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Historically, vagrancy laws made it a crime for a person to wander from place to place without visible means of

support. Basically, these laws criminalized being homeless and jobless. States used vagrancy laws to arrest,
prosecute, and harass homeless people and poor people who were suspected of criminal activity or who were
considered undesirable.

Criminalizing Homelessness and Poverty


Most criminal statutes prohibit certain acts, such as taking something that does not belong to you or having sex
for money; or failures to act, such as failing to provide a safe home for your children. While vagrancy laws
sometimes prohibited specific acts, such as loitering (although this term can be problematic, as explained
below), sleeping outside, panhandling, fortune telling, gambling, or prostitution, they also prohibited being a
certain type of person (without regard to what that person might be doing or not doing). Vagrancy laws
criminalized being:

 unemployed
 an alcoholic or a drug addict
 a prostitute, or
 homeless.
Under vagrancy laws, it was a crime to be any of these things, even if the person was not otherwise doing
anything illegal. Laws that prohibit being something, rather than doing something, are called status crimes. As
explained below, many courts have decided that status crimes, including some vagrancy laws, are problematic
and hence unenforceable.

Constitutional Problems
All laws must be constitutional. This simply means that no law can violate any of the provisions in the United
States Constitution. Many vagrancy laws have been struck down because they violated the constitution’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment or were vague.

Cruel and unusual punishment


Laws cannot impose punishment that is cruel and unusual. Many courts have decided that status crimes violate
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because the defendant is punished for unfortunate
circumstances beyond his or her control. (Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758
(1962).) Few people desire to be homeless and unemployed and it violates the tenets of fairness to jail someone
based on financial catastrophes, medical problems, mental illness, or addiction.
For more on the concept of cruel and unusual punishment, see The Meaning of "Cruel and Unusual
Punishment".

Vagueness
A law must also be written so than an ordinary person can determine exactly what acts are prohibited and what
people must do (or refrain from doing) in order to avoid criminal prosecution. Without clear guidelines for
conduct, ordinary folk, police officers, and judges have no way of knowing what constitutes a crime. This
uncertainty violates a person’s right to due process (fairness). Vagrancy laws, particularly laws prohibiting
loitering, have been challenged successfully in court on the basis that they are too vague. (Chicago v. Morales,
527 U.S. 41, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 144 L. Ed. 2d 67(1999).)
Disorderly Conduct and Public Intoxication
Beginning in the 1960s, in response to constitutional challenges, many states repealed their vagrancy statutes
and replaced them with laws prohibiting disorderly conduct, public intoxication, sleeping outside, and begging.
Critics charge that these newer laws replicate the problems of vagrancy laws and that states use them to unfairly
jail and harass poor people.
For more information on disorderly conduct and public intoxication, see our articles on Disorderly Conduct,
and Public Intoxication.

Punishment
Historically, vagrancy laws were misdemeanors. Today, disorderly conduct and public intoxication are
misdemeanors. Misdemeanors are crimes punishable by time in county or local jail (usually less than one year),
a fine, or probation. To learn more about misdemeanors, see our article Misdemeanor Crimes: Classes and
Penalties.

Obtaining Legal Assistance


If you are charged with vagrancy, disorderly conduct, public intoxication, or any other crime because you are
homeless or unemployed, you should contact a local criminal defense attorney to talk about your case.
Attorneys have successfully challenged these laws on the basis that they are unfair. An attorney can help you
navigate the criminal justice system and obtain the best possible outcome in your case.

Vagrancy
The condition of an individual who is idle, has no visible means of support, and travels from place to place
without working.
At Common Law the term vagrant referred to a person who was idle, refused to work although capable of doing
so, and lived on the charity of others. Until the 1970s state vagrancy statutes were used by police to charge
persons who were suspected of criminal activity, but whose actions had not gone far enough to constitute a
criminal attempt. Court decisions, however, have struck down vagrancy laws as unconstitutionally vague. In
addition, the term vagrant has been replaced by Homeless Person as a way of describing a person who is
without means or a permanent home.
Traditionally, communities tended to regard vagrants with suspicion and view them either as beggars or as
persons likely to commit crimes. In England vagrants were whipped, branded, conscripted into military service,
or exiled to penal colonies. In colonial America vagrancy statutes were common. A person who wandered into a
town and did not find work was told to leave the community or face criminal prosecution.
After the U.S. Civil War, the defeated Southern states enacted Black Codes, sets of laws that sought to maintain
white control over the newly freed African American slaves. The concern that African Americans would leave
their communities and deplete the labor supply led to the inclusion of vagrancy laws in these codes.
Unemployed African Americans who had no permanent residence could be arrested and fined. Typically, the
person could not pay the fine and was therefore either sent for a term of labor with the county or hired out to a
private employer.
The abuse of vagrancy laws by the police throughout the United States was common. Such laws were vague and
undefined, allowing police to arrest persons merely on the suspicion they were about to do something illegal. In
1972 the U.S. Supreme Court addressed this problem in Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S. Ct.
839, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110. The Court ruled that a Florida vagrancy statute was unconstitutional because it was too
vague to be understood. The Court emphasized that members of the public cannot avoid engaging in criminal
conduct, if prior to engaging in it, they cannot determine that the conduct is forbidden by law. The Court also
concluded that the vagrancy law's vagueness lent itself to Arbitrary enforcement: police, prosecutors, and juries
could enforce the law more stringently against one person than against another, even though the two individuals'
conduct was similar.
After Papachristou the validity of vagrancy statutes was put in doubt. Prosecutions for vagrancy must now be
tied to observable acts, such as public begging. Prosecutions are rare, however, because local governments do
not want to spend their financial resources incarcerating persons for such offenses.

Cross-references
Homeless Person; Void for Vagueness Doctrine.
West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. Copyright 2008 The Gale Group, Inc. All rights reserved.

vagrancy
n. moving about without a means to support oneself, without a permanent home, and relying on begging. Until
recently it was a considered a minor crime (misdemeanor) in many states. Constitutionally it is evident that
being poor is not a crime. The same is true of "loitering."
Copyright © 1981-2005 by Gerald N. Hill and Kathleen T. Hill. All Right reserved.

vagrancy
noun evagation, hoboism, indolence, pererration, roaming, roving, shiftlessness, vagabondage, vagabondism,
wandering, wayfaring
Associated concepts: common-law vagrancy, loitering
Burton's Legal Thesaurus, 4E. Copyright © 2007 by William C. Burton. Used with permission of The
McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.

