Issue.
Whether the President’s acts of “nullifying”� the attachments
Dames and Moore v. Regan
Brief Fact Summary. The Supreme Court of the United States held
that the President may nullify attachments and order the transfer of
frozen Iranian assets pursuant to Section 1702(a)(1) of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”�). Based on the Court’s
inferences from legislation passed by Congress (IEEPA and the
Hostage Act) regarding the President’s authority to deal with
international crises and from the history of congressional acquiescence
in executive claims settlement, the President may also suspend claims
pursuant to the Executive Order.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Where Congress has a history of
acquiescence, as with claims settlement, it thereby implicitly approves
of the President’s actions regarding that specific subject matter about
which Congress was silent.
Facts. In response to the seizure of American personnel as hostages
at the American Embassy in Iran, the President issued various
Executive Orders and regulations by which the President nullified
attachments and liens on Iranian assets in the United States, directed
that theses assets be transferred to Iran, and suspended claims against
Iran that may be presented to an International Claims Tribunal. On
December 19, 1979, Petitioner, Dames & Moore, filed suit in the United
Sates District Court against Defendants, the government of Iran, the
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and many Iranian banks, alleging
that its subsidiary was a party to a contract with the Atomic Energy
Organization and that the subsidiary’s interest had been assigned to
Petitioner. Petitioner alleged it was owed over 3 million dollars. The
District Court issued orders of attachment directed against the
Defendants’ property and the property of certain Iranian banks. In a
January 20, 1981 Executive Agreement, the
President agreed to nullify attachments and ordered the transfer of
frozen Iranian assets. On February 24, 1981, the President ratified an
earlier Order wherein he “suspended”� all “claims which may be
presented to the Tribunal”� and provided that such claims “shall have
no legal effect in any action now pending in U.S. courts.”�
and ordering the “transfer”� of all frozen assets are specifically
authorized by Congress.
Whether the President has authority to suspend claims pending in
American courts.
Held.
Yes. Because the President’s actions in nullifying the attachments and
ordering the transfer of assets were taken pursuant to congressional
authorization (Section 1702 (a)(1) of IEEPA), it is “supported by the
strongest of presumptions and widest latitude of judicial interpretation
and the burden of persuasion rests heavily on any who might attack
it.”�
Yes. Based on the legislation (IEEPA and the Hostage Act) which
Congress has enacted in the area of the President’s authority to deal
with international crises, and from the history of congressional
acquiescence in executive claims settlement, the President was
authorized to suspend claims pursuant to the Executive Order
Discussion. The majority resorts to drawing inferences from Congress’
legislation to conclude that the President has authority to suspend
claims in American Courts.
USAFFE v. Treasurer of the Philippines (1959)
USAFFE VETERANS ASSOCIATION, INC. v TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ET. AL. (June 30, 1959) Appeal from a judgment of the
CFI of Manila
FACTS:
• Romulo-Snyder Agreement (1950): RP Govt undertook to return to
the US Govt in 10 annual installments, a total of about $35M advanced
by the US to, but unexpended by, the Nat’l Defense Forces of the RP.
• Oct 1954: The Usaffe Veterans Associations Inc prayed in its
complaint before the CFI that said Agreement be annulled; that
payments thereunder be declared illegal; & that defendants as officers
of RP be restrained from disbursing any funds in the Nat’l Treasury in
pursuance of said Agreement.
• Usaffe Veterans further asked that the moneys available, instead of
being remitted to the US, should be turned over to the Finance Service
of the AFP for the payment of all pending claims of the veterans
represented by plaintiff.
• 3 PROPOSITIONS OF PLAINTIFF IN COMPLAINT: 1) that the funds
to be “returned” under the Agreement were funds appropriated by the
US Congress for the RP Army, actually delivered to the RP Govt &
actually owned by the said Government; 2) that U.S Secretary Snyder
of the Treasury, had no authority to retake such funds from the RP Govt;
3) The RP Foreign Secretary Carlos P. Romulo had no authority to
return or promise to return the aforesaid sums of money through the
Agreement.
• The court eventually upheld the validity of the Agreement. Plaintiff
appealed.
• July 26, 1941: Foreseeing the War in the Pacific, Pres Roosevelt,
called into the service of the US Armed Forces, for the duration of the
emergency, all organized mil forces of the Commonwealth. (His order
was published here by Proc No 740 of Pres Quezon on Aug 10, 1941)
• October 1941: By 2 special orders, MacArthur, Commanding Gen of
USAFFE, placed under his command all the RP Army units including
Phil Constabulary.
