Criminal Procedure- Special Penal Law, Illegal Sale of Drugs

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WILTON ALACDIS y ANATIL a.k.a.

"WELTON", et al.
G.R. No. 220022 June 19, 2017, THIRD DIVISION. (TIJAM, J.)

DOCTRINE: In the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the delivery of the
illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked
money consummate the illegal transaction.

FACTS:

Wilton Alacdis, Domingo Lingbanan (Lingbanan) and Pepito Anatil

Alacdis were charged for the illegal-sale, delivery and transport of dried
marijuana leaves.

The arrest resulted from an entrapment operation carried out by PDEA-

CAR who acted upon a tip by a confidential informant. SP02 Agbayani was
introduced by the informant to the accused as the buyer of dried marijuana.
After a series of transactions, on the day of the agreed meet up, Lingbanan
arrived and informed SP02 Agbayani that the marijuana was inside the taxi.
SP02 Agbayani asked to be· shown the goods first before he gives the money.
Lingbanan opened one carton in front of SP02 Agbayani who saw several
marijuana bricks inside. Upon seeing the bricks, SP02 Agbayani gave the signal
and the back-up team rushed to the scene and arrested the accused-appellant
and the taxi driver, Danny Sison.

ISSUE:

Was the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs consummated?

RULING:

NO.

In the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the delivery of the illicit
drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money
consummate the illegal transaction. Inarguably, consideration/payment is one
of the essential elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, without which,
accused-appellant's conviction for said crime cannot stand.

In this case, the sale of the dangerous drugs cannot be said to have been
consummated because the accused-appellant did not receive consideration. He
was arrested immediately after the box containing the marijuana bricks were
opened for SP02 Agbayani.

Accused-appellant is liable for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

Special Penal Law

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WILTON ALACDIS y ANATIL a.k.a.

"WELTON", et al.
G.R. No. 220022 June 19, 2017, THIRD DIVISION. (TIJAM, J.)

DOCTRINE: To sustain a conviction for the illegal delivery of dangerous drugs,

it must be proven that: (1) the accused passed on possession of a dangerous
drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means; (2) such delivery is
not authorized by law; and (3) the accused knowingly made the delivery. Worthy
of note is that the delivery may be committed even without consideration.

FACTS:

Wilton Alacdis, Domingo Lingbanan (Lingbanan) and Pepito Anatil

Alacdis were charged for the illegal-sale, delivery and transport of dried
marijuana leaves.

The arrest resulted from an entrapment operation carried out by PDEA-

CAR who acted upon a tip by a confidential informant. SP02 Agbayani was
introduced as the buyer of dried marijuana by the informant to Lingbanan and
Alacdis. They agreed to deliver the marijuana leaves at Rizal Park at around 10-
11 o'clock in the morning. On the designated day of meet up, the five cartons of
marijuana were loaded into the taxi. Accused-appellant opened 'the carton
containing the marijuana to show the goods to SP02 Agbayani prior to the
payment. The buy-bust team found and confiscated a substantial amount of
marijuana loaded in the taxi.

ISSUE:

Must the conviction for the illegal delivery of dangerous drugs be

sustained?

RULING:

To sustain a conviction for the illegal delivery of dangerous drugs, it

must be proven that: (1) the accused passed on possession of a dangerous drug
to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means; (2) such delivery is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused knowingly made the delivery. Worthy of
note is that the delivery may be committed even without consideration.

The prosecution was able to prove the purpose of accused-appellant's

transportation of the marijuana, and his actual transportation of the dangerous
drugs, through the following circumstances: (1) a prior unlawful arrangement
between Lingbanan and Alacdis with SP02 Agbayani for the purchase of
marijuana; 2) Rizal Park was designated as the place of delivery and that the
marijuana would be delivered by the accused-appellant at around 10-11 o'clock
in the morning; 3) the five cartons of marijuana were loaded into the taxi that
was ridden by the accused-appellant to Rizal Park; 4) accused-appellant opened
'the carton containing the marijuana to show the goods to SP02 Agbayani prior
to the payment; and 5) the buy-bust team found and confiscated a substantial
amount of marijuana loaded in the taxi.
Criminal Procedure- entrapment

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WILTON ALACDIS y ANATIL a.k.a.

"WELTON", et al.
G.R. No. 220022 June 19, 2017, THIRD DIVISION. (TIJAM, J.)

DOCTRINE: A police officer's act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a
buy-bust operation, or what is known as a "decoy solicitation," is not prohibited
by law and does not render invalid the buy-bust operation.

FACTS:

Wilton Alacdis, Domingo Lingbanan (Lingbanan) and Pepito Anatil

Alacdis were charged for the illegal-sale, delivery and transport of dried
marijuana leaves.

The arrest resulted from an entrapment operation carried out by PDEA-

CAR who acted upon a tip by a confidential informant. SP02 Agbayani was
introduced as the buyer of dried marijuana by the informant to Lingbanan and
Alacdis. However, since they did not have with them the stocks at that time,
they agreed to keep in touch. Lingbanan contacted SP02 Agbayani to ask if he
was willing to come to Baguio City to pick up the marijuana. SP02 Agbayani
agreed and formed a buy-bust team as back-up.

After a series of transactions, on the day of the agreed meet up,

Lingbanan arrived and informed SP02 Agbayani that the marijuana was inside
the taxi. SP02 Agbayani asked to be shown the goods first before he gives the
money. Lingbanan opened one carton in front of SP02 Agbayani who saw
several marijuana bricks inside. Upon seeing the bricks, SP02 Agbayani gave
the signal and the back-up team rushed to the scene and arrested the accused-
appellant and the taxi driver, Danny Sison.

ISSUE:

Is the entrapment valid?

RULING:

A police officer's act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a buy-
bust operation, or what is known as a "decoy solicitation," is not prohibited by
law and does not render invalid the buy-bust operation. The sale of contraband
is a kind of offense habitually committed, and the solicitation simply furnishes
evidence of the criminal's 'course of conduct.

Here, the solicitation by SP02 Agbayani and the informant of drugs from
Lingbanan ana Alacdis, that was delivered by accused-appellant, is mere
evidence of a course of conduct.1âwphi1 The police received an intelligence
report that accused-appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They
duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with the
accused-appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced the
accused-appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.
Criminal Procedure

NESTOR GUELOS, et al. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 177000 June 19, 2017, THIRD DIVISION. (REYES, J.)

DOCTRINE: Qualifying circumstances or generic aggravating circumstances

will not be appreciated by the Court unless alleged in the Information.
FACTS:

Two separate Informations were filed with the RTC against the petitioners
for Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide. The
accusatory portions of the two Informations state:

1. That on or about the 4th day of June 1995, at about 5:00 p.m., in
Barangay Boot, Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually
helping one another, Nestor while armed with an armalite rifle, with intent to
kill and without any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said firearm the victims,
SP02 Andaya/P/C Insp. Camacho;
2. That the said victims are bona fide members of the PNP assigned at
Tanauan Police Station, and one of them was the current Chief of Police
ofTanauan, Batangas; and
3. That at the time of the incident, they were engaged in the performance
of their official duties.

The accused were convicted for the crime charged.

ISSUE:

Do the Informations allege the elements of direct assault?

RULING:

NO.

While the elements constituting the crime of Homicide were properly

alleged in the two Informations and were duly established in the trial, the said
Informations, however, failed to allege all the elements constitutive of the
applicable form of direct assault. The Informations do not allege that the
petitioners knew that the ones they were assaulting were agents of a person in
authority, in the exercise of their duty.

While it is true that the evidence presented sufficiently established the

fact that the petitioners came to know that the victims were agents of a person
in authority, the establishment of the fact that the petitioners came to know
that the victims were agents of a person in authority cannot cure the lack of
allegation in the Informations that such fact was known to the accused which
renders the same defective.
 In addition, neither can this fact be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance under paragraph 3 of Article 14 of the RPC for acts committed
with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of
his rank to justify the imposition of an increased penalty against the
petitioners. Qualifying circumstances or generic aggravating circumstances will
not be appreciated by the Court unless alleged in the Information.
Criminal Procedure

PO1 CELSO TABOBO III y EBID v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 220977 June 19, 2017, THIRD DIVISION. (REYES, J.)

DOCTRINE: An admission of fact is starkly different from, and is not

tantamount to, a confession of guilt.

FACTS:

Victor Ramon Martiny Ong (Martin) and Leopoldo Villanueva were

arrested after a manhunt operation was conducted as a result of Manuel
Escudero’s death. While being interrogated at the police station, Martin
requested to remove his handcuffs to answer the call of nature. When the same
was removed, Martin suddenly grabbed PO2 De Leon’s service firearm. A scuffle
ensued and the gun went off. PO1 Tabobo, heard the gunshot and proceeded to
the second floor; he fired his gun twice and hit Martin on the chest causing the
death of Martin.

Consequently, the petitioner was charged with the crime of Homicide.

P02 De Leon initially took the witness stand for his direct examination.
However, he was not able to complete his testimony prompting the R TC to
order his direct testimony to be stricken off the records. Accordingly, the case
was considered submitted for decision. The petitioner was convicted of the
crime charged

ISSUE:
Is an admission of fact tantamount to confession of guilt?

RULING:

NO.

While the Sworn Statement, Counter-Affidavit, and Joint Rejoinder may

be considered as the petitioner's admission as to the fact of the killing, the
same were never identified by the petitioner in court since he never took the
witness stand, and is thus, hearsay as regards to him. The fact that the
petitioner may have admitted shooting Martin in the said documents does not
necessarily establish his guilt for the crime charged. An admission of fact is
starkly different from, and is not tantamount to, a confession of guilt.

One who invokes self-defense admits responsibility for the killing.

Accordingly, the burden of proof shifts to the accused who must then prove the
justifying circumstance. Thus, the petitioner must establish with clear and
convincing evidence that the killing was justified, and that he incurred no
criminal liability therefor. However, the petitioner was deprived of such
opportunity to effectively present his evidence and to defend himself due to the
gross and palpable negligence and incompetence of his counsel. Such
deprivation amounts to a denial of the petitioner's due process.
 It is an oft-repeated ruling that the negligence and mistakes of counsel
bind the client, but this case is an exception. The Court resolved to remand the
case to the RTC for further reception of the accused's evidence.
RPC- Conspiracy

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERTO ESPERANZA JESALVA alias

"ROBERT SANTOS"
G.R. No. 227306 June 19, 2017, THIRD DIVISION. (JARDELEZA, J.)

DOCTRINE: Mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the

cooperation and the agreement to cooperate, is not enough to establish
conspiracy.
FACTS:

While Arnel Ortigosa and his cousins Renato B. Flores (Flores) and
Manny Boy Ditche were in a store, Flores noticed Roberto Jesalva standing in a
comer near it and staring at them. When Jesalva and his companions were
already in front of Ortigosa, Menieva proceeded to stab Ortigosa twice with an
icepick. As Menieva stabbed Ortigosa, Ilaw pointed a sumpak at Ortigosa while
Jesalva pointed at Ortigosa' s group and left.

Jesalva denied any participation in Ortigosa's stabbing. The RTC of held

that Jesalva conspired with Menieva and Ilaw to kill Ortigosa.

ISSUE:

Was it established that Jesalva conspired with Minieva and Ilaw?

RULING:

NO.

Flores admitted that accused-apellant did not inflict any injury on

Ortigosa. Jesalva's act of pointing to the victim and his group is not an overt act
which shows that accused-appellant acted in concert with his co-accused to
cause the death of Ortigosa. We stress that mere knowledge, acquiescence or
approval of the act, without the cooperation and the agreement to cooperate, is
not enough to establish conspiracy. Even if the accused were present and
agreed to cooperate with the main perpetrators of the crime, their mere
presence does not make them parties to it, absent any active participation in
the furtherance of the common design or purpose. Likewise, where the only act
attributable to the other accused is an apparent readiness to provide
assistance, but with no certainty as to its ripening into an overt act, there is no
conspiracy.

In this case, while accused-appellant's presence and act of pointing at

the victim and his group may mean he approved of the crime or that he was
ready to assist his co-accused, absent any other overt act on his part, there is
no conspiracy.
Special Penal Law- Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

CORAZON M. LACAP v. SANDIGANBAYAN [Fourth Division] and THE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 198162 June 21, 2017, FIRST DIVISION. (CAGUIOA, J.)

DOCTRINE: If the deliberate refusal to act or intentional inaction on an

application for mayor's permit is motivated by personal conflicts and political
considerations, it thus becomes discriminatory, and constitutes a violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

FACTS:

Corazon M. Lacap, the Municipal Mayor of Masantol, Pampanga was

indicted for violation of Section 3(f) of RA 3019 or Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for having allegedly neglected or refused, after repeated demands,
and without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time, on the
application of complainant Fermina Santos (Fermina) for a business permit.

Corazon argues that she did not refuse to act on Fermina's application
for a mayor's permit. She only deemed it wise to ask legal advice from her
lawyer because of other pending cases lodged by Fermina against her in court.
For Corazon, she made a "positive and categorical act" when she referred the
matter to her lawyer.

ISSUE:

Does the Act of Lacap constitute a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act?

RULING:

YES.

In an application for a mayor's permit or license to do business in a

municipality or city, the procedure is fairly standard and uncomplicated. In
case of failure to comply with the requirements, the application deserves to be
disapproved. If the application is compliant, then approval is the action to be
taken. An inaction or refusal to act is a course of action anathema to public
service with utmost responsibility and efficiency. If the deliberate refusal to act
or intentional inaction on an application for mayor's permit is motivated by
personal conflicts and political considerations, it thus becomes discriminatory,
and constitutes a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

While a discretionary power or authority of Corazon is involved in this

case, its exercise must be pursuant to law and ordinance. When Corazon
referred to her lawyer, Fermina's application for mayor's permit Corazon did not
act according to law or ordinance. She failed to cite any law or ordinance which
required her to do so. Rather than being a proof of "positive and categorical act"
as claimed by Corazon in her Petition, it shows that Corazon merely dribbled
the ball, and made Corazon's deliberate refusal' to act on Fermina's application
for business/mayor's permit and her motive clear and patent.