III. Challenges to Vagrancy, Loitering, and Curfew Laws


A. Federal Cases
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
The city of Chicago challenged the Supreme Court of Illinois’ decision that a Gang Congregation Ordinance
violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution for impermissible
vagueness -- lack of notice of proscribed conduct and failure to govern law enforcement. The ordinance
prohibited criminal street gang members from loitering in a public place. The ordinance allowed a police
officer to order persons to disperse if the officer observed any person loitering that the officer reasonably
believed to be a gang member. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court and
ruled the ordinance unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the court ruled that the ordinance violated the requirement that a legislature
establish guidelines to govern law enforcement. Additionally, the ordinance failed to give the ordinary citizen
adequate notice of what constituted the prohibited conduct – loitering. The ordinance defined “loitering” as “to
remain in any one place with no apparent purpose.” The vagueness the Court found was not uncertainty as to
the normal meaning of “loitering” but to the ordinance’s definition of that term. The court reasoned that the
ordinary person would find it difficult to state an “apparent purpose” for why they were standing in a public
place with a group of people. “Freedom to loiter for innocent purposes,” the court reiterated, is part of the
liberty protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Gaffney v. City of Allentown, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14565 (D. Pa. 1997).
Plaintiffs challenged a juvenile curfew ordinance on due process and equal protection grounds. The court
applied strict scrutiny and found the ordinance unconstitutional. The court held that the statute burdened a
minor’s right to move freely and that the case did not present factors justifying differential treatment of minors
that would allow the court to employ a lesser standard of review. Although the parties agreed that the city had a
compelling interest in passing the ordinance, i.e., the protection of minors from nighttime crime and the
prevention of the same, it nevertheless failed because it was not narrowly tailored to advance that interest. The
statistical evidence the city presented to the court showed no correlation between the passage of the ordinance
and the incidence of juvenile crime, and the city did not present evidence that comparatively more juveniles
were victims of nighttime crime.
Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048 (7th Cir. 2004).
A parent and her minor children brought a class action to seek a preliminary injunction against the enforcement
of Indiana’s juvenile curfew ordinance on First Amendment and due process grounds. The district court
maintained that a First Amendment exception was necessary in a juvenile curfew ordinance to ensure that it was
not overly broad. The plaintiffs argued that since a minor arrested under the ordinance could use the First
Amendment only as an affirmative defense, the ordinance unduly chilled a minor’s First Amendment rights.
The district court found no evidence, however, that the threat of arrest actually chilled minors’ exercise of their
First Amendment rights. The court also found that the ordinance left ample alternative channels for minors’
communication. The court went on to find that the right of a parent to allow her minor children to be in public
during curfew hours was not a fundamental right, and accordingly applied intermediate scrutiny to the statute.
The ordinance survived intermediate scrutiny, because of its limited hours of operation and numerous
exceptions.
The plaintiffs appealed, and the Seventh Circuit reversed. While the court recognized that the curfew ordinance
did not have a disproportionate impact on First Amendment rights, it did regulate the ability of minors to
participate in a range of traditionally protected forms of speech and expression, including political rallies and
various evening religious services. Applying the “no more restrictive than necessary” standard, the court found
that even with the First Amendment affirmative defense, whereby arrest is avoided based on the facts and
circumstances in a police officer’s actual knowledge, the ordinance did not pass intermediate scrutiny because it
violated minors’ free expression rights.
Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiff’s challenge of a juvenile curfew ordinance and found it
unconstitutional on due process and vagueness grounds. A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit initially affirmed,
but upon a rehearing en banc, the ordinance was upheld. The court refused to recognize a fundamental right for
juveniles to be in a public place without adult supervision during curfew hours, nor was it willing to
acknowledge a fundamental right for parents to allow their children to be in public places at night. The court
applied intermediate scrutiny to the ordinance and held that the District had adequate factual bases to support its
passage of the ordinance. In addition, the court found the ordinance enhanced parental authority as opposed to
challenging it, owing to the ordinance’s exceptions for activities where parents were supervising their children.
The court dismissed plaintiffs’ vagueness and Fourth Amendment claims.
Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 2002 WL 31119105 (6th Cir. 2002).
Two plaintiffs, including a homeless man, successfully challenged a Cincinnati ordinance creating “drug-
exclusion zones.” The ordinance prohibited an individual from entering a drug-exclusion zone for up to ninety
days if the individual was arrested or taken into custody within such a zone for any number of enumerated drug
offenses. If the individual was thereafter convicted of the offense, the ordinance extended the exclusion to a
year. People who violated the ordinance could be prosecuted for criminal trespass. The ordinance empowered
the chief of police to grant variances to individuals who were bona fide residents of the zone, or whose
occupation was located in the zone. The homeless plaintiff claimed that he had been prohibited from entering
the drug-exclusion zone in question for four years for drug-related offenses and spent four hundred days in jail
for violating the ordinance. He regularly sought food, clothing, and shelter from organizations located in the
zone, and his attorney’s office was located in the zone.
The district court held the ordinance unconstitutional on its face and as applied to the plaintiffs, finding that it
violated their rights to free association, to travel within a state, and, as to the homeless plaintiff, to be free from
double jeopardy.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the ordinance burdened the plaintiffs’ fundamental right to
intrastate travel and the homeless plaintiff’s First Amendment associational right to see his attorney. Applying
strict scrutiny, the court found the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to advance the compelling state interest
in enhancing the quality of life of its citizens. The ordinance swept too broadly as it forbade innocent conduct
within the zones. In addition, it did not provide for any particularized finding that an individual was likely to
engage in recidivist drug activity within the zones. Nor had the city adequately demonstrated that there were no
less restrictive alternatives to the ordinance.
In discussing the homeless plaintiff’s interest in his relationship with his attorney, the court noted that since he
was homeless he had “no readily available, realistic alternative to communicate with his attorney” other than
meeting him at his office in the drug-exclusion zone. His attorney could not visit him anywhere, and he had no
phone available for a private conversation. “An urban street corner simply does not provide a sufficient
guarantee of privacy and a realistically effective guard against disclosure of privileged and confidential
information to be considered a viable alternative. … [the plaintiff] is a homeless man, existing at the margin of
our society, where he is uniquely vulnerable and in particular need of unobstructed access to legal
representation and a buffer against the power of the State.”
Justin v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV-00-12352 LGB, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17881 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2000).
1. Plaintiffs, a group of homeless people living on the streets and in shelters of Los Angeles, filed suit
alleging a violation of their First and Fourth Amendment rights and then filed for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) in federal district court. Plaintiffs were ultimately seeking only injunctive relief. Plaintiffs
sought the TRO to stop defendants from using two anti-loitering statutes, California Penal Code § 647(e)
and Los Angeles Municipal Code § 41.18(a), to harass plaintiffs. The court denied the TRO as to
preventing the authorities from using the codes to ask homeless individuals to “move along.” However,
the court granted the TRO as to all other acts because plaintiffs established that they had shown a
substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits, would suffer irreparable harm if the TRO was not
granted, and that the balance of equities tipped in their favor.
2.
3. The case has now been settled and a permanent injunction is in force for 48 months with the possibility
of a court-granted extension for up to an additional 48 months. Defendants did not admit liability but
were “enjoined as follows with respect to all members of the Class, when such Class members are in the
Skid Row area described in plaintiffs’ complaint: (1) Officers will not conduct detentions or ‘Terry’
stops without reasonable suspicion. However, officers may continue to engage in consensual encounters
with persons in the Skid Row area, including members of the Class; (2) Officers will not demand
identification upon threat of arrest or arrest individuals solely due to their failure to produce
identification in circumstances where there is no reasonable suspicion to stop or probable cause to arrest;
(3) Officers will not conduct searches without probable cause to do so, except by consent or for officer
safety reasons as permitted by law; (4) Officers will not order individuals to move from their position on
the sidewalk on the basis of loitering unless they are obstructing or unreasonably interfering with the
free passage of pedestrians on the sidewalk or ‘loitering’ for a legally independent unlawful purpose as
specified in California Penal Code section 647; (5) Defendants will not confiscate personal property that
does not appear abandoned and destroy it without notice. However, defendants may continue to clean
streets and sidewalks, remove trash and debris from them, and immediately dispose of such trash and
debris. Where applicable, defendants will give notice in compliance with the temporary restraining
order issued in Bennion v. City of Los Angeles (C637718). Any personal property that does not appear
intentionally abandoned collected by defendants will be retained for 90 days as provided by California
Civil Code section 2080.2; (6) Officers will not cite individuals for violation of either Penal Code
section 647(e) (loitering) or that portion of Los Angeles Municipal Code section 41.18 which makes it
unlawful to “annoy or molest” a pedestrian on any sidewalk. However, officers may cite for obstructing
or unreasonably interfering with the free passage of pedestrians on the sidewalk.”
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a California state statute that required persons who loiter or wander
on the streets to provide “credible and reliable” identification and account for their presence when asked to do
so by a police officer. The Supreme Court found that the statute failed to adequately explain what a suspect
must do to satisfy its requirements, and thus vested complete discretion in the hands of the police officers
enforcing it, encouraging arbitrary enforcement. The court held that the statute was unconstitutionally vague in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Leal v. Town of Cicero, 2000 WL 343232 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
The plaintiff was arrested for violating a Cicero ordinance prohibiting loitering on a street corner after a police
officer has made a request that the individual move on. The officer had observed the plaintiff doing no more
than remaining in a certain area for a short period of time. The plaintiff challenged the ordinance on vagueness
grounds, and the court agreed that the law was unconstitutionally vague. The fact that the ordinance made the
police officer’s request to move on the basis for any potential arrest, as opposed to the loitering per se, did not
save it from constitutional scrutiny. As in City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), if the loitering is
harmless or justified, then the dispersal order itself is an unjustified impairment of liberty. Additionally, the
ordinance invited uneven police enforcement, as it contained no guidelines for the exercise of official
discretion.
NAACP Anne Arundel County Branch v. City of Annapolis, 133 F.Supp.2d 795 (D. Md. 2001).
The NAACP brought a facial challenge on federal and state constitutional grounds to an Annapolis ordinance
prohibiting loitering within certain posted drug-loitering free zones. The ordinance made it a misdemeanor for
a person observed, inter alia, “making hand signals associated with drug related activity” or “engaging in a
pattern of any other conduct normally associated by law enforcement with the illegal distribution, purchase or
possession of drugs” within a designated drug-loitering free zone to disobey the order of a police officer to
move on. After finding that both the individual members of the NAACP and the NAACP itself had standing to
bring the lawsuit, the district court ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The
court held that the plain language of the ordinance contained no mens rea requirement, and that, as it was
interpreting a state law, the court had no authority to read a specific intent requirement into the ordinance.
Without the narrowing device of the mens rea requirement, the ordinance was void for vagueness since it failed
to provide adequate warning to the ordinary citizen to enable her to conform her conduct to the law and it vested
unbridled discretion in police officers enforcing the ordinance. The ordinance was also unconstitutionally
overbroad since without the specific intent requirement it reached a host of activities ordinarily protected by the
constitution, such as selling lawful goods, communicating to motorists, and soliciting contributions.
Nunez by Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997).
Minors and parents brought an appeal challenging constitutionality of San Diego’s juvenile curfew ordinance.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, that it violated the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, and that it violated the right of parents to rear their children. The phrase
“loiter, idle, wander, stroll or play” did not provide reasonable notice of what conduct was illegal and allowed
the police excessive discretion in stopping and arresting juveniles. While the court found that the city had a
compelling interest in protecting children and preventing crime, the city failed to provide exceptions in the
statute allowing for the rights of free movement and expression, and thus struck down the statute as not
narrowly tailored to meet the city’s interest.
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
Eight individuals convicted under Jacksonville’s vagrancy ordinance challenged the constitutionality of the
law. The Supreme Court overturned the decision of the Florida Circuit Court and found that the ordinance was
void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the ground that the
ordinance “fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden
by the statute” and “encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions.”
Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1127 (1994).
The district court permanently enjoined the operation of a juvenile curfew ordinance on grounds that it violated
the First Amendment and the equal protection clause. The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court assumed that the
ordinance burdened a fundamental right of minors to travel, and applied strict scrutiny. The statute survived
because the city provided sufficient data to establish that the ordinance was narrowly tailored and the defenses
in the ordinance ensured that it employed the least restrictive means available. The court also relied on the
defenses in rejecting the parental plaintiffs’ argument that it burdened their fundamental right to make decisions
concerning their children.
Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2003).
Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of Vernon, Connecticut’s juvenile curfew
ordinance on First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, equal protection, vagueness, due process, and state
constitutional grounds. The district court denied the injunction. The court found that the ordinance’s exception
for First Amendment activities saved it from an overbreadth challenge. The ordinance did not authorize
unconstitutional searches and seizures. In analyzing the equal protection claim, the court applied intermediate
scrutiny to the statute and found that the history and perception of crime in Vernon and some evidence that the
ordinance was effective indicated that it was substantially related to its goals. Further, the ordinance adequately
described the conduct it prohibited, and provided police with reasonable guidelines for its enforcement. Finally,
since the ordinance contained an exception for minors accompanied by their parents, it did not unduly burden
parents’ liberty interest in raising their children. The court certified the state constitutional claims to the
Connecticut Supreme Court.
Plaintiffs appealed, and the Second Circuit reversed, applying intermediate scrutiny to hold that the city