• Thus, US Congress provided in its Appropriation Act of Dec 17, 1941
(Public Law No. 353): “For all expenses necessary for the mobilization,
operation & maintenance of the RP Army, including expenses
connected w/ calling into the service RP mil forces…$269,000.00; to
remain available ‘til June 30, 1943, w/c shall be available for payment
to the Commonwealth upon its written request, either in advance of or
in reimbursement for all or any part of the estimated or actual costs, as
authorized by the USAFFE Commanding Gen, of the necessary
expenses for the purposes aforesaid.”
• Pursuant to the power reserved to him under Public Law 353,
Roosevelt issued EO 9011: “2(a) Necessary expenditures from funds
in the Phil Treasury for the purposes authorized by Public Law 353, will
be made by disbursing officers of the RP Army on the approval of
authority of the Commandign General, USAFFE, & such purposes as
he may deem proper…”
• P570,863,000.00 was transferred directly to the AFP by means of
vouchers w/c stated “Advance of Funds under Public Law 353 & EO
9011” This was used mostly to discharge in RP the monetary
obligations assumed by the US as a result of the induction of the AFP
into the US Army, & its operations beginning in 1941.
• There remained unexpended & uncommitted $35M in the possession
of the AFP as of Dec 31, 1949. Bec the RP Govt then badly needed
funds, Pres Quirino, through CB Gov Cuaderno, proposed to US
officials the retention of the $35M as a loan, & for its repayment in 10
annual installments. This was the Romulo-Snyder Agreement, signed
in Washington on Nov 6, 1950 by RP Foreign Affairs Sec Romulo, &
US Sec of Treasury, John Snyder.
• PRESENT ACTION: Usaffe’s arguments – 1) the money delivered by
the US to the AFP were straight payments for mil services; ownership
thus vested in RP Govt upon delivery, & consequently, there was
nothing to return, nothing to consider as a loan; 2) the Agreement was
void bec there was no loan to be repaid & bec it was not binding on the
RP Govt for lack of authority of the officers who concluded it.
ISSUES
• Basic issue: Validity of the Romulo-Snyder Agreement – Court can’t
pass judgment
1. WON there is obligation to repay - YES
2. WON the officers who promised to repay had authority to bind this
Govt – YES
RATIO:
1. YES
• Note that the $269M appropriated in Public Law 353 (see 8th bullet)
expressly said that the money is to be handed to the RP Govt either in
advance of or in reimbursement thereof.
• In any system of accounting, advances of funds for expenditures
contemplate disbursements to be reported, & credited if approved,
against such advances, the unexpended sums to be returned later.
Congressional law itself required accounting “in the manner prescribed
by US Pres - & said Pres in EO 9011, outlined the procedure whereby
advanced funds shall be accounted for.
• It also requires as a condition sine qua non that all expenditures shall
first be approved by the USAFFE Commanding Gen.
• These ideas of “funds advanced” to meet expenditures of the Phil
Army as may be approved by the USAFFE Comm-Gen, in connection
w/ the accounting requirement, evidently contradict appellant’s thesis
that the moneys represented straight payments to RP Govt for its
armed services, & passed into the absolute control of such Govt
• Instead of returning such amount into one lump sum, our Exec Dept
arranged for its repayment in 10 annual installments. Prima facie such
arrangement should raise no valid objection, given the obligation to
return.
2. YES (They have authority to bind Govt even w/o Senate
concurrence)
• There is no doubt Pres Quirino approved the negotiations. And he had
the power to contract budgetary loans under RA 213, amending RA 16.
• The most impt argument, however, rests on the lack of ratification of
the Agreement by RP Senate to make it binding on the Govt.
• The ff explanation of the defendant was considered persuasive by the
Court…
The agreement is not a ‘treaty’ as that term is used in CONSTI.
However, a treaty is not the only form that an int’l agreement may
assume. For the grant of treatymaking power to the Executive & the
Senate does not exhaust the power of the govt over int’l relations.
Executive agreements may be entered into w/ other states & are
effective even w/o concurrence of Senate.
In int’l law, there’s no difference bet’n treaties & executive
agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned as long as the
negotiating functionaries have remained w/n their powers.
The distinction bet’n executive agreements & treaties is purely a
const’l one & has not int’l legal significance.
