PATTERN OF MISCONDUCT/ ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCESSES
her (Complainants) brother xxx and is still awaiting
BAN HUA U. FLORES, complainant, vs. ATTY. ENRIQUE S.
CHUA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In its Resolution No. XIII-98-288 in this Administrative Case,
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
RESOLVED as follows:
to ADOPT and APPROVE the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A, and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, respondent Atty. Enrique S. Chua is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.
We quote the 21-page report of the Investigating
Commissioner, Atty. Jaime M. Vibar:
THE FACTS AND THE CASE
Complainant Ban Hua U. Flores seeks the disbarment of respondent
Atty. Enrique S. Chua, a practicing lawyer in the City of Bacolod
(Complaint dated October 11, 1995) for various offenses amounting
to malpractice, gross misconduct, violation of his lawyers oath, the
Code of Professional Conduct and Responsibility, as well as the
provisions of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, to wit:
I.FRAUD AGAINST A DEFENSELESS WIDOW BY
THE DEATHBED OF HER DECEASED SPOUSE
THROUGH FALSIFICATION AND FORGERY OF
PUBLIC DOCUMENT.
II.FOISTING FALSEHOOD AND FABRICATED
PUBLIC DOCUMENT TO MOLEST AND
HARASS PARTIES CONCERNED AND
DEPRIVED THEM OF THEIR PROPERTY
RIGHTS TO THEIR PREJUDICE AND
DETRIMENT.
III.LIBEL, MISPRESENTATION AND UNLAWFUL
ADVERTISEMENT THROUGH THE
PREMATURE PUBLICATION OF PORTION OF A
QUESTIONABLE DECISION WHICH IS
PENDING APPEAL.
IV.BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION AND
BLACKMAIL OF THE JUDICIARY
AMOUNTING TO MALPRACTICE.
V.ILLEGAL TAPPING OF CONVERSATIONS IN
VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4200.
VI.COMMISSION OF PERJURY, FORUM
SHOPPING, MISPRESENTATION, FILLING A
FALSE SUIT AND MISLEADING THE CLERK
OF COURT TO EVADE PAYMENT OF DOCKET
FEES.
Respondent filed his comment on the complaint with a countercharge
against complainant and counsel, dated January 24,
1996. Respondent denies the charges and alleges that:
1. Grounds I and II, referring to the forgery of the
signature on a Deed of Sale notarized by respondent
Chua, are presently the subject of an on-going
litigation (Crim. Case No. 12036 or Annex A
Complaint and SEC Case No. 3328 or Annex F or
Sec Case No. 520 or Annex P, Complaint) whose
termination or conclusion is far from over, thus it
would be premature to impose now any sanction
upon the respondent xxxx
2. Grounds III, III-A and III-B are presently litigated in
the Libel Complaint docketed as BC-I.S. No. 93-
2801 filed by complainant against the respondent and
resolution. Said grounds are also intertwined with
other pending cases.
3. Grounds IV, IV-A. IV-B and IV-C are absolutely
baseless and false.
4. Other grounds mentioned are not valid and sufficient
basis for respondents disbarment for the issues raised
therein are still the subject of pending cases. Such
grounds are flimsy and frivolous.
Respondent claims that the cases he is handling and subject of the
complaint involve disputes between family members. As he
represents the brother of complainant, the present administrative
complaint has apparently been filed by complainant to vent her ire for
failing to attain what she sought in the pending litigations against
respondents client.
In the trial of the case, complainant presented testimonial and
documentary evidence, including decisions of courts and pleadings
filed therein while respondent opted to submit the case for decision
only on the basis of documents. He submitted resolutions, pleadings
and orders issued in other pending cases adverted to in the complaint,
to prove that the issues raised in the disbarment case are still the
subject of pending actions, or that the complaint has no legal and
factual basis.
Let us examine the facts as established by the evidence adduced by
the parties.
GROUND I. On the charge that respondent Chua was guilty of
falsification and criminal activities in connection with his office as
lawyer and notary public.
Complainant presented evidence on the notarization by respondent
Chua of a Deed of Sale allegedly executed on December 5, 1989
(Exhibit E), or one (1) day before the death of Chua Beng, one of the
owners of the property. In the transcript of stenographic notes taken
in Criminal Case Nos. 12037 and 12036, a proceeding against
respondent Chua for falsification and notarization of a falsified
document, RTC-Bacolod City, Branch 53, it is revealed that during
the wake of Chua Beng, Silvina Chua, the wife of the deceased,
asked to sign a document by Yu Seng, her husbands helper or
assistant, who represented to her that said document she signed was a
deed of sale which conveyed a property of her husband located in
Nandalagan, Bacolod City, containing 344 square meters and
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 151706. She also
found out that her husbands signature was forged. The deed of sale
purportedly transferred their property to Yu Seng and Benjamin
Laudio.
Silvina Chua gave testimony that her husband Chua Beng could not
have signed the deed of sale as they were together all the time prior to
his death and she did not see him sign any document (Exhibit G at
pages 39, et seg.) The forgery of the signature of her husband was
reported to authorities (Exhibit G at page 55) and a fingerprint expert
in the person of Police Superintendent Rodolfo Castillo attested to
such forgery (Exhibit F at page 48 et. seq.) The forgery and
notarization of the document containing the said forged signature of
Chua Beng became the basis of a criminal prosecution for
falsification of notarial document against Atty. Chua, the above-
mentioned Criminal Case Nos. 12037 and 12036.
Respondent Chua has not rebutted evidence presented on his role in
notarizing a deed of sale where the signatory did not appear before
him as, in fact, the signature was a forgery. The Acknowledgment in
the deed of sale states that Chua Beng appeared and signed the deed
personally before respondent. In his defense, respondent claims that
there is a criminal case still pending against him for his participation
in the notarization and alleged falsification of the document so the
administrative case cannot proceed until the decision is rendered in
the criminal case.
GROUND II. On the charge that respondent foisted falsehood
and falsification to molest and harass parties concerned to their
prejudice and detriment.
The charge relates to the filing of a notice of lis pendens in
connection with a case filed before the Securitie [sic] and Exchange
Commission (SEC). It appears that a petition, dated April 6, 1988,
was filed by the lawyers Ramon Encarnacion and Alberto de Joya in
behalf of UBS Marketing Corporation and Johnny K.H.
Uy. Complainant herein and other family members were the
respondents. The action was for the turn over of Books of Accounts,
Sums of Money and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction. Subsequently, or on April 26, 1995, a notice of lis
pendens was sent to the Register of Deed of Bacolod City, informing
of the filing of a SEC petition, docketed as Case No. 3328. The first
page of the petition was altered by obliterating the entry pertaining to
the nature of the suit appearing at the upper right hand portion of the
caption of the case just below the case number. The complainant
testified that the erasure was made to conceal the true nature of the
suit and lack of basis of the notice so as to mislead the Register of
Deeds into annotating the notice of lis pendens. The notice sent to the
Register of Deeds, Exhibit J, Annex F, Disbarment Complaint, was
signed for Ramon Encarnacion and Associates.
It is further charged that the notice was unlawful and baseless as the
owner (SK Realty, Inc.) of the properties subject thereof was not
even a party to the SEC petition.
The application for the annotation of the notice of lis pendens was
denied by the Register of Deeds in a letter dated May 5, 1995,
addressed to UBS Marketing Corp. and Johnny KH Uy c/o Atty.
Enrique Chua on the ground that the ownership of the titles was never
an issue in the case and the registered owner was not a party
thereto. Respondent Chua, this time acting for the applicants,
appealed the denial to the Land Registration Commission (LRC) en
consulta. However, the LRC Administrator, in a Resolution dated
September 21, 1995, denied the appeal, sustaining the ground stated
by the Register of Deeds that the notice was not registrable as the
registered owner of the affected properties was not a party to the SEC
case.
No contrary evidence was presented by respondent.
GROUND III. On the third charge that respondent was guilty of libel,
misrepresentation and unlawful conduct by causing the publication
and advertisement of a portion of the SEC decision in a newspaper of
general and wide circulation in the province, evidence is not disputed
that indeed an advertisement/notice and news report came out in the
Visayan Daily Star, in its issues of June 6, 1995 ad June 9, 1995
(Exhibits Q and R, Annexes L and M) respectively, relating to the
decision of the hearing officer in the SEC Case No. 3328 holding
complainant and other liable for P68 million. The decision as
published included, among others, the cancellation of titles of SK
Realty, Inc. and New Challenge Resources, Inc.
In these publications, respondent was always in the forefront,
claiming to be the lawyer of the winning parties and paying for the
advertisement/notice of the SEC decision. (Annexes N and O).