ordinance infringes on minors’ equal protection rights. The court noted that although the curfew ordinance
sought to reduce night-time juvenile crime and victimization, the city did not consider night-time aspects of the
ordinance in its drafting process. Furthermore, the ordinance’s age limit is not targeted at those who were likely
to cause trouble or to be victimized. Indeed, one of the city’s expert witnesses stated that “the adoption of the
curfew itself probably could be considered a knee jerk reaction.”
Richard v. Nevada, No. CV-S-90-51 (D. Nev. Apr. 25, 1991).
Four Franciscan clergymen and four homeless individuals challenged Nevada’s statute prohibiting criminal
loitering and vagrancy and related provisions of the Las Vegas Municipal Code alleging that they were
unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad. The U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada held that the
section of the Nevada statute defining vagrancy was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the court abstained from making a decision on the other
challenged section of the Nevada statute or sections of the Las Vegas Municipal Code. The court certified those
matters to the Nevada Supreme Court, which subsequently held that both provisions were unconstitutionally
vague.
Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 1908 (1999).
Plaintiffs challenged a juvenile curfew ordinance on due process and equal protection grounds. The district
court upheld the ordinance, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Recognizing the greater state latitude in regulating
the conduct of minors, the court applied intermediate scrutiny to the statute. The ordinance sought to advance
compelling state interests, i.e., the reduction of juvenile crime, the protection of juveniles from crime, and the
strengthening of parental responsibility for children. The court found that the ordinance was substantially
related to these interests, as the city had before it adequate information that the ordinance would create a safer
community and protect juveniles from crime. Further, the court found the ordinance narrow enough to survive
strict scrutiny, were it to be applied. Nor did the ordinance burden parents’ privacy interests in raising their
children. The Fourth Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs’ vagueness claim, citing the ordinance’s exceptions for
First Amendment activities.
B. State Court Cases
City of Salida v. Edelstein, Case No. 97CR62 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1998).
Defendants were arrested for violating a Salida ordinance prohibiting anyone from loitering in one place for
more than five minutes after 11:00 PM at night. One defendant had been speaking with friends on the sidewalk
outside his home, while another defendant had been observing a police officer issue loitering citations to other
individuals. The defendants challenged the ordinance on First Amendment, due process, and vagueness
grounds. The municipal court found the ordinance unconstitutional, and the district court affirmed. The court
held that the ordinance interfered with citizens’ fundamental rights to stand and walk about in public places.
The ordinance was not narrowly drawn to regulate that right, and the city failed to convince the court that any
plausible safety concerns existed to justify the ordinance. Additionally, the court found the ordinance void for
vagueness, since it failed to provide law enforcement with proper standards to prevent its arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.
Commonwealth v. Asamoah, 2002 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2896 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
The defendant was convicted for loitering pursuant to a York, Pennsylvania ordinance. Police observed
Asamoah near a man they believed to be carrying drugs, although Asamoah himself did no more than stand on
the sidewalk with money in one of his hands. Police arrested him for violating that part of the ordinance
forbidding “acts that demonstrate an intent or desire to enter into a drug transaction.” The Superior Court
overturned his conviction, finding the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The ordinance’s
language provided inadequate guidance as to what constituted illegal behavior and left police free to enforce it
in an ad hoc and subjective manner. The ordinance also proscribed and punished protected activities such as
“hanging around” and “sauntering.”
Johnson v. Athens - Clarke County, 529 S.E.2d 613 (Ga. 2000).
Plaintiff was arrested for violating an Athens municipal ordinance prohibiting loitering or prowling. A
policeman had observed Johnson at a particular intersection four times over a two-day period. At trial, the
policeman testified that the location where he arrested Johnson was a known drug area, although the state
presented no evidence of drug activity. The Georgia Supreme Court found the ordinance void for vagueness,
since there was nothing in the ordinance’s language that would put an innocent person on notice that particular
behavior was forbidden. There was no way a person of average intelligence could be aware of what locations
were known drug areas and what innocent-seeming conduct could seem to be drug-related in the opinion of a
police officer. The ordinance also failed scrutiny because it did not provide adequate safeguards against
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.
State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857 (Ohio 2001) .
The defendant successfully challenged a Cincinnati ordinance creating “drug-exclusion zones.” The defendant
was arrested for one of the designated drug offenses and given a ninety-day exclusion notice from the Over-the-
Rhine exclusion zone, which the city extended to one year. He was subsequently arrested for criminal trespass
for being present in the zone.
The Ohio Supreme Court denied the defendant’s freedom of association claim, but found that the ordinance
impermissibly burdened his fundamental right to travel and that it violated the Ohio state constitution. As to the
first amendment claim, the court found that the ordinance did not, on its face, interfere with the defendant’s
fundamental, personal relationships. However, the court went on to hold that the due process clause of the
federal constitution included the fundamental right to intrastate travel. Under the required compelling interest
analysis, the ordinance failed because it was not narrowly tailored to serve Ohio’s compelling interest in
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. The ordinance reached a host of innocent conduct,
including visiting an attorney, attending church, and receiving emergency medical care. Finally, the court
found the ordinance violated the Ohio state constitutional provision forbidding municipalities from adopting
laws that conflicted with the “general laws” because it added a criminal penalty for a drug offense that was not
imposed by a court or authorized by a statute.
527 U.S. at 51 n. 14.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 53.
The district court had struck down a previous version of the Indianapolis juvenile curfew ordinance on
overbreadth grounds because it lacked an exception for First Amendment activities. See Hodgkins v. Peterson,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11801 (S.D. Ind. 2000), amended by2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11758 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
Subsequently, the plaintiff challenged an amended version of the ordinance on grounds that it violated her
liberty interest in raising her children without undue government interference. The court denied a preliminary
injunction on those grounds. See Hodgkins v. Peterson, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20850 (S. D. Ind. 2000).
The Sixth Circuit agreed to hear the appeal even though the Ohio Supreme Court had already found that the
ordinance violated both the state and federal constitutions. SeeState v. Burnett, 93 Ohio St.3d 419 (2001) infra.
2002 WL 31119105 at *18.
Id.
Justin v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 00-12352 LGB (AIJx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2001).
461 U.S. at 355.
133 F.Supp.2d at 797-98.
114 F.3d at 942.
Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972)(citations omitted).
48 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D. Conn. 1999).
The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the ordinance against each of the plaintiffs’ state constitutional claims.
SeeRamos v. Town of Vernon, 254 Conn. 799 (2000).
Richard v. Nevada, No. CV-S-90-51 (Apr. 25, 1991).
State v. Richard, 108 Nev. 626, 836 P.2d 622 (Nev. 1992).
2002 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2896 at **10.
Id. at **11.
SeeJohnson v. City of Cincinnati, -- F.3d --, 2002 WL 31119105 (6th Cir. 2002), supra.
One justice concurred only in the state constitutional holding, arguing that no fundamental right to intrastate
travel existed under the federal due process clause. See 93 Ohio St.3d at 869.
Republic Act No. 10158