Altman v. US: An int’l compact negotiated bet’n the reps of 2
sovereign nations & made in the name or behalf of the contracting
parties & dealing w/ impt commercial rel’ns bet’n the 2 countries, is a
treaty both internationally although as an executive agreement it is not
technically a treaty requiring the advice & consent of the Senate
2 classes of Executive Agreements: 1) agreements made purely as
executive acts affecting external relations & independent of or w/o
legislative authorization, w/c may be termed as pres’l agreements; 2)
agreements entered into in pursuance of acts of Cong, w/c have been
designated as Congressional-Executive Agreements
The Romulo-Snyder Agreement may fall under any of these 2 classes
for on Sept 18, 1946, RP Congress authorized the RP Pres to obtain
such loans or incur such indebtedness w/ the US.
Even granting there’s no leg authorization, the Agreement was legally
& validly entered into to conform to the 2nd category, namely, as
agreements entered into purely as executive acts w/o leg authorization’,
w/c usu includes money agreements.
• The Agreement was not submitted to the US Senate either. But the
Phil Senate’s Resolution No. 15 practically admits the validity & binding
force of such Agreement.
• Further, the acts of Congress appropriating funds for the yearly
installments necessary to comply w/ such Agreement constitute a
ratification thereof, W/C PLACES THE QUESTION OF VALIDITY OUT
OF THE COURT’S REACH, NO CONST’L PRINCIPLE HAVING BEEN
INVOKED TO RESTRICT CONGRESS’ PLENARY POEWR TO
APPROPRIATE FUNDS – LOAN OR NO LOAN.

HELD: Plaintiff failed to make a clear case for the relief demanded.
Petition DENIED.
Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading
(G.R. No. L-14279)
FACTS: EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from
Japan of onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the
Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the
import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank
Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to EO 328 w/c
sought to regulate the importation of such non-dollar goods from Japan
(as there was a Trade and Financial Agreement b/n the Philippines and
Japan then). EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that
the said EO was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was
elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of
EST. The Commissioner appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least
2/3 of the Senate.
HELD: No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject
to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate.
Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are
commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less
common in our scheme of government than are the more formal
instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form
of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents
denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’. The point where ordinary
correspondence between this and other governments ends and
agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or
exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult
of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss
here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from
time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those
entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated
with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to
show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not
anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have
abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of
agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the
approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of
vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission
of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally,
international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and
copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific
congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in
acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as
tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the
settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded
independently of any legislation.
Bayan v Zamora (Public International Law)
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a JUNK VFA MOVEMENT v
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA
G.R. No. 138570 ; October 10, 2000
FACTS:
The Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense
Treaty on August 30, 1951, To further strengthen their defense and
security relationship. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to
any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public
vessels, and aircraft.
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed
RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect,
would have extended the presence of US military bases in the
Philippines.
On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among
other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA).This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which
culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel
Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary
Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the
President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines,the
Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners – as legislators, non-
governmental organizations, citizens and taxpayers – assail the
constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein respondents grave
abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.
Petitioner contends, under they provision cited, the “foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met: a) it must be a treaty,b) it must
be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by
congress, and c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is
applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and
effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members
of the senate.
ISSUES AND RULING:
1. Issue 1: Do the Petitioners have legal standing as concerned
citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the
VFA?
NO. Petitioners Bayan Muna, etc. have no standing. A party bringing a
suit challenging the Constitutionality of a law must show not only that
the law is invalid, but that he has sustained or is in immediate danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. Petitioners have
failed to show that they are in any danger of direct injury as a result of
the VFA.
As taxpayers, they have failed to establish that the VFA involves the
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A taxpayer's
suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Before he
can invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that
he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of
the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient
that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the
public. Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are
involved in this case, and in the absence of any allegation by petitioners
that public funds are being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners,
as taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA.
Similarly, the petitioner-legislators (Tanada, Arroyo, etc.) do not
possess the requisite locus standi to sue. In the absence of a clear
showing of any direct injury to their person or to the institution to which
they belong, they cannot sue. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) is also stripped of standing in these cases. The IBP lacks the legal
capacity to bring this suit in the absence of a board resolution from its
Board of Governors authorizing its National President to commence the
present action.
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the
constitutional significance of the issues raised, the Court may brush
aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions.
2. Issue 2: Is the VFA governed by section 21, Art. VII, or section 25,
Art. XVIII of the Constitution?
Section 25, Art XVIII, not section 21, Art. VII, applies, as the VFA
involves the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines.
The Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of
the Senate on treaties or international agreements.