Complainant testified (TSN February 19, 1997 at page 54 et seq.)
before this Commission and affirmed tat the decision of the hearing
officer in SEC Case No. 3328 declared her and others in default and
held liable for P68 million. Thereafter, Atty. Chua, who was not the
counsel of petitioners in the proceedings, caused damage and
embarrassment to the [sic] them when said respondent instigated and
initiated the publication in a newspaper of general and wide
circulation in the Visayas, the Visayan Daily Star issue of June 6,
1995, the issuance of the decision with the caption BUSINESSMEN
ORDERED TO PAY P68 MILLION PESOS BY THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION. The publication reported that
Atty. Chua was the counsel of the petitioners. Not content with the
news report, respondent Chua himself caused and paid for the
publication of a two (2) page notice/advertisement in the Visayan
Daily Star in its issue of June 9, 1995, informing the public about the
decision of the SEC finding the complainant and others liable for P68
million.
Even non-parties, SK Realty, Inc. and New Challenge Resources
were mentioned in the publication (Exhibit Q, Annex L, Complaint).
The SEC decision adverted to in the publications had been appealed
to the Commission en banc. A copy of the notice of appeal was sent
by mail to the counsel of record on June 9, 1995.(Exhibit V, Annex
P).
While the SEC case was pending appeal, respondent Chua filed a
case against SK Realty, complainant herein and others with the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Case No. 95-9051 for
Reconveyance of Property and Cancellation of Titles and/or
Recovery of Ownership and Possession of Real Estate with Damages
and Accounting. (Annex Q).
In defense, respondent Chua submitted evidence to show that a
complaint for libel filed by Ban Hua Flores against respondent,
arising from the publication/advertisement of the decision in SEC No.
3328, was dismissed by the prosecutors office of Bacolod (Annex 1,
Respondents Manifestation and Submission of Evidence dated
February 15, 1997). He further alleged that while complainant filed
an administrative complaint against the prosecutors, the said
complaint was likewise dismissed for the acts complained of
amounted merely to errors of judgment correctible by appeal or a
petition for review and not by an administrative proceedings (Annex
3, Ibid). Respondent maintains that the complaint on the publication
is, therefore, baseless.
GROUND IV. On the charge that respondent was guilty of bribery,
corruption and blackmail of the judiciary, as well as harassment of
the prosecution arm through the filing of administrative and criminal
cases against them, complainant presented evidence that respondent
testified in Administrative Matter No. RTJ-92-863 and
Administrative Matter No. RTJ No. 92-880, involving Judge Renato
Abastillas and Judge Bethel Moscardon, respectively, whereat
respondent Chua allegedly admitted having bribed and/or conspired
to bribe then RTC Judge Abastillas in order to obtain a favorable
ruling for his clients in Crim. Case Nos. 10009 and 10010. Failing to
get a favorable action, respondent Chua squealed/fabricated
Administrative Matter No. RTJ-92-863 against ex-Judge Abastillas.
Complainant further charges respondent of having conspired to bribe
Judge Moscardon, which illegal act he admitted in A.M. RTJ-92-
880. Complainant also makes the sweeping accusation that
respondent Chua has the propensity to either bribe or sue the judges
and prosecutors. He is charged of having harassed Provincial
Prosecutor Bartolome Facual.
Respondent denies the accusation but admits that he has already been
proceeded against and, in fact sternly warned for his misconduct in
giving Judge Abastillas P20,000.00 for a case he was handling and
for which acts he has already expressed rancor (A.M. No. RTJ-92-
863). He emphasizes that the charges he acted irresponsibly by
indiscriminately suing of harassing judges and others, while serious,
are false and untrue. His actions, in fact, resulted in the dismissal of
judges.
Evidence adduced indeed prove that respondent Chua was previously
found guilty for misconduct as a lawyer in Administrative Matter No.
RTJ-92-863/Administrative Case No. 3815, and where Judge Renato
Abastillas was ordered dismissed (Annex C, Complaint for
Disbarment). Respondent was found to have bribed Judge Abastillas
and sternly warned that a repetition of similar act or acts or violation
committed by him in the future will be dealt with more severely. In
Administrative Matter RTJ-92-880 (In re: Judge Bethel Moscardon),
the Honorable Supreme Court directed the Bar Confidant to
investigate Atty. Chuas conduct in negotiating with a judge for an
increase in rent for his client and further noted that:
Thus is not the first time that Atty. Chua was involved in a similar
incident. In A.C. No. 3815 Atty. Chua admitted giving P20,000.00
bribe to another judge who was ordered dismissed. Atty. Chua was
spared from prosecution but he was sternly warned that a repetition
of a similar acts or acts or violation committed by him in the future
would be dealt with more severely.
The Honorable Supreme Court furnished the Department of Justice
with a copy of the decision in A.M. RTJ-92-880 for investigation and
possible criminal prosecution of persons concerned including
respondent herein. A copy of said decision was also endorsed to the
Bar Confidant for possible investigation and disciplinary action
against respondent.
Complainant further alleges that there is a pattern of conduct on the
part of respondent that tends towards the frustration of justice. While
not specifically alleged in the complaint, evidence was adduced that
respondent resorted to dilatory tactics in the handling of his
cases. The attempts to delay and impeded the natural course of justice
has not remained unnoticed. In a Comment of the Office of the
Solicitor General (Exhibit Z) filed in CA-G.R. No. 41329, a petition
to question an order of the trial court which denied the accused
petitioners Motion to Suspend Further Proceedings in a criminal case
for Estafa filed in 1988, the Solicitor General revealed that the
petitioner therein, who was assisted by Atty. Chua, filed (6) Motions
to Disqualify Private Prosecutor/law firm, three (3) Motion for
Reinvestigation, five (5) Motions to Quash/Dismiss/Suspend
Proceedings, four (4) Motions to Recall Warrant of Arrest and
several motions to inhibit the judges. These motions were all denied
or dismissed. Aside from the motions, the accused succeeded in
seeking the postponement of the arraignment twenty three (23)
times. The filling of the petition in the Court of Appeals was part of
the ploy to further delay the proceedings.
The dilatory tactics of respondent Chua has not escaped the attention
of the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-
G.R. No. 38798 (Exhibit A). This petition was filed by respondent
Chua to seek the annulment of an Order of the trial court dated
August 21, 1995 setting the case for further proceedings on various
dates and the annulment of the April 27, 1998 Order which directs
Atty. Reyanaldo Depasucat, counsel for the plaintiff, to put in writing
his oral manifestation that respondent Chuas client has not honored a
subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum previously
issued by the court. Petitioner likewise seeks to compel the trial court
to dismiss and/or suspend the proceedings in Civil Case No.
7675. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition but noted that:
The petition is utterly without merit and is obviously intended to
delay proceedings in the aforesaid civil case.
The court looks with disfavor at the clear dilatory tactics employed
by herein petitioner in delaying the proceedings in Civil Case No.
7635 by bringing the instant petition before this court when private
respondent is merely being required to put in writing his oral
manifestation that Sy Seng Cho refused to honor the subpoena duces
tecum requiring him to produce the original of the minutes of the
reconciliation meeting of the feuding Uy family of which he is the
custodian. Quite obvious is the fact that herein petitioner is merely
employing this petition to delay the case and thus delay likewise the
motion to cite him for contempt.
We will not be a part to the unreasonable and unnecessary delay of
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 7635 which has dragged on since
1993 to the detriment of the proper administration of justice and has
prolonged the long standing feud of the Uy family.
We see that there is no valid issues that could arise from the order of
the public respondent since the order merely directs counsel for the
plaintiff (private respondent) to put in writing his oral manifestation
as to the reason for the dishonor by the petitioner of the subpoena
xxxx.
Respondent claims that he has not caused a delay in the proceedings
much less in Case No. 95-9597 or in Criminal Case Nos. 12037 and
12036.
V. On the charge that respondent admitted in the administrative cases
as aforesaid that he and his client tapped private conversations and
that said acts allegedly violated the Anti-Wiretapping Act. RA No.
4200, no evidence was adduced, independent of what has been stated
in the administrative cases, had been adduced by the complainant.
VI. Respondent is further charged of forum shopping for his role as
counsel for certain parties in instituting various actions in different
judicial and quasi-judicial fora. These case have the same or similar
causes of action and were allegedly instituted to defeat the ends of
justice.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court on a motion to dismiss the
case entitled Johnny K.H. Uy & UBS vs. Sk Realty, et al. Civil Case
No. 95-9051, RTC-Bacolod City, Branch 43 gives a summary of the
cases instituted by respondent Chua in behalf of his clients and finds
that there was forum shopping committed, thus:
xxx defendants alleged that there are three pending case involving
practically the same parties, subject matter and issues. The first is
SEC AC Case No. 520 entitled UBS Marketing Corporation and
Johnny K.H. Uy vs. Ban Hua U Flores, et al. which is an appeal from
the decision of the Hearing Officer of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC Case No. 3528) to the SEC En Banc. The
dispositive portion of the appealed decision ordered, among others,
the cancellation and annulment of all Certificates of Title in the name
of herein defendant S.K. Realty Inc. The present case, likewise, asks
for the annulment and cancellation of transfer certificates of title in
the name of defendant S.K. Realty, Inc. which properties are the very
same properties covered by SEC AC No. 520.
