Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as
Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the
1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325,
326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566,
573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061,
1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-
1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192,
193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-
283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385,
386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610,
611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-
1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-
1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807,
1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860,
1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-
2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532,
536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703,
705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners
have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any
showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus
proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which
we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,
or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other
specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to
compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court
held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases
where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of
that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public
rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right
and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party
in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the
laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal
president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a
proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general
rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason
'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason
for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule
itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States,
inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we
have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people
in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply
squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized
by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed
be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government
officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of
laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential
issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is
not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation
itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes
into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that
said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the
date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions
of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be
so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law;
and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from
time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published.
...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are
to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the
legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan
Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-
making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and
texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden
tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las
mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ."
The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law
itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with
no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a
burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on
the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the
land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official
government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so
that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have
no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision
might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the
pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had
been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this
Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
 The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and
hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442;
Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The
actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have
become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of
public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium
Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an
operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by
petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937
to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be
ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of
these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court,
through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal]
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is
apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a
matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the
Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect
immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave

Separate Opinion

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am
unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette
for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely
to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My
point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is
an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do
so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the
same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such
a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of
effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so
aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this
clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or
presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what
to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the
publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that
the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such
notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise
in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice
before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable
in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by
Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to
subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of
what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that
parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal
consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous
transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential
decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes
evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a
showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the
police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be
that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional
terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the
effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such
publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to
laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this
exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act
No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act
which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and
executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be,
in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore
unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law
connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances
and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is
an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people
who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due
process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its
penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative
Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive
notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly
published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their
effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and
meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso
perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one
year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date
of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to
nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official
Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its
proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published.
What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree
but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the
decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity
if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected
parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due
process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it
obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that
each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus,
a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be
published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of
the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency,
provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also
enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a
public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except
such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the
Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in
the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the
same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or
restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a
higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person
should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that
such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the
Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general applicability
ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am
unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette
for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely
to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My
point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is
an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do
so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the
same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such
a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of
effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so
aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this
clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or
presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what
to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the
publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that
the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such
notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise
in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice
before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable
in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by
Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to
subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of
what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that
parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal
consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous
transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential
decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes
evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a
showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the
police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be
that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional
terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the
effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such
publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to
laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this
exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act
No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act
which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and
executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be,
in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore
unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law
connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances
and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is
an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people
who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due
process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its
penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative
Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive
notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly
published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their
effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and
meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso
perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one
year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date
of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to
nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official
Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its
proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published.
What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree
but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the
decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity
if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected
parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due
process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it
obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that
each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus,
a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be
published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of
the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency,
provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also
enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a
public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except
such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the
Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in
the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the
same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or
restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a
higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person
should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that
such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the
Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general applicability
ineffective, until due publication thereof.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET
AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they
claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity
for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1Specifically,
they ask the following questions:

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by "publication"?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made
forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2

In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory
opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2
of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary,
did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three
justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February
Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under
Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the internal
administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not have to be 'Published; that publication when
necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not
binding because it was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant
motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period
shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in
the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official
Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is that
such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to
govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of
publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know
of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-
penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they
can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the
law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that
Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this
certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to
the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a
particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said
that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject
of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he
is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to
the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. administrative rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative
agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national
territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even,
say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements.
The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the
details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to
be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or
workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this
rule but by the Local Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents
of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title
of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance.
This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably
of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold
rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in the Official
Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently
informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating
where it should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear
consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic
releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of
communicating, the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come
out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As
far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to
such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical.
That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as
conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be
made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication
or after a different period provided by the legislature.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant
to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be
rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This
is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable,
to say the least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all the acts of
the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to
remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of their delegates and
to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they
cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon
thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their
publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

FERNAN, J., concurring:

While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to
add a few observations. Even as a Member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the
insidious manner by which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands of decrees,
executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power which traditionally belongs to the legislature
been used and abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime.
Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential decrees bearing the same
number, although covering two different subject matters. In point is the case of two presidential decrees bearing number
1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President's nephew and
the other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the
issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and
Dennis George Still

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made effective seeks prevent
abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process
and to information on matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At the same time, I wish
to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court is saying.

A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is properly interpreted
as coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come into effect immediately upon its
approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the
constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to
and unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a common tool of tyrannical governments.
Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations
between a government and its people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as distinguished from
any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional
command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as
the prescribed medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a
constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article
2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, J., concurring:

While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to
add a few observations. Even as a Member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the
insidious manner by which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands of decrees,
executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power which traditionally belongs to the legislature
been used and abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime.
Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential decrees bearing the same
number, although covering two different subject matters. In point is the case of two presidential decrees bearing number
1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President's nephew and
the other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the
issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and
Dennis George Still
The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made effective seeks prevent
abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process
and to information on matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At the same time, I wish
to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court is saying.

A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is properly interpreted
as coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come into effect immediately upon its
approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the
constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to
and unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a common tool of tyrannical governments.
Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations
between a government and its people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as distinguished from
any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional
command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as
the prescribed medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a
constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article
2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 110318. August 28, 1996]

COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES CORPORATION, PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORPORATION,

TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION, UNITED ARTISTS CORPORATION, UNIVERSAL CITY
STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, and WARNER BROTHERS, INC., petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, SUNSHINE HOME VIDEO, INC. and DANILO A. PELINDARIO, respondents.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals[1] promulgated on July 22, 1992
and its resolution[2] of May 10, 1993 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, both of which sustained the order [3] of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati, Metro Manila, dated November 22, 1988 for the quashal of Search Warrant
No. 87-053 earlier issued per its own order[4] on September 5, 1988 for violation of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No.
49, as amended, otherwise known as the Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property.
The material facts found by respondent appellate court are as follows:
Complainants thru counsel lodged a formal complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation for violation of PD No.
49, as amended, and sought its assistance in their anti-film piracy drive. Agents of the NBI and private researchers made
discreet surveillance on various video establishments in Metro Manila including Sunshine Home Video Inc. (Sunshine for
brevity), owned and operated by Danilo A. Pelindario with address at No. 6 Mayfair Center, Magallanes, Makati, Metro
Manila.
On November 14, 1987, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes applied for a search warrant with the court a quo against
Sunshine seeking the seizure, among others, of pirated video tapes of copyrighted films all of which were enumerated in a
list attached to the application; and, television sets, video cassettes and/or laser disc recordings equipment and other
machines and paraphernalia used or intended to be used in the unlawful exhibition, showing, reproduction, sale, lease or
disposition of videograms tapes in the premises above described. In the hearing of the application, NBI Senior Agent Lauro
C. Reyes, upon questions by the court a quo, reiterated in substance his averments in his affidavit. His testimony was
corroborated by another witness, Mr. Rene C. Baltazar. Atty. Rico V. Domingos deposition was also taken. On the basis of
the affidavits and depositions of NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Rene C. Baltazar and Atty. Rico V. Domingo, Search
Warrant No 87-053 for violation of Section 56 of PD No. 49, as amended, was issued by the court a quo.
The search warrant was served at about 1:45 p.m. on December 14, 1987 to Sunshine and/or their representatives. In
the course of the search of the premises indicated in the search warrant, the NBI Agents found and seized various video
tapes of duly copyrighted motion pictures/films owned or exclusively distributed by private complainants, and machines,
equipment, television sets, paraphernalia, materials, accessories all of which were included in the receipt for properties
accomplished by the raiding team. Copy of the receipt was furnished and/or tendered to Mr. Danilo A. Pelindario, registered
owner-proprietor of Sunshine Home Video.
On December 16, 1987, a Return of Search Warrant was filed with the Court.
A Motion To Lift the Order of Search Warrant was filed but was later denied for lack of merit (p. 280, Records).
A Motion for reconsideration of the Order of denial was filed. The court a quo granted the said motion for
reconsideration and justified it in this manner:
It is undisputed that the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were allegedly copies (sic), were never
presented in the proceedings for the issuance of the search warrants in question.The orders of the Court granting the search warrants
and denying the urgent motion to lift order of search warrants were, therefore, issued in error. Consequently, they must be set aside.
(p. 13, Appellants Brief)[5]

Petitioners thereafter appealed the order of the trial court granting private respondents motion for reconsideration, thus
lifting the search warrant which it had therefore issued, to the Court of Appeals. As stated at the outset, said appeal was
dismissed and the motion for reconsideration thereof was denied. Hence, this petition was brought to this Court particularly
challenging the validity of respondent courts retroactive application of the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.,[6] in dismissing petitioners appeal and upholding the quashal of the search warrant by the trial court.
I
Inceptively, we shall settle the procedural considerations on the matter of and the challenge to petitioners legal standing
in our courts, they being foreign corporations not licensed to do business in the Philippines.
Private respondents aver that being foreign corporations, petitioners should have such license to be able to maintain
an action in Philippine courts. In so challenging petitioners personality to sue, private respondents point to the fact that
petitioners are the copyright owners or owners of exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines of copyrighted motion
pictures or films, and also to the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as their attorney-in-fact, as being constitutive of
doing business in the Philippines under Section 1(f) (1) and (2), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Board of Investments. As foreign
corporations doing business in the Philippines, Section 133 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, or the Corporation Code of the
Philippines, denies them the right to maintain a suit in Philippine courts in the absence of a license to do
business. Consequently, they have no right to ask for the issuance of a search warrant.[7]
In refutation, petitioners flatly deny that they are doing business in the Philippines, [8] and contend that private
respondents have not adduced evidence to prove that petitioners are doing such business here, as would require them to
be licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission, other than averments in the quoted portions of petitioners
Opposition to Urgent Motion to Lift Order of Search Warrant dated April 28, 1988 and Atty. Rico V. Domingos affidavit of
December 14, 1987. Moreover, an exclusive right to distribute a product or the ownership of such exclusive right does not
conclusively prove the act of doing business nor establish the presumption of doing business. [9]
The Corporation Code provides:
Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its
successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative
agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals
on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.

The obtainment of a license prescribed by Section 125 of the Corporation Code is not a condition precedent to the
maintenance of any kind of action in Philippine courts by a foreign corporation. However, under the aforequoted provision,
no foreign corporation shall be permitted to transact business in the Philippines, as this phrase is understood under the
Corporation Code, unless it shall have the license required by law, and until it complies with the law in transacting business
here, it shall not be permitted to maintain any suit in local courts.[10] As thus interpreted, any foreign corporation not doing
business in the Philippines may maintain an action in our courts upon any cause of action, provided that the subject matter
and the defendant are within the jurisdiction of the court. It is not the absence of the prescribed license but doing business
in the Philippines without such license which debars the foreign corporation from access to our courts. In other words,
although a foreign corporation is without license to transact business in the Philippines, it does not follow that it has no
capacity to bring an action. Such license is not necessary if it is not engaged in business in the Philippines.[11]
Statutory provisions in many jurisdictions are determinative of what constitutes doing business or transacting business
within that forum, in which case said provisions are controlling there. In others where no such definition or qualification is
laid down regarding acts or transactions falling within its purview, the question rests primarily on facts and intent. It is thus
held that all the combined acts of a foreign corporation in the State must be considered, and every circumstance is material
which indicates a purpose on the part of the corporation to engage in some part of its regular business in the State. [12]
No general rule or governing principles can be laid down as to what constitutes doing or engaging in or transacting
business. Each case must be judged in the light of its own peculiar environmental circumstances.[13] The true tests, however,
seem to be whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body or substance of the business or enterprise for which it
was organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another. [14]
As a general proposition upon which many authorities agree in principle, subject to such modifications as may be
necessary in view of the particular issue or of the terms of the statute involved, it is recognized that a foreign corporation is
doing, transacting, engaging in, or carrying on business in the State when, and ordinarily only when, it has entered the State
by its agents and is there engaged in carrying on and transacting through them some substantial part of its ordinary or
customary business, usually continuous in the sense that it may be distinguished from merely casual, sporadic, or
occasional transactions and isolated acts.[15]
The Corporation Code does not itself define or categorize what acts constitute doing or transacting business in the
Philippines. Jurisprudence has, however, held that the term implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements,
and contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident
to or in progressive prosecution of the purpose and subject of its organization. [16]
This traditional case law definition has evolved into a statutory definition, having been adopted with some qualifications
in various pieces of legislation in our jurisdiction.
For instance, Republic Act No. 5455[17] provides:
SECTION 1. Definitions and scope of this Act. (1) x x x; and the phrase doing business shall include soliciting orders, purchases,
service contracts, opening offices, whether called liaison offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors who are
domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the Philippines for a period or periods totalling one hundred eighty
days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business firm, entity or corporation in the
Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent
the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in-progressive prosecution of,
commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization.

Presidential Decree No. 1789,[18] in Article 65 thereof, defines doing business to include soliciting orders, purchases,
service contracts, opening offices, whether called liaison offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors who
are domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the Philippines for a period or periods totalling one
hundred eighty days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business firm, entity
or corporation in the Philippines, and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements
and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident
to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization.
The implementing rules and regulations of said presidential decree conclude the enumeration of acts constituting doing
business with a catch-all definition, thus:
Sec. 1(g). Doing Business shall be any act or combination of acts enumerated in Article 65 of the Code. In particular doing business
includes:

xxx xxx xxx

(10) Any other act or acts which imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the
performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, or in the progressive prosecution of,
commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization.

