Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Bruno Latour
Every synthesis begins ‘‘anew’’ and has to be taken up from the start
as if for the first time.
—Isabelle Stengers, Penser avec Whitehead: Une libre et sauvage
création de concepts
Book Reviewed: Isabelle Stengers, Penser avec Whitehead: Une libre et sauvage création
de concepts (Paris: Gallimard, 2002). This work is cited parenthetically. Unless otherwise
noted, all translations are my own.
I thank Lindsay Waters for his valuable comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
1. Because of this long and friendly collaboration, Stengers has been associated with the
physics of complexity pioneered by Ilya Prigogine. In her own work since, Prigogine’s influ-
ence is important not because she tried to prolong some more elaborated naturalism but
because she learned from Prigogine’s experience to which extent scientists would go to
ignore something as crucial as time. Hence her admiration for science and her deep-
seated suspicion for some of its sleight of hand.
2. From Cosmopolitiques—Tome 1: La guerre des sciences (Paris: La découverte & Les
Empêcheurs de penser en rond, 1996), to Cosmopolitiques—Tome 7: Pour en finir avec
la tolérance (Paris: La Découverte-Les Empêcheurs de penser en rond, 1997).
3. Isabelle Stengers teaches philosophy in Brussels. Only a small part of her works is
available in English: Power and Invention, with a foreword by Bruno Latour (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1997); The Invention of Modern Science, trans. Daniel W.
Smith (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000); Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent
and Isabelle Stengers, A History of Chemistry, trans. Deborah Van Dam (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); and Leon Chertock and Isabelle Stengers, A
Critique of Psychoanalytic Reason: Hypnosis as a Scientific Problem from Lavoisier to
Lacan, trans. Martha Noel Evans (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992). I have
Latour / What Is Given in Experience? 225
For people who have read for years both Stengers and Whitehead,
the prospect of reading the prose of the first commenting on the prose of the
second might be somewhat daunting. And yet, one gets exactly the oppo-
site result: Stengers illuminates the most obscure passages of Whitehead
in a style that is supple, often witty, always generous. So readers should
not be put off by the surprising subtitle, which Stengers actually borrowed
from Deleuze: there is nothing ‘‘wild’’ in this book, except as that word might
be used to characterize the freedom and invention of the author. Of those
virtues the book is stuffed full.4
Following Whitehead, Stengers has been able to turn around many of
the metaphors usually borrowed from critical thinking: ‘‘To think with White-
head today means to sign on in advance to an adventure that will leave none
of the terms we normally use as they were, even though none will be under-
mined or summarily denounced as a carrier of illusion’’ (24).
Whitehead is thoroughly put to the test here, and yet I have no doubt
that, had he lived, Deleuze would have celebrated this book as a major event
in the geopolitics of philosophy: a great but neglected Anglo-American is
reimported into France through Belgium, and the event is taken as the occa-
sion to reinterpret pragmatism, Bergsonism, and empiricism. What a won-
der! What an interesting ecological ‘‘inter-capture’’!
Although the book is a close reading, in chronological order, of the
major books of Whitehead, and although it makes good use of the body
of existing scholarship, it does not simply try to explain or popularize the
history of Whitehead’s thought. As the title indicates so well, the aim is
to think with Whitehead. Because she is herself a philosopher of science
who has explored minutely many of the same fields as Whitehead—chem-
istry, physics, Darwinism, ethology, and psychology (but not mathematics
nor logic, although she takes very seriously the fact that Whitehead thinks
as a mathematician)—Stengers’s book can be seen as an effort to test out
Whitehead’s most daring concepts on new materials and in new examples.
But contrary to the rather cavalier way in which Whitehead treats his own
predecessors, Stengers is very precise and follows with great attention
attempted to present Stengers’s epistemological principle in ‘‘How to Talk about the Body?
The Normative Dimension of Science Studies,’’ in Part 3: Body Collective of ‘‘Bodies on
Trial,’’ ed. Marc Berg and Madeleine Akrich, special issue, Body and Society 10, no. 2–3
(June–September 2004): 205–29.
4. The choice of the subtitle is even more bizarre, since on page 307 Stengers reveals a
clear contrast between the positivity of Whitehead and the exaggerated tropism of Deleuze
for chaos and organicism.
226 boundary 2 / Spring 2005
Whitehead’s own hunches. Have no doubt: when we read this book, we are
thinking with Stengers and with Whitehead all along; we are not thinking
with Whitehead about what is on Stengers’s mind.
l l l l
The whole book turns around the most arduous question of White-
head, without making any attempt either to avoid the difficulties or to obfus-
cate his philosophy by bringing in new irrelevant conundrums. The basic
question is to decide whether or not empiricism can be renewed so that
‘‘what is given in experience’’ is not simplified too much. Against the tradi-
tion inaugurated by Locke and Descartes, then pushed to the limits by Kant,
until it was terminated by William James, Whitehead offers another role for
the object of study to play: ‘‘The object [for him] is neither the judge of our
production nor the product of our judgments’’ (93).5
What has been least critically considered by the philosophical tradi-
tion, and especially by the anti-metaphysical one, is the feature of Western
thought that occupied Whitehead for most of his career, what he calls ‘‘the
bifurcation of nature,’’ that is to say, the strange and fully modernist divide
between primary and secondary qualities.6 Bifurcate is a strange and awk-
ward word, strange to the tongue and ear, but what it betokens is something
even worse for our thinking. Bifurcation is what happens whenever we think
the world is divided into two sets of things: one which is composed of the
fundamental constituents of the universe—invisible to the eyes, known to
5. ‘‘It is because William James has refused to give to reflexive consciousness and to its
pretensions to invariance, the privilege to occupy the center of the scene, that James has
explicated so well [for Whitehead] what human experience requests from metaphysics
and, more precisely, to what it requests metaphysics to resist’’ (230). Far from psycholo-
gizing everything, Whitehead sees in James—and especially in his celebrated essay on
consciousness—the thinker who has ended all the pretensions of the mind. If the ‘‘actual
occasion’’ is depsychologized, it is thanks to James.
6. Here is a standard definition of the problem: ‘‘However, we must admit that the causality
theory of nature has its strong suit. The reason why the bifurcation of nature is always
creeping back into scientific philosophy is the extreme difficulty of exhibiting the perceived
redness and warmth of the fire in one system of relations with the agitated molecules of
carbon and oxygen with the radiant energy from them, and with the various functioning
of the material body. Unless we produce the all-embracing relations, we are faced with a
bifurcated nature; namely, warmth and redness on one side, and molecules, electrons and
ether on the other side. Then the two factors are explained as being respectively the cause
and the mind’s reaction to the cause’’ (Alfred North Whitehead, The Concept of Nature
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920], 32).
Latour / What Is Given in Experience? 227
science, real and yet valueless—and the other which is constituted of what
the mind has to add to the basic building blocks of the world in order to
make sense of them. Those ‘‘psychic additions,’’ as Whitehead calls them,
are parts of common sense, to be sure, but they are unfortunately of no use
to science, since they have no reality, even though they are the stuff out of
which dreams and values are made.7
If I could summarize Stengers’s version of Whitehead by a sort of
syllogism, it could be the following one: modernist philosophy of science
implies a bifurcation of nature into objects having primary and secondary
qualities. However, if nature really is bifurcated, no living organism would
be possible, since being an organism means being the sort of thing whose
primary and secondary qualities—if they did exist—are endlessly blurred.
Since we are organisms surrounded by many other organisms, nature has
not bifurcated. Corollary: if nature has never bifurcated in the way philoso-
phy has implied since the time of Locke, what sort of metaphysics should be
devised that would pay full justice to the concrete and obstinate existence of
organisms? The consequence of considering this question is radical indeed:
‘‘The question of what is an object and thus what is an abstraction must
belong, if nature is not allowed to bifurcate, to nature and not to knowledge
only’’ (95; my emphasis).
Hence the roughly three equal parts of the book (although Stengers
divides her book in two): How to overcome the bifurcation of nature? What
is an organism of a creative sort? What sort of strange God is implied for
this new philosophical business?
l l l l
7. On the political dimension of this divide, see my own footnote on Whitehead’s argument
in Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, trans. Catherine Porter
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004).
8. Gabriel Tarde, one of the (forgotten) founders of sociology, and, like Whitehead, a deci-
sive influence on Deleuze, called ‘‘societies’’ what is called here ‘‘organisms,’’ but with very
228 boundary 2 / Spring 2005
much the same argument. Witness his slogan ‘‘Exister c’est différer.’’ See his Monadolo-
gie et sociologie, réédition (Paris: Les empêcheurs de penser en rond, 1999). One of his
most original books lives again on the Web: G. Tarde, Social Laws: An Outline of Soci-
ology (1899), trans. Howard C. Warren (Kitchener, Ont.: Batoche Books, 2000), available
at http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/tarde/laws.pdf.
9. On the difference between the two, see my own attempt, ‘‘Why Has Critique Run Out
of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern,’’ in ‘‘The Future of Criticism—A
Critical Inquiry Symposium,’’ special issue, Critical Inquiry 30, no. 2 (2004): 225–48.
Latour / What Is Given in Experience? 229
Hence the two crucial results for the second empiricism: (a) Percep-
tion is not what stops access to things and directs attention to the mind, to
its activity and to its ‘‘additions.’’ Rather, perception is what marks the event
and the beginning of an attention directed toward everything else that has
been present in perception and that cannot be eliminated. (b) Perception
refers back to a point of view, a locus, but this point of view is the least rela-
tivist and the least subjective element, since it is what is seized and grasped
by the panorama being embraced. The results of these two different kinds of
perception are very different: one destroys objectivism, the other destroys
subjectivism; although the first keeps everything the sciences might add to
experience, the other keeps everything that counts in the localization and
incarnation of some experimenting organism.
To avoid the bifurcation of nature, there was only one thing that
needed to be added, an understanding of the event of the grasping itself
by science as being something that happens not only in the world but to
the world. But to be able to succeed in this undertaking, Whitehead has
literally to move heaven and earth, that is, to completely redo cosmology:
‘‘Neither nature nor mind is in command’’ (127). When commenting upon the
discovery of the nature of the atom as grasped by chemistry and physics,
Stengers explains, ‘‘These atoms are in no way an answer to the question
of deciding what pertains to ‘our’ projection and what pertains to nature.
They are an answer to the type of attention associated with the experimental
effort’’ (116).
Science has been the captive for much too long of theories of knowl-
edge. This is the most difficult and crucial point in Stengers’s interpreta-
tion of Whitehead: at one and the same time, the invention of the scientific
object, ‘‘independent of perception,’’ can be used to celebrate a new grasp
of nature that intensifies what nature is made of (this is Whitehead’s sec-
ond empiricism) or to completely disqualify the poetic and subjective world
of lived human experience (the first empiricism). Hence the example of a
butterfly detecting a flower:
10. A colleague of Stengers, another Belgium philosopher, Vinciane Despret, has devel-
oped empirically in great detail this crucial insight. See her books, Ces émotions qui nous
fabriquent: Ethnopsychologie de l’authenticité (Paris: Les empêcheurs de penser en rond,
1999); and Quand le loup habitera avec l’agneau (Paris: Les Empêcheurs, 2002).
232 boundary 2 / Spring 2005
11. For a nice but totally derivative rehashing of the same old arguments, see James
Robert Brown, Who Rules in Science? An Opinionated Guide to the Wars (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001).
Latour / What Is Given in Experience? 233
l l l l
12. See the small but marvelous book written by Stengers and a dissident biologist, Pierre
Sonigo, L’évolution, Collection Mot à Mot (Les Ulis, France: EDP Sciences, 2003).
234 boundary 2 / Spring 2005
‘‘Objects that we use as standards and signposts, which are elected and sta-
bilized as ‘what’ we perceive, do not faithfully bear witness to what is nature,
but they bear witness for nature, thanks to the judicious character of the rea-
son why they have been selected in the first place. Judicious and not justi-
fied: nature does not explain nor justify anything, but it is pragmatically impli-
cated in the consequences that verify or falsify the consequences of having
chosen this or that signpost, the adequation to this type of attention’’ (132).
The second part of Stengers’s book is a close commentary on what
Whitehead had to do in order to be faithful to this intuition that ‘‘a subject, or
rather a superject, emerges from the world,’’ instead of, as Kant believed, to
have a world emerge out of a subject.
To summarize Stengers’s interpretation of Process and Reality would
require a commentary as long as her own book is, although—and this is
the extraordinary gift of the author—the reader may feel, after having read
it, that it is the novelty of Whitehead’s argument, much more than its intrin-
sic difficulty, that has caused most of the problems we have comprehending
him. In the end, the argument seems plain enough. And yet, Stengers goes
through all the difficulties one by one: subject, superject, positive and nega-
tive prehension, and this most disturbing of all concepts, the eternal objects:
‘‘Whitehead will never change his mind on this point: the eternal object can-
not provide a weapon for any judgment, give a foundation to any argument,
grant a privilege to any power, communicate with any ‘pure’ experience’’
(240). Most of the problems we have with Whitehead are due to a disre-
spect for the simplicity of his argument and to what he famously called
‘‘misplaced concreteness.’’ We always try to translate his metaphysics into
what we imagine metaphysics has to deliver: an insurance against risk,
when it does exactly the opposite. It takes as much risk as the experience
it tries to describe: ‘‘What the reader should always be reminded of is the
Whiteheadian decision to take the following statement literally: ‘this thing is
present in my experience inasmuch as it is present elsewhere as well,’ and
to stick to this statement no matter how fanciful the consequences to which
it leads’’ (330).
It would be ridiculous for me to claim that Process and Reality, under
Stengers’s watch, reads like a novel. And yet it shares, in the end, some of
the power of fiction. If the bifurcation of nature is impossible, then it means
that every entity has to explore what, in the rest of the world, may offer it
some grasp on life in order for it to continue existing. This grasp is intensely
objective, since it mobilizes so many other entities; but it is also intensely
subjective, since it represents, like Leibniz’s monads, a very particular ver-
Latour / What Is Given in Experience? 235
sion of what the world looks like, that is, an interpretation, a bet, a risk taken,
a confidence shared, a choice.
This new distribution of the former functions of subject and object is
what Whitehead calls actual occasion. In his hands, the two arch-modernist
concepts of subject and object, instead of designating spatial domains of the
world, have become temporal markers: past (object) and present (subject).
Eternal objects are not there, as in Plato, to guard the substance against
dissolution into appearance but to guard the organism against becoming
either an isolated atom or a mere cause of something else. They are there
‘‘to deprive the continuous of its explanatory power’’ (219). Eternal objects
are there so that we keep being able to say, ‘‘Creativity is what the world
is about.’’ Try to take eternal objects out, as so many embarrassed readers
would like to, and, immediately, Whitehead’s argument becomes another
theory of emergence, another form of naturalization, or even worse, some
type of panpsychism. Stengers is right in using Deleuze’s crucial distinction
between the potential/real couple and the virtual/actual one. Eternal objects
protect us against the confusion between the two.13 It is because they play
no direct role but are present nonetheless that events can play the full role.
They don’t explain, but they allow the scene of the world to be fully deployed.
l l l l
I think it is with Whitehead’s God that Stengers’s book reveals its ulti-
mate power. Commentators have often tried either to drag Whitehead in
theology seminars—forgetting that his God is there to solve very precisely
a technical problem of philosophy, not of belief—or to get rid of this embar-
rassing appendix altogether. Stengers does not hesitate to go all the way in
the direction of Whitehead’s argument: if nature can’t be seen as bifurcated,
if actual occasions are the stuff out of which the world is made, if ‘‘negative
prehensions’’ are the only way actual occasions have to envisage the world,
to apprehend it, if eternal objects are there as guardians against the shift
back to substance and foundations, then a God-function is implied in this
philosophy.
But, of course, everything now turns around the word implied, or
implicated. Taken superficially, it shifts the concept of God into one of a king
13. If you realize a potential, nothing really happens, since ‘‘everything was already there in
potentia.’’ If you actualize virtualities, it is only retrospectively, because of the radically new
event of the actual occasion, that the real can be seen as what has emerged out of what
was possible. On this distinction, see François Zourabichvili, Le vocabulaire de Deleuze
(Paris: Ellipses, 2003).
236 boundary 2 / Spring 2005
who sits on a throne or some great plant ensconced in a sort of flower pot,
holding this position in order to close a book of metaphysics—the equivalent
in philosophy of the Queen of England in politics. Or else, taken as a belief,
God gives some philosophical luster to parts of the creed of some church,
becoming what you confide in when you have lost confidence in the world
and especially in science. Without disregarding those possibilities, White-
head means something else altogether. Implied is not only a logical func-
tion—who is less a logician than the Whitehead of the famous team ‘‘Russell
and Whitehead’’?—but a thoroughly ontological involvement into the world.
God is the feeling for positive, instead of negative, prehensions. After years
(or should I say centuries?) of associating God with negativity—think, for
instance, of Hegel—it will take some time to see his role as consisting of a
positivity, but that would be a welcome change! ‘‘Divine experience is, in that
sense, conscious but also incomplete. God does not envisage what could
be. His existence does not precede nor predict future actualizations. His
envisagement comes from the thirst for some novelty that this thirst is going
to induce but which, by definition, will go beyond it’’ (525).
In a way, it is not surprising that theology has found Whitehead so
congenial, since innovations in theology are few and far between. But Sten-
gers redresses the usual imbalance and places Whitehead’s invention of
a God implicated squarely inside the world—and unable to ‘‘explicate’’ it,
nor to ‘‘extricate’’ himself out of it—as the most daring but also the most
indispensable consequence of his early refusal to let nature bifurcate. No
more than you can choose in nature to eliminate either primary or second-
ary qualities can you choose, in Whitehead, between his epistemology and
his theology. And, of course, it would be impossible to say that the modern-
ist philosophy has ‘‘no need for God,’’ as philosophers are so proud of say-
ing and say frequently. Their crossed-out God—to use my term—is always
there but only to fill gaps in their reasoning. By taking Whitehead’s God as
seriously as Whitehead’s epistemology, Stengers is leading us in the first
systematic attempt at finding a metaphysical alternative to modernism. The
reason why her attempts are so beautifully moving is that Whitehead has a
gift of the most extraordinary rarity: he is not a creature of the culture of cri-
tique. ‘‘He knows no critique,’’ as one could say of a saint ‘‘she knows no sin.’’
l l l l
wishes to frighten his human victims out of their wits. Stengers’s book is a
frightening one, no question about that: five hundred pages of purely specu-
lative metaphysics. But Grendel, as we learn when we read the story, is not
there to eat all of us up. On the contrary, he is there to remind us of our lost
wisdom. How can it be that America, nay, the Harvard Philosophy Depart-
ment, provided a shelter to the most important philosopher of the twentieth
century and then has utterly forgotten him? Why has it taken us so long to
understand Grendel’s moaning? Probably because it does not offer the easy
grasp of the usual domesticated philosophical animals presented in zoos
behind bars, always there to be inspected and endlessly monitored. Maybe
this is what Deleuze meant by ‘‘a free and wild invention of concepts.’’ ‘‘Wild’’
does not mean ‘‘savage,’’ but out in the open, as when we go searching for
some elusive wildlife.
I have always felt that Whitehead-watching had a lot to do with whale-
watching as it is practiced, for instance, on the coast of San Diego in the
winter. You stay on a boat for hours, see nothing, and suddenly, ‘‘There she
blows, she blows!’’ and swiftly the whale disappears again. But with Sten-
gers at the helm, the little ship is able to predict with great accuracy where
the whale will emerge again, in a few hours. Come on board, prepare your
binoculars, and be confident in the captain’s watch.