Republic of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines

Metro Manila
Fifteenth Congress
Second Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-fifth day of July, two thousand eleven.
[ REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10158 ]
AN ACT DECRIMINALIZING VAGRANCY, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLE 202 OF
ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby, amended to read as follows:
“Article 202. Prostitutes; Penalty. – For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
“Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be punished by arresto menor or a
fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correctional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the
court.”
SEC. 2. Effect on Pending Cases. – All pending cases under the provisions of Article 202 of the Revised Penal
Code on Vagrancy prior to its amendment by this Act shall be dismissed upon effectivity of this Act.
SEC. 3. Immediate Release of Convicted Persons. – All persons serving sentence for violation of the provisions
of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code on Vagrancy prior to its amendment by this Act shall be immediately
released upon effectivity of this Act: Provided, That they are not serving sentence or detained for any other
offense or felony.
SEC. 4. Repealing Clause. – All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations and other
issuances, or any part thereof, inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
SEC. 5. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO (Sgd.) JUAN PONCE
BELMONTE JR. ENRILE
Speaker of the House of President of the Senate
Representatives

This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2726 and House Bill No. 4936 was finally passed by the
Senate and the House of Representatives on March 14, 2011 and January 30, 2012, respectively.

(Sgd.) MARILYN B. (Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-


BARUA-YAP REYES
Secretary General House of Secretary of the Senate
Representatives

Approved: MARCH 27, 2012

(Sgd.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III


President of the Philippines
PHILIPPINES: Anti-Vagrancy Law
PHILIPPINES: Anti-Vagrancy Law

(Women's Feature Service/January 20, 2006)

DAVAO CITY -- On the night of November 14, 2003, Mary


Salsaba was with her friend Norma waiting for a
jeepney ride along downtown San Pedro Street here when
suddenly a police car screeched to a stop. To their
surprise, a policeman approached them and, without
word, forcibly hauled them off to the car and brought
them to jail.

The police arresting Salsaba later explained in an


affidavit that they were conducting routine
surveillance when they spotted Salsaba and her
companion. Because they were observed “as loitering or
wandering around the said street corner without any
lawful purpose despite their physical capacity to
work”, Plaza arrested them on the ground of
“vagrancy,” a crime publishable under Art. 202 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Recently, the case of People v. Salsaba has gained


prominence as a test case after women’s groups
questioned the constitutionality of Article 202. The
case is now pending before the Supreme Court after the
Regional Trial Court in Davao City declared the
anti-vagrancy provision as unconstitutional.

Article 202 which is entitled “vagrants and


prostitutes” states that a vagrant is “any person
having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the
physical ability to work and who neglects to apply
himself or herself to some lawful calling; and any
person found loitering about public or semi-public
buildings or places or trampling or wandering about
the country or the streets without visible means of
support.”

Prostitutes, on the other hand, are defined by Article


202 as “women who, for money or profit, habitually
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.”

These definitions, according to criminal law experts,


is so vague and so broad that these opened the
floodgate to abuse and various interpretations. In the
US, vagrancy laws which are called the “garbage pail
of criminal laws” have targeted not only plain
loiterers and wanderers but also hippies and students.

In the Philippines, women’s groups assail the


provision for being particularly discriminatory
against prostituted women and children who are
imprisoned by the police on grounds of simply “having
no apparent means of subsistence and are found
loitering and wandering in the streets.” In Southern
Mindanao alone, more than 300 cases were filed against
persons considered as vagrants, mostly women and
children from January to June last year.

Lawyer Evalyn Ursua, Salsaba’s counsel and director of


the Women’s Legal Bureau, asserted that the law runs
counter to constitutionally-protected individual
rights, particularly the right to liberty and the
right to free expression. Salsaba, for example,
happened to be lingering in the city streets just
before midnight, for which reason she was sent to
prison for the crime of “vagrancy”.

“Loitering or wandering in public places is an


exercise of one’s freedom of expression. And no person
shall be deprived of such rights freedoms without due
process of law,” Ursua said.