Finally, Republic Act No. 7042[19] embodies such concept in this wise:
SEC. 3. Definitions. As used in this Act:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) the phrase doing business shall include soliciting orders, service contracts, opening offices, whether called liaison offices or
branches; appointing representatives or distributors domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the country for a
period or periods totalling one hundred eight(y) (180) days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any
domestic business, firm, entity or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial
dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions
normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business
organization: Provided, however, That the phrase doing business shall not be deemed to include mere investment as a shareholder by a
foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do business, and/or the exercise of rights as such investors; nor having a
nominee director or officer to represent its interests in such corporation; nor appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the
Philippines which transacts business in its own name and for its own account.

Based on Article 133 of the Corporation Code and gauged by such statutory standards, petitioners are not barred from
maintaining the present action. There is no showing that, under our statutory or case law, petitioners are doing, transacting,
engaging in or carrying on business in the Philippines as would require obtention of a license before they can seek redress
from our courts. No evidence has been offered to show that petitioners have performed any of the enumerated acts or any
other specific act indicative of an intention to conduct or transact business in the Philippines.
Accordingly, the certification issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission [20] stating that its records do not show
the registration of petitioner film companies either as corporations or partnerships or that they have been licensed to transact
business in the Philippines, while undeniably true, is of no consequence to petitioners right to bring action in the
Philippines. Verily, no record of such registration by petitioners can be expected to be found for, as aforestated, said foreign
film corporations do not transact or do business in the Philippines and, therefore, do not need to be licensed in order to take
recourse to our courts.
Although Section 1(g) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Omnibus Investments Code lists, among
others
(1) Soliciting orders, purchases (sales) or service contracts. Concrete and specific solicitations by a foreign firm, or by an agent of
such foreign firm, not acting independently of the foreign firm amounting to negotiations or fixing of the terms and conditions of sales
or service contracts, regardless of where the contracts are actually reduced to writing, shall constitute doing business even if the
enterprise has no office or fixed place of business in the Philippines. The arrangements agreed upon as to manner, time and terms of
delivery of the goods or the transfer of title thereto is immaterial. A foreign firm which does business through the middlemen acting in
their own names, such as indentors, commercial brokers or commission merchants, shall not be deemed doing business in the
Philippines. But such indentors, commercial brokers or commission merchants shall be the ones deemed to be doing business in the
Philippines.

(2) Appointing a representative or distributor who is domiciled in the Philippines, unless said representative or distributor has an
independent status, i.e., it transacts business in its name and for its own account, and not in the name or for the account of a
principal. Thus, where a foreign firm is represented in the Philippines by a person or local company which does not act in its name but
in the name of the foreign firm, the latter is doing business in the Philippines.

as acts constitutive of doing business, the fact that petitioners are admittedly copyright owners or owners of exclusive
distribution rights in the Philippines of motion pictures or films does not convert such ownership into an indicium of doing
business which would require them to obtain a license before they can sue upon a cause of action in local courts.
Neither is the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as attorney-in-fact of petitioners, with express authority pursuant
to a special power of attorney, inter alia
To lay criminal complaints with the appropriate authorities and to provide evidence in support of both civil and criminal proceedings
against any person or persons involved in the criminal infringement of copyright, or concerning the unauthorized importation,
duplication, exhibition or distribution of any cinematographic work(s) films or video cassettes of which x x x is the owner of copyright
or the owner of exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines pursuant to any agreement(s) between x x x and the respective
owners of copyright in such cinematographic work(s), to initiate and prosecute on behalf of x x x criminal or civil actions in the
Philippines against any person or persons unlawfully distributing, exhibiting, selling or offering for sale any films or video cassettes of
which x x x is the owner of copyright or the owner of exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines pursuant to any agreement(s)
between x x x and the respective owners of copyright in such works. [21]

tantamount to doing business in the Philippines. We fail to see how exercising ones legal and property rights and taking
steps for the vigilant protection of said rights, particularly the appointment of an attorney-in-fact, can be deemed by and of
themselves to be doing business here.
As a general rule, a foreign corporation will not be regarded as doing business in the State simply because it enters
into contracts with residents of the State, where such contracts are consummated outside the State. [22] In fact, a view is
taken that a foreign corporation is not doing business in the state merely because sales of its product are made there or
other business furthering its interests is transacted there by an alleged agent, whether a corporation or a natural person,
where such activities are not under the direction and control of the foreign corporation but are engaged in by the alleged
agent as an independent business.[23]
It is generally held that sales made to customers in the State by an independent dealer who has purchased and
obtained title from the corporation to the products sold are not a doing of business by the corporation. [24] Likewise, a foreign
corporation which sells its products to persons styled distributing agents in the State, for distribution by them, is not doing
business in the State so as to render it subject to service of process therein, where the contract with these purchasers is
that they shall buy exclusively from the foreign corporation such goods as it manufactures and shall sell them at trade prices
established by it.[25]
It has moreover been held that the act of a foreign corporation in engaging an attorney to represent it in a Federal court
sitting in a particular State is not doing business within the scope of the minimum contact test. [26] With much more reason
should this doctrine apply to the mere retainer of Atty. Domingo for legal protection against contingent acts of intellectual
piracy.
In accordance with the rule that doing business imports only acts in furtherance of the purposes for which a foreign
corporation was organized, it is held that the mere institution and prosecution or defense of a suit, particularly if the
transaction which is the basis of the suit took place out of the State, do not amount to the doing of business in the State. The
institution of a suit or the removal thereof is neither the making of a contract nor the doing of business within a constitutional
provision placing foreign corporations licensed to do business in the State under the same regulations, limitations and
liabilities with respect to such acts as domestic corporations. Merely engaging in litigation has been considered as not a
sufficient minimum contact to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.[27]
As a consideration aside, we have perforce to comment on private respondents basis for arguing that petitioners are
barred from maintaining suit in the Philippines. For allegedly being foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines
without a license, private respondents repeatedly maintain in all their pleadings that petitioners have thereby no legal
personality to bring an action before Philippine courts.[28]
Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court are lack of legal capacity to sue [29] and that the
complaint states no cause of action.[30] Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil
rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or representation
he claims.[31] On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the
real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action.[32]The term lack of capacity to sue should not be
confused with the term lack of personality to sue. While the former refers to a plaintiffs general disability to sue, such as on
account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the
latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party- in-interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a
motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue;[33] whereas the second can be used as a ground for
a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action. [34]
Applying the above discussion to the instant petition, the ground available for barring recourse to our courts by an
unlicensed foreign corporation doing or transacting business in the Philippines should properly be lack of capacity to sue,
not lack of personality to sue. Certainly, a corporation whose legal rights have been violated is undeniably such, if not the
only, real party-in-interest to bring suit thereon although, for failure to comply with the licensing requirement, it is not
capacitated to maintain any suit before our courts.
Lastly, on this point, we reiterate this Courts rejection of the common procedural tactics of erring local companies
which, when sued by unlicensed foreign corporations not engaged in business in the Philippines, invoke the latters supposed
lack of capacity to sue. The doctrine of lack of capacity to sue based on failure to first acquire a local license is based on
considerations of public policy. It was never intended to favor nor insulate from suit unscrupulous establishments or
nationals in case of breach of valid obligations or violations of legal rights of unsuspecting foreign firms or entities simply
because they are not licensed to do business in the country.[35]
II
We now proceed to the main issue of the retroactive application to the present controversy of the ruling in 20th Century
Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., promulgated on August 19, 1988,[36] that for the determination of probable
cause to support the issuance of a search warrant in copyright infringement cases involving videograms, the production of
the master tape for comparison with the allegedly pirated copies is necessary.
Petitioners assert that the issuance of a search warrant is addressed to the discretion of the court subject to the
determination of probable cause in accordance with the procedure prescribed therefor under Sections 3 and 4 of Rule
126. As of the time of the application for the search warrant in question, the controlling criterion for the finding of probable
cause was that enunciated in Burgos vs. Chief of Staff[37] stating that:
 Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched.
According to petitioners, after complying with what the law then required, the lower court determined that there was
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and which determination in fact led to the issuance and service on
December 14, 1987 of Search Warrant No. 87-053. It is further argued that any search warrant so issued in accordance
with all applicable legal requirements is valid, for the lower court could not possibly have been expected to apply, as the
basis for a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant in copyright infringement cases involving
videograms, a pronouncement which was not existent at the time of such determination, on December 14, 1987, that is, the
doctrine in the 20th Century Fox case that was promulgated only on August 19, 1988, or over eight months later.
Private respondents predictably argue in support of the ruling of the Court of Appeals sustaining the quashal of the
search warrant by the lower court on the strength of that 20th Century Fox ruling which, they claim, goes into the very
essence of probable cause. At the time of the issuance of the search warrant involved here, although the 20th Century
Fox case had not yet been decided, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution and Section 3, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure embodied the prevailing and governing law on the matter. The ruling in 20th Century Fox was merely
an application of the law on probable cause. Hence, they posit that there was no law that was retrospectively applied, since
the law had been there all along. To refrain from applying the 20th Century Fox ruling, which had supervened as a doctrine
promulgated at the time of the resolution of private respondents motion for reconsideration seeking the quashal of the
search warrant for failure of the trial court to require presentation of the master tapes prior to the issuance of the search
warrant, would have constituted grave abuse of discretion.[38]
Respondent court upheld the retroactive application of the 20th Century Fox ruling by the trial court in resolving
petitioners motion for reconsideration in favor of the quashal of the search warrant, on this renovated thesis:
And whether this doctrine should apply retroactively, it must be noted that in the 20th Century Fox case, the lower court quashed the
earlier search warrant it issued. On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the quashal on the ground among others that the master
tapes or copyrighted films were not presented for comparison with the purchased evidence of the video tapes to determine whether the
latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former.

If the lower court in the Century Fox case did not quash the warrant, it is Our view that the Supreme Court would have invalidated the
warrant just the same considering the very strict requirement set by the Supreme Court for the determination of probable cause in
copyright infringement cases as enunciated in this 20th Century Fox case. This is so because, as was stated by the Supreme Court in
the said case, the master tapes and the pirated tapes must be presented for comparison to satisfy the requirement of probable cause. So
it goes back to the very existence of probable cause. x x x[39]

Mindful as we are of the ramifications of the doctrine of stare decisis and the rudiments of fair play, it is our considered
view that the 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be retroactively applied to the instant case to justify the quashal of Search
Warrant No. 87-053. Herein petitioners consistent position that the order of the lower court of September 5, 1988 denying
therein defendants motion to lift the order of search warrant was properly issued, there having been satisfactory compliance
with the then prevailing standards under the law for determination of probable cause, is indeed well taken. The lower court
could not possibly have expected more evidence from petitioners in their application for a search warrant other than what
the law and jurisprudence, then existing and judicially accepted, required with respect to the finding of probable cause.
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that (l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
Correlatively, Article 8 of the same Code declares that (j)udicial decisions applying the laws or the Constitution shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Jurisprudence, in our system of government, cannot be considered as an independent source of law; it cannot create
law.[40] While it is true that judicial decisions which apply or interpret the Constitution or the laws are part of the legal system
of the Philippines, still they are not laws. Judicial decisions, though not laws, are nonetheless evidence of what the laws
mean, and it is for this reason that they are part of the legal system of the Philippines. [41] Judicial decisions of the Supreme
Court assume the same authority as the statute itself.[42]
Interpreting the aforequoted correlated provisions of the Civil Code and in light of the above disquisition, this Court
emphatically declared in Co vs. Court of Appeals, et al.[43] that the principle of prospectivity applies not only to original
amendatory statutes and administrative rulings and circulars, but also, and properly so, to judicial decisions. Our holding in
the earlier case of People vs. Jubinal[44] echoes the rationale for this judicial declaration, viz.:
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why
under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the
legal system. The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that the law was
originally passed, since this Courts construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed
intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim legis interpretation legis
vim obtinet the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. x x x, but when a doctrine of this
Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties
who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. x x x. (Stress supplied).

This was forcefully reiterated in Spouses Benzonan vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[45] where the Court expounded:
x x x. But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that
laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. This is expressed in the familiar legal maximum lex prospicit, non
respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a
law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional
(Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1961]). The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions
enunciating new doctrines. x x x.