The second case, entitled S.K. Realty, Inc. et al. vs. Securities and
Exchange Commission, UBS Marketing Corporation and Johnny
K.H. Uy is CA-G.R. No. 37451 pending in the Court of Appeals. The
issue raised thereto refers to the nullity of the decision rendered in
SEC Case No. 3328 which awarded the real properties of S.K.
Realty, Inc., to the herein plaintiffs. These properties are the very
same subject matter of the present action between the same parties.
The third case, Civil Case No. 95-8978 entitled SK Realty, Inc. vs.
Johnny K.H. Uy and UBS Marketing Corporation pending in Branch
41 of this Court, is an action for damages due to the Notices of Lis
Pendens effected by the herein plaintiffs on the real properties of the
defendant SK Realty, Inc.
xxx
Finally it is the contention of plaintiffs that there is no forum
shopping in the present case as the defendants even vehemently
declared that defendant SK Realty is not and has never been a party
to SEC Case Nos. 3318, 520 and 3328, therefore, is a total stranger to
the said case. Neither can there be a similarity of causes in the
petition with the Court of Appeals and Civil Case No. 95-8975, for
the causes of action in these cases are distinct and the reliefs prayed
for are different from the present case.
The denial of defendants motion to dismiss is what plaintiffs seek for.
A judicious scrutiny of the evidence on record led this Court to hold
that defendants' position, as a whole, is impressed with merit.
A perusal of the plaintiffs complaint in the instant case and SEC Case
No. 5328 xxx which is now the subject of appeal docketed as SEC
Case No. 520, disclosed that the plaintiffs in both instances assert
rights founded on substantially the same set of facts giving to the
same basic issues breach, on the defendants part, of the Family
Agreement reached during the Family Reconciliation Meeting held
on February 10, 11 and 12, 1987; and the validity of nullity of the
Deed of Sale involving several parcels of land, executed by and
between the defendants, to the prejudice of the rights and interest of
the plaintiffs.
While the case at bar is for the recovery of ownership and possession
of real properties and on the other hand SEC Case No. 3328 (now
pending appeal) involves, inter alia, an action for accounting and
damages, ostensibly the cause of action in one is different from the
other but in the final analysis the same aforementioned basic issues
confront these cases.
One must bear in mind that a party cannot, by varying the form of
action or adopting a different method of presenting this case, escape
the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action
shall not be twice litigated. (Aldez Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
212 SCRA 623)
It is evident that the aforementioned cases hinges on the same
essential facts and circumstances. Though the parties impleaded in
one are not entirely the same to that (sic) in the other, nevertheless,
the same parties represent the same interest in both actions.
What we have before us is a clear case of forum shopping.
Respondent is thus accused of perjury in falsely certifying in his
Complaint, Civil Case No. 95-9051 (Annex Q), that there are no
pending cases with the same subject matter and cause of
action.Likewise, it is charged that respondent, in not specifying the
value of the real properties involved in the suit, misled the clerk of
court in accepting the complaint without the correct filing fee being
paid.
FINDING AND RECOMMENDATION
I. On the first charge (GROUND I) that respondent was guilty of
fraud against a person in his deathbed by falsification and forgery of
a deed of sale, there is no evidence that he actively conspired with
any party, or actively participated, in the forgery of the signature of
one Chua Beng, a purported party to the contract. However,
complainants evidence supports the conclusion that the signature of
Chua Beng on a Deed of Sale (Exhibit E) was forged. While the wife,
Silvina Chua, admits that she signed a document during the wake of
her husband, she denies that her husband signed a Deed of Sale
(ANNEX E) on 5 December 1989, or one (1) day before her
husbands death, concerning a property covered by TCT No. T-
151706.
We find the testimony of the wife on the forgery, which is supported
by a handwriting expert, as truthful and credible. We cannot ignore
the circumstances of the execution of the said deed of sale which
purports to have been signed by Chua Beng before a Notary Public
one day before his death. We find the statement in the
Acknowledgment appearing on the second page of the deed stating
that Chua Beng personally appeared before the Notary Public is an
untruthful statement that amounts to falsification. While we note that
there is a criminal case of falsification pending against respondent
(Criminal Case No. 12036), the lack of a decision from the trial court
on the matter should not dissuade us from making a finding of
liability in this administrative proceedings against respondent, as, in
fact, we find respondent Chua failed to exercise the required
diligence and fealty to his office by attending to the fact that the
alleged party, Chua Beng, appeared before him and signed the deed
when in truth and in fact said person did not so participate in the
execution thereof. Emphatically, this finding does not in any way
preempt the trial court on whatever decision it will issue on the
criminal cases against respondent Chua.
II. We shall jointly discuss the second ground (Ground II) together
with Ground VI, VI-A, VI-B, and VI-C, as said charges emanate
from, or is related to, the filing of a case with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC Case No. 3328), involving the Uy
family members and another case with the civil court (Case No. 95-
9051) involving their properties.
Complainant charges respondent Chua, under the second ground of
her complaint, of foisting falsehood and falsified a document to
obtain a notice of lis pendens. We find documentary evidence to
sustain the conclusion that indeed a Notice of Lis Pendens was filed
in relation to SEC Case No. 3328 (Exhibit J, Annex F, Complaint), to
which was attached a copy of the Petition with page one thereof
containing an apparent erasure to omit the statement that it is
For: Turn over of Books of Account, Sums of Money and Damages
with Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.However, the Petition
and the Notice of Lis Pendens have been prepared and executed by
Ramon Encarnacion or his law firm. It does not appear from the
documents, neither is there credible testimonial evidence, that
respondent Chua directly participated in the unlawful acts
complained of. The fact that respondent Chua was not the lawyer for
the petitioners in the said SEC case is even admitted by complainant
in her complaint (Complaint, paragraph 15, page 11).
However, there is evidence that respondent Chua subsequently took
action to appeal the denial by the Registry of Deeds of the application
for the registration of the Notice of Lis Pendens to the Land
Registration Commission, which eventually sustained the decision of
the former, in a Resolution dated September 21, 1995, which denied
the application on the ground that the real party in interest in the SEC
case, the registered property owner SK Realty, Inc., was not
impleaded in the suit.
It also appears that respondent Chua filed a similar action in the civil
court while the SEC case was pending adjudication, an action
claimed to amount to forum shopping, intended to enable respondents
clients to annotate a notice of lis pendens on the titles of the
properties which were the same subject of an earlier SEC petition and
application for a notice of lis pendens.Respondent Chua cannot deny
the institution of the civil complaint (Annex Q, Complaint for
Disbarment). The civil complaint, Civil Case No. 95-9051, shows
that SK Realty, Inc., which was not a party in the SEC case, was
impleaded this time as partly plaintiff. The causes of action and the
reliefs sought therein seem to differ from those stated in the SEC
case. In the civil case, the plaintiffs seek judgment specifically as
follows:
1. Declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex A) and
annulling and cancelling Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. T-
141057; 141059; 141060; 141061; 141062; 141063; 141064,
standing in the name of defendant SK and reverting their ownership
and possession to either of the plaintiffs; 2) Directing the defendants
to render full and accurate account of income and revenues on the
eight (8) parcels of land; 3) finding defendants, jointly and severally,
liable for a) attorneys fees x x x x b) Moral Damages x x x c)
Exemplary Damages x x x d) Nominal Damages x x x x x and e)
Moderate Damages x x x.
The controversy over the sale of, or the titles to, the real properties of
the Uy family was, to respondent Chuas thinking, cognizable by the
civil court and on the face of the SEC petition filed by another
lawyer, it is not indicated that a relief for the annulment of titles was
being sought. As admitted by complainant herself, SK Realty, Inc.
was not a party litigant in the SEC case, while she is now a party in
the civil case and perhaps rightly so considering that an owner of
property is an indispensable party.
We cannot, however, ignore the resolution of the trial court in Civil
Case No. 95-9051, dated November 9, 1995, which found that while
ostensibly the causes of action in the civil action is different from the
SEC Case, it held that in the final analysis the same x x x issues
confront these cases. (Exhibit P at page 5) and it, therefore,
concluded that respondents clients were guilty of forum shopping.
Indeed, while it would appear that respondent Chua was not the
counsel of the petitioners in SEC CASE No. 3328, his action to have
a notice of lis pendens annotated at the Register of Deeds and his
appeal to the LRC indicate his clear knowledge of the pending
action. Clearly, while there is no sufficient basis to hold respondent
liable for the charge of committing fraud in the filing of notice of lis
pendens in relation to the SEC case, or for falsification of page one of
the SEC petition as attached to the notice, respondent not being privy
thereto, we are not prepared, however, to say that he is off the hook
on the forum shopping charge. As we have earlier pointed out, the
pleadings in the SEC case and in Civil Case No. 95-9051, may appear
to have different causes of action and parties. But here is the
catch. The SEC rendered a decision, dated May 3, 1995, which
directed, among others, the cancellation and annulment of the transfer
certificate of titles in the name of Soon Kee Commercial, Inc. if any,
the certificate of titles in the name of SK Realty, Inc., if any, and the
certificate of titles in the name of New Challenge Resources, if still
there is, and all the properties formerly belonging to and in the name
of UBS, presently totalling eight (8) lots TCT No. 141057, TCT No.
141058. TCT No. 141059, TCT No. 141060, TCT No. 141061, TCT
No. 141062, TCT No. 141063, TCT No. 14106 and reverting them
back to UBS Marketing Corporation. The Decision was published
and even quoted in the Visayan daily Star, the issue of June 6, 1995,
at respondent Chuas behest and expense. The decision was later
appealed to the SEC Commission en banc. Respondent Chua was
undoubtedly aware that while the SEC petition did not make any
references to the real properties, the decision of the SEC gave reliefs
in relation thereto. Therefore, when respondent filed a complaint,
Civil Case No. 95-9051 (Annex Q, Disbarment complaint), on
September 18, 1995, he was aware that the forum shopping
prohibition could be violated and yet he submitted a Verification in
his civil complaint, which was for reconveyance and cancellation of
titles, that there is no prior action or proceedings involving the same
issues, as herein raised, has been filed with the Court of Appeals or
Supreme Court or any other tribunal or agency. He knew that the
controversy on the properties was pending with the SEC, or was
pending appeal, initiated by SK Realty and New Challenge
Resources, Inc., with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 37541) and
SEC Case No. 520). The fact that the relief granted by the SEC
gearing officer has not yet been set aside when respondent instituted
the civil case and that he was aware of this fact should be enough
reason for him to be made answerable for making false representation
and forum shopping. It is also worth noting the fact that when the
civil complaint was filed on September 18, 1995, the appeal in
Consulta No. 2334, with respect to the Notice of Lis Pendens, was
still unresolved. The decision of the LRC Administrator came only
on September 21, 1995 (Annex K, Disbarment Case). Ignorance of a
pending action on the properties subject of the SEC case cannot,
therefore, be invoked by respondent. Respondent is answerable for
misconduct under Canon 12.02.
III. On the third ground (Ground III, III-A and III-B) that respondent
Chua caused the publication of new reports and paid
advertisement/notice about the issuance of a decision by the
Securities ad Exchange Commission, there is sufficient evidence to
sustain complainant's charges.
Undeniably, respondent Chua did not act as counsel for any of the
parties in the SEC case, although it is safe to say that he represented
some of the protagonist in other matters or cases. It is likewise
undenied that the decision of the SEC hearing officer in Case No.
3328 was favorable to respondent Chuas clients. Respondent Chua,
being a lawyer, should have known that the said decision was
appealable. When he published the decision, he courted a possible
sanction for contempt. Here, we cannot excuse him from such
misconduct for it behooves him to even exert earnest efforts towards
the settlement of family disputes and certainly he should be the last to
exacerbate and complicate the controversial situation in which family
members are embroiled. By his publication, respondents has violated
the canons of professional ethics and professional responsibility,
particularly Canon 19, 27, 3.01, 13.02, 1.03 and 1.04.
IV. The charges alleged in Ground IV, IV-A IV-B and IV-C, which
imputes to respondent acts of blackmail, harassment of the judiciary,
arbitrary filing of administrative and criminal cases, and the charges
alleged in Ground V, which attributes to represent the crime of wire
tapping private conversations in violation of RA No. 4200 should be
dismissed for lack of evidence and for being without basis. Besides,
the acts complained of were the subject of Administrative Case No.
92-863 and A.M. No. RTJ 92-880. The decision in said
administrative matters will have a bearing on the imposition of the
penalty on respondent who has been warned of a stiffer penalty in
case another misconduct is committed.
V. The charge alleged in Ground VI-D which assails the allegation of
respondent in the civil complaint, paragraph 4 of Annex Q,
Complaint for Disbarment, as a brazen lie should be dismissed for
lack of merit. A reading of paragraph 4 of the Complaint shows that
when respondent made a statement that these facts are within the
judicial notice of the Court being a settled litigation passed upon with
finality by the Supreme Court, he made a reference to a case
docketed as Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Court of
Appeals and JBS vs. Court of Appeals reported in 201 SCRA
124. The term these facts should not, therefore, be interpreted by
complainant as referring to the facts alleged in the complainant or
that there was an intention to mislead the trial court by invoking
judicial notice of a court decision.
VI. The charge against respondent, stated under Ground VI-E of the
complaint, of allegedly misleading the Clerk of Court into accepting
the filing of a civil complaint without the proper filing fee being paid
should be dismissed for lack of merit. The insufficiency in the
payment of filing should be better be threshed in the civil case rather
than before the Commission. The intent to mislead the Clerk of Court
cannot be deduced from the mere fact of filing, although real
properties are involved in the case. We think that the charge lacks
factual and legal basis.
Finally, the Commission does not wish to see lawyers deeply
involving themselves in a fractious and divisive family feud, nay
aggravating a controversy by reckless resort to unnecessary legal
actions that only tend to frustrate the ends of justice. Instead of
working for the amicable settlement or a friendly end to the dispute,
lawyers file pleadings, perhaps with the clients cheers and approval,
that only cause delay and impede the normal course of justice until
the solution to the family imbroglio has become unreachable. Under
Rule 1.04, it is mandated that lawyers shall encourage (their) clients
to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement. It appears that in the family conflicts in which the lawyers
involved herein are also active participants, no earnest efforts have
been exerted by said lawyers towards that end. It is pathetic that years
have been wasted without any end in sight.
While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his clients rights and is
expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of a clients cause, the
conduct must never be at the expense of truth. (People v. Susano
Blancas, 45 SCRA 405; Caballero vs. Deiparine , 60 SCRA 136;
Muoz v. People, 53 SCRA 190) A lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended for any misconduct when he is wanting in moral character,
in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court. (Nadayag vs. Grageda, 237 SCRA 202).
In view of our observation and finding that the charges against
respondent for forum shopping, committing falsehood, injurious,
willful and unprofessional conduct of publishing, or causing the
publication, in a newspaper of general circulation, of a pending case,
causing undue delay in the court proceedings and for notarizing a
document without the party being present, to be supported by
evidence and meritorious, it is hereby recommended that respondent
be suspended for a total of three (3) years for all his acts of
misconduct. Respondent Chua has, by his unprofessional conduct,
violated Rule 10.01, 12.02, 12.04 (foisting or commission of false
hood, forum shopping and causing delay in court proceedings),
Canon 19 (failing to resort to lawful means in representing client),
27, 3.01, 13.02 (causing undue publication of pending
action). Having been previously found guilty of misconduct by the
Hon. Supreme Court and warned of a more stern penalty should he
commit another breach of the Canons of Professional Responsibility,
respondents penalty would even seem light.
While the counsel for the complainant is not recommended for any
disciplinary action, he is, however, advised to take note of the Rules
of Professional Conduct (Rule 1.01) which requires him to take the
necessary steps aimed at encouraging a fair amicable settlement of
the long-running family disputes, brought to light in this
administrative proceedings, where he is actively and deeply involved.
We fully agree with the Investigating Commissioner in his
findings of facts and conclusion of culpability, and even in his own
lament that the recommended penalty would even seem light.Indeed,
the misconduct of respondent, which this case has unfolded, is grave
and serious that brings dishonor to the legal profession. Committed in
succession and within a short time, the misconduct exposes a habit,
attitude, and mindset not only to abuse ones legal knowledge or
training, but also to deliberately defy or ignore known virtues and
values which the legal profession demands from its members.