Ursua’s argument was later upheld by the Regional


Trial Court in Davao City which found the provision
also a violation of the “equal protection clause”
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights. The RTC decision
partly states that:

"Loitering about and wandering have become national


pastimes, particularly in these times of recession
where there are many who are without visible means of
support, not by reason of choice but by force of
circumstance as borne out by the high unemployment
rate in the entire country...To authorize law
enforcement authorities to arrest someone for no other
reason than the fact that she cannot find gainful
employment would indeed be adding insult to injury."

Aside from vagrancy charges that could be filed


against those found loitering and wandering without
means of support in this city, children below 15 years
old could also be imprisoned for violating a city
ordinance which imposes a curfew on minors. They are
prohibited from loitering in public places here from
10 pm to 4 am of the following day, unless they are in
the company of their parents or guardians.

“Thus, children find themselves locked up at congested


Philippine National Police (PNP) stations until social
workers from CSSDO conduct their counselling sessions
the next day,” writes Mae Templa in her study entitled
“Understanding Children in Conflict with the Law in
Davao City.”

Legal Assistance for Women


Lawyer Romeo Cabarde, Ursua’s co-counsel, said Article
202 often victimizes the poor thus creating a
situation “where you may be penalized for being
jobless and loitering in the city streets,” he said,
citing Salsaba’s case who is jobless and who happens
to live in a known urban poor area in Davao City.
Cabarde is also the director of the Davao-based Luna
Legal Assistance Center for Women and Children which
so far handles at least four cases of vagrancy,
including the Salsaba case.

Luna, which is a Cebuano term for “space” or “place”,


was formed last year to offer a “refuge or sanctuary
by providing legal assistance to women and children
victims of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination.” The center’s formation was prompted
by requests from women’s groups such as the Bathaluman
Crisis Center and Talikala which are swamped by
clients in need of legal assistance. Majority of these
clients, such as Salsaba, could not afford to hire the
services of a lawyer.

Cabarde also noted the following constraints in


rendering legal assistance: machismo in the judiciary,
dilatory court processes, economic dependence of women
and the welfare of children, lack of shelter for
abused children and security of clients. “The
availability and willingness of volunteer lawyers is
also seen as a problem,” he added, as most of them are
also active legal practitioners.

Today, Luna handles more than 30 cases from violations


of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Law
(RA 9262), rape and vagrancy. Cabarde however stressed
that Luna encourages “client participation instead of
dole-out.”

Article 15 of the Convention of the Elimination of All


Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDA) states
that “parties shall accord to women equality with men
before the law.” Unless women are ensured of access to
legal assistance, Article 15 is rendered meaningless.
The Philippine government is signatory to CEDAW, the
most comprehensive treaty on women’s rights. CEDAW
came into force in 1981 signed by the Philippines in
the same year. It is the second most widely ratified
international human rights treaty, ratified or acceded
to by 180 governments or state parties. CEDAW is the
only human rights treaty to affirm the reproductive
rights of women.

Implementation of the Convention is monitored by the


CEDAW committee of 23 experts, now chaired by a
Filipino, former Ambassador Rosario Manalo. They
review each country’s compliance every 4 years.

The vagrancy law: Unconstitutional and often prone to abuse

By by Romel Bagares | Updated March 9, 2000 - 12:00am


0 2googleplus0 0

(Conclusion)

The brouhaha caused by the case of four women booked by operatives of the
Central Police District (CPD) for alleged prostitution has moved some
legislators from the House of Representatives to resurrect a bill
decriminalizing vagrancy.

That is a bit of good news. For in the din of angry words exchanged in the last
two weeks between Quezon City Rep. Michael Defensor and National Capital
Regional Police Office director Chief Superintendent Edgar Aglipay over the
case, the real issue might have been lost on most people, who, in this day and
age of multi-media, may not see beyond the clash of personalities what,
ultimately, is at stake.

Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code defines a vagrant as:

A) Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical
ability to work and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful
calling;
Headlines ( Article MRec ), pagematch: 1, sectionmatch: 1

B) Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places


or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means
of support;

C) Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill-fame; ruffians or


pimps and those who habitually associate with prostitutes;

D) Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of
this Code, shall be found loitering in an inhabited or uninhabited place
belonging to another without any lawful or justifiable purpose;

E) Prostitutes;

The last paragraph defines "prostitutes" as "women who, for money or profit,
habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct." First time
offense is punishable by imprisonment of between one to 30 days or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos. Repeated offenses are punishable by imprisonment of
between two months to two years or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos or
both, according to the discretion of the court.

In 1978, then President Marcos augmented the anti-vagrancy law with


Presidential Decree 1563, the Mendicancy Law. It defined mendicants as persons
with no visible and legal means of support or lawful employment and who are
physically able to work but fail to apply themselves to some lawful calling and
instead, use begging as a means of making a living.

The same law penalizes anyone who abets mendicancy by giving alms.

Vagrancy laws are tools of abuse

As early as 1924, Associate Justice Villamor, in his book, Crime and Moral
Education, noted that "such simple crimes as theft, swindling, and forgery, are
committed in the majority of cases by vagrants. And whenever the evidence in a
case would not warrant the conviction of the accused for theft, he is generally
charged for vagrancy."

Vagrancy laws are often called "dead letter" laws because they are hardly
enforced. When the police do enforce them, it is often because of less than
legal motivations. Women's groups complain that prostitutes are arrested for
vagrancy but pimps or proprietors of prostitution houses are not.

Law enforcers who "fish for evidence" against people suspected of crime find it
a useful "fallback" when they fail to gather enough evidence to prosecute
bigger crimes.

Observers note that vagrancy laws are an "improper exercise of the State's
police power" because police officers, always presumed to act in good faith,
have wide latitude in interpreting these laws. How does one, for example,
interpret "without visible means of support"? Philippine jurisprudence on this
matter is silent.

This problem leads to another constitutional issue: it is an axiom in criminal


law that clear and precise language in penal statutes is an essential
requirement for due process of law -- that "sporting idea of fair play," in the
words of a noted American jurist.

This simply means that a person accused of a crime has the right to know
exactly what he is being charged with.

The Philippine Law Journal notes that Art. 202 "is replete with phrases worded
in very general terms making the import of the law itself vague and
ambiguous."