The reasoning behind Senarillos vs. Hermosisima[46] that judicial interpretation of a statute constitutes part of the law
as of the date it was originally passed, since the Courts construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the interpreted law carried into effect, is all too familiar. Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of
a new law but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, and that is precisely the situation
obtaining in this case.
It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally
passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and
more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties
who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. [47] To hold otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality of
fairness and justice then, if there is no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. [48]
There is merit in petitioners impassioned and well-founded argumentation:
The case of 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 164 SCRA 655 (August 19, 1988) (hereinafter 20th
Century Fox) was inexistent in December of 1987 when Search Warrant 87-053 was issued by the lower court. Hence, it boggles the
imagination how the lower court could be expected to apply the formulation of 20th Century Fox in finding probable cause when the
formulation was yet non-existent.

xxx xxx xxx

In short, the lower court was convinced at that time after conducting searching examination questions of the applicant and his
witnesses that an offense had been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense (were) in the place sought to
be searched (Burgos v. Chief of Staff, et al., 133 SCRA 800). It is indisputable, therefore, that at the time of the application, or on
December 14, 1987, the lower court did not commit any error nor did it fail to comply with any legal requirement for the valid
issuance of search warrant.

x x x. (W)e believe that the lower court should be considered as having followed the requirements of the law in issuing Search
Warrant No. 87-053. The search warrant is therefore valid and binding. It must be noted that nowhere is it found in the allegations of
the Respondents that the lower court failed to apply the law as then interpreted in 1987. Hence, we find it absurd that it is (sic) should
be seen otherwise, because it is simply impossible to have required the lower court to apply a formulation which will only be defined
six months later.

Furthermore, it is unjust and unfair to require compliance with legal and/or doctrinal requirements which are inexistent at the time
they were supposed to have been complied with.

xxx xxx xxx

x x x. If the lower courts reversal will be sustained, what encouragement can be given to courts and litigants to respect the law and
rules if they can expect with reasonable certainty that upon the passage of a new rule, their conduct can still be open to question? This
certainly breeds instability in our system of dispensing justice. For Petitioners who took special effort to redress their grievances and
to protect their property rights by resorting to the remedies provided by the law, it is most unfair that fealty to the rules and procedures
then obtaining would bear but fruits of injustice.[49]

Withal, even the proposition that the prospectivity of judicial decisions imports application thereof not only to future
cases but also to cases still ongoing or not yet final when the decision was promulgated, should not be countenanced in the
jural sphere on account of its inevitably unsettling repercussions. More to the point, it is felt that the reasonableness of the
added requirement in 20th Century Fox calling for the production of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for
determination of probable cause in copyright infringement cases needs revisiting and clarification.
 It will be recalled that the 20th Century Fox case arose from search warrant proceedings in anticipation of the filing of
a case for the unauthorized sale or renting out of copyrighted films in videotape format in violation of Presidential Decree
No. 49. It revolved around the meaning of probable cause within the context of the constitutional provision against illegal
searches and seizures, as applied to copyright infringement cases involving videotapes.
Therein it was ruled that
The presentation of master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the
validity of search warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films. The petitioners argument to the effect that the
presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not
determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court
cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.

The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and
renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.

The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the
copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence
of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the
copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the
existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.

For a closer and more perspicuous appreciation of the factual antecedents of 20th Century Fox, the pertinent portions
of the decision therein are quoted hereunder, to wit:
In the instant case, the lower court lifted the three questioned search warrants against the private respondents on the ground that it
acted on the application for the issuance of the said search warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations of applicant NBI and its
witnesses that infringement of copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed. Thus the lower court stated in its
questioned order dated January 2, 1986:

According to the movant, all three witnesses during the proceedings in the application for the three search warrants testified of their
own personal knowledge. Yet, Atty. Albino Reyes of the NBI stated that the counsel or representative of the Twentieth Century Fox
Corporation will testify on the video cassettes that were pirated, so that he did not have personal knowledge of the alleged piracy. The
witness Bacani also said that the video cassettes were pirated without stating the manner it was pirated and that it was Atty. Domingo
that has knowledge of that fact.

On the part of Atty. Domingo, he said that the re-taping of the allegedly pirated tapes was from master tapes allegedly belonging to the
Twentieth Century Fox, because, according to him it is of his personal knowledge.

At the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, Senior NBI Agent Atty. Albino Reyes testified that when the complaint for
infringement was brought to the NBI, the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were shown to him and he made comparisons of
the tapes with those purchased by their man Bacani. Why the master tapes or at least the film reels of the allegedly pirated tapes were
not shown to the Court during the application gives some misgivings as to the truth of that bare statement of the NBI agent on the
witness stand.

Again as the application and search proceedings is a prelude to the filing of criminal cases under P.D. 49, the copyright infringement
law, and although what is required for the issuance thereof is merely the presence of probable cause, that probable cause must be
satisfactory to the Court, for it is a time-honored precept that proceedings to put a man to task as an offender under our laws should be
interpreted in strictissimi juris against the government and liberally in favor of the alleged offender.

xxx xxx xxx

This doctrine has never been overturned, and as a matter of fact it had been enshrined in the Bill of Rights in our 1973 Constitution.

So that lacking in persuasive effect, the allegation that master tapes were viewed by the NBI and were compared to the purchased and
seized video tapes from the respondents establishments, it should be dismissed as not supported by competent evidence and for that
matter the probable cause hovers in that grey debatable twilight zone between black and white resolvable in favor of respondents
herein.

But the glaring fact is that Cocoon, the first video tape mentioned in the search warrant, was not even duly registered or copyrighted in
the Philippines. (Annex C of Opposition, p. 152, record.) So that lacking in the requisite presentation to the Court of an alleged master
tape for purposes of comparison with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated and those seized from respondents,
there was no way to determine whether there really was piracy, or copying of the film of the complainant Twentieth Century Fox.

xxx xxx xxx

The lower court, therefore, lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of probable cause that the private
respondents violated P.D. 49. As found by the court, the NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the
subject matter of their testimony which was the alleged commission of the offense by the private respondents. Only the petitioners
counsel who was also a witness during the application for the issuance of the search warrants stated that he had personal knowledge
that the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the
petitioner. However, the lower court did not give much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the master tapes of the
allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the application (Italics ours).

The italicized passages readily expose the reason why the trial court therein required the presentation of the master
tapes of the allegedly pirated films in order to convince itself of the existence of probable cause under the factual milieu
peculiar to that case. In the case at bar, respondent appellate court itself observed:
We feel that the rationale behind the aforequoted doctrine is that the pirated copies as well as the master tapes, unlike the other types
of personal properties which may be seized, were available for presentation to the court at the time of the application for a search
warrant to determine the existence of the linkage of the copyrighted films with the pirated ones. Thus, there is no reason not to present
them (Italics supplied for emphasis).[50]

In fine, the supposed pronunciamento in said case regarding the necessity for the presentation of the master tapes of
the copyrighted films for the validity of search warrants should at most be understood to merely serve as a guidepost in
determining the existence of probable cause in copyright infringement cases where there is doubt as to the true nexus
between the master tape and the pirated copies. An objective and careful reading of the decision in said case could lead to
no other conclusion than that said directive was hardly intended to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement in all or similar
copyright infringement cases. Judicial dicta should always be construed within the factual matrix of their parturition,
otherwise a careless interpretation thereof could unfairly fault the writer with the vice of overstatement and the reader with
the fallacy of undue generalization.
In the case at bar, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes who filed the application for search warrant with the lower court
following a formal complaint lodged by petitioners, judging from his affidavit[51] and his deposition,[52] did testify on matters
within his personal knowledge based on said complaint of petitioners as well as his own investigation and surveillance of
the private respondents video rental shop. Likewise, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, in his capacity as attorney-in-fact, stated in his
affidavit[53] and further expounded in his deposition[54] that he personally knew of the fact that private respondents had never
been authorized by his clients to reproduce, lease and possess for the purpose of selling any of the copyrighted films.
Both testimonies of Agent Reyes and Atty. Domingo were corroborated by Rene C. Baltazar, a private researcher
retained by Motion Pictures Association of America, Inc. (MPAA, Inc.), who was likewise presented as a witness during the
search warrant proceedings.[55] The records clearly reflect that the testimonies of the abovenamed witnesses were
straightforward and stemmed from matters within their personal knowledge. They displayed none of the ambivalence and
uncertainty that the witnesses in the 20th Century Fox case exhibited. This categorical forthrightness in their statements,
among others, was what initially and correctly convinced the trial court to make a finding of the existence of probable cause.
There is no originality in the argument of private respondents against the validity of the search warrant, obviously
borrowed from 20th Century Fox, that petitioners witnesses NBI Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Atty. Rico V. Domingo and Rene
C. Baltazar did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their respective testimonies and that said witnesses
claim that the video tapes were pirated, without stating the manner by which these were pirated, is a conclusion of fact
without basis.[56] The difference, it must be pointed out, is that the records in the present case reveal that (1) there is no
allegation of misrepresentation, much less a finding thereof by the lower court, on the part of petitioners witnesses; (2) there
is no denial on the part of private respondents that the tapes seized were illegitimate copies of the copyrighted ones nor
have they shown that they were given any authority by petitioners to copy, sell, lease, distribute or circulate, or at least, to
offer for sale, lease, distribution or circulation the said video tapes; and (3) a discreet but extensive surveillance of the
suspected area was undertaken by petitioners witnesses sufficient to enable them to execute trustworthy affidavits and
depositions regarding matters discovered in the course thereof and of which they have personal knowledge.
It is evidently incorrect to suggest, as the ruling in 20th Century Fox may appear to do, that in copyright infringement
cases, the presentation of master tapes of the copyrighted films is always necessary to meet the requirement of probable
cause and that, in the absence thereof, there can be no finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. It is
true that such master tapes are object evidence, with the merit that in this class of evidence the ascertainment of the
controverted fact is made through demonstrations involving the direct use of the senses of the presiding magistrate. [57] Such
auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out the use of testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions, admissions or
other classes of evidence tending to prove the factum probandum,[58] especially where the production in court of object
evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to its evidentiary value.[59]
Of course, as a general rule, constitutional and statutory provisions relating to search warrants prohibit their issuance
except on a showing of probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation. These provisions prevent the issuance of warrants
on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact, and emphasize the purpose to protect against all general searches. [60] Indeed,
Article III of our Constitution mandates in Sec. 2 thereof that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized; and Sec. 3 thereof provides
that any evidence obtained in violation of the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
These constitutional strictures are implemented by the following provisions of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.

Sec. 5. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is
based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form
prescribed by these Rules.

The constitutional and statutory provisions of various jurisdictions requiring a showing of probable cause before a
search warrant can be issued are mandatory and must be complied with, and such a showing has been held to be an
unqualified condition precedent to the issuance of a warrant. A search warrant not based on probable cause is a nullity, or
is void, and the issuance thereof is, in legal contemplation, arbitrary. [61] It behooves us, then, to review the concept of
probable cause, firstly, from representative holdings in the American jurisdiction from which we patterned our doctrines on
the matter.
Although the term probable cause has been said to have a well-defined meaning in the law, the term is exceedingly
difficult to define, in this case, with any degree of precision; indeed, no definition of it which would justify the issuance of a
search warrant can be formulated which would cover every state of facts which might arise, and no formula or standard, or
hard and fast rule, may be laid down which may be applied to the facts of every situation.[62] As to what acts constitute
probable cause seem incapable of definition.[63] There is, of necessity, no exact test.[64]
At best, the term probable cause has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged;[65] or the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite an honest belief
in a reasonable mind acting on all the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the magistrate that the charge made
by the applicant for the warrant is true.[66]
Probable cause does not mean actual and positive cause, nor does it import absolute certainty. The determination of
the existence of probable cause is not concerned with the question of whether the offense charged has been or is being
committed in fact, or whether the accused is guilty or innocent, but only whether the affiant has reasonable grounds for his
belief.[67] The requirement is less than certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or possibility.[68]
In Philippine jurisprudence, probable cause has been uniformly defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. [69] It being the duty of the issuing officer to issue, or
refuse to issue, the warrant as soon as practicable after the application therefor is filed,[70] the facts warranting the conclusion
of probable cause must be assessed at the time of such judicial determination by necessarily using legal standards then
set forth in law and jurisprudence, and not those that have yet to be crafted thereafter.
As already stated, the definition of probable cause enunciated in Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, et al., supra, vis-a-
vis the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 126, were the prevailing and controlling legal standards, as they continue to
be, by which a finding of probable cause is tested. Since the proprietary of the issuance of a search warrant is to be
determined at the time of the application therefor, which in turn must not be too remote in time from the occurrence of the
offense alleged to have been committed, the issuing judge, in determining the existence of probable cause, can and should
logically look to the touchstones in the laws therefore enacted and the decisions already promulgated at the time, and not
to those which had not yet even been conceived or formulated.
 It is worth noting that neither the Constitution nor the Rules of Court attempt to define probable cause, obviously for
the purpose of leaving such matter to the courts discretion within the particular facts of each case. Although the Constitution
prohibits the issuance of a search warrant in the absence of probable cause, such constitutional inhibition does not
command the legislature to establish a definition or formula for determining what shall constitute probable cause. [71] Thus,
Congress, despite its broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures, [72] does not venture
to make such a definition or standard formulation of probable cause, nor categorize what facts and circumstances make up
the same, much less limit the determination thereof to and within the circumscription of a particular class of evidence, all in
deference to judicial discretion and probity.[73]
Accordingly, to restrict the exercise of discretion by a judge by adding a particular requirement (the presentation of
master tapes, as intimated by 20th Century Fox) not provided nor implied in the law for a finding of probable cause is beyond
the realm of judicial competence or statemanship. It serves no purpose but to stultify and constrict the judicious exercise of
a court's prerogatives and to denigrate the judicial duty of determining the existence of probable cause to a mere ministerial
or mechanical function. There is, to repeat, no law or rule which requires that the existence of probable cause is or should
be determined solely by a specific kind of evidence. Surely, this could not have been contemplated by the framers of the
Constitution, and we do not believe that the Court intended the statement in 20th Century Fox regarding master tapes as
the dictum for all seasons and reasons in infringement cases.
Turning now to the case at bar, it can be gleaned from the records that the lower court followed the prescribed
procedure for the issuances of a search warrant: (1) the examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and his
witnesses, with them particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (2) an examination
personally conducted by the judge in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath of the
complainant and witnesses on facts personally known to them; and, (3) the taking of sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted, which were duly attached to the records.
Thereafter, the court a quo made the following factual findings leading to the issuance of the search warrant now
subject to this controversy:
In the instant case, the following facts have been established: (1) copyrighted video tapes bearing titles enumerated in Search Warrant
No. 87-053 were being sold, leased, distributed or circulated, or offered for sale, lease, distribution, or transferred or caused to be
transferred by defendants at their video outlets, without the written consent of the private complainants or their assignee; (2) recovered
or confiscated from defendants' possession were video tapes containing copyrighted motion picture films without the authority of the
complainant; (3) the video tapes originated from spurious or unauthorized persons; and (4) said video tapes were exact reproductions
of the films listed in the search warrant whose copyrights or distribution rights were owned by complainants.

The basis of these facts are the affidavits and depositions of NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, and Rene C.
Baltazar. Motion Pictures Association of America, Inc. (MPAA) thru their counsel, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, filed a complaint with the
National Bureau of Investigation against certain video establishments one of which is defendant, for violation of PD No. 49 as
amended by PD No, 1988. Atty. Lauro C. Reyes led a team to conduct discreet surveillance operations on said video
establishments. Per information earlier gathered by Atty. Domingo, defendants were engaged in the illegal sale, rental, distribution,
circulation or public exhibition of copyrighted films of MPAA without its written authority or its members. Knowing that defendant
Sunshine Home Video and its proprietor, Mr. Danilo Pelindario, were not authorized by MPAA to reproduce, lease, and possess for
the purpose of selling any of its copyrighted motion pictures, he instructed his researcher, Mr. Rene Baltazar to rent two video
cassettes from said defendants on October 21, 1987. Rene C. Baltazar proceeded to Sunshine Home Video and rented tapes containing
Little Shop of Horror. He was issued rental slip No. 26362 dated October 21, 1987 for P10.00 with a deposit of P100.00. Again, on
December 11, 1987, he returned to Sunshine Home Video and rented Robocop with a rental slip No. 25271 also for P10.00. On the
basis of the complaint of MPAA thru counsel, Atty. Lauro C. Reyes personally went to Sunshine Home Video at No. 6 Mayfair
Center, Magallanes Commercial Center, Makati. His last visit was on December 7, 1987.There, he found the video outlet renting,
leasing, distributing video cassette tapes whose titles were copyrighted and without the authority of MPAA.

Given these facts, a probable cause exists. x x x.[74]

The lower court subsequently executed a volte-face, despite its prior detailed and substantiated findings, by stating in
its order of November 22, 1988 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration and quashing the search warrant that
x x x. The two (2) cases have a common factual milieu; both involve alleged pirated copyrighted films of private complainants which
were found in the possession or control of the defendants. Hence, the necessity of the presentation of the master tapes from which the
pirated films were allegedly copied is necessary in the instant case, to establish the existence of probable cause. [75]

Being based solely on an unjustifiable and improper retroactive application of the master tape requirement generated
by 20th Century Fox upon a factual situation completely different from that in the case at bar, and without anything more,
this later order clearly defies elemental fair play and is a gross reversible error. In fact, this observation of the Court in La
ChemiseLacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez, et al., supra, may just as easily apply to the present case:
A review of the grounds invoked x x x in his motion to quash the search warrants reveals the fact that they are not appropriate for
quashing a warrant. They are matters of defense which should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the case. x x x

As correctly pointed out by petitioners, a blind espousal of the requisite of presentation of the master tapes in copyright
infringement cases, as the prime determinant of probable cause, is too exacting and impracticable a requirement to be
complied with in a search warrant application which, it must not be overlooked, is only an ancillary proceeding. Further, on
realistic considerations, a strict application of said requirement militates against the elements of secrecy and speed which
underlie covert investigative and surveillance operations in police enforcement campaigns against all forms of criminality,
considering that the master tapes of a motion picture required to be presented before the court consists of several reels
contained in circular steel casings which, because of their bulk, will definitely draw attention, unlike diminutive objects like
video tapes which can be easily concealed.[76] With hundreds of titles being pirated, this onerous and tedious imposition
would be multiplied a hundredfold by judicial fiat, discouraging and preventing legal recourses in foreign jurisdictions.
Given the present international awareness and furor over violations in large scale of intellectual property rights, calling
for transnational sanctions, it bears calling to mind the Courts admonition also in La Chemise Lacoste, supra, that
x x x. Judges all over the country are well advised to remember that court processes should not be used as instruments to, unwittingly
or otherwise, aid counterfeiters and intellectual pirates, tie the hands of the law as it seeks to protect the Filipino consuming public and
frustrate executive and administrative implementation of solemn commitments pursuant to international conventions and treaties.

III
The amendment of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 49 by Presidential Decree No. 1987, [77] which should here
be publicized judicially, brought about the revision of its penalty structure and enumerated additional acts considered
violative of said decree on intellectual property, namely, (1) directly or indirectly transferring or causing to be transferred any
sound recording or motion picture or other audio-visual works so recorded with intent to sell, lease, publicly exhibit or cause
to be sold, leased or publicly exhibited, or to use or cause to be used for profit such articles on which sounds, motion
pictures, or other audio-visual works are so transferred without the written consent of the owner or his assignee; (2) selling,
leasing, distributing, circulating, publicly exhibiting, or offering for sale, lease, distribution, or possessing for the purpose of
sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public exhibition any of the abovementioned articles, without the written consent of
the owner or his assignee; and, (3) directly or indirectly offering or making available for a fee, rental, or any other form of
compensation any equipment, machinery, paraphernalia or any material with the knowledge that such equipment,
machinery, paraphernalia or material will be used by another to reproduce, without the consent of the owner, any
phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, film or other article on which sounds, motion pictures or other audio-visual recordings
may be transferred, and which provide distinct bases for criminal prosecution, being crimes independently punishable under
Presidential Decree No. 49, as amended, aside from the act of infringing or aiding or abetting such infringement under
Section 29.
The trial courts finding that private respondents committed acts in blatant transgression of Presidential Decree No. 49
all the more bolsters its findings of probable cause, which determination can be reached even in the absence of master
tapes by the judge in the exercise of sound discretion. The executive concern and resolve expressed in the foregoing
amendments to the decree for the protection of intellectual property rights should be matched by corresponding judicial
vigilance and activism, instead of the apathy of submitting to technicalities in the face of ample evidence of guilt.
The essence of intellectual piracy should be essayed in conceptual terms in order to underscore its gravity by an
appropriate understanding thereof. Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and occupied by
the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous
term in this connection, consists in the doing by any person, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of anything
the sole right to do which is conferred by statute on the owner of the copyright. [78]
A copy of a piracy is an infringement of the original, and it is no defense that the pirate, in such cases, did not know
what works he was indirectly copying, or did not know whether or not he was infringing any copyright; he at least knew that
what he was copying was not his, and he copied at his peril. In determining the question of infringement, the amount of
matter copied from the copyrighted work is an important consideration. To constitute infringement, it is not necessary that
the whole or even a large portion of the work shall have been copied. If so much is taken that the value of the original is
sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially and to an injurious extent appropriated by another,
that is sufficient in point of law to constitute a piracy.[79] The question of whether there has been an actionable infringement
of a literary, musical, or artistic work in motion pictures, radio or television being one of fact, [80] it should properly be
determined during the trial. That is the stage calling for conclusive or preponderating evidence, and not the summary
proceeding for the issuance of a search warrant wherein both lower courts erroneously require the master tapes.
In disregarding private respondents argument that Search Warrant No. 87-053 is a general warrant, the lower court
observed that it was worded in a manner that the enumerated seizable items bear direct relation to the offense of violation
of Sec. 56 of PD 49 as amended. It authorized only the seizur(e) of articles used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale,
lease and other unconcerted acts in violation of PD 49 as amended. x x x.[81]
On this point, Bache and Co., (Phil.), Inc., et al. vs. Ruiz, et al.,[82] instructs and enlightens:
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law
by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised
Rules of Court). x x x. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must
necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure
should come in handy merely to strengthen suchevidence. x x x.

On private respondents averment that the search warrant was made applicable to more than one specific offense on
the ground that there are as many offenses of infringement as there are rights protected and, therefore, to issue one search
warrant for all the movie titles allegedly pirated violates the rule that a search warrant must be issued only in connection
with one specific offense, the lower court said:
x x x. As the face of the search warrant itself indicates, it was issued for violation of Section 56, PD 49 as amended only. The
specifications therein (in Annex A) merely refer to the titles of the copyrighted motion pictures/films belonging to private
complainants which defendants were in control/possession for sale, lease, distribution or public exhibition in contravention of Sec. 56,
PD 49 as amended.[83]

That there were several counts of the offense of copyright infringement and the search warrant uncovered several
contraband items in the form of pirated video tapes is not to be confused with the number of offenses charged. The search
warrant herein issued does not violate the one-specific-offense rule.
It is pointless for private respondents to insist on compliance with the registration and deposit requirements under
Presidential Decree No. 49 as prerequisites for invoking the courts protective mantle in copyright infringement cases. As
explained by the court below:
Defendants-movants contend that PD 49 as amended covers only producers who have complied with the requirements of deposit and
notice (in other words registration) under Sections 49 and 50 thereof. Absent such registration, as in this case, there was no right
created, hence, no infringement under PD 49 as amended. This is not well-taken.

As correctly pointed out by private complainants-oppositors, the Department of Justice has resolved this legal question as far back as
December 12, 1978 in its Opinion No. 191 of the then Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos which stated that Sections 26 and 50
do not apply to cinematographic works and PD No. 49 had done away with the registration and deposit of cinematographic works and
that even without prior registration and deposit of a work which may be entitled to protection under the Decree, the creator can file
action for infringement of its rights. He cannot demand, however, payment of damages arising from infringement. The same opinion
stressed that the requirements of registration and deposit are thus retained under the Decree, not as conditions for the acquisition of
copyright and other rights, but as prerequisites to a suit for damages. The statutory interpretation of the Executive Branch being
correct, is entitled (to) weight and respect.

xxx xxx xxx

Defendants-movants maintain that complainant and his witnesses led the Court to believe that a crime existed when in fact there was
none. This is wrong. As earlier discussed, PD 49 as amended, does not require registration and deposit for a creator to be able to file
an action for infringement of his rights. These conditions are merely pre-requisites to an action for damages. So, as long as the
proscribed acts are shown to exist, an action for infringement may be initiated. [84]

Accordingly, the certifications[85] from the Copyright Section of the National Library, presented as evidence by private
respondents to show non-registration of some of the films of petitioners, assume no evidentiary weight or significance,
whatsoever.
Furthermore, a closer review of Presidential Decree No. 49 reveals that even with respect to works which are required
under Section 26 thereof to be registered and with copies to be deposited with the National Library, such as books, including
composite and cyclopedic works, manuscripts, directories and gazetteers; and periodicals, including pamphlets and
newspapers; lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations prepared for oral delivery; and letters, the failure to comply with
said requirements does not deprive the copyright owner of the right to sue for infringement. Such non-compliance merely
limits the remedies available to him and subjects him to the corresponding sanction.
The reason for this is expressed in Section 2 of the decree which prefaces its enumeration of copyrightable works with
the explicit statement that the rights granted under this Decree shall, from the moment of creation, subsist with respect to
any of the following classes of works. This means that under the present state of the law, the copyright for a work is acquired
by an intellectual creator from the moment of creation even in the absence of registration and deposit. As has been
authoritatively clarified:
The registration and deposit of two complete copies or reproductions of the work with the National Library within three weeks after
the first public dissemination or performance of the work, as provided for in Section 26 (P.D. No. 49, as amended), is not for the
purpose of securing a copyright of the work, but rather to avoid the penalty for non-compliance of the deposit of said two copies and
in order to recover damages in an infringement suit.[86]

One distressing observation. This case has been fought on the basis of, and its resolution long delayed by resort to,
technicalities to a virtually abusive extent by private respondents, without so much as an attempt to adduce any credible
evidence showing that they conduct their business legitimately and fairly. The fact that private respondents could not show
proof of their authority or that there was consent from the copyright owners for them to sell, lease, distribute or circulate
petitioners copyrighted films immeasurably bolsters the lower courts initial finding of probable cause. That private
respondents are licensed by the Videogram Regulatory Board does not insulate them from criminal and civil liability for their
unlawful business practices. What is more deplorable is that the reprehensible acts of some unscrupulous characters have
stigmatized the Philippines with an unsavory reputation as a hub for intellectual piracy in this part of the globe, formerly in
the records of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and, now, of the World Trade Organization. Such acts must not
be glossed over but should be denounced and repressed lest the Philippines become an international pariah in the global
intellectual community.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, and necessarily inclusive of the
order of the lower court dated November 22, 1988, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order of the court a quo of
September 5, 1988 upholding the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-053 is hereby REINSTATED, and said court is
DIRECTED to take and expeditiously proceed with such appropriate proceedings as may be called for in this case. Treble
costs are further assessed against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.,
Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., no part in deliberations.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared the rightful governor of
Sorsogon
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but who was twice
declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his
lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;

(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be
considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the
most number of valid votes; or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the position of governor, but who
according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent
vacancy in the contested office has occurred"?

