation if what they
will submit will not be considered.

15. LTO Disciplinary Board vs. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 224395, July 3, 2017
normita
FACTS:
Pursuant to Administrative Order No. A VT-2014-023 implementing the "Do-It-
Yourself" Program in the LTO, Gutierrez, Chief of the LTO Registration Section,
received a Memorandum dated February 11, 2014, instructing her to temporarily
relocate her Section's equipment to the Bulwagang R.F. Edu in order to
accommodate the renovation of the work stations in the said program. Finding that
there is a prima facie case against Gutierrez, the L TO issued a Formal Charge
dated June 2, 2014 charging her of Gross Insubordination, Refusal to Perform
Official Duties, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, giving
her five (5) days from receipt thereof to file her Answer and supporting affidavits,
and preventively suspending her for a period of ninety (90) days. Consequently,
Gutierrez filed her Answer dated June 5, 2014 and a Manifestation dated August
20, 2014, which, inter alia, contested the validity of the Formal Charge against her
on the ground of lack of due process. According to Gutierrez, she was deprived of
procedural due process as the LTO issued the Formal Charge against her without
the requisite preliminary investigation.

ISSUE:
Was Gutierrez was deprived of her right to procedural due process in connection
with the Formal Charge issued against her?

RULING:
The CA erred in finding that Gutierrez's right to procedural due process was
violated. To recapitulate, the CA anchored such finding on the fact that the
administrative case was instituted against Gutierrez because of her defiance of the
Memoranda dated January 28, 2014 and February 11, 2014, and her refusal to
transfer the computers of the Registration Section as per the Report dated February
17, 2014; whereas the Show Cause Memorandum only referenced one of the
aforesaid Memoranda. However, a closer scrutiny of the Show Cause
Memorandum and the Formal Charge reveals that their main subject is Gutierrez's
continuous failure and/or refusal to temporarily relocate the equipment of the
Registration Section to the Bulwagang R.F. Edu pursuant to Administrative Order
No. AVT-2014-023 implementing the LTO's "Do-It-yourself' Program, with the
mention of the aforesaid Memoranda - whether in the Show Cause Memorandum
or the Formal Charge - merely exhibiting such defiance. Irrefragably, Gutierrez
was amply accorded her rights to procedural due process and, thus, there is no
more need to conduct another preliminary investigation on her administrative case.

Equal Protection Clause

16. Obergefell vs. Hodges, No. 14-556 SCOTUS, June 26, 2015
FACTS: Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio,
Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those
states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages
that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The plaintiffs in
each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also
brought claims under the Civil Rights Act.
Issue: Are the 14th Amendment Rights [equal protection and due process] of the
petitioners same-sex-couples’ violated by the states of Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio,
and Tennessee which denied them the right to marry or to have marriages lawfully
performed in another State given full recognition?
RULING: Yes, the Court held that same-sex couples may exercise the
fundamental right to marry in all States. It follows that the Court also must hold—
and it now does hold—that there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to
recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of
its same-sex character.
17. Villanueva vs. JBC, G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015
FACTS: After about a year from being appointed as an MCTC judge, Judge
Villanueva applied for the vacant position of presiding judge in some RTC
branches. The JBC, however, informed him that he was not included in the list of
candidates for such position because the JBC’s long-standing policy requires 5
years of service as judge of first-level courts before one can apply as judge for
second-level courts. Before the SC, he assailed via Rule 65 and Rule 63 with
prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction the policy of JBC on the ground that it
is unconstitutional and was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: Does the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as judges of first-
level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts violate the
equal protection clause?
RULING: No. The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the
universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction; what it
requires is simply equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing
recommended appointees does not constitute a violation of the equal protection
clause. The JBC does not discriminate when it employs number of years of service
to screen and differentiate applicants from the competition. The number of years of
service provides a relevant basis to determine proven competence which may be
measured by experience, among other factors.
18. Limkaichong vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 158464,
Aug. 2, 2016
FACTS:

ISSUE: Is the petitioner entitled to equal protection and treatment accorded to

other land owners who had been given the chance to be heard on their claim for re-
valuation?
RULING: YES. Here, the petitioner laments that she had not been accorded equal
protection and treatment by the trial court which had awarded to other landowners
a higher valuation of their property despite the belated filing of their petitions. For
sure, the petition for certiorari thereby plainly alleged that the RTC had committed
grave abuse of discretion by violating the petitioner's constitutional right to due
process or equal protection. Such a petition should not be forthwith dismissed but
should be fully heard if only to ascertain and determine if the very serious
allegations were true.
 Void-for-Vague and Overbroad
19. Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 20481, April 8, 2014
Issue: Is the RH Law "void-for-vagueness" for imposing the penalty of
imprisonment for any violation and for not defining the type of conduct to be
treated as "violation" thereof?
RULING: Yes. The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or
fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct
to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to
due process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own
affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of
services they shall offer." It ignores the management prerogative inherent in
corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own
discretion and judgment.
ISSUE #2: If it is not a speech regulating statute, can the RH law be “facially
challenged”?
RULING: The application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the Court has
withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has
expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those
involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason
for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court,
under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution
envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.
20. Lagman vs. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017 chad
On June 5, 2017, Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito s. Villarin, Gary C.
Alejano, Emmanuel A. Billones, and Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed a Petition
Under the Third Paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient
factual basis because there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part
of Mindanao; because the President's Report contained "false, inaccurate, contrived
and hyperbolic accounts"; since the President's Report mistakenly included the
attack on the military outpost; the President acted alone and did not consult the
military establishment or any ranking official; there was absence of any hostile
plan by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front; and the number of foreign fighters
allied with ISIS was "undetermined".
§ What is the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine and where is it applicable?
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if "men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application." It is best to stress that the vagueness doctrine has a special application
only to free-speech cases. They are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal
statutes.
§ Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 is vague and thus void because of (a) its
inclusion of "other rebel groups"; and (b) the absence of any guideline specifying
its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region?
Proclamation No. 216 cannot be facially challenged using the vagueness doctrine.
The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when
viewed in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of
Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other rebel groups" found in Proclamation No.
55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses. Neither could
Proclamation No. 216 be described as vague, and thus void, on the ground that it
has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire
Mindanao region. Besides, operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for
the implementation of the proclamation.
21. SPARK vs. Quezon City, etc., G.R. No. 225442. Aug.8, 2017
FACTS:
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a
nationwide curfew for minors, several local governments in Metro Manila started
to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors through police operations
which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."
Petitioners, spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SP
ARK) - an association of young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and
just society, in particular the protection of the rights and welfare of the youth and
minors – argued that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a)
result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for
vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing
legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; ( c) deprive minors of the right
to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; and ( d) deprive
parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive
due process. In addition, petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes
RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630.

ISSUE #1: § Are the Curfew Ordinances void-for-being vague? Airah

RULING:
No. "A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in
two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2)
it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."
Petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering
that they did not properly identified any provision in any of the Curfew
Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning
and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act
accordingly. The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process
considerations, which are absent from this particular claim.
The petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local
authorities in the proper apprehension of suspected curfew offenders, which is in
fact a mistake since Section 7 of RA 9344, as amended, provides the guidelines in
the determination of the age of a child.
ISSUE #2: § Did the Curfew Ordinances passed the first and second prong of
strict scrutiny test? Reyna
The first requirement of the strict scrutiny test was satisfied. The Court thus finds
that the local governments have not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to
substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with respect to
minors. As such, a compelling State interest exists for the enactment and
enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances. After a thorough evaluation of the
ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds that only the Quezon City
Ordinance meets the second requirement, while the Manila and Navotas
Ordinances do not.