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Rubi v Provincial Board of Mindoro 39 PHIL 660 (1919)

“AO requires Mangyans to live within the reservation provided for them”

Facts: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian
inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code,
800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the
permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit
homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously
recommended by the provincial governor.

In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans
in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including
those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their
habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to
comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in
accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.

Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for
the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in
which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them. It appeared that Rubi and
those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and
are liable to be punished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on
the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to
be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run
away form the reservation.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a person of his
liberty pf abode. Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.

Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a
person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and
that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery
and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian
people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes
was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the
following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in
which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines.

“Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual
and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No
man can do exactly as he pleases.
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas
corpus can, therefore, not issue.

Villegas v Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270 (1978)

Facts: The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila
on February 22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for
any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to
be engaged in any kind of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila without
securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes.

Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance.

Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.

Held: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to
enable aliens generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of
regulation.

While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from
the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or
disapproval of application is regulatory in character, the second part which requires the
payment of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure.

Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic
human right of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. While it is
true that the Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within it's territory, once an
alien is admitted he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee
includes the means of livelihood. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide the City
Mayor in the issuance or denial of an alien employment permit fee.
VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG

[86 SCRA 270; NO.L-29646; 10 NOV 1978]

Facts:

The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22,
1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of
the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade
business or occupation within the city of Manila without securing an employment permit from the Mayor
of Manila and for other purposes.
Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of preliminary
injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance.

Issue:

Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.

Held:

It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable aliens
generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation.

While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from the
Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or disapproval of
application is regulatory in character, the second part which requires the payment of a sum of
50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure.

Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human right
of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines
as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within it's territory, once an alien is admitted he cannot be
deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. Also it
does not lay down any standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance or denial of an alien
employment permit fee.

PBM EMPLOYEES VS. PBM

[51 SCRA 189; G.R. NO. L-31195; 5 JUN 1993]

Facts:

The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union
composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners.
Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union. Petitioners
claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4,
1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already
been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do
with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. The Management,
thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration
for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. Workers who without
previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting
to an illegal strike. Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with
the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not
be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should
be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, filed a charge against
petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No.
875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' Petitioners were
held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated.

Held:

Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
This is not present in the case. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense
of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment,
vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its
productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its
employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their
right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and
laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons
afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The
pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation
merely of their property rights. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused,
harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As
above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of
Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families.
Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken
in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. As heretofore stated,
the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress
of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. To regard the demonstration against police
officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation
of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the
demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a
potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the
constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of
the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the
circulation of the Issue raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more
persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their
members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their
position and abet continued alleged police persecution.

RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO

[39 PHIL 660; G.R. NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919]


Facts:

This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro.

The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which states that “provincial governor of any
province in which non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) are found is authorized, when such a
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial
board”. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in
the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in
Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said
homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor.

Thereafter, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2, which says that the
provincial governor has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised
Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of
the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered
to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse
to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance
with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.

Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam,
and to introduce civilized customs among them.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation
of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of
that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao,
Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff
in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

Issue:

Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty without due
process of law.

Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.


Held:

The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty
without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that
confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary
servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate
exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section
2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation,
it will be read, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for
the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for
educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General
adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which
they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature
has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady
requires an equally drastic remedy. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered
without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their
own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not
been followed.

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. To constitute "due
process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some
instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much must
be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases.

The idea of the provision in question is to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach
the highest conception of nationality. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is
shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this
governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of
the country.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
therefore, not issue.

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