In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing
jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755.
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and preliminary injunction to
review and annul a Resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division,1 promulgated
on December 19,19952 and another Resolution of the Comelec en bane promulgated February 23, 19963 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The Facts

On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of
Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition4 with
the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office
or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On May
1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution5 granting the petition with the following disposition:6
"WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office
of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy
is cancelled."

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his
candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en
banc7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of
Votes8.dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor
of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060

Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440

RaulR.Lee 53,304

Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925

On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition9 praying for his proclamation as the duly-
elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en
bane directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul
Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the
evening of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, 11 docketed as SPC No. 95-317, praying for the
annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995,
at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under
P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted." As such, when
"the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at
5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the
alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,12 the Vice-Governor not Lee should occupy
said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution13 holding that Lee, "not
having garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that
Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes, and xxx having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation
on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 xxx (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of
Sorsogon"; thus:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition.

Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered
annulled, being contrary to law, he not having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.

Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately
reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon
having garnered the highest number of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30,1995 under
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon.

Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His
Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this
resolution immediately upon the due implementation thereof."

On December 26,1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec en banc in its
Resolution14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a
temporary restraining order, this Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain
the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."

The Issues in G.R. No. 123755

Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand briefly be capsulized in the following propositions": 15
"First - The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its
jurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said petition;

Second- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be
elected to and to hold the Office of Governor;

Third - The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and
qualify him to hold the Office of Governor; and

Fourth - Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of petitioner's proclamation as duly elected
Governor of Sorsogon."

G.R. No. 120295

This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which are also at issue in G.R.
No. 123755, as follows:
1. Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon in
the May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines";

2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and

3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.

The Facts and the Issue

The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo assails the above-
mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced
hereinunder:
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election." (Italics supplied.)

the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered "within the period allowed by
law," i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for disqualification within the
period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions
null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since they are intimately
related in their factual environment and are identical in the ultimate question raised, viz., who should occupy the position of
governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them thereafter to file simultaneously
their respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues

From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be
proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?

2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be
elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?

3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering that : said petition is not "a
pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case"?

4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence?

5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of which
prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within ( the period referred
to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?

The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation

The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in this case. All the other
matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local
officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:
"Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or
member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

xxx xxx xxx

Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon him to show
that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R. A.
7160).
Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation.
Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654 22 and during the oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship
by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of
several members of the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the
same case, his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural
defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of Sorsogon,
with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee.
Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular
mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision from
the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully passed through the third and last
mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor General himself, who
was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing
the validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance
under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists that henot Leeshould
have been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m.
on the said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes in the elections and since at
that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted ; with serious defects, which we shall now discuss in
seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed," asserting that "then President Corazon Aquino
exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by
Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under
the 1987 Constitution," adding that in her memorandum dated March 27,1987 to the members of the Special Committee on
Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist
from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility as defined under Letter of Instructions
(LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended."23
This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law
sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may be
express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum
based on the copy furnished us by Lee did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was
being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other
hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be
allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently
inconsistent that they cannot co-exist."26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every
pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be
regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the
Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the
first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but
left it to the first Congress once createdto deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have
unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance
in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion"
to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as
is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory construction but on
common sense as well.
Second. Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings," asserting that
Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 x x x (and) was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 x
x x," which "prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application
for repatriation with the Office of the President in Malacanang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is confirmed by the Solicitor
General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee
started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required.
Under these circumstances, it could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in the processing of his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on Naturalization was intended solely for
the personal interest of respondent,"27 the Solicitor General explained during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that
such allegation is simply baseless as there were many others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of
whom was submitted by him to this Court, through a Manifestation28 filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The
mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily
tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious
and cumbersome. In fact, P.D. 72529 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to implement
the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in naturalization where
an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who
is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen
who openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his naturalization in the United States a naturalization
he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience
embrace and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to
his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were granted repatriation argues
convincingly and conclusively against the existence of favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest
on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the
Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third. Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be effective
as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist
on the date of his election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R. 104654 30 which held
that "both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can run and be elected to
Public office" Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization
was valid or not and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue
of when an aspirant for public office should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question we shall now
directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on
election day."
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must
possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the
day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, 31 and the purpose of the
citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall
govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions
only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his
citizenship on June 30, 1995the very day32 the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) beganhe was therefore
already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said
date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that
should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted.
So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local
Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of candidates. Why then should such
qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists?
Literally, such qualifications unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence should thus be
possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his
term in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giapand Li Seng Giap & Sons,33 if the
purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens,
i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by
construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his
term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument34 to the effect that the citizenship
qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter.
After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he
be a "registered voter." And, under the law35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not
have been a voter-much less a validly registered one if he was not a citizen at the time of such registration.
 The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law intended
the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter,
then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to
reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes
being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from
"citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA
OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province
x x x where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official
to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registrationnot the actual votingis the core of this
"qualification." In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is
actually registered in the area he seeks to govern and not anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasizedand Lee has not disputed that he "was and is a registered voter
of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by judicial declaration x x x In fact, he cast his vote
in his precinct on May 8, 1995."36
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel stead-fastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered
voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987,1988,1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was
questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the
previous elections including on May 8,1995.37
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not
necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election
Code38 gives any voter, presumably including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the
disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the
Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local
Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning
candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And
since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably
a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the
candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding elections
and such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETRO ACTED to the
date of the filing of his application on August 17,1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines,39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided." But there are settled exceptions40 to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in
nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating
judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not
produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical
requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo, 42 on the
other hand, says that curative statutes are "healing acts x x x curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing
obligations x x x (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils x x x By
their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive xxx (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities and
to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which
do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights,
ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective
operation of statutes.43
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling
certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who)
had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C. A. No. 63, as
amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status" and who
could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to
retain her Philippine citizenship xxx" because "such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who
had married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these womenthe right to re-
acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand,
said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their
Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship," because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725
such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent
of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General44 argues:
"By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils
(Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).

In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law, specifically C. A. No. 63 wherein married
Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship
by naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship by naturalization.

Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its provisions are considered
essentially remedial and curative."

In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that the legislative intent
was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment where
the intent that it should so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof."45 It
is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions not otherwise
covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a political and civil right
equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and
other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725
must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect
the evident purpose for -which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to
those in the future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair
some vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty."46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any
restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering that
said law was enacted on June 5,1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and
applied for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it
is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is tobe given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to
Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The
reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply to
past events i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into being in order to benefit the greatest
number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of
citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason
to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the
passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect
as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary
intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything
unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the
impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine
laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were
not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications
for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldohaving already renounced his
American citizenship was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.47
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and grant applications for repatriation
within relatively short spans of time after the same were filed. 48 The fact that such interregna were relatively insignificant
minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the government as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind
of the Court, direct prejudice to the government is possible only where a person's repatriation has the effect of wiping out a
liability of his to the government arising in connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and accruing only during the
interregnum between application and approval, a situation that is not present in the instant case.
 And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should now prevail. Under the
circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of the
date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions about his possession of the nationality
qualification whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his
certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is
considered as having been repatriatedi.e., his Filipino citizenship restored as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is
likewise deemed validated as of said date.

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively
give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective
local position?"49 We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at
the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that
he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenshiplong before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in
the interim when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship." 50

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:51

"By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of
allegiance to the Philippine Government."

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been
effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court,
absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.52
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing Disqualification?

Lee contends that the May 1,1995 Resolution53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in
toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final and executory after five (5) days or on May
17,1995, no restraining order having been issued by this Honorable Court." 54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the
elected governor on June 30, 1995, there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that
this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become
final and executory way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial pronouncements of his political status as an American
citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public office in the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the
1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such
elections is final and can no longer be changed. In the words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed
Resolution:55
"The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the
purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no record of any 'final judgment' of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a
candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30,
1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen 'having been declared by the Supreme
Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the Philippines.' This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in
connection with the 1992 elections."

Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality.
This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes
recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,56 we held:
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding
court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands."

The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction

Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
 Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No. 95-317 because the
only "possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest
or a quo warranto case." Again, Lee reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No.
95-317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 "beyond the 5-day reglementary period." Hence, according
to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest or a quo warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57 has given the Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective x x x provincial x x x officials."
Instead of dwelling at length on the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may
entertain, suffice
it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment
of proclamations of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one.58Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,59 we ruled:
"The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed,
we are aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning
candidate has been proclaimed, (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513;
Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation
at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of
nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)"

The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done within ten (10) days following
the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question
that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid

Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,60 "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will," and
in Aquino vs. COMELEC,61 Lee is "a second placer, xxx just that, a second placer."

In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this Court in the
aforesaid Labo62 case, as follows:
"The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the
electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing
away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected."

But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:

"But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was
notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo
was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city mayor as
its resolution dated May 9,1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject
to the final outcome of this case."

The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this case because Frivaldo was
in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was
not yet final on election day as there was in both cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec
issued an (omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others can still be voted for in the
May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of Sorsogon was "fully aware
in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety", in other
words, that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible.
If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor and not Leeshould be proclaimed, since in losing the election,
Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of
Labo:
"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office."
 Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably re-acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he
obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, henot Lee should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation
was patently erroneous and should now be corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the Election Code Mandatory?

In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second Division) dated May 1, 1995
and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995 disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled
because they were rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
which reads as follows:
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election" (italics supplied.)

This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded by the subsequent ones
issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19, 1995, affirmed en banc63 on February 23, 1996, which both
upheld his election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes
the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:
"SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election
to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the -winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong."
(Italics supplied)

Refutation of Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent

In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that President Aquino's memorandum
dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees
a suspension or a repeal is a purely academic distinction because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or
abrogate an existing law. The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo case; 64 viz,
"(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by xxx
repatriation" He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in
effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see such abetting
or mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects there may have been
in his registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in
1988 and 1992, which were the subjects of such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the ineligibility of a candidate,
citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of
candidacy on the ground of a false material representation therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states
his disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo
was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995
were invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen days before the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In
dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion because
"Section 6 of R. A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after the elections." In spite of his
disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory," we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide
nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295." One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition
to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present case however
deals with the period during which the Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after
the fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the
elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor
conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual circumstances of Frivaldo,
repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that such retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case.
But the first (and even the second Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship.
If we may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his qualifications in the
1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening repatriation has changed his political status not in 1988 or
1992, but only in the 1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his repatriation, saying that
"informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship." Since our courts are charged only with
the duty of the determining who are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not
Americans. It is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its own citizens not who are the
citizens of other countries.65 The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such
finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such finding is binding and
final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all three previous elections,
should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an American was publicly known." First, there is
absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public" knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post
facto only of the last two previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still deliberating on his
nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How then can there be such "public" knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the qualifications of elective local
officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must
be possessed by candidates, not merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it
differently. Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates." If the
qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to "candidates" and not elected officials, the legislature would have said
so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that the citizenship
qualification should be possessed at election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the same
way it did in pars. (b) to (f) for other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the ground, among others,
that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath of allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not question what the provision states. We hold however that the provision should
be understood thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship,
which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to have retroacted to the date of his application
therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective" in reference to Section 39 of
the Local Government Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest
non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather extensively earlier in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law." We agree
we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here. The issue is how should the law be interpreted and applied
in this case so it can be followed, so it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply laws
relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or
substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious
choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but
little understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon would constitute
unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon this Court's conscience.
EPILOGUE

In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official
at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected. We further
hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor
impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and effective.
Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and
the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political
aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of
his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given ' up his U. S. nationality. Thus, in
contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of
governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted
to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The
foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing
disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings
recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.
 This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect
to the manifest will of our people,66 for in case of doubt, political laws must be
interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal
niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections (citations omitted)." 67

The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in deference to the popular
will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the
survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must
exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound
public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully
challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic68 to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent
will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our
Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court could have refused to
grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the
time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that
he was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification "from running
for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal
technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development
of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh
anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique
situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape
the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and dedication to
this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve his people once more. The people of
Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his
certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and
sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact
and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines
even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost
on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of
ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on
returning to and serving once more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation
of the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable
people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the respondent Commission
are AFFIRMED.
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any event, it has no merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., J. dissenting opinion
Puno., J. concurring opinion
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Regalado, Romero, and Bellosillo, JJ., pro hac vice.
Melo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur in the result.
Narvasa, C.J. and Mendoza, J., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68385 May 12, 1989

ILDEFONSO O. ELEGADO, as Ancillary Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late WARREN TAYLOR
GRAHAM, petitioner
vs.
HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE respondents.

Agrava, Lucero & Gineta for petitioners.