Under recognized principles of statutory construction, our vagrancy laws should


be declared void for being vague. Another objection to vagrancy laws is the
limitation they impose on personal liberty, in the banning of "loitering" in
public places. Art. III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees "liberty
of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety,
or public health, as may be provided by law."

Our vagrancy laws punish a person because he or she belongs to a certain class
or indulges in what is only seen as a socially contemptible habit, raising a
host of constitutional issues.

Felonies or crimes are "acts or omissions punishable by law," according to The


Revised Penal Code, yet in the same breath, it treats vagrancy as a sui generis
crime, because it is based on one's status, condition, mode of life or
reputation, not his acts.

In simpler terms, the law punishes the poor simply because they are poor.

What is most surprising is that until now, the constitutionality of these laws
has not been raised in the Supreme Court, even if they go against
constitutional provisions that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws."

Perhaps, with the controversy attending the case of the four women booked by
police for vagrancy, it is time to re-examine the country's vagrancy laws and
see if they are still relevant to the times.

And, perhaps, greatly reduce opportunities for police abuse or mulcting.

DSWD
Mission
"To provide social protection and promote the rights and welfare of the poor, vulnerable and the disadvantaged
individual, family and community to contribute to poverty alleviation and empowerment through SWD policies,
programs, projects and services implemented with or through LGUs, NGOs, POs, GOs and other members of
civil society."
DSWD Legal Bases

 Provide a balanced approach to welfare whereby the needs and interest of the population are addressed
not only at the outbreak of crisis but more importantly at the stage that would inexorably lead to such
crisis.
- Executive Order No. 123

 An Act to Regulate the Practice of Social Work and the Operation of Social Work Agencies in the
Philippines and for Other Purposes
- Republic Act No. 4373

 Develop and implement a comprehensive social welfare program consisting of:

 Prevention and remedial programs and services for individuals, families and communities;
 Protective, remedial and development welfare services for children and youth;
 Vocational rehabilitation and related services for the physically handicapped, ex-convict and
individuals with special needs;
 Training and research and special projects.
- Republic Act No. 5416

 Consistent with local autonomy and decentralization, the provision for the delivery of basic services and
facilities shall be devolved from the National Government to provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays so that each Local Government Unit shall be responsible for a minimum set of services and
facilities in accordance with established national policies, guidelines and standard.

 For purposes of this Rule, devolution shall mean the transfer of power and authority from the National
Government to LGUs to enable them to perform specific functions and responsibilities.

 All NGAs shall conduct periodic consultations with appropriate LGUs, People s Organization, NGOs
and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their
respective jurisdiction.
- Republic Act No. 7160
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5416
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5416 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR COMPREHENSIVE SOCIAL SERVICES
FOR INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE, CREATING FOR THIS PURPOSE
A DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE

Section 1. Short Title. — This Act shall be known as the Social Welfare Act of 1968.

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared that it is the responsibility of the Government to
provide a comprehensive program of social welfare services designed to ameliorate the living conditions of
distressed Filipinos particularly those who are handicapped by reason of poverty, youth, physical and mental
disability, illness and old age or who are victims of natural calamities including assistance to members of the
cultural minorities to facilitate their integration into the body politic.

Sec. 3. The Department of Social Welfare; its powers and duties. — There is hereby created a Department of
Social Welfare, hereafter referred to as the Department, which shall develop and implement a comprehensive
social welfare program consisting of (1) preventive and remedial programs and services for individuals,
families and communities; (2) protective, remedial and developmental welfare services for children and youth;
(3) vocational rehabilitation and related services for the physically handicapped, ex-convict and individuals
with special needs; and (4) training and research and special projects.

The Department shall have the following powers and duties, among others:

1. To develop, administer and implement such social service programs as may be needed to accomplish the
objectives of this Act;

2. To set standards and policies to insure effective implementation of public and private social welfare
programs;

3. To undertake research programs and studies on matters pertaining to family life, the welfare needs of
children and youth, the aged, the disabled and other individuals, or groups with special needs;

4. To initiate and administer pilot social welfare projects designed to suit local settings, problems and
situations for possible implementation on a nation-wide basis;

5. To credit institutions and organizations, public and private, engaged in social welfare activity including the
licensing of child caring and child placement institutions and provide consultative services thereto;

6. To license and regulate public solicitations and fund drives for charitable or civic purposes;

7. To provide consultative services and develop training programs for personnel, students and third country
participation;

8. To insure proper dissemination of information relative to social welfare programs and activities; to publish
and issue technical bulletins on social welfare programs;

9. To establish such regional, provincial, city and municipal branches and field offices of the Department
whenever and wherever it may be expedient or necessary, and to supervise such branches;

10. To coordinate government and voluntary efforts in social welfare work to avoid duplication, friction and
overlapping of responsibility in social services;

11. To establish, administer and maintain such facilities as child caring institutions and others, wherever and
whenever it may be deemed necessary to carry out the objectives of this Act; and

12. To establish such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.

Sec. 4. The Secretary and the Undersecretaries; their qualifications and compensation. — The Department
shall be under the executive authority of a Secretary who shall be assisted by an Undersecretary for Program
and an Undersecretary for Operation and Administration.

The Secretary and the two undersecretaries shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments.

The Secretary must have shown a demonstrated interest in social welfare and possess a working knowledge of
public administration.

No person shall be appointed Undersecretary for Program unless he is a holder of a master's degree in social
work, is duly registered to practice social work, and has at least seven years experience in the administration of
social service programs, preferably in a public agency.

No person shall be appointed Undersecretary for Operation and Administration unless he possesses a working
knowledge of public administration or social work and has at least seven years experience in administration of
social welfare programs: Provided, That these requirements shall not be applicable to persons holding the
position or detailed to discharge the duties of Deputy Administrator at the time of the enactment of this Act.

The Secretary and the Undersecretaries shall each receive an annual compensation at the rate fixed by law for
department secretaries and undersecretaries.