In respondents notarization of a forged deed of sale, we see not
just an act of generosity lavishly extended. We see his active role to
perpetuate a fraud, a deceitful act to prejudice a party. He did not
deny knowing the supposed vendor. As a matter of fact, he certified unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is
in the acknowledgment that he knew the vendor and knew him to be thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name
the same person who executed the document.When he then solemnly stricken off of the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
declared that such vendor appeared before him and acknowledged to Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar
him that the document was the vendors free act and deed despite the Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the personal filed of
fact that the vendor did not do so as his signature was forged, respondent; all the Courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the
respondent deliberately made false representations. Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters;
It must be stressed that under Section 1 of Public Act and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the republic of
No. 2103,[1] a notary public, like herein respondent, shall certify that the Philippines.
the person acknowledging or document is known to him and that he
is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same
is his free act and deed. The purpose of the requirement of personal NATALIA REALTY, INC., G.R. No. 164914
appearance by the acknowledging party before the notary public is to Petitioner,
enable the latter to verify the genuineness of the signature of the Present :
former.[2] It may be added, too, that only by such personal appearance
may the notary public be able to ascertain from the acknowledging PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman,
party himself that the instrument or document is his own free act and SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
deed. Needless to state, the personal appearances and - v e r s u s - CORONA,
acknowledgement by the party to the document are the core of the C
ritual that effectively convert a private document into a public ARPIO
document, making it admissible in court without further proof of its MORAL
authenticity.[3] ES and
The role then of the notary public in this ritual cannot be taken G
lightly. Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is ARCIA,
placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the JJ.
laws and to do no falsehood or consent tot he doing of any. The Code HON. MAURICIO M. RIVERA,
of Professional Responsibility also commands him not to engage in Presiding Judge, Br. 73,
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at all Regional Trial Court, Antipolo
times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. In Maligsa v. City, BRANCH CLERK OF COURT
Cabanting, we emphatically pronounced: GLORIA M. DE GUZMAN, DEPUTY
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated SHERIFF ROLANDO P. PALMARES,
to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties ANTONIO MARTINEZ, FELIPE
being dictated by public policy impressed with public PADUA, MARIO PERFECTO and
interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal HERMITO SALUDEGA,
solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is Respondents.
sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon and P
failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences romulgat
of his professional indiscretion. By his effrontery of notarizing a ed :
fictitious or spurious document, he has made a mockery of the legal
solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment.[4] October 5, 2005
In said case, respondent Cabanting notarized a forged deed of
quitclaim. Considering also his previous misconduct for which he DECISION
was suspended from the practice of law for six months, we ordered
him disbarred from the practice of law. CORONA, J.:
In the instant case, respondent Enrique S. Chua also notarized a This case has dragged on for more than two decades because of the
forged deed of sale. it must be recalled that in Lee v. dilatory tactics employed by petitioner to thwart the final and
Abastillas and Abastillas v. Chua,[5] we held respondent Enrique executory orders of the courts. The endless motions and opposition
Chua administratively liable for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of filed by petitioner to block the implementation of said orders have
Professional Responsibility for allegedly bribing Judge Abastillas; not only delayed but also mocked our justice system. This is
and, accordingly, we STERNLY WARNED [him] that a repetition of reprehensible.
similar act or acts or violation committed by him in the future
[would] be dealt with more severely. Respondent Chua should, on The facts follow.
this score alone, deserve a similar deal with Cabanting. But,
considering the other items of his misconduct enumerated in the On January 24, 1984, petitioner Natalia Realty Inc. filed an
Report of the Investigating Commissioner, which in their totality action for recovery of possession of two parcels of land covered by
brought dishonor to the legal profession, for more reasons must we Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 31527 and 31528 located at Sitio
visit upon respondent the most severe permissible penalty. What we Banabas, Antipolo, Rizal against private respondents Antonio
said in Maligsa v. Cabanting bears repeating: Martinez, Felipe Padua, Mario Perfecto and Hermito Salodega[1].
Petitioner alleged that private respondents were illegally occupying
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the certain portions of the subject property. Private respondents, on the
legal profession. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal other hand, contended that they had been in possession of their
proficiency as well as honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings respective houses and lots even before the outbreak of World War
honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to II.[2]
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a
member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act After the issues were joined, trial ensued.
which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by
the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. Seven years later, on August 26, 1991, the court a
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent quo issued an order[3] dismissing the case for petitioners lack of
ENRIQUE S. CHUA guilty of grave misconduct rendering him
interest to prosecute. Private respondents filed a motion to have the
possession of the property restored to them. In an order dated April
20, 1992, the trial court granted the private respondents motion:
Accordingly, this Court, after a
judicious scrutiny of the position taken by the
defendants finds defendants motion to be
impressed with merit. Plaintiff Natalia Realty is
hereby ordered to surrender or restore the
possession of the subject property to herein
defendants.
Let copies of this Order be furnished each of the
parties and their respective counsel.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On May 20, 1992, petitioner filed an urgent manifestation
and motion to set aside the orders dated August 26, 1991 and April
20, 1992. In denying the motion, the trial court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
The questioned order dated August 26,
1991 dismissing the case for failure to prosecute
has the effect of an adjudication upon the merits
and is understood to be with prejudice (Sec. 3,
Rule 17, Rules of Court). Moreover, the order has
already become final and executory as plaintiff
failed to file a motion for reconsideration or to
appeal the same within the 15-day reglementary
period from its receipt of said Order on
September 21, 1991. For this reason alone, this
Court has already lost jurisdiction to modify or
alter the August 26, 1991 order. The rule is that
once a judgment or order has become final and
executory, said judgment or order can no longer
be amended, much less revoked, by the Court,
and the only authority left is to order its
execution.
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing premises, plaintiffs urgent
manifestation and motion is hereby denied for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[5]
On April 23, 1993, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing the dismissal of its motion.
In its decision[6] dated June 18, 1993, the CA dismissed the petition
reasoning as follows:
Moreover, the petition seeks to reopen
the trial of a case which has already been
dismissed by the court for failure to prosecute,
and from which order of dismissal no motion for
reconsideration nor appeal was admittedly taken
despite receipt of the order on September 21,
1991. The trial court is correct when it ruled that
for this reason alone, the court had already lost
jurisdiction to modify or alter the August 26,
1991 order, following the settled rule that once a
judgment or order has become final and
executory said judgment or order can no longer
be amended, much less revoked by the court, and
the only authority left is to order its execution.[7]
On December 21, 1993, judgment was entered on the case.
On March 15, 1995, private respondents filed with the trial court a
motion for execution to enforce the final and executory orders of
August 26, 1991 and April 20, 1992. Without acting on the motion,
Judge Franscisco A. Querubin[8] wrote the Ninth Division of the
Court of Appeals inquiring as to what final orders and decisions he
should enforce in Civil Case No. 359-A.
In a resolution dated June 27, 1995, the CA declared that the
following orders and decision should be executed in Civil Case No.
359-A:
(1) the decision of
the trial court dated August 26, 1991
dismissing the complaint for recovery
of possession filed by herein petitioner;
(2) the order of the
trial court dated April 20, 1992
ordering petitioner to surrender
possession of the property to private
respondents, and
(3) the decision of
the fifth division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 30787
dated June 18, 1993 dismissing the
petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner.[9]
On August 3, 1995, Judge Querubin issued an order granting private
respondents motion for execution pursuant to the above resolution of
the CA:
Let the corresponding Writ of
Execution be issued directing the Deputy Sheriff
of this Court to cause the plaintiff to surrender or
restore the possession of portions of the parcels
of land covered by TCT No. 31527 and 31528
(now No. N-67845) to the defendants which were
in possession of the latter prior to the
implementation of the temporary restraining
order dated January 30, 1994.[10]
Judge Querubin, however, inhibited himself from further acting on
the case and the case was re-raffled to Branch 71 of the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal with Judge Felix Z. Caballes as
presiding judge. On November 6, 1995, Judge Caballes granted
petitioners MR and reversed the resolution of the CA citing the ruling
of the Supreme Court in Natalia Realty v. Department of Agrarian
Reform as a supervening event.
On December 6, 1995, private respondents filed with the CA an
urgent manifestation with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
execution claiming that the November 6, 1995 order of Judge
Caballes was a complete reversal of the orders and decisions of the
CA. On June 19, 1996, the CA issued a resolution, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
x x x the Court RESOLVED, a) that in
view of the resolution dated June 27, 1995 which
is hereby REITERATED, the plaintiff-appellees
motion dated July 10, 1995 is NOTED, b) to
REQUIRE Hon. Felix Caballes of RTC-Br. 71,
Antipolo, Rizal to COMMENT why he should
not be held in contempt of court for disobeying
 the lawful orders, decisions of this Court within
10 days from notice hereof.[11]
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but it
was denied. And so it filed a petition for certiorari with this Court
seeking to annul the June 27, 1995 resolution of the former Ninth
Division of the CA. Also assailed in the petition was the CA
resolution dated June 19, 1996 reiterating the June 27, 1995
resolution.
On November 12, 2002, the then First Division of this Court rendered
a decision[12] in G.R. No. 126462[13], the dispositive portion of which
read:
WHEREFORE, the petition is
DISMISSED. The Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, shall forthwith issue
and cause to be immediately enforced an ALIAS
WRIT OF EXECUTION of the Order of August
3, 1995 granting possession to private
respondents of portions of the parcels of land
covered by TCT Nos. 31527 and 31528 (now No.
N-67845). This decision is immediately
executory. The Clerk of Court is directed to
remand the records of the case to the court of
origin.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.[14]
On February 20, 2003, the court a quo again issued an alias writ of
execution pursuant to the above order of this Court.