The Office of the Solictor General for public respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

What the petitioner presents as a rather complicated problem is in reality a very simple question from the viewpoint of the
Solicitor General. We agree with the latter. There is actually only one issue to be resolved in this action. That issue is
whether or not the respondent Court of Tax Appeals erred in dismissing the petitioner's appeal on grounds of jurisdiction
and lack of a cause of action.

Appeal from what? That indeed is the question.

But first the facts.

On March 14, 1976, Warren Taylor Graham, an American national formerly resident in the Philippines, died in Oregon,
U.S.A. 1 As he left certain shares of stock in the Philippines, his son, Ward Graham, filed an estate tax return on
September 16, 1976, with the Philippine Revenue Representative in San Francisco, U.S.A. 2

On the basis of this return, the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed the decedent's estate an estate
tax in the amount of P96,509.35 on February 9, 1978.3 This assessment was protested on March 7, 1978, by the law firm
of Bump, Young and Walker on behalf of the estate . 4 The protest was denied by the Commissioner on July 7, 1978.5 No
further action was taken by the estate in pursuit of that protest.

Meanwhile, on January 18, 1977, the decedent's will had been admitted to probate in the Circuit Court of Oregon 6 Ward
Graham, the designated executor, then appointed Ildefonso Elegado, the herein petitioner, as his attorney-in-fact for the
allowance of the will in the Philippines.7

Pursuant to such authority, the petitioner commenced probate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 8 The
will was allowed on December 18, 1978, with the petitioner as ancillary administrator. 9 As such, he filed a second estate
tax return with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on June 4, 1980.10

On the basis of this second return, the Commissioner imposed an assessment on the estate in the amount of
P72,948.87.11 This was protested on behalf of the estate by the Agrava, Lucero and Gineta Law Office on August 13,
1980.12

While this protest was pending, the Commissioner filed in the probate proceedings a motion for the allowance of the basic
estate tax of P96,509.35 as assessed on February 9, 1978.13 He said that this liability had not yet been paid although the
assessment had long become final and executory.

The petitioner regarded this motion as an implied denial of the protest filed on August 13, 1980, against the second
assessment of P72,948.87.14 On this understanding, he filed on September 15, 1981, a petition for review with the Court
of Tax Appeals challenging the said assessment. 15
The Commissioner did not immediately answer (in fact, as the petitioner stressed, no answer was filed during a delay of
195 days) and in the end instead cancelled the protested assessment in a letter to the decedent's estate dated March 31,
1982.16 This cancellation was notified to the Court of Tax Appeals in a motion to dismiss on the ground that the protest
had become moot and academic.17

The motion was granted and the petition dismissed on April 25, 1984. 18 The petitioner then came to this Court
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The petitioner raises three basic questions, to wit, (1) whether the shares of stocks left by the decedent should be treated
as his exclusive, and not conjugal, property; (2) whether the said stocks should be assessed as of the time of the owner's
death or six months thereafter; and (3) whether the appeal filed with the respondent court should be considered moot and
academic.

We deal first with the third issue as it is decisive of this case.

In the letter to the decedent's estate dated March 31, 1982, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue wrote as follows:

Estate of WARREN T. GRAHAM c/o Mr. ILDEFENSO O. ELEGADO Ancillary Administrator Philex Building cor. Brixton &
Fairlane Sts. Pasig, Metro Manila

Sir:

This is with regard to the estate of the late WARREN TAYLOR GRAHAM, who died a resident of Oregon,
U.S.A. on March 14, 1976. It appears that two (2) letters of demand were issued by this Bureau. One is
for the amount of P96,509.35 based on the first return filed, and the other in the amount of P72,948.87,
based on the second return filed.

It appears that the first assessment of P96,509.35 was issued on February 9, 1978 on the basis of the
estate tax return filed on September 16, 1976. The said assessment was, however, protested in a letter
dated March 7, 1978 but was denied on July 7, 1978. Since no appeal was made within the regulatory
period, the same has become final.

In view thereof, it is requested that you settle the aforesaid assessment for P96,509.35 within fifteen (15)
days upon receipt hereof to the Receivable Accounts Division, this Bureau, BIR National Office Building,
Diliman, Quezon City. The assessment for P72,949.57 dated July 3, 1980, referred to above is hereby
cancelled.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) RUBEN B. ANCHETA Acting Commissioner 19

It is obvious from the express cancellation of the second assessment for P72,948.87 that the petitioner had been deprived
of a cause of action as it was precisely from this assessment that he was appealing.

In its decision, the Court of Tax Appeals said that the petition questioning the assessment of July 3, 1980, was
"premature" since the protest to the assessment had not yet been resolved. 20 As a matter of fact it had: the said
assessment had been cancelled by virtue of the above-quoted letter. The respondent court was on surer ground,
however, when it followed with the finding that the said cancellation had rendered the petition moot and academic. There
was really no more assessment to review.

The petitioner argues that the issuance of the second assessment on July 3, 1980, had the effect of canceling the first
assessment of February 9, 1978, and that the subsequent cancellation of the second assessment did not have the effect
of automatically reviving the first. Moreover, the first assessment is not binding on him because it was based on a return
filed by foreign lawyers who had no knowledge of our tax laws or access to the Court of Tax Appeals.

The petitioner is clutching at straws.

It is noted that in the letter of July 3, 1980, imposing the second assessment of P72,948.87, the Commissioner made it
clear that "the aforesaid amount is considered provisional only based on the estate tax return filed subject to investigation
by this Office for final determination of the correct estate tax due from the estate. Any amount that may be found due after
said investigation will be assessed and collected later." 21 It is illogical to suggest that a provisional assessment can
supersede an earlier assessment which had clearly become final and executory.

The second contention is no less flimsy. The petitioner cannot be serious when he argues that the first assessment was
invalid because the foreign lawyers who filed the return on which it was based were not familiar with our tax laws and
procedure. Is the petitioner suggesting that they are excused from compliance therewith because of their ignorance?

If our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim a similar preference because they are not allowed to claim a like
ignorance, it stands to reason that foreigners cannot be any less bound by our own laws in our own country. A more
obvious and shallow discrimination than that suggested by the petitioner is indeed difficult to find.

But the most compelling consideration in this case is the fact that the first assessment is already final and executory and
can no longer be questioned at this late hour. The assessment was made on February 9, 1978. It was protested on March
7, 1978. The protest was denied on July 7, 1978. As no further action was taken thereon by the decedent's estate, there is
no question that the assessment has become final and executory.

In fact, the law firm that had lodged the protest appears to have accepted its denial. In his motion with the probate court,
the respondent Commissioner stressed that "in a letter dated January 29, 1980, the Estate of Warren Taylor Graham thru
the aforesaid foreign law firm informed claimant that they have paid said tax liability thru the Agrava, Velarde, Lucero and
Puno, Philippine law firm of 313 Buendia Avenue Ext., Makati, Metro Manila that initiated the instant ancillary
proceedings" although he added that such payment had not yet been received. 22 This letter was an acknowledgment by
the estate of the validity and finality of the first assessment. Significantly, it has not been denied by the petitioner.

In view of the finality of the first assessment, the petitioner cannot now raise the question of its validity before this Court
any more than he could have done so before the Court of Tax Appeals. What the estate of the decedent should have
done earlier, following the denial of its protest on July 7, 1978, was to appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within the
reglementary period of 30 days after it received notice of said denial. It was in such appeal that the petitioner could then
have raised the first two issues he now raises without basis in the present petition.

The question of whether or not the shares of stock left by the decedent should be considered conjugal property or
belonging to him alone is immaterial in these proceedings. So too is the time at which the assessment of these shares of
stock should have been made by the BIR. These questions were not resolved by the Court of Tax Appeals because it had
no jurisdiction to act on the petitioner's appeal from an assessment that had already been cancelled. The assessment
being no longer controversial or reviewable, there was no justification for the respondent court to rule on the petition
except to dismiss it.

If indeed the Commissioner of Internal Revenue committed an error in the computation of the estate tax, as the petitioner
insists, that error can no longer be rectified because the original assessment has long become final and executory. If that
assessment was not challenged on time and in accordance with the prescribed procedure, that error — for error it was —
was committed not by the respondents but by the decedent's estate itself which the petitioner represents. So how can he
now complain.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered,

Narvasa (Chairman), Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001

D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the
Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report dated November 25,
1990, stating that:

x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where he was pronounced
dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at around 2:15 p.m. of the same date.

Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie
Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the 14th floor of the
Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board a [p]latform made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters
by 2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5
ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the
[p]latform, got loose xxx causing the whole [p]latform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the
elevator core, Tower D of the building under construction thereby crushing the victim of death, save his two (2)
companions who luckily jumped out for safety.

It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on board and
performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was
merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety lock. 1

On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages
against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior
availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, as follows:

1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.

2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.

3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juego’s earning capacity.

4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.

5. P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.2

On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:

 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.

 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR [sic]
IS APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.

 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT

UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND

 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM
RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.3

Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible. The CA ruled
otherwise. It held that said report, being an entry in official records, is an exception to the hearsay rule.
The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that
is, which are derived from his perception.4 A witness, therefore, may not testify as what he merely learned from others
either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as
proof of the truth of what he has learned.5 This is known as the hearsay rule.

Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to
written, as well as oral statements.6

The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and
untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light and
exposed by the test of cross-examiantion.7 The hearsay rule, therefore, excludes evidence that cannot be tested by cross-
examination.8

The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule,9 among which are entries in official records. Section 44, Rule 130
provides:

Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing the work of Chief Justice Moran, enumerated the requisites
for admissibility under the above rule:

(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;

(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and

(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have
been acquired by him personally or through official information.

The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner contends that the last requisite is not present.

The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also testified before the trial court. In Rodriguez
vs. Court of Appeals,11 which involved a Fire Investigation Report, the officer who signed the fire report also testified
before the trial court. This Court held that the report was inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the
statements contained in the report but admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of the officer who executed
the report.

x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was available for cross-examination, the portions
of the report which were of his personal knowledge or which consisted of his perceptions and conclusions were
not hearsay. The rest of the report, such as the summary of the statements of the parties based on their sworn
statements (which were annexed to the Report) as well as the latter, having been included in the first purpose of
the offer [as part of the testimony of Major Enriquez], may then be considered as independently relevant
statements which were gathered in the course of the investigation and may thus be admitted as such, but not
necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It has been said that:

"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant, the
hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to the making of such
statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact."

When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report and made himself available for
cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it proved that certain utterances were made (but
not their truth), was effectively removed from the ambit of the aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130. Properly
understood, this section does away with the testimony in open court of the officer who made the official record,
considers the matter as an exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in said official record admissible
in evidence as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The underlying reasons for this exceptionary rule
are necessity and trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon v. Barcelon.
 The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions in which the
officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are numberless. The public
officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in which testimony is not needed from official
sources. Were there no exception for official statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting the
greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in court or delivering deposition before an officer. The
work of administration of government and the interest of the public having business with officials would
alike suffer in consequence. For these reasons, and for many others, a certain verity is accorded such
documents, which is not extended to private documents. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1631).

The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge their several
trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge of their duty may be
given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as to the nature and
circumstances of each case may appear to require.

It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not presented to testify on his report. In that
case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 143 would have been ripe for determination, and this Court would
have agreed with the Court of Appeals that said report was inadmissible since the aforementioned third requisite
was not satisfied. The statements given by the sources of information of Major Enriquez failed to qualify as
"official information," there being no showing that, at the very least, they were under a duty to give the statements
for record.

Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained
therein but is admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of PO3 Villanueva.

In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanueva’s testimony which were of his personal knowledge suffice to
prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator crash. PO3 Villanueva had seen Juego’s remains at the
morgue,12 making the latter’s death beyond dispute. PO3 Villanueva also conducted an ocular inspection of the premises
of the building the day after the incident 13 and saw the platform for himself.14 He observed that the platform was
crushed15 and that it was totally damaged.16 PO3 Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to bring the chain block to the
police headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the chain was detached from the lifting machine, without any pin or
bolt.17

What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanueva’s testimony that the cause of the fall of the platform was
the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed that such portion of the testimony is mere opinion. Subject to
certain exceptions,18 the opinion of a witness is generally not admissible.19

Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of
the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the person having
charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of
negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence.20

The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:

While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or injury will
not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendant’s part, under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction,
that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such
as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some
other person who is charged with negligence.

x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the
control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the
ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care, there is
sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. 21

One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not available.22
 The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality
which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and
that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to
rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the
doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent,
is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.

It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge of
the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised
by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another
court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in
which the doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to show that there was no negligence on
his part, and direct proof of defendant’s negligence is beyond plaintiff’s power. Accordingly, some court add to the
three prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the
cause of the accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for
explanation of the accident.23

The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar:

There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down from the 14 th floor of a building to the basement while he
was working with appellant’s construction project, resulting to his death. The construction site is within the
exclusive control and management of appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter
leadman and others who are in complete control of the situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that
would occur therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On the other hand, the
appellee is not in a position to know what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it
applies where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or
agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3)
the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured. x x x.

No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a construction
site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is
present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely
caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is
also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee’s deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last
requisite is also present. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a
reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. x x x. 24

Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur, but argues that the
presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it "proved that it exercised due care to avoid the accident
which befell respondent’s husband."

Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, the defendant’s negligence is
presumed or inferred25 when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to explain. 26 The presumption or
inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption,
such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference. 27 It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its
defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into
play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been established.1âwphi1.nêt

In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed before the police investigator
as evidence of its due care. According to Fabro’s sworn statement, the company enacted rules and regulations for the
safety and security of its workers. Moreover, the leadman and the bodegero inspect the chain block before allowing its
use.

It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabro’s sworn statement as proof of its due care but, in arguing that private respondent
failed to prove negligence on the part of petitioner’s employees, also assails the same statement for being hearsay.
Petitioner is correct. Fabro’s sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are inadmissible as evidence under
the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. 28 The inadmissibility of this sort of
evidence is based not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but
also on the commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who
uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the one writing
them.29 Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said statement as proof of its due care any more than private respondent can use
it to prove the cause of her husband’s death. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the
inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense
relating to the incident.

Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits provided under the Labor
Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceased’s employer damages under the Civil Code.

Article 173 of the Labor Code states:

Article 173. Extent of liability. – Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title
shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone
otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment of
compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Republic Act Numbered
Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four as amended, and other laws
whose benefits are administered by the System or by other agencies of the government.

The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, provided that:

Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. – The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by
reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to
the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil
Code and other laws because of said injury x x x.

Whether Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act allowed recovery under said Act as well as under the Civil Code
used to be the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court finally settled the matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining
Corporation,30 which involved a cave-in resulting in the death of the employees of the Philex Mining Corporation. Alleging
that the mining corporation, in violation of government rules and regulations, failed to take the required precautions for the
protection of the employees, the heirs of the deceased employees filed a complaint against Philex Mining in the Court of
First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs
sought relief from this Court.

Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority of the Court En Banc,31 following the rule
in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in the affirmative.

WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of
selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and
exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail
themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.

In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an
injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen’s
Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot
pursue both courses of action simultaneously. [Underscoring supplied.]

Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed with their suit under the Civil Code
despite having availed of the benefits provided under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The Court reasoned:

With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before
the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza,
Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted notices and claims for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the
then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez
 whose heirs decided that they be paid in installments x x x. Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in
their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated may 27, 1968 x x x in the lower court, but they set up the defense
that the claims were filed under the Workmen’s Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the
committee created to investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence and violation of law by
Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a
letter dated October 19, 1967 only x x x.

WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act,
such my not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of
the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving
compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by
Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on
ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should
therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful
in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be
deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor. [Underscoring supplied.]

The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated in Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs.
Avelino,32 Vda. De Severo vs. Feliciano-Go,33 and Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Abeleda.34 In the last case, the Court again
recognized that a claimant who had been paid under the Act could still sue under the Civil Code. The Court said:

In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment
could be filed only under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other
laws. In Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in favor of the new rule that the claimants may invoke either the
Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of
one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will
preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has
already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the
basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. (Underscoring supplied.)

Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the exception because private respondent was unaware of
petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed
the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the Prosecutor’s
Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioner’s personnel. While stating that there was no negligence
attributable to the respondents in the complaint, the prosecutor nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, "if at all," the
"case is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the exception in Floresca:

x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged negligence of appellant as early as November
25, 1990, the date of the police investigator’s report. The appellee merely executed her sworn statement before
the police investigator concerning her personal circumstances, her relation to the victim, and her knowledge of the
accident. She did not file the complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against appellant’s
employees. It was the investigator who recommended the filing of said case and his supervisor referred the same
to the prosecutor’s office. This is a standard operating procedure for police investigators which appellee may not
have even known. This may explain why no complainant is mentioned in the preliminary statement of the public
prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6, 1991, to wit: "Respondent Ferdinand Fabro x x x are being
charged by complainant of "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide." It is also possible that the appellee did not
have a chance to appear before the public prosecutor as can be inferred from the following statement in said
memorandum: "Respondents who were notified pursuant to Law waived their rights to present controverting
evidence," thus there was no reason for the public prosecutor to summon the appellee. Hence, notice of
appellant’s negligence cannot be imputed on appellee before she applied for death benefits under ECC or before
she received the first payment therefrom. Her using the police investigation report to support her complaint filed
on May 9, 1991 may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy of the February 6, 1991 Memorandum of the
Prosecutor’s Office dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency of evidence, stating therein that: "The death
of the victim is not attributable to any negligence on the part of the respondents. If at all and as shown by the
records this case is civil in nature." (Underscoring supplied.) Considering the foregoing, We are more inclined to
believe appellee’s allegation that she learned about appellant’s negligence only after she applied for and received
the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will make this case fall under the exception held in
the Floresca ruling.35

The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as well:
 x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only elementary school for her educational
attainment; that she did not know what damages could be recovered from the death of her husband; and that she
did not know that she may also recover more from the Civil Code than from the ECC. x x x.36

Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent "failed to allege in her complaint that her
application and receipt of benefits from the ECC were attended by ignorance or mistake of fact. Not being an issue
submitted during the trial, the trial court had no authority to hear or adjudicate that issue."

Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the facts because as early as November
28, 1990, private respondent was the complainant in a criminal complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide"
against petitioner’s employees. On February 6, 1991, two months before the filing of the action in the lower court,
Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a resolution finding that, although there was insufficient evidence against petitioner’s
employees, the case was "civil in nature." These purportedly show that prior to her receipt of death benefits from the ECC
on January 2, 1991 and every month thereafter, private respondent also knew of the two choices of remedies available to
her and yet she chose to claim and receive the benefits from the ECC.

When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the election is final and
bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other party. The
first act of election acts as a bar.37 Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible
unfairness to both parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their choices. The
purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single wrong.38

The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Hence, the rule in Floresca that a
claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of action under
the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the other.

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39

[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert
them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against whom the waiver is
asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the party’s rights or of all material
facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it
can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under
a mistake or misapprehension of fact.

A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and has adequate
knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision.

Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its
consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the
evidence.40

That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for the exception in Floresca.

It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioner’s contentions.

Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her complaint that she had
availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner to burden private respondent with raising waiver as
an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its
Answer;41 otherwise, the defense is waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the trial court had
no jurisdiction over the issue when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial court.

Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to her husband’s death and the rights
pertaining to a choice of remedies?

It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this case, the "fact" that served as
a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioner’s employees, of which private respondent purportedly
learned only after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be civil liability. In Floresca, it was
the negligence of the mining corporation and its violation of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or violation of
government rules and regulations, for that matter, however, is not a fact, but a conclusion of law, over which only the
courts have the final say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore, that the
principle that ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been misapplied in Floresca and in the case at bar.

In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator crash when on
November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The police investigation report is dated
November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on
November 27, 1990.

There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC
was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights.

Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system
(Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of
remedies.

The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws.42 This may be
deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or
her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory
nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.

Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do not indicate the total amount private
respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it appears from Exhibit "K" 43 that she received P3,581.85 as initial
payment representing the accrued pension from November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial monthly pension, according to
the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97 and present total monthly pension was P716.40. Whether the total amount she will
eventually receive from the ECC is less than the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by the trial court is
subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court for such determination. Should the trial court find that its
award is greater than that of the ECC, payments already received by private respondent under the Labor Code shall be
deducted from the trial court'’ award of damages. Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent
double compensation.

WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed
in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by
the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all
other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

July 30, 1979

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO,
HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ.
GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H.
CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA,
TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA,
ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA,
JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F.
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
 RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May
5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be
allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's
Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered consolidated.

Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:

1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name which includes the name
of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides in the last
paragraph that: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name, or the name of a
deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of the deceased partner
liable for any debts contracted by such person or partnership. 1

2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has authorized the adoption of
firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; 2 the legislative
authorization given to those engaged in the practice of accountancy — a profession requiring the same degree of trust
and confidence in respect of clients as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client — to acquire and use a trade
name, strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of
professionals of a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm name has acquired
the characteristics of a "trade name." 3

3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a deceased partner in the
firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association declares that: têñ.£îhqwâ£

... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local custom, is
not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. ... 4

4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective deceased partners were well-
publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used by them carry new
letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will
notify all leading national and international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths. 5

5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's name; 6there is no
custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm
necessarily Identifies the individual members of the firm. 7

6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has been consistently allowed by
U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world. 8

The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953 when a law firm in Cebu (the
Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was
resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist from including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who
has long been dead."

The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled Register of Deeds of
Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus
curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why the
name of Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957,
the law firm of Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now being raised by
petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.

On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: têñ.£îhqwâ£

 After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for their
continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no reason to depart from the
policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City
to desist from including in their firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court
believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between attorney and client,
and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed
which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are
accordingly advised to drop the name "PERKINS" from their firm name.

Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.

The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.

A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes"
are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to Article 1815 of
the Civil Code which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not include the name of
one or more of the partners.

Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name, shall be subject
to the liability, of a partner.

It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those of living partners
and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil
Code prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner.
The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm
particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an agreement for
the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from
the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and
because such payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the
widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor. There
being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding liability.

Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the names of deceased
partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and
disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself
starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation
established by deceased partners.

B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is
that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with the
exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts
contracted by the person or partnership which continues the business using the partnership name or the name of the
deceased partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to formal
reorganization.

Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than of
a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its
individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot
arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers. 9têñ.£îhqwâ£

As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding partners or parties
have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the absence of a stipulation forbidding it,
(s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is a partnership asset inseparable from the good will of the
firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, têñ.£îhqwâ£

 ... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the individual skill of the members, such
as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be distributed as a firm asset on its
dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation may be, especially where there is no
provision in the partnership agreement relating to good will as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis
supplied)

C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or for business.
For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with the practice of
accountancy.10 têñ.£îhqwâ£

A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a
particular purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of
holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in
law practice is improper. 12

The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the practice of law from
those pertaining to business is that the law is a profession.

Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal Profession, (The Lawyer
from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as "a group of men pursuing a learned art as a
common calling in the spirit of public service, — no less a public service because it may incidentally be a
means of livelihood."

xxx xxx xxx

Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may attain the
highest eminence without making much money.

2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity,
and reliability.

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their
clients. 13

"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. 14 It is limited
to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The right does not only
presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly
personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust." 16

D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association" in support of their
petitions.

It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner in
the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care
should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.

It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or former
partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, Identify the more active and/or more
senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this
country would show how their firm names have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the
partnership changed. têñ.£îhqwâ£
 The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners designated by it is proper
only where sustained by local custom and not where by custom this purports to Identify the active
members. ...

There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the propriety of adding the
name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased partner who was never a
partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).

The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased partner continues to be
used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name
appearing in a firm title.

E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased partner's name in the
firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by custom.

In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted
in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if none
of the present ten partners of the firm bears either name because the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not
offend any statutory provision or legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated
therein: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no statutory provision or
legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of both the American Bar Association
and the New York State Bar Association provides in part as follows: "The continued use of the name of a
deceased or former partner, when permissible by local custom is not unethical, but care should be taken
that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use." There is no question as to local custom.
Many firms in the city use the names of deceased members with the approval of other attorneys, bar
associations and the courts. The Appellate Division of the First Department has considered the matter
and reached The conclusion that such practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The use of the firm
name herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners. 18

Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has been defined as a rule of
conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and
obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the
elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does
not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be
differentiated from social custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute.
Not so with the latter.

Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal system. 22 When the Supreme Court in
the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the names of deceased
partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if
proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death
of any partner. 23 Custom which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. 24

The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not be considered like an
ordinary "money-making trade." têñ.£îhqwâ£

... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service. A trade ... aims
primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to mankind. If, as in the era of
wide free opportunity, we think of free competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer and grocer
and farmer may seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling in order each to acquire as
much of the world's good as he may within the allowed him by law. But the member of a profession does
not regard himself as in competition with his professional brethren. He is not bartering his services as is
 the artisan nor exchanging the products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. There
should be no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The best service of the professional man is
often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does in a way
worthy of his profession even if done with no expectation of reward, This spirit of public service in which
the profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of sound administration of justice
according to law. The other two elements of a profession, namely, organization and pursuit of a learned
art have their justification in that they secure and maintain that spirit. 25

In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to legal and ethical
impediment.

ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA"
from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been
partners in their firms indicating the years during which they served as such.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur

Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices being of the contrary view,
as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the undersigned did
not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo
started with the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon Quisumbing, being
the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law.
For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and not only of petitioners, to the last
sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be
included in the listing of individuals wtes

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition of June
10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding the death of Attorney Alexander
Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder of the firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law
Office.

On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in their
petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said firm name notwithstanding the death of
two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.

They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was established in 1957 by Justice
Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary
connotation.

Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a deceased partner as part of
the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that the continued use by a law firm of the
name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local custom, is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or deception
is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).

I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the letterheads of the two firms
(as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they
served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased founders is to retain the
clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill
attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.

The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by the law firm of James Ross.
Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name
was retained in the firm name with an indication of the year when he died. No one complained that the retention of the
name of Judge Ross in the firm name was illegal or unethical.

# Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices being of the contrary view,
as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the undersigned did
not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo
started with the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon Quisumbing, being
the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law.
For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and not only of petitioners, to the last
sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be
included in the listing of individuals wtes

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition of June
10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding the death of Attorney Alexander
Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder of the firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law
Office.