Sec. 5. Functions of the Undersecretaries. — The Undersecretary for Program shall have the following
functions, among others:
(a) To formulate the program of services of the Department on the basis of priority of needs and the
availability of resources to service these needs;

(b) To recommend to the Secretary such measures relating to social welfare programs as may be necessary to
carry out the policy declared in Section two hereof;

(c) To draw up program standards and procedures;

(d) To direct and supervise technical operations of the different bureaus of the department; and

(e) To perform such related duties as may be delegated by the Secretary;

The Undersecretary for Operation and Administration shall have the following functions, among others:

(a) To recommend to the Secretary matters relating to operations and administration;

(b) To formulate administrative standards and procedures in implementing programs;

(c) To provide consultative and technical services in administrative and legal matters;

(d) To implement programs, special projects and services in the field, staff development and training
programs, conduct research, undertake the publication of researches, interpretative and teaching materials and
other social work literature and provide public information regarding activities of the Department; and

(e) To perform such related duties as may be delegated by the Secretary.

Sec. 6. Bureaus under the Department. — The Department shall have executive control and administrative
supervision over the Bureau of Family Welfare, Bureau of Child and Youth Welfare, Bureau of Vocational
Rehabilitation, Bureau of Field Services and Bureau of Training, Research and Special Projects.

Sec. 7. Functions of the different bureaus. — (a) Bureau of Family Welfare. — The Bureau of Family
Welfare shall have, among others, the following functions:

To formulate, administer, develop and implement social welfare services which will promote the social
adjustment of families, prevent family disorganization, develop social consciousness and civic responsibility.
Such services shall include among others family life, education programs, establishment of family welfare
centers and extension youth centers, of groups for self-help, groupwork and street-corner gang work with out-
of-school youth, pre-vocational and work training, income-producing projects and employment referral
services for handicapped adults and youth, programs for pre-school children of working mothers.

To formulate, administer, develop and implement family welfare programs to meet such problems of
individuals and families arising from the lack or loss of income or disturbances in family relationship; and to
perform such other functions as the Secretary may direct: Provided, That such functions shall not duplicate
those presently performed by other departments or other government agencies or instrumentalities.

(b) Bureau of Child and Youth Welfare. — The Bureau of Child and Youth Welfare shall have, among
others, the following functions:

To formulate, administer, develop and implement programs for the care, protection, training and rehabilitation
of children and youth such as the abused, abandoned, neglected, handicapped and delinquent with emphasis on
their preparation for participation in economically productive activities, initiate demonstration and
experimental projects and administer them for the exploration of improved techniques of social work with the
young adapted to local problems, situations, and culture; and to perform such other related functions as the
Secretary may direct.

(c) Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation. — The Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation shall have, among
others, the following functions:

To formulate, administer, develop and implement programs of vocational rehabilitation and related services to
disabled and physically handicapped persons and individuals with special need, and services including among
others social adjustment services, medical services, pre-vocational assessment and guidance services;
vocational training, selective placement and employment exchange services and sheltered workshop operations
with adequate revolving funds; administer national program of vocational rehabilitation centers and facilities to
meet the needs of disabled and physically handicapped persons and individuals with special needs including
negative Hansenites, released prisoners, alcoholics and drug addicts; initiate and develop vocational
rehabilitation programs in rehabilitation training centers; and to perform such other related functions as the
Secretary may direct: Provided, That vocational rehabilitation sheltered workshop shall be established in each
congressional district, the location of which shall be chosen by the Secretary of Social Welfare, upon
recommendation of the Director of Vocational Rehabilitation.

(d) Bureau of Field Services. — The Bureau of Field Services shall have, among others, the following
functions:

To administer, operate, direct, supervise, and coordinate all welfare functions of the regional offices subject to
direct authority from the Undersecretary for Operation and Administration; execute and implement approved
policies, regulations, and work plans and render administrative decisions on these matters within limits of
delegated authority; and maintain cooperative and harmonious relationship with other entities and agencies,
public and private, local, national or international, in the promotion of economic and social development and
welfare of the nation.

There shall be regional offices which shall carry out the functions thru the provincial, city and municipal
branch offices all to be located in the same provinces, cities or municipalities as presently fixed by law for
similar offices under the Social Welfare Administration.

(e) Bureau of Training, Research and Special Projects. — The Bureau of Training, Research and Special
Projects shall have, among others, the following functions:

To formulate, develop and implement programs or research, training and special projects; and to perform such
other functions as the Secretary may direct. The special projects will include the Central Institute for Training
and Relocation of Urban Squatters (CITRUS); disaster and emergency relief services and such other new
program which may be developed and assigned to it by Congress.

Sec. 8. Abolition of the Social Welfare Administration. — The Social Welfare Administration is hereby
abolished, and the personnel, records, documents, supplies, equipment, priorities and existing balance of
appropriations thereof are hereby transferred to the Department of Social Welfare: Provided, That no official or
employee, who has satisfactorily served the Administration shall suffer a loss of employment or a reduction of
salary or rank as a consequence of the abolition: And provided, finally, That nothing in this provision shall be
construed in any way to amend, repeal, alter, or modify the provision of Republic Acts Numbered Forty-three
hundred and seventy-three and Fifty-one hundred seventy-five.

Sec. 9. Authority to receive grants and make direct purchase. — The Department is hereby authorized to
receive grants, bequests, donations and trust funds made or given for the purpose of promoting or assisting
social welfare services. Such grants, bequests and donations so received shall be exempted from taxes.

Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding but limited to the maximum prices paid by the Bureau of
Supply Coordination and subject to the usual auditing and accounting rules and regulations, the Department of
Social Welfare is hereby authorized to procure directly such equipment, materials and supplies needed in the
implementation of all of the welfare programs pertinent and related thereto.

SECTION 10. Settlement and Revolving Fund. — The Department of Social Welfare is hereby authorized to
establish a Settlement and Revolving Fund. All income accruing from such projects shall form part of said
revolving fund, and that such shall be used exclusively for projects of bureaus concerned.

SECTION 11. Appropriation. — There is hereby appropriated out of any funds in the National Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, the sum of three million pesos in addition to the present appropriation of the Social
Welfare Administration, to carry out the purpose of this Act: Provided, That the sum should be utilized for
programs and services according to need: Provided, finally, That not more than fifteen per cent shall be used
for personnel services.

SECTION 12. Repealing Clause. — All laws, executive orders, administrative rules and regulations which
are contrary or inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SECTION 13. Separability Clause. — If for any reason any section or provision of this Act shall be held to
be unconstitutional or invalid, no other section or provision of this Act shall be affected thereby.

SECTION 14. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

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