On March 12, 2003, petitioner filed a motion to quash the
alias writ of execution for failure to state in clear terms the extent and
location of the portions of the subject parcels of land the possession
of which should be restored to private respondents. On the other
hand, private respondent Antonio Martinez filed an ex-parte motion
for partial execution and for the dispossession of plaintiff and its
agents, attaching thereto a copy of a survey verification plan (Vs-
045802-000375). The trial court denied both motions. It held:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the above-entitled motions are hereby
DENIED for lack of merit, and the writ of
execution dated February 20, 2003 already issued
by this Court implementing in exact terms the
dispositive portion of the High Courts final and
executory decision stands and is hereby
reiterated.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Both petitioner and private respondent Martinez moved for a
reconsideration of the above order. On October 17, 2003, the trial
court granted private respondent Martinezs MR:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the Court hereby resolves to GRANT the instant
motion for reconsideration. The Order dated May
15, 2003 issued by Presiding Judge of Branch 74
is hereby reconsidered and set aside.
Let an alias writ of execution be issued
in accordance with the order dated August 3,
1995.
SO ORDERED.[16]
In an effort to again frustrate the final orders of the courts, petitioner
filed an MR but this was denied. On February 20, 2004, an alias writ
of execution was again issued together with a notice to petitioner to
vacate the subject property within three working days from receipt
thereof.[17]
But petitioner would not give up. To further obstruct the execution of
the writ, petitioner again went up to the CA but the latter dismissed
its petition for lack of merit.[18] The CA squarely addressed the issue
raised by petitioner that the two Orders[19] may not be implemented
for lack of any evidence or determination as to the exact metes and
bounds of the specific portions private respondents used to possess.
The CA held:
Petitioners contention is bereft of merit.
The pertinent portion of the questioned
Order dated April 20, 1992 reads, justice and
equity dictate that the parties in this case be
restored to their original position or status which
precedes the filing of the case. Accordingly, this
Court, after a judicious scrutiny of the position
taken by the defendants, finds defendants
position to be impressed with merit. Plaintiff
Natalia is hereby ordered to surrender or restore
possession of subject property to herein
defendants. Obviously, the subject property refers
to all portions of the land in litigation which were
in the possession of respondents prior to the
implementation of the temporary restraining
order dated January 30, 1984.
Furthermore, a closer examination of
petitioners allegations, under paragraph 4 of its
Complaint for Recovery of Possession reveals
that the property in litigation is specifically
identified as two contiguous parcels of land
situated at Sitio Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 31527 and
31528 (now No. N-67845) of the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal, at Marikina Branch. Clearly,
there is no merit in petitioners contention that the
Order dated August 3, 1995, reiterating the April
20, 1992, is impossible to implement. We
likewise find that the Alias Writ of Execution is
neither vague nor ambiguous.[20]
In this petition for review under Rule 45, petitioner assails the above
decision of the CA for being contrary to law and established
jurisprudence. It contends that both the trial court and the CA erred
because they failed to state to what portions of its property
respondents should be restored. This they claim is a deprivation of
due process of law and a disregard of the basic rule of evidence.
We find the petition to be without merit.
Settled is the rule that after a judgment becomes final, no
additions can be made thereto and nothing can be done therewith
except its execution.[21] Once a judgment becomes final and
executory, it can no longer be disturbed no matter how erroneous it
may be.[22] In any case, no error was committed in this case. The CA
acted correctly in affirming the order of the court a quo to issue an
alias writ of execution so that the final orders of the courts could be
finally implemented and justice done to the deserving party. It is
almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is
the life of the law.[23] When a final judgment becomes executory, it
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable.[24]
As borne out by the records of the case, the orders sought to be
implemented have long become final and executory. In fact, there
was already an entry of judgment in this case. But petitioner
continued to file one motion after another to block the execution of
the final orders of the courts in an attempt to frustrate the ends of
justice. Thus, what should have been a simple implementation of said
orders spanned over a period of more than twenty years, with nine
RTC judges and several justices of this Court and the Court of
Appeals, many of them already retired from the service, presiding
over the case. All of them, except one, uniformly ruled that private
respondents should be restored to their possession of the properties in
dispute. If left unexecuted, the final judgment would be nothing but a
phyrric victory for private respondents. This is repulsive to our sense
of justice and fairness.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for absolute lack of
merit.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Committee on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the
commencement of disbarment proceedings against Attorneys Reno R.
Gonzales Jr. and Katherine C. Jambaro of the Tan and Venturanza
Law offices, counsels for petitioners, for their possible unprofessional
conduct not befitting their positions as officers of the court.
Costs against petitioner.
URBAN BANK, INC., complainant, vs. ATTY. MAGDALENO
M. PEA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
Before us is an administrative case for disbarment filed by
complainant Urban Bank, Inc., a commercial bank, against
respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea. Complainant charges that
respondent is guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in
violation of Section 27, Rule 138, of the Revised Rules of Court. The
allegations of the Complaint in support of the accusation are as
follows:
3. Last 1 December 1994, Complainant bought a parcel of land
located along Roxas Boulevard from the Isabela Sugar
Company (ISC for brevity). One of the conditions of the sale
was for ISC to cause the eviction of all the occupants found in
said property. This condition was incorporated in the Contract
to Sell and adopted in the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by and between ISC and Complainant dated 15
November 1994 and 29 Novemebr 1994, respectively.
4. To fully implement the abovementioned condition, ISC
engaged the services of herein Respondent Atty. Magdaleno M.
Pea. This was communicated by ISC to Respondent in a
Memorandum dated 20 November 1994 and relayed to
Complainant in a Letter dated 19 December 1994.
5. Respondent accepted the engagement of his services by ISC
and he proceeded to take the necessary steps to evict the
occupants of the property subject of the sale.
6. During the eviction process, Complainant was informed by
ISC and Respondent about the necessity of a letter of authority
in favor of the latter, granting him the authority to represent
Complainant in maintaining possession of the aforesaid
property and to represent Complainant in any court action that
may be instituted in connection with the exercise of said duty.
7. Complainant acceded to the request and issued a letter-
authority dated 15 December 1994, but only after making it
very clear to the Respondent that it was ISC which contracted
his services and not Complainant.This clarification was
communicated to Respondent by Atty. Corazon M. Bejasa and
Mr. Arturo E. Manuel, Jr., Senior Vice-President and Vice-
President, respectively of Complainant bank in a letter
addressed to respondent dated 15 December 1994. A copy of
said letter is attached hereto and made an integral part of this
Complaint as Annex E.
8. Subsequently however, Respondent requested for a
modification of said letter of authority by furnishing
Complainant with a draft containing the desired wordings
(including the date, i.e., 19 December 1994) and asking
Complainant to modify the previous letter by issuing a new one
similarly worded as his draft. A copy of said request is attached
hereto and made an integral part of this Complaint as Annex F.
9. If only to expedite and facilitate matters, Complainant
willingly obliged and re-issued a new letter of authority to
Respondent, this time incorporating some of Respondents
suggestions. Thus it came to pass that the actual letter of
authority was dated 19 December 1994, while Complainants
clarificatory letter was dated 15 December 1994.
10. Eventually, the eviction of the occupants of the property in
question was successfully carried out. After the lapse of more
than thirteen (13) months, Respondent filed a collection suit
against herein Complainant and its senior officers for recovery
of agents compensation and expenses, damages and attorneys
fees, on the strength of the letter of authority issued by Atty.
Bejasa and Mr. Manuel, Jr. A copy of the complaint filed by
herein Respondent with the Bago City Regional Trial Court is
attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as Annex G.
11. The act of Respondent in securing the letter of authority
from Complainant, ostensibly for the purpose of convincing the
occupants sought to be evicted that he was duly authorized to
take possession of the property and then using the same letter
as basis for claiming agents compensation, expenses and
attorneys fees from Complainant, knowing fully well the
circumstances surrounding the issuance of said letter of
authority, constitutes deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said
provision enumerates the grounds for the suspension and
disbarment of lawyers, namely:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court, on what
grounds, - A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath of which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court or for corruptly
or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without any
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)[1]
In answer to these allegations, respondent submitted with this
Court his Comment, wherein he refuted all the charges against
him. Preliminarily, he claimed that the present complaint should be
dismissed outright since its filing constitutes forum shopping and it
involves a matter which is sub-judice, in view of the pending civil
action involving the same parties. Respondent then disputed that he
was guilty of deceit, malpractice or gross misconduct. He declared
that complainant, through its duly authorized officers, engaged his
services to rid the property of tenants and intruders in the course of a
telephone conversation. He added that there was no reason for him to
deceive complainant into writing a letter of authority because he
knew very well that the verbal agreement was sufficient to constitute
an attorney-client relationship. The request for a letter of authority,
according to him, was merely to formalize the engagement.[2] Lastly,
he argued that the complainant accepted the benefits of his service,
just as it never disclaimed that he was acting in its behalf during the
period of engagement.
We referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation. Both parties presented their respective
evidence before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. After
only one hearing, and upon agreement of the parties, the case was
submitted for resolution on the basis of their respective pleadings and
annexes thereto. The investigating officer, Commissioner Navarro,
required both parties to file their own memoranda. The commissioner
made the following findings:
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the
Undersigned noted that the complainant (plaintiff) in RTC Bago City
Civil Case is the respondent in the present case which only showed
that to get even with the respondent, complainant instituted the
present case as leverage for respondents complaint in the civil
case. The complainant in the RTC Bago City Civil case is the
respondent in the present case and vice-versa; therefore there was no
institution by the same party for remedies in different fora which
negates forum shopping.
The fact remains however that complainant never contested the
actuations done by the respondent to rid its property from tenants and
intruders; and even executed a letter of authority in favor of
respondent dated December 19, 1994; otherwise complainant should
have engaged the services of other lawyers.
Nevertheless, it is not for this Office to determine who should pay the
respondent for this is a matter not within its jurisdiction but for the
proper court to do so.
The only issue for resolution of this Office is whether or not
respondent committed malpractice, deceit and gross misconduct in
the practice of his profession as member of the bar.
The evidence on record showed that respondent successfully
performed his task of evicting the tenants and intruders in the
property in question. More so, no less than Senior Vice-President
Corazon Bejasa was very thankful for his job well done.
Complainant benefited from respondents task and for a period of fifty
(50) days no behest or complaint was received by the respondent
from the complainant. It was only when payment for his legal
services was demanded that complainant re-acted when it is
incumbent upon the benefactor of services that just compensation
should be awarded.
It is but just and proper that if refusal to pay just compensation
ensues in any transaction, the proper remedy is to institute an action
before the proper court and such actuation of the respondent herein
did not constitute deceit, malpractice or gross misconduct.
In view of the foregoing, the Undersigned hereby recommends that
the complaint against Atty. Magdaleno Pea be dismissed for lack of
merit.[3]
Thereafter, IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution
DISMISSING the Complaint based on the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Navarro. It appears that on April
26, 2000, the complainant was closed by the Monetary Board of the
Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas and was placed under receivership of the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). On May 8, 2000, it
received a notice of the resolution. With the PDIC now acting as its
counsel, it sought reconsideration of the resolution with the IBP,
which was denied there being no substantive reason to reverse the
findings therein and because the pleading is improper as the remedy
of the complainant is to file the appropriate Motion with the Supreme
Court within fifteen days from receipt of notice of said Decision
pursuant to Section 12 of Rule 139-B.[4]
On October 5, 2000, we received a Manifestation from the
complainant, represented this time by Corazon M. Bejasa, praying
that the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and Board of Governors
be ordered to make a more thorough determination of whether or not
respondent committed the acts of deceit, malpractice and gross
misconduct complained of as grounds for the latters disbarment. We
then resolved to treat this manifestation as an appeal. Disbarment
proceedings are matters of public interest,[5] undertaken for public
welfare and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the
official ministration of the persons unfit to practice them.[6]
The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether or not respondent
should be disbarred on the ground of deceit, malpractice and gross
misconduct. We rule in the negative.
From the record and evidence before us, we agree with the
commissioners conclusion that respondent cannot be found guilty of
the charges against him. Apart from the allegations it made in various
pleadings, complainant has not proferred any proof tending to show
that respondent really induced it, through machination or other
deceitful means, to issue the December 19 letter of authority
ostensibly for the purpose of evicting illegal occupants, then using
the very same letter for demanding agents compensation. During the
scheduled hearing, it did not introduce a single witness to testify
apropos the circumstance under which the letter was
dispatched. Those who signed and issued the letter, Corazon M.
Bejasa and Arturo E. Manuel Jr., were never presented before the
investigating commissioner to substantiate its assertion that the letter
it gave to the respondent was only for show, and for a purpose which
is limited in scope. Similarly, not even the sworn statements from
these or other vital witnesses were attached to the memorandum or
the other pleadings it submitted.It is one thing to allege deceit,
malpractice and gross misconduct, and another to demonstrate by
evidence the specific acts constituting the same.
To be sure, no evidence in respect of the supposed deceit,
malpractice or gross misconduct was adduced by the complainant. It
is axiomatic that he who alleges the same has the onus of validating
it. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the
complainant and this Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if
the former establishes its case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory
evidence.[7] In this regard, we find that complainant failed to meet the
required standard.
In an effort to lend credence to its claim that there was no
contractual relation between them, complainant attempted to establish
that the legal services of the respondent was engaged, not by it, but
by the seller of the lot, Isabela Sugar Company. This should
presumably settle any doubt that the December 19 letter was only to
be used by respondent for the purpose of supervising the eviction of
the occupants of the property and protecting it from intruders, and
nothing more. To support this, it submitted correspondence coming
from people who appear to be responsible officers of ISC (one from
Enrique Montilla III, and another from Julie Abad and Herman
Ponce) informing respondent of the engagement of his services by the
ISC. These letters, though, cannot by themselves be accorded strong
probative weight in the face of respondents emphatic assertion that he
has never seen any of these documents.[8] Likewise, they do not
indicate that copies thereof were received by him or by any
authorized person in his behalf. It bears stressing that they do not
carry his signature, nor the time or date he took possession of them. It
follows that they cannot be used to bind and prejudice the respondent
absent any showing that he had actual and ample knowledge of their
contents.
Lastly, complainant seems to belabor under the mistaken
assumption that the basis of the respondent in instituting the civil
case against it was the December 19 letter of authority. Well to point
out, the suit was grounded on an oral contract of agency purportedly
entered into between him and the complainant, represented by its
duly authorized officers. This is evident from the averments
embodied in the Complaint filed with the Bago City Trial Court, the
pertinent portions of which state:
7. The defendant URBAN BANK through its president,
defendant TEODORO BORLONGAN, and the defendants
Board of Directors as well as its Senior Vice President
CORAZON BEJASA and Vice President, ANTONIO
MANUEL, JR., entered into an agency agreement with the
plaintiff, whereby the latter in behalf of the defendant URBAN
BANK, shall hold and maintain possession of the
aforedescribed property, prevent entry of intruders, interlopers
and squatters therein and finally turn over peaceful possession
 thereof to defendant URBAN BANK; it was further agreed that
for the services rendered as its agent, defendant URBAN
BANK shall pay plaintiff a fee in an amount equivalent to 10
% of the the market value of the property prevailing at the time
of payment;
8. The plaintiff accepted the engagement and in a letter dated
December 19, 1994, defendant URBAN BANK through its
authorized officials, namely, defendant CORAZON BEJASA
and ARTURO E. MANUEL, JR., Senior Vice President and
Vice President respectively, of defendant URBAN
BANK, officially confirmed the engagement of the services of
the plaintiff as its Agent-representative for the following
specific purposes; x x x to hold and maintain possession of our
abovecaptioned property and to protect the same from tenants,
occupants or any other person who are threatening to return to
the said property and/or to interfere with your possession of the
said property for and in our behalf. You are likewise authorized
to represent Urban Bank in any court action that you may
institute to carry out your aforementioned duties, and to
prevent any intruder, squatter or any other person not otherwise
authorized in writing by Urban bank from entering or staying
in the premises.
A photocopy of the letter dated December 19, 1994 is hereto
attached as Annex C and made integral part
hereof.[9] (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the above that what respondent was trying to enforce
were the terms and conditions of the contract. The letter, from the his
own admission, just served to officially confirm a done deal. It was,
hence, utilized solely as documentary evidence to buttress
respondents assertion regarding the existence of the agency
agreement. In fact, the amount of compensation (to the tune of 10%
of the market value of the property) he was recovering in the action
was never mentioned in the letter, but apparently settled in the course
of an oral conversation. Indeed, respondent, with or without the letter,
could have instituted a suit against the complainant.There is no
gainsaying that a verbal engagement is sufficient to create an
attorney-client relationship.[10]
In sum, we find that, under the premises, respondent can hardly
be faulted and accused of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct
for invoking the aid of the court in recovering recompense for legal
services which he claims he undertook for the complainant, and
which the latter does not deny to have benefited from. Indeed, what
he did was a lawful exercise of a right.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the disbarment complaint against
respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
RE: LETTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST HON.
JUSTICESANTONIO T. CARPIO AND MARIA LOURDES
P.A. SERENO DATED SEPTEMBER 16, 2011 FILED BY
ATTY. MAGDALENO M. PEA
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In 1996 complainant Magdaleno M. Pea filed an action against Urban
Bank and certain members of its Board of Directors before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bago City, Negros Occidental, for
recovery of agents compensation and attorneys fees allegedly for
services he rendered in evicting the occupants of a bank property
in Pasay City. The RTC rendered judgment in the case, ordering
defendants to pay Pea P28.5 million as compensation, attorneys fees,
reimbursement of expenses, and exemplary damages plus costs of
suit.
The bank appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
(CA) but Pea succeeded in getting the RTC to allow execution of the
decision in his favor pending appeal. The defendants challenged the
advance execution before the CA with the result that the latter
rendered judgment, stopping and annulling the same. On motion,
however, the CA amended its decision and allowed execution
pending appeal because the bank in the meantime ran into financial
difficulties.
Nevertheless, the CA stayed the execution insofar as three
defendant directors were concerned after they posted a P40 million
bond in Peas favor. Because the stay did not cover Urban Bank and
the rest of its directors, the sheriff levied on and sold some of their
properties, including the banks club shares in Makati Sports Club,
Inc. (MSCI).
In any event, with the denial of their motion for
reconsideration, the defendants affected by the execution pending
appeal filed separate petitions for review of the CAs amended
decision before this Court in G.R. 145817, 145818,[1] and 145822,
which were eventually consolidated and assigned to the Courts
Member-in-Charge to whom the lower number was raffled, namely,
to Justice Antonio T. Carpio.
Following the lead of the three defendant directors, Urban
Bank filed with this Court a motion to approve a P40 million
supersedeas bond for the stay of the execution of the RTC decision
pending adjudication of its appeal in the main case. The Court
granted the motion by its resolution of November 19, 2001 that reads:
Considering the motion of petitioner
Urban Bank, Inc. in G.R. No. 145817 to approve
the attached supersedeas bond issued by the
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. in the amount
of P40,000,000.00, posted by petitioner bank to
secure the claims of respondent against petitioner
and to stay the execution pending appeal of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bago
City, Branch 62, in Civil Case No. 754, entitled
Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea vs. Urban Bank, Inc., et
al., as well as the opposition thereto of
respondent Magdaleno M. Pea, the Court resolves
to [1] GRANT the motion; [2] APPROVE the
supersedeas bond; and [3] ORDER the stay of
execution pending appeal of the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Bago City, Branch
62, in Civil Case No. 754 as against petitioner.
With the issuance of the above resolution, Export and
Industry Bank (EIB), Urban Banks successor in interest, requested
MSCIs corporate secretary not to cancel or transfer Urban Banks club
shares which were previously sold at public auction. Because of
ensuing disputes between EIB and those who won the bids, on
February 4, 2002 MSCI sought clarification from the Court on
whether its November 19, 2001 resolution prohibited MSCI from
transferring Urban Banks shares to the winning bidders. Urban Bank
itself filed an identical motion for clarification dated August 6, 2002.
On November 13, 2002 the Court, acting on the two
motions, stated that its approval of the supersedeas bond suspended
or stayed the running of the one-year period for the Bank to redeem
the properties sold at public auction and prohibited the transfer of
Union Banks MSCI club shares to the winning bidders.
On December 10, 2002 Pea filed an urgent omnibus motion
to expunge the banks motion for clarification and recall the Courts
November 13, 2002 resolution on the ground that he was neither
furnished a copy of that motion nor given an opportunity to be heard
on it.

On January 30, 2003 Pea also filed an urgent motion to
Inhibit and to resolve his urgent omnibus motion, enclosing as
Annexes B and C purported photocopies of pages 61 and 62 of the
Courts November 13, 2002 supplemental agenda (First Division),
internal documents that are regarded as highly confidential. Both
annexes had marginal handwritten notes on the right side which
supposedly recorded the Courts action on the items listed on the
agenda. Annex B had on its left margin the handwritten note that
says: 10 AC. AC are the initials of Justice Antonio T. Carpio to
whom the corresponding items were assigned as Member-in-Charge.
Pea alleged that, based on the handwritten notes on the
right hand margin of the November 13, 2002 supplemental agenda,
the Court merely took note of the filing of the motion for
clarification, listed as Item 175 (f), and did not act further on
it. Consequently, the resolution bearing that date, which granted the
motion, had been falsified.
Bothered by Peas statements involving strictly confidential
documents, the First Division of the Court summoned him to appear
before it on March 3, 2003. The purpose of the hearing was to find
out where he got his Annexes and if they were authentic. The
members of the Division told him outright that, while his Annex B
was a copy of the printed agenda, the handwritten notations on the
same did not belong to any of the Justices of the First Division.
On April 28, 2003 the Court directed the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) to conduct a formal investigation of Atty. Pea for
submitting a falsified document, Annex B, to the Court and to submit
its findings and recommendations. On the basis of the OBCs initial
Report of August 1, 2003 and upon resolution of the Court dated
December 10, 2003, a formal charge of falsification was filed against
Pea in A.C. 6332, entitled Re: Supreme Court Resolution dated April
28, 2003.
On September 19, 2011 Pea filed the present complaint
against Justices Carpio and Sereno. Pea averred that Justice Carpio,
as Member-in-Charge of the consolidated cases, caused the issuance
of the falsified November 13, 2002 resolution which suspended and
stayed the transfer of MSCIs club shares from Urban Bank to those
who won them in the bidding. Pea repeated his claim that the Court
merely took note of Urban Banks motion for clarification and did not
grant it. Pea also pointed out that opposing counsel, Atty. Manuel
Singson, got an advance copy of the November 13 resolution, and
faxed it to him on November 19, 2002, days before the Court released
it for mailing.
With respect to Justice Sereno, Pea alleged that, as
Member-in-Charge to whom the main cases were re-raffled, she
unjustifiably refused to inhibit herself from the case notwithstanding
that Justice Carpios former law office, the Villaraza Cruz Marcelo
Angangco Law Office, had a significant role in her appointment to
the Supreme Court. Pea said that, because of this, Justice Sereno will
attempt to protect Justice Carpio.
Pending consideration of Peas present complaint, on
October 19, 2011 the Second Division rendered a decision in the
consolidated cases (G.R. 145817, 145822, and 162562) respecting the
merits of Peas claim for compensation, among others, against Urban
Bank and the execution pending appeal of the RTCs decision. Apart
from disposing of the principal actions on their merits, in the per
curiam Decision of the Court en banc promulgated on April 17, 2012
in A.C. No. 6332, the Court found Pea guilty for violating Canons 8,
10 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for failing
to give due respect to the Courts and his fellow lawyers, and meted
out to him the penalty of disbarment.
Pea claimed that Justice Carpio caused the issuance of the
Courts November 13, 2002 resolution that granted Union Banks
motion for clarification when, based on the copy of the supplemental
agenda he submitted (his Annex B), the Court merely noted the
motion. But this charge has no basis. The Court did not merely note
the motion. The item in the agenda included several matters. The
Courts action on the first, as the Division chairman noted on his copy
of the agenda, was SEE RES which in the Courts action code meant
the approval during its session of the draft resolution that the
Member-in-Charge submitted for consideration. As it happened, the
draft resolution granted the motion for clarification.
The Courts action on the other matters in the item,
including the motion for clarification, was uniformly N. Under the
code in use, this meant that the Court was taking note of such other
matters. The two actions, approving the submitted draft of a
resolution and noting the other matters are compatible. The Court
noted the motion for clarification and granted it as stated in the draft
resolution.
Pea also sought to ascribe to Justice Carpio the alleged fact
that Atty. Singson, counsel for Urban Bank, got an advance copy of
the November 13, 2002 resolution and faxed it to him on November
19, days before the Court released it for mailing. But, Pea has been
unable to show that this advance copy came from Justice
Carpio. Besides, the record shows that the First Division released the
resolution for dissemination on November 14, days before Atty.
Singson faxed a copy to Pea. Moreover, it was the Division Clerk of
Court, not Justice Carpio, who had the duty to release decisions and
resolutions for dissemination.[2]
In the case at bar, complainant also seeks disciplinary
action against Justice Carpio for allegedly taking cognizance of
Urban Banks Motion for Clarification of which respondent was
allegedly not furnished a copy of, and for issuing the November 13,
2002 clarificatory resolution without first requiring complainant to
comment on Urban Banks Motion. Moreover, the November 13,
2002 resolution allegedly caused irreparable damage to complainant
and other auction buyers and destroyed the credibility and sanctity of
valid auction sales.
Judicial remedies were available to complainant in the main
cases. In fact, the allegations in the present complaint are a mere
rehash of the allegations in complainants Urgent Omnibus Motion
(To Expunge Motion for Clarification and Recall of the 13 November
2002 Resolution) dated December 9, 2002 and Urgent Motion to
Inhibit and to Resolve Respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion dated
January 30, 2003 filed in the main cases, which, in fact, have already
been decided on October 19, 2011.
Pea charges Justice Sereno of unfairly refusing to inhibit
herself from taking part in the deliberation in the main cases
notwithstanding that Justice Carpios former law office supposedly
worked for her appointment in the Supreme Court. But the Court had
already found in its April 17, 2012 per curiam decision in A.C. No.
6332 that this charge has no extrinsic factual evidence to support
it. The charge is purely conjectural.
WHEREFORE, Magdaleno M. Peas complaint against
Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.