On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in their
petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said firm name notwithstanding the death of
two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.

They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was established in 1957 by Justice
Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary
connotation.

Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a deceased partner as part of
the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that the continued use by a law firm of the
name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local custom, is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or deception
is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).

I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the letterheads of the two firms
(as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they
served as partners should be stated therein.

Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased founders is to retain the
clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill
attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.

The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by the law firm of James Ross.
Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name
was retained in the firm name with an indication of the year when he died. No one complained that the retention of the
name of Judge Ross in the firm name was illegal or unethical.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143687. July 31, 2001]

SPOUSES RAMON ESTANISLAO, JR. and DINA TEOTICO ESTANISLAO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HI-
YIELD REALTY, INC., HUMBERTO BASCO, and NORBERTO VASQUEZ, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision,[1] dated March 20, 2000, of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 128, Caloocan City, which dismissed petitioners complaint for annulment of private respondent Hi-Yield Realty,
Inc.s title and instead ordered petitioners to pay damages and attorneys fees to private respondents, and the appeals courts
resolution,[2] dated June 20, 2000, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In 1985, spouses Ramon Estanislao, Jr. and Dina Teotico Estanislao, petitioners herein, mortgaged to respondent Hi-Yield Realty,
Inc. a parcel of land, registered in their name under TCT No. 120717, together with the buildings and improvements thereon. The
mortgage was constituted to secure a loan of P200,000.00. For petitioners failure to comply with some of its conditions, the mortgage
was extra-judicially foreclosed and the property was sold on December 9, 1988 for P445,000.00 to Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. as the highest
bidder. The Certificate of Sale issued to the highest bidder was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City on June 9, 1992.
On June 4, 1993, petitioner Ramon Estanislao, Jr. offered to redeem the property by tendering to Atty. Humberto Basco, the notary
public who conducted the sale, a PCIB managers check in the amount of P445,000.00 (Exh. E). The amount covered the auction price
alone as petitioner Estanislao allegedly did not know the amount of interest and other charges/assessments. In his letter of June 4, 1993
enclosing the managers check, petitioner Estanislao requested that a purchasers statement of interest and other charges be furnished to
him.
However, on June 15, 1993, Atty. Basco returned the PCIB check to petitioner Estanislao on the ground that its amount did not
include the interests, charges, and penalties. In his letter (Exh. G; Exh. 24),Atty. Basco stated that no certificate of redemption could be
issued unless the amount was fully paid and settled.
Without waiting for purchasers statement of interest and other charges which he had requested, petitioner Estanislao again tendered
to private respondents on June 21, 1993 the PCIB check for P445,000.00 and another PCIB managers check (Exh. H) for P81,521.27 to
cover the interest. The checks were, however, rejected by private respondents for being inadequate.
On July 14, 1993, petitioner Estanislao found from the records of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City that their property had
been transferred in the name of private respondent Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, dated June 10,
1993 (Exh. I), was notarized by Atty. Basco and filed with the Registry of Deeds on June 14, 1993. On June 15, 1993, private respondent
Norberto Vasquez, Acting Registrar of Deeds, ordered the annotation of the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, the cancellation
of TCT No. 120717 (Exh. A), and the issuance of TCT No. 265782 (Exh. J) in the name of Hi-Yield Realty, Inc.
On August 13, 1993, petitioner spouses brought suit against private respondents in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
seeking the annulment of the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, the cancellation of TCT No. 265782, and the payment of damages
and attorneys fees.
On December 7, 1995, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 128, Caloocan City, dismissed petitioners suit and ordered them to pay
damages to private respondents. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, this Court decides in favor of defendants and ordering plaintiff-spouses Ramon
Estanislao, Jr. and Dina Teotico Estanislao the following:

1. To pay defendant Norberto Vasquez P50,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as attorneys fees;

2. To pay defendant Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. P20,000.00 as attorneys fees; and

3. To pay defendant Humberto B. Basco P20,000.00 as attorneys fees.

Cost against the plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.[3]
 Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision on March 20, 2000 affirming in toto the decision of the
trial court. On June 20, 2000, it denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners contend that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
41.1. when it made findings and conclusions in its Decision not within the issues raised before the trial court, and not supported by the
evidence on record;

41.2. when it erroneously included as part of the redemption price the other charges (taxes and assessments) although the petitioner
was not aware thereof, and no notice of taxes and assessment was filed with the Registry of Deeds;

41.3. when it had evidently and utterly disregarded the doctrines laid down by this Honorable Court in the cases of Rosario vs. Tayug
Rural Bank, Inc., 22 SCRA 1220, and Castillo vs. Nagtalon, 4 SCRA 48, as regards liberal interpretation of redemption rules, without
even discussing, even in passing, why those cases decided by this Honorable court are not applicable in the case at bar;

41.4. when it also absolutely disregarded the doctrine laid down by this Honorable Court in the case of Rosales vs. Yboa, 120 SCRA
869, that interests of 1% monthly on the redemption price shall commence to run only from the date of registration of the certificate of
sale, also without discussing, even in passing, why the said case is not applicable in the case at bar;

41.5. when it misapplied the case of Conejero, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 16 SCRA 775, apropos the necessity of consigning
the redemption price, in the case at bar;

41.6. when it ruled that the appellants failed to present any evidence whatsoever in support of the allegation of fraudulent collusion
and unholy alliance among the defendants-appellees with respect to the registration of the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership
and the issuance of the new TCT in favor of Hi-Yield Realty;

41.7. when it awarded moral damages and attorneys fees in favor of the respondents contrary to the prevailing jurisprudence; and

41.8. when it failed to grant the relief prayed for by the petitioners including damages and attorneys fees. [4]

We find the petition to be without merit.

First. Section 6 of Act No. 3135 provides:
In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in
interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the
mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and
after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-four to four
hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act.[5]

The references to 464-466 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be understood to be to 29-31 of Rule 39 of the 1964 Rules of Court,
which was the applicable law at the time material to this case. It will be noted that while Act No. 3135, 6 speaks of the right of a debtor
to redeem property sold at auction sale in extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage within the term of one year from and after the date of
the sale, which means within a period of 365 days, Rule 39, 30 of the 1964 Rules of Court spoke of the right of a judgment debtor to
redeem property sold at auction within twelve (12) months after the sale, which means within 360 days on the basis of 30 days in a
month. This is because Art. 13 of the Civil Code provides that When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be
understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights, from
sunset to sunrise. The discrepancy was corrected in Rule 39, 28 of the 1997 Rules of Court, effective July 1, 1997, which changed the
period from twelve (12) months to one (1) year.
Although the prevailing law at the time of the auction sale in this case was the 1964 Rules of Court, the question is actually merely
of academic interest in this case, because even if the period of redemption is 365 days, the tender of the full redemption price made by
petitioners on June 21, 1993 was 12 days late counted from the expiration of the redemption period on June 9, 1993.
The right of redemption should be exercised within the period prescribed by law. As explained by this Court in Basbas v. Entena:[6]
. . . . [T]he right of legal redemption must be exercised within specified time limits; and the statutory periods would be rendered
meaningless and of easy evasion unless the redemptioner is required to make an actual tender in good faith of what he believed to be
the reasonable price of the land sought to be redeemed. The existence of the right of redemption operates to depress the market value
of the land until the period expires, and to render that period indefinite by permitting the tenant to file a suit for redemption, with
either party unable to foresee when final judgment will terminate the action, would render nugatory the period of two years fixed by
the statute for making the redemption and virtually paralyze any efforts of the landowner to realize the value of his land. No buyer can
be expected to acquire it without any certainty as to the amount for which it may be redeemed, so that he can recover at least his
investment in case of redemption. In the meantime, the landowners needs and obligations cannot be met. It is doubtful if any such
result was intended by the statute, absent clear wording to that effect.

Moreover, the tender of payment must be for the full amount of the purchase price. Otherwise, to allow payment by installments
would be to allow the indefinite extension of the redemption period. [7]Consequently, the payment tendered by petitioners on June 4,
1993, while made within the period of redemption (365 days), was ineffective since the amount offered did not include the interest but
was limited to the purchase price.
Indeed, Rule 39, 30 of the 1964 Rules of Court (now Rule 39, 28 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) provided:
The judgment debtor, or redemptioner, may redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time within twelve (12) months after the
sale, on paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase, with one per centum per month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of
redemption, together with the amount of any assessment or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and
interest on such last-named amount at the same rate . . . .

Written notice of any redemption must be given to the officer who made the sale and a duplicate filed with the registrar of deeds of the
province, and if any assessments or taxes are paid by the redemptioner or if he has or acquires any lien other than that upon which the
redemption was made, notice thereof must in like manner be given to the officer and filed with the registrar of deeds; if such notice be
not filed, the property may be redeemed without paying such assessments, taxes, or liens.

In Bodiongan v. Court of Appeals,[8] it was held:

In order to effect a redemption, the judgment debtor must pay the purchaser the redemption price composed of the following: (1) the
price which the purchaser paid for the property; (2) interest of 1% per month on the purchase price; (3) the amount of any assessments
or taxes which the purchaser may have paid on the property after the purchase; and (4) interest of 1% per month on such assessments
and taxes. . . .

The appellate court erred in ruling that the interest due from the mortgage was P240,300.00, at one percent monthly interest of the
auction price of P445,000.00, computed from the date of sale on June 9, 1988 [December 9, 1988]. The interest on the auction price
should be computed not from the date of the sale, as the appeals court appears to have done, but from the registration thereof. Since the
period of redemption begins only from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale in the Registry of Deeds, the computation of
the interest on the purchase price should also be made to commence from that date. [9] Hence, the interest due on the auction price for 12
months, i.e., from June 9, 1992 to June 9, 1993, is only P53,400.00 (P445,000.00 x 1% x 12 months) and the amount of P81,521.27,
which petitioners tendered on June 21, 1993, was in excess of the accrued interest due. Nevertheless, as the tender of payment of the
interest and the purchase price of P445,000.00 was late, such tender did not effect a valid redemption.
There are additional amounts to be made in order to effect a valid redemption required by law, but, as respondent Hi-Yield Realty,
Inc. failed to comply with certain requirements, petitioners failure to paythese additional amounts may be considered excused. As
provided in Rule 39, 30 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the redemptioner must also pay the assessment or taxes paid by the purchaser.
However, the latter must give notice to the officer who conducted the sale of the assessments or taxes paid by him and file the same
with the Registry of Deeds. In fact, the Certificate of Sale, (Exh. C; Exh. 3) issued to Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. in this case clearly stated:
It is hereby required of said highest bidder that a statement of any amount of assessment or taxes, which may have been paid on
account of this purchase, and such other liens chargeable to a redemptioner, WITH PROOFS THEREOF, all in accordance with Sec.
30, Rule 39 of the New Rules of Court [now 28 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure], should be submitted to this Office,
for purposes of computing the actual amount payable by MORTGAGORS/REDEMPTIONERS, in case of redemption. [10]

If no such notice is given, the property may be redeemed without paying such assessments or taxes.
Petitioners were not furnished by respondent Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. such statement of account.[11] Neither was such statement filed
with the Registry of Deeds. Respondent Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. claimed that a statement of account (Exh. 8-C and Exh. 8-D) was furnished
the office of Atty. Basco, the notary public who had conducted the sale, as received by Elizabeth Roque, an employee
therein.[12] However, Atty. Basco denied having received the statement.[13] Petitioners were therefore justified in not paying any
assessments or taxes which respondent Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. may have paid.
Second. Petitioners accuse private respondents of fraudulent collusion and unholy alliance in the registration of the Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership and the issuance of the new TCT to Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. We find this allegation to be without basis. As
already stated, the period of redemption expired on June 9, 1993 without petitioners being able to pay the purchase price plus the interest
required by Rule 39, 30 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Hence, the consolidation of ownership in the purchaser was justified.
Moreover, the records show that Atty. Vasquez, who was at the time Acting Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City, approved the
registration of the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership filed by the purchaser Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. on June 14, 1993 upon payment
by the latter of the registration fee.[14] This was five days after the expiration of redemption period on June 9, 1993. [15] Atty. Vasquez
denied knowing any of the persons connected with Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. or Atty. Basco and that he only met them for the first time
during the pre-trial.[16] For his part, Atty. Manuel Soriano, Jr., who is the president and chairman of the board of Hi-Yield Realty, Inc.,
testified that he does not personally know Atty. Vasquez, and that he never went to the Registry of Deeds since a company employee
usually took care of the registration process.[17]
On the other hand, we find no basis for the award of moral damages to private respondents. The law presumes good faith, and any
person who seeks an award of damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or with ill
motive.[18] It is not enough that one says he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, social humiliation, wounded feelings, and the like
as a result of the actuations of the other party. [19] Proof of moral suffering must be introduced, otherwise the award for moral damages
is not proper.[20] In this case, the evidence presented by private respondents is insufficient to overcome the presumption of good faith.
Nor can the award of attorneys fees be sustained in the light of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to
litigate.[21] No penalty should be imposed on those who exercise such right in good faith, even though erroneously. [22] The fact that
private respondents incurred expenses to protect their rights does not necessarily imply that the action which they were opposing was
instituted in bad faith. The award of attorneys fees must be deleted where the award of moral and exemplary damages are eliminated.[23]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages
and attorneys fees to private respondents is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Buena, J., abroad on official business.