Section 21, Article VII reads: “[n]o treaty or international agreement
shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of
all the Members of the Senate.”
Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:”[a]fter the expiration in 1991 of the
Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under
a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so
requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty
by the other contracting State.”
Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in
general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of
all the Members of the Senate is required to make the treaty valid and
binding to the Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on
treaties. All treaties, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or
particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the
Senate to be valid and effective. In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is
a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence
of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under
this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the
requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements
and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Sec 25
further requires that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be
allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by
the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and
recognized as such by the other contracting state.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of
US troops visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to
govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights
of the US and RP government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, import and export of equipment,
materials and supplies. Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which
specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent,
however, the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find applicability
with regard to determining the number of votes required to obtain the
valid concurrence of the Senate.
It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to
mere transient agreements for the reason that there is no permanent
placing of structure for the establishment of a military base. The
Constitution makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent”.
We find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops
or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the
Philippines. When no distinction is made by law; the Court should not
distinguish. We do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25,
Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely
foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. The proscription
covers “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.” Stated differently,
this prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops and facilities without
any foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to
“foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” collectively but treats them
as separate and independent subjects, such that three different
situations are contemplated — a military treaty the subject of which
could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign
facilities — any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage
of Section 25, Article XVIII.
3. Issue 3: Was Sec 25 Art XVIII's requisites satisfied to make the VFA
effective?
YES
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently
met:
(a) it must be under a treaty;
(b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so
required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum; and
(c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the
case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through
Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the Constitution, as there were
at least 16 Senators that concurred.
As to condition (c), the Court held that the phrase “recognized as a
treaty” means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges
the agreement as a treaty. To require the US to submit the VFA to the
US Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord
strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the
words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be
understood in the sense they have in common use.
The records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador
Hubbard, has stated that the US has fully committed to living up to the
terms of the VFA. For as long as the US accepts or acknowledges the
VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its treaty
obligations, there is indeed compliance with the mandate of the
Constitution.
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification by the President of the VFA,
and the concurrence of the Senate, should be taken as a clear and
unequivocal expression of our nation's consent to be bound by said
treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and
responsibilities embodied thereunder. Ratification is generally held to
be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state, through which
the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide
in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. In our
jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as
commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited
only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification.
With the ratification of the VFA it now becomes obligatory and
incumbent on our part, under principles of international law (pacta sunt
servanda), to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less
than Section 2, Article II declares that the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity with all nations.
GONZALES VS HECHANOVA
G.R. No. L-21897 October 22 1963 [Executive Agreements]
FACTS:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign rice
to be purchased from private sources. Gonzales filed a petition
opposing the said implementation because RA No. 3542 which
allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207, prohibits the importation of
rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be
authorized by the President of the Philippines, and by or on behalf of
the Government of the Philippines. They add that after enjoining the
Rice and Corn administration and any other government agency from
importing rice and corn, S. 10 of RA 3542 indicates that only private
parties may import rice under its provisions. They contended that the
government has already constitute valid executive agreements with
Vietnam and Burma, that in case of conflict between RA 2207 and
3542, the latter should prevail and the conflict be resolved under the
American jurisprudence.
ISSUE:
W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.
RULING:
No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged
executive agreements has been sufficiently established. Even
assuming that said contracts may properly considered as executive
agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a
constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the
provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the
President may, under the American constitutional system enter into
executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may
not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited
by statutes enacted prior thereto.
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce
laws enacted by Congress. He may not interfere in the performance of
the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto
power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired
the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall
said laws. compromise it.

Abbas vs Comelec (179 SCRA 287)
Facts: The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may
generally be categorized into either of the following:
(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli
Agreement.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an
autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions
of the Constitution on the autonomous region which make the creation
of such region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite.
In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A.
No. 6734 which declares that “[t]here is hereby created the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces
and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in
accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.” Petitioner
contends that the tenor of the above provision makes the creation of an
autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote
in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created
composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were
obtained.
It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region
is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite,
but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and
the proviso underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of
the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes
cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as
that used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. “the creation
of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.”
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple
majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual
constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all
constituent units put together, as well as in the individual
constituent units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the
sense in which the vote requirement in the plebiscite provided under
Article X, section 18 must have been understood by the people when
they ratified the Constitution.

The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its

composition needs to be clarified.

Held: Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of
the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and
only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the
Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces
and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included
in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region
is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities
mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included
therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A.
No